Upload dataset files
Browse files- README.md +356 -0
- data/combined_dataset.json +0 -0
- data/qa_dataset.json +571 -0
- data/qa_dataset.parquet +3 -0
- data/ransomware_groups.json +1538 -0
- data/ransomware_groups.parquet +3 -0
- data/response_playbooks.json +902 -0
- data/response_playbooks.parquet +3 -0
- data/statistics.json +53 -0
README.md
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| 1 |
+
---
|
| 2 |
+
language:
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| 3 |
+
- fr
|
| 4 |
+
license: cc-by-4.0
|
| 5 |
+
pretty_name: "Ransomware Playbooks FR"
|
| 6 |
+
size_categories:
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| 7 |
+
- n<1K
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| 8 |
+
tags:
|
| 9 |
+
- ransomware
|
| 10 |
+
- incident-response
|
| 11 |
+
- threat-intelligence
|
| 12 |
+
- malware
|
| 13 |
+
- cybersecurity
|
| 14 |
+
- dfir
|
| 15 |
+
- ayinedjimi-consultants
|
| 16 |
+
dataset_info:
|
| 17 |
+
config_name: default
|
| 18 |
+
features:
|
| 19 |
+
- name: id
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| 20 |
+
dtype: string
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| 21 |
+
- name: name
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| 22 |
+
dtype: string
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| 23 |
+
- name: description_fr
|
| 24 |
+
dtype: string
|
| 25 |
+
- name: description_en
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| 26 |
+
dtype: string
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| 27 |
+
source_url: "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr"
|
| 28 |
+
---
|
| 29 |
+
|
| 30 |
+
# Ransomware Playbooks - Dataset Français
|
| 31 |
+
|
| 32 |
+
Un dataset complet et bilingue (FR/EN) contenant des informations détaillées et opérationnelles sur les groupes de ransomware, les playbooks de réponse aux incidents, et des Q&A structurées sur la cybersécurité et la réponse aux attaques ransomware.
|
| 33 |
+
|
| 34 |
+
## Vue d'ensemble
|
| 35 |
+
|
| 36 |
+
Ce dataset fournit une ressource complète pour les équipes de sécurité, les CISOs, et les professionnels du DFIR (Digital Forensics and Incident Response) pour comprendre, détecter et répondre aux attaques ransomware modernes.
|
| 37 |
+
|
| 38 |
+
### Contenu Principal
|
| 39 |
+
|
| 40 |
+
#### 1. 40+ Groupes de Ransomware (data_ransomware_groups.py)
|
| 41 |
+
|
| 42 |
+
Profils détaillés de familles ransomware actives et históricos:
|
| 43 |
+
|
| 44 |
+
- **LockBit 3.0** - Groupe dominant le paysage ransomware avec infrastructure RaaS sophistiquée
|
| 45 |
+
- **BlackCat/ALPHV** - Ransomware écrit en Rust avec techniques évolutives
|
| 46 |
+
- **Cl0p** - Exploiteur de vulnérabilités zero-day supply-chain
|
| 47 |
+
- **Royal** - Approche ciblée PMEs avec infrastructure distribuée
|
| 48 |
+
- **Play** - Attaques rapides sans fenêtre de communication
|
| 49 |
+
- **Akira** - Nouveau groupe tirant parti de vulnérabilités VPN
|
| 50 |
+
- **BlackBasta** - Groupe professionnel offrant services RaaS haut de gamme
|
| 51 |
+
- **Rhysida** - Groupe émergeant ciblant secteur public
|
| 52 |
+
- **Medusa** - Techniques évasives contre EDR modernes
|
| 53 |
+
- **Vice Society** - Spécialisation secteurs santé/éducation sans chiffrement systématique
|
| 54 |
+
- **Hive** - Plateforme RaaS sophistiquée (dismantled)
|
| 55 |
+
- **Conti** - Dominateur historique du paysage (dissolved)
|
| 56 |
+
- ... et 26 autres groupes
|
| 57 |
+
|
| 58 |
+
**Champs par groupe:**
|
| 59 |
+
- `id`: identifiant unique
|
| 60 |
+
- `name`: nom du groupe/famille
|
| 61 |
+
- `aliases`: liste d'alias utilisés
|
| 62 |
+
- `first_seen`: année première observation
|
| 63 |
+
- `status`: Active, Disbanded, Rebranded
|
| 64 |
+
- `description_fr` / `description_en`: descriptions bilingues
|
| 65 |
+
- `ttps_fr` / `ttps_en`: tactiques, techniques, procédures détaillées
|
| 66 |
+
- `initial_access_vector`: Phishing, RDP, VPN_Exploit, Supply_Chain, Drive_By
|
| 67 |
+
- `encryption_type`: AES-256, RSA-2048, ChaCha20, Hybrid
|
| 68 |
+
- `double_extortion` / `triple_extortion`: booléens
|
| 69 |
+
- `targeted_sectors`: Healthcare, Finance, Government, Manufacturing, Education
|
| 70 |
+
- `mitre_techniques`: liste IDs MITRE ATT&CK (T1566, T1190, T1021, etc.)
|
| 71 |
+
- `iocs`: indicateurs de compromission (domaines, extensions, ransom notes)
|
| 72 |
+
|
| 73 |
+
#### 2. 20 Playbooks de Réponse aux Incidents (data_playbooks.py)
|
| 74 |
+
|
| 75 |
+
Procédures opérationnelles étape-par-étape pour 6 phases réponse incident:
|
| 76 |
+
|
| 77 |
+
**Playbooks par phase:**
|
| 78 |
+
|
| 79 |
+
**Préparation (Preparation):**
|
| 80 |
+
1. EDR & Security Hardening - Durcissement infrastructure détection
|
| 81 |
+
2. Incident Response Plan Development - Plan de réponse documenté
|
| 82 |
+
3. Backup & Recovery Strategy - Stratégie sauvegarde 3-2-1 isolée
|
| 83 |
+
|
| 84 |
+
**Détection (Detection):**
|
| 85 |
+
4. Anomaly Detection & Alerting - Détection ML et corrélation événements
|
| 86 |
+
5. File Integrity Monitoring - Monitoring intégrité fichiers critiques
|
| 87 |
+
|
| 88 |
+
**Contention (Containment):**
|
| 89 |
+
6. Network Segmentation & Isolation - Isolation systèmes infectés via VLAN
|
| 90 |
+
7. Credential Management & Reset - Réinitialisation credentials compromises
|
| 91 |
+
8. Malicious Process Termination - Arrêt processus malveillants
|
| 92 |
+
|
| 93 |
+
**Éradication (Eradication):**
|
| 94 |
+
9. Complete Malware Eradication - Suppression complète malware
|
| 95 |
+
10. Vulnerability Patching & Hardening - Correction vulnérabilités exploitées
|
| 96 |
+
11. Network Infrastructure Cleanup - Nettoyage infrastructure réseau (C2, DNS)
|
| 97 |
+
|
| 98 |
+
**Récupération (Recovery):**
|
| 99 |
+
12. System Restoration from Backups - Restauration depuis sauvegardes
|
| 100 |
+
13. Application & Data Validation - Validation applications/données restaurées
|
| 101 |
+
14. Business Continuity Restoration - Restauration continuité métier
|
| 102 |
+
|
| 103 |
+
**Leçons Apprises (LessonsLearned):**
|
| 104 |
+
15. Post-Incident Forensic Analysis - Analyse forensique complète post-incident
|
| 105 |
+
16. Threat Intelligence & Attribution - Attribution groupe et partage intelligence
|
| 106 |
+
17. Incident Review & Process Improvement - Revue post-mortem et amélioration
|
| 107 |
+
18. Security Culture & Training Enhancement - Amélioration sensibilisation personnel
|
| 108 |
+
|
| 109 |
+
**Champs par playbook:**
|
| 110 |
+
- `id`: identifiant unique
|
| 111 |
+
- `name`: nom playbook
|
| 112 |
+
- `phase`: Preparation, Detection, Containment, Eradication, Recovery, LessonsLearned
|
| 113 |
+
- `description_fr` / `description_en`: descriptions bilingues
|
| 114 |
+
- `steps`: liste actions (step_num, action_fr, action_en, responsible, priority)
|
| 115 |
+
- `tools_required`: outils nécessaires
|
| 116 |
+
- `decision_tree_fr` / `decision_tree_en`: arbre décisionnel si/alors
|
| 117 |
+
|
| 118 |
+
#### 3. 50 Q&A Français (data_qa_fr.py)
|
| 119 |
+
|
| 120 |
+
Questions-réponses structurées couvrant:
|
| 121 |
+
- Anatomie attaques ransomware
|
| 122 |
+
- Vecteurs accès initial
|
| 123 |
+
- Techniques chiffrement
|
| 124 |
+
- Détection et alerting
|
| 125 |
+
- Investigation forensique
|
| 126 |
+
- Outils DFIR
|
| 127 |
+
- Anti-forensique
|
| 128 |
+
- EDR/XDR solutions
|
| 129 |
+
- Stratégies défense
|
| 130 |
+
- Planification réponse incident
|
| 131 |
+
- Conformité et assurance
|
| 132 |
+
- Sensibilisation personnel
|
| 133 |
+
|
| 134 |
+
**Champs par Q&A:**
|
| 135 |
+
- `id`: identifiant unique
|
| 136 |
+
- `question`: question en français
|
| 137 |
+
- `answer`: réponse détaillée en français
|
| 138 |
+
- `source_url`: lien vers article source complet
|
| 139 |
+
- `keywords`: mots-clés pour indexation
|
| 140 |
+
|
| 141 |
+
#### 4. 50 Q&A Anglais (data_qa_en.py)
|
| 142 |
+
|
| 143 |
+
Même structure que version française avec contenu en anglais
|
| 144 |
+
|
| 145 |
+
## Ressources Complètes
|
| 146 |
+
|
| 147 |
+
### Livre Blanc Principal
|
| 148 |
+
|
| 149 |
+
**[Anatomie Complète d'une Attaque Ransomware](https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html)**
|
| 150 |
+
|
| 151 |
+
Document complet couvrant:
|
| 152 |
+
- Evolution historique ransomware depuis WannaCry (2017)
|
| 153 |
+
- Anatomie détaillée chaîne d'attaque ransomware
|
| 154 |
+
- Profils 40+ groupes actifs 2025
|
| 155 |
+
- Techniques TTPs répertoriées
|
| 156 |
+
- Stratégies détection modernes
|
| 157 |
+
- Plans réponse incident complets
|
| 158 |
+
- Cas d'étude réels d'attaques
|
| 159 |
+
|
| 160 |
+
### Articles Spécialisés
|
| 161 |
+
|
| 162 |
+
1. **[Forensics: Évasion Anti-Forensique](https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/evasion-antiforensic.html)**
|
| 163 |
+
- Suppression logs et artifacts
|
| 164 |
+
- Malwares fileless
|
| 165 |
+
- Living-off-the-land binaries
|
| 166 |
+
- Contournements EDR
|
| 167 |
+
|
| 168 |
+
2. **[Forensics: Memory Forensics](https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/memory-forensics.html)**
|
| 169 |
+
- Analyse mémoire RAM avec Volatility
|
| 170 |
+
- Détection malwares en mémoire
|
| 171 |
+
- Extraction infos runtime (tokens, clés)
|
| 172 |
+
- Profils et commandes essentielles
|
| 173 |
+
|
| 174 |
+
3. **[Rapport: Top 10 Solutions EDR/XDR 2025](https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/top-10-solutions-edr-xdr-2025.html)**
|
| 175 |
+
- Comparaison CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender, SentinelOne
|
| 176 |
+
- Fonctionnalités détection ransomware
|
| 177 |
+
- ROI et coûts implémentation
|
| 178 |
+
- Matrice sélection par taille organisation
|
| 179 |
+
|
| 180 |
+
4. **[DFIR: Outils Comparison](https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/dfir-tools-comparison.html)**
|
| 181 |
+
- Volatility, Autopsy, EnCase, FTK
|
| 182 |
+
- Wireshark pour analyse réseau
|
| 183 |
+
- YARA pour pattern matching
|
| 184 |
+
- Splunk pour centralisation logs
|
| 185 |
+
|
| 186 |
+
### Profil Auteur
|
| 187 |
+
|
| 188 |
+
**[AYI-NEDJIMI Consultants](https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/bio.html)**
|
| 189 |
+
|
| 190 |
+
Expert cybersécurité, DFIR, threat intelligence avec expérience réponse incidents ransomware Fortune 500.
|
| 191 |
+
|
| 192 |
+
## Utilisation
|
| 193 |
+
|
| 194 |
+
### Installation
|
| 195 |
+
|
| 196 |
+
```bash
|
| 197 |
+
# Cloner repository
|
| 198 |
+
git clone https://github.com/AYI-NEDJIMI/ransomware-playbooks.git
|
| 199 |
+
cd ransomware-playbooks
|
| 200 |
+
|
| 201 |
+
# Installer dépendances
|
| 202 |
+
pip install pandas pyarrow huggingface_hub
|
| 203 |
+
```
|
| 204 |
+
|
| 205 |
+
### Génération Dataset
|
| 206 |
+
|
| 207 |
+
```bash
|
| 208 |
+
# Générer dataset français
|
| 209 |
+
python generate_dataset.py fr
|
| 210 |
+
|
| 211 |
+
# Générer dataset anglais
|
| 212 |
+
python generate_dataset.py en
|
| 213 |
+
|
| 214 |
+
# Fichiers générés dans output_fr/ et output_en/:
|
| 215 |
+
# - ransomware_groups.json/.parquet
|
| 216 |
+
# - response_playbooks.json/.parquet
|
| 217 |
+
# - qa_dataset.json/.parquet
|
| 218 |
+
# - combined_dataset.json
|
| 219 |
+
# - statistics.json
|
| 220 |
+
```
|
| 221 |
+
|
| 222 |
+
### Upload HuggingFace
|
| 223 |
+
|
| 224 |
+
```bash
|
| 225 |
+
# Vérifier token HF
|
| 226 |
+
export HF_TOKEN="votre_token_hf"
|
| 227 |
+
|
| 228 |
+
# Dry-run (voir fichiers à uploader)
|
| 229 |
+
python upload_to_hf.py fr --dry-run
|
| 230 |
+
|
| 231 |
+
# Upload réel français
|
| 232 |
+
python upload_to_hf.py fr
|
| 233 |
+
|
| 234 |
+
# Upload réel anglais
|
| 235 |
+
python upload_to_hf.py en
|
| 236 |
+
```
|
| 237 |
+
|
| 238 |
+
### Accès via HuggingFace Hub
|
| 239 |
+
|
| 240 |
+
```python
|
| 241 |
+
from datasets import load_dataset
|
| 242 |
+
|
| 243 |
+
# Charger dataset français
|
| 244 |
+
dataset_fr = load_dataset('AYI-NEDJIMI/ransomware-playbooks-fr')
|
| 245 |
+
|
| 246 |
+
# Charger dataset anglais
|
| 247 |
+
dataset_en = load_dataset('AYI-NEDJIMI/ransomware-playbooks-en')
|
| 248 |
+
|
| 249 |
+
# Accéder aux données
|
| 250 |
+
groups = dataset_fr['ransomware_groups']
|
| 251 |
+
playbooks = dataset_fr['playbooks']
|
| 252 |
+
qa = dataset_fr['qa']
|
| 253 |
+
|
| 254 |
+
# Filtrer par group actif
|
| 255 |
+
active_groups = [g for g in groups if g['status'] == 'Active']
|
| 256 |
+
|
| 257 |
+
# Trouver playbooks par phase
|
| 258 |
+
containment_playbooks = [p for p in playbooks if p['phase'] == 'Containment']
|
| 259 |
+
```
|
| 260 |
+
|
| 261 |
+
### Format Données
|
| 262 |
+
|
| 263 |
+
**JSON:**
|
| 264 |
+
```json
|
| 265 |
+
{
|
| 266 |
+
"id": "lockbit3",
|
| 267 |
+
"name": "LockBit 3.0",
|
| 268 |
+
"aliases": ["LockBit", "LockBit Black"],
|
| 269 |
+
"first_seen": 2019,
|
| 270 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 271 |
+
"description_fr": "...",
|
| 272 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 273 |
+
"double_extortion": true
|
| 274 |
+
}
|
| 275 |
+
```
|
| 276 |
+
|
| 277 |
+
**Parquet:**
|
| 278 |
+
- Format columnar optimisé pour requêtes analytiques
|
| 279 |
+
- Compression et performance améliorées
|
| 280 |
+
- Compatible Pandas, Polars, DuckDB
|
| 281 |
+
|
| 282 |
+
## Statistiques
|
| 283 |
+
|
| 284 |
+
### Groupes Ransomware
|
| 285 |
+
- **Total:** 40+ familles
|
| 286 |
+
- **Actifs:** 30+ groupes opérant en 2025
|
| 287 |
+
- **Dismantlés:** 8 groupes (Hive, Conti, DarkSide, REvil, etc.)
|
| 288 |
+
- **Rebranded:** 3 groupes (Babuk → Tortilla, ALPHV → BlackCat)
|
| 289 |
+
|
| 290 |
+
### Encryption
|
| 291 |
+
- **AES-256:** 85% des groupes (rapide, standard)
|
| 292 |
+
- **Hybrid (AES+RSA):** 12% des groupes (sécurité augmentée)
|
| 293 |
+
- **ChaCha20:** 3% des groupes (optimisation)
|
| 294 |
+
|
| 295 |
+
### Secteurs Ciblés
|
| 296 |
+
1. **Finance:** 25% des attaques
|
| 297 |
+
2. **Healthcare:** 30% (plus haut volume/impact)
|
| 298 |
+
3. **Government:** 20% (infrastructure critique)
|
| 299 |
+
4. **Manufacturing:** 18% (interruption production)
|
| 300 |
+
5. **Education:** 7% (données étudiants)
|
| 301 |
+
|
| 302 |
+
### Vecteurs Accès Initial
|
| 303 |
+
1. **Phishing:** 40% (email malveillants)
|
| 304 |
+
2. **RDP Exposé:** 25% (brute force)
|
| 305 |
+
3. **VPN/Appliance Exploit:** 20% (vulnérabilités)
|
| 306 |
+
4. **Supply-Chain:** 10% (trusted partners)
|
| 307 |
+
5. **Drive-By Downloads:** 5% (malvertising)
|
| 308 |
+
|
| 309 |
+
## Tags et Collection
|
| 310 |
+
|
| 311 |
+
**Tags:**
|
| 312 |
+
- ransomware
|
| 313 |
+
- incident-response
|
| 314 |
+
- threat-intelligence
|
| 315 |
+
- malware
|
| 316 |
+
- cybersecurity
|
| 317 |
+
- dfir
|
| 318 |
+
- ayinedjimi-consultants
|
| 319 |
+
|
| 320 |
+
**Collection:** [Ransomware Security](https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr) - Collection complète ressources ransomware
|
| 321 |
+
|
| 322 |
+
## License
|
| 323 |
+
|
| 324 |
+
**CC-BY-4.0 (Creative Commons Attribution 4.0)**
|
| 325 |
+
|
| 326 |
+
Libre d'utilisation avec attribution AYI-NEDJIMI Consultants
|
| 327 |
+
|
| 328 |
+
## Changelog
|
| 329 |
+
|
| 330 |
+
### v1.0 (2025-02-13)
|
| 331 |
+
- 40+ profils ransomware groupes
|
| 332 |
+
- 20 playbooks réponse incident
|
| 333 |
+
- 50 Q&A français, 50 Q&A anglais
|
| 334 |
+
- Support JSON/Parquet
|
| 335 |
+
- Integration HuggingFace Hub
|
| 336 |
+
|
| 337 |
+
## Contact & Support
|
| 338 |
+
|
| 339 |
+
- **Site:** https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr
|
| 340 |
+
- **Bio:** https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/bio.html
|
| 341 |
+
- **Email:** contact@ayinedjimi-consultants.fr
|
| 342 |
+
|
| 343 |
+
## Contributions & Feedback
|
| 344 |
+
|
| 345 |
+
Contributions bienvenues! Veuillez:
|
| 346 |
+
1. Fork repository
|
| 347 |
+
2. Créer branch feature
|
| 348 |
+
3. Ajouter/modifier données
|
| 349 |
+
4. Valider syntaxe JSON
|
| 350 |
+
5. Pull request avec description
|
| 351 |
+
|
| 352 |
+
---
|
| 353 |
+
|
| 354 |
+
**Dernier mise à jour:** 2025-02-13
|
| 355 |
+
**Version:** 1.0
|
| 356 |
+
**Maintenance:** AYI-NEDJIMI Consultants
|
data/combined_dataset.json
ADDED
|
The diff for this file is too large to render.
See raw diff
|
|
|
data/qa_dataset.json
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,571 @@
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| 1 |
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[
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| 2 |
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{
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| 3 |
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"id": "qa_fr_001",
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| 4 |
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"question": "Qu'est-ce qu'une attaque ransomware et comment fonctionne-t-elle?",
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| 5 |
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"answer": "Une attaque ransomware est une cyberattaque durant laquelle les attaquants chiffrent les données d'une victime et demandent un paiement (rançon) pour fournir la clé de déchiffrement. Le processus typique inclut: reconnaissance, accès initial, privilèges élevés, mouvement latéral, exfiltration de données, et chiffrement.",
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| 6 |
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"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
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| 7 |
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"keywords": [
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| 8 |
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"ransomware",
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| 9 |
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"chiffrement",
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| 10 |
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"extorsion"
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| 11 |
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]
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| 12 |
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},
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| 13 |
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{
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| 14 |
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"id": "qa_fr_002",
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| 15 |
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"question": "Quels sont les principaux vecteurs d'accès initial pour les ransomwares?",
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| 16 |
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"answer": "Les vecteurs d'accès initial incluent: phishing et compromission d'email (40%), RDP exposé non sécurisé (25%), exploitation de vulnérabilités de VPN/appliances (20%), supply chain/trusted partners (10%), et drive-by downloads (5%). RDP et VPN non patchés sont les plus courants.",
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| 17 |
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"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
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| 18 |
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"keywords": [
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| 19 |
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"vecteur",
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| 20 |
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"accès initial",
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| 21 |
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"phishing",
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| 22 |
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"RDP"
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| 23 |
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]
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| 24 |
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},
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| 25 |
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{
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| 26 |
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"id": "qa_fr_003",
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| 27 |
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"question": "Qu'est-ce que la double et triple extorsion?",
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| 28 |
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"answer": "Double extorsion: les attaquants chiffrent les données ET menacent de publier les données volées. Triple extorsion: ajoute menaces d'attaques DDoS contre clients/partenaires. Cela augmente la pression pour paiement en créant risques multiples.",
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| 29 |
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"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
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| 30 |
+
"keywords": [
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| 31 |
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"extorsion",
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| 32 |
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"double extorsion",
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| 33 |
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"triple extorsion"
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| 34 |
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]
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| 35 |
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},
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| 36 |
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{
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| 37 |
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"id": "qa_fr_004",
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| 38 |
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"question": "Comment identifier une attaque ransomware en cours?",
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| 39 |
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"answer": "Signes d'une attaque en cours: modifications massives de fichiers, création de ransom notes, extensions de fichiers inhabituelles, processus CPU/disque anormaux, communications réseau vers IPs suspectes, alertes EDR, augmentation soudaine des avertissements antivirus.",
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| 40 |
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"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
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| 41 |
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"keywords": [
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| 42 |
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"détection",
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| 43 |
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"indicateurs",
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| 44 |
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"IOC"
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| 45 |
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]
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| 46 |
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},
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| 47 |
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{
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| 48 |
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"id": "qa_fr_005",
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| 49 |
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"question": "Quel est le meilleur type de chiffrement utilisé par ransomware?",
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| 50 |
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"answer": "La plupart des ransomwares modernes utilisent AES-256 (chiffrement symétrique rapide) combiné avec RSA-2048 ou courbes elliptiques (chiffrement asymétrique pour clé). Certains comme BlackCat utilisent du Rust et ChaCha20 pour optimisation.",
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| 51 |
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"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
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| 52 |
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"keywords": [
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| 53 |
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"chiffrement",
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| 54 |
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"AES-256",
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| 55 |
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"RSA",
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| 56 |
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"asymétrique"
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| 57 |
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]
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| 58 |
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},
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| 59 |
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{
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| 60 |
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"id": "qa_fr_006",
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| 61 |
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"question": "Que faire si mon organisation est victime de ransomware?",
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| 62 |
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"answer": "Actions immédiates: isoler systèmes infectés, déconnecter du réseau, NE PAS PAYER, alerter les autorités, contacter incident response team, préserver evidence, évaluer impact. Actions post-incident: investigation forensique, patching vulnérabilités, amélioration EDR, sensibilisation personnel.",
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| 63 |
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"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
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| 64 |
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"keywords": [
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| 65 |
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"réponse incident",
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| 66 |
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"isolation",
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| 67 |
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"autorités"
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| 68 |
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]
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| 69 |
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},
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| 70 |
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{
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| 71 |
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"id": "qa_fr_007",
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| 72 |
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"question": "Pourquoi ne pas payer la rançon?",
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| 73 |
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"answer": "Raisons de ne pas payer: 1) financer criminalité, 2) clé peut ne pas être fournie, 3) données peuvent être revendues/publiées quand même, 4) relance vers même groupe, 5) illégal sous sanctions contre certains pays, 6) pas de garantie données restaurées complètement.",
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| 74 |
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"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 75 |
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"keywords": [
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| 76 |
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"paiement",
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| 77 |
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"rançon",
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| 78 |
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"sanctions"
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| 79 |
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]
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| 80 |
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},
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| 81 |
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{
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| 82 |
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"id": "qa_fr_008",
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| 83 |
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"question": "Comment protéger ses données contre ransomware?",
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| 84 |
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"answer": "Protection multicouche: sauvegardes 3-2-1 (3 copies, 2 médias, 1 isolée), air-gap ou immutable backups, EDR/XDR robuste, MFA obligatoire, patches automatisés, monitoring réseau, segmentation réseau, training personnel, password managers.",
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| 85 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
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| 86 |
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"keywords": [
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| 87 |
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"protection",
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| 88 |
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"backup",
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| 89 |
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"EDR",
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| 90 |
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"MFA"
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| 91 |
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]
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| 92 |
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},
|
| 93 |
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{
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| 94 |
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"id": "qa_fr_009",
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| 95 |
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"question": "Qu'est-ce qu'une stratégie 3-2-1 pour les sauvegardes?",
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| 96 |
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"answer": "Stratégie 3-2-1: avoir 3 copies de données, sur 2 médias différents (ex: SSD + bande), avec 1 copie stockée hors-site. Pour ransomware, ajouter une 4e exigence: une copie doit être isolée en air-gap ou avec contrôle d'accès lecture seule.",
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| 97 |
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"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 98 |
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"keywords": [
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| 99 |
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"backup",
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| 100 |
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"3-2-1",
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| 101 |
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"stratégie"
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| 102 |
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]
|
| 103 |
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},
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| 104 |
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{
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| 105 |
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"id": "qa_fr_010",
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| 106 |
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"question": "Quelles sont les techniques MITRE ATT&CK utilisées par ransomwares?",
|
| 107 |
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"answer": "Techniques communes: T1566 (Phishing), T1190 (Exploitation), T1021 (Lateral Movement), T1087 (Account Enumeration), T1056 (Input Capture), T1005 (Data Staging), T1041 (Exfiltration), T1486 (Encryption).",
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| 108 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 109 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 110 |
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"MITRE ATT&CK",
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| 111 |
+
"techniques",
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| 112 |
+
"TTP"
|
| 113 |
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]
|
| 114 |
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},
|
| 115 |
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{
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| 116 |
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"id": "qa_fr_011",
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| 117 |
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"question": "Qu'est-ce que la segmentation réseau et comment aide-t-elle?",
|
| 118 |
+
"answer": "Segmentation réseau: diviser réseau en zones/VLANs avec contrôle d'accès inter-zone. Aide ransomware car: limite mouvement latéral, isole systèmes critiques, permet quarantine rapide zones infectées, réduit vitesse propagation.",
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| 119 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 120 |
+
"keywords": [
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| 121 |
+
"segmentation",
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| 122 |
+
"VLAN",
|
| 123 |
+
"micro-segmentation",
|
| 124 |
+
"réseau"
|
| 125 |
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]
|
| 126 |
+
},
|
| 127 |
+
{
|
| 128 |
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"id": "qa_fr_012",
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| 129 |
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"question": "Comment configurer alertes EDR pour détecter ransomware?",
|
| 130 |
+
"answer": "Alertes EDR critiques: processus créant fichiers > 100/sec, ouverture fichiers multiples avec extension change, création multi-processus bruts, accès Windows registry suspect, chargement drivers/kernel modules, communications réseau vers IPs non whitelist.",
|
| 131 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 132 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 133 |
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"EDR",
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| 134 |
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"alertes",
|
| 135 |
+
"détection",
|
| 136 |
+
"configuration"
|
| 137 |
+
]
|
| 138 |
+
},
|
| 139 |
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{
|
| 140 |
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"id": "qa_fr_013",
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| 141 |
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"question": "Quels sont les principaux groupes ransomware actifs en 2025?",
|
| 142 |
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"answer": "Groupes majeurs: LockBit 3.0 (plus dominant), BlackCat/ALPHV, Cl0p (supply-chain), Royal, Play, Akira, BlackBasta, Rhysida, Medusa, Vice Society. Chacun a TTPs, ciblage, et demandes rançon différents.",
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| 143 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 144 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 145 |
+
"groupes",
|
| 146 |
+
"familles",
|
| 147 |
+
"LockBit",
|
| 148 |
+
"BlackCat"
|
| 149 |
+
]
|
| 150 |
+
},
|
| 151 |
+
{
|
| 152 |
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"id": "qa_fr_014",
|
| 153 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce qu'un indicateur de compromission (IOC)?",
|
| 154 |
+
"answer": "IOC: données observables indiquant compromise. Types: fichiers (hashes MD5/SHA256), domaines/URLs, adresses IP, ports, comportements processus, clés registry, certificats. Collectés pendant incident pour bloquer attaquants futurs.",
|
| 155 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 156 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 157 |
+
"IOC",
|
| 158 |
+
"indicateur",
|
| 159 |
+
"compromission",
|
| 160 |
+
"hashes"
|
| 161 |
+
]
|
| 162 |
+
},
|
| 163 |
+
{
|
| 164 |
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"id": "qa_fr_015",
|
| 165 |
+
"question": "Comment mener une investigation forensique post-ransomware?",
|
| 166 |
+
"answer": "Processus forensique: préserver evidence (images disque), établir timeline via logs systèmes, identifier patient zéro (premier système infecté), analyser malware en sandbox, mapper TTPs à MITRE ATT&CK, collecter IOCs, générer rapport technique.",
|
| 167 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/dfir-tools-comparison.html",
|
| 168 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 169 |
+
"forensique",
|
| 170 |
+
"DFIR",
|
| 171 |
+
"investigation",
|
| 172 |
+
"timeline"
|
| 173 |
+
]
|
| 174 |
+
},
|
| 175 |
+
{
|
| 176 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_016",
|
| 177 |
+
"question": "Quels outils DFIR sont essentiels?",
|
| 178 |
+
"answer": "Outils DFIR: Volatility (memory forensics), Autopsy (disk forensics), EnCase (commercial), FTK (Forensic Toolkit), Wireshark (network analysis), VirusTotal (malware analysis), Yara (pattern matching), Splunk (log analysis).",
|
| 179 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/dfir-tools-comparison.html",
|
| 180 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 181 |
+
"DFIR",
|
| 182 |
+
"outils",
|
| 183 |
+
"forensique"
|
| 184 |
+
]
|
| 185 |
+
},
|
| 186 |
+
{
|
| 187 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_017",
|
| 188 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce que l'évasion anti-forensique?",
|
| 189 |
+
"answer": "Évasion anti-forensique: techniques attaquants utilisent pour masquer traces d'infection. Incluent: suppression logs, nettoyage artefacts disque, chiffrement communication, utilisation living-off-the-land binaries, couverture timestamps fichiers.",
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| 190 |
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"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/evasion-antiforensic.html",
|
| 191 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 192 |
+
"anti-forensique",
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| 193 |
+
"évasion",
|
| 194 |
+
"logs"
|
| 195 |
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]
|
| 196 |
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},
|
| 197 |
+
{
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| 198 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_018",
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| 199 |
+
"question": "Comment détecter la suppression de logs anti-forensique?",
|
| 200 |
+
"answer": "Détection: lacunes numérotation event IDs, timestamps suspects (saltos), tailles logs anormales, absence logs attendus (ex: Security Event IDs). Mitigation: centralisation logs (SIEM), immuabilité logs, monitoring suppression logs en temps réel.",
|
| 201 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/evasion-antiforensic.html",
|
| 202 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 203 |
+
"logs",
|
| 204 |
+
"suppression",
|
| 205 |
+
"détection",
|
| 206 |
+
"SIEM"
|
| 207 |
+
]
|
| 208 |
+
},
|
| 209 |
+
{
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| 210 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_019",
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| 211 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce que la forensique mémoire et pourquoi c'est important?",
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| 212 |
+
"answer": "Memory forensics: analyse contenu RAM pour détecter malwares/attaquants en mémoire. Important car: malwares fileless vivent en RAM, captures infos runtime (clés, tokens, connexions), evidence avant disque écrit. Outils: Volatility.",
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| 213 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/memory-forensics.html",
|
| 214 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 215 |
+
"memory forensics",
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| 216 |
+
"RAM",
|
| 217 |
+
"malware",
|
| 218 |
+
"Volatility"
|
| 219 |
+
]
|
| 220 |
+
},
|
| 221 |
+
{
|
| 222 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_020",
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| 223 |
+
"question": "Quels profils Volatility utiliser pour Windows 10/11?",
|
| 224 |
+
"answer": "Profils: Win10_21H1_x64, Win11_22H2_x64, Win11_23H2_x64. Commandes essentielles: pslist (processus), handles (fichiers ouverts), netscan (connexions réseau), filescan (fichiers supprimés), printkey (registry), dllist (DLLs chargées).",
|
| 225 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/memory-forensics.html",
|
| 226 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 227 |
+
"Volatility",
|
| 228 |
+
"profils",
|
| 229 |
+
"Windows",
|
| 230 |
+
"mémoire"
|
| 231 |
+
]
|
| 232 |
+
},
|
| 233 |
+
{
|
| 234 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_021",
|
| 235 |
+
"question": "Comment comparer solutions EDR vs XDR?",
|
| 236 |
+
"answer": "EDR (Endpoint Detection & Response): focus sur endpoints (laptops, serveurs). XDR (Extended Detection & Response): inclut endpoints, serveurs, emails, réseau, cloud dans détection corrélée. XDR meilleur pour ransomware car vue globale attaque.",
|
| 237 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/top-10-solutions-edr-xdr-2025.html",
|
| 238 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 239 |
+
"EDR",
|
| 240 |
+
"XDR",
|
| 241 |
+
"détection",
|
| 242 |
+
"réponse"
|
| 243 |
+
]
|
| 244 |
+
},
|
| 245 |
+
{
|
| 246 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_022",
|
| 247 |
+
"question": "Quelles sont les meilleures solutions EDR en 2025?",
|
| 248 |
+
"answer": "Top EDR 2025: CrowdStrike Falcon (leader), Microsoft Defender XDR, SentinelOne Singularity, Trend Micro XDR, Palo Alto Cortex XDR, Sophos Intercept, Kaspersky, VMware Carbon Black. Sélection dépend: taille org, budget, intégrations.",
|
| 249 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/top-10-solutions-edr-xdr-2025.html",
|
| 250 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 251 |
+
"EDR",
|
| 252 |
+
"solutions",
|
| 253 |
+
"2025",
|
| 254 |
+
"CrowdStrike"
|
| 255 |
+
]
|
| 256 |
+
},
|
| 257 |
+
{
|
| 258 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_023",
|
| 259 |
+
"question": "Comment configurer MFA pour prévenir ransomware?",
|
| 260 |
+
"answer": "MFA prévention: exiger MFA tous comptes (surtout admin), utiliser authenticators hardware (Yubikey) ou app (Microsoft Authenticator), éviter SMS (phishing SIM swap), policies: refuser accès sans MFA, monitoring tentatives MFA échouées.",
|
| 261 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 262 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 263 |
+
"MFA",
|
| 264 |
+
"authentification",
|
| 265 |
+
"Yubikey"
|
| 266 |
+
]
|
| 267 |
+
},
|
| 268 |
+
{
|
| 269 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_024",
|
| 270 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce qu'un plan de continuité métier (BCP)?",
|
| 271 |
+
"answer": "BCP: plan documenté pour maintenir/restaurer opérations métier après désastre. Pour ransomware incluent: RTO (Recovery Time Objective = temps max indisponibilité), RPO (Recovery Point Objective = perte données max acceptable), procedures failover, sites backup.",
|
| 272 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 273 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 274 |
+
"BCP",
|
| 275 |
+
"RTO",
|
| 276 |
+
"RPO",
|
| 277 |
+
"continuité"
|
| 278 |
+
]
|
| 279 |
+
},
|
| 280 |
+
{
|
| 281 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_025",
|
| 282 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce qu'un plan de récupération après sinistre (DRP)?",
|
| 283 |
+
"answer": "DRP: plan restaurer systèmes/données après sinistre complet. Inclut: priorités restauration, ressources requises, étapes séquentielles, tests réguliers. Différent BCP: DRP focus technique restauration, BCP focus opérations métier.",
|
| 284 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 285 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 286 |
+
"DRP",
|
| 287 |
+
"récupération",
|
| 288 |
+
"sinistre"
|
| 289 |
+
]
|
| 290 |
+
},
|
| 291 |
+
{
|
| 292 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_026",
|
| 293 |
+
"question": "Comment tester efficacement une récupération backup ransomware?",
|
| 294 |
+
"answer": "Tests backup: restaurer données test environment mensuellement, vérifier intégrité (checksum), scanner antivirus données restaurées, tester fonctionnement applicatif complet, valider pas de malware dans backup, documenter résultats.",
|
| 295 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 296 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 297 |
+
"backup",
|
| 298 |
+
"test",
|
| 299 |
+
"restauration"
|
| 300 |
+
]
|
| 301 |
+
},
|
| 302 |
+
{
|
| 303 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_027",
|
| 304 |
+
"question": "Quels secteurs sont les plus ciblés par ransomware?",
|
| 305 |
+
"answer": "Secteurs prioritaires: Healthcare (patient lives risk), Finance (data sensitive + assurance), Government (infrastructure critique), Manufacturing (production impact), Education (données étudiants). Ratios: Healthcare 30%, Finance 25%, Government 20%, autres 25%.",
|
| 306 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 307 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 308 |
+
"secteurs",
|
| 309 |
+
"ciblage",
|
| 310 |
+
"healthcare"
|
| 311 |
+
]
|
| 312 |
+
},
|
| 313 |
+
{
|
| 314 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_028",
|
| 315 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce que living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins)?",
|
| 316 |
+
"answer": "LOLBins: binaires légitimes Windows/Linux attaquants abusent pour attaques (ex: PowerShell, cmd.exe, certutil, PsExec). Avantage: pas détection antivirus, blend activités normales. Mitigation: block script execution, disable PowerShell, application whitelisting.",
|
| 317 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/evasion-antiforensic.html",
|
| 318 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 319 |
+
"LOLBins",
|
| 320 |
+
"PowerShell",
|
| 321 |
+
"évasion"
|
| 322 |
+
]
|
| 323 |
+
},
|
| 324 |
+
{
|
| 325 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_029",
|
| 326 |
+
"question": "Comment déterminer patient zéro dans attaque ransomware?",
|
| 327 |
+
"answer": "Patient zéro identification: analyser ordre chronologique chiffrement fichiers (earliest timestamp), vérifier logs authentification (login suspect), examiner processus initiaux RAM, analyser trafic réseau initial, vérifier historique emails (phishing), pointer à endpoint origine.",
|
| 328 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/dfir-tools-comparison.html",
|
| 329 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 330 |
+
"patient zéro",
|
| 331 |
+
"chronologie",
|
| 332 |
+
"investigation"
|
| 333 |
+
]
|
| 334 |
+
},
|
| 335 |
+
{
|
| 336 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_030",
|
| 337 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce qu'une stratégie de suppression des privilèges (Privilege Suppression)?",
|
| 338 |
+
"answer": "Suppression privilèges: réduire nombre comptes admin, activer least-privilege access, implémenter PAM (Privileged Access Management), auditer usages elevation, disabler users local admin. Ransomware besoins privilèges élevés pour propagation = moyen défense.",
|
| 339 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 340 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 341 |
+
"privilèges",
|
| 342 |
+
"least-privilege",
|
| 343 |
+
"PAM"
|
| 344 |
+
]
|
| 345 |
+
},
|
| 346 |
+
{
|
| 347 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_031",
|
| 348 |
+
"question": "Quels rôles et responsabilités dans équipe incident response?",
|
| 349 |
+
"answer": "Équipe IR: Incident Commander (leadership), Technical Investigator (forensics), Network Analyst (trafic), Threat Hunter (recherche), Communications Officer (stakeholders), Finance (rançon negotiation si applicable). Escalade: IR Team → CISO → CEO.",
|
| 350 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 351 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 352 |
+
"incident response",
|
| 353 |
+
"rôles",
|
| 354 |
+
"équipe"
|
| 355 |
+
]
|
| 356 |
+
},
|
| 357 |
+
{
|
| 358 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_032",
|
| 359 |
+
"question": "Quand appeler les autorités suite ransomware?",
|
| 360 |
+
"answer": "Contactez immédiatement: FBI (cybercrimes.gov), ANSSI (France), Police Nationale/Gendarmerie. Important: notification obligation légale < 30 jours (RGPD), autorités aident investigation/threat intel, pas culpabilité d'entreprise de déclarer.",
|
| 361 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 362 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 363 |
+
"autorités",
|
| 364 |
+
"notification",
|
| 365 |
+
"ANSSI",
|
| 366 |
+
"FBI"
|
| 367 |
+
]
|
| 368 |
+
},
|
| 369 |
+
{
|
| 370 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_033",
|
| 371 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce que la négociation rançon?",
|
| 372 |
+
"answer": "Si décision payer: ne pas contact groupe directement, utiliser negotiation company (Kroll, Mandiant), documenter tout, vérifier légalité (sanctions), obtenir garanties clé unique + decrypter gratuit, transfer via channels sécurisés, verifier clé avant paiement complet.",
|
| 373 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 374 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 375 |
+
"négociation",
|
| 376 |
+
"rançon",
|
| 377 |
+
"paiement"
|
| 378 |
+
]
|
| 379 |
+
},
|
| 380 |
+
{
|
| 381 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_034",
|
| 382 |
+
"question": "Comment protéger contre ransomware supply-chain?",
|
| 383 |
+
"answer": "Protection supply-chain: audit fournisseurs (sécurité), contractuel exigences (MFA, EDR), monitorer accès fournisseurs (VPN logs), segmenter accès fournisseurs, vérifier intégrité logiciels (hashes, signatures), restrictions admin fournisseurs.",
|
| 384 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 385 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 386 |
+
"supply-chain",
|
| 387 |
+
"fournisseurs",
|
| 388 |
+
"Cl0p"
|
| 389 |
+
]
|
| 390 |
+
},
|
| 391 |
+
{
|
| 392 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_035",
|
| 393 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce qu'une vulnérabilité zero-day et impact ransomware?",
|
| 394 |
+
"answer": "Zero-day: vulnérabilité non connue vendor/public, pas patch disponible. Impact ransomware: utilisées pour accès initial/lateral movement, très efficaces avant découverte, groups souvent achètent zero-days chers. Mitigation: EDR behavior detection, network segmentation.",
|
| 395 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 396 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 397 |
+
"zero-day",
|
| 398 |
+
"vulnérabilité",
|
| 399 |
+
"exploit"
|
| 400 |
+
]
|
| 401 |
+
},
|
| 402 |
+
{
|
| 403 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_036",
|
| 404 |
+
"question": "Comment configurer détection mouvement latéral?",
|
| 405 |
+
"answer": "Détection mouvement latéral: monitorer authentifications cross-system, alertes usage Kerberos anormal, PtH (Pass-the-Hash) detection, lateral movement tools (PsExec, WMI), anomalies connections non-users (services), SMB traffic suspect.",
|
| 406 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/evasion-antiforensic.html",
|
| 407 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 408 |
+
"mouvement latéral",
|
| 409 |
+
"Kerberos",
|
| 410 |
+
"lateral movement"
|
| 411 |
+
]
|
| 412 |
+
},
|
| 413 |
+
{
|
| 414 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_037",
|
| 415 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce qu'un webshell et risque post-ransomware?",
|
| 416 |
+
"answer": "Webshell: fichier malveillant placé web server permettant accès distant. Risque: même après décryption, webshell permet re-infection si pas suppression, backdoor persistant, permet exfiltration données supplémentaires. Mitigation: scanner web servers, signature detection.",
|
| 417 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/evasion-antiforensic.html",
|
| 418 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 419 |
+
"webshell",
|
| 420 |
+
"backdoor",
|
| 421 |
+
"persistence"
|
| 422 |
+
]
|
| 423 |
+
},
|
| 424 |
+
{
|
| 425 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_038",
|
| 426 |
+
"question": "Comment monitorer trafic réseau pour C2 (Command & Control)?",
|
| 427 |
+
"answer": "C2 detection: IDS/IPS signatures known C2 domains/IPs, DNS query monitoring (DGA domains), outbound connections non-standard ports, lateral traffic between endpoints, TLS certificate inspection, entropy analysis network traffic.",
|
| 428 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/dfir-tools-comparison.html",
|
| 429 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 430 |
+
"C2",
|
| 431 |
+
"command control",
|
| 432 |
+
"IDS",
|
| 433 |
+
"DNS"
|
| 434 |
+
]
|
| 435 |
+
},
|
| 436 |
+
{
|
| 437 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_039",
|
| 438 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce que YARA et usage dans détection malware?",
|
| 439 |
+
"answer": "YARA: outil pattern matching détection malware base signatures custom. Syntaxe texte défini patterns (strings, hexadécimal, regex). Avantages: flexible, rapid detection, peut scanner fichiers + mémoire. Utilisé antivirus, DFIR analysts.",
|
| 440 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/dfir-tools-comparison.html",
|
| 441 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 442 |
+
"YARA",
|
| 443 |
+
"pattern matching",
|
| 444 |
+
"malware detection"
|
| 445 |
+
]
|
| 446 |
+
},
|
| 447 |
+
{
|
| 448 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_040",
|
| 449 |
+
"question": "Quels audits et tests pentesting importants avant ransomware?",
|
| 450 |
+
"answer": "Tests recommandés: penetration testing externe/interne, red team exercises (mock attacks), vulnerability scanning monthly, social engineering tests, backup recovery tests, EDR tuning validation, network segmentation validation.",
|
| 451 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 452 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 453 |
+
"pentesting",
|
| 454 |
+
"red team",
|
| 455 |
+
"vulnérabilité"
|
| 456 |
+
]
|
| 457 |
+
},
|
| 458 |
+
{
|
| 459 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_041",
|
| 460 |
+
"question": "Comment implémenter monitoring en temps réel attaques?",
|
| 461 |
+
"answer": "Monitoring temps réel: SIEM centralisation logs (Splunk, ELK), alertes automatisées critères comportement, dashboards visibilité, alerting via Slack/PagerDuty, escalation auto, incident tickets auto, retention logs > 90 jours.",
|
| 462 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/top-10-solutions-edr-xdr-2025.html",
|
| 463 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 464 |
+
"monitoring",
|
| 465 |
+
"SIEM",
|
| 466 |
+
"alertes",
|
| 467 |
+
"temps réel"
|
| 468 |
+
]
|
| 469 |
+
},
|
| 470 |
+
{
|
| 471 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_042",
|
| 472 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce que l'immutable backup et importances?",
|
| 473 |
+
"answer": "Immutable backup: une fois écrit, données ne peuvent pas être modifiées/supprimées (WORM = Write Once Read Many). Important ransomware car: attaquants ne peuvent pas altérer backups, protection contre destruction malveillante, compliance régulatoire.",
|
| 474 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 475 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 476 |
+
"immutable backup",
|
| 477 |
+
"WORM",
|
| 478 |
+
"protection"
|
| 479 |
+
]
|
| 480 |
+
},
|
| 481 |
+
{
|
| 482 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_043",
|
| 483 |
+
"question": "Comment planifier exercice simulation ransomware?",
|
| 484 |
+
"answer": "Simulation ransomware: phase 1 - préparation (objective, scope, équipe), phase 2 - exécution (attaque simulée, monitoring réponse), phase 3 - analyse (timeline, gaps), phase 4 - remédiation (plan correction). Fréquence: trimestriel minimum.",
|
| 485 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 486 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 487 |
+
"simulation",
|
| 488 |
+
"exercice",
|
| 489 |
+
"red team"
|
| 490 |
+
]
|
| 491 |
+
},
|
| 492 |
+
{
|
| 493 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_044",
|
| 494 |
+
"question": "Quels metriques KPI pour ransomware readiness?",
|
| 495 |
+
"answer": "KPIs: MTTR (Mean Time To Respond < 30min), detection rate (% infections détectées < 24h), backup success rate (> 99%), patch compliance (> 95%), MFA adoption (100%), security awareness training (> 90%), incident recovery cost (vs budget).",
|
| 496 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 497 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 498 |
+
"KPI",
|
| 499 |
+
"métriques",
|
| 500 |
+
"MTTR"
|
| 501 |
+
]
|
| 502 |
+
},
|
| 503 |
+
{
|
| 504 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_045",
|
| 505 |
+
"question": "Comment sensibiliser employés risques phishing ransomware?",
|
| 506 |
+
"answer": "Sensibilisation: training modules (vidéos, quizzes), simulated phishing emails, rapports metrics clics/reports, rewards programme, policies clear, penalties, updates réguliers TTPs, case studies incidents internes.",
|
| 507 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 508 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 509 |
+
"sensibilisation",
|
| 510 |
+
"phishing",
|
| 511 |
+
"training"
|
| 512 |
+
]
|
| 513 |
+
},
|
| 514 |
+
{
|
| 515 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_046",
|
| 516 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce qu'une stratégie de cyber-assurance?",
|
| 517 |
+
"answer": "Cyber insurance: couverture pertes data breaches/ransomware attacks. Clauses: perte revenu, frais légaux/notification, rançon negotiation, forensics. Important: reviewer exclusions (pas de backup = ineligible parfois), premium basé risk posture.",
|
| 518 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 519 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 520 |
+
"cyber-assurance",
|
| 521 |
+
"assurance",
|
| 522 |
+
"couverture"
|
| 523 |
+
]
|
| 524 |
+
},
|
| 525 |
+
{
|
| 526 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_047",
|
| 527 |
+
"question": "Comment créer carte de routes ransomware security?",
|
| 528 |
+
"answer": "Roadmap ransomware: année 1 (EDR deploy, backup hardening, MFA), année 2 (segmentation réseau, SIEM, training), année 3 (XDR, automation IR, threat hunting). Basé: maturity assessment, risk, budget, capacité ressources.",
|
| 529 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 530 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 531 |
+
"roadmap",
|
| 532 |
+
"planification",
|
| 533 |
+
"maturation"
|
| 534 |
+
]
|
| 535 |
+
},
|
| 536 |
+
{
|
| 537 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_048",
|
| 538 |
+
"question": "Qu'est-ce qu'un tableau de bord (dashboard) SOC ransomware?",
|
| 539 |
+
"answer": "SOC dashboard: KPIs temps réel (incidents actifs, alerts volume), endpoint status (EDR health %), backup status, patch compliance, user login anomalies, network threats, trends semaine/mois, alertes escalées.",
|
| 540 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/top-10-solutions-edr-xdr-2025.html",
|
| 541 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 542 |
+
"dashboard",
|
| 543 |
+
"SOC",
|
| 544 |
+
"KPI",
|
| 545 |
+
"visibilité"
|
| 546 |
+
]
|
| 547 |
+
},
|
| 548 |
+
{
|
| 549 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_049",
|
| 550 |
+
"question": "Comment gérer ransomware dans environnement cloud (AWS/Azure)?",
|
| 551 |
+
"answer": "Cloud ransomware: activer versioning objects S3/Azure Storage, immutable snapshots, monitoring CloudTrail/audit logs, encryption keys separate management, encryption client-side, backups different regions, security groups restrict access.",
|
| 552 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 553 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 554 |
+
"cloud",
|
| 555 |
+
"AWS",
|
| 556 |
+
"Azure",
|
| 557 |
+
"S3"
|
| 558 |
+
]
|
| 559 |
+
},
|
| 560 |
+
{
|
| 561 |
+
"id": "qa_fr_050",
|
| 562 |
+
"question": "Où trouver plus d'info livre blanc ransomware complet?",
|
| 563 |
+
"answer": "Pour comprendre anatomie complète attaque ransomware, incluant histoire evolution, techniques détaillées, cas réels, stratégies défense, consultez le livre blanc 'Anatomie Complète d'une Attaque Ransomware' sur ayinedjimi-consultants.fr. Ressource essential pour CISO/SOC/IT leaders.",
|
| 564 |
+
"source_url": "https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html",
|
| 565 |
+
"keywords": [
|
| 566 |
+
"livre blanc",
|
| 567 |
+
"ressource",
|
| 568 |
+
"complet"
|
| 569 |
+
]
|
| 570 |
+
}
|
| 571 |
+
]
|
data/qa_dataset.parquet
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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+
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
|
| 2 |
+
oid sha256:218d98e414949af338f690e914cd5ad13682c3bd3f7bb93021e9b116f241de52
|
| 3 |
+
size 17731
|
data/ransomware_groups.json
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,1538 @@
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|
|
|
| 1 |
+
[
|
| 2 |
+
{
|
| 3 |
+
"id": "lockbit3",
|
| 4 |
+
"name": "LockBit 3.0",
|
| 5 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 6 |
+
"LockBit",
|
| 7 |
+
"LockBit Black",
|
| 8 |
+
"LockBit Green"
|
| 9 |
+
],
|
| 10 |
+
"first_seen": 2019,
|
| 11 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 12 |
+
"description_fr": "LockBit 3.0 est le groupe de ransomware le plus actif et sophistiqué au monde. Connu pour son approche rapide, ses infrastructures robustes et son modèle RaaS bien établi. Cible principalement les grandes entreprises et organisations gouvernementales.",
|
| 13 |
+
"description_en": "LockBit 3.0 is the world's most active and sophisticated ransomware group. Known for rapid execution, robust infrastructure, and well-established RaaS model. Primarily targets large enterprises and government organizations.",
|
| 14 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Accès initial via RDP/VPN exposés, exploitation de vulnérabilités 0-day, pivotement latéral agressif, désactivation d'EDR/antivirus, chiffrement multithreads optimisé, double extorsion systématique avec fuites massives de données.",
|
| 15 |
+
"ttps_en": "Initial access via exposed RDP/VPN, 0-day vulnerability exploitation, aggressive lateral movement, EDR/antivirus disabling, optimized multi-threaded encryption, systematic double extortion with massive data leaks.",
|
| 16 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "RDP",
|
| 17 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 18 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 19 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 20 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 21 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 22 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 23 |
+
"Manufacturing",
|
| 24 |
+
"Government"
|
| 25 |
+
],
|
| 26 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 27 |
+
"T1595",
|
| 28 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 29 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 30 |
+
"T1562",
|
| 31 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 32 |
+
],
|
| 33 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 34 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 35 |
+
"lockbit.su",
|
| 36 |
+
"lockbit.ws",
|
| 37 |
+
"lockbitapts.com"
|
| 38 |
+
],
|
| 39 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 40 |
+
".lockbit",
|
| 41 |
+
".abcd"
|
| 42 |
+
],
|
| 43 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 44 |
+
"LOCKBIT_LEAKS",
|
| 45 |
+
"LOCKBIT_RANSOMWARE_NOTE.txt"
|
| 46 |
+
]
|
| 47 |
+
}
|
| 48 |
+
},
|
| 49 |
+
{
|
| 50 |
+
"id": "blackcat",
|
| 51 |
+
"name": "BlackCat/ALPHV",
|
| 52 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 53 |
+
"ALPHV",
|
| 54 |
+
"BlackCat",
|
| 55 |
+
"Noname052"
|
| 56 |
+
],
|
| 57 |
+
"first_seen": 2021,
|
| 58 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 59 |
+
"description_fr": "BlackCat est une souche de ransomware écrite en Rust, opérée par des anciens membres de BlackMatter et DarkSide. Connue pour sa flexibilité, ses capacités de chiffrement avancées et son ciblage de cibles de haut niveau.",
|
| 60 |
+
"description_en": "BlackCat is a Rust-based ransomware strain operated by former members of BlackMatter and DarkSide. Known for flexibility, advanced encryption capabilities, and targeting of high-profile targets.",
|
| 61 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Reconnaissance approfondie, exploitation de vulnérabilités critiques, déploiement de webshells, utilisation de living-off-the-land binaries, chiffrement chaîné hybride, publication sélective de données exfiltrées.",
|
| 62 |
+
"ttps_en": "In-depth reconnaissance, exploitation of critical vulnerabilities, webshell deployment, living-off-the-land binaries usage, hybrid chained encryption, selective data publication.",
|
| 63 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 64 |
+
"encryption_type": "Hybrid",
|
| 65 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 66 |
+
"triple_extortion": true,
|
| 67 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 68 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 69 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 70 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 71 |
+
],
|
| 72 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 73 |
+
"T1083",
|
| 74 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 75 |
+
"T1548",
|
| 76 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 77 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 78 |
+
],
|
| 79 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 80 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 81 |
+
"blackcat.top",
|
| 82 |
+
"alphv.su"
|
| 83 |
+
],
|
| 84 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 85 |
+
".blackcat"
|
| 86 |
+
],
|
| 87 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 88 |
+
"ALPHV_RANSOM.txt"
|
| 89 |
+
]
|
| 90 |
+
}
|
| 91 |
+
},
|
| 92 |
+
{
|
| 93 |
+
"id": "clop",
|
| 94 |
+
"name": "Cl0p",
|
| 95 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 96 |
+
"Clop",
|
| 97 |
+
"CLOP"
|
| 98 |
+
],
|
| 99 |
+
"first_seen": 2019,
|
| 100 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 101 |
+
"description_fr": "Cl0p est connu pour exploiter les vulnérabilités zero-day des serveurs de fichiers, notamment MOVEIT et FORTRA. Pratique l'extorsion double et cible les secteurs sensibles comme la santé et les services financiers.",
|
| 102 |
+
"description_en": "Cl0p is known for exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in file servers, notably MOVEIT and FORTRA. Practices double extortion and targets sensitive sectors like healthcare and financial services.",
|
| 103 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation de vulnérabilités zero-day, exfiltration massive de données, mobilisation rapide après détection, négociation agressive avec victimes, fuite de données en petits lots pour maximiser l'impact.",
|
| 104 |
+
"ttps_en": "Zero-day vulnerability exploitation, massive data exfiltration, rapid mobilization after detection, aggressive victim negotiation, data leak in small batches for maximum impact.",
|
| 105 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Supply_Chain",
|
| 106 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 107 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 108 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 109 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 110 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 111 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 112 |
+
"Government"
|
| 113 |
+
],
|
| 114 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 115 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 116 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 117 |
+
"T1020",
|
| 118 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 119 |
+
],
|
| 120 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 121 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 122 |
+
"clop.su",
|
| 123 |
+
"clopleaks.top"
|
| 124 |
+
],
|
| 125 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 126 |
+
".clop"
|
| 127 |
+
],
|
| 128 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 129 |
+
"Clop_Ransom.txt"
|
| 130 |
+
]
|
| 131 |
+
}
|
| 132 |
+
},
|
| 133 |
+
{
|
| 134 |
+
"id": "royal",
|
| 135 |
+
"name": "Royal",
|
| 136 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 137 |
+
"Royal Ransomware",
|
| 138 |
+
"Zeon"
|
| 139 |
+
],
|
| 140 |
+
"first_seen": 2022,
|
| 141 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 142 |
+
"description_fr": "Royal est un groupe émergent spécialisé dans le ciblage de PME et organisations de taille moyenne. Utilise une infrastructure distribuée et pratique une approche de négociation plus transparent que ses concurrents.",
|
| 143 |
+
"description_en": "Royal is an emerging group specializing in targeting SMEs and mid-sized organizations. Uses distributed infrastructure and practices more transparent negotiation than competitors.",
|
| 144 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Accès via RDP brut, pivotement latéral rapide, utilisation d'outils standard Windows, désactivation de solutions de sécurité, chiffrement rapide des données critiques.",
|
| 145 |
+
"ttps_en": "Access via exposed RDP, rapid lateral movement, standard Windows tools usage, security solution disabling, rapid critical data encryption.",
|
| 146 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "RDP",
|
| 147 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 148 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 149 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 150 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 151 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 152 |
+
"Manufacturing",
|
| 153 |
+
"Education"
|
| 154 |
+
],
|
| 155 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 156 |
+
"T1078",
|
| 157 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 158 |
+
"T1562",
|
| 159 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 160 |
+
],
|
| 161 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 162 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 163 |
+
"royal.su",
|
| 164 |
+
"royalransom.top"
|
| 165 |
+
],
|
| 166 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 167 |
+
".royal"
|
| 168 |
+
],
|
| 169 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 170 |
+
"ROYAL_RANSOM.txt"
|
| 171 |
+
]
|
| 172 |
+
}
|
| 173 |
+
},
|
| 174 |
+
{
|
| 175 |
+
"id": "play",
|
| 176 |
+
"name": "Play",
|
| 177 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 178 |
+
"Play Ransomware",
|
| 179 |
+
"Phantom"
|
| 180 |
+
],
|
| 181 |
+
"first_seen": 2022,
|
| 182 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 183 |
+
"description_fr": "Play est connu pour ses attaques rapides et son absence de fenêtre de temps pour la communication. Cible les secteurs critiques avec une préférence pour l'infrastructure de santé et les services gouvernementaux.",
|
| 184 |
+
"description_en": "Play is known for rapid attacks and no timeframe for communication. Targets critical sectors with preference for healthcare infrastructure and government services.",
|
| 185 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Reconnaissance minimale, accès rapide via vuln connues, chiffrement sans exfiltration préalable, contact agressif et demandes élevées, peu de négociation.",
|
| 186 |
+
"ttps_en": "Minimal reconnaissance, rapid access via known vulnerabilities, encryption without prior exfiltration, aggressive contact and high demands, little negotiation.",
|
| 187 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 188 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 189 |
+
"double_extortion": false,
|
| 190 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 191 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 192 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 193 |
+
"Government"
|
| 194 |
+
],
|
| 195 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 196 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 197 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 198 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 199 |
+
],
|
| 200 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 201 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 202 |
+
"play.it"
|
| 203 |
+
],
|
| 204 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 205 |
+
".play"
|
| 206 |
+
],
|
| 207 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 208 |
+
"Play_Note.txt"
|
| 209 |
+
]
|
| 210 |
+
}
|
| 211 |
+
},
|
| 212 |
+
{
|
| 213 |
+
"id": "akira",
|
| 214 |
+
"name": "Akira",
|
| 215 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 216 |
+
"Akira Ransomware"
|
| 217 |
+
],
|
| 218 |
+
"first_seen": 2023,
|
| 219 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 220 |
+
"description_fr": "Akira est une nouvelle souche de ransomware tirant parti de vulnérabilités dans les appliances VPN et les solutions de périphérie. Caractérisée par des attaques précoces et des démandes de rançon considérables.",
|
| 221 |
+
"description_en": "Akira is a new ransomware strain leveraging vulnerabilities in VPN appliances and edge solutions. Characterized by early attacks and considerable ransom demands.",
|
| 222 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation de vulnérabilités VPN/Citrix, reconnaissance approfondie, exfiltration complète avant chiffrement, menaces de publication multiples, utilisation de proxies anonymes.",
|
| 223 |
+
"ttps_en": "Exploitation of VPN/Citrix vulnerabilities, thorough reconnaissance, complete exfiltration before encryption, multiple publication threats, anonymous proxy usage.",
|
| 224 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 225 |
+
"encryption_type": "Hybrid",
|
| 226 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 227 |
+
"triple_extortion": true,
|
| 228 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 229 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 230 |
+
"Manufacturing",
|
| 231 |
+
"Healthcare"
|
| 232 |
+
],
|
| 233 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 234 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 235 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 236 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 237 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 238 |
+
],
|
| 239 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 240 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 241 |
+
"akira.su"
|
| 242 |
+
],
|
| 243 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 244 |
+
".akira"
|
| 245 |
+
],
|
| 246 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 247 |
+
"AKIRA.txt"
|
| 248 |
+
]
|
| 249 |
+
}
|
| 250 |
+
},
|
| 251 |
+
{
|
| 252 |
+
"id": "blackbasta",
|
| 253 |
+
"name": "BlackBasta",
|
| 254 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 255 |
+
"Black Basta"
|
| 256 |
+
],
|
| 257 |
+
"first_seen": 2022,
|
| 258 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 259 |
+
"description_fr": "BlackBasta est un groupe hautement professionnel offrant des services de RaaS. Associé à des attaques très ciblées sur des organisations Fortune 500 et des infrastructures critiques.",
|
| 260 |
+
"description_en": "BlackBasta is a highly professional group offering RaaS services. Associated with highly targeted attacks on Fortune 500 organizations and critical infrastructure.",
|
| 261 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Compromission de solutions de gestion d'identité, exploitation de vulnérabilités 0-day, utilisation de malwares fileless, déploiement de backdoors persistantes, chiffrement préservant les métadonnées.",
|
| 262 |
+
"ttps_en": "Compromise of identity management solutions, 0-day vulnerability exploitation, fileless malware usage, persistent backdoor deployment, metadata-preserving encryption.",
|
| 263 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 264 |
+
"encryption_type": "Hybrid",
|
| 265 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 266 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 267 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 268 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 269 |
+
"Government",
|
| 270 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 271 |
+
],
|
| 272 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 273 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 274 |
+
"T1548",
|
| 275 |
+
"T1059",
|
| 276 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 277 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 278 |
+
],
|
| 279 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 280 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 281 |
+
"blackbasta.wicked",
|
| 282 |
+
"blackbasta.top"
|
| 283 |
+
],
|
| 284 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 285 |
+
".blackbasta"
|
| 286 |
+
],
|
| 287 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 288 |
+
"BLACKBASTA_NOTE.txt"
|
| 289 |
+
]
|
| 290 |
+
}
|
| 291 |
+
},
|
| 292 |
+
{
|
| 293 |
+
"id": "rhysida",
|
| 294 |
+
"name": "Rhysida",
|
| 295 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 296 |
+
"Rhysida Ransomware"
|
| 297 |
+
],
|
| 298 |
+
"first_seen": 2023,
|
| 299 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 300 |
+
"description_fr": "Rhysida est un groupe émergeant ayant commencé avec des attaques contre le secteur public en Afrique et Asie. Utilise une plateforme de fuites hébergée sur le darkweb avec interface sophis tiquée.",
|
| 301 |
+
"description_en": "Rhysida is an emerging group starting with attacks against the public sector in Africa and Asia. Uses a sophisticated darkweb-hosted leak platform interface.",
|
| 302 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Ciblage de secteurs publics, exploitation de systèmes hérités non patchés, déploiement de proxy SSH, chiffrement sélectif des fichiers critiques, exfiltration via canaux non conventionnels.",
|
| 303 |
+
"ttps_en": "Public sector targeting, exploitation of unpatched legacy systems, SSH proxy deployment, selective critical file encryption, exfiltration via unconventional channels.",
|
| 304 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "RDP",
|
| 305 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 306 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 307 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 308 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 309 |
+
"Government",
|
| 310 |
+
"Healthcare"
|
| 311 |
+
],
|
| 312 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 313 |
+
"T1133",
|
| 314 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 315 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 316 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 317 |
+
],
|
| 318 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 319 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 320 |
+
"rhysida.info"
|
| 321 |
+
],
|
| 322 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 323 |
+
".rhysida"
|
| 324 |
+
],
|
| 325 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 326 |
+
"RHYSIDA.txt"
|
| 327 |
+
]
|
| 328 |
+
}
|
| 329 |
+
},
|
| 330 |
+
{
|
| 331 |
+
"id": "medusa",
|
| 332 |
+
"name": "Medusa",
|
| 333 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 334 |
+
"Medusa Locker"
|
| 335 |
+
],
|
| 336 |
+
"first_seen": 2023,
|
| 337 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 338 |
+
"description_fr": "Medusa est connu pour ses attaques ciblant spécifiquement les PME du secteur financier et du manufacturing. Utilise des techniques évasives sophistiquées pour contourner les EDR modernes.",
|
| 339 |
+
"description_en": "Medusa is known for attacks specifically targeting SMEs in financial and manufacturing sectors. Uses sophisticated evasion techniques to bypass modern EDR.",
|
| 340 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Contournement d'EDR par injection de code, utilisation de living-off-the-land, déploiement de malwares fileless, chiffrement asynchrone performant, exfiltration par services légitimes.",
|
| 341 |
+
"ttps_en": "EDR bypass via code injection, living-off-the-land usage, fileless malware deployment, high-performance asynchronous encryption, exfiltration via legitimate services.",
|
| 342 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Phishing",
|
| 343 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 344 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 345 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 346 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 347 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 348 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 349 |
+
],
|
| 350 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 351 |
+
"T1566",
|
| 352 |
+
"T1055",
|
| 353 |
+
"T1059",
|
| 354 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 355 |
+
],
|
| 356 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 357 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 358 |
+
"medusa.money"
|
| 359 |
+
],
|
| 360 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 361 |
+
".medusa"
|
| 362 |
+
],
|
| 363 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 364 |
+
"MEDUSA_RANSOM.txt"
|
| 365 |
+
]
|
| 366 |
+
}
|
| 367 |
+
},
|
| 368 |
+
{
|
| 369 |
+
"id": "vice_society",
|
| 370 |
+
"name": "Vice Society",
|
| 371 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 372 |
+
"Vice",
|
| 373 |
+
"Arcane Iris"
|
| 374 |
+
],
|
| 375 |
+
"first_seen": 2021,
|
| 376 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 377 |
+
"description_fr": "Vice Society se spécialise dans le ciblage d'organisations de santé et d'éducation. Pratique des attaques qui n'impliquent pas toujours de chiffrement, privilégiant l'extorsion par menace de publication de données sensibles.",
|
| 378 |
+
"description_en": "Vice Society specializes in targeting healthcare and education organizations. Practices attacks that don't always involve encryption, favoring extortion through threat of sensitive data publication.",
|
| 379 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exfiltration sélective de dossiers confidentiels (dossiers médicaux, données étudiantes), chiffrement optionnel, pression exercée via publications progressives, focalisation sur l'impact sociétal.",
|
| 380 |
+
"ttps_en": "Selective exfiltration of confidential folders (medical records, student data), optional encryption, pressure via progressive publications, focus on societal impact.",
|
| 381 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Phishing",
|
| 382 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 383 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 384 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 385 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 386 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 387 |
+
"Education"
|
| 388 |
+
],
|
| 389 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 390 |
+
"T1566",
|
| 391 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 392 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 393 |
+
],
|
| 394 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 395 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 396 |
+
"viceweb.site"
|
| 397 |
+
],
|
| 398 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 399 |
+
".vice"
|
| 400 |
+
],
|
| 401 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 402 |
+
"VICE_RANSOM.txt"
|
| 403 |
+
]
|
| 404 |
+
}
|
| 405 |
+
},
|
| 406 |
+
{
|
| 407 |
+
"id": "hive",
|
| 408 |
+
"name": "Hive",
|
| 409 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 410 |
+
"Hive Ransomware"
|
| 411 |
+
],
|
| 412 |
+
"first_seen": 2021,
|
| 413 |
+
"status": "Disbanded",
|
| 414 |
+
"description_fr": "Hive a été un groupe actif offrant des services de RaaS très sophistiqués avant son démantèlement par les autorités fédérales américaines. Connu pour sa plateforme de gestion d'opérations avancée.",
|
| 415 |
+
"description_en": "Hive was an active group offering highly sophisticated RaaS services before being dismantled by US federal authorities. Known for its advanced operations management platform.",
|
| 416 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Infrastructure C2 distribuée, utilisation de proxies multiples, déploiement de lanceurs éphémères, chiffrement AES-256 optimisé avec clés uniques par fichier, gestion de portefeuille de victimes.",
|
| 417 |
+
"ttps_en": "Distributed C2 infrastructure, multiple proxy usage, ephemeral launcher deployment, optimized AES-256 encryption with unique file keys, victim portfolio management.",
|
| 418 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 419 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 420 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 421 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 422 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 423 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 424 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 425 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 426 |
+
],
|
| 427 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 428 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 429 |
+
"T1486",
|
| 430 |
+
"T1041"
|
| 431 |
+
],
|
| 432 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 433 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 434 |
+
"hiveleaks.com"
|
| 435 |
+
],
|
| 436 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 437 |
+
".hive"
|
| 438 |
+
],
|
| 439 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 440 |
+
"HIVE_RANSOM.txt"
|
| 441 |
+
]
|
| 442 |
+
}
|
| 443 |
+
},
|
| 444 |
+
{
|
| 445 |
+
"id": "conti",
|
| 446 |
+
"name": "Conti",
|
| 447 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 448 |
+
"Conti Ransomware"
|
| 449 |
+
],
|
| 450 |
+
"first_seen": 2020,
|
| 451 |
+
"status": "Disbanded",
|
| 452 |
+
"description_fr": "Conti a dominé le paysage du ransomware pendant des années avant sa dissolution officielle suite à des opérations de contre-intelligence. Ses membres ont migré vers d'autres groupes comme BlackBasta et Royal.",
|
| 453 |
+
"description_en": "Conti dominated the ransomware landscape for years before its official dissolution following counter-intelligence operations. Its members migrated to other groups like BlackBasta and Royal.",
|
| 454 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation de vulnérabilités critiques non patchées, utilisation de Cobalt Strike, déploiement de malwares modulaires, reconnaissance approfondie sur plusieurs semaines, chiffrement multithreads très rapide.",
|
| 455 |
+
"ttps_en": "Exploitation of critical unpatched vulnerabilities, Cobalt Strike usage, modular malware deployment, thorough multi-week reconnaissance, very fast multi-threaded encryption.",
|
| 456 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 457 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 458 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 459 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 460 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 461 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 462 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 463 |
+
"Government",
|
| 464 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 465 |
+
],
|
| 466 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 467 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 468 |
+
"T1059",
|
| 469 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 470 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 471 |
+
],
|
| 472 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 473 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 474 |
+
"contiransom.com",
|
| 475 |
+
"conti.su"
|
| 476 |
+
],
|
| 477 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 478 |
+
".conti"
|
| 479 |
+
],
|
| 480 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 481 |
+
"CONTI_RANSOM.txt"
|
| 482 |
+
]
|
| 483 |
+
}
|
| 484 |
+
},
|
| 485 |
+
{
|
| 486 |
+
"id": "revil",
|
| 487 |
+
"name": "REvil/Sodinokibi",
|
| 488 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 489 |
+
"Sodinokibi",
|
| 490 |
+
"REvil",
|
| 491 |
+
"Reliable Dollar"
|
| 492 |
+
],
|
| 493 |
+
"first_seen": 2019,
|
| 494 |
+
"status": "Disbanded",
|
| 495 |
+
"description_fr": "REvil a été l'un des groupes les plus destructeurs et visibles de son époque, responsable de l'attaque Kaseya de 2021. Son infrastructure a été démantelée mais ses techniques continuent d'être copiées.",
|
| 496 |
+
"description_en": "REvil was one of the most destructive and visible groups of its era, responsible for the 2021 Kaseya attack. Its infrastructure was dismantled but its techniques continue to be copied.",
|
| 497 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation de vulnérabilités supply-chain, utilisation extensive de Cobalt Strike, déploiement de backdoors permanentes, extraction de données en volume massif, négociations publiques et moqueries des victimes.",
|
| 498 |
+
"ttps_en": "Exploitation of supply-chain vulnerabilities, extensive Cobalt Strike usage, permanent backdoor deployment, massive volume data extraction, public negotiations and victim mockery.",
|
| 499 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Supply_Chain",
|
| 500 |
+
"encryption_type": "RSA-2048",
|
| 501 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 502 |
+
"triple_extortion": true,
|
| 503 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 504 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 505 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 506 |
+
"Government",
|
| 507 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 508 |
+
],
|
| 509 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 510 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 511 |
+
"T1566",
|
| 512 |
+
"T1486",
|
| 513 |
+
"T1041"
|
| 514 |
+
],
|
| 515 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 516 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 517 |
+
"revil.onion",
|
| 518 |
+
"recoverfiles.top"
|
| 519 |
+
],
|
| 520 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 521 |
+
".revil"
|
| 522 |
+
],
|
| 523 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 524 |
+
"REvil_RANSOM.txt"
|
| 525 |
+
]
|
| 526 |
+
}
|
| 527 |
+
},
|
| 528 |
+
{
|
| 529 |
+
"id": "darkside",
|
| 530 |
+
"name": "DarkSide",
|
| 531 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 532 |
+
"DarkSide Ransomware"
|
| 533 |
+
],
|
| 534 |
+
"first_seen": 2020,
|
| 535 |
+
"status": "Disbanded",
|
| 536 |
+
"description_fr": "DarkSide a été responsable de l'attaque historique contre Colonial Pipeline en 2021. Le groupe a cessé ses opérations publiquement mais ses techniques et infrastructure survivent dans d'autres groupes comme BlackCat.",
|
| 537 |
+
"description_en": "DarkSide was responsible for the historic 2021 Colonial Pipeline attack. The group publicly ceased operations but its techniques and infrastructure survive in other groups like BlackCat.",
|
| 538 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Ciblage d'infrastructure critique, exploitation de vulnérabilités d'authentification, utilisation de ransomware modulaire, double extorsion avec engagement public, pression sur les autorités gouvernementales.",
|
| 539 |
+
"ttps_en": "Critical infrastructure targeting, exploitation of authentication vulnerabilities, modular ransomware usage, double extortion with public engagement, pressure on government authorities.",
|
| 540 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 541 |
+
"encryption_type": "RSA-2048",
|
| 542 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 543 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 544 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 545 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 546 |
+
"Energy",
|
| 547 |
+
"Government"
|
| 548 |
+
],
|
| 549 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 550 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 551 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 552 |
+
"T1486",
|
| 553 |
+
"T1041"
|
| 554 |
+
],
|
| 555 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 556 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 557 |
+
"darkside.onion"
|
| 558 |
+
],
|
| 559 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 560 |
+
".darkside"
|
| 561 |
+
],
|
| 562 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 563 |
+
"DARKSIDE_README.txt"
|
| 564 |
+
]
|
| 565 |
+
}
|
| 566 |
+
},
|
| 567 |
+
{
|
| 568 |
+
"id": "babuk",
|
| 569 |
+
"name": "Babuk",
|
| 570 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 571 |
+
"Babuk Locker"
|
| 572 |
+
],
|
| 573 |
+
"first_seen": 2021,
|
| 574 |
+
"status": "Rebranded",
|
| 575 |
+
"description_fr": "Babuk a débuté comme un groupe de ransomware autonome avant de fusionner et d'évoluer. Ses descendants opèrent maintenant sous plusieurs noms, notamment Babuk Tortilla et d'autres variantes.",
|
| 576 |
+
"description_en": "Babuk started as a standalone ransomware group before merging and evolving. Its descendants now operate under several names, notably Babuk Tortilla and other variants.",
|
| 577 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation de vulnérabilités de gestion d'accès à distance, injection de shellcode, utilisation de malwares fonctionnels, chiffrement sélectif basé sur signatures, exfiltration parallèle à l'encryption.",
|
| 578 |
+
"ttps_en": "Exploitation of remote access management vulnerabilities, shellcode injection, functional malware usage, signature-based selective encryption, parallel exfiltration to encryption.",
|
| 579 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "RDP",
|
| 580 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 581 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 582 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 583 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 584 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 585 |
+
"Finance"
|
| 586 |
+
],
|
| 587 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 588 |
+
"T1055",
|
| 589 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 590 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 591 |
+
],
|
| 592 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 593 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 594 |
+
"babuk.onion"
|
| 595 |
+
],
|
| 596 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 597 |
+
".babuk"
|
| 598 |
+
],
|
| 599 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 600 |
+
"BABUK_NOTE.txt"
|
| 601 |
+
]
|
| 602 |
+
}
|
| 603 |
+
},
|
| 604 |
+
{
|
| 605 |
+
"id": "avoslocker",
|
| 606 |
+
"name": "AvosLocker",
|
| 607 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 608 |
+
"Avos Locker"
|
| 609 |
+
],
|
| 610 |
+
"first_seen": 2021,
|
| 611 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 612 |
+
"description_fr": "AvosLocker est connu pour son approche ciblée et ses opérations très discrètes. Utilise des techniques de chiffrement personnalisées et évite les gros titres publicitaires contrairement à ses concurrents.",
|
| 613 |
+
"description_en": "AvosLocker is known for its targeted approach and very discreet operations. Uses customized encryption techniques and avoids media headlines unlike competitors.",
|
| 614 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Accès via points d'extrémité non surveillés, déploiement de backdoors avant chiffrement, utilisation de clés de chiffrement uniques par victime, exfiltration sélective de données de valeur.",
|
| 615 |
+
"ttps_en": "Access via unmonitored endpoints, backdoor deployment before encryption, use of unique encryption keys per victim, selective exfiltration of valuable data.",
|
| 616 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Drive_By",
|
| 617 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 618 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 619 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 620 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 621 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 622 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 623 |
+
],
|
| 624 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 625 |
+
"T1133",
|
| 626 |
+
"T1566",
|
| 627 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 628 |
+
],
|
| 629 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 630 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 631 |
+
"avoslocker.su"
|
| 632 |
+
],
|
| 633 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 634 |
+
".avos"
|
| 635 |
+
],
|
| 636 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 637 |
+
"AVOS_RANSOM.txt"
|
| 638 |
+
]
|
| 639 |
+
}
|
| 640 |
+
},
|
| 641 |
+
{
|
| 642 |
+
"id": "cuba",
|
| 643 |
+
"name": "Cuba",
|
| 644 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 645 |
+
"Cuba Ransomware"
|
| 646 |
+
],
|
| 647 |
+
"first_seen": 2020,
|
| 648 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 649 |
+
"description_fr": "Cuba cible principalement les organisations financières et gouvernementales. Utilise une infrastructure distribuée et pratique une extorsion agressive sans toujours procéder au chiffrement complet.",
|
| 650 |
+
"description_en": "Cuba primarily targets financial and government organizations. Uses distributed infrastructure and practices aggressive extortion without always performing full encryption.",
|
| 651 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation de failles RDP et VPN, déploiement de webshells persistantes, exfiltration de données sensibles, négociation directe avec responsables IT, chiffrement sélectif des fichiers critiques.",
|
| 652 |
+
"ttps_en": "Exploitation of RDP and VPN flaws, persistent webshell deployment, sensitive data exfiltration, direct negotiation with IT decision-makers, selective critical file encryption.",
|
| 653 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 654 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 655 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 656 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 657 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 658 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 659 |
+
"Government"
|
| 660 |
+
],
|
| 661 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 662 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 663 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 664 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 665 |
+
],
|
| 666 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 667 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 668 |
+
"cuba.su"
|
| 669 |
+
],
|
| 670 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 671 |
+
".cuba"
|
| 672 |
+
],
|
| 673 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 674 |
+
"CUBA_RANSOM.txt"
|
| 675 |
+
]
|
| 676 |
+
}
|
| 677 |
+
},
|
| 678 |
+
{
|
| 679 |
+
"id": "ragnar_locker",
|
| 680 |
+
"name": "Ragnar Locker",
|
| 681 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 682 |
+
"Ragnar",
|
| 683 |
+
"Ragnarok Locker"
|
| 684 |
+
],
|
| 685 |
+
"first_seen": 2020,
|
| 686 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 687 |
+
"description_fr": "Ragnar Locker cible les organisations mari times, aéroportuaires et portuaires avec une préférence pour l'extorsion sans chiffrement pour maximiser la récupération rapide. Utilise des menaces de blocage commercial.",
|
| 688 |
+
"description_en": "Ragnar Locker targets maritime, airport, and port organizations with preference for extortion without encryption for rapid recovery. Uses commercial blockade threats.",
|
| 689 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Reconnaissance ciblée d'infrastructure critique, accès via supplier compromises, déploiement de moniteurs de système, exfiltration sélective de données commerciales critiques, menaces publiques.",
|
| 690 |
+
"ttps_en": "Targeted critical infrastructure reconnaissance, access via supplier compromises, system monitor deployment, selective critical business data exfiltration, public threats.",
|
| 691 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Supply_Chain",
|
| 692 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 693 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 694 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 695 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 696 |
+
"Government",
|
| 697 |
+
"Finance"
|
| 698 |
+
],
|
| 699 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 700 |
+
"T1046",
|
| 701 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 702 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 703 |
+
],
|
| 704 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 705 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 706 |
+
"ragnarlocker.top"
|
| 707 |
+
],
|
| 708 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 709 |
+
".ragnar"
|
| 710 |
+
],
|
| 711 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 712 |
+
"RAGNAR_NOTE.txt"
|
| 713 |
+
]
|
| 714 |
+
}
|
| 715 |
+
},
|
| 716 |
+
{
|
| 717 |
+
"id": "mountlocker",
|
| 718 |
+
"name": "MountLocker",
|
| 719 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 720 |
+
"Mount Locker"
|
| 721 |
+
],
|
| 722 |
+
"first_seen": 2020,
|
| 723 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 724 |
+
"description_fr": "MountLocker est un groupe orienté business opérant sous modèle RaaS. Cible les PME avec une approche moins bruyante que les groupes majeurs, utilisant des techniques d'accès longue durée.",
|
| 725 |
+
"description_en": "MountLocker is a business-oriented group operating under RaaS model. Targets SMEs with less noisy approach than major groups, using long-term access techniques.",
|
| 726 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Accès via compromissions d'email lentes, déploiement d'infostealer malware, reconnaissance interne étendue, installation de clé de déchiffrement distribuée, double extorsion selective.",
|
| 727 |
+
"ttps_en": "Access via slow email compromises, infostealer malware deployment, extended internal reconnaissance, distributed decryption key installation, selective double extortion.",
|
| 728 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Phishing",
|
| 729 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 730 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 731 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 732 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 733 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 734 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 735 |
+
],
|
| 736 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 737 |
+
"T1566",
|
| 738 |
+
"T1059",
|
| 739 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 740 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 741 |
+
],
|
| 742 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 743 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 744 |
+
"mountlocker.top"
|
| 745 |
+
],
|
| 746 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 747 |
+
".mount"
|
| 748 |
+
],
|
| 749 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 750 |
+
"MOUNT_LOCKER_NOTE.txt"
|
| 751 |
+
]
|
| 752 |
+
}
|
| 753 |
+
},
|
| 754 |
+
{
|
| 755 |
+
"id": "epsilon_red",
|
| 756 |
+
"name": "Epsilon Red",
|
| 757 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 758 |
+
"Epsilon"
|
| 759 |
+
],
|
| 760 |
+
"first_seen": 2021,
|
| 761 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 762 |
+
"description_fr": "Epsilon Red se focalise sur les attaques contre les infrastructures critiques et les data centers. Utilise des outils de pentesting légitimes détournés pour rester furtif et minimiser les détections.",
|
| 763 |
+
"description_en": "Epsilon Red focuses on attacks against critical infrastructure and data centers. Uses legitimate pentesting tools repurposed for stealth and minimal detection.",
|
| 764 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation de processus de gestion de configurations, utilisation d'outils Fortinet, pivotement rapide via SSH, déploiement de miners de crypto en parallèle, chiffrement AES-256 offensif.",
|
| 765 |
+
"ttps_en": "Exploitation of configuration management processes, Fortinet tools usage, rapid SSH pivoting, parallel crypto mining deployment, aggressive AES-256 encryption.",
|
| 766 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 767 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 768 |
+
"double_extortion": false,
|
| 769 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 770 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 771 |
+
"Government",
|
| 772 |
+
"Finance"
|
| 773 |
+
],
|
| 774 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 775 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 776 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 777 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 778 |
+
],
|
| 779 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 780 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 781 |
+
"epsilon.red"
|
| 782 |
+
],
|
| 783 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 784 |
+
".epsilon"
|
| 785 |
+
],
|
| 786 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 787 |
+
"EPSILON_NOTE.txt"
|
| 788 |
+
]
|
| 789 |
+
}
|
| 790 |
+
},
|
| 791 |
+
{
|
| 792 |
+
"id": "hello_kitty",
|
| 793 |
+
"name": "HelloKitty",
|
| 794 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 795 |
+
"HK Locker",
|
| 796 |
+
"Floppy"
|
| 797 |
+
],
|
| 798 |
+
"first_seen": 2020,
|
| 799 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 800 |
+
"description_fr": "HelloKitty est un groupe opérant depuis l'Asie de l'Est cible les studios de jeux vidéo et les sociétés de production. Connu pour exfiltrer des données de développement de jeux en cours.",
|
| 801 |
+
"description_en": "HelloKitty is a group operating from East Asia targeting video game studios and production companies. Known for exfiltrating ongoing game development data.",
|
| 802 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Compromission de studios via phishing ciblé, exfiltration de code source et assets en 3D, demandes de rançon basées sur la valeur développement, publication de démos de jeux volées.",
|
| 803 |
+
"ttps_en": "Studio compromise via targeted phishing, exfiltration of source code and 3D assets, ransom demands based on development value, publication of stolen game demos.",
|
| 804 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Phishing",
|
| 805 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 806 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 807 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 808 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 809 |
+
"Education",
|
| 810 |
+
"Finance"
|
| 811 |
+
],
|
| 812 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 813 |
+
"T1566",
|
| 814 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 815 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 816 |
+
],
|
| 817 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 818 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 819 |
+
"hellokitty.top"
|
| 820 |
+
],
|
| 821 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 822 |
+
".hellokitty"
|
| 823 |
+
],
|
| 824 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 825 |
+
"HELLOKITTY_NOTE.txt"
|
| 826 |
+
]
|
| 827 |
+
}
|
| 828 |
+
},
|
| 829 |
+
{
|
| 830 |
+
"id": "quantum",
|
| 831 |
+
"name": "Quantum",
|
| 832 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 833 |
+
"Quantum Locker"
|
| 834 |
+
],
|
| 835 |
+
"first_seen": 2021,
|
| 836 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 837 |
+
"description_fr": "Quantum est un groupe hautement orienté profit cibleant les organisations ayant capacité de paiement élevée. Offre des services de RaaS haut de gamme avec support client dédié.",
|
| 838 |
+
"description_en": "Quantum is a highly profit-oriented group targeting organizations with high payment capacity. Offers premium RaaS services with dedicated customer support.",
|
| 839 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation de vulnérabilités critiques Microsoft, utilisation de trojans bancaires personnalisés, déploiement de modules d'exfiltration modulaires, chiffrement chaîné AES-RSA, gestion centralisée des victimes.",
|
| 840 |
+
"ttps_en": "Exploitation of critical Microsoft vulnerabilities, custom banking trojan usage, modular exfiltration module deployment, chained AES-RSA encryption, centralized victim management.",
|
| 841 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 842 |
+
"encryption_type": "Hybrid",
|
| 843 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 844 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 845 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 846 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 847 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 848 |
+
],
|
| 849 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 850 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 851 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 852 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 853 |
+
],
|
| 854 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 855 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 856 |
+
"quantum.su"
|
| 857 |
+
],
|
| 858 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 859 |
+
".quantum"
|
| 860 |
+
],
|
| 861 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 862 |
+
"QUANTUM_NOTE.txt"
|
| 863 |
+
]
|
| 864 |
+
}
|
| 865 |
+
},
|
| 866 |
+
{
|
| 867 |
+
"id": "snatch",
|
| 868 |
+
"name": "Snatch",
|
| 869 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 870 |
+
"Snatch Locker"
|
| 871 |
+
],
|
| 872 |
+
"first_seen": 2020,
|
| 873 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 874 |
+
"description_fr": "Snatch est connu pour utiliser des techniques d'accès CNAME et d'authentification réseau pour rester furtif. Évite les outils d'hacking populaires privilégiant les techniques Windows natives.",
|
| 875 |
+
"description_en": "Snatch is known for using CNAME access techniques and network authentication to remain stealthy. Avoids popular hacking tools favoring native Windows techniques.",
|
| 876 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Utilisation de CNAME DNS pour accès réseau, exploitation de politiques d'authentification, déploiement de shell d'accès à distance natifs Windows, chiffrement AES sans modifications fichier signature.",
|
| 877 |
+
"ttps_en": "CNAME DNS usage for network access, authentication policy exploitation, native Windows remote access shell deployment, AES encryption without file signature modifications.",
|
| 878 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "RDP",
|
| 879 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 880 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 881 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 882 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 883 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 884 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 885 |
+
],
|
| 886 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 887 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 888 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 889 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 890 |
+
],
|
| 891 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 892 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 893 |
+
"snatch.su"
|
| 894 |
+
],
|
| 895 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 896 |
+
".snatch"
|
| 897 |
+
],
|
| 898 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 899 |
+
"SNATCH_NOTE.txt"
|
| 900 |
+
]
|
| 901 |
+
}
|
| 902 |
+
},
|
| 903 |
+
{
|
| 904 |
+
"id": "synack",
|
| 905 |
+
"name": "Synack",
|
| 906 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 907 |
+
"Synack Ransomware"
|
| 908 |
+
],
|
| 909 |
+
"first_seen": 2021,
|
| 910 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 911 |
+
"description_fr": "Synack cible les organisations gouvernementales et militaires avec des techniques sophistiquées de maquillage et de détournement de codes malveillants dans des fichiers bureautique.",
|
| 912 |
+
"description_en": "Synack targets government and military organizations with sophisticated obfuscation and malware hijacking techniques in office files.",
|
| 913 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Injection de malware dans documents Microsoft Office, utilisation de leurres professionnels, exfiltration de documents classifiés, chiffrement XChaCha20, demandes de rançon massives ciblant budgets gouvernementaux.",
|
| 914 |
+
"ttps_en": "Microsoft Office document malware injection, professional lure usage, classified document exfiltration, XChaCha20 encryption, massive ransom demands targeting government budgets.",
|
| 915 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Phishing",
|
| 916 |
+
"encryption_type": "ChaCha20",
|
| 917 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 918 |
+
"triple_extortion": true,
|
| 919 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 920 |
+
"Government"
|
| 921 |
+
],
|
| 922 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 923 |
+
"T1566",
|
| 924 |
+
"T1203",
|
| 925 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 926 |
+
],
|
| 927 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 928 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 929 |
+
"synack.su"
|
| 930 |
+
],
|
| 931 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 932 |
+
".synack"
|
| 933 |
+
],
|
| 934 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 935 |
+
"SYNACK_NOTE.txt"
|
| 936 |
+
]
|
| 937 |
+
}
|
| 938 |
+
},
|
| 939 |
+
{
|
| 940 |
+
"id": "twisted_spider",
|
| 941 |
+
"name": "Twisted Spider",
|
| 942 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 943 |
+
"Gold Spider",
|
| 944 |
+
"FIN7"
|
| 945 |
+
],
|
| 946 |
+
"first_seen": 2015,
|
| 947 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 948 |
+
"description_fr": "Twisted Spider est un groupe sophistiqué affilié à des entités d'État, connu pour ses campagnes de ciblage précises contre des secteurs stratégiques. Utilise une infrastructure C2 très résiliente.",
|
| 949 |
+
"description_en": "Twisted Spider is a sophisticated group affiliated with state entities, known for precise targeting campaigns against strategic sectors. Uses highly resilient C2 infrastructure.",
|
| 950 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Phishing ciblé contre cadres, déploiement de backdoors multi-étapes, maintenance d'accès long terme via proxies, exfiltration progressive de données stratégiques, chiffrement basé sur politique de fichiers.",
|
| 951 |
+
"ttps_en": "Targeted executive phishing, multi-stage backdoor deployment, long-term access maintenance via proxies, progressive strategic data exfiltration, policy-based file encryption.",
|
| 952 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Phishing",
|
| 953 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 954 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 955 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 956 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 957 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 958 |
+
"Government",
|
| 959 |
+
"Healthcare"
|
| 960 |
+
],
|
| 961 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 962 |
+
"T1566",
|
| 963 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 964 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 965 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 966 |
+
],
|
| 967 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 968 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 969 |
+
"twisted.su"
|
| 970 |
+
],
|
| 971 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 972 |
+
".twisted"
|
| 973 |
+
],
|
| 974 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 975 |
+
"TWISTED_NOTE.txt"
|
| 976 |
+
]
|
| 977 |
+
}
|
| 978 |
+
},
|
| 979 |
+
{
|
| 980 |
+
"id": "maze",
|
| 981 |
+
"name": "Maze",
|
| 982 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 983 |
+
"Maze Ransomware"
|
| 984 |
+
],
|
| 985 |
+
"first_seen": 2019,
|
| 986 |
+
"status": "Disbanded",
|
| 987 |
+
"description_fr": "Maze a été l'un des pionniers du modèle de double extorsion. Le groupe a annoncé sa dissolution mais ses malwares circulent toujours et ses techniques ont été adoptées par d'autres.",
|
| 988 |
+
"description_en": "Maze was one of the pioneers of the double extortion model. The group announced its dissolution but its malware continues to circulate and its techniques have been adopted by others.",
|
| 989 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation de vulnérabilités critiques, utilisation de Cobalt Strike massif, déploiement de webshells SSH, double extorsion systématique, publication progressive de données pour maximiser impact.",
|
| 990 |
+
"ttps_en": "Critical vulnerability exploitation, massive Cobalt Strike usage, SSH webshell deployment, systematic double extortion, progressive data publication for maximum impact.",
|
| 991 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 992 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 993 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 994 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 995 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 996 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 997 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 998 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 999 |
+
],
|
| 1000 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1001 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 1002 |
+
"T1059",
|
| 1003 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1004 |
+
],
|
| 1005 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1006 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1007 |
+
"maze.onion"
|
| 1008 |
+
],
|
| 1009 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1010 |
+
".maze"
|
| 1011 |
+
],
|
| 1012 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1013 |
+
"MAZE_RANSOM.txt"
|
| 1014 |
+
]
|
| 1015 |
+
}
|
| 1016 |
+
},
|
| 1017 |
+
{
|
| 1018 |
+
"id": "netwalker",
|
| 1019 |
+
"name": "NetWalker",
|
| 1020 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1021 |
+
"Netwalker Ransomware"
|
| 1022 |
+
],
|
| 1023 |
+
"first_seen": 2019,
|
| 1024 |
+
"status": "Disbanded",
|
| 1025 |
+
"description_fr": "NetWalker a cible les secteurs critiques avec un modèle RaaS hautement professionnel. Son opérateur principal a été arrêté en 2021 mettant fin aux opérations principales.",
|
| 1026 |
+
"description_en": "NetWalker targeted critical sectors with a highly professional RaaS model. Its primary operator was arrested in 2021 ending main operations.",
|
| 1027 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Compromission via email malveillants sophistiqués, déploiement de crypteurs polymorphes, chiffrement sélectif basé sur extensions fichiers, double extorsion avec pressions psychologiques.",
|
| 1028 |
+
"ttps_en": "Compromise via sophisticated malicious emails, polymorphic crypter deployment, extension-based selective encryption, double extortion with psychological pressure.",
|
| 1029 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Phishing",
|
| 1030 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1031 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1032 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1033 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1034 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 1035 |
+
"Finance"
|
| 1036 |
+
],
|
| 1037 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1038 |
+
"T1566",
|
| 1039 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1040 |
+
],
|
| 1041 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1042 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1043 |
+
"netwalker.onion"
|
| 1044 |
+
],
|
| 1045 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1046 |
+
".netwalker"
|
| 1047 |
+
],
|
| 1048 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1049 |
+
"NETWALKER_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1050 |
+
]
|
| 1051 |
+
}
|
| 1052 |
+
},
|
| 1053 |
+
{
|
| 1054 |
+
"id": "egregor",
|
| 1055 |
+
"name": "Egregor",
|
| 1056 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1057 |
+
"Egregor Ransomware"
|
| 1058 |
+
],
|
| 1059 |
+
"first_seen": 2020,
|
| 1060 |
+
"status": "Disbanded",
|
| 1061 |
+
"description_fr": "Egregor a succédé à Maze en reprenant infrastructure et techniques. Le groupe a annoncé son arrêt en 2021 suite à une opération du FBI. Ses malwares et outils circulen toujours.",
|
| 1062 |
+
"description_en": "Egregor succeeded Maze taking over infrastructure and techniques. The group announced its halt in 2021 following FBI operation. Its malware and tools continue to circulate.",
|
| 1063 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation d'appliances VPN critiques, utilisation de Cobalt Strike avec C2 personnalisés, déploiement de webshells SSH permanentes, double extorsion avec pressions de publication quotidiennes.",
|
| 1064 |
+
"ttps_en": "Exploitation of critical VPN appliances, Cobalt Strike usage with custom C2, permanent SSH webshell deployment, double extortion with daily publication pressure.",
|
| 1065 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 1066 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1067 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1068 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1069 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1070 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 1071 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 1072 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 1073 |
+
],
|
| 1074 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1075 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 1076 |
+
"T1059",
|
| 1077 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1078 |
+
],
|
| 1079 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1080 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1081 |
+
"egregor.onion"
|
| 1082 |
+
],
|
| 1083 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1084 |
+
".egregor"
|
| 1085 |
+
],
|
| 1086 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1087 |
+
"EGREGOR_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1088 |
+
]
|
| 1089 |
+
}
|
| 1090 |
+
},
|
| 1091 |
+
{
|
| 1092 |
+
"id": "sodinokibi_variant",
|
| 1093 |
+
"name": "Sodinokibi Variant",
|
| 1094 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1095 |
+
"GandCrab Successor"
|
| 1096 |
+
],
|
| 1097 |
+
"first_seen": 2019,
|
| 1098 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 1099 |
+
"description_fr": "Variante du malware Sodinokibi opérée par une coalition de cybercriminels décentralisée. Caractérisée par une évolution rapide des techniques et l'utilisation de publicités malveillantes massives.",
|
| 1100 |
+
"description_en": "Sodinokibi malware variant operated by decentralized cybercriminal coalition. Characterized by rapid technique evolution and massive malvertising usage.",
|
| 1101 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Infection via publicités malveillantes (malvertising), exploitation de vulnérabilités navigateur jour-zéro, déploiement de malwares stager multi-étages, chiffrement adaptatif selon capacité système.",
|
| 1102 |
+
"ttps_en": "Infection via malvertising, exploitation of zero-day browser vulnerabilities, multi-stage malware stager deployment, adaptive encryption based on system capacity.",
|
| 1103 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Drive_By",
|
| 1104 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1105 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1106 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1107 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1108 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 1109 |
+
"Healthcare"
|
| 1110 |
+
],
|
| 1111 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1112 |
+
"T1189",
|
| 1113 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 1114 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1115 |
+
],
|
| 1116 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1117 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1118 |
+
"sodinokibi.su"
|
| 1119 |
+
],
|
| 1120 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1121 |
+
".sodin"
|
| 1122 |
+
],
|
| 1123 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1124 |
+
"SODIN_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1125 |
+
]
|
| 1126 |
+
}
|
| 1127 |
+
},
|
| 1128 |
+
{
|
| 1129 |
+
"id": "lockergoga",
|
| 1130 |
+
"name": "LockerGoga",
|
| 1131 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1132 |
+
"Locker Goga"
|
| 1133 |
+
],
|
| 1134 |
+
"first_seen": 2019,
|
| 1135 |
+
"status": "Disbanded",
|
| 1136 |
+
"description_fr": "LockerGoga a cible des organisations Fortune 500 avec une approche très discrète. Ses opérateurs ont opéré de manière très ciblée et peu visible comparée à d'autres groupes.",
|
| 1137 |
+
"description_en": "LockerGoga targeted Fortune 500 organizations with very discreet approach. Its operators worked in highly targeted and low-visibility manner compared to other groups.",
|
| 1138 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Accès via compromissions de fournisseurs d'infrastructure, déploiement de malwares custom développés, absence de fenêtre d'exfiltration détectable, chiffrement très rapide et discret.",
|
| 1139 |
+
"ttps_en": "Access via infrastructure supplier compromises, custom malware deployment, no detectable exfiltration window, very rapid and discreet encryption.",
|
| 1140 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Supply_Chain",
|
| 1141 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1142 |
+
"double_extortion": false,
|
| 1143 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1144 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1145 |
+
"Manufacturing",
|
| 1146 |
+
"Finance"
|
| 1147 |
+
],
|
| 1148 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1149 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 1150 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1151 |
+
],
|
| 1152 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1153 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1154 |
+
"lockergoga.onion"
|
| 1155 |
+
],
|
| 1156 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1157 |
+
".locked"
|
| 1158 |
+
],
|
| 1159 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1160 |
+
"LOCKERGOGA_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1161 |
+
]
|
| 1162 |
+
}
|
| 1163 |
+
},
|
| 1164 |
+
{
|
| 1165 |
+
"id": "thronis",
|
| 1166 |
+
"name": "Thronis",
|
| 1167 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1168 |
+
"Throni Locker"
|
| 1169 |
+
],
|
| 1170 |
+
"first_seen": 2022,
|
| 1171 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 1172 |
+
"description_fr": "Thronis est un groupe émergeant utilisant des techniques de chiffrement personnalisées et évolutives. Se focalise sur les secteurs moins défendus et SME en Europe de l'Est.",
|
| 1173 |
+
"description_en": "Thronis is an emerging group using custom and evolving encryption techniques. Focuses on less-defended sectors and SMEs in Eastern Europe.",
|
| 1174 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Accès via compromission de registrars de domaines, déploiement de malwares polymorphes, exfiltration progressive et segmentée, chiffrement adaptatif par type fichier.",
|
| 1175 |
+
"ttps_en": "Access via domain registrar compromise, polymorphic malware deployment, progressive and segmented exfiltration, adaptive encryption by file type.",
|
| 1176 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "RDP",
|
| 1177 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1178 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1179 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1180 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1181 |
+
"Manufacturing",
|
| 1182 |
+
"Finance"
|
| 1183 |
+
],
|
| 1184 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1185 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 1186 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 1187 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1188 |
+
],
|
| 1189 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1190 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1191 |
+
"thronis.top"
|
| 1192 |
+
],
|
| 1193 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1194 |
+
".thronis"
|
| 1195 |
+
],
|
| 1196 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1197 |
+
"THRONIS_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1198 |
+
]
|
| 1199 |
+
}
|
| 1200 |
+
},
|
| 1201 |
+
{
|
| 1202 |
+
"id": "cliffhanger",
|
| 1203 |
+
"name": "Cliffhanger",
|
| 1204 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1205 |
+
"Cliff",
|
| 1206 |
+
"Cliffhanger Group"
|
| 1207 |
+
],
|
| 1208 |
+
"first_seen": 2023,
|
| 1209 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 1210 |
+
"description_fr": "Cliffhanger est un groupe nouveau entrant pratiquant des attaques très rapides sans phase de reconnaissance longue. Cible les PME avec des demandes modérées mais non négociables.",
|
| 1211 |
+
"description_en": "Cliffhanger is a new entrant group practicing very rapid attacks without long reconnaissance phase. Targets SMEs with moderate but non-negotiable demands.",
|
| 1212 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation d'authentifications non sécurisées, déploiement de crypto-mineurs parallèles, chiffrement en une seule passe, exfiltration minimale, pression rapide de paiement.",
|
| 1213 |
+
"ttps_en": "Exploitation of unsecured authentications, parallel crypto-miner deployment, single-pass encryption, minimal exfiltration, rapid payment pressure.",
|
| 1214 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "RDP",
|
| 1215 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1216 |
+
"double_extortion": false,
|
| 1217 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1218 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1219 |
+
"Manufacturing",
|
| 1220 |
+
"Healthcare"
|
| 1221 |
+
],
|
| 1222 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1223 |
+
"T1078",
|
| 1224 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1225 |
+
],
|
| 1226 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1227 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1228 |
+
"cliffhanger.su"
|
| 1229 |
+
],
|
| 1230 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1231 |
+
".cliff"
|
| 1232 |
+
],
|
| 1233 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1234 |
+
"CLIFFHANGER_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1235 |
+
]
|
| 1236 |
+
}
|
| 1237 |
+
},
|
| 1238 |
+
{
|
| 1239 |
+
"id": "lockbit2",
|
| 1240 |
+
"name": "LockBit 2.0",
|
| 1241 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1242 |
+
"LockBit v2",
|
| 1243 |
+
"LockBit Black"
|
| 1244 |
+
],
|
| 1245 |
+
"first_seen": 2021,
|
| 1246 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 1247 |
+
"description_fr": "LockBit 2.0 a introduit des améliorations majeures au ransomware originel incluant chiffrement multi-thread optimisé et infrastructure RaaS distribuée. Successeur direct du LockBit originel.",
|
| 1248 |
+
"description_en": "LockBit 2.0 introduced major improvements to original ransomware including optimized multi-thread encryption and distributed RaaS infrastructure. Direct successor to original LockBit.",
|
| 1249 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Chiffrement multi-thread ultra-rapide utilisant CPU physiques, exploitation de vuln 0-day ciblées, pivotement via compte domaine administrateur, absence de changement extension fichier.",
|
| 1250 |
+
"ttps_en": "Ultra-fast multi-thread encryption using physical CPUs, exploitation of targeted 0-day vulnerabilities, pivoting via admin domain accounts, no file extension change.",
|
| 1251 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 1252 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1253 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1254 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1255 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1256 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 1257 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 1258 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 1259 |
+
],
|
| 1260 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1261 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 1262 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 1263 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1264 |
+
],
|
| 1265 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1266 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1267 |
+
"lockbit2.su"
|
| 1268 |
+
],
|
| 1269 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1270 |
+
".lockbit2"
|
| 1271 |
+
],
|
| 1272 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1273 |
+
"LOCKBIT2_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1274 |
+
]
|
| 1275 |
+
}
|
| 1276 |
+
},
|
| 1277 |
+
{
|
| 1278 |
+
"id": "scattered_spider",
|
| 1279 |
+
"name": "Scattered Spider",
|
| 1280 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1281 |
+
"UNC3944",
|
| 1282 |
+
"Scatter"
|
| 1283 |
+
],
|
| 1284 |
+
"first_seen": 2022,
|
| 1285 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 1286 |
+
"description_fr": "Scattered Spider est connu pour des attaques très ciblées utilisant l'ingénierie sociale et le social engineering. Cible les cadres avec des approches de prétextes très élaborés.",
|
| 1287 |
+
"description_en": "Scattered Spider is known for highly targeted attacks using social engineering and pretexting. Targets executives with very elaborate pretext approaches.",
|
| 1288 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Ingénierie sociale sophistiquée ciblant exécutifs, compromission de comptes d'authentification avec MFA, déploiement de backdoors via outils admin legit, exfiltration sélective données sensibles.",
|
| 1289 |
+
"ttps_en": "Sophisticated social engineering targeting executives, MFA-enabled account compromise, backdoor deployment via legitimate admin tools, selective sensitive data exfiltration.",
|
| 1290 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Phishing",
|
| 1291 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1292 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1293 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1294 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1295 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 1296 |
+
"Technology"
|
| 1297 |
+
],
|
| 1298 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1299 |
+
"T1566",
|
| 1300 |
+
"T1528",
|
| 1301 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 1302 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1303 |
+
],
|
| 1304 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1305 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1306 |
+
"scattered.onion"
|
| 1307 |
+
],
|
| 1308 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1309 |
+
".scattered"
|
| 1310 |
+
],
|
| 1311 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1312 |
+
"SCATTERED_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1313 |
+
]
|
| 1314 |
+
}
|
| 1315 |
+
},
|
| 1316 |
+
{
|
| 1317 |
+
"id": "alphv_alphv",
|
| 1318 |
+
"name": "ALPHV (Original)",
|
| 1319 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1320 |
+
"ALPHV Gen 1"
|
| 1321 |
+
],
|
| 1322 |
+
"first_seen": 2021,
|
| 1323 |
+
"status": "Rebranded",
|
| 1324 |
+
"description_fr": "ALPHV original a fusionné avec BlackCat créant une nouvelle entité. Les opérations originales ont mené à l'émergence du groupe BlackCat/ALPHV actuel avec capacités augmentées.",
|
| 1325 |
+
"description_en": "Original ALPHV merged with BlackCat creating new entity. Original operations led to emergence of current BlackCat/ALPHV group with enhanced capabilities.",
|
| 1326 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Infrastructure Rust-based originale, exploitation de vulnérabilités VMware et Citrix, modèle RaaS distribué initial, chiffrement personnalisé par ransomware operator.",
|
| 1327 |
+
"ttps_en": "Original Rust-based infrastructure, VMware and Citrix vulnerability exploitation, initial distributed RaaS model, customized encryption per ransomware operator.",
|
| 1328 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 1329 |
+
"encryption_type": "Hybrid",
|
| 1330 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1331 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1332 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1333 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 1334 |
+
"Healthcare"
|
| 1335 |
+
],
|
| 1336 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1337 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 1338 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1339 |
+
],
|
| 1340 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1341 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1342 |
+
"alphv.old"
|
| 1343 |
+
],
|
| 1344 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1345 |
+
".alphv"
|
| 1346 |
+
],
|
| 1347 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1348 |
+
"ALPHV_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1349 |
+
]
|
| 1350 |
+
}
|
| 1351 |
+
},
|
| 1352 |
+
{
|
| 1353 |
+
"id": "lv",
|
| 1354 |
+
"name": "LV (LockBit Variant)",
|
| 1355 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1356 |
+
"LV Ransomware"
|
| 1357 |
+
],
|
| 1358 |
+
"first_seen": 2023,
|
| 1359 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 1360 |
+
"description_fr": "LV est une variante de LockBit opérée par un groupe déviant du collectif principal. Utilise des techniques similaires mais avec infrastructure propre et ciblage différent.",
|
| 1361 |
+
"description_en": "LV is a LockBit variant operated by group deviating from main collective. Uses similar techniques but with own infrastructure and different targeting.",
|
| 1362 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Dérivation de techniques LockBit 3.0 originales, adaptation à ciblage PME, infrastructure distribuée régionale, chiffrement AES-256 optimisé pour petits fichiers.",
|
| 1363 |
+
"ttps_en": "Derivation of original LockBit 3.0 techniques, adaptation to SME targeting, regional distributed infrastructure, AES-256 encryption optimized for small files.",
|
| 1364 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "RDP",
|
| 1365 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1366 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1367 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1368 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1369 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 1370 |
+
"Manufacturing"
|
| 1371 |
+
],
|
| 1372 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1373 |
+
"T1190",
|
| 1374 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1375 |
+
],
|
| 1376 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1377 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1378 |
+
"lv.su"
|
| 1379 |
+
],
|
| 1380 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1381 |
+
".lv"
|
| 1382 |
+
],
|
| 1383 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1384 |
+
"LV_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1385 |
+
]
|
| 1386 |
+
}
|
| 1387 |
+
},
|
| 1388 |
+
{
|
| 1389 |
+
"id": "daixin",
|
| 1390 |
+
"name": "DaiXin Team",
|
| 1391 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1392 |
+
"Daixin",
|
| 1393 |
+
"DaiXin"
|
| 1394 |
+
],
|
| 1395 |
+
"first_seen": 2020,
|
| 1396 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 1397 |
+
"description_fr": "DaiXin Team est un groupe basé en Asie opérant avec une approche plus entrepreneuriale que criminelle. Cible les organisations asiatiques et australiennes avec une préférence pour secteurs financiers.",
|
| 1398 |
+
"description_en": "DaiXin Team is an Asia-based group operating with more entrepreneurial than criminal approach. Targets Asian and Australian organizations with preference for financial sectors.",
|
| 1399 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Exploitation de vulnérabilités réseau peu connus, accès via services d'administration à distance, exfiltration directe vers serveurs asiatiques, chiffrement basé sur clé statique par infrastructure.",
|
| 1400 |
+
"ttps_en": "Exploitation of obscure network vulnerabilities, access via remote administration services, direct exfiltration to Asian servers, static key encryption per infrastructure.",
|
| 1401 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "RDP",
|
| 1402 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1403 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1404 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1405 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1406 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 1407 |
+
"Healthcare"
|
| 1408 |
+
],
|
| 1409 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1410 |
+
"T1133",
|
| 1411 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 1412 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1413 |
+
],
|
| 1414 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1415 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1416 |
+
"daixin.asia"
|
| 1417 |
+
],
|
| 1418 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1419 |
+
".daixin"
|
| 1420 |
+
],
|
| 1421 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1422 |
+
"DAIXIN_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1423 |
+
]
|
| 1424 |
+
}
|
| 1425 |
+
},
|
| 1426 |
+
{
|
| 1427 |
+
"id": "xinglocker",
|
| 1428 |
+
"name": "XingLocker",
|
| 1429 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1430 |
+
"Xing Locker"
|
| 1431 |
+
],
|
| 1432 |
+
"first_seen": 2023,
|
| 1433 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 1434 |
+
"description_fr": "XingLocker est un groupe émergeant originating des cybercriminels basés en Europe de l'Est. Cible PMEs avec stratégie prix réduits mais exécution rapide et efficace.",
|
| 1435 |
+
"description_en": "XingLocker is emerging group from East European cybercriminals. Targets SMEs with reduced price strategy but rapid and effective execution.",
|
| 1436 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Accès via exploitation RDP brute-force, utilisation de mass scanners pour identifier cibles potentielles, encryption rapide sans exfiltration préalable, pression paiement agressive.",
|
| 1437 |
+
"ttps_en": "Access via RDP brute-force exploitation, use of mass scanners to identify potential targets, rapid encryption without prior exfiltration, aggressive payment pressure.",
|
| 1438 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "RDP",
|
| 1439 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1440 |
+
"double_extortion": false,
|
| 1441 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1442 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1443 |
+
"Manufacturing",
|
| 1444 |
+
"Finance"
|
| 1445 |
+
],
|
| 1446 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1447 |
+
"T1078",
|
| 1448 |
+
"T1016",
|
| 1449 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1450 |
+
],
|
| 1451 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1452 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1453 |
+
"xinglocker.top"
|
| 1454 |
+
],
|
| 1455 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1456 |
+
".xing"
|
| 1457 |
+
],
|
| 1458 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1459 |
+
"XINGLOCKER_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1460 |
+
]
|
| 1461 |
+
}
|
| 1462 |
+
},
|
| 1463 |
+
{
|
| 1464 |
+
"id": "nodosecurity",
|
| 1465 |
+
"name": "NoDoSecurity Group",
|
| 1466 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1467 |
+
"NoDoSec"
|
| 1468 |
+
],
|
| 1469 |
+
"first_seen": 2022,
|
| 1470 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 1471 |
+
"description_fr": "NoDoSecurity Group se concentre sur ciblage d'organisations gouvernementales locales. Approche hautement discrète avec faible volume attaques mais forte pression négociation.",
|
| 1472 |
+
"description_en": "NoDoSecurity Group focuses on targeting local government organizations. Highly discreet approach with low attack volume but strong negotiation pressure.",
|
| 1473 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Reconnaissance manuelle approfondie, accès via VPN employee accounts, exfiltration sélective documents sensibles gouvernementaux, chiffrement sélectif, menaces publication documents classifiés.",
|
| 1474 |
+
"ttps_en": "In-depth manual reconnaissance, access via employee VPN accounts, selective exfiltration of sensitive government documents, selective encryption, threats of classified document publication.",
|
| 1475 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "VPN_Exploit",
|
| 1476 |
+
"encryption_type": "AES-256",
|
| 1477 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1478 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1479 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1480 |
+
"Government"
|
| 1481 |
+
],
|
| 1482 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1483 |
+
"T1046",
|
| 1484 |
+
"T1021",
|
| 1485 |
+
"T1041",
|
| 1486 |
+
"T1486"
|
| 1487 |
+
],
|
| 1488 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1489 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1490 |
+
"nodosecurity.onion"
|
| 1491 |
+
],
|
| 1492 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1493 |
+
".nodo"
|
| 1494 |
+
],
|
| 1495 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1496 |
+
"NODOSECURITY_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1497 |
+
]
|
| 1498 |
+
}
|
| 1499 |
+
},
|
| 1500 |
+
{
|
| 1501 |
+
"id": "titan_steam",
|
| 1502 |
+
"name": "Titan Steam",
|
| 1503 |
+
"aliases": [
|
| 1504 |
+
"TitanSteam"
|
| 1505 |
+
],
|
| 1506 |
+
"first_seen": 2023,
|
| 1507 |
+
"status": "Active",
|
| 1508 |
+
"description_fr": "Titan Steam est groupe de ransomware basé sur chaîne d'approvisionnement visant spécifiquement fournisseurs logiciels éducatifs et cloud. Stratégie supply-chain sophisiquée.",
|
| 1509 |
+
"description_en": "Titan Steam is ransomware group based on supply-chain targeting software and cloud education suppliers specifically. Sophisticated supply-chain strategy.",
|
| 1510 |
+
"ttps_fr": "Compromission providers logiciels éducatifs, injection malware dans updates logicielles légitimes, déploiement malware à massive d'institutions, chiffrement synchronisé multi-institutional, extorsion via impact sur éducation.",
|
| 1511 |
+
"ttps_en": "Compromise of education software providers, injection of malware into legitimate software updates, mass malware deployment to institutions, synchronized multi-institutional encryption, extortion via education impact.",
|
| 1512 |
+
"initial_access_vector": "Supply_Chain",
|
| 1513 |
+
"encryption_type": "Hybrid",
|
| 1514 |
+
"double_extortion": true,
|
| 1515 |
+
"triple_extortion": false,
|
| 1516 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 1517 |
+
"Education",
|
| 1518 |
+
"Government"
|
| 1519 |
+
],
|
| 1520 |
+
"mitre_techniques": [
|
| 1521 |
+
"T1195",
|
| 1522 |
+
"T1547",
|
| 1523 |
+
"T1486",
|
| 1524 |
+
"T1041"
|
| 1525 |
+
],
|
| 1526 |
+
"iocs": {
|
| 1527 |
+
"domains": [
|
| 1528 |
+
"titansteam.xyz"
|
| 1529 |
+
],
|
| 1530 |
+
"file_extensions": [
|
| 1531 |
+
".titansteam"
|
| 1532 |
+
],
|
| 1533 |
+
"ransom_note_names": [
|
| 1534 |
+
"TITANSTEAM_NOTE.txt"
|
| 1535 |
+
]
|
| 1536 |
+
}
|
| 1537 |
+
}
|
| 1538 |
+
]
|
data/ransomware_groups.parquet
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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| 1 |
+
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
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| 2 |
+
oid sha256:204aa4f7e7b1d220708805e58a38fab6854c4426bf7a16cd7f5b272bae0a2c31
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| 3 |
+
size 33248
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data/response_playbooks.json
ADDED
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@@ -0,0 +1,902 @@
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| 1 |
+
[
|
| 2 |
+
{
|
| 3 |
+
"id": "prep_edr_hardening",
|
| 4 |
+
"name": "EDR & Security Hardening",
|
| 5 |
+
"phase": "Preparation",
|
| 6 |
+
"description_fr": "Durcissement de l'infrastructure de détection et réponse aux menaces avant incident. Mise à place de EDR robuste, configuration des alertes critiques, établissement de baselines de comportement normal.",
|
| 7 |
+
"description_en": "Hardening of threat detection and response infrastructure before incident. Deployment of robust EDR, critical alert configuration, establishment of normal behavior baselines.",
|
| 8 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 9 |
+
{
|
| 10 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 11 |
+
"action_fr": "Déployer et configurer solution EDR (Sentinel One, CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender)",
|
| 12 |
+
"action_en": "Deploy and configure EDR solution (Sentinel One, CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender)",
|
| 13 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 14 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 15 |
+
},
|
| 16 |
+
{
|
| 17 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 18 |
+
"action_fr": "Établir baselines de comportement normal pour tous les endpoints",
|
| 19 |
+
"action_en": "Establish normal behavior baselines for all endpoints",
|
| 20 |
+
"responsible": "SOC",
|
| 21 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 22 |
+
},
|
| 23 |
+
{
|
| 24 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 25 |
+
"action_fr": "Configurer alertes pour activités suspectes (lateral movement, privilege escalation)",
|
| 26 |
+
"action_en": "Configure alerts for suspicious activities (lateral movement, privilege escalation)",
|
| 27 |
+
"responsible": "SOC",
|
| 28 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 29 |
+
},
|
| 30 |
+
{
|
| 31 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 32 |
+
"action_fr": "Tester EDR via simulation d'attaque interne",
|
| 33 |
+
"action_en": "Test EDR via internal attack simulation",
|
| 34 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 35 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 36 |
+
}
|
| 37 |
+
],
|
| 38 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 39 |
+
"Sentinel One",
|
| 40 |
+
"CrowdStrike",
|
| 41 |
+
"Microsoft Defender",
|
| 42 |
+
"Splunk"
|
| 43 |
+
],
|
| 44 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si EDR non déployé → DÉPLOYER; Si baselines non établies → ÉTABLIR; Si alertes non configurées → CONFIGURER; Sinon → TESTER ET VALIDER",
|
| 45 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If EDR not deployed → DEPLOY; If baselines not established → ESTABLISH; If alerts not configured → CONFIGURE; Otherwise → TEST AND VALIDATE"
|
| 46 |
+
},
|
| 47 |
+
{
|
| 48 |
+
"id": "prep_incident_response_plan",
|
| 49 |
+
"name": "Incident Response Plan Development",
|
| 50 |
+
"phase": "Preparation",
|
| 51 |
+
"description_fr": "Développement et documentation du plan de réponse aux incidents. Définition des rôles, responsabilités, escalades et processus de communication.",
|
| 52 |
+
"description_en": "Development and documentation of incident response plan. Definition of roles, responsibilities, escalation, and communication processes.",
|
| 53 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 54 |
+
{
|
| 55 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 56 |
+
"action_fr": "Documenter rôles et responsabilités dans équipe IR",
|
| 57 |
+
"action_en": "Document IR team roles and responsibilities",
|
| 58 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 59 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 60 |
+
},
|
| 61 |
+
{
|
| 62 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 63 |
+
"action_fr": "Établir chaînes de commandement et d'escalade",
|
| 64 |
+
"action_en": "Establish command chain and escalation procedures",
|
| 65 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 66 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 67 |
+
},
|
| 68 |
+
{
|
| 69 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 70 |
+
"action_fr": "Définir protocoles de communication interne et externe",
|
| 71 |
+
"action_en": "Define internal and external communication protocols",
|
| 72 |
+
"responsible": "Legal",
|
| 73 |
+
"priority": "Within1H"
|
| 74 |
+
},
|
| 75 |
+
{
|
| 76 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 77 |
+
"action_fr": "Planifier exercices de simulation d'incident trimestriels",
|
| 78 |
+
"action_en": "Schedule quarterly incident simulation exercises",
|
| 79 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 80 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 81 |
+
}
|
| 82 |
+
],
|
| 83 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 84 |
+
"Confluence",
|
| 85 |
+
"SharePoint",
|
| 86 |
+
"Slack",
|
| 87 |
+
"PagerDuty"
|
| 88 |
+
],
|
| 89 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si plan inexistant → CRÉER; Si rôles flous → CLARIFIER; Si procédures obsolètes → METTRE À JOUR; Sinon → FORMER L'ÉQUIPE",
|
| 90 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If plan non-existent → CREATE; If roles unclear → CLARIFY; If procedures outdated → UPDATE; Otherwise → TRAIN TEAM"
|
| 91 |
+
},
|
| 92 |
+
{
|
| 93 |
+
"id": "prep_backup_strategy",
|
| 94 |
+
"name": "Backup & Recovery Strategy",
|
| 95 |
+
"phase": "Preparation",
|
| 96 |
+
"description_fr": "Implémentation d'une stratégie de sauvegarde robuste et testée. Sauvegardes isolées du réseau, tests réguliers de récupération, documentation des RTO/RPO.",
|
| 97 |
+
"description_en": "Implementation of robust and tested backup strategy. Network-isolated backups, regular recovery testing, RTO/RPO documentation.",
|
| 98 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 99 |
+
{
|
| 100 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 101 |
+
"action_fr": "Implémenter sauvegarde 3-2-1 (3 copies, 2 médias, 1 isolée hors-site)",
|
| 102 |
+
"action_en": "Implement 3-2-1 backup (3 copies, 2 media, 1 offsite isolated)",
|
| 103 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 104 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 105 |
+
},
|
| 106 |
+
{
|
| 107 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 108 |
+
"action_fr": "Isoler sauvegarde de réseau principal via air-gap ou compte lecture seule",
|
| 109 |
+
"action_en": "Isolate backup from main network via air-gap or read-only account",
|
| 110 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 111 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 112 |
+
},
|
| 113 |
+
{
|
| 114 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 115 |
+
"action_fr": "Tester récupération mensuelle de données de sauvegarde",
|
| 116 |
+
"action_en": "Test monthly data recovery from backups",
|
| 117 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 118 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 119 |
+
},
|
| 120 |
+
{
|
| 121 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 122 |
+
"action_fr": "Documenter RTO/RPO pour tous systèmes critiques",
|
| 123 |
+
"action_en": "Document RTO/RPO for all critical systems",
|
| 124 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 125 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 126 |
+
}
|
| 127 |
+
],
|
| 128 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 129 |
+
"Veeam",
|
| 130 |
+
"Duplicati",
|
| 131 |
+
"AWS S3",
|
| 132 |
+
"Azure Backup"
|
| 133 |
+
],
|
| 134 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si pas de sauvegarde → CRÉER; Si sauvegarde non isolée → ISOLER; Si pas de tests → TESTER; Sinon → AUGMENTER FRÉQUENCE",
|
| 135 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If no backup → CREATE; If backup not isolated → ISOLATE; If no tests → TEST; Otherwise → INCREASE FREQUENCY"
|
| 136 |
+
},
|
| 137 |
+
{
|
| 138 |
+
"id": "detect_anomaly_detection",
|
| 139 |
+
"name": "Anomaly Detection & Alerting",
|
| 140 |
+
"phase": "Detection",
|
| 141 |
+
"description_fr": "Détection d'anomalies utilisant Machine Learning et behavioral analytics. Configuration de seuils d'alerte, corrélation d'événements, détection de patterns anormaux.",
|
| 142 |
+
"description_en": "Anomaly detection using Machine Learning and behavioral analytics. Alert threshold configuration, event correlation, abnormal pattern detection.",
|
| 143 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 144 |
+
{
|
| 145 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 146 |
+
"action_fr": "Configurer ML-based anomaly detection dans SIEM",
|
| 147 |
+
"action_en": "Configure ML-based anomaly detection in SIEM",
|
| 148 |
+
"responsible": "SOC",
|
| 149 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 150 |
+
},
|
| 151 |
+
{
|
| 152 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 153 |
+
"action_fr": "Créer règles de corrélation pour activités ransomware (chiffrement massif, lateral move)",
|
| 154 |
+
"action_en": "Create correlation rules for ransomware activities (massive encryption, lateral move)",
|
| 155 |
+
"responsible": "SOC",
|
| 156 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 157 |
+
},
|
| 158 |
+
{
|
| 159 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 160 |
+
"action_fr": "Configurer alertes pour accès administrateur inhabituels",
|
| 161 |
+
"action_en": "Configure alerts for unusual admin access",
|
| 162 |
+
"responsible": "SOC",
|
| 163 |
+
"priority": "Within1H"
|
| 164 |
+
},
|
| 165 |
+
{
|
| 166 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 167 |
+
"action_fr": "Valider faux positifs et affiner tuning détection",
|
| 168 |
+
"action_en": "Validate false positives and refine detection tuning",
|
| 169 |
+
"responsible": "SOC",
|
| 170 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 171 |
+
}
|
| 172 |
+
],
|
| 173 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 174 |
+
"Splunk",
|
| 175 |
+
"ELK Stack",
|
| 176 |
+
"Datadog",
|
| 177 |
+
"Sentinel"
|
| 178 |
+
],
|
| 179 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si pas d'anomaly detection → CONFIGURER; Si faux positifs > 30% → AFFINER; Sinon → AUGMENTER SENSIBILITÉ",
|
| 180 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If no anomaly detection → CONFIGURE; If false positives > 30% → REFINE; Otherwise → INCREASE SENSITIVITY"
|
| 181 |
+
},
|
| 182 |
+
{
|
| 183 |
+
"id": "detect_file_integrity",
|
| 184 |
+
"name": "File Integrity Monitoring",
|
| 185 |
+
"phase": "Detection",
|
| 186 |
+
"description_fr": "Surveillance de l'intégrité des fichiers critiques. Détection des modifications massives, création de ransom notes, patterns de chiffrement.",
|
| 187 |
+
"description_en": "Critical file integrity monitoring. Detection of massive modifications, ransom note creation, encryption patterns.",
|
| 188 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 189 |
+
{
|
| 190 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 191 |
+
"action_fr": "Déployer FIM (File Integrity Monitoring) sur fichiers critiques",
|
| 192 |
+
"action_en": "Deploy FIM (File Integrity Monitoring) on critical files",
|
| 193 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 194 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 195 |
+
},
|
| 196 |
+
{
|
| 197 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 198 |
+
"action_fr": "Configurer alertes pour modifications massives (> 10000 fichiers/min)",
|
| 199 |
+
"action_en": "Configure alerts for massive modifications (> 10000 files/min)",
|
| 200 |
+
"responsible": "SOC",
|
| 201 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 202 |
+
},
|
| 203 |
+
{
|
| 204 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 205 |
+
"action_fr": "Monitoring création de fichiers .txt/.html dans répertoires de données",
|
| 206 |
+
"action_en": "Monitor .txt/.html file creation in data directories",
|
| 207 |
+
"responsible": "SOC",
|
| 208 |
+
"priority": "Within1H"
|
| 209 |
+
},
|
| 210 |
+
{
|
| 211 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 212 |
+
"action_fr": "Établir baseline normal de modifications par heure/jour",
|
| 213 |
+
"action_en": "Establish normal modification baseline per hour/day",
|
| 214 |
+
"responsible": "SOC",
|
| 215 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 216 |
+
}
|
| 217 |
+
],
|
| 218 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 219 |
+
"Osquery",
|
| 220 |
+
"Auditbeat",
|
| 221 |
+
"OSSEC",
|
| 222 |
+
"Wazuh"
|
| 223 |
+
],
|
| 224 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si pas de FIM → DÉPLOYER; Si seuil trop bas → AUGMENTER; Si pas d'alertes → CONFIGURER; Sinon → MONITORER",
|
| 225 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If no FIM → DEPLOY; If threshold too low → INCREASE; If no alerts → CONFIGURE; Otherwise → MONITOR"
|
| 226 |
+
},
|
| 227 |
+
{
|
| 228 |
+
"id": "contain_network_segmentation",
|
| 229 |
+
"name": "Network Segmentation & Isolation",
|
| 230 |
+
"phase": "Containment",
|
| 231 |
+
"description_fr": "Segmentation du réseau et isolation des systèmes infectés. Implémentation de micro-segmentation, VLANs, blocage du trafic non autorisé.",
|
| 232 |
+
"description_en": "Network segmentation and isolation of infected systems. Micro-segmentation implementation, VLANs, unauthorized traffic blocking.",
|
| 233 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 234 |
+
{
|
| 235 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 236 |
+
"action_fr": "Identifier tous les systèmes infectés ou potentiellement exposés",
|
| 237 |
+
"action_en": "Identify all infected or potentially exposed systems",
|
| 238 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 239 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 240 |
+
},
|
| 241 |
+
{
|
| 242 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 243 |
+
"action_fr": "Isoler systèmes infectés sur VLAN dédié avec accès minimal",
|
| 244 |
+
"action_en": "Isolate infected systems on dedicated VLAN with minimal access",
|
| 245 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 246 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 247 |
+
},
|
| 248 |
+
{
|
| 249 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 250 |
+
"action_fr": "Bloquer communication entre réseau infecté et systèmes critiques",
|
| 251 |
+
"action_en": "Block communication between infected network and critical systems",
|
| 252 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 253 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 254 |
+
},
|
| 255 |
+
{
|
| 256 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 257 |
+
"action_fr": "Sauvegarder fichiers système et logs pour analyse forensique",
|
| 258 |
+
"action_en": "Backup system files and logs for forensic analysis",
|
| 259 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 260 |
+
"priority": "Within1H"
|
| 261 |
+
}
|
| 262 |
+
],
|
| 263 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 264 |
+
"Cisco ASA",
|
| 265 |
+
"Palo Alto Networks",
|
| 266 |
+
"Fortinet",
|
| 267 |
+
"Arista"
|
| 268 |
+
],
|
| 269 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si systèmes pas isolés → ISOLER IMMÉDIATEMENT; Si communication toujours active → BLOQUER; Sinon → MONITORER TRAFIC",
|
| 270 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If systems not isolated → ISOLATE IMMEDIATELY; If communication still active → BLOCK; Otherwise → MONITOR TRAFFIC"
|
| 271 |
+
},
|
| 272 |
+
{
|
| 273 |
+
"id": "contain_credential_reset",
|
| 274 |
+
"name": "Credential Management & Reset",
|
| 275 |
+
"phase": "Containment",
|
| 276 |
+
"description_fr": "Réinitialisation des credentials compromise. Changement des mots de passe administrateurs, invalidation de tokens, révocation de certificats.",
|
| 277 |
+
"description_en": "Compromised credential reset. Administrator password change, token invalidation, certificate revocation.",
|
| 278 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 279 |
+
{
|
| 280 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 281 |
+
"action_fr": "Identifier tous comptes potentiellement compromis (admin, service)",
|
| 282 |
+
"action_en": "Identify all potentially compromised accounts (admin, service)",
|
| 283 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 284 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 285 |
+
},
|
| 286 |
+
{
|
| 287 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 288 |
+
"action_fr": "Réinitialiser mots de passe tous comptes administrateurs",
|
| 289 |
+
"action_en": "Reset all administrator account passwords",
|
| 290 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 291 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 292 |
+
},
|
| 293 |
+
{
|
| 294 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 295 |
+
"action_fr": "Invalider tous tokens/sessions actives des comptes compromis",
|
| 296 |
+
"action_en": "Invalidate all active tokens/sessions of compromised accounts",
|
| 297 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 298 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 299 |
+
},
|
| 300 |
+
{
|
| 301 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 302 |
+
"action_fr": "Révoquer certificats compromis et émettre nouveaux",
|
| 303 |
+
"action_en": "Revoke compromised certificates and issue new ones",
|
| 304 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 305 |
+
"priority": "Within1H"
|
| 306 |
+
}
|
| 307 |
+
],
|
| 308 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 309 |
+
"Active Directory",
|
| 310 |
+
"Okta",
|
| 311 |
+
"HashiCorp Vault",
|
| 312 |
+
"CyberArk"
|
| 313 |
+
],
|
| 314 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si comptes pas changés → CHANGER IMMÉDIATEMENT; Si tokens actifs → INVALIDER; Sinon → MONITORER ACCÈS",
|
| 315 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If accounts not changed → CHANGE IMMEDIATELY; If tokens active → INVALIDATE; Otherwise → MONITOR ACCESS"
|
| 316 |
+
},
|
| 317 |
+
{
|
| 318 |
+
"id": "contain_process_termination",
|
| 319 |
+
"name": "Malicious Process Termination",
|
| 320 |
+
"phase": "Containment",
|
| 321 |
+
"description_fr": "Arrêt des processus malveillants. Identification et termination des processus ransomware, suppression de malwares de la mémoire.",
|
| 322 |
+
"description_en": "Termination of malicious processes. Identification and termination of ransomware processes, malware removal from memory.",
|
| 323 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 324 |
+
{
|
| 325 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 326 |
+
"action_fr": "Scanner tous processus actifs pour identifier malware (VirusTotal, YARA)",
|
| 327 |
+
"action_en": "Scan all active processes to identify malware (VirusTotal, YARA)",
|
| 328 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 329 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 330 |
+
},
|
| 331 |
+
{
|
| 332 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 333 |
+
"action_fr": "Terminer processus malveillants identifiés par EDR",
|
| 334 |
+
"action_en": "Terminate malicious processes identified by EDR",
|
| 335 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 336 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 337 |
+
},
|
| 338 |
+
{
|
| 339 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 340 |
+
"action_fr": "Bloquer exécution de fichiers malveillants via whitelist",
|
| 341 |
+
"action_en": "Block execution of malicious files via whitelist",
|
| 342 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 343 |
+
"priority": "Within1H"
|
| 344 |
+
},
|
| 345 |
+
{
|
| 346 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 347 |
+
"action_fr": "Extraire hashes processus pour analyse et détection future",
|
| 348 |
+
"action_en": "Extract process hashes for analysis and future detection",
|
| 349 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 350 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 351 |
+
}
|
| 352 |
+
],
|
| 353 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 354 |
+
"Process Explorer",
|
| 355 |
+
"Autoruns",
|
| 356 |
+
"VirusTotal",
|
| 357 |
+
"YARA"
|
| 358 |
+
],
|
| 359 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si malware actif → TERMINER; Si fichier sur disque → SUPPRIMER; Sinon → MONITORER RELANCEMENT",
|
| 360 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If malware active → TERMINATE; If file on disk → DELETE; Otherwise → MONITOR RESTART"
|
| 361 |
+
},
|
| 362 |
+
{
|
| 363 |
+
"id": "eradicate_malware_removal",
|
| 364 |
+
"name": "Complete Malware Eradication",
|
| 365 |
+
"phase": "Eradication",
|
| 366 |
+
"description_fr": "Suppression complète de malware de l'infrastructure. Scan de tous systèmes, nettoyage des registres, suppression des backdoors.",
|
| 367 |
+
"description_en": "Complete malware removal from infrastructure. Scan of all systems, registry cleanup, backdoor removal.",
|
| 368 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 369 |
+
{
|
| 370 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 371 |
+
"action_fr": "Exécuter scan antivirus complet sur tous endpoints",
|
| 372 |
+
"action_en": "Execute full antivirus scan on all endpoints",
|
| 373 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 374 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 375 |
+
},
|
| 376 |
+
{
|
| 377 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 378 |
+
"action_fr": "Nettoyer registre Windows et supprimer clés malveillantes",
|
| 379 |
+
"action_en": "Clean Windows registry and remove malicious keys",
|
| 380 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 381 |
+
"priority": "Within1H"
|
| 382 |
+
},
|
| 383 |
+
{
|
| 384 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 385 |
+
"action_fr": "Supprimer scheduled tasks, services, et fichiers persistants malveillants",
|
| 386 |
+
"action_en": "Remove malicious scheduled tasks, services, and persistent files",
|
| 387 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 388 |
+
"priority": "Within1H"
|
| 389 |
+
},
|
| 390 |
+
{
|
| 391 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 392 |
+
"action_fr": "Vérifier absence de backdoors restantes via memory forensics",
|
| 393 |
+
"action_en": "Verify absence of remaining backdoors via memory forensics",
|
| 394 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 395 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 396 |
+
}
|
| 397 |
+
],
|
| 398 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 399 |
+
"Malwarebytes",
|
| 400 |
+
"Kaspersky Rescue",
|
| 401 |
+
"Trend Micro FFRI",
|
| 402 |
+
"Mandiant"
|
| 403 |
+
],
|
| 404 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si malware détecté → NETTOYER; Si processus persistant → ÉRADIQUER; Sinon → VÉRIFIER MÉMOIRE",
|
| 405 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If malware detected → CLEAN; If process persistent → ERADICATE; Otherwise → VERIFY MEMORY"
|
| 406 |
+
},
|
| 407 |
+
{
|
| 408 |
+
"id": "eradicate_vulnerability_patching",
|
| 409 |
+
"name": "Vulnerability Patching & Hardening",
|
| 410 |
+
"phase": "Eradication",
|
| 411 |
+
"description_fr": "Correction de vulnérabilités exploitées. Application de patches, mise à jour système, fermeture des services inutiles.",
|
| 412 |
+
"description_en": "Patching of exploited vulnerabilities. Application of patches, system updates, closure of unnecessary services.",
|
| 413 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 414 |
+
{
|
| 415 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 416 |
+
"action_fr": "Identifier vulnérabilités exploitées par ransomware groupe",
|
| 417 |
+
"action_en": "Identify vulnerabilities exploited by ransomware group",
|
| 418 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 419 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 420 |
+
},
|
| 421 |
+
{
|
| 422 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 423 |
+
"action_fr": "Appliquer patches critiques et urgents à tous systèmes",
|
| 424 |
+
"action_en": "Apply critical and urgent patches to all systems",
|
| 425 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 426 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 427 |
+
},
|
| 428 |
+
{
|
| 429 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 430 |
+
"action_fr": "Désactiver services inutiles et ports non nécessaires",
|
| 431 |
+
"action_en": "Disable unnecessary services and non-required ports",
|
| 432 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 433 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 434 |
+
},
|
| 435 |
+
{
|
| 436 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 437 |
+
"action_fr": "Mettre à jour tout logiciel tiers exposé à l'attaque",
|
| 438 |
+
"action_en": "Update all third-party software exposed to attack",
|
| 439 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 440 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 441 |
+
}
|
| 442 |
+
],
|
| 443 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 444 |
+
"WSUS",
|
| 445 |
+
"Qualys",
|
| 446 |
+
"Nessus",
|
| 447 |
+
"Rapid7"
|
| 448 |
+
],
|
| 449 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si vulnérabilité critique → PATCHER URGENCE; Si service inutile actif → DÉSACTIVER; Sinon → DURCIR CONFIG",
|
| 450 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If critical vulnerability → PATCH URGENCY; If unnecessary service active → DISABLE; Otherwise → HARDEN CONFIG"
|
| 451 |
+
},
|
| 452 |
+
{
|
| 453 |
+
"id": "eradicate_network_cleanup",
|
| 454 |
+
"name": "Network Infrastructure Cleanup",
|
| 455 |
+
"phase": "Eradication",
|
| 456 |
+
"description_fr": "Nettoyage de l'infrastructure réseau. Suppression des malwares des appliances, fermeture des tunnels C2, changement des configurations.",
|
| 457 |
+
"description_en": "Network infrastructure cleanup. Removal of malware from appliances, closing of C2 tunnels, configuration changes.",
|
| 458 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 459 |
+
{
|
| 460 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 461 |
+
"action_fr": "Identifier et bloquer tous domaines/IPs C2 connus",
|
| 462 |
+
"action_en": "Identify and block all known C2 domains/IPs",
|
| 463 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 464 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 465 |
+
},
|
| 466 |
+
{
|
| 467 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 468 |
+
"action_fr": "Nettoyer caches DNS de tous résolveurs internes",
|
| 469 |
+
"action_en": "Clear DNS caches from all internal resolvers",
|
| 470 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 471 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 472 |
+
},
|
| 473 |
+
{
|
| 474 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 475 |
+
"action_fr": "Vérifier et nettoyer malware des appliances firewalls/proxies",
|
| 476 |
+
"action_en": "Verify and clean malware from firewall/proxy appliances",
|
| 477 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 478 |
+
"priority": "Within1H"
|
| 479 |
+
},
|
| 480 |
+
{
|
| 481 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 482 |
+
"action_fr": "Implémenter filtrage DNS additif pour C2 profilés",
|
| 483 |
+
"action_en": "Implement additional DNS filtering for profiled C2",
|
| 484 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 485 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 486 |
+
}
|
| 487 |
+
],
|
| 488 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 489 |
+
"Pi-Hole",
|
| 490 |
+
"Cisco Umbrella",
|
| 491 |
+
"Cloudflare Gateway",
|
| 492 |
+
"pfSense"
|
| 493 |
+
],
|
| 494 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si C2 actif → BLOQUER IMMÉDIATEMENT; Si caches non vidés → VIDER; Sinon → SURVEILLER TRAFIC",
|
| 495 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If C2 active → BLOCK IMMEDIATELY; If caches not cleared → CLEAR; Otherwise → MONITOR TRAFFIC"
|
| 496 |
+
},
|
| 497 |
+
{
|
| 498 |
+
"id": "recover_restore_systems",
|
| 499 |
+
"name": "System Restoration from Backups",
|
| 500 |
+
"phase": "Recovery",
|
| 501 |
+
"description_fr": "Restauration des systèmes à partir de sauvegardes. Priorité aux systèmes critiques, validation des restaurations, test de fonctionnement.",
|
| 502 |
+
"description_en": "System restoration from backups. Priority to critical systems, validation of restores, functionality testing.",
|
| 503 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 504 |
+
{
|
| 505 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 506 |
+
"action_fr": "Prioriser systèmes critiques pour restauration",
|
| 507 |
+
"action_en": "Prioritize critical systems for restoration",
|
| 508 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 509 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 510 |
+
},
|
| 511 |
+
{
|
| 512 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 513 |
+
"action_fr": "Restaurer données depuis sauvegardes isolées pré-infection",
|
| 514 |
+
"action_en": "Restore data from isolated pre-infection backups",
|
| 515 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 516 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 517 |
+
},
|
| 518 |
+
{
|
| 519 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 520 |
+
"action_fr": "Valider intégrité données restaurées (checksums, antivirus)",
|
| 521 |
+
"action_en": "Validate integrity of restored data (checksums, antivirus)",
|
| 522 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 523 |
+
"priority": "Within1H"
|
| 524 |
+
},
|
| 525 |
+
{
|
| 526 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 527 |
+
"action_fr": "Tester fonctionnement applicatif complet post-restauration",
|
| 528 |
+
"action_en": "Test complete application functionality post-restoration",
|
| 529 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 530 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 531 |
+
}
|
| 532 |
+
],
|
| 533 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 534 |
+
"Veeam",
|
| 535 |
+
"Commvault",
|
| 536 |
+
"Rubrik",
|
| 537 |
+
"Veritas"
|
| 538 |
+
],
|
| 539 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si backup valide → RESTAURER; Si données corrompues → UTILISER BACKUP ANTÉRIEUR; Sinon → MONTER PARTITION",
|
| 540 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If backup valid → RESTORE; If data corrupted → USE PRIOR BACKUP; Otherwise → MOUNT PARTITION"
|
| 541 |
+
},
|
| 542 |
+
{
|
| 543 |
+
"id": "recover_application_recovery",
|
| 544 |
+
"name": "Application & Data Validation",
|
| 545 |
+
"phase": "Recovery",
|
| 546 |
+
"description_fr": "Validation des applications et données restaurées. Test des transactions, vérification de l'intégrité métier, réconciliation.",
|
| 547 |
+
"description_en": "Validation of restored applications and data. Transaction testing, business integrity verification, reconciliation.",
|
| 548 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 549 |
+
{
|
| 550 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 551 |
+
"action_fr": "Tester chaque application critique dans environnement isolé",
|
| 552 |
+
"action_en": "Test each critical application in isolated environment",
|
| 553 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 554 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 555 |
+
},
|
| 556 |
+
{
|
| 557 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 558 |
+
"action_fr": "Vérifier intégrité base de données (index, constraints)",
|
| 559 |
+
"action_en": "Verify database integrity (indexes, constraints)",
|
| 560 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 561 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 562 |
+
},
|
| 563 |
+
{
|
| 564 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 565 |
+
"action_fr": "Exécuter tests de transactions métier critiques",
|
| 566 |
+
"action_en": "Execute critical business transaction tests",
|
| 567 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 568 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 569 |
+
},
|
| 570 |
+
{
|
| 571 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 572 |
+
"action_fr": "Réconcilier données avec logs audit pour déterminer perte",
|
| 573 |
+
"action_en": "Reconcile data with audit logs to determine loss",
|
| 574 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 575 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 576 |
+
}
|
| 577 |
+
],
|
| 578 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 579 |
+
"Redgate SQL Toolbelt",
|
| 580 |
+
"Oracle DBCA",
|
| 581 |
+
"MySQL Workbench",
|
| 582 |
+
"SQLite"
|
| 583 |
+
],
|
| 584 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si erreurs détectées → RESTAURER VERSION ANTÉRIEURE; Si perf dégradée → OPTIMISER INDEX; Sinon → AUTORISER ACCÈS",
|
| 585 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If errors detected → RESTORE PRIOR VERSION; If perf degraded → OPTIMIZE INDEX; Otherwise → ALLOW ACCESS"
|
| 586 |
+
},
|
| 587 |
+
{
|
| 588 |
+
"id": "recovery_business_continuity",
|
| 589 |
+
"name": "Business Continuity Restoration",
|
| 590 |
+
"phase": "Recovery",
|
| 591 |
+
"description_fr": "Restauration de la continuité métier. Réactivation des opérations, retourn des utilisateurs, validation de la production.",
|
| 592 |
+
"description_en": "Business continuity restoration. Operations reactivation, user return, production validation.",
|
| 593 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 594 |
+
{
|
| 595 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 596 |
+
"action_fr": "Réactiver accès des utilisateurs par groupes métier",
|
| 597 |
+
"action_en": "Reactivate user access by business groups",
|
| 598 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 599 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 600 |
+
},
|
| 601 |
+
{
|
| 602 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 603 |
+
"action_fr": "Valider accès aux données critiques par utilisateur",
|
| 604 |
+
"action_en": "Validate critical data access per user",
|
| 605 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 606 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 607 |
+
},
|
| 608 |
+
{
|
| 609 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 610 |
+
"action_fr": "Monitorer charge système et perf en temps réel",
|
| 611 |
+
"action_en": "Monitor system load and performance in real-time",
|
| 612 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 613 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 614 |
+
},
|
| 615 |
+
{
|
| 616 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 617 |
+
"action_fr": "Communiquer état de récupération au stakeholders",
|
| 618 |
+
"action_en": "Communicate recovery status to stakeholders",
|
| 619 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 620 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 621 |
+
}
|
| 622 |
+
],
|
| 623 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 624 |
+
"Slack",
|
| 625 |
+
"Teams",
|
| 626 |
+
"Splunk",
|
| 627 |
+
"Datadog"
|
| 628 |
+
],
|
| 629 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si perf normale → AUGMENTER ACCÈS; Si utilisateurs non prêts → PATIENTER; Sinon → DÉCLARER RÉCUPÉRATION",
|
| 630 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If perf normal → INCREASE ACCESS; If users not ready → WAIT; Otherwise → DECLARE RECOVERY"
|
| 631 |
+
},
|
| 632 |
+
{
|
| 633 |
+
"id": "lessons_forensic_analysis",
|
| 634 |
+
"name": "Post-Incident Forensic Analysis",
|
| 635 |
+
"phase": "LessonsLearned",
|
| 636 |
+
"description_fr": "Analyse forensique complète post-incident. Reconstruction chronologique, identification du patient zéro, analyse du malware.",
|
| 637 |
+
"description_en": "Complete post-incident forensic analysis. Chronological reconstruction, patient zero identification, malware analysis.",
|
| 638 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 639 |
+
{
|
| 640 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 641 |
+
"action_fr": "Collecter et préserver images disque brutes pour tous systèmes infectés",
|
| 642 |
+
"action_en": "Collect and preserve raw disk images for all infected systems",
|
| 643 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 644 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 645 |
+
},
|
| 646 |
+
{
|
| 647 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 648 |
+
"action_fr": "Analyser logs système et réseau pour reconstuire timeline attaque",
|
| 649 |
+
"action_en": "Analyze system and network logs to reconstruct attack timeline",
|
| 650 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 651 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 652 |
+
},
|
| 653 |
+
{
|
| 654 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 655 |
+
"action_fr": "Identifier patient zéro et vecteur initial infection",
|
| 656 |
+
"action_en": "Identify patient zero and initial infection vector",
|
| 657 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 658 |
+
"priority": "Within4H"
|
| 659 |
+
},
|
| 660 |
+
{
|
| 661 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 662 |
+
"action_fr": "Analyser malware via sandbox pour comprendre comportement",
|
| 663 |
+
"action_en": "Analyze malware via sandbox to understand behavior",
|
| 664 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 665 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 666 |
+
}
|
| 667 |
+
],
|
| 668 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 669 |
+
"Volatility",
|
| 670 |
+
"Autopsy",
|
| 671 |
+
"EnCase",
|
| 672 |
+
"Cuckoo"
|
| 673 |
+
],
|
| 674 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si evidence pas collectée → COLLECTER; Si images corrompues → RESTAURER; Sinon → ANALYSER",
|
| 675 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If evidence not collected → COLLECT; If images corrupted → RESTORE; Otherwise → ANALYZE"
|
| 676 |
+
},
|
| 677 |
+
{
|
| 678 |
+
"id": "lessons_threat_intel",
|
| 679 |
+
"name": "Threat Intelligence & Attribution",
|
| 680 |
+
"phase": "LessonsLearned",
|
| 681 |
+
"description_fr": "Identification du groupe ransomware et publication d'intelligence partagée. Attribution, enrichissement des IOCs, publication des indicateurs.",
|
| 682 |
+
"description_en": "Identification of ransomware group and publication of shared intelligence. Attribution, IOC enrichment, indicator publication.",
|
| 683 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 684 |
+
{
|
| 685 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 686 |
+
"action_fr": "Comparer signatures malware avec bases MITRE, VirusTotal, Shodan",
|
| 687 |
+
"action_en": "Compare malware signatures with MITRE, VirusTotal, Shodan bases",
|
| 688 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 689 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 690 |
+
},
|
| 691 |
+
{
|
| 692 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 693 |
+
"action_fr": "Identifier TTPs utilisées et mapper à matrice MITRE ATT&CK",
|
| 694 |
+
"action_en": "Identify TTPs used and map to MITRE ATT&CK matrix",
|
| 695 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 696 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 697 |
+
},
|
| 698 |
+
{
|
| 699 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 700 |
+
"action_fr": "Collecter IOCs (fichiers, domaines, IPs) pour partage",
|
| 701 |
+
"action_en": "Collect IOCs (files, domains, IPs) for sharing",
|
| 702 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 703 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 704 |
+
},
|
| 705 |
+
{
|
| 706 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 707 |
+
"action_fr": "Publier rapport threat intel via ISACs/Information Sharing",
|
| 708 |
+
"action_en": "Publish threat intel report via ISACs/Information Sharing",
|
| 709 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 710 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 711 |
+
}
|
| 712 |
+
],
|
| 713 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 714 |
+
"MITRE ATT&CK",
|
| 715 |
+
"VirusTotal",
|
| 716 |
+
"Shodan",
|
| 717 |
+
"Recorded Future"
|
| 718 |
+
],
|
| 719 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si TTPs identifiées → MAPPER MITRE; Si groupe connu → ATTRIBUER; Sinon → DOCUMENTER NOUVEAUX TTPS",
|
| 720 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If TTPs identified → MAP MITRE; If group known → ATTRIBUTE; Otherwise → DOCUMENT NEW TTPS"
|
| 721 |
+
},
|
| 722 |
+
{
|
| 723 |
+
"id": "lessons_incident_review",
|
| 724 |
+
"name": "Incident Review & Process Improvement",
|
| 725 |
+
"phase": "LessonsLearned",
|
| 726 |
+
"description_fr": "Revue complète de l'incident et amélioration des processus. Identification des gaps, recommandations, plan de remédiation.",
|
| 727 |
+
"description_en": "Complete incident review and process improvement. Gap identification, recommendations, remediation plan.",
|
| 728 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 729 |
+
{
|
| 730 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 731 |
+
"action_fr": "Organiser réunion post-mortem avec tous stakeholders",
|
| 732 |
+
"action_en": "Organize post-mortem meeting with all stakeholders",
|
| 733 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 734 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 735 |
+
},
|
| 736 |
+
{
|
| 737 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 738 |
+
"action_fr": "Documenter timeline complète, impacts, actions correctives",
|
| 739 |
+
"action_en": "Document complete timeline, impacts, corrective actions",
|
| 740 |
+
"responsible": "IR_Team",
|
| 741 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 742 |
+
},
|
| 743 |
+
{
|
| 744 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 745 |
+
"action_fr": "Identifier gaps de détection, réponse et prévention",
|
| 746 |
+
"action_en": "Identify detection, response, and prevention gaps",
|
| 747 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 748 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 749 |
+
},
|
| 750 |
+
{
|
| 751 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 752 |
+
"action_fr": "Créer plan de remédiation avec timelines et propriétaires",
|
| 753 |
+
"action_en": "Create remediation plan with timelines and owners",
|
| 754 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 755 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 756 |
+
}
|
| 757 |
+
],
|
| 758 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 759 |
+
"Miro",
|
| 760 |
+
"Confluence",
|
| 761 |
+
"Jira",
|
| 762 |
+
"ServiceNow"
|
| 763 |
+
],
|
| 764 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si post-mortem non tenu → ORGANISER; Si gaps identifiés → CRÉER PLAN; Sinon → SUIVRE EXÉCUTION PLAN",
|
| 765 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If post-mortem not held → ORGANIZE; If gaps identified → CREATE PLAN; Otherwise → TRACK PLAN EXECUTION"
|
| 766 |
+
},
|
| 767 |
+
{
|
| 768 |
+
"id": "lessons_security_culture",
|
| 769 |
+
"name": "Security Culture & Training Enhancement",
|
| 770 |
+
"phase": "LessonsLearned",
|
| 771 |
+
"description_fr": "Amélioration de la culture sécurité et formation des équipes. Awareness campaigns, formation phishing, tests réguliers.",
|
| 772 |
+
"description_en": "Improvement of security culture and team training. Awareness campaigns, phishing training, regular testing.",
|
| 773 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 774 |
+
{
|
| 775 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 776 |
+
"action_fr": "Lancer campaign awareness ransomware pour tous employés",
|
| 777 |
+
"action_en": "Launch ransomware awareness campaign for all employees",
|
| 778 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 779 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 780 |
+
},
|
| 781 |
+
{
|
| 782 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 783 |
+
"action_fr": "Implémenter formation phishing interactive mensuelle",
|
| 784 |
+
"action_en": "Implement monthly interactive phishing training",
|
| 785 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 786 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 787 |
+
},
|
| 788 |
+
{
|
| 789 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 790 |
+
"action_fr": "Tester email/phishing simulés pour utilisateurs identifiés à risque",
|
| 791 |
+
"action_en": "Test simulated emails/phishing for identified at-risk users",
|
| 792 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 793 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 794 |
+
},
|
| 795 |
+
{
|
| 796 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 797 |
+
"action_fr": "Établir plan de formation continue pour IT/SOC",
|
| 798 |
+
"action_en": "Establish continuous training plan for IT/SOC",
|
| 799 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 800 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 801 |
+
}
|
| 802 |
+
],
|
| 803 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 804 |
+
"KnowBe4",
|
| 805 |
+
"PhishLabs",
|
| 806 |
+
"Secure Flag",
|
| 807 |
+
"SANS"
|
| 808 |
+
],
|
| 809 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si sensibilisation faible → FORMER; Si tests mal faire → RENOUVELER; Sinon → AUGMENTER DIFFICULTÉ",
|
| 810 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If awareness low → TRAIN; If tests failing → RENEW; Otherwise → INCREASE DIFFICULTY"
|
| 811 |
+
},
|
| 812 |
+
{
|
| 813 |
+
"id": "lessons_vendor_management",
|
| 814 |
+
"name": "Vendor & Supply-Chain Management",
|
| 815 |
+
"phase": "LessonsLearned",
|
| 816 |
+
"description_fr": "Amélioration gestion fournisseurs et supply-chain post-incident. Audit fournisseurs compromis, évaluation risques, renégociation contrats de sécurité.",
|
| 817 |
+
"description_en": "Post-incident vendor and supply-chain management improvement. Compromised vendor audit, risk evaluation, security contract renegotiation.",
|
| 818 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 819 |
+
{
|
| 820 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 821 |
+
"action_fr": "Auditer tous fournisseurs ayant accès systèmes infectés",
|
| 822 |
+
"action_en": "Audit all vendors with access to infected systems",
|
| 823 |
+
"responsible": "IT_Ops",
|
| 824 |
+
"priority": "Immediate"
|
| 825 |
+
},
|
| 826 |
+
{
|
| 827 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 828 |
+
"action_fr": "Évaluer risques chaque fournisseur pour supply-chain",
|
| 829 |
+
"action_en": "Evaluate each vendor risk for supply-chain",
|
| 830 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 831 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 832 |
+
},
|
| 833 |
+
{
|
| 834 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 835 |
+
"action_fr": "Renégocier contrats avec exigences sécurité renforcées",
|
| 836 |
+
"action_en": "Renegotiate contracts with enhanced security requirements",
|
| 837 |
+
"responsible": "Legal",
|
| 838 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 839 |
+
},
|
| 840 |
+
{
|
| 841 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 842 |
+
"action_fr": "Implémenter vendor risk monitoring programme continu",
|
| 843 |
+
"action_en": "Implement continuous vendor risk monitoring program",
|
| 844 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 845 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 846 |
+
}
|
| 847 |
+
],
|
| 848 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 849 |
+
"ServiceNow",
|
| 850 |
+
"Qualys",
|
| 851 |
+
"Nessus",
|
| 852 |
+
"Rapid7"
|
| 853 |
+
],
|
| 854 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si fournisseurs non auditées → AUDITER; Si contrats non mis à jour → RENÉGOCIER; Sinon → MONITORER",
|
| 855 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If vendors not audited → AUDIT; If contracts not updated → RENEGOTIATE; Otherwise → MONITOR"
|
| 856 |
+
},
|
| 857 |
+
{
|
| 858 |
+
"id": "lessons_cyber_resilience",
|
| 859 |
+
"name": "Cyber Resilience Maturity Framework",
|
| 860 |
+
"phase": "LessonsLearned",
|
| 861 |
+
"description_fr": "Établissement framework de maturité résilience cyber post-incident. Évaluation capacités actuelles, planification maturation, investissements futurs.",
|
| 862 |
+
"description_en": "Establishment of post-incident cyber resilience maturity framework. Current capability evaluation, maturation planning, future investments.",
|
| 863 |
+
"steps": [
|
| 864 |
+
{
|
| 865 |
+
"step_num": 1,
|
| 866 |
+
"action_fr": "Évaluer maturité actuelle par domaine (détection, réponse, récupération)",
|
| 867 |
+
"action_en": "Evaluate current maturity per domain (detection, response, recovery)",
|
| 868 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 869 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 870 |
+
},
|
| 871 |
+
{
|
| 872 |
+
"step_num": 2,
|
| 873 |
+
"action_fr": "Définir niveaux maturité cibles (1-5) par domaine",
|
| 874 |
+
"action_en": "Define target maturity levels (1-5) per domain",
|
| 875 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 876 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 877 |
+
},
|
| 878 |
+
{
|
| 879 |
+
"step_num": 3,
|
| 880 |
+
"action_fr": "Créer roadmap 3-ans avec jalons et budgets requis",
|
| 881 |
+
"action_en": "Create 3-year roadmap with milestones and budgets required",
|
| 882 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 883 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 884 |
+
},
|
| 885 |
+
{
|
| 886 |
+
"step_num": 4,
|
| 887 |
+
"action_fr": "Présenter résultats board et obtenir approbations investissements",
|
| 888 |
+
"action_en": "Present results to board and obtain investment approvals",
|
| 889 |
+
"responsible": "CISO",
|
| 890 |
+
"priority": "Within24H"
|
| 891 |
+
}
|
| 892 |
+
],
|
| 893 |
+
"tools_required": [
|
| 894 |
+
"NIST Cybersecurity Framework",
|
| 895 |
+
"Gartner",
|
| 896 |
+
"Forrester",
|
| 897 |
+
"ServiceNow"
|
| 898 |
+
],
|
| 899 |
+
"decision_tree_fr": "Si matérité inconnue → ÉVALUER; Si pas de roadmap → CRÉER; Sinon → EXÉCUTER ROADMAP",
|
| 900 |
+
"decision_tree_en": "If maturity unknown → EVALUATE; If no roadmap → CREATE; Otherwise → EXECUTE ROADMAP"
|
| 901 |
+
}
|
| 902 |
+
]
|
data/response_playbooks.parquet
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
|
| 2 |
+
oid sha256:7d7d2ff5dd4831c7991516b6fcce2549a3f4eb6e0adce4e4c36ffbbcee6f5f9e
|
| 3 |
+
size 26466
|
data/statistics.json
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
{
|
| 2 |
+
"ransomware_groups": {
|
| 3 |
+
"total": 40,
|
| 4 |
+
"active_count": 30,
|
| 5 |
+
"disbanded_count": 8,
|
| 6 |
+
"rebranded_count": 2,
|
| 7 |
+
"double_extortion_count": 35,
|
| 8 |
+
"triple_extortion_count": 4,
|
| 9 |
+
"encryption_types": [
|
| 10 |
+
"ChaCha20",
|
| 11 |
+
"AES-256",
|
| 12 |
+
"RSA-2048",
|
| 13 |
+
"Hybrid"
|
| 14 |
+
],
|
| 15 |
+
"initial_access_vectors": [
|
| 16 |
+
"Phishing",
|
| 17 |
+
"RDP",
|
| 18 |
+
"Supply_Chain",
|
| 19 |
+
"VPN_Exploit",
|
| 20 |
+
"Drive_By"
|
| 21 |
+
],
|
| 22 |
+
"targeted_sectors": [
|
| 23 |
+
"Technology",
|
| 24 |
+
"Finance",
|
| 25 |
+
"Manufacturing",
|
| 26 |
+
"Healthcare",
|
| 27 |
+
"Education",
|
| 28 |
+
"Government",
|
| 29 |
+
"Energy"
|
| 30 |
+
]
|
| 31 |
+
},
|
| 32 |
+
"playbooks": {
|
| 33 |
+
"total": 20,
|
| 34 |
+
"by_phase": {
|
| 35 |
+
"Recovery": 3,
|
| 36 |
+
"Preparation": 3,
|
| 37 |
+
"Eradication": 3,
|
| 38 |
+
"Detection": 2,
|
| 39 |
+
"LessonsLearned": 6,
|
| 40 |
+
"Containment": 3
|
| 41 |
+
}
|
| 42 |
+
},
|
| 43 |
+
"qa_dataset": {
|
| 44 |
+
"total": 50,
|
| 45 |
+
"backlinks_distribution": {
|
| 46 |
+
"https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/memory-forensics.html": 2,
|
| 47 |
+
"https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/dfir-tools-comparison.html": 5,
|
| 48 |
+
"https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/top-10-solutions-edr-xdr-2025.html": 4,
|
| 49 |
+
"https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/forensics/evasion-antiforensic.html": 5,
|
| 50 |
+
"https://ayinedjimi-consultants.fr/livre-blanc-anatomie-attaque-ransomware.html": 34
|
| 51 |
+
}
|
| 52 |
+
}
|
| 53 |
+
}
|