{"file_name": "2024_10_108_125_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 108 : 2024 INSC 735\n\nVijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma \nv. \nThe State of Bihar\n\n(Criminal Appeal No. 1031 of 2015)\n\n25 September 2024\n\n[Bela M. Trivedi and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nIssue arose as regards sustainablility of the findings of the High \nCourt holding the appellants guilty of commission of offences u/ss. \n302/34 and 364/34 IPC; as also the approach of the High Court, if \nin line with the settled law for reversing an acquittal into conviction.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nPenal  Code,  1860  –  ss.  302/34  and  364/34  –  Kidnapping  or \nabducting in order to murder – Abduction and murder of woman \nover a property dispute – Factum of her death discovered in \nfurtherance of written report lodged by informant and brother-\nin-law of the victim – Conviction and sentence of accused nos. \n1-5  of  the  commission  of  offences  u/ss.  302/34  and  364/34, \nhowever acquittal of accused nos. 6 and 7 of all the charges – \nHigh Court upheld the conviction of accused nos. 1-5, as also \nconvicted accused nos. 6 and 7 of the commission of offences \nu/ss. 364/34 and 302/34 – Sustainability:\n\nHeld:  Offence  of  murder  is  entirely  dependent  on  circumstantial \nevidence and in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the chain \nof evidence must be complete and must give out an inescapable \nconclusion  of  guilt  –  Prosecution  case  is  far  from  meeting  that \nstandard  –  Mere  presence  of  certain  make-up  articles  cannot \nbe  a  conclusive  proof  of  the  fact  that  the  victim  was  residing  in \nthe said house, especially when another woman was admittedly \nresiding  there  –  No  material  whatsoever  could  be  found  at  the \nhouse to directly indicate that the deceased as also the informant \nwere  residing  there  –  Prosecution  failed  to  examine  even  one \ncohabitant to prove the said fact – Evidence of the eye witnesses \ndeclared  as  wholly  unreliable  including  on  the  aspect  of  time  of \ndeath  –  Thus,  no  reason  to  doubt  the  post  mortem  report  and \nthe  findings  therein  –  Prosecution  case  full  of  glaring  doubts  as \n\n* Author\n\n\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n109\n\nregards  abduction  – Although,  the  post  mortem  report  indicates \nthat the death of the deceased was unnatural and the commission \nof  murder  cannot  be  ruled  out,  however  no  direct  evidence  to \nprove the commission of murder by the accused persons – Link of \ncausation between the accused persons and the alleged offence \nconspicuously  missing  –  Circumstantial  evidence  emanating \nfrom the facts surrounding the offence of abduction, such as the \ntestimonies of eye witnesses, failed to meet the test of proof and \ncannot be termed as proved in the eyes of law – No inference could \nbe drawn from it to infer the commission of the offence u/s. 302 \nby the accused persons – Also motive has a bearing only when \nthe evidence on record is sufficient to prove the ingredients of the \noffences under consideration – Without the proof of foundational \nfacts, the case of the prosecution cannot succeed on the presence of \nmotive alone – Thus, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden \nto prove the case beyond reasonable doubt – Reasonable doubts \nare irreconcilable and strike at the foundation of the prosecution’s \ncase – Furthermore, approach of the High Court in reversing the \nacquittal of A-6 and A-7 not in line with the settled law pertaining \nto reversal of acquittals – High Court took a cursory view of the \nmatter  and  reversed  the  acquittal  without  arriving  at  any  finding \nof illegality or perversity or impossibility of the trial court’s view or \nnon-appreciation of evidence by the trial tourt – Thus, the appellants \nto be acquitted of all the charges – Findings of conviction arrived \nat by the courts below not sustainable and set aside. [Paras 28-\n32, 34-37]\n\nJudicial deprecation – High Court’s observation that the make-\nup articles found in the house could not have belonged to the \nwidow lady as there was no need for her to put on make-up \nbeing a widow:\n\nHeld:  Said  observation  not  only  legally  untenable  but  also \nhighly  objectionable  –  Sweeping  observation  of  this  nature  not \ncommensurate with the sensitivity and neutrality expected from a \ncourt of law, specifically when the same is not made out from any \nevidence on record. [Para 27]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nState of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran [2007] 3 SCR 507 : (2007) 3 SCC \n755; Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [2007] 2 SCR 630 : (2007) \n4 SCC 415; Nepal Singh v. State of Haryana [2009] 6 SCR 982 : \n(2009) 12 SCC 351; Kashiram v. State of M.P. [2001] 4 Supp. SCR \n\nVijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar\f110 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n263 : (2002) 1 SCC 71; Labh Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 1 \nSCC 181; Suratlal v. State of M.P (1982) 1 SCC 488; Rai Saheb \n&  Ors.  v.  State  of  Haryana  (1994)  Supp.1  SCC  74;  Sanjeev  v. \nState of H.P (2022) 6 SCC 294 – referred to.\n\nPenal Code, 1860.\n\nList of Acts\n\nList of Keywords\n\nAbduction; Murder; Abduction and murder of woman; Circumstantial \nevidence; Chain of evidence; Reversal of acquittal; Motive; Burden \nto  prove  case  beyond  reasonable  doubt;  Judicial  deprecation; \nObservation of High Court highly objectionable; Observation of High \nCourt not commensurate with sensitivity and neutrality expected \nfrom court of law.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1031 \nof 2015\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 26.03.2015 of the High Court of \nJudicature at Patna in Govt. Appeal (DB) No. 16 of 1992\n\nWith\n\nCriminal Appeal Nos. 1578, 765, 1579 of 2017 \n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nR. K. Dash, Sr. Adv., Ms. Fauzia Shakil, Amit Sharma, Dipesh Sinha, \nMs. Pallavi Barua, Ms. Aparna Singh, Ajay Kumar Singh, Advs. for \nthe Appellant.\n\nShivam Singh, Kartikay Aggarwal, Manish Kumar, Shantanu Sagar, \nAnil Kumar, Prabhat Ranjan Raj, Gunjesh Ranjan, Shashank Kumar \nSaurav, Vaibhav Jain, Manoneet Dwivedi, Advs. for the Respondent.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nSatish Chandra Sharma, J.\n\n1.  On 30.08.1985, Neelam breathed her last in Simaltalla, PS Sikandra, \nDistrict Munger, Bihar. The factum of her death was discovered in \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n111\n\nfurtherance of the written report lodged by the informant and brother-\nin-law  of  the  deceased,  namely,  Ramanand  Singh  (examined  as \nPW18 before the Trial Court1) wherein he alleged that Neelam was \nabducted  by  seven  persons  from  their  house  in  an  incident  which \noccurred at around 10:00 PM on the said day. On the basis of this \ninformation,  an  FIR  bearing  no.  127  of  1985  was  lodged  at  PS \nSikandra and investigation was commenced which led to the filing of \na chargesheet against the seven accused persons, namely – Krishna \nNandan Singh (Accused No.1), Ram Nandan Singh (Accused No.2), \nRaj Nandan Singh (Accused No.3), Shyam Nandan Singh (Accused \nNo.4), Bhagwan Singh (Accused No. 5), Vijay Singh (Accused No. \n6) and Tanik Singh (Accused No.7). \n\n2.  The Trial Court charged all seven accused persons for the commission \nof  offences  punishable  under  Sections  323,  302,  364,  449,  450, \n380/34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.2 Later, accused \nnos. 6 and 7 were distinctly charged for the commission of offences \npunishable  under  Sections  342,  506  read  with  Section  34  of  IPC. \nAfter  trial,  the  Trial  Court,  vide  order  dated  05.06.1992,  convicted \nthe accused persons listed as accused nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for the \ncommission  of  offences  under  Section  302/34  and  364/34  of  IPC. \nThey were acquitted of all other charges, and accused nos. 6 and \n7 were acquitted of all the charges. \n\n3.  The convicts preferred an appeal before the Patna High Court against \nthe order of conviction and the State preferred an appeal before the \nHigh Court against the order of acquittal of the two accused persons. \nThe Patna High Court, vide a common judgment dated 26.03.2015,3 \nupheld the conviction of the five convicts and set aside the acquittal \nof  accused  nos.  6  and  7  by  finding  them  guilty  of  the  commission \nof offences under Sections 364/34 and 302/34 of IPC. Accordingly, \naccused  nos.  6  and  7  were  also  convicted  and  were  sentenced \nto undergo  rigorous life imprisonment  on each count. The present \nbatch of appeals assail the order/judgment dated 26.03.2015 of the \nPatna High Court. \n\n1 \n\n2 \n\n3 \n\nProsecution witness or PW\n\nHereinafter referred as “IPC”\n\nPassed in Govt. Appeal (DB) No. 16/1992, Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 219/1992 and Criminal Appeal (DB) \nNo. 271/1992\n\nVijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar\f112 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nBRIEF FACTS\n\n4.  Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts reveal that deceased Neelam \nwas the wife of one Ashok Kumar who happened to be the son of \nPW3/Ganesh  Prasad  Singh,  and  the  informant  PW18/Ramanand \nSingh was the brother of Ashok Kumar. The informant’s case was \nthat at the relevant point of time, the deceased was residing with her \nhusband and the informant in the house belonging to her late father \nJang  Bahadur  Singh,  who  belonged  to  Simaltalla. The  house  was \npartially  occupied  by  the  deceased,  her  husband  and  her  brother-\nin-law and the remaining portion was rented out and tenants were \nresiding in those portions. \n\n5.  As  per  the  prosecution  case,  on  30.08.1985  at  about  10:00  PM, \nPW18 was sitting outside the house on a rickshaw along with one \nDoman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Soordas, and Neelam was sleeping \ninside the house. Her husband, Ashok Kumar, had gone to his native \nplace  Ghogsha.  Suddenly,  the  seven  accused  persons,  including \nthe  appellants  before  us,  came  from  north  direction  along  with  15 \nother unknown assailants. Accused Vijay Singh/A-6 caught hold of \nthe  informant/PW18  and  as  soon  as  he  raised  alarm  and  started \nshouting, two unknown persons pointed out pistols towards him and \ndirected  him  to  maintain  silence.  Thereafter,  the  accused  persons \nwho had caught the informant, assaulted him with fists and slaps, and \nconfined him near the well situated on the north side of the house. \nMeanwhile, A-1 entered the house with 5-7 other accused persons \nby  getting  the  house  unlatched  through  a  resident  namely  Kumud \nRanjan  Singh  and  dragged  Neelam  out  of  the  house. As  soon  as \nthey  dragged  her  out,  four  persons  caught  hold  of  Neelam  by  her \narms and legs, lifted her and started moving towards Lohanda. As \nper the informant, the accused persons also picked up two sarees, \ntwo  blouses,  two  petticoats  and  a  pair  of  slippers  from  Neelam’s \nroom while going out. \n\n6.  As  the  informant  raised  alarm,  other  people  of  the  mohalla  also \ngathered around including PW2 Vinay Kumar Singh, PW4 Chandra \nShekhar Prasad Singh and PW5 Ram Naresh Singh. The said three \nwitnesses witnessed the accused persons taking away Neelam but \ncould not stop them. The informant explained that no one dared to \nfollow  the  accused  persons  as  they  had  pointed  pistols  and  had \nthreatened of dire consequences. The informant also explained the \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n113\n\nmotive  behind  the  commission  of  the  crime.  It  transpires  from  his \nstatement  that  Neelam’s  late  father  Jang  Bahadur  Singh  had  no \nson and his house was in possession of his daughter Neelam. She \nwas  abducted  in  order  to  forcefully  obtain  the  possession  of  the \nhouse  belonging  to  her  father.  The  second  limb  of  motive  stems \nfrom the pending litigation between A-1 to A-5 (appellants) on one \nside  and  deceased  Neelam,  her  maternal  grandfather  and  her \ntwo  sisters  on  the  other  side.  The  accused  persons  had  obtained \nletters  of  administration  and  probate  of  the  Will  left  by  late  Jang \nBahadur Singh from the competent court and the said order came \nto  be  challenged  before  the  Patna  High  Court  by  the  deceased, \nher  maternal  grandfather  and  younger  sisters.  In  the  said  appeal, \nthe  Patna  High  Court  had  injuncted  the  accused  persons  from \nalienating any part of the property. The High Court also restrained \nthe execution of the probate of the Will by restraining the delivery of \npossession of the property to the accused persons. Thus, deceased \nNeelam was residing in her father’s house along with her husband \nand brother-in-law in order to retain the possession of the property. \nIn this backdrop, the matter went for trial. \n\nBEFORE THE TRIAL COURT\n\n7.  The  Trial  Court,  while  acquitting A-6  and A-7,  observed  that  the \nmotive attributed for the commission of the crime was not attributable \nto  the  said  two  accused  persons  as  no  interest  of  theirs  could  be \ndisclosed  in  the  pending  litigation.  Further,  it  also  found  that A-6 \nwas not named in the FIR registered upon the information supplied \nby PW18 and in his oral testimony, no statement of assault by A-6 \nand A-7 was given by him. It further held that no evidence surfaced \nduring the trial to indicate the participation of A-6 and A-7 in the acts \nof abduction and commission of murder. \n\n8.  While convicting A-1 to A-5 on the charges under Sections 302/34 \nand  364/34  of  IPC,  the  Trial  Court  primarily  relied  upon  the  oral \ntestimonies  of  PW18/informant,  PW2,  PW4  and  PW5. The  motive \nfor the commission of the offence was supplied by the pending legal \ndispute relating to the property belonging to late Jang Bahadur Singh. \nThe Court also replied upon circumstantial evidence borne out from \nthe  testimonies  of  PW7  (maternal  uncle  of  the  de-ceased),  PW3 \n(father-in-law of the deceased), PW23 (sister of the deceased) and \nPW13 (doctor) to arrive at the finding of guilt. \n\nVijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar\f114 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nBEFORE THE HIGH COURT\n\n9.  A  reading  of  the  impugned  judgment  passed  by  the  High  Court \nsuggests  that  the  High  Court  carried  out  a  fresh  appreciation  of \nevidence.  The  High  Court  firstly  examined  the  question  whether \nNeelam  was  actually  residing  in  the  house  from  which  she  was \nabducted. Relying upon the testimonies of PW7 (maternal uncle of \ndeceased),  PW18  (brother-in-law  of  deceased  and  informant)  and \nPW21 (Investigating Officer), the Court concluded that Neelam was \nindeed residing in the said house. In doing so, the Court discarded \nthe fact that the other independent occupants of the house such as \nRam Chabila Singh, his son, Kumud Ranjan Singh etc. did not come \nin  support  of  the  said  fact. To  overcome  this  deficiency,  the  Court \nrelied upon the statements of PW21 and PW23 (sister of deceased) \nthat some make-up articles were found in a bag lying in the room, \nwhich was suggestive of the fact that a woman was residing in the \nsaid room. \n\n10. \n\nIn  further  consideration,  the  High  Court  excluded  the  evidence \nof  PW5  for  the  reason  that  his  presence  at  the  place  of  incident \nwas doubtful. For, PW5 deposed that he was heading towards his \nhome from Deoghar and on the way from Lakhisarai to Simaltalla, \nhe  stopped  at  Sikandra  Chowk  along  with  PW2  and  PW4.  It  was \nat this point that they heard the hulla and ended up witnessing the \ncommission  of  offence.  The  High  Court  took  note  of  the  fact  that \nwhile  going  from  Deoghar  to  Simaltalla,  Lakhisarai  and  Ghogsha \nwould come first and thus, there was no reason for PW5 to come all \nthe way to Sikandra Chowk if he was going to his home in Ghogsha \nas  he  could  have  directly  proceeded  from  Lakhisarai  to  Ghogsha. \nNevertheless, the High Court duly relied upon the evidence of PW2, \nPW4 and PW18 as well as on circumstantial evidence comprising \nof the testimonies of PW23, PW13 (doctor) and absence of suitable \nexplanation  in  the  statements  of  accused  persons  under  Section \n313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734 as regards the fatal \ninjuries suffered by the deceased. Thus, the High Court upheld the \nfinding of guilt of A-1 to A-5. \n\n11.  As  regards A-6  and A-7,  the  High  Court  reversed  the  finding  of \nacquittal of the Trial Court into that of conviction. Primarily, the High \n\n4 \n\nHereinafter referred as “CrPC”\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n115\n\nCourt observed that the said two accused persons were acquitted on \nthe basis of the exonerating testimony of PW5 and the same cannot \nbe  sustained  as  the  testimony  of  PW5  has  been  excluded  by  the \nHigh Court in appeal. Further, the Court held that the testimonies of \nPW2,  PW4  and  PW18  were  consistent  regarding  the  participation \nof A-6 and A-7 and thus, they were convicted for the commission of \nthe offences under Sections 364 and 302 of IPC read with Section \n34  of  IPC.  The  applicability  of  Section  34  IPC  was  based  on  the \nfact that A-6 and A-7 had confined PW18 near the well in order to \neliminate  any  chances  of  resistance  in  the  acts  committed  by  the \nother five accused persons. \n\nSUBMISSIONS\n\n12.  On  behalf  of A-6 and A-7, it is  submitted that there  was no  motive \nfor  the  said  accused  persons  to  have  indulged  in  the  commission \nof  the  offence  in  question.  The  motive,  if  any,  existed  only  for  the \nremaining five accused persons who were interested in the outcome \nof the pending litigation between the parties. It is further contended \nthat  the  High  Court  ought  not  to  have  entered  into  the  exercise  of \nre-appreciation of the entire evidence without finding any infirmity in \nthe  view  taken  by  the Trial  Court. To  buttress  this  submission,  it  is \nsubmitted that since the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible \nview, it could not have been disturbed by the High Court in appeal. \nIn this regard, reliance has been placed upon the decisions of this \nCourt in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran,5 Chandrappa v. State of \nKarnataka,6 Nepal Singh v. State of Haryana,7 Kashiram v. State of \nM.P.,8 Labh Singh v. State of Punjab9 and Suratlal v. State of M.P.10 \n\n13. \n\nIt  is  further  submitted  that  no  reliance  could  be  placed  upon  the \ntestimonies  of  PW2  and  PW4  as  their  presence  at  the  spot  was \ndoubtful. Further, if they were 400 yards away when hue and cry was \nraised, they could not have seen A-6 taking away PW18 towards the \nwell as the said fact took place prior to the hue and cry. It is further \n\n5 \n\n6 \n\n7 \n\n8 \n\n9 \n\n[2007] 3 SCR 507 : (2007) 3 SCC 755\n\n[2007] 2 SCR 630 : (2007) 4 SCC 415\n\n[2009] 6 SCR 982 : (2009) 12 SCC 351\n\n[2001] 4 Supp. SCR 263 : (2002) 1 SCC 71\n\n(1976) 1 SCC 181\n\n10 \n\n(1982) 1 SCC 488\n\nVijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar\f116 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nsubmitted that in the FIR, no pistol was assigned to A-6, whereas, the \nsaid fact was brought forward at the time of evidence. The appellants \nhave  also  raised  a  question  regarding  the  time  of  incident  on  the \nbasis  of  medical  evidence.  It  is  stated  that  the  post-mortem  report \nindicated  that  half-digested  food  was  found  in  the  stomach  of  the \ndeceased, whereas, the informant PW18 deposed that the incident \ntook place immediately after dinner. If such was the case, the death \nought  to  have  occurred  around  1-2 AM  in  the  intervening  night  of \n30.08.1985-31.08.1985,  but  the  post-mortem  report,  based  on  the \npost-mortem conducted at around 05:30 PM on 31.08.1985, indicated \nthat death took place about 24 hours ago and thus, the time of death \nwas around 05:00 PM on 30.08.1985 and not 10:00 PM, as alleged. \n\n14.  The  appellants  have  also  submitted  that  the  prosecution  has  not \nproved  that  the  deceased  was  actually  residing  in  the  concerned \nhouse at Simaltalla. \n\n15.  Per  contra,  it  is  submitted  on  behalf  of  the  State  that  mere  non-\nexamination  of  some  independent  witnesses  shall  not  be  fatal  to \nthe  case  of  the  prosecution.  Reliance  has  been  placed  upon  the \ndecision of this Court in Rai Saheb & ors. v. State of Haryana11 to \ncontend that at times, independent witnesses may not come forward \ndue to fear. It is further submitted that the High Court has correctly \nappreciated the evidence in order to arrive at the finding of guilt of \nthe accused persons. It is further submitted that the testimonies of \nPW2, PW4 and PW18 are consistent and the High Court has correctly \nplaced reliance upon their testimonies. As regards motive as well, it \nis submitted that the evidence is sufficient to reveal motive for the \ncommission of the crime. \n\n16.  We  have  heard  learned  counsels  for  the  appellants  as  well  as  for \n\nthe State. We have also carefully examined the record.\n\nDISCUSSION\n\n17. \n\nIn  light  of  the  rival  contentions  raised  by  the  parties,  the  principal \nissue that arises before the Court is whether the finding of guilt of \nthe appellants arrived at by the High Court is sustainable in light of \nthe  evidence  on  record. As  a  corollary  of  this  issue,  it  also  needs \n\n11 \n\n(1994) Supp.1 SCC 74\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n117\n\nto be examined whether the approach of the High Court was in line \nwith  the  settled  law  for  reversing  an  acquittal  into  conviction  in  a \ncriminal appeal. \n\n18.  After two rounds of litigation before the Trial Court and the High Court, \nit is fairly certain the case is to be examined only with respect to the \noffences under Sections 364 and 302 of IPC read with Section 34 \nIPC. With respect to the offence under Section 364 IPC, the case of \nthe prosecution is based on direct oral evidence, and with respect \nto the offence under Section 302 IPC, the case of the prosecution is \nessentially based on circumstantial evidence as no direct evidence \nof  the  commission  of  murder  could  be  collected.  However,  it  is \nquite  evident  that  the  offence  of  murder  was  committed  after  the \ncommission  of  the  offence  of  abduction.  There  is  a  sequential \nrelationship between the two offences and thus, in order to set up \na case for the commission of the offence of murder, it is necessary \nto prove the commission of the offence of abduction by the accused \npersons/appellants. For, the chain, in a case based on circumstantial \nevidence, must be complete and consistent. \n\n19. \n\nIn order to prove the offence under Section 364 IPC, the prosecution \nhas  relied  upon  the  oral  testimonies  of  four  eye  witnesses  –  PW-\n2, PW-4, PW-5 and PW-18. Their  testimonies have been  assailed \non various counts. The appellants have termed the said witnesses \nas interested and chance witnesses. The former charge originates \nfrom the fact that the witnesses were related to the deceased, and \nthe latter charge originates from the fact that the witnesses had no \nrea-son to be present at the place of offence and they just appeared \nunexpectedly as a matter of chance. Let us examine both the aspects. \nWe may first examine the testimonies of the witnesses independently, \nwithout going into their relationship with the deceased. \n\n20.  The  informant  PW18  has  deposed  that  he  was  standing  near  a \nrickshaw outside his house and the deceased was sleeping inside \nthe  house.  PW18  was  standing  along  with  three  independent \npersons namely, Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry and Soordas. The seven \naccused persons came along with 15 other persons. A-6 and A-7, \nalong with unknown persons, first came to PW18 and took him away \ntowards the well and confined him there. Thereafter, the remaining \naccused  persons,  along  with  other  unknown  assailants,  entered \nthe  house  wherein  the  deceased  was  sleeping.  Interestingly,  as \n\nVijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar\f118 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nper the version of the informant, the house was bolted from inside \nand  was  opened  by  a  tenant  namely  Kumud  Ranjan  Singh.  The \nproblem  with  the  informant’s  version  begins  from  this  point  itself. \nAs per his version, the first eye witnesses of the incident ought to \nhave been Doman Tenti, Daso Mistry, Soordas and Kumud Ranjan \nSingh.  One  person,  namely  Soordas,  was  stated  to  be  blind  and \nthus, he may be excluded. Nevertheless, the prosecution ought to \nhave examined the three natural witnesses of the incident namely, \nDoman  Tenti,  Daso  Mistry  and  Kumud  Ranjan  Singh.  There  is  no \nexplanation for non-examination of the natural eye witnesses. The \nversion becomes more doubtful when it is examined in light of his \nstatement  that  he  could  not  prevent  the  accused  persons  as A-6 \nhad  threatened  him  with  a  pistol.  In  the  FIR,  no  pistol  has  been \nattributed to A-6, whereas in the statement recorded before the Trial \nCourt, this fact was introduced for the first time, which is indicative of \nimprovement. Furthermore, PW18 got it recorded in the FIR that A-6 \nand others had assaulted him with fists and slaps, but the said fact \nwas not deposed before the Trial Court in his examination in chief. \nThe discrepancy assumes greater seriousness in light of the fact that \nno pistol has been recovered from any of the accused persons and \nif the factum of branding of pistol is un-der the cloud of doubt, the \nentire conduct of PW18 becomes doubtful and unnatural, as he did \nnot try to prevent the accused persons from entering the premises \nor from abducting the deceased or from taking away the deceased \non their shoulders in front of his eyes as he was the brother-in-law \nof the deceased. \n\n21.  The other eye witnesses, PW2, PW4 and PW5, de-posed collectively \nin  favour  of  the  prosecution  as  they  had  arrived  at  the  scene  of \ncrime  together. At  around  10:00  PM  on  the  fateful  night,  the  said \neye  witnesses  happened  to  be  present  at  Sikandra  Chowk  and \nthey  heard  some  hue  and  cry  at  the  house  of  the  deceased.  The \nwitnesses were coming together in a jeep from Lakhisarai and were \ngoing towards their home in Ghogsha village, the village wherein the \ndeceased was married and also the native village of PW18/informant. \nPW2 was the driver of PW4. The testimo-nies of the said PWs have \nmade it clear that while coming from Lakhisarai to Sikandra Chowk, \nGhogsha  came  first,  followed  by  Lohanda  and  Simaltalla.  In  such \ncircumstances, their presence at Sikandra Chowk at 10:00 PM must \nbe explained to the satisfaction of the Court. For, if they were going \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n119\n\n22. \n\nto their village, there was no occasion for them to come to Simaltalla \nas it did not fall on their way. But no such ex-planation is forthcoming \nfrom the material on record. \n\nInterestingly,  this  lacuna  was  duly  noted  by  the  High  Court  with \nrespect  to  PW5  as  there  was  no  reason  for  him  to  be  present  at \nSikandra  Chowk  at  the  time  of  incident  and  his  testimony  was \nexcluded. However, the same logic was not extended to the testimony \nof PW4 as well, as it was equally improbable for him to be present \nat Sikandra Chowk at 10:00 PM on the date of incident. His visit to \nSikandra Chowk was not necessitated for going to his village. Even \notherwise,  since  the  three  eye  witnesses  were  similarly  placed  as \nper  their  own  version,  the  rejection  of  testimony  of  one  witness \nought to have raised a natural doubt on the testimonies of the other \ntwo  witnesses  unless  they  had  a  better  explanation.  However,  no \nsuch  doubt  was  entertained  by  the  High  Court  and  the  impugned \njudgment  offers  no  explanation  for  the  same.  In  light  of  their  own \ntestimonies, none of the three eye witnesses were required to visit \nSikandra Chowk or Simaltalla for going to their village. \n\n23.  The testimonies of the eye witnesses are also impeachable in light of \nthe other evidence on record. PW21 was the investigating officer in \nthe case and he had examined the aforesaid PWs as eye witnesses \nof the incident. The version put forth by the eye witnesses meets a \nserious doubt when examined in light of the evidence of DW3 and \nDW4, the concerned Deputy Superintendent and Superintendent of \nPolice respectively who had supervised the investigation of the present \ncase. Both these officers were examined as defence witnesses on \nbehalf of the appellants. As per the supervision notes prepared by \nDW3 during the course of investigation, PW2 and PW4 got to know \nabout the incident only when PW18 came running to them after the \nincident. PW2, at that time, was sitting in a hotel with Umesh Singh \nto  have  ‘prasad’.  Similarly,  the  evidence  of  DW4  indicates  that  on \nthe  date  of  incident,  at  around  10:00  PM,  PW4  was  coming  from \nLakhisarai in his jeep and he saw six-seven persons fleeing away in \na jeep and he identified them as the accused persons. Thus, PW4 \nentered the scene after the commission of offence and he did not \nwitness  the  act  of  abduction.  The  testimony  of  PW2  strengthens \nthe doubt as he deposed that when they reached the police station \nafter  the  incident  with  PW18,  neither  him  nor  PW4  in-formed  the \nIO  that  they  had  directly  seen  the  incident.  The  stark  difference \n\nVijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar\f120 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nbetween the versions put forth by the PW21 and DW3/DW4 raises \nserious concerns regarding the fairness of investigation conducted \nby  PW21  and  it  is  a  reasonable  possibility  that  the  eye  witnesses \nwere brought in to create a fool proof case. The evidence of DW3 \nand DW4, both senior officers who had exercised supervision over \nthe  investigation  conducted  by  PW21,  indicates  that  the  so-called \neye  witnesses  of  the  incident  were  actually  accessories  after  the \nfact and not accessories to the fact. \n\n24.  The second limb of the objection against the testimonies of the eye \nwitnesses is that none of the eye witnesses is an independent witness \nof fact. Ordinarily, there is no rule of law to discard the testimonies \nof  the  witnesses  merely  because  they  were  known  to  the  victim \nor  belonged  to  her  family.  For,  an  offence  may  be  committed  in \ncircumstances that only the family members are present at the place \nof  occurrence  in  natural  course.  However,  the  present  case  does \nnot fall in such category. In the facts of the present case, the natural \npresence of the eye witnesses at the place of occurrence is under \nserious doubt, as discussed above, and for unexplained reasons, the \nnaturally present public persons were not examined as witnesses in \nthe matter. The non-examination of natural witnesses such as Doman \nTenti, Daso Mistry, Soordas, Kumud Ranjan Singh and many other \nneighbours who admittedly came out of their houses to witness the \noffence, coupled with the fact that the projected eye witnesses failed \nto  explain  their  presence  at  the  place  of  occurrence,  renders  the \nentire version of the prosecution as improbable and unreliable. The \neye witnesses, being family members, were apparently approached \nby  PW18  who  in-formed  them  about  the  incident  and  later,  their \nversions were fabricated to make the case credible. Notably, when \nthe  version  put  forth  by  the  interested  witnesses  comes  under  a \nshadow of doubt, the rule of prudence demands that the independent \npublic witnesses must be examined and corroborating material must \nbe gathered. More so, when public witnesses were readily available \nand the offence has not taken place in the bounds of closed walls. \n\n25.  Pertinently,  the  conduct  of  the  eye  witnesses  also  ap-pears  to  be \nunnatural considering that they were all relatives of the deceased. \nFirstly, PW18 did not try to prevent the ab-duction. Even if it is believed \nthat he was held against a pistol, the statement regarding the existence \nof pistol comes as an improvement from his first information given \nto  the  police,  as  already  noted  above.  Nonetheless,  it  is  admitted \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n121\n\nthat PW2, PW4 and PW5 came in a jeep and they saw the accused \npersons leaving with Neelam after abducting her. It is also admitted \nthat they had identified the accused persons, who were essentially \nthe  relatives  of  the  eye  witnesses.  In  such  circumstances,  as  per \nnatural  human  conduct,  the  least  that  they  could  have  done  was \nto follow the accused persons in their jeep. They admittedly had a \nready vehicle with them. Despite so, there was no such attempt on \ntheir part, so much so that the dead body of Neelam was not even \ndiscovered until the following morning as none of the eye witnesses \nhad any clue as to where the accused persons had taken away the \ndeceased after abducting her. \n\n26.  One crucial foundational fact in the present case is that the deceased \nwas residing in her father’s house at Simaltalla. Although, the Trial \nCourt and High Court have not doubted the said fact, we have our \nreservations  regarding  the  same.  In  addition  to  the  statements  of \nPW18 (informant), PW23 (sister of deceased) and PW7 (maternal \nuncle of deceased), no other witness has deposed to prove the factum \nof residence. The admitted evidence on record sufficiently indicates \nthat various other tenants were residing in the same house, including \nKumud Ranjan Singh, Education Officer Ram Chabila Singh along \nwith his daughter and son. \n\n27.  The investigating officer PW21 had inspected the house and no direct \nmaterial, except some make-up articles, could be gathered so as to \nindicate that Neelam was actually residing there. Admittedly, another \nwoman  namely,  Chando  Devi  (sister  of  Ram  Chabila  Singh)  was \nalso residing in the same portion of the house. The High Court did \ntake note of this fact but explained it away by observing that since \nChando  Devi  was  a  widow,  the  make-up  articles  could  not  have \nbelonged  to  her  as  there  was  no  need  for  her  to  put  on  make-up \nbeing a widow. In our opinion, the observation of the High Court is \nnot only legally untenable but also highly objectionable. A sweeping \nobservation of this nature is not commensurate with the sensitivity \nand  neutrality  expected  from  a  court  of  law,  specifically  when  the \nsame is not made out from any evidence on record. \n\n28.  Be that as it may, mere presence of certain make-up articles cannot \nbe a conclusive proof of the fact that the deceased was residing in \nthe  said  house,  especially  when  another  woman  was  admittedly \nresiding  there.  Furthermore,  if  Neelam  was  indeed  residing  there, \nher other belongings such as clothes etc. ought to have been found \n\nVijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar\f122 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nin  the  house  and  even  if  not  so,  the  other  residents  of  the  same \nhouse could have come forward to depose in support of the said fact. \n\n29.  Notably,  certain  clothes  such  as  two  sarees,  two  blouses  and  two \npetticoats were recovered along with the dead body of the deceased. \nThe prosecution version is that the accused persons had taken away \nthe said clothes from the house of the deceased while abducting her. \nThere is absolutely no explanation for the said conduct on the part \nof  the  accused  persons.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  as  to  why  the \naccused persons would take her clothes along while abducting her. \nOn the contrary, this fact actually serves the case of the prosecution \nin proving that the de-ceased was actually residing at the house in \nSimaltalla. The clothes appear to have been planted along with the \ndead  body  in  order  to  support  the  fact  of  actual  residence  of  the \ndeceased at her father’s house in Simaltalla. In light of the material \non record, it could be concluded that no material whatsoever could \nbe  found  at  the  house  of  Jang  Bahadur  Singh  to  directly  indicate \nthat  the  deceased  was  residing  there.  The  make-up  articles  were \nlinked with the deceased on the basis of a completely unacceptable \nreasoning and without any corroborative material. The prosecution \nhas  failed  to  examine  even  one  cohabitant  to  prove  the  said  fact. \nFurthermore,  no  personal  belongings  of  the  deceased,  such  as \nclothes, footwear, utensils etc., could be found in the entire house. \nTherefore,  we  are  not  inclined  to  believe  that  the  deceased  was \nactually residing in the house at Simaltalla. In the same breath, we \nmay  also  note  that  even  for  PW18,  no  material  was  found  in  the \nsaid house to indicate that he was in fact residing there. Apart from \nhis own statement, no witness has come forward to depose that the \ninformant was a resident of the said house. The prosecution has not \nspotted any room in the entire house wherein PW18 was residing \nand thus, his own presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful. \n\n30.  The appellants have also raised certain objections with respect to the \ntime of death. The discrepancy has been flagged in light of the post \nmortem report, based on the post-mortem conducted at around 5:30 \nPM on 31.08.1985, which indicates that death took place around 24 \nhours ago. It indicates that the time of death must have been around \n5:00 PM on 30.08.1985, which is contrary to the evidence of PW18 \nthat the incident took place around 10:00 PM on 30.08.1985. A post \nmortem  report  is  generally  not  considered  as  conclusive  evidence \nof the facts mentioned in the re-port regarding the cause of death, \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n123\n\ntime of death etc. It could always be corroborated with other direct \nevidence on record such as ocular evidence of the eye witnesses. \nHowever,  when  there  is  no  other  credible  evidence  on  record  to \ncontradict the report, the facts stated in the post mortem report are \ngenerally taken as true. In the present matter, the evidence of the \neye witnesses has been declared as wholly unreliable including on \nthe aspect of time of death. Thus, there is no reason to doubt the \npost mortem report and the findings therein. \n\n31.  At this stage, we may also note that the approach of the High Court \nin  reversing  the  acquittal  of A-6  and A-7  was  not  in  line  with  the \nsettled law pertaining to reversal of acquittals. The Trial Court had \nacquitted the said two accused persons on the basis of a thorough \nappreciation of evidence and the High Court merely observed that \ntheir acquittal was based on the improbable statement of PW5 and \nsince  the  evidence  of  PW5  stood  excluded  from  the  record,  there \nwas no reason left for the acquittal of A-6 and A-7. Pertinently, the \nHigh Court did not arrive at any finding of illegality or perversity in \nthe opinion of the Trial Court on that count. Furthermore, it did not \narrive at any positive finding of involvement of the said two accused \npersons within the sphere of common intention with the remaining \naccused  persons.  Equally,  the  exclusion  of  the  evidence  of  PW5, \nwithout  explaining  as  to  how  the  evidence  of  PW2  and  PW4  was \nnot  liable  to  be  excluded  in  the  same  manner,  was  in-correct  and \nerroneous. \n\n32.  We  do  not  intend  to  say  that  the  High  Court  could  not  have \nappreciated  the  evidence  on  record  in  its  exercise  of  appellate \npowers.  No  doubt,  the  High  Court  was  well  within  its  powers  to \ndo so. However, in order to reverse a finding of acquittal, a higher \nthreshold is required. For, the presumption of innocence operating \nin favour of an accused through-out the trial gets concretized with a \nfinding of acquittal by the Trial Court. Thus, such a finding could not \nbe reversed merely because the possibility of an alternate view was \nalive. Rather, the view taken by the Trial Court must be held to be \ncompletely unsustainable and not a probable view. The High Court, \nin  the  impugned  judgment,  took  a  cursory  view  of  the  matter  and \nreversed the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 without arriving at any finding \nof illegality or perversity or impossibility of the Trial Court’s view or \nnon-appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court. \n\nVijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar\f124 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n33.  We may usefully refer to the exposition of law in Sanjeev v. State \nof H.P.,12 wherein this Court summarized the position in this regard \nand observed as follows:\n\n“7. It is well settled that:\n\n7.1.  While  dealing  with  an  appeal  against  acquittal,  the \nreasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting \nthe accused must be dealt with, in case the appellate court \nis of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court \ndeserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State \nof Karnataka13, Anwar Ali v. State of H.P.14)\n\n7.2.  With  an  order  of  acquittal  by  the  trial  court,  the \nnormal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets \nreinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P.15)\n\n7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, \nthe appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering \nwith  the  appeal  against  acquittal  (see  Sambasivan  v. \nState of Kerala16)”\n\n34.  Having  observed  that  the  case  of  the  prosecution  is  full  of  glaring \ndoubts  as  regards  the  offence  of  abduction,  we  may  briefly  note \nand  reiterate  that  the  offence  of  murder  is  entirely  dependent  on \ncircumstantial evidence. Although, the post mortem report indicates \nthat the death of the deceased was unnatural and the commission \nof  murder  cannot  be  ruled  out.  But  there  is  no  direct  evidence  on \nrecord to prove the commission of murder by the accused persons. \nThe link of causation between the accused persons and the alleged \noffence  is  conspicuously  missing.  The  circumstantial  evidence \nemanating  from  the  facts  surrounding  the  offence  of  abduction, \nsuch  as  the  testimonies  of  eye  witnesses,  has  failed  to  meet  the \ntest  of  proof  and  cannot  be  termed  as  proved  in  the  eyes  of  law. \nTherefore,  the  foundation  of  circumstantial  evidence  having  fallen \ndown, no inference could be drawn from it to infer the commission \n\n12 \n\n13 \n\n14 \n\n(2022) 6 SCC 294\n\n(2019) 5 SCC 436\n\n(2020) 10 SCC 166\n\n15  AIR 1955 SC 807\n\n16 \n\n[1998] 3 SCR 280 : (1998) 5 SCC 412\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n125\n\nof the offence under Section 302 IPC by the accused persons. It is \ntrite law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the chain \nof  evidence  must  be  complete  and  must  give  out  an  inescapable \nconclusion of guilt. In the pre-sent case, the prosecution case is far \nfrom meeting that standard. \n\n35.  As regards motive, we may suffice to say that motive has a bearing \nonly when the evidence on record is sufficient to prove the ingredients \nof the offences under consideration. Without the proof of foundational \nfacts, the case of the prosecution cannot succeed on the presence of \nmotive alone. Moreover, the motive in the present matter could operate \nboth  ways. The  accused  persons  and  the  eyewitnesses  belong  to \nthe  same family and the presence of a property  related dispute is \nevident. In a hypothetical sense, both the sides could benefit from \nimplicating the other. In such circumstances, placing reliance upon \nmotive alone could be a double-edged sword. We say no more. \n\n36.  The  above  analysis  indicates  that  the  prosecution  has  failed  to \ndischarge  its  burden  to  prove  the  case  beyond  reasonable  doubt. \nThe reasonable doubts, indicated above, are irreconcilable and strike \nat the foundation of the prosecution’s case. Thus, the appellants are \nliable to be acquitted of all the charges. \n\n37. \n\nIn  light  of  the  foregoing  discussion,  we  hereby  conclude  that  the \nfindings of conviction arrived at by the Trial Court and the High Court \nare  not  sustainable.  Moreover,  the  High  Court  erred  in  reversing \nthe  acquittal  of A-6  and A-7. Accordingly,  the  impugned  judgment \nas well as the judgment rendered by the Trial Court (to the extent \nof  conviction  of A-1  to A-5)  are  set  aside,  and  all  seven  accused \npersons (appellants) are hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled \nupon them. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith, if \nlying in custody. \n\n38.  The captioned appeals stand disposed of in terms of this judgment. \nInterim application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. No costs. \n\nResult of the Case: Appeals disposed of.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain\n\nVijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. The State of Bihar\f"}