{"file_name": "2024_10_126_149_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 126 : 2024 INSC 748\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni  \nv. \nThe Union of India and Others\n\n(Civil Appeal No(s). 8617 of 2013)\n\n30 September 2024\n\n[Sandeep Mehta* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nWhether the seniority of the appellant is to be reckoned from the \ndate of induction/initial appointment or as per the date of promotion/\nconfirmation in the skilled grade.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nService  Law  –  Promotion  –  Seniority  –  Date  of  induction  – \nDate of promotion – The GO dated 24.12.2002 issued by the \nOrdinance Factory Board placed on record clarifies the position \nregarding counting of seniority by laying down that seniority \nwill  be  counted  from  the  date  of  promotion  to  skilled  grade \nand not from the date of induction/entry/promotion in semi-\nskilled  grade  –  However,  the  appellant  has  placed  reliance \non  GO  dated  04.08.2015,  the  rule  position  qua  the  fixation \nof seniority has been restored to be governed by OM dated \n04.11.1992, according to which the relevant date for fixation \nof seniority would be the date of initial appointment and not \nthe date of upgradation/promotion to the skilled grade:\n\nHeld:  The  clarification  issued  vide  GO  dated  04.08.2015  does \nnot  operate  retrospectively  as  it  is  specifically  provided  in  the \nsaid  GO  that  “henceforth”,  the  seniority  in  respect  of  Industrial \nEstablishments  will  be  governed  by  the  relevant  clause  of  OM \ndated  04.11.1992  –  It  is  trite  law  that  an  Office  Memorandum/\nGovernment Order cannot have a retrospective effect unless and \nuntil there is an express provision to make its effect retrospective \nor  that  the  operation  thereof  is  retrospective  by  necessary \nimplication – If a Government Order is treated to be in the nature \nof  a  clarification  of  an  earlier  Government  Order,  it  may  be \nmade  applicable  retrospectively  –  Conversely,  if  a  subsequent \nGovernment Order is held to be a modification/amendment of the \nearlier  Government  Order,  its  application  would  be  prospective \nas retrospective application thereof would result in withdrawal of \n\n* Author\n\n\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n127\n\nvested rights which is impermissible in law and the same may also \nentail recoveries to be made – In the instant case, the subsequent \nGO dated 04.08.2015 cannot be read simply as a clarification and \ntherefore  cannot  be  made  applicable  retrospectively  –  The  said \nGO  has  substantively  modified  the  position  governing  seniority \nin the Industrial Establishments by reviving the earlier OM dated \n04.11.1992, and supersedes the orders/circulars dated 24.12.2002 \nand  13.01.2003,  which  were  holding  the  field  over  more  than  a \ndecade  – Therefore,  giving  retrospective  effect  to  the  GO  dated \n04.08.2015 would have catastrophic effect on the seniority of the \nentire  cadre  – As  much  water  has  flown  under  the  bridge  and \nretrospective  application  of  the  GO  issued  in  2015  would  open \nfloodgates  of  litigation  and  would  disturb  the  seniority  of  many \nemployees causing them grave prejudice and heartburn as it would \ndisturb the crystallized rights regarding seniority, rank and promotion \nwhich would have accrued to them during the intervening period – \nThis Court is of the view that applicability of the Government Order \ndated 04.08.2015 cannot enure to the benefit of the appellant as \nits operation is clearly prospective. [Paras 41, 42, 43, 50, 51]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nPawan Pratap Singh and Others v. Reevan Singh and Others [2011] \n2 SCR 831 : (2011) 3 SCC 267; Sonia v. Oriental Insurance Co. \nLtd.  and  Others  [2007]  8  SCR  883  :  (2007)  10  SCC  627;  Sree \nSankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Others v. Dr. Manu and \nAnother [2023] 7 SCR 366 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 640; Malcom \nLawrence Cecil D’Souza v. Union of India and Others (1976) 1 SCC \n599; R.S. Makashi and Others v. I.M. Menon and Others [1982] \n2 SCR 69 : (1982) 1 SCC 379; K.R. Mudgal and Others v. R.P. \nSingh  and  Others  [1986]  3  SCR  993  :  (1986)  4  SCC  531;  B.S. \nBajwa and Another v. State of Punjab and Others [1997] Supp. \n6 SCR 451 : (1998) 2 SCC 523 – relied on.\n\nBSNL v. R. Santhakumari Velusamy [2011] 14 SCR 502 : (2011) \n9 SCC 510; Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Assn. v. State \nof  Maharashtra  [1990]  2  SCR  900  :  (1990)  2  SCC  715;  Suresh \nChandra  Jha  v.  State  of  Bihar  and  Others  [2006]  Supp.  8  SCR \n831  :  (2007)  1  SCC  405;  L.  Chandrakishore  Singh  v.  State  of \nManipur  and  Others  [1999]  Supp.  3  SCR  323  :  (1999)  8  SCC \n287; Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa and Others [1999] Supp. \n4 SCR 302 : (1999) 9 SCC 596; L. Chandrakishore Singh v. State \nof Haryana, AIR 1975 SC 613 – referred to.\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f128 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nList of Keywords\n\nService  Law;  Promotion;  Date  of  induction;  Date  of  promotion; \nSeniority; GO dated 04.08.2015; GO dated 24.12.2002 issued by \nOrdinance Factory Board; Industrial establishment; Skilled grade; \nSemi-skilled grade; Retrospective effect; Prospective operation.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8617 of 2013\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 10.10.2011 of the High Court of \nMadras in WP No. 583 of 2011\n\nWith\n\nCivil Appeal Nos. 10944 - 10946 of 2024\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nR  Nedumaran,  Vijay  Kumar,  Prashant  Bhushan, Anurag  Tiwary, \nAdvs. for the Appellant.\n\nVikramjeet Banerjee, ASG, Rupesh Kumar, Sr. Adv., Abid Ali Beeran \nP,  Saswat Adhyapak,  Sarath  S  Janardanan,  Joydip  Bhattacharya, \nMrs. Anil Katiyar, Nachiketa Joshi, Ms. Priya Mishra, Rajesh Kumar \nSingh, Advs. for the Respondents.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nMehta, J.\n\nCivil Appeal No(s). 8617 of 2013\n\n1.  The instant appeal by special leave takes exception to the judgment \ndated  10th  October,  2011  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature \nat Madras in Writ Petition,1 whereby the Division Bench of the High \nCourt accepted the writ petition2 preferred by the private respondents \nherein3 and reversed the judgment dated 24th December, 2010 passed \nby  the  Central Administrative  Tribunal,  Madras  Bench4  in  Original \n\n1  Writ Petition No. 583 of 2011\n\n2 \n\n3 \n\n4 \n\nIbid\n\nRespondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5\n\n‘CAT’, hereafter\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n129\n\nApplication5 preferred by the private respondents herein. The CAT \nhad  rejected  the  Original Application,6  challenging  the  proposed \naction of revision and fixation of their seniority in the Engine Factory, \nAvadi, Chennai.7\n\n2.  The brief facts in a nutshell, relevant and essential for the disposal \n\nof the instant appeal are noted hereinbelow.\n\n3.  The  appellant  and  the  private  respondents  were  engaged  on \nsemi-skilled  posts  such  as  Fitters  and  Machinists  in  respondent \nNo.2-Factory. A  common  select  list  of  candidates  based  on  merit \nwas issued by the General Manager of respondent No.2-Factory in \nthe year 1995 wherein the appellant herein was placed at a higher \nposition than the private respondents. An appointment order dated \n17th January, 1996 was issued in the favour of the appellant for the \npost  of  ‘Fitter  General(semi-skilled)’  in  respondent  No.2-Factory. \nHe was initially placed on probation for a period of two years which \nwas further extended for a period of six months w.e.f. 17th January, \n1998. The appellant satisfactorily completed the probation period on \n16th July, 1998. Thereafter, he was promoted to the ‘Skilled’ grade \non 6th January, 1999.\n\n4.  A draft seniority list dated 28th July, 2006 was issued by respondent \nNo.2-Factory, whereby the seniority of ‘Fitters’ was fixed as per their \nrespective dates of promotion to the skilled grade and the appellant \nwas placed at a lower position than the private respondents. \n\n5.  Aggrieved  of  the  draft  seniority  list,8  the  appellant  submitted  a \nrepresentation dated 13th November, 2006 to the General Manager \nof  respondent  No.2-Factory  seeking  necessary  amendments  in \nthe  draft  seniority  list  and  to  fix  his  position  appropriately  and \nthereafter,  to  publish  a  final  seniority  list.  The  General  Manager \nrejected the aforesaid representation submitted by the appellant vide \ncommunication dated 9th July, 2007, observing that his seniority had \nbeen fixed from the date of holding the skilled grade, and thus the \nposition of the appellant in the seniority list was not liable to be altered.\n\n5 \n\n6 \n\n7 \n\n8 \n\nOriginal Application No. 318 of 2009\n\nIbid\n\n‘respondent No. 2-Factory’, hereafter\nDated 28th July, 2006\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f130 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n6.  Being  aggrieved,  the  appellant  preferred  Original Application  No. \n821 of 2007 before the CAT challenging the draft seniority list dated \n28th July, 2006.\n\n7.  Another employee, namely, Mr. P. Kumaresan who was appointed \nas a Mechanist in respondent No.2-Factory in January 1996, also \nfiled Original Application No. 831 of 2007, before the CAT, wherein \nMr. P. Kumaresan also claimed that he had to be placed at the 6th \nposition instead of the 27th position as set out in the draft seniority \nlist.  Original Application9  preferred  by  Mr.  P.  Kumaresan  came  to \nbe allowed by the CAT holding that the seniority fixed in the draft \nlist was incorrect. The CAT noted that respondent No.2-Factory had \nallowed  the  promotion  to  the  juniors  of  Mr.  P.  Kumaresan  on  the \nground that he was still undergoing the extended period of probation. \nThe  CAT  held  that  it  is  settled  law  that  once  the  extended  period \nof  probation  is  completed,  the  employee  should  be  confirmed  in \nservice from the date of initial selection and should be assigned the \noriginal rank in the seniority list. Thus, once the extended period of \nprobation  came  to  an  end  and  the  employee  was  found  suitable, \nhe had to be confirmed in service, promoted with seniority and all \nconsequential benefits to the next grade with reference to the date \nof initial appointment.\n\n8.  The CAT allowed Original Application No. 821 of 2007 preferred by \nthe appellant herein vide order dated 23rd January, 2009, basing its \ndecision on the order passed in Original Application No. 831 of 2007 \nconsidering the fact that both the workers were identically employed \nin  respondent  No.2-Factory  and  directed  that  the  appellant  was \nentitled to be considered for his claim of seniority and directed the \nrespondents10 to revise the seniority list accordingly. \n\n9.  The private respondents herein filed Original Application No. 318 of \n2009 before CAT against the proposed action of revision of seniority \nlist and promotions in accordance with the order dated 23rd January, \n2009 passed in the Original Application No. 821 of 2007 filed by the \nappellant.  The  said  Original Application11  was  dismissed  by  CAT \nvide order dated 24th December, 2010 while granting the liberty to \n\n9 \n\nOriginal Application No. 831 of 2007\n\n10  Respondent Nos. 1 and 2\n\n11  Original Application No.318 of 2009\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n131\n\nthe  applicants  therein(private  respondents  herein)  to  file  a  review \napplication for assailing the orders passed in Original Application No. \n831 of 2007 and Original Application No. 821 of 2007.\n\n10.  However,  private  respondents  herein  rather  than  filing  a  review \napplication, chose to assail the orders passed by the CAT by preferring \na  Writ  Petition12  before  the  Madras  High  Court  which  came  to  be \nallowed vide order dated 10th October, 2011. The Union of India13 and \nrespondent No. 2-Factory were directed by the High Court to restore \nthe seniority of the writ petitioners(private respondents herein), holding \nthat the writ petitioners are senior to the appellant herein, both as \nper the date of initial appointment and also in the promotional post \nof skilled grade. The High Court held that an employee selected in \nthe semi-skilled grade is required to complete the probation period \nsatisfactorily and has to pass the requisite trade test prescribed for the \npost before he can be confirmed and promoted to the skilled grade. \nDue to the extension of the probation period of the respondents in \nthe Writ Petition No.583 of 2011(including the appellant herein), they \nwere required to be placed below the persons who were promoted \nto the skilled grade earlier to them. The High Court held that in the \nskilled grade, the writ petitioners(private respondents herein) were \nsenior to the third respondent(appellant herein). It was also held that \nthe promotions to the skilled grade and the highly skilled grade were \ncarried  out  in  the  years  1998  and  2003,  respectively  but  the  third \nrespondent (appellant herein) chose to file the Original Application14 \nin the year 2007 and no reason was forthcoming for the gross delay. \nThe  relevant  extract  from  the  High  Court’s  judgment  dated  10th \nOctober, 2011 is reproduced hereinbelow: -\n\n“7. A mere reading of the counter affidavit would show that \nthe probation of the third respondent in W.P. No. 583 of 2011 \nwas extended by six months and for the third respondent \nin W.P. No. 584 of 2011, it was extended by three months \nby virtue of their failure to complete probation of two years \nand  to  pass  the  required  trade  test  prescribed  for  the \nposts. Accordingly, the third respondent in W.P. No. 583 of \n\n12  Writ Petition No. 583 of 2011\n\n13  Respondent No. 1\n\n14  Original Application No. 821 of 2007\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f132 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n2011 was placed in the skilled grade only with effect from \n6.1.1999  and  third  respondent  in  W.P.  No.  584  of  2011 \nwas  promoted  only  with  effect  from  5.10.1998  whereas \nthe petitioners in both the petitions were promoted to the \nskilled grade on 3.7.1998.\n\n8. It is not in dispute that the Semi-Skilled grade is only \nhas  to  complete  the  probation  period  satisfactorily  and \npass  the  requisite  trade  tests  prescribed  for  the  posts. \nIn  the  present  case,  it  is  clear  that  due  to  extension  of \nthe probation period, the respondents were placed below \nthe persons who were promoted to Skilled grade earlier \nthan them. Even if the date of appointment is taken into \nconsideration,  the  petitioners  are  seniors  to  the  third \nrespondent in these petitions.\n\n9. That apart, the petitioners were promoted to the skilled \ngrade in the year 1998 and to the highly skilled grade in \nthe year 2003. But the third respondent in these petitions \nhave  chosen  to  file  the  original  applications  only  in  the \nyear 2007 and no reason is forthcoming for the delay.\n\n10. In view of the counter affidavit filed by the Department \nwhich is in favour of the petitioners and the fact that the \npetitioners  are  seniors  to  the  third  respondent  in  these \npetitions  both  as  per  the  date  of  initial  appointment  and \nalso the date of promotion to the skilled grade, we are of \nthe view that revising the seniority list at the instance of \nthe third respondent in the Writ Petitions in the guise of \nimplementing the order of the Tribunal, is illegal. Therefore, \nin our considered opinion, the order of the Tribunal is to \nbe interfered with.\n\n11. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petitions are allowed \nand the order of the Tribunal is set aside. The respondents 1 \nand 2 are directed to restore the seniority of the petitioners \nconfirming  their  original  date  of  promotion  to  the  Highly \nSkilled Grade. After revising the seniority, the respondents \nare further directed to consider the case of the petitioners \nfor subsequent promotion on par with their juniors.”\n\n(quoted verbatim from the paper book)\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n133\n\nThe  judgment  dated  10th  October,  2011  passed  by  the  Division \nBench  of  the  High  Court  is  the  subject  matter  of  challenge  in  the \ninstant appeal.\n\nSubmissions on behalf of the appellant: \n\n11.  Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  urged  that  the  High \nCourt premised its findings on a totally erroneous reasoning that the \nchallenge laid by the appellant to the draft seniority list was delayed \nand that the private respondents herein(writ petitioners) were senior \nto the appellant as on the date of initial appointment.\n\n12.  Learned  counsel  contended  that  the  draft  seniority  list  in  the \nappellant’s  cadre  was  published  in  the  year  2006  for  the  first \ntime  after  the  appointment  of  the  appellant  as  well  as  the  private \nrespondents.  Immediately  on  receiving  the  draft  seniority  list,  the \nappellant herein made a representation against the same and when \na favourable decision was not forthcoming, he approached the CAT \nfor challenging the validity thereof. He submitted that the finding of \nthe High Court that the private respondents herein(writ petitioners) \nwere senior to the appellant as on the date of initial appointment is \ntotally against the record. \n\n13.  He further urged that the extant rules do not provide that the promotion \nfrom  Fitter(semi-skilled)  to  Fitter(skilled)  would  be  dependent  on \npassing  the  trade  test.  Thus,  as  soon  as  the  appellant  completed \nthe probation period, his services would have to be confirmed and \nreckoned from the date of initial appointment, and by virtue thereof, \nthe  appellant  would  be  entitled  to  be  placed  above  the  private \nrespondents in the order of seniority. \n\n14.  Learned  counsel  submitted  that  the  period  spent  during  training/\nprobation has to be reckoned for computation of length of service and \nthe same cannot be excluded while assigning seniority to an employee. \nIn support of his arguments, learned counsel placed reliance on the \njudgment of this Court in the case of L. Chandrakishore Singh v. \nState of Haryana.15 \n\n15.  He further submitted that the movement of the employee from semi-\nskilled to skilled grade tantamounts to confirmation/ upgradation and \n\n15  AIR 1975 SC 613\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f134 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nnot a promotion. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on \nthe judgment of this Court in the case of BSNL v. R. Santhakumari \nVelusamy.16\n\n16.  Learned counsel also placed reliance on the Office Memorandum17 \ndated  4th  November,1992,  issued  by  the  Government  of  India, \nDepartment  of  Personnel  and  Training,  which  was  in  force  at  the \ntime when the appellant and the private respondents were appointed, \nwherein, it is provided: -\n\n“Seniority for Promotion\n\nOrder effective from 4th November, 1992\n\n[Government  of  India,  Department  of  Personnel  and \nTraining,  Office  Memorandum  No.  20011/5/90-Estt.  (D), \ndated the 4th November, 1992]\n\nSeniority to be determined by the order of merit indicated \nat  the  time  of  initial  appointment.-  The  seniority  of \nGovernment  servants  is  determined  in  accordance  with \nthe  general  principles  of  seniority  contained  in  M.Η.Α., \nΟ.Μ. No. 9/11155-RPS, dated the 22nd December, 1959 \n(See  Section  II).  One  of  the  basic  principles  enunciated \nin the said OM is that, seniority follows confirmation and \nconsequently permanent officers in each grade shall rank \nsenior to those who are officiating in that grade.\n\n2. This principle has been coming under judicial scrutiny in \na number of cases in the past; the last important judgment \nbeing the one delivered by the Supreme Court on 2-5-1990, \nin the case of Class II Direct Recruits Engineering Officers’ \nAssociation v. State of Maharashtra. In Para. 47 (A) of the \nsaid judgment, the Supreme Court has held that once an \nincumbent  is  appointed  to  a  post  according  to  rule,  his \nseniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment \nand not-according to the date of his confirmation.\n\n3. The general principle of seniority mentioned above has \nbeen examined in the light of the judicial pronouncement \n\n16 \n\n17 \n\n[2011] 14 SCR 502 : (2011) 9 SCC 510\n\n‘OM’, hereafter\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n135\n\nreferred to above and it has been decided that seniority \nmay  be  delinked  from  confirmation  as  per  the  directive \nof  the  Supreme  Court  in  Para,  47  (A)  of  its  judgment, \ndated  2-5-1990.  Accordingly,  in  modification  of  the \nGeneral  Principle  3,  proviso  to  General  Principle  4 \nand  proviso  to  General  Principle  5  (i)  contained  in \nO.M.  No.  9/11155-RPS,  dated  the  22nd  December, \n1959 and Para. 2.3 of O.M., dated the 3rd July, 1986, \nit  has  been  decided  that  the  seniority  of  a  person \nregularly appointed to a post according to rule would \nbe determined by the order of merit indicated at the \ntime of initial appointment and not according to the \ndate of confirmation.\n\n4.  These  orders  shall  take  effect  from  the  date  of  issue \nof this Office Memorandum. Seniority already determined \naccording to the existing principles on the date of issue of \nthese orders will not be reopened even if in some cases \nseniority  has  already  been  challenged  or  is  in  dispute \nand it will continue to be determined on the basis of the \nprinciples  already  existing  prior  to  the  date  of  issue  of \nthese orders.”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\nHe thus urged that the seniority of a person regularly appointed would \nhave to be reckoned based on the merit indicated at the time of the \ninitial appointment and not as per the date of confirmation. To support \nthis submission, he also placed reliance on the Constitution Bench \ndecision  of  this  Court  in  Direct  Recruit  Class  II  Engg.  Officers’ \nAssn. v. State of Maharashtra.18\n\nHe  thus  implored  the  Court  to  accept  the  appeal,  set  aside  the \nimpugned  judgment  rendered  by  the  High  Court,  and  restore  the \njudgment of the CAT.\n\nSubmissions on behalf of the respondents: \n\n17.  Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 \nsubmitted that the appellant was appointed as Fitter General(semi-\n\n18 \n\n[1990] 2 SCR 900 : (1990) 2 SCC 715\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f136 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nskilled)  on  17th  January,  1996.  The  semi-skilled  grade  is  only  a \ntrainee grade and in order to be confirmed in service and for being \npromoted to the skilled grade, the employee would have to complete \nthe probation period satisfactorily and pass the requisite trade test \nprescribed for promotion to the skilled grade. Only on passing the \ntrade test, the employee would qualify for a permanent status and \npromotion to the skilled grade.\n\n18.  He further submitted that it is a settled law that in cases where there \nare no rules governing the field, it is the placement in the initial merit \nlist that will decide the seniority, however, if the rules are in vogue, \nthen  the  same  will  prevail.  In  this  regard,  he  placed  reliance  on \nSuresh Chandra Jha v. State of Bihar and Others.19\n\n19.  Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  placed  reliance  on  Statutory \nRegulatory  Order20  No.  185  of  1994  dated  1st  November,  1994  to \nurge  that  any  appointment  in  the  industrial  establishment  is  done \nagainst the skilled grade and hence, the period spent in the semi-\nskilled  grade  till  completion  of  probation  period  and  qualifying  the \nprescribed trade test for promotion to the skilled grade is considered \nonly  as  a  trainee  grade.  Resultantly,  the  seniority/merit  position  at \nthe  time  of  induction  in  the  trainee  grade  would  have  no  bearing \non the inter se seniority of the employees which would have to be \nreckoned from the date the employee is confirmed and promoted to \nthe skilled grade upon completing the probation period and clearing \nthe trade test. \n\n20.  He further placed reliance upon the Government Order21 dated 24th \nDecember,  2002  issued  by  the  Ordinance  Factory  Board,  Ministry \nof  Defence,  Government  of  India,  which  was  issued  to  clarify  the \ncounting of seniority in trades mentioned in SRO No. 185 of 1994 \napplicable to the Industrial Establishments and urged that the said \nGO clarifies beyond the pale of doubt that the semi-skilled grade is \na  trainee  grade  and  the  seniority  will  be  counted  from  the  date  of \npromotion  to  the  skilled  grade  and  not  from  the  date  of  induction/\nentry in the semi-skilled grade.\n\n19 \n\n20 \n\n21 \n\n[2006] Supp. 8 SCR 831 : (2007) 1 SCC 405\n\n‘SRO’, hereafter\n\n‘GO’, hereafter\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n137\n\n21.  Learned  counsel  pointed  out  that  the  two  years’  probation  period \nof  the  appellant  was  extended  by  six  months  w.e.f.  17th  January, \n1998, and the appellant could complete the probation period only on \n16th July, 1998. Subsequently, upon passing the trade test, he was \npromoted to the skilled grade w.e.f. 6th January, 1999. The appellant \nlost the seniority on account of his failure to complete probation in \nthe  period  of  two  years  and  clearing  the  trade  test  whereas,  the \nprivate respondents herein had completed probation in time and were \nfound to be fit in the trade test and therefore, they were promoted \nto the skilled grade much before the appellant. Consequently, these \nemployees  i.e.  private  respondents  herein  were  placed  higher  in \nseniority,  as  per  clarification  issued  by  Ordinance  Factory  Board \nvide GO dated 24th December, 2002. \n\nOn  these  grounds,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  implored \nthe Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the order passed by the \nHigh Court.\n\n22.  Learned  counsel  for  the  private  respondents  herein22  adopted  the \nsubmissions  advanced  by  learned  counsel  for  respondent  Nos.  1 \nand 2.\n\n23.  We  have  given  our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the  submissions \nadvanced  at  the  bar  by  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and  have \ngone through the impugned judgment and the material placed on \nrecord.\n\nDiscussion and Conclusion:\n\n24.  The fact that the appellant and private respondents were inducted \nas  semi-skilled  grade  employees  in  respondent  No.  2-Factory  in \nthe year 1996 is not in dispute. The common select list dated 22nd \nNovember,  1995  is  not  placed  on  record  by  the  parties.  However, \nappellant filed an RTI,23 and the reply thereto dated 29th December, \n2011 clearly shows that at the time of initial induction, appellant was \nplaced  at  the  7th  position,  whereas  the  private  respondents24  were \nplaced at the 30th, 31st and 32nd positions, respectively in the select \nlist based on merit.\n\n22  Respondent Nos. 3, 4, and 5\n\n23  Right to Information\n\n24  Respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f138 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n25.  The  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  in  the  impugned  judgment \ndated  10th  October,  2011  has  recorded  a  categoric  finding  that \neven if the date of appointment is taken into consideration, the writ \npetitioners(private  respondents  herein)  are  senior  to  respondent \nNo.3(appellant herein). This finding seems to be prima facie erroneous \nbecause admittedly, the appellant herein was placed at 7th position \nand the private respondents were placed at the 30th, 31st and 32nd \npositions in the order of merit, as borne out from the record. Further, \nin writ petition25 filed by the private respondents before the High Court \nand the counter affidavit filed by the respondents herein before this \nCourt,  there  is  no  averment  that  these  respondents  were  placed \nabove to the appellant at the time of initial appointment. Rather the \nsole ground taken by the writ petitioners(private respondents herein) \nto  oppose  the  prayer  of  the  appellant  was  that  the  appellant  was \nnot  able  to  complete  his  probation  period  and  pass  the  trade  test \non time and thus, he was placed below the private respondents in \nthe draft seniority list.\n\n26.  Before we adjudicate upon the issue of inter se seniority amongst the \nlitigating parties, we find it necessary to comment on the appellant’s \napproach  towards  filing  his  claim  concerning  his  promotion  in  the \nhighly skilled grade.\n\n27.  The  appellant  and  the  private  respondents  faced  a  common \nselection  process  and  were  appointed  in  the  semi-skilled  grade \nin  the  year  1996.  The  private  respondents  herein  were  promoted \nto the skilled grade on 11th January, 1998 and further promoted to \nthe highly skilled grade on 20th May, 2003. On the other hand, the \nappellant was promoted to the skilled grade on 17th July, 1998(after \ncompleting his extended probation period of 6 months and clearing \nthe mandatory trade test). Considering that the private respondents \nwere promoted to highly skilled grade in May, 2003, the appellant in \nthe normal course should also have been promoted to highly skilled \ngrade  by  the  end  of  the  year  2003.  However,  as  per  the  factual \nmatrix, he was promoted to the highly skilled grade after around 5 \nyears i.e. on 26th March, 2008. A tabular chart depicting the date of \nappointment and the date of promotion to skilled and highly skilled \ngrade is placed below: - \n\n25  Writ Petition No. 583 of 2011\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n139\n\nName\n\nV. Sivaraman \n(Respondent \nNo. 3)\n\nG. Sudhakar \n(Respondent \nNo. 4)\n\nP. Ramesh \n(Respondent \nNo. 5)\n\nV. Vincent \nVelankanni \n(Appellant)\n\nExtension of \nprobation\n\nDate of \nappointment \nin the Semi \nSkilled grade\n\nEffective \ndate of \nsatisfactory \ncompletion of \nprobation\n\nDate of \npromotion \nto Skilled \ngrade\n\nDate of \npromotion \nto the \nHighly \nskilled \ngrade\n\n11.01.1996\n\nNA\n\n11.01.1998\n\n03.07.1998\n\n20.05.2003\n\n11.01.1996\n\nNA\n\n11.01.1998\n\n03.07.1998\n\n20.05.2003\n\n11.01.1996\n\nNA\n\n11.01.1998\n\n03.07.1998\n\n20.05.2003\n\n17.07.1988\n\n06.01.1999\n\n26.03.2008\n\n17.01.1996\n\nBy 6 months \nw.e.f. \n17.1.1998 by \norder dated \n5.2.1998\n\n28.  The draft seniority list was published on 28th July, 2006. The appellant \nnever questioned the denial of promotion to the highly skilled grade, \ntill  much  after  the  publication  of  the  draft  seniority  list. Admittedly, \nco-employees  who  were  below  the  appellant  in  the  select  list  of \nthe year 1996 were promoted in the intervening period without any \nobjection being raised by the appellant. After the publication of the \ndraft seniority list in the year 2006, he chose to challenge the same \nand to consider his promotion to highly skilled grade with effect from \n20th May, 2003 by filing an Original Application26 before CAT only in \nthe year 2007. Thus, it was the first time in 2007 that the appellant \nclaimed his promotion with retrospective effect. However, this benefit \nof retrospective promotion was neither granted by the CAT nor by the \nHigh Court and thus, there is no need to delve into this aspect further. \n\n29.  The primary issue which requires adjudication is as to whether the \nseniority of the appellant is to be reckoned from the date of induction/\ninitial  appointment  or  as  per  the  date  of  promotion/confirmation  in \nthe skilled grade. \n\n30. \n\nIt is a well-settled proposition that once an incumbent is appointed to \na post according to the rules, his seniority has to be reckoned from \n\n26  Original Application No. 821 of 2007\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f140 \n\n31. \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nthe date of the initial appointment and not according to the date of \nconfirmation, unless the rules provide otherwise.\n\nIn the case of L. Chandrakishore Singh v. State of Manipur and \nOthers,27 this Court held that in cases of probationary or officiating \nappointments which are followed by a confirmation, unless a contrary \nrule is shown, the services rendered as the officiating appointment \nor  on  probation  cannot  be  ignored  while  reckoning  the  length  of \nservice  for  determining  the  position  in  the  seniority  list.  This  view \nhas  been  reiterated  in  the  case  of  Ajit  Kumar  Rath  v.  State  of \nOrissa and Others.28 \n\n32.  The Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg \nOfficers’ Assn.(supra) stated the legal position with regard to inter \nse  seniority  of  direct  recruits  and  promotees  and  while  doing  so, \ninter alia, it was held that once an incumbent is appointed to a post \naccording to rules, his seniority has to be counted from the date of \nhis appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation.\n\n33.  This  Court  summarised  the  legal  principles  with  regard  to  the \ndetermination  of  seniority  in  Pawan  Pratap  Singh  and  Others  v. \nReevan Singh and Others29 in the following terms: \n\n45.  From  the  above,  the  legal  position  with  regard  to \ndetermination of seniority in service can be summarised \nas follows:\n\n(i)  The effective date of selection has to be understood \nin  the  context  of  the  service  rules  under  which  the \nappointment is made. It may mean the date on which \nthe process of selection starts with the issuance of \nadvertisement  or  the  factum  of  preparation  of  the \nselect list, as the case may be.\n\n(ii) \n\nInter  se  seniority  in  a  particular  service  has  to  be \ndetermined  as  per  the  service  rules.  The  date  of \nentry in a particular service or the date of substantive \nappointment is the safest criterion for fixing seniority \ninter se between one officer or the other or between \n\n27 \n\n28 \n\n29 \n\n[1999] Supp. 3 SCR 323 : (1999) 8 SCC 287\n\n[1999] Supp. 4 SCR 302 : (1999) 9 SCC 596\n\n[2011] 2 SCR 831 : (2011) 3 SCC 267\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n141\n\none  group  of  officers  and  the  other  recruited  from \ndifferent  sources. Any  departure  therefrom  in  the \nstatutory  rules,  executive  instructions  or  otherwise \nmust be consistent with the requirements of Articles \n14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\n(iii)  Ordinarily, notional seniority may not be granted from \nthe backdate and if it is done, it must be based on \nobjective considerations and on a valid classification \nand must be traceable to the statutory rules.\n\n(iv)  The  seniority  cannot  be  reckoned  from  the  date  of \noccurrence  of  the  vacancy  and  cannot  be  given \nretrospectively unless it is so expressly provided by \nthe relevant service rules. It is so because seniority \ncannot  be  given  on  retrospective  basis  when  an \nemployee has not even been borne in the cadre and \nby  doing  so  it  may  adversely  affect  the  employees \nwho have been appointed validly in the meantime.\n\n34.  Thus, it is trite that when an employee completes the probation period \nand is confirmed in service albeit with some delay, the confirmation \nin service shall relate back to the date of the initial appointment. Any \ndeparture from this principle in the form of statutory rules, executive \ninstructions or otherwise must be consistent with the requirements \nof Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.\n\n35. \n\nIn the backdrop of the above legal and factual background, let us now \nexamine  if whether  the extant rules/regulations/circulars prevailing \nin the establishment30 contained any stipulation that the completion \nof the probation period and the passing of the trade test is sin qua \nnon for being promoted to the skilled grade and if so, whether the \nseniority of the employees selected on the same date would have \nto be reckoned from the date of confirmation/passing the trade test \nor from the date of initial appointment. \n\n36.  A  pertinent  averment  is  made  in  the  counter  affidavit  filed  by  the \nrespondents emphasizing their stand that the semi-skilled grade is \nonly a trainee grade and in order to place an employee in the skilled \ngrade, he would have to complete the probation period satisfactorily \n\n30  Respondent No. 2-Factory\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f142 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nand  also  clear  the  trade  test  as  laid  down  in  the  SRO  No.  185  of \n1994.  The  relevant  extract  from  SRO  No.  185  of  1994  dated  1st \nNovember,  1994  is  reproduced  hereinbelow  for  the  sake  of  ready \nreference. Note 6 of the said SRO reads as below: -\n\n“Note 6. Wherever “Trade Test” is laid down in Column 12 \nof this Schedule such trade test shall be prescribed by the \nGeneral manager of the factory or the Ordnance Factory \nBoard. The term “Trade Test” will include written, oral and \npractical examination and aptitude test and interview and \nalso statutory qualification test where applicable.”\n\n37.  The GO dated 24th December, 2002 issued by the Ordinance Factory \nBoard placed on record clarifies the position regarding counting of \nseniority  in  the  trades  of  SRO  No.  185  of  1994  for  the  industrial \nestablishments. The language of this GO is considered germane to \nthe controversy and hence, the relevant portion thereof is extracted \nhereinbelow: -\n\n“With a view to overcome doubts in counting of seniority \nin  respect  of  industrial  employees  who  are  working  in \ntrades listed at Annexure ‘A’ of SRO 185/1994 it has been  \ndecided to interpret rules relating to seniority in consonance \nwith  existing  SRO  provisions. Accordingly,  the  following \nrules for determining seniority may be followed in all OFs \nwith immediate effect.\n\n1) Semi-skilled posts are training post for skilled posts \nof trades listed at Annexure ‘A’ of SRO 185/1994.\n\n2)  Educational  Qualification/Technical  Qualification  will \nnot be deciding factor while counting seniority for trades \nlisted at Annexure ‘A’ of SRO 185/1994.\n\nHowever, where passing of trade test/competency test \nor any other statutory certificate is required, the same \nmust be adhered to and cannot be done away with.\n\n3) Seniority will be counted from the date of promotion \nto  Skilled  grade  and  not  from  the  date  of  induction/\nentry/promotion in semi-skilled grade.\n\n4)……\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n143\n\n5)……\n\n6) The above orders are in consonance with the existing \nSRO provisions and various court orders on the subject.”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n38.  The validity of this GO31 was never assailed by the appellant at any \nstage  either  before  the  CAT  or  the  High  Court. A  conjoint  reading \nof SRO No. 185 of 1994 and the GO dated 24th December, 2002, \nwhich indisputably were applicable to the cadre of semi-skilled and \nskilled fitters in the respondent establishment32 at the relevant point of \ntime would make it clear that the seniority in the skilled grade would \nhave to be reckoned from the date of promotion to the skilled grade \nand  not  from  the  date  of  induction/entry  in  the  semi-skilled  grade \nand the candidate joining service in the semi-skilled grade would be \nmandatorily  required  to  complete  the  probation  period  and  also  to \nclear the trade test for being promoted to the skilled grade. In the \nevent  of  either  of  the  two  conditions  not  being  met,  the  employee \nconcerned would not be entitled to be promoted to the skilled grade.\n\n39.  The appellant, in support of his plea, has placed reliance on a GO \ndated 4th August, 2015, whereby the GO dated 24th December, 2002 \nhas  been  superseded  and  it  has  been  decided  by  the  Competent \nAuthority  that  “henceforth”,  the  seniority  in  respect  of  Industrial \nEstablishments  would  be  governed  by  the  relevant  clause  of  OM \ndated  4th  November,  1992(reproduced  supra). The  said  GO  dated \n4th August,  2015  is  reproduced  hereinbelow  for  the  sake  of  ready \nreference: -\n\n“No. Per/I/Seniority/2015-16 \n\nDate: 04-08-2015\n\nTo\n\nThe Sr. General Managers/ General Managers\n\nAll Ordnance & Ordnance Equipment Factories\n\nSub: Determination of Seniority in connection with direct \nRecruitment in the Industrial Establishment.\n\nRef: (i) OFB Circular No. 590/OFBOL/A/I dated 24.12.2002\n\n31  Dated 24th December, 2002\n\n32  Engine Factory, Avadi, Chennai\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f144 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n(ii) OFB Circular No. 590/OFBOL/A/I dated 13.01.2003\n\nIn  connection  with  counting  of  Seniority  in Annexure-A \ntrades of SRO 185/1994 in the Industrial Establishment, \nabove  referred  OFB  Circulars  clarified  and  directed  that \nseniority in respect of Industrial Employees will be counted \nfrom  the  date  of  up-gradation  to  Skilled  Grade  and  not \nfrom  the  date  of  induction/entry/promotion  in  the  Semi-\nskilled grade.\n\nSeveral references in this regard have been received at \nOFB and after due examination, it has been observed that \nthe OFB Circulars under reference are not in line with the \nprinciples  of  seniority  as  laid  down  by  DOPT  from  time \nto time.\n\nTherefore,  the  Competent Authority  has  decided  that  in \nsupersession of the above referred OFB Circulars dated \n24.12.2002  and  13.01.2003,  henceforth,  seniority  in \nrespect of IEs will be governed by the relevant clause of \nDOPT  OM  No.20011/5/90-Estt(D)  dated  4th  November, \n1992 and OM No.22011/7/86-Estt(D) dated 3rd July, 1986. \nAccordingly, promotion from Skilled to Highly Skilled Grade-\nII will be made as per the seniority fixed for Semi-skilled \ngrade (entry grade) which will be arrived at as per merit \nof the select panel, without making any linkage to the date \nof up-gradation to the Skilled Grade.\n\nIt may so happen that a person lower in the merit list of \nrecruitment (in Semi-skilled grade) joins earlier due to early \nclearance of PVR. In such case, the person lower in the \nmerit  list  will  complete  his/her  qualifying  service  and  be \nup-graded to Skilled Grade on earlier date as compared to \na person higher in the merit list. However, person higher in \nthe merit list will not lose his seniority and will be placed \nabove the person lower in the merit list after getting up-\ngradation to Skilled Grade.\n\n(S. K. Singh) \nDirector/IR \nFor Director General, Ordnance Factories”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n145\n\n40.  By  virtue  of  the  above  GO,33  the  rule  position  qua  the  fixation \nof  seniority  has  been  restored  to  be  governed  by  OM  dated  4th \nNovember, 1992(reproduced supra), according to which the relevant \ndate for fixation of seniority would be the date of initial appointment \nand not the date of upgradation/promotion to the skilled grade. The \nOM  dated  4th August,  2015  further  clarifies  that  the  person  higher \nin the merit list will not lose his seniority and will be placed above \nthe  person  lower  in  the  merit  list  after  getting  upgradation  to  the \nskilled grade.\n\n41.  However,  the  clarification  issued  vide  GO  dated  4th August,  2015 \ndoes not operate retrospectively as it is specifically provided in the \nsaid  GO  that  “henceforth”,  the  seniority  in  respect  of  Industrial \nEstablishments will be governed by the relevant clause of OM dated \n4th November, 1992. \n\n42. \n\nIt is trite law that an Office Memorandum/Government Order cannot \nhave  a  retrospective  effect  unless  and  until  there  is  an  express \nprovision to make its effect retrospective or that the operation thereof \nis  retrospective  by  necessary  implication.  In  this  regard,  we  are \nbenefitted  by  the  observations  of  this  Court  in  Sonia  v.  Oriental \nInsurance Co. Ltd. and Others,34 wherein it was held that:\n\n“11. ….In any view of the matter, law is well settled that \nan Office Memorandum cannot have a retrospective effect \nunless and until intention of the authorities to make it as \nsuch is revealed expressly or by necessary implication in \nthe Office Memorandum.”\n\n43. \n\nIf a Government Order is treated to be in the nature of a clarification \nof  an  earlier  Government  Order,  it  may  be  made  applicable \nretrospectively. Conversely, if a subsequent Government Order is \nheld  to  be  a  modification/amendment  of  the  earlier  Government \nOrder,  its  application  would  be  prospective  as  retrospective \napplication thereof would result in withdrawal of vested rights which \nis  impermissible  in  law  and  the  same  may  also  entail  recoveries \nto  be  made. The  principles  in  this  regard  were  culled  out  by  this \nCourt in a recent judgment of Sree Sankaracharya University of \n\n33  Dated 4th August, 2015\n\n34 \n\n[2007] 8 SCR 883 : (2007) 10 SCC 627\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f146 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nSanskrit and Others v. Dr. Manu and Another,35 in the following \nterms: -\n\n“52. From the aforesaid authorities, the following principles \ncould be culled out:\n\ni) \n\nii) \n\nIf  a  statute  is  curative  or  merely  clarificatory  of  the \nprevious  law,  retrospective  operation  thereof  may \nbe permitted.\n\nIn order for a subsequent order/provision/amendment \nto be considered as clarificatory of the previous law, \nthe pre-amended law ought to have been vague or \nambiguous. It is only when it would be impossible to \nreasonably interpret a provision unless an amendment \nis read into it, that the amendment is considered to \nbe a clarification or a declaration of the previous law \nand therefore applied retrospectively.\n\niii)  An explanation/clarification may not expand or alter \n\nthe scope of the original provision.\n\niv)  Merely  because  a  provision  is  described  as  a \nclarification/explanation,  the  Court  is  not  bound  by \nthe  said  statement  in  the  statute  itself,  but  must \nproceed to analyse the nature of the amendment and \nthen conclude whether it is in reality a clarificatory or \ndeclaratory  provision  or  whether  it  is  a  substantive \namendment which is intended to change the law and \nwhich would apply prospectively.”\n\n44.  Applying  these  principles  to  the  case  at  hand,  we  are  of  the  view \nthat  the  subsequent  GO  dated  4th August,  2015  cannot  be  read \nsimply  as  a  clarification  and  therefore  cannot  be  made  applicable \nretrospectively. The said GO has substantively modified the position \ngoverning seniority in the Industrial Establishments by reviving the \nearlier OM dated 4th November, 1992, and supersedes the orders/\ncirculars dated 24th December, 2002 and 13th January, 2003, which \nwere holding the field over more than a decade. Therefore, giving \nretrospective  effect  to  the  GO  dated  4th August,  2015  would  have \ncatastrophic effect on the seniority of the entire cadre.\n\n35 \n\n[2023] 7 SCR 366 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 640\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n147\n\n45.  This  Court  has  time  and  again  dealt  with  the  effect  of  altering  the \nseniority list at a belated stage and how it may adversely affect the \nemployees  whose  seniority  and  rank  has  been  determined  in  the \nmeantime. In this connection, reference may be made to Malcom \nLawrence Cecil D’Souza v. Union of India and Others,36 wherein \nthis Court held that: -\n\n“9.  Although  security  of  service  cannot  be  used  as  a \nshield against administrative action for lapses of a public \nservant, by and large one of the essential requirements of \ncontentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of \nsecurity. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security \nin all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to \nensure that matters like one’s position in the seniority list \nafter having been settled for once should not be liable to \nbe reopened after lapse of many years….. Raking up old \nmatters  like  seniority  after  a  long  time  is  likely  to  result \nin  administrative  complications  and  difficulties.  It  would, \ntherefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and \nefficiency of service that such matters should be given a \nquietus after lapse of some time.”\n\n46. \n\nIn R.S. Makashi and Others v. I.M. Menon and Others,37 this Court \nobserved as follows: -\n\n“33.  ….  We  must  administer  justice  in  accordance  with \nlaw and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. \nIt would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights \nwhich  have  accrued  to  them.  Each  person  ought  to  be \nentitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and \npromotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside \nafter the lapse of a number of years. ….”\n\n47. \n\nIn K.R. Mudgal and Others v. R.P. Singh and Others,38 this Court \nobserved in the following terms: -\n\n“2. … A government servant who is appointed to any post \nordinarily  should  at  least  after  a  period  of  3  or  4  years \n\n36 \n\n37 \n\n38 \n\n(1976) 1 SCC 599\n\n[1982] 2 SCR 69 : (1982) 1 SCC 379\n\n[1986] 3 SCR 993 : (1986) 4 SCC 531\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f148 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nof  his  appointment  be  allowed  to  attend  to  the  duties \nattached  to  his  post  peacefully  and  without  any  sense \nof insecurity.”\n\n48. \n\nIn B.S. Bajwa and Another v. State of Punjab and Others,39 this \nCourt held that the seniority list should not be reopened after a lapse \nof reasonable period as it would disturb the settled position which \nis unjustifiable. The relevant extract is as follows: -\n\n“7. … It is well settled that in service matters the question \nof seniority should not be reopened in such situations after \nthe lapse of a reasonable period because that results in \ndisturbing the settled position which is not justifiable….”\n\n49. \n\nIt can easily be inferred that in the intervening period, before the GO \ndated  4th August,  2015  came  to  be  issued,  seniority  of  multitudes \nof employees must have been fixed according to the GO dated 24th \nDecember,  2002,  which  is  according  to  the  date  of  promotion  to \nskilled grade and not from the date of induction/entry in semi-skilled \ngrade. As  a  matter  of  fact,  respondent  Nos.  3,  4  and  5  who  were \nbelow the appellant in the order of merit at the time of induction in \nthe semi-skilled grade, have been promoted to the skilled grade and \nthe highly skilled grade much before the appellant by application of \nthe GO dated 24th December, 2002. The appellant did not question \ntheir promotions before any Court or Tribunal at any stage. \n\n50.  Thus,  much  water  has  flown  under  the  bridge  and  retrospective \napplication of the GO issued in 2015 would open floodgates of litigation \nand  would  disturb  the  seniority  of  many  employees  causing  them \ngrave prejudice and heartburn as it would disturb the crystallized rights \nregarding seniority, rank and promotion which would have accrued to \nthem during the intervening period. To alter a seniority list after such \na long period would be totally unjust to the multitudes of employees \nwho  could  get  caught  in  the  labyrinth  of  uncertainty  for  no  fault  of \ntheirs and may suffer loss of their seniority rights retrospectively. \n\n51.  Keeping  in  mind  the  afore-stated  principles,  we  are  of  the  view \nthat  applicability  of  the  Government  Order  dated  4th August,  2015 \ncannot enure to the benefit of the appellant as its operation is clearly \nprospective. \n\n39 \n\n[1997] Supp. 6 SCR 451 : (1998) 2 SCC 523\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n149\n\n52. \n\nIn wake of the above discussion, we find that the impugned judgment \nof  the  High  Court  does  not  suffer  from  any  infirmity  warranting \ninterference.\n\n53.  This appeal is dismissed as being devoid of merit. No order as to \n\ncosts.\n\n54.  Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.\n\nCIVIL APPEAL @ SLP(Civil) D. No. 3704-3706 of 2012)\n\n55.  Delay condoned.\n\n56.  Leave granted.\n\n57. \n\nIn terms of the judgment passed in Civil Appeal No(s). 8617 of 2013, \nthe present appeals are disposed of. No order as to costs.\n\n58.  Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.\n\nResult of the Case: Appeals disposed of.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan\n\nV. Vincent Velankanni v. The Union of India and Others\f"}