{"file_name": "2024_10_1359_1370_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1359 : 2024 INSC 773\n\nRenjith K.G. & Others  \nv. \nSheeba\n\n(Civil Appeal Nos. 8315-8316 of 2014)\n\n14 October 2024\n\n[Pankaj Mithal and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nWhether a pendente lite transferee, a stranger to the suit can file \napplication  under  Order  XXI  Rule  99,  Code  of  Civil  Procedure, \n1908 seeking re-delivery after dispossession.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nCode of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXI, r.99 – Predecessor of \nthe respondents, a pendente lite transferee was dispossessed \nfrom the property in execution of the decree passed in the suit, if \ncould file application under Or. XXI, r.99 against dispossession:\n\nHeld: Yes – Under Or.XXI, r.99, where any person other than the \njudgment  debtor  is  dispossessed  of  immovable  property  by  the \nholder of a decree for the possession of such property, or where \nsuch  property  has  been  sold  in  execution  of  a  decree,  by  the \npurchaser thereof, he may make an application complaining of such \ndispossession – A third party to the decree has a right to approach \nthe Court even after dispossession of the immovable property, which \nhe was occupying – Predecessor of the respondents not a party \nto the suit was dispossessed from the property in execution of the \ndecree passed in the suit and therefore, he who is purported to be \na stranger to the decree can adjudicate his claim of independent \nright, title and interest in the decretal property as per Or.XXI, r.99 – \n“any person” not a party to the suit or a stranger to the suit can \nseek  re-delivery  after  being  dispossessed  – The  term  “stranger” \nwould cover within its ambit, a pendente lite transferee, who has \nnot been impleaded – Once an application under Or.XXI, r.99 is \nfiled, it is incumbent upon the Trial Court to consider all the rival \nclaims  including  the  right,  title  and  interest  of  the  parties  under \nOr.21, r.101 – High Court rightly set aside the order passed in the \nexecution  petition  and  remanded  the  matter  to  the  trial  court  for \nfresh consideration leaving all the issues including the independent \n\n* Author\n\n\f1360 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nright, title or interest claimed by the respondents in the property in \nquestion, to be adjudicated – No illegality in the judgment of the \nHigh Court warranting interference. [Paras 14-16, 19]\n\nLimitation  –  Decree  passed  in  suit  for  partition  –  Limitation \nfor execution – Respondent argued that the decree passed on \n09.03.1970 was engrossed on the stamp paper on 19.11.1990, \nthe execution petition for delivery of possession of the property \nfiled only on 13.03.1991 was time-barred and the High Court \nrightly  allowed  the  applications  filed  by  the  predecessor  of \nthe respondents seeking re-delivery of possession inter alia \ncontending that the execution petition was time barred:\n\nHeld:  As  regards  the  limitation  for  execution  of  a  decree  passed \nin  the  suit  for  partition,  time  begins  to  run  from  the  date  of  final \ndecree and not from the date on which it is engrossed on the stamp \npaper – High Court rightly set aside the order passed in the execution \npetition and remanded the matter to the trial court. [Paras 16, 19]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nChiranji Lal (D) by LRs. v. Hari Das (D) by Lrs. [2005] Supp. 1 SCR \n359 : (2005) 10 SCC 746; Sriram Housing Finance & Investment \n(India) Ltd. v. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust (2022) 15 \nSCC 176 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 794 – relied on.\n\nCode of Civil Procedure, 1908; Limitation Act, 1963.\n\nList of Acts\n\nList of Keywords\n\nOrder XXI Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Pendente \nlite transferee; “Stranger”; Stranger to the suit/decree; Not a party \nto the suit; Dispossession; Re-delivery; Third party to the decree; \nRights of a decree holder; Third party to the suit; Right of a third \nparty after being dispossessed; Execution petition for delivery of \npossession of the property; Execution petition time-barred; Decree \npassed in suit for partition; Limitation for execution.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 8315-8316 \nof 2014\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 11.11.2011 of the High Court \nof Kerala at Ernakulam in EFA Nos. 6 and 7 of 1998\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1361\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nRajeev Mishra, Sanand Ramakrishnan, Thomas Martin, Advs. for \nthe Appellants.\n\nJayanth Muth Raj, Sr. Adv., Nishe Rajen Shonker, K.S. Bharathan, \nMrs. Anu K Joy, Alim Anvar, Ajith Anto Perumbully, Advs. for the \nRespondent.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nR. Mahadevan, J.\n\nHeard  Mr.  Rajeev  Mishra  and  Mr.  Sanand  Ramakrishnan,  learned \ncounsel for the appellants and Mr. Jayant Muth Raj, learned senior \ncounsel  and  Mrs.  Nishe  Rajen  Shonker,  learned  counsel  for  the \nRespondent.\n\n2.  These Civil Appeals are preferred against the judgment and order \ndated 11.11.2011 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam1 \nin E.F.A Nos.6 and 7 of 1998, whereby, the High Court allowed the \nsaid  appeals  and  remanded  the  matter  to  the  trial  Court  for  fresh \nconsideration.\n\n3.  Succinctly  stated  facts  are  that  the  appellants  are  the  legal \nrepresentatives of the original plaintiff / decree holder viz., Padmakshy \n(deceased), who had filed a suit in O.S.No.38 of 1956 before the Sub \nCourt, Parur, for partition and separate possession of her share in \nthe plaint schedule 13 items of immovable properties. The Sub Court, \nParur,  passed  a  preliminary  decree  on  23.10.1958.  Subsequently, \nthe  said  suit  was  transferred  to  the  file  of  the Additional  District \nCourt,  Parur  and  re-numbered  as  O.S.No.82  of  1960,  in  which,  a \nfinal decree was passed on 09.03.1970. \n\n4.  The dispute revolved around is qua item no.4 of the plaint schedule \nproperty  measuring  an  extent  of  1  acre  57  cents  in  Sy.No.120/10 \nsituated  at  Muppathepadam  Kara,  Kodungallur  Village,  Paravur \nTaluk, Kerala, which originally belonged to one Ayyapan, who had \neight children. In the year 1085 M.E.2 the said Ayyappan executed a \n\n1 \n\n2 \n\nHereinafter shortly referred to as “the High Court”\n\nMalayalam Era or the Malayalam Calendar. To get the corresponding year on the Gregorian Calendar, \nadd 826 which makes it 1911.\n\nRenjith K.G. & Others v. Sheeba\f1362 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nmortgage in favour of one Kunjan and created a further mortgage in \nfavour of the same mortgagee in the year 1093 M.E.3 On the death \nof Ayyappan, his six children assigned their 6/8 shares in favour of \none  Raghuthaman,  by  gift  deed  No.  2147  dated  17.07.1963  and \nthe remaining 2/8 shares were obtained by the Defendant No.1, by \nname, Padmanabhan, as per the deed No.1491 of 1119 M.E.4 On the \ndeath of the mortgagee Kunjan, his rights devolved on the Defendant \nNo.1 and the original plaintiff Padmakshy (who was a minor at that \ntime). The Defendant No.1, without the concurrence of Padmakshy, \nexecuted  a  mortgage  for  Rs.1,000/-  in  favour  of  one  Nanu,  in  the \nyear 1123 M.E.5 and the said Nanu, in turn, assigned his right to the \nDefendant No.10, by name, Veeran, as per deed No.101 of 1951. \nAs per document No.3669 of 1964, the Defendant No.10 assigned \nhis right to the said Raghuthaman.\n\nIn  the  final  decree  proceedings,  qua  item  no.4,  based  on  the \nAdvocate Commissioner’s report, the plaintiff was allotted one half \nportion  of  the  property  in  Sy.No.120/10  i.e.,  red  shaded  portion  in \nEx.C2 plan; and the Defendant No.10 was directed to pay a sum of \nRs.461.67 towards equalisation and also mesne profit at the rate of \nRs.64.80 per year to the plaintiff. The final decree was engrossed \non the requisite stamp paper on 19.11.1990. To execute the same, \nthe  plaintiff  preferred  an  Execution  Petition  bearing  No.4  of  1991, \nin which, notice was ordered to the defendants / judgment debtors, \nbut,  they  did  not  turn  up.  Ultimately,  the  Executing  Court  ordered \ndelivery of possession and accordingly, a portion of item no.4 plaint \nschedule  property,  as  shown  in  Ex.C2  plan,  was  delivered  to  the \nplaintiff on 22.11.1994.\n\n5. \n\n6.  Thereafter, the aforesaid Raghuthaman preferred E.A.No.1 of 1995 \nin E.P. No.4 of 1991under Order XXI Rule 99 of the Civil Procedure \nCode6  for  re-delivery  of  the  property  mentioned  in  Ex.C2  plan, \nclaiming independent right, title and interest in the same. Along with \nthis  application,  he  also  filed  E.A.No.2  of  1995  seeking  an  order \nof  injunction  restraining  the  plaintiff  from  committing  waste  till  the \ndisposal  of  EA  No.1  of  1995;  and  E.A.No.3  of  1995  for  recovery \n\n3 \n\n4 \n\n5 \n\n6 \n\nGregorian Calendar year 1919\n\nGregorian Calendar year 1945\n\nGregorian Calendar year 1949\n\nFor short, “CPC”\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1363\n\nof damages to the tune of Rs.25,000/- from the plaintiff for having \ncommitted waste in the property. All the three applications were jointly \nheard and were dismissed, by a common order dated 12.08.1997.\n\n7.  Aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed in E.A. Nos.1 and 3 of 1995, \nthe said Raghuthaman filed Execution First Appeals viz., EFA Nos.6 \nof  1998  and  7  of  1998,  which  came  to  be  dismissed  by  the  High \nCourt,  by  judgment  dated  30.05.2007.  Seeking  to  review  the  said \njudgment, the respondents herein, who are the legal representatives \nof the said Raghuthaman, filed R.P.Nos.1107 and 934 of 2007, which \ncame  to  be  allowed,  by  order  dated  22.03.2010.  Pursuant  to  the \nsame, E.F.A Nos.6 and 7 of 1998 were re-heard and were eventually, \nallowed by the High Court, by the judgment dated 11.11.2011 which \nis impugned herein.\n\n8.  The first and foremost contention of the learned counsel appearing \nfor  the  appellants  is  that  the  predecessor  of  the  respondents \n(Raghuthaman)  did  not  establish  his  independent  right,  title  or \ninterest in the property in question and he was only a pendente lite \ntransferee and therefore, he cannot resist the execution of a decree \nfiled by the original plaintiff / decree holder. Additionally, the learned \ncounsel  submitted  that  the  decision  in  Chiranji  Lal  (D)  by  LRs.  v. \nHari Das (D) by LRs.7 relied on by the High Court is not applicable \nto the facts of the present case. \n\n9.  The  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  contesting  respondent,  on \nthe  other  hand,  submitted  that  the  final  decree  was  passed  on \n09.03.1970;  it  was  engrossed  on  the  stamp  paper  on  19.11.1990; \nthe execution petition seeking delivery of possession of the property \nunder  the  decree  was  preferred  only  on  13.03.1991,  which  was \nclearly barred by limitation as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act. \nThat  apart,  the  predecessor  of  the  respondents  under  Order  XXI \nRule  99  CPC  is  entitled  to  raise  the  question  of  limitation  for  the \nexecution of the decree, which has become time-barred. Accordingly, \nthe High Court set aside the order dated 12.08.1997 passed in EA \nNos.1 and 3 of 1995 and remanded the matter to the trial Court for \nfresh consideration, by the judgment impugned herein, which does \nnot call for any interference at the hands of this Court.\n\n7 \n\n[2005] Supp. 1 SCR 359 : (2005) 10 SCC 746\n\nRenjith K.G. & Others v. Sheeba\f1364 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n10.  We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  the  learned \ncounsel  on  either  side  and  perused  the  records  carefully  and \nmeticulously. \n\n11.  The facts narrated above are not disputed. Concededly, in the suit filed \nby the original plaintiff, preliminary decree was passed on 23.10.1958; \nfinal  decree  was  passed  on  09.03.1970  and  it  was  engrossed  on \nstamp  paper  on  19.11.1990;  and  the  Execution  Petition  seeking \ndelivery of possession of the suit properties, came to be filed only \non 13.03.1991. It is also to be noted that in the final decree, there \nwas  no  order  directing  the  parties  to  furnish  stamp  papers  for  the \npurpose of engrossing the decree. \n\n12.  Seemingly,  the  predecessor  of  the  respondents  claimed  right,  title \nand  interest  qua  78.5  cents  forming  part  of  item  no.4  of  the  plaint \nschedule property, by virtue of the assignment deed dated 01.12.1964 \nbearing No.3669 executed by the Defendant No.10. Pursuant to the \norder of the Executing Court, he was dispossessed from the subject \nproperty, in which, he was occupying and the possession was handed \nover  to  the  plaintiff  /  decree  holder. After  repeated  challenge,  the \napplications preferred by the predecessor of the respondents seeking \nre-delivery of possession and damages, contending inter alia that the \nExecution Petition was barred by limitation, came to be allowed and \nthe matter was remanded to the trial Court for fresh consideration, \nby the judgment impugned herein. \n\n13. \n\nIt was the specific plea of the appellants that the predecessor of the \nrespondents being a pendente lite transferee, is not entitled to file \nan application under Order XXI Rule 99 CPC and raise the question \nof limitation of the Execution Petition, so as to deprive the right of \nthe appellants to enjoy the fruits of the decree. \n\n14.  On a reading of Order XXI Rule 99 CPC, it is lucid that where any \nperson other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable \nproperty  by  the  holder  of  a  decree  for  the  possession  of  such \nproperty,  or  where  such  property  has  been  sold  in  execution  of  a \ndecree,  by  the  purchaser  thereof,  he  may  make  an  application  to \nthe Court complaining of such dispossession. It also means that a \nthird party to the decree has a right to approach the Court even after \ndispossession of the immovable property, which he was occupying. \nIn the case on hand, the predecessor of the respondents was not \na  party  to  the  suit  and  he  was  dispossessed  from  the  property,  in \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1365\n\n15. \n\nexecution of the decree passed in the suit and therefore, he who is \npurported to be a stranger to the decree, can very well adjudicate his \nclaim of independent right, title and interest in the decretal property \nas per Order XXI Rule 99 CPC. \n\nIn  so  far  as  the  claim  of  appellants  that  the  predecessor  of  the \nrespondents, namely Mr. Raghuthaman, being pendent lite transferee \nand  hence  would  have  no  locus  to  file  the  application  seeking  re-\ndelivery, we have already held that “any person” not a party to the \nsuit or in other words a stranger to the suit can seek re-delivery, after \nhe has been dispossessed. The term “Stranger” would cover within \nits  ambit,  a  pendent  lite  transferee,  who  has  not  been  impleaded. \nThat apart, the facts in the present case disclose that the property \nstood transferred to the predecessor of the respondents before the \nFinal  Decree  was  passed  in  1970. The  fact  that  Mr.Raghuthaman \nhad successfully resisted the claim of the 9th Defendant for delivery \nof possession, in the presence of the predecessor of the appellant is \nnot disputed. While so, it was incumbent on the appellants to have \nimpleaded the predecessor of the respondents by filing an application \nunder  Order  21  Rule  97  of  CPC,  when  they  resisted  the  delivery. \nThe pendent lite purchaser has every right to defend his right, title, \ninterest and possession. This Court recently while adjudicating the \nright of a pendent lite transferee held as under: \n\nYogesh  Goyanka  v.  Govind  (2024)  7  SCC  524  :  2024 \nSCC OnLine SC 1692 \n\n“16.  The  fulcrum  of  the  dispute  herein  concerns  the \nimpleadment of a transferee pendente lite who undisputedly \nhad notice of the pending litigation. At the outset, it appears \npertinent to reiterate the settled position that the doctrine \nof  lis  pendens  as  provided  under  Section  52  of  the Act \ndoes not render all transfers pendente lite to be void ab \ninitio, it merely renders rights arising from such transfers \nas subservient to the rights of the parties to the pending \nlitigation and subject to any direction that the Court may \npass thereunder.\n\n“17.  Therefore,  the  mere  fact  that  RSD  was  executed \nduring  the  pendency  of  the  underlying  suit  does  not \nautomatically render it null and void. On this ground alone, \nwe  find  the  impugned  order  to  be  wholly  erroneous  as \n\nRenjith K.G. & Others v. Sheeba\f1366 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nit  employs  Section  52  of  the Act  to  nullify  RSD  and  on \nthat basis, concludes that the impleadment application is \nuntenable.  Contrary  to  this  approach  of  the  High  Court, \nthe  law  on  impleadment  of  subsequent  transferees,  as \nestablished  by  this  Court  has  evolved  in  a  manner  that \nliberally  enables  subsequent  transferees  to  protect  their \ninterests in recognition of the possibility that the transferor \npendente lite may not defend the title or may collude with \nthe plaintiff therein (see the decision of this Court in Amit \nKumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon [Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida \nKhatoon  (2005)  11  SCC  403]  & A.  Nawab  John  v.  V.N. \nSubramaniyam  [A.  Nawab  John  v.  V.N.  Subramaniyam \n(2012) 7 SCC 738 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 324] ).”\n\n16.  The difference between the rights of a decree holder qua a third party \nto  the  suit  and  the  right  of  a  third  party  after  being  dispossessed \nhas  been  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  Sriram  Housing  Finance  & \nInvestment  (India)  Ltd.  v.  Omesh  Mishra  Memorial  Charitable \nTrust (2022) 15 SCC 176 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 794, wherein it \nwas held as follows: \n\n“24.  On  conjoint  reading  of  the  aforesaid  provisions, \nit  can  be  observed  that  under  Rule  97,  it  is  only  the \n“decree-holder”  who  is  entitled  to  make  an  application \nin  case  where  he  is  offered  resistance  or  obstruction \nby  “any  person”.  In  the  present  case,  as  admitted  by \nthe  appellant  itself,  it  is  a  bona  fide  purchaser  of  the \nproperty  and  not  the  “decree-holder”. As  available  from \nthe material placed on record, it is the respondent Trust \nalong  with  legal  heirs  of  late  N.D.  Mishra  who  are  the \ndecree-holders  and  not  the  appellant.  Therefore,  it  is \nobvious that the appellant cannot take shelter of Rule 97 \nas stated above to raise objections against execution of  \ndecree passed in favour of the respondent. Further, Rule \n99  pertains  to  making  a  complaint  to  the  Court  against \n“dispossession” of the immovable property by the person \nin “possession” of the property by the holder of a decree \nor purchaser thereof.\n\n“25.  It  is  factually  not  in  dispute  that  the  appellant \npurchased the said property from Mr Yogesh Mishra vide \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1367\n\nsale deed dated 12-4-2004 and has been in vacant and \nphysical  possession  of  the  property  since  then.  Had  it \nbeen  the  case  that  the  appellant  was  dispossessed  by \nthe  respondent  Trust  in  execution  of  decree  dated  2-9-\n2003, the appellant would have been well within the ambit \nof  Rule  99  to  make  an  application  seeking  appropriate \nrelief to be put back in possession. On the contrary, the \nappellant in the instant case was never dispossessed from \nthe  property  in  question  and  till  date,  as  contended  and \nunrefuted, the possession of same rests with the appellant. \nConsidering the aforesaid, the appellant cannot be said to \nbe entitled to make an application under Rule 99 raising \nobjections  in  execution  proceedings  since  he  has  never \nbeen dispossessed as required under Rule 99.\n\n26.  Now,  as  stated  above,  applications  under  Rule  97 \nand Rule 99 are subject to Rule 101 which provides for \ndetermination of questions relating to disputes as to right, \ntitle or interest in the property arising between the parties to \nthe proceedings or their representatives on an application \nmade under Rule 97 or Rule 99. Effectively, the said Rule \ndoes away with the requirement of filing of fresh suit for \nadjudication of disputes as mentioned above. Now, in the \npresent case, Order 21 Rule 101 has no applicability as \nthe  appellant  is  neither  entitled  to  make  an  application \nunder Rule 97 nor Rule 99 for the reasons stated above. \nAccordingly, we find no substance in the argument raised \nby the learned counsel for the appellant.”\n\nTherefore,  once  an  application  under  Order  21  Rule  99  is  filed,  it \nis  incumbent  upon  the  Trial  Court  to  consider  all  the  rival  claims \nincluding  the  right  title  and  interest  of  the  parties  under  Order  21 \nRule  101  which  bars  a  separate  suit  by  mandating  the  execution \ncourt to decide the dispute.\n\n17.  As regards the question of limitation for execution of a decree passed \nin  the  suit  for  partition,  this  Court,  in  the  decision  in  Chiranji  Lal \n(supra), has categorically held that the time begins to run from the \ndate of final decree and not from the date on which it is engrossed \non the stamp paper. For better appreciation, the relevant passage \nof the said decision is reproduced below:\n\nRenjith K.G. & Others v. Sheeba\f1368 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n“24. A decree in a suit for partition declares the rights of \nthe  parties  in  the  immovable  properties  and  divides  the \nshares by metes and bounds. Since a decree in a suit for \npartition  creates  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties  with \nrespect  to  the  immovable  properties,  it  is  considered  as \nan instrument liable for the payment of stamp duty under \nthe Indian Stamp Act. The object of the Stamp Act being \nsecuring  the  revenue  for  the  State,  the  scheme  of  the \nStamp Act  provides  that  a  decree  of  partition  not  duly \nstamped can be impounded and once the requisite stamp \nduty along with penalty, if any, is paid the decree can be \nacted upon.\n\n25.  The  engrossment  of  the  final  decree  in  a  suit  for \npartition would relate back to the date of the decree. The \nbeginning  of  the  period  of  limitation  for  executing  such \na  decree  cannot  be  made  to  depend  upon  date  of  the \nengrossment of such a decree on the stamp paper. The \ndate  of  furnishing  of  stamp  paper  is  an  uncertain  act, \nwithin the domain, purview and control of a party. No date \nor  period  is  fixed  for  furnishing  stamp  papers.  No  rule \nhas been shown to us requiring the court to call upon or \ngive  any  time  for  furnishing  of  stamp  paper. A  party  by \nhis own act of not furnishing stamp paper cannot stop the \nrunning of period of limitation. None can take advantage \nof his own wrong. The proposition that period of limitation \nwould remain suspended till stamp paper is furnished and \ndecree engrossed thereupon and only thereafter the period \nof twelve years will begin to run would lead to absurdity. \nIn  Yeswant  Deorao  Deshmukh  v.  Walchand  Ramchand \nKothari [1950 SCR 852] it was said that the payment of \ncourt fee on the amount found due was entirely in the power \nof the decree holder and there was nothing to prevent him \nfrom paying it then and there; it was a decree capable of \nexecution from the very date it was passed.\n\n26. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not \nresort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. As \nabove noted, there is no statutory provision prescribing a \ntime limit for furnishing of the stamp paper for engrossing \nthe decree or time limit for engrossment of the decree on \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1369\n\nstamp  paper  and  there  is  no  statutory  obligation  on  the \nCourt passing the decree to direct the parties to furnish the \nstamp paper for engrossing the decree. In the present case \nthe Court has not passed an order directing the parties to \nfurnish the stamp papers for the purpose of engrossing the \ndecree. Merely because there is no direction by the Court \nto furnish the stamp papers for engrossing of the decree \nor there is no time limit fixed by law, does not mean that \nthe party can furnish stamp papers at its sweet will and \nclaim  that  the  period  of  limitation  provided  under Article \n136  of  the Act  would  start  only  thereafter  as  and  when \nthe decree is engrossed thereupon. The starting of period \nof limitation for execution of a partition decree cannot be \nmade  contingent  upon  the  engrossment  of  the  decree \non the stamp paper. The engrossment of the decree on \nstamp paper would relate back to the date of the decree, \nnamely, 7th August, 1981, in the present case. In this view \nthe execution application filed on 21st March, 1994 was \ntime barred having been filed beyond the period of twelve \nyears  prescribed  under Article  136  of  the Act. The  High \nCourt committed illegality in coming to the conclusion that \nit was not barred by limitation.”\n\n18.  The above judgment was relied upon by the Constitutional Bench of \nthis  Court  while  deciding  the  validity  of  an  unstamped  agreement, \nwherein it was observed as under:\n\nInterplay Between Arbitration Agreements under A&C \nAct,  1996  &  Stamp Act,  1899,  In  re  (2024)  6  SCC  1  : \n2023 SCC OnLine SC 1666 \n\n“255. In Chiranji Lal v.  Hari Das [Chiranji Lal v. Hari Das \n(2005) 10 SCC 746] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court \nrejected  the  contention  that  an  unstamped  preliminary \ndecree  is  not  enforceable  and,  therefore,  the  period  of \nlimitation  begins  to  run  when  the  decree  is  engrossed \non  the  stamp  paper. The  Stamp Act  is  a  fiscal  measure \nwith the object to secure revenue for the State on certain \nclasses of instruments. The Stamp Act is not enacted to \narm the litigant with a weapon of technicality to meet the \ncase of his opponent. As there is no rule which prescribes \n\nRenjith K.G. & Others v. Sheeba\f1370 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nany  time  for  furnishing  of  stamp  paper  or  to  call  upon \na  person  to  pay  stamp  duty  on  a  preliminary  decree  of \npartition,  the  proposition  that  period  of  limitation  would \nremain suspended till stamp paper is furnished and decree \nengrossed thereon was rejected.”\n\n19.  Applying the ratio laid down in Chiranjilal case (Supra) to the facts of \nthe present case, the High Court rightly set aside the order passed in \nthe Execution Petition and remanded the matter to the trial court for \nfresh consideration, leaving all the issues including the independent \nright, title or interest claimed by the respondents in the property in \nquestion,  to be adjudicated  therein. Therefore, we do  not  find any \ninfirmity or illegality in the judgment so rendered by the High Court, \nwarranting our interference.\n\n20. \n\nIn view thereof, these Civil Appeals stand dismissed. However, it is \nopen to the appellants to raise all the contentions available to them \nbefore the trial Court. Costs made easy. \n\n21.  Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. \n\nResult of the case: Appeals dismissed.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f"}