{"file_name": "2024_10_1448_1461_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1448 : 2024 INSC 806\n\nMafabhai Motibhai Sagar \nv. \nState of Gujarat & Ors. \n\n(Criminal Appeal No. 4307 of 2024)\n\n21 October 2024\n\n[Abhay S. Oka* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nThe  appellant  was  convicted  for  offences  punishable  under \nSection  302  read  with  sections  147  and  148  Penal  Code,  1860 \nand sentenced to life imprisonment. His application for remission \nwas  considered  expeditiously  by  the  State  Government  after \ninterference of the Supreme Court. The State Government while \ngranting remission imposed four conditions on the appellant. The \nappellant  contended  that  two  out  of  these  four  conditions  are \nvague,  subjective  and  arbitrary.  The  issue  before  the  Hon’ble \nSupreme  Court  is  the  legality  of  these  two  conditions  imposed \nby  the  appropriate  government  in  exercise  of  its  powers  under   \nSection 432(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, \n‘the CrPC’) while remitting the life sentence of the appellant.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.432(1) – Explained:\n\nHeld: The appropriate government has the power to remit the whole \nor any part of the punishment of a convict unconditionally or subject \nto certain conditions – Actual remission takes effect only after the \nconvict accepts the conditions – There is an identical provision in \nthe Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) in form of \nsection 473(1). [Paras 9, 17(i), 2]\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.432(1) – The power to \ngrant remission – How to be exercised:\n\nHeld: A constitution bench of Supreme Court in Union of India v. \nV. Sriharan alias Murugan & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 1, while approving \nthe  view  taken  in  Mohinder  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab  (2013)  3 \nSCC 294 held that, the decision to grant remission has to be well \ninformed, reasonable and fair to all concerned – Convict cannot seek \nremission of sentence as of right – Factors including public interest, \n\n* Author\n\n\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1449\n\nthe gravity and nature of the offences involved and antecedents of \nthe convict can be looked into by the appropriate government as \nthe power to grant remission is discretionary – Almost all the States \nincluding  the  State  of  Gujarat  who  is  a  respondent  here  have  a \nwritten policy on grant of remission in order to avoid arbitrary use \nof this power. [Paras 10-11, 12, 17(ii), 17(iii)]\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.432(1) – Nature of the \nconditions that can be imposed by the appropriate government: \n\nHeld: The conditions imposed must be fair, reasonable and stand \nthe  test  of  scrutiny  of Article  14  of  the  Constitution  –  Conditions \ncannot be arbitrary as it will violate rights guaranteed under Articles \n14 and 21 of the Constitution. [Paras 12, 17(iv)]\n\nCode  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  –  s.432(1)  –  Whether  the \ncondition requiring the convict to behave ‘decently’ for a period \nof two years after his release from jail is arbitrary and hit by \nArticle 14 of the Constitution:\n\nHeld:  The  condition  number  1  imposed  by  the  appropriate \ngovernment  required  the  convict  to:  (a)  behave  ‘decently’  for  a \nperiod of two years after his release from jail and; (b) submit two \nrespectable sureties to ensure that he does not commit the breach \nof  peace  and  harmony  of  the  society  and  does  not  threaten  the \ncomplainant and the witnesses – The words ‘decent’ and ‘decency’ \nare not defined in CrPC or any other cognate legislation, it can mean \ndifferent things to different people and differently in different times – \nThis condition is thus vague, arbitrary, unclear, unambiguous and \ncapable of having different interpretations – Hence the condition \nis unenforceable and hit by Article 14. [Paras 13, 18a]\n\nCode  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  –  s.432(1)  and  432(3)  – \nWhether  the  condition  providing  for  arrest  and  automatic \nrevocation of remission of sentence if appellant commits any \nother cognizable offence or inflicts any serious injury to any \ncitizen or property after his release, valid:\n\nHeld: The Apex Court while dealing with Section 401 of the CrPC of \n1898 (identical to Section 432(3) of CrPC of 1973 and Section 473(3) \nof BNSS), in Shaikh Abdul Azees vs. State of Karnataka (1977) 2 \nSCC 485, held that, the provision does not intend to automatically \nrevive the sentence already remitted and the government is under \nno legal obligation to cancel such remission – This drastic power \naffecting  the  convict’s  liberty  has  to  be  exercised  only  after  due \n\nMafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat & Ors.\f1450 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\ncompliance  of  the  principles  of  natural  justice  –  Serving  show \ncause  notice,  opportunity  to  file  reply  and  of  being  heard  and  a \nreasoned order by the adjudicating authority are essential before \ncancellation of such remission – An order cancelling remission can \nbe  challenged  under Article  226  of  Constitution  by  the  convict  – \nMere registration of a cognizable offence or allegation of breach \nof condition not a ground for cancellation of remission – A decision \nto  cancel  remission  has  to  be  made  on  a  case  to  case  basis \ntaking into consideration the seriousness and gravity of offence or \nbreach – Condition number 2 thus clarified. [Paras 14-16, 17(v), \n17(vi), 18b, 18c] \n\nCase Law Cited\n\nShaikh Abdul Azees v. State of Karnataka [1977] 3 SCR 393 : (1977) \n2 SCC 485; Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan & Ors. [2015] \n14 SCR 613 : (2016) 7 SCC 1; Epuru Sudhakar & Anr. v. Govt. of A.P. \n& Ors. [2006] Supp. 7 SCR 81 : (2006) 8 SCC 161; Mohinder Singh \nv. State of Punjab [2013] 3 SCR 90 : (2013) 3 SCC 294 – relied on.\n\nList of Acts\n\nPenal Code, 1860; Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, \n1959;  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973;  Constitution  of  India; \nBharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. \n\nList of Keywords\n\nSection  432  of  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973;  Remission \nof  sentence;  Power  to  remit;  Condition  imposed  by  appropriate \nauthority for remission; Cancellation of remission.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Criminal  Appeal  No. \n4307 of 2024\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 15.02.2023 of the High Court \nof Gujarat at Ahmedabad in SCRA No. 963 of 2023\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nRauf  Rahim,  Sr. Adv., Ali Asghar  Rahim,  Shekhar  Kumar, Advs. \nfor the Appellant.\n\nMs.  Swati  Ghildiyal,  Ms.  Devyani  Bhatt,  Ms.  Shreya  Jain, Advs. \nfor the Respondents.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1451\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nAbhay S. Oka, J.\n\n1. \n\nLeave granted.\n\n2.  The issue involved in this appeal is as regards the legality of the \nconditions imposed while remitting the life sentence of the appellant \nin  the  exercise  of  powers  under  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  432 \nof  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (for  short,  ‘the  CrPC’). \nThere is an identical provision in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha \nSanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘the BNSS’) in the form of sub-section (1) \nof Section 473.\n\nFACTUAL ASPECTS\n\n3.  The  appellant  was  convicted  for  the  offence  punishable  under \nSection  302  read  with  Sections  147  and  148  of  the  Indian  Penal \nCode, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’) and was sentenced on 18th February \n2008 to undergo life imprisonment. The conviction of the appellant \nhas attained finality. \n\n4.  The present appeal arises out of an order passed by the High Court \nof  Gujarat  on  an  application  made  by  the  appellant  for  grant  of \nparole under Rule 19 of the Prisons (Bombay Furlough and Parole) \nRules,  1959. As  the  prayer  was  rejected  by  the  impugned  order, \nthis  appeal  was  filed  before  this  Court.  While  arguing  the  appeal \nbefore this Court, on 26th June 2023, a submission was made on \nbehalf of the appellant that the application for remission made by \nthe  appellant  under  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  432  of  the  CrPC \nwas not being considered by the State Government. Therefore, a \nnotice was issued on 26th June 2023 on that limited aspect, and a \ndirection was issued to expeditiously decide the pending application \nfor grant of remission.\n\n5.  On 15th September 2023, the Home Department of the Government \nof Gujarat passed an order granting remission to the appellant. His \nremaining sentence was remitted. While granting remission by the \norder  dated  15th  September  2023,  four  conditions  were  imposed, \nwhich read thus: \n\nMafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat & Ors.\f1452 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n“Conditions:\n\n(1)  After  the  release  from  jail  the  prisoner  shall \nbehave decently for 2 (Two) years. For this purpose \nhe  has  to  submit  two  Sureties  of  the  respectable \npersons of the Society stating that the prisoner shall \nnot  breach  the  peace  and  harmony  of  the  society \nand  also  shall  not  threaten  the  complainant  and \nwitnesses.\n\n(2) \n\nIf  the  prisoner  after  the  release  from  the  jail \ncarries out any cognizable offence or inflict any \nserious injury to any citizen or property then he \nwill be arrested again and he will have to serve \nthe remaining period of sentence in jail.\n\n(3)  After being released from jail the prisoner shall mark \nhis presence in the nearest police station for a period \nof 1 (one) year.\n\n(4)  The prisoner shall be released only after paying the \n\nunpaid fine amount if any.”\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nAs  the  appellant  was  aggrieved  by  the  first  two  conditions,  we \npermitted him to amend the appeal and challenge conditions nos.1 \nand  2  instead  of  driving  him  to  file  a  fresh  writ  petition  before  the \nHigh Court.\n\nSUBMISSIONS\n\n6.  Mr  Rauf  Rahim,  the  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the \nappellant,  has  made  submissions  on  the  power  of  the  State \nGovernment  to  impose  conditions  while  granting  remission.  He \nsubmits that the impugned conditions defeat the very object of the \ngrant of remission. He submitted that the word “decently” used in \ncondition no.1 is vague. The concept of decency differs from person \nto person. Therefore, putting such a condition of maintaining decent \nbehaviour is completely violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of \nIndia being manifestly arbitrary. It is submitted that putting such a \ncondition confers arbitrary power on the State Government to cancel \nthe remission order. Hence, the condition violates Article 21 of the \nConstitution of India. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1453\n\n7.  Regarding condition no.2, the learned senior counsel submitted that \neven if a false allegation is made against the appellant of commission \nof any cognizable offence, he will be deprived of remission granted \nunder  the  order  dated  15th  September  2023.  The  learned  senior \ncounsel relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Shaikh \nAbdul Azees v. State of Karnataka.1 While dealing with sub-section \n(3)  of  Section  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1898  (for \nshort, ‘the CrPC of 1898’) which is pari materia with Section 432 of \nthe  CrPC,  this  Court  held  that  on  breach  of  any  of  the  conditions \non which remission is granted, there is no automatic revival of the \nsentence. He submitted that both conditions are completely illegal.\n\n8.  Ms  Swati  Ghildiyal,  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  1st \nrespondent-State  of  Gujarat,  submitted  that  under  sub-section  (1) \nof  Section  432  of  the  CrPC,  the  appropriate  Government  has  the \npower to remit the whole or any part of the punishment subject to \ncertain conditions. The provision requires the convict to accept the \nsaid conditions, without which he cannot be granted the benefit of \nremission. The learned counsel submitted that it is very well settled \nthat a convict is not entitled to remission of the sentence as a matter \nof  right.  She  submitted  that  the  limited  right  of  the  convict  is  only \nto be considered for remission as held by this Court in the case of \nUnion of India v. V. Sriharan alias Murugan & Ors.2 The learned \ncounsel also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Epuru \nSudhakar  & Anr.  v.  Govt.  of A.P.  &  Ors.,3  which  lays  down  that \nthe power to remit sentence is a discretionary power which has to \nbe exercised on public interest considerations. The learned counsel \nsubmitted  that  the  appellant  has  accepted  the  conditions  imposed \non him and has furnished surety in terms of condition no.1. Hence, \nno interference is called for.\n\nCONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS\n\n9.  Section 432 of the CrPC reads thus:\n\n“432. Power to suspend or remit sentences.—(1) When \nany person has been sentenced to punishment for an \n\n1 \n\n2 \n\n3 \n\n[1977] 3 SCR 393 : (1977) 2 SCC 485\n\n[2015] 14 SCR 613 : (2016) 7 SCC 1\n\n[2006] Supp. 7 SCR 81 : (2006) 8 SCC 161\n\nMafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat & Ors.\f1454 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\noffence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, \nwithout conditions or upon any conditions which the \nperson  sentenced  accepts,  suspend  the  execution \nof his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the \npunishment to which he has been sentenced.\n\n(2)  Whenever  an  application  is  made  to  the  appropriate \nGovernment for the suspension or remission of a sentence, \nthe  appropriate  Government  may  require  the  presiding \nJudge of the Court before or by which the conviction was \nhad or confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the \napplication  should  be  granted  or  refused,  together  with \nhis reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the \nstatement  of  such  opinion  a  certified  copy  of  the  record \nof the trial or of such record thereof as exists.\n\n(3)  If  any  condition  on  which  a  sentence  has  been \nsuspended  or  remitted  is,  in  the  opinion  of  the \nappropriate Government, not fulfilled, the appropriate \nGovernment may cancel the suspension or remission, \nand thereupon the person in whose favour the sentence \nhas  been  suspended  or  remitted  may,  if  at  large,  be \narrested  by  any  police  officer,  without  warrant  and \nremanded  to  undergo  the  unexpired  portion  of  the \nsentence.\n\n(4) The  condition  on  which  a  sentence  is  suspended  or \nremitted under this section may be one to be fulfilled by \nthe  person  in  whose  favour  the  sentence  is  suspended \nor remitted, or one independent of his will.\n\n(5)  The  appropriate  Government  may,  by  general  rules \nor special orders, give directions as to the suspension of \nsentences  and  the  conditions  on  which  petitions  should \nbe presented and dealt with:\n\nProvided that in the case of any sentence (other than a \nsentence  of  fine)  passed  on  a  male  person  above  the \nage  of  eighteen  years,  no  such  petition  by  the  person \nsentenced or by any other person on his behalf shall be \nentertained, unless the person sentenced is in jail, and—\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1455\n\n(a)  where  such  petition  is  made  by  the  person \nsentenced,  it  is  presented  through  the  officer  in \ncharge of the jail; or\n\n(b) where such petition is made by any other person, \nit contains a declaration that the person sentenced \nis in jail.\n\n(6)  The  provisions  of  the  above  sub-sections  shall  also \napply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any \nsection  of  this  Code  or  of  any  other  law  which  restricts \nthe liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him \nor his property.\n\n(7)  In  this  section  and  in  Section  433,  the  expression \n“appropriate Government” means,— \n\n(a)  in  cases  where  the  sentence  is  for  an  offence \nagainst, or the order referred to in sub-section (6) is \npassed under, any law relating to a matter to which \nthe executive power of the Union extends, the Central \nGovernment; \n\n(b)  in  other  cases,  the  Government  of  the  State \nwithin  which  the  offender  is  sentenced  or  the  said \norder is passed.”\n\n(emphasis added)\n\nUnder sub-section (1) of Section 432 of the CrPC, the appropriate \nGovernment  has  the  power  to  remit  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the \npunishment  of  a  convict.  The  remission  can  be  granted  either \nunconditionally or subject to certain conditions. As expressly provided \nunder sub-section (1) of Section 432, actual remission takes effect \nonly after the convict accepts the conditions. Thus, there is no doubt \nthat  there  exists  a  power  in  the  appropriate  Government  to  grant \nremission subject to compliance with conditions.\n\n10. \n\nInsofar  as  the  exercise  of  power  under  sub-section  (1)  of  Section \n432 of the CrPC is concerned, the Constitution Bench in the case of \nV. Sriharan2 has approved the view taken by this Court in the case \nof Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab.4 The view taken is that the \n\n4 \n\n(2013) 3 SCC 294\n\nMafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat & Ors.\f1456 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n11. \n\ndecision to grant remission has to be well-informed, reasonable and \nfair to all concerned.\n\nIt is no doubt true that the power to remit a sentence under Section \n432(1)  of  the  CrPC  is  discretionary.  One  of  the  considerations  for \nthe exercise of the discretion can be public interest. The gravity and \nnature of the offences committed by the convict are also factors to \nbe  considered.  The  antecedents  of  the  convict  are  also  relevant. \nAlmost all the States have a written policy on the grant of remission \nunder Section 432(1) of the CrPC. For example, the 1st respondent, \nthe State of Gujarat, has a policy that forms part of the Government \nResolution dated 23rd January 2014, which was amended from time \nto  time.  The  said  Government  Resolution  incorporates  guidelines/\npolicy for consideration of cases for grant of remission and premature \nrelease of prisoners. The existence of a rational policy is necessary \nto prevent the arbitrary exercise of power to grant a remission under \nSection 432(1) of the CrPC.\n\n12.  A convict cannot seek remission as a matter of right. However, he \nhas  a  right  to  say  that  his  case  for  the  grant  of  remission  ought \nto  be  considered  in  accordance  with  the  law.  The  power  under  \nsub-section (1) of Section 432 of the CrPC has to be exercised in \na fair and reasonable manner. Therefore, conditions imposed while \nexercising the power under sub-section (1) of Section 432 must be \nreasonable. The conditions must stand the test of scrutiny of Article \n14 of the Constitution of India. If the conditions imposed are arbitrary, \nthe conditions will stand vitiated due to violation of Article 14. Such \narbitrary conditions may also violate the convict’s rights under Article \n21 of the Constitution.\n\n13.  Now, we come to condition no.1. The first part of this condition requires \nthe convict to behave decently for a period of two years after release \nfrom jail. The convict must submit two respectable sureties to ensure \nthat  he  does  not  commit  the  breach  of  peace  and  harmony  of  the \nsociety and does not threaten the complainant and the witnesses. The \nwords ‘decent’ or ‘decently’ are not defined in the CrPC or any other \ncognate legislation. The concept of decency of each human being is \nlikely to be different. The idea of decency keeps on changing with time. \nAs the term ‘decency’ is not defined in the CrPC or any other cognate \nlegislation, every person or authority may interpret the same differently. \nTherefore,  such  a  condition  while  granting  remission  becomes  too \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1457\n\nsubjective. Putting such a vague condition while exercising the power \nunder sub-section (1) of Section 432 of the CrPC will give a tool in \nthe hands of the executive to cancel the remission at its whims and \nfancies.  Therefore,  such  a  condition  is  arbitrary  and  will  be  hit  by \nArticle  14  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  Such  a  condition  cannot  be \nimposed as it will defeat the very object of remitting the sentence in \nthe exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of Section 432 of the \nCrPC. Therefore, condition no.1 cannot be sustained. If a condition \nimposed  is  unclear  or  ambiguous,  it  can  have  different  meanings. \nConsequently,  it  becomes  very  difficult  to  enforce  such  conditions. \nThus, the condition imposed while granting remission must be such \nthat it is capable of being complied with and enforced.\n\n14.  Now, we come to condition no.2, which provides that if the appellant, \nafter his release from jail, commits any cognizable offence or inflicts \nany serious injury to any citizen or property, he will be arrested again \nand  will  have  to  serve  the  remaining  period  of  the  sentence  in  jail. \nThus, this condition authorises the appropriate Government to arrest \nthe convict and revoke the benefit of remission. This clause provides \nfor automatic cancellation of the order remitting the sentence. In this \nrespect, it is necessary to consider the decision of this Court in the \ncase of Shaikh Abdul Azees1. It was a case where remission was \nearned by the appellant therein after undergoing a life sentence for \nfifteen and a half years. The High Court held that Section 303 of the \nIPC was applicable, and this was a case of conditional remission under \nSection 401 of the CrPC of 1898. Section 401 of the CrPC of 1898 has \nbeen quoted in paragraph 13 of the said decision, which reads thus:\n\n“13. We are, however, clearly of opinion that for the purpose \nof Section 303 IPC it does not make any difference whether \nthe remission under Section 401 CrPC is with or without \nconditions. This is clear from a perusal of sub-section (3) \nof Section 401 CrPC which reads as follows:\n\n“401(3)  If  any  condition  on  which  a  sentence  has \nbeen suspended or remitted, is, in the opinion of the \nappropriate Government, not fulfilled, the appropriate \nGovernment may cancel the suspension or remission \nand  thereupon  the  person  in  whose  favour  the \nsentence  has  been  suspended  or  remitted,  may,  if \nat  large,  be  arrested  by  any  police  officer  without \n\nMafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat & Ors.\f1458 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nwarrant  and  remanded  to  undergo  the  unexpired \nportion of the sentence.”\n\nAn  identical  provision  is  found  in  sub-section  (3)  of  Section \n432 of the CrPC and sub-section (3) of Section 473 of BNSS. \nUltimately, in paragraph 14 of the said decision, while dealing \nwith sub-section (3) of Section 401 of the CrPC of 1898, this \nCourt held thus:\n\n“14.  It  is  manifest  from  the  above  provision  that  on \nbreach of any condition of the remission there is not \nan automatic revival of the sentence. It will certainly \nbe  open  to  the  Government  in  a  particular  case  to \ncancel the remission but it may not. The Government \nis not under a legal obligation to cancel the remission. \nIt is only when the Government chooses to pass an \norder  of  cancellation  of  the  remission  of  sentence \nthat  the  convict  is  arrested  and  is  required  to  serve \nthe  unexpired  portion  of  the  sentence.  During  the \ninterregnum the accused who is released cannot be \nsaid to be under a sentence of imprisonment for life. \nWhile  he  is  in  enjoyment  of  the  freedom  on  account  of \nremission, that period is not even reckoned under Section \n401 CrPC for the purpose of calculation of the sentence \nto be served in the eventuality.”\n\n(emphasis added)\n\n15.  The effect of remitting the sentence is the restoration of the liberty of a \nconvict. If the order granting remission is to be cancelled or revoked, \nit will naturally affect the convict’s liberty. The reason is that when an \naction is taken under sub-section (3) of Section 432 of the CrPC or sub-\nsection (3) of Section 473 of the BNSS, it results in the convict being \ntaken to prison for undergoing the remaining part of the sentence. Thus, \nthe benefit of remission stands withdrawn. Therefore, this drastic power \ncannot be exercised without following the principles of natural justice. A \nshow cause notice must be served on the convict before taking action \nto withdraw/cancel remission. The show cause notice must contain the  \ngrounds on which action under sub-section (3) of Section 432 of the \nCrPC or sub-section (3) of Section 473 of the BNSS is proposed to be \ntaken. The concerned authority must give the convict an opportunity \nto  file  a  reply  and  of  being  heard. After  that,  the  authority  must \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1459\n\n16. \n\npass an order stating brief reasons. The principles of natural justice \nmust  be  read  into  sub-section  (3)  of  Section  432  and  sub- section \n(3)  of  Section  473  of  the  BNSS. The  convict  whose  remission  has \nbeen cancelled can always adopt a remedy under Article 226 of the \nConstitution of India.\n\nIn view of the legal position stated above, condition no.2 cannot be \ninterpreted to mean that every allegation of a breach thereof would \nautomatically  result  in  the  cancellation  of  the  order  of  remission. \nRegistration of a cognizable offence against the convict, per se, is not \na ground to cancel the remission order. The allegations of breach of \ncondition cannot be taken at their face value, and whether a case for \ncancellation of remission is made out will have to be decided in the \nfacts of each case. Every case of breach cannot invite cancellation \nof  the  order  of  remission.  The  appropriate  Government  will  have \nto consider the nature of the breach alleged against the convict. A \nminor or a trifling breach cannot be a ground to cancel remission. \nThere  must  be  some  material  to  substantiate  the  allegations  of \nbreach. Depending upon the seriousness and gravity thereof, action \ncan be taken under sub-section (3) of Section 432 of the CrPC or \nsub-section  (3)  of  Section  473  of  the  BNSS  of  cancellation  of  the \norder remitting sentence.\n\n17.  Our conclusions can be summarised as under:\n\n(i)  Under sub-section (1) of Section 432 of the CrPC or sub-section \n(1) of Section 473 of the BNSS, the appropriate Government has \nthe power to remit the whole or any part of the punishment of \na convict. The remission can be granted either unconditionally \nor subject to certain conditions; \n\n(ii)  The  decision  to  grant  or  not  to  grant  remission  has  to  be  \n\nwell-informed, reasonable and fair to all concerned;\n\n(iii)  A convict cannot seek remission as a matter of right. However, \nhe has a right to claim that his case for the grant of remission \nought  to  be  considered  in  accordance  with  the  law  and/or \napplicable policy adopted by the appropriate Government;\n\n(iv)  Conditions  imposed  while  exercising  the  power  under  sub-\nsection (1) of Section 432 or sub-section (1) of Section 473 of \nthe BNSS must be reasonable. If the conditions imposed are \narbitrary,  the  conditions  will  stand  vitiated  due  to  violation  of \n\nMafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat & Ors.\f1460 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nArticle 14. Such arbitrary conditions may violate the convict’s \nrights under Article 21 of the Constitution;\n\n(v)  The  effect  of  remitting  the  sentence,  in  part  or  full,  results \nin  the  restoration  of  liberty  of  a  convict.  If  the  order  granting \nremission is to be cancelled or revoked, it will naturally affect \nthe  liberty  of  the  convict.  The  reason  is  that  when  action  is \ntaken  under  sub-section  (3)  of  Section  432  of  the  CrPC  or \nsub-section  (3)  of  Section  473  of  the  BNSS,  it  results  in  the \nconvict  being  taken  to  prison  for  undergoing  the  remaining \npart of the sentence. Therefore, this drastic power cannot be \nexercised  without  following  the  principles  of  natural  justice. A \nshow cause notice must be served on the convict before taking \naction  to  withdraw/cancel  remission.  The  show  cause  notice \nmust  contain  the  grounds  on  which  action  under  sub-section \n(3)  of  Section  432  of  the  CrPC  or  sub-section  (3)  of  Section \n473 of BNNS is sought to be taken. The concerned authority \nmust give the convict an opportunity to file a reply and of being \nheard. After that, the authority must pass an order stating the \nreasons in brief. The convict can always challenge the order of \ncancellation  of  remission  by  adopting  a  remedy  under Article \n226 of the Constitution of India.; and\n\n(vi)  Registration of a cognizable offence against the convict, per se, \nis not a ground to cancel the remission order. The allegations \nof breach of condition cannot be taken at their face value, and \nwhether a case for cancellation of remission is made out will \nhave  to  be  decided  in  the  facts  of  each  case.  Every  case  of \nbreach cannot invite cancellation of the order of remission. The \nappropriate Government will have to consider the nature of the \nbreach alleged against the convict. A minor or a trifling breach \ncannot be a ground to cancel remission. There must be some \nmaterial to substantiate the allegations of breach. Depending \nupon the seriousness and gravity thereof, action can be taken \nunder sub-section (3) of Section 432 of the CrPC or sub-section \n(3)  of  Section  473  of  the  BNSS  of  cancellation  of  the  order \nremitting sentence.\n\n18.  Therefore, we pass the following order:\n\na.  The first part of condition no.1 regarding behaving decently, being \nmanifestly arbitrary, is struck down. Therefore, the undertaking \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1461\n\ngiven by the appellant and the surety bonds submitted by him \nstand cancelled only to that extent; \n\nb.  Condition no.2 stands clarified in terms of this judgment;\n\nc. \n\nThe order of remission shall not be revoked on the ground of \nbreaches of conditions without compliance with the principles \nof natural justice as provided in paragraph 17(v) above; and\n\nd.  The Appeal is partly allowed on the above terms.\n\nResult of the case: Appeal partly allowed. \n\n†Headnotes prepared by:  Swathi H. Prasad, Hony. Associate Editor \n\n(Verified by: Shadan Farasat, Adv.)\n\nMafabhai Motibhai Sagar v. State of Gujarat & Ors.\f"}