{"file_name": "2024_10_1513_1632_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1513 : 2024 INSC 790\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. \nv. \nUnion of India & Ors.\n\n(Writ Petition (C) No. 1234 of 2017)\n\n18 October 2024\n\n[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud,* CJI, \nJ.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nPetitioner, an NGO raised significant concerns as regards \nprevelance of child marriages and failure of authorities to prevent \nthem despite the enactment of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, \n2006. Sought issuance of effective guidelines inter alia for stronger \nenforcement mechanisms, awareness programs, appointment of \nChild Marriage Prohibition Officers, and comprehensive support \nsystems for child brides.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nChild Marriage – Guidelines issued for effective implementation \nof the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) and \nachieving the elimination of child marriage:\n\nHeld: The success of PCMA, a social legislation requires collective \nefforts of all stakeholders – Need for intersectional approach, \nmulti-  sectoral coordination, preventive and community-driven \nstrategies to ensure complete eradication of child marriages, \nemphasized – Guidelines issued with respect to-(1) Legal \nenforcement pertaining to appointment and accountability of Child \nMarriage Prohibition Officers (CMPO); District-Level responsibility for \nactive prevention of child marriages; Establishment of a Specialized \nPolice Unit and Special Child Marriage Prohibition Unit – (2) Judicial \nmeasures such as empowering Magistrates to take suo moto action \nand issue preventive injunctions; Exploration of Special Fast-\nTrack Courts for child marriage cases; Mandatory action against \nneglectful Public Servants – (3) Community involvement which \nincludes Annual action plans and Community-Centric Capacity \nBuilding; Adoption of the Child Marriage Free Village Initiative – \n(4) Awareness Campaigns: Led by CMPOs in Schools, Religious \n\n* Author\n\n\f1514 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nInstitutions, Panchayats; Integrating comprehensive sexuality \nand rights education into school curricula; Educational materials \nand community awareness tools; Targeted community awareness \ncampaigns; Empowerment programs for girls and young women; \nHelpline awareness and reporting mechanisms – (5) Training/\nCapacity Building for Teachers and School Administrators, Training \nfor Community Health Workers and Educators, Law Enforcement, \nJudicial Officers and Health Care Providers; as also Empowerment \nof Local Leaders and Community Influencers; Engagement with \nNon-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) – (6) Educational and \nSocial Support like scholarships, educational incentive programs \nspecifically targeted at girls at risk of child marriage; Social Welfare \nPrograms; Convergence and continuity of services – (7) Monitoring \nand Accountability which inter alia includes formulation of Standard \nOperating Procedure by NALSA, Ministry of Women and Child \nDevelopment, in consultation with State Child Protection Societies, \nNational Commission for protection of child rights; Monitoring also \nincludes role of Panchayats and local leaders; Individual care plans \nfor At-Risk girls – (8) Technology-driven initiatives for reporting \nchild marriage such as creation of a Centralized Reporting Portal; \nTechnology-Driven Support Services; Monitoring of Attendance – \n(9) Funding in form of Dedicated annual budget allocation by \nrelevant ministries of the Union Government for each State aimed \nat preventing child marriage and supporting affected individuals; \nInstitutionalization of Juvenile Justice Fund; Compensation for \nGirls opting out of marriage; Identification and support for At-Risk \nChildren. [Para 211]\n\nProhibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) vis-à-vis \nPersonal laws – PCMA, if overrides various personal laws \ngoverning marriage:\n\nHeld: Issue is pending consideration before Parliament as the \nProhibition of Child Marriage (Amending) Bill 2021 introduced in \nParliament sought amendment of PCMA to expressly state the \noverriding effect of the statute over various personal laws. [Para 214] \n\nSuggestions by Supreme Court – Outlawing of child betrothals:\n\nHeld: Child betrothals, marriages fixed in the minority of a child \nundermines and violates their rights to free choice, autonomy, \nagency and childhood – Though Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, \n2006 prohibits child marriages, it does not stipulate on betrothals – \nParliament may consider outlawing child betrothals. [Para 215]\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1515\n\nChild marriage – Constitutional guarantees against – Right to \nself-determination: choice, autonomy and sexuality of children; \nRight to health; Right to childhood: Right to education and \ndevelopment – Explained – Evils of child marriage, enumerated:\n\nHeld: Child marriage deprives children of their agency, autonomy, \nright to sexuality and right to enjoy their childhood – The right to \nlife and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution is violated \nby the commission of child marriage – Both sexes are adversely \naffected by forced and early marriage – Constitution recognises \nthe right a person has over all aspects of their sexuality – Men \nand women alike are victimised by compulsory heterosexuality – \nIn child marriage, their limited agency within heteropatriarchy is \nalso taken away in infancy – Marrying in childhood objectifies the \nchild – Child marriage imposes mature burdens on children who are \nnot physically or mentally prepared to comprehend the significance \nof marriage – The right to choice and autonomy of a woman who \nis married as a child is violated by the system of child marriage – \nMinor girls forced to make conjugal relations experience post-\ntraumatic stress and depression emanating from sexual abuse by \nan elder partner – Right to choice and autonomy includes the right \nto reproductive freedom – The right to reproductive freedom is part \nof the rights wherein the right to the health of a person also finds \nplace – Constitution recognises the right to health as an inalienable \naspect of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 – Child \nmarriage inflicts tangible and lifelong physical and mental injuries \nto its members – Right to health is made illusory by all accounts \nwithin such an institution – The effect of child marriage denies \nwomen their health which is vital to lead a dignified life – Marriage \nfor most women in patriarchal societies is an announcement of \neducational conclusion – The minority of a woman’s age at the time \nof her marriage has a heightened impact on her education – Right \nto primary education is a fundamental right expressly enshrined \nunder Article 21-A – Issue as regards approach towards boys in \nchild marriage also ought to be taken into account – The right to \nchildhood belongs to all sexes – Primary, sexual and life enhancing \neducation is integral to the right to childhood. [Paras 171, 173, \n176-178, 184, 188, 191, 197]\n\nProhibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 – Scheme of the Act – \nss.3-7, 9-12, 15, 13, 14, 16 – Protection of women married \nas girls, children born in child marriages – Maintenance \nand residence of the female contracting party; custody and \nmaintenance of children of a child marriage – Solemnization of \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1516 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nchild marriages – Punishment – Preventive measures against \nchild marriages, deterrence and prevention – Injunctions \nagainst child marriages – Elucidated – Appointment of Child \nMarriage Prohibition Officers (CMPOs), appointment of \nexclusive CMPOs in each district directed.\n\nProhibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 – s.9 – Punishment for \nmale adult marrying a child – Penalizing the groom based on \nhigher agency he possesses in the marriage as against the girl:\n\nHeld: Under s.9, the Court is empowered to penalise an accused \nwith imprisonment or a fine or both – Punishment can be imposed \nbased on the gravity of the offence, the circumstance of the marriage \nand the socio-economic power of the male over his child bride – \nFurther, despite the age of majority for a man to enter into a marriage \nbeing twenty-one under s.2(a), his criminal liability for entering into \na child marriage with a minor woman begins at eighteen – Under \ns.9, a woman, regardless of her age is not liable for entering into \na child marriage and a man above the age of eighteen but under \nthe age of twenty one is liable for marrying a girl who is under the \nage of eighteen – The legislative intent behind making a groom \nliable for entering into child marriage is to recognise the relative \ncontrol of the agency that a groom has in relation to his marriage \nas opposed to a girl. [Paras 52, 55]\n\nProhibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 – ss.10, 11 – Scope – \nPunishment for solemnising a child marriage – Punishment \nfor promoting or permitting solemnisation of child marriages:\n\nHeld: The Act punishes three classes of persons – An adult groom \nin a child marriage (s.9); persons involved in the solemnization \nof child marriage (s.10) and; persons promoting or permitting the \nsolemnization of child marriage (s.11) – s.10 is expansive and \ngoverns any accomplice to the commission of child marriage \nincluding the priest who performs the marriage, any family member, \nrelative or person at whose direction the marriage takes place \nor anyone who abets it – Further, under s.11 any person having \ncharge of the child, who promotes or permits a child marriage or \nfails to prevent it is liable to rigorous imprisonment which may \nextend to two years and a fine – The person liable under s.11 may \nbe the parents of the child or a guardian or any other person or \norganisation – The means by which a person may have the charge \nof the child is immaterial as the provision stipulates that the charge \nmay be ‘lawful or unlawful’ – Thus, the section penalises any person \nor organisation involved in a child marriage – Its expansive scope \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1517\n\nallows prosecution of any person who may have unlawfully taken \nthe custody of a child and thereafter promoted, permitted or failed \nto prevent the child marriage – s.11 also deals with organisations, \nsuch as orphanages or schools or hostels, which may have the \ncharge of a child and under whose watch the child is married off. \n[Para 52, 58, 60]\n\nProhibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 – s.11 – Intention – \nExplained.\n\nProhibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 – s.12 – Child marriage \nwhen void ab initio – Stated.\n\nProhibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 – s.11(2) – Presumption \nof negligence – Nature of presumption:\n\nHeld: s.11(2) raises a presumption – Any person in charge of a \nchild who was married off, is presumed to have negligently failed \nto prevent the child marriage – The presumption is however, \nrebuttable and may be rebutted by proving that the person could \nnot have prevented the marriage or failed at preventing it, despite \ntheir best efforts – This principle is only applicable to an offence \nu/s.11. [Para 62]\n\nChild marriage – Laws governing child rights – Protective \nlegislations such as Protection of Children from Sexual \nOffences Act, 2012 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of \nChildren) Act, 2015 – ss.2(14), 27, 106, 107 – Commissions for \nProtection of Child Rights Act 2005 – ss.2(b), 13, 24 – Legal \nServices Authorities Act 1987 – s.12 – Protective framework \nof the Acts:\n\nHeld: 1. The principles of the POCSO Act are directly threatened \nby the commission of child marriage. The intent of the POCSO Act \nis to protect children from sexual advances. Child marriage on the \nother hand is an institution which puts minor girls directly in harm’s \nway. Under the POCSO Act, a man is liable to punishment for \nhaving sex with his minor wife. Nevertheless, the existence of child \nmarriage and its continued recognition in the law as a valid (and \nvoidable) marriage threatens the dignity of children. The institution \nof child marriage, more directly than any other institution, stipulates \nfor the sexual abuse of child brides by design. [Para 81]\n\n2.1 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act \nprovides a comprehensive framework to deal with children in need \nof care and protection (CNCP). Section 27 of the JJ Act establishes \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1518 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nthe Child Welfare Committee (CWC) to inter alia handle and \nresolve complaints in relation to children who are in need of care. \nThe CWC's role is to ensure the children's basic needs are met \nand that they are protected, treated, developed, and rehabilitated. \nTherefore, children who are married off are required to be produced \nbefore the CWC so that they may be rehabilitated and taken care \nof. As a beneficial social legislation aimed at children, the society \nand units constituted under the JJ Act are required to proactively \nidentify remedies and strategies for the rehabilitation and protection \nof victims of child marriages. [Para 85]\n\n2.2 Children who are at risk of marriage at the hands of their \nfamily or relatives are expressly recognised as CNCP under \nthe Act. The  JJ Act further prescribes for their protection, \nrehabilitation and development. While victims of child marriage \nare protected under the  JJ Act, it further strengthens the effort \nto eliminate child marriages by creating a trained and skilled \nforce of police officers to deal with children. The Special Juvenile \nPolice Units (SJPUs) are marked by their unique ability to inject \nhumanity in law enforcement. The task of law enforcement \nofficers, the police in particular, has traditionally been associated \nby the State’s ability to compel compliance to its norms. The formation \nof SJPUs reflects a refreshing outlook toward police work, one \nwhich is imperative in liberal democracies’ treatment of vulnerable \ngroups. Law with a touch of humanity and law enforcement with \na boost of sensitivity and empathy are the cornerstone of the law \non children. [Para 88]\n\n3.1 The effective implementation of the Prohibition of Child Marriage \nAct, 2006 (PCMA) also falls within the subject matter of the \nNational Commission for the protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) \nand State Commissions for the protection of Child Rights (SCPCR) \nestablished under Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act \n2005. [Para 92]\n\n3.2 The Ministry of Women and Child Development (MWCD) and \nthe NCPCR have been actively engaged in raising awareness about \nthe negative consequences of child marriage and strengthening \nthe enforcement of the PCMA. In recent years, the NCPCR has \nconducted multiple review meetings and collaborated with a broad \nspectrum of stakeholders, including District Magistrates, CMPOs, \nChild Development Project Officers (CDPOs), Child Welfare \nCommittee (CWCs), and Anganwadi Workers. These initiatives \nhave aimed to create a coordinated approach to tackling child \nmarriage at the grassroots level. [Para 93]\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1519\n\n3.3 The NCPCR has also concentrated on identifying children at \nrisk by compiling school-wise data on those who have dropped out \nor exhibit irregular attendance. In 2023-2024, the NCPCR identified \n645,673 children across India who were either out of school or at \nrisk of early marriage. The Commission directed district authorities \nto pinpoint vulnerable children from this list, prevent their marriages, \nand ensure proper rehabilitation for those affected. While these \nawareness campaigns and data-driven interventions have been \nvital, it is evident that awareness alone is not enough to prevent \nchild marriages effectively. Enforcement of laws, community \nengagement, and support systems for vulnerable children are equally \ncrucial. [Para 94]\n\n4. Section 12(c) of the Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 stipulates \nthat any child who has to file or defend a case is entitled to legal \nservices. The Legal Services Authorities are therefore under an \nobligation under the Act to assist minors who file cases under \nthe PCMA to exercise their statutory rights. The National Legal \nServices Authority, State Legal Services Authority, District Legal \nServices Authorities, Taluk Legal Services Committees, High Court \nLegal Services Committees, and Supreme Court Legal Services \nCommittee have formulated various schemes to be followed while \nthey deal with legal services to children. [Para 96]\n\nChild Marriage – Schemes, Policies formulated by the Union \nGovernment also, to empower young girls and women – \nDiscussed – Lack in implementation of targeted measures \nsolely for prevention of child marriage – Direction issued for \nintroducing special scheme focusing on skill development, \nvocational training and economic stability for women and \ngirls who leave child marriages – Various preventive training, \neducation, financial support, community-based initiatives and \nother initiatives by States and UTs – Stated – Impact analysis \nof State schemes.\n\nChild marriages – Child Rights Law – International law – Universal \nframework on Child Rights – International Conventions, Political \nConventions; Regional Conventions  – Universal Declaration \nof Human Rights; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition \nof Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices \nSimilar to Slavery of 1956; International Covenant on Civil and \nPolitical Rights; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms \nof Discrimination against Women; Convention on the Rights \nof the Child – Framework developed in the African Union, the \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1520 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nEuropean Union and the SAARC – Elucidated – Rights-based \nframework against child marriages: Right to free choice and \nautonomy – Right to free and informed consent, Right against \ngender-based violence; Right to education – Right to primary \neducation, Right to be informed, Right to sex education; Right \nto development of children – Stated.\n\nChild marriages – Indian jurisprudence – Constitution of India – \nArticle 51 – India’s obligation as regards international treaties, \nconventions and norms – Discussed.\n\nChild marriage – Age of marriage, age of consent – History \ntraced – Effects, socio-economic determinants of child \nmarriage – Explained.\n\nChild Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 – Salient features – \nDiscussed.\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nUnion of India v. VR Tripathi [2018] 13 SCR 281 : (2019) 14 SCC \n646; Hardev Singh v. Harpreet Kaur [2019] 14 SCR 120 : (2020) \n19 SCC 504; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan [1997] Supp. 3 SCR \n404 : 1997 AIR 3011; Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of \nIndia [1996] Supp. 5 SCR 241 : (1996) INSC 952; Apparel Export \nPromotion Council v. AK Chopra [1999] 1 SCR 117 : (1999) 1 SCC \n759; Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admn. [1980] 3 SCR 855 : \n(1980) 3 SCC 526; Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd. v. Audrey \nD’ Costa [1987] 2 SCR 659 : (1987) 2 SCC 469; Sheela Barse v. \nSecy., Children’s Aid Society [1987] 1 SCR 870 : (1987) 3 SCC \n50, 51]; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India [1997] \n1 SCR 923 : (1997) 3 SCC 433; D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [1996] \nSupp. 10 SCR 284 : (1997) 1 SCC 416, 438; M/s Entertainment \nNetwork (India) Ltd. v. M/s Super Cassette Industries Ltd. [2008] 9 \nSCR 165 : (2008) 13 SCC 30; Ravindra Kumar Dhariwal v. Union \nof India [2021] 13 SCR 823, Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India \n[2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; Joseph Shine v. Union of \nIndia [2018] 11 SCR 765 : (2019) 3 SCC 39; X v. Principal Secretary \n[2022] 12 SCR 246 : (2023) 9 SCC 433; National Legal Services \nAuthority v. Union of India [2014] 5 SCR 119 : (2014) 5 SCC 438; \nKS Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J) v. Union of India [2017] 10 SCR 569 : \n(2017) 10 SCC 1; Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India [2007] \n12 SCR 991 : (2008) 3 SCC 1, Pt. Parmanand Katara v. Union \nof India [1989] 3 SCR 997 : (1989) 4 SCC 286; Paschim Banga \nKhet Majoor Samiti v. State of West Bengal [1996] Supp. 2 SCR \n331 : (1996) 4 SCC 37; Independent Thought v. Union of India \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1521\n\n[2017] 13 SCR 821 : (2017) 10 SCC 800; Sheela Barse II v. Union \nof India [1983] 2 SCR 337 : 1983 AIR 378; Unni Krishnan JP v. \nState of Andhra Pradesh [1993] 1 SCR 594 : (1993) 1 SCC 645; \nSociety for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India \n[2012] 2 SCR 715 : (2012) 6 SCC 1; Avinash Mehrotra v. Union \nof India [2009] 5 SCR 913; Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union \nof India [2011] 5 SCR 353 : (2011) 5 SCC 1; Maharishi Mahesh \nYogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya v. State of M.P. [2013] 13 SCR 464 : \n(2013) 15 SCC 677; Sampurna Behura v. Union of India [2018] 2 \nSCR 940 : (2018) 4 SCC 433; Just Rights for Children Alliance v. \nS Harish [2024] 10 SCR 154 : 2024 INSC 716; Shafin Jahan v. \nAshokan KM [2018] 4 SCR 955 : (2018) 10 SCC 1 – referred to.\n\nProsecutor v. Dominic Ongwen No. ICC-02/04-01/15 A A2 (Ongwen \nTrial Judgment); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality \nv. Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6, CC (South Africa); Artavia \nMurillo ET AL v. Costa Rica Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 257 \n(American Court of Human Rights); A.R. and L.R. v. 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Union of India & Ors.\f1524 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nDocument A/47/38 [Para 11], UN General Assembly, Declaration \non the Elimination of Violence against Women, A/RES/48/104, UN \nGeneral Assembly (20 December 1991), International Covenant \non Civil and Political Rights 1966, The Universal Declaration \nof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), UN \nGeneral Assembly (1966). International Covenant on Civil and \nPolitical Rights, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, \nOHCHR (2013). Realising the Right to Development: Essays in \nCommemoration of 25 Years of the United Nations Declaration \non the Right to Development, UN General Assembly (1966). \nInternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, \nUnited Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, NCPCR (2017). A \nStatistical Analysis of Child Marriage in India, Based on Census, \n2011. Young Lives and National Commission for Protection of \nChild Rights, The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of \nthe Child (1990). OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, IPAS, African \nAlliance for Women’s Reproductive Health Rights – A Handbook \nfor Advocacy in the African Human Rights System (Chapel Hill: \nIPAS, 2006), 29, Maputo Protocol – referred to.\n\nList of Websites\n\nhttps://www.unicef.org/protection/child-marriage, https://www.unicef.\norg/press-releases/115-million-boys-and-men-around-world-married-\nchildren-unicef, https://data.unicef.org/resources/child-marriage-\nlatest-trends-and-future-prospects/, https://www.india.gov.in/rajiv-\ngandhi-scheme-empowerment-adolescent-girls-sabla, https://www.\nmyscheme.gov.in/schemes/bbbp, https://dwcd.karnataka.gov.in/\ninfo-4/Details+of+Government+orders+and+guidelines+for+major+\nschemes+and+programs+of+the+Department/en, https://www.echr.\ncoe.int/european-convention-on-human-rights – referred to.\n\nList of Acts\n\nProhibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006; Constitution of India 1950; \nChild Marriage Restraint Act 1929; Age of Consent Act 1891; \nJuvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; \nProtection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012; Commissions \nfor Protection of Child Rights Act 2005; Legal Services Authorities \nAct 1987; Domestic Violence Act 2005; Penal Code 1860; Bharatiya \nNagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023; \nHindu Widows’ Remarriage Act 1856; Child Marriage Restraint \n(Second Amendment) Act 1938.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1525\n\nList of Keywords\n\nChild marriage; Guidelines for prevention, elimination of child \nmarriage; Constitutional guarantees against Child marriage; \nForced marriages; Child Marriage Prohibition Officers (CMPO); \nChild brides; Male adult; Groom; Patriarchy; Maternal morbidity; \nAdolescent fertility; Girl child; Virginity; Chastity; Early childbirth; \nTeenage pregnancy; Pregnancy complications; Age of consent; \nAge of marriage; Maintenance and residence to the female \ncontracting party; Voidable; Void; Child law; Child betrothals; \nWelfare and beneficial interest of the child; Ministry of Women and \nChild Development; Penalties; Presumption; Offences cognizable \nand non-bailable; Minor woman; Accomplice to the commission of \nchild marriage; Custodians or parents; Injunctions against child \nmarriage; POCSO Act; JJ Act; Child Welfare Committee; Beneficial \nsocial legislation; National Commission for the protection of Child \nRights (NCPCR) and State Commissions for the protection of \nChild Rights (SCPCR); Legal Services Authorities; National Legal \nServices Authority, State Legal Services Authority, District Legal \nServices Authorities, Taluk Legal Services Committees, High Court \nLegal Services Committees and Supreme Court Legal Services \nCommittee; State Schemes; Training schemes; Awareness \nprograms; Financial incentives; International human rights norms; \nUniversal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); International \nConventions; Regional Conventions; Political conventions; \nConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination \nAgainst Women (CEDAW); Convention on the Rights of the Child \n(CRC); African Union; European Union; SAARC; Right to free \nchoice and autonomy; Right to free and informed consent; Right \nagainst gender-based violence; Right to education; Right to primary \neducation; Right to be informed; Right to sex education; Right to \ndevelopment of children; International treaties; Domestic laws; \nInternational human rights standards; Right to self-determination: \nchoice, autonomy and sexuality of children; Right to health; Right \nto childhood: education and development; Community Involvement; \nAwareness Campaigns; Training/Capacity Building; Educational \nand Social Support; Social Welfare Programs; Standard Operating \nProcedures.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1526 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (C) No. 1234 of 2017\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nMs. Mugdha, Kamran Khawja, Satya Mitra, Advs. for the Petitioners.\n\nTushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., \nGurmeet Singh Makker, Ms. Snidha Mehra, Ms. Swarupama \nChaturvedi, Rajat Nair, Pratyush Shrivastava, Sandeep Kumar \nMahapatra, Amrish Kumar Sharma, Manish Kumar, Abhimanyu \nTewari, Ms. Eliza Barr, Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Prashant \nBhagwati, Avijit Mani Tripathi, Anando Mukherjee, Shwetank \nSingh, Ms. Akshata Chhabra, Som Raj Choudhury, Ms. Shrutee \nAradhana, Prashant Kumar, Anand Shankar, Raghvendra Kumar, \nAnand Kumar Dubey, Jainendra Kumar, Aravindh S., Advs. for the \nRespondents.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nDr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI\n\nTable of Contents*\n\nI.\nII.\nIII.\n\nIV.\n\nV.\n\nBackground .......................................................................\nProcedural history and submissions ...............................\nA vicious cycle: socio-economic determinants and \neffects of child marriage ..................................................\nA national reckoning: child marriage in India ................\nA. The age of consent .....................................................\ni. Rukhmabai’s case ..................................................\nii. Phulmoni Dasi’s case .............................................\nB. Regulating the age of marriage ..................................\nC. The Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929 ......................\nContemporary legal framework .......................................\n\nA. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 ............\n\n6\n9\n\n14\n18\n18\n20\n24\n25\n27\n31\n\n31\n\n* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1527\n\ni. Recourse to the wedded: maintenance, residence \nand custody ..........................................................\n\nii. Penalties for child marriage ..................................\n\niii. Preventive measures under the PCMA ................\n\nInjunctions against child marriage ................................\n\nChild Marriage Prohibition Officers ...............................\n\nB. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences \nAct 2012 .......................................................................\n\nC. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of \nChildren) Act 2015 ......................................................\n\nD. The Commissions for Protection of Child Rights \nAct 2005 ......................................................................\n\nE. The Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 .................\n\nF. Policies formulated by the Union Government ......\n\nG. States’ efforts to curb child marriage ........................\n\ni.\n\nTraining schemes .................................................\n\nii. Awareness programs ............................................\n\niii. Financial incentives ...............................................\n\niv. Other initiatives ......................................................\n\nv.\n\nImpact analysis of State schemes ..........................\n\n34\n\n38\n\n45\n\n45\n\n49\n\n53\n\n55\n\n59\n\n61\n\n62\n\n65\n\n65\n\n66\n\n68\n\n69\n\n70\n\nVI.\n\nTraversing frontiers: international human rights \nnorms .................................................................................... 72\n\nA. Universal framework .................................................\n\ni. Universal Declaration of Human Rights ...............\n\nii. Recognition in political conventions ......................\n\niii. Targeted focus: the Convention on the Elimination \nof All Forms of Discrimination against Women and \nthe Convention on the Rights of the Child. ..........\n\nB. Regional framework ..................................................\n\ni.\n\nAfrican Union .........................................................\n\nii. European Union ....................................................\n\niii. SAARC ..................................................................\n\nC. Rights based framework ...........................................\n\ni. Right to free choice and autonomy ..........................\n\n73\n\n73\n\n74\n\n75\n\n77\n\n78\n\n80\n\n83\n\n84\n\n86\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1528 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\na. Right to free and informed consent .................\n\nb. Right against gender-based violence .............\n\nii. Right to education .................................................\n\na. Right to primary education ...............................\n\nb. Right to be informed .......................................\n\nc. Right to sex education ....................................\n\niii. Right to development of children ............................\n\nVII.\n\nIndia’s obligation ...............................................................\n\nVIII. Constitutional guarantees against child marriage .........\n\n87\n\n89\n\n91\n\n91\n\n92\n\n93\n\n94\n\n96\n\n98\n\nA. Right to self-determination: choice, autonomy and \n\nsexuality of children .................................................. 100\n\nB. Right to health ............................................................ 105\n\nC. Right to childhood: education and development ....... 107\n\nD. Reiterating the States’ obligations towards \n\ncombatting child marriage ......................................... 112\n\nIX. Way forward ...................................................................\n\nA. Legal Enforcement .................................................\n\nB. Judicial Measures ..................................................\n\nC. Community Involvement .......................................\n\nD. Awareness Campaigns ..........................................\n\nE. Training/Capacity Building ....................................\n\n116\n\n118\n\n122\n\n124\n\n125\n\n128\n\nF. Educational and Social Support .............................. 131\n\nG. Monitoring and Accountability ............................... 133\n\nH. Technology-Driven Initiatives for Reporting Child \n\nMarriage ........................................................\n\nI.\n\nFunding and Resources ........................................\n\nX.\n\nXI.\n\nSuggestions ..................................................................\n\nConclusion ....................................................................\n\n135\n\n136\n\n138\n\n140\n\n“Sir, I am one of those unfortunate Hindu women, whose hard lot \nit is to suffer the unnameable miseries entailed by the custom of \nearly marriage. This wicked practice has destroyed the happiness of \nmy life. It comes between me and that thing which I prize above all \nothers—study and mental cultivation. Without the least fault of mine \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1529\n\nI am doomed to seclusion; every aspiration of mine to rise above \nmy ignorant sisters is looked upon with suspicion, and is interpreted \nin the most uncharitable manner.” 1\n\n~ Rukhmabai\n\nI. \n\nBackground\n\n1. The Petitioner has approached this court under Article 32 of the \nConstitution to raise an issue which has been debated in our nation \nfor over one and a half centuries. The Petitioner is an NGO that has \nworked extensively against child marriage. The Petitioner’s primary \ngrievance is that despite the enactment of the Prohibition of Child \nMarriage Act 20062, the rate of child marriages in India is alarming. \nThe Petitioner seeks to address the failure of authorities to prevent \nchild marriages. The Petitioner has sought stronger enforcement \nmechanisms, awareness programs, the appointment of Child Marriage \nProhibition Officers, and comprehensive support systems for child \nbrides – including education, healthcare, and compensation, to \nensure the protection and welfare of vulnerable minors. Accordingly, \nthe Petitioner prays for the issuance of effective guidelines. \n\n2. Child marriage is a social evil, and its commission is a criminal offence. \nDespite the near-universal agreement on the ills of child marriage, \nits commission and prevalence have been sobering. Child marriage \nis the phenomenon of children being married before they attain the \nminimum legal age under the law. Globally, children continue – despite \nlegal norms to the contrary – to be married before they reach the \nage of eighteen years. Patriarchy, gender inequality, poverty and \nlack of education and employment lead to child marriage.3 The UN \nConvention on the Rights of the Child regards child marriage as a \nviolation of human rights4. While both sexes are inflicted with the \nviolence of child marriages, the prevalence of child marriage globally \namong boys is one-sixth that of girls.5\n\n1 \n\n2 \n\n3 \n\n4 \n\n5 \n\nExtracted from a letter written by Rukhmabai to the Times of India on 26 June 1885.\n\n‘PCMA’\n\nUNICEF (2023). Child Marriage. https://www.unicef.org/protection/child-marriage; Anita Raj (2010). \nWhen the mother is a child: the impact of child marriage on the health and human rights of girls. Archives \nof Disease in Childhood, 95(11), 931. BJM Journals.\n\nUnited Nations (1989). Convention on the Rights of the Child.\n\nUNICEF (2019). 115 Million Boys and Men Around the World Married as Children. https://www.unicef.\norg/press-releases/115-million-boys-and-men-around-world-married-children-unicef.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1530 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n3. Elimination of child, early and forced marriages has been committed \nto by one hundred and ninety-three nations, including India under \ntarget 5.36 of the Sustainable Development Goals7. Section 28 of \nPCMA defines child marriage as a marriage to which either of the \ncontracting parties is a child. Girls below the age of eighteen and \nboys below the age of twenty-one are deemed to be children under \nthe PCMA.9\n\n4. The 2019-2021 National Family Health Survey-510 pits child marriage \nat 23.3% of girls11 under the age of eighteen and 17.7% of boys12 \nunder the age of twenty-one. The data is based on a survey of \nwomen aged 20-24 and men aged 25-29.This is a reduction from \nthe 2015-2016 NFHS-4 which showed that 26.8% of girls and 20.3% \nof boys marry under the legal age of marriage. Child marriage has \nbeen on a steady decline in India. The prevalence of child marriages \nin India has halved since the enactment of the PCMA in 2006 from \n47% to 27% in 2015-16 and 23.3% in 2019-2021.13 The decline in \nchild marriage in India is in line with the global trend. In the past \ndecade, the proportion of girls married as children has dropped \nby 15%.14 Despite these enormous strides globally and in India, \nno region in the world is on track to attain the SDG-5 target.15 It is \nestimated that the progress in reducing child marriage would need \nto be twelve times faster than the rate observed in the past decade \nto achieve the SDG-5 target.16\n\n6 \n\n7 \n\n8 \n\nUnited Nations (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.\n\n‘SDG’\n\n“2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— \n(a) “child” means a person who, if a male, has not completed twenty-one years of age, and if a female, \nhas not completed eighteen years of age; \n(b) “child marriage” means a marriage to which either of the contracting parties is a child; \n(c) “contracting party”, in relation to a marriage, means either of the parties whose marriage is or is about \nto be thereby solemnised; …”\n\n9 \n\nSection 2(a), PCMA.\n\n10 \n\n‘NFHS-5’\n\n11 Data based on the survey of women ages 20-24, NFHS-5.\n\n12 Data based on the survey of men ages 25-29, NFHS-5.\n\n13 NFHS-3, NFHS-4, NFHS-5.\n\n14 UNICEF (2018). Child Marriage: Latest trends and future prospects. https://data.unicef.org/resources/\n\nchild-marriage-latest-trends-and-future-prospects/. \n\n15 \n\nIbid.\n\n16 Pintu Paul (2020). Child Marriage Among Girls in India: Prevalence, Trends and Socio-Economic \n\nCorrelates. Indian Journal of Human Development, 14(2), 304. Sage Journals.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1531\n\n5. The term child marriage is an oxymoron. A child implies a person \nwhose capacity to make legal decisions is not fully developed. On \nthe other hand, marriage is an institution with legal standing. The law \nseeks to govern the legitimacy of sexual activity and marriage is the \ninstitution in which it is legitimised. Marriage dictates the framework \nrules of permissible and impermissible social behaviours. However, a \nchild is incapable of understanding the broad and serious obligations \nexpected from members of a marital union. Child marriage often \ndeprives children of intellectual, social and psychological development \nand carries life-threatening risks. It therefore comes as a great \ntragedy that the term child marriage is normalised to a point where \nthis blatant paradox is lost on most people.\n\nII. Procedural history and submissions\n\n6. This Court issued notice to the Union of India on 13 April 2018. On \n13 April 2023, this Court further directed the Ministry of Women and \nChild Development to file a status report elucidating the following:\n\n(i) The data collected from various States bearing on the nature \n\nand extent of child marriages; \n\n(ii) Steps taken to implement the provisions of the PCMA; and \n\n(iii) The policies formulated by the Union government to effectuate \n\nthe purpose.\n\nThe Court also directed the Union to consult the States on the \nappointment of Child Marriage Prohibition Officers17 under Section 1618 \n\n17 \n\n18 \n\n‘CMPO’\n\n“16. Child Marriage Prohibition Officers\n(1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint for the whole State, or \nsuch part thereof as may be specified in that notification, an officer or officers to be known as the Child \nMarriage Prohibition Officer having jurisdiction over the area or areas specified in the notification.\n(2) The State Government may also request a respectable member of the locality with a record of social \nservice or an officer of the Gram Panchayat or Municipality or an officer of the Government or any public \nsector undertaking or an office bearer of any non-governmental organisation to assist the Child Marriage \nProhibition Officer and such member, officer or office bearer, as the case may be, shall be bound to act \naccordingly.\n(3) It shall be the duty of the Child Marriage Prohibition Officer\n\n(a) to prevent solemnisation of child marriages by taking such action as he may deem fit;\n(b) to collect evidence for the effective prosecution of persons contravening the provisions of this Act;\n(c) to advise either individual cases or counsel the residents of the locality generally not to indulge in \npromoting, helping, aiding or allowing the solemnisation of child marriages;\n(d) to create awareness of the evil which results from child marriages;\n(e) to sensitise the community on the issue of child marriages;\n(f) to furnish such periodical returns and statistics as the State Government may direct; and\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1532 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nof the PCMA and submit a comprehensive affidavit on whether the \nofficers appointed as CMPOs are given other multifarious duties. \n\n7. The Ministry of Women and Child Development has submitted that it \nhas successfully collected data from all States and Union Territories \nexcept Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Odisha, Sikkim, Jammu \n& Kashmir and Lakshadweep. The data placed on record by the \nMinistry reflects that many child marriages are prevented before their \nsolemnization. The remaining cases are investigated and prosecuted \nunder the law. We shall analyse the data submitted by the Ministry \nof Women and Child Development in the course of this judgment.\n\n8. On 10 July 2024, this Court heard Ms Mugdha, learned counsel \nappearing on behalf of the Petitioner as well as Ms Aishwarya \nBhati, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of \nthe Union of India. While reserving the judgment this Court granted \nliberty to the Petitioner and the Union to make their submissions in \nthe form of a note including suggestions on ways for the effective \nenforcement of PCMA. \n\n9. The Petitioner has submitted that:\n\n(i) Data from NFHS-4 and NFHS-5 reflects that high rate of child \nmarriages have been solemnised. The Petitioner submits that \nthis can be gathered from the rate of adolescent pregnancies \nin multiple States;\n\n(ii) Under Section 16 of PCMA, CMPOs are empowered to \nprevent child marriages. However, findings from HAQ - Centre \nfor Child Rights19 show that CMPOs are often tasked with \nmultiple responsibilities, limiting their capacity to focus on child \nmarriage prevention. Many States designate officials holding \nother substantial roles, such as Child Development Project \n\n(g) to discharge such other functions and duties as may be assigned to him by the State Government.\n(3) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, subject to such conditions and \nlimitations, invest the Child Marriage Prohibition Officer with such powers of a police officer as may be \nspecified in the notification and the Child Marriage Prohibition Officer shall exercise such powers subject \nto such conditions and limitations, as may be specified in the notification.\n(4) The Child Marriage Prohibition Officer shall have the power to move the Court for an order under \nsections 4, 5 and 13 and along with the child under section 3.”\n\n19 HAQ Centre for Child Rights (n.d.). Child Marriage in India: Achievements, Gaps and Challenges, \nResponse to Questions for OHCHR Report on Preventing Child, Early and Forced Marriages for Twenty-\nsixth Session of the Human Rights Council.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1533\n\nOfficers20 or District Welfare Officers as the CMPO. This leads \nto CMPOs prioritising their duties in the discharge of other \nroles – defeating the purpose of appointing CMPOs - as they \nwould not have the time, monetary and human resources to \ncarry out the responsibilities enumerated in the Act. For instance, \nSection 3(1) of the Mizoram Gazette mandates that the District \nSocial Welfare Officer or, in their absence, the CDPO acts as \nthe CMPO;\n\n(iii) Responses to various requests under the Right to Information \nAct 200521 by all States and UTs reveal significant disparities in \nthe appointment and functionality of CMPOs. Of the 36 States \nand UTs, only 23 responded, and only 14 provided substantive \ndata. Most of the responses indicated the transfer of the RTI \nto other departments without concrete answers. Notably, only \nHaryana and Sikkim reported having exclusively appointed \nCMPOs. In contrast, other States and UTs assign these duties \nto already overburdened officers, such as District Magistrates \nor CDPOs, undermining the effectiveness of CMPOs;\n\n(iv) There is a discrepancy between data from the National Crime \nRecords Bureau22 and information obtained from various State \ndepartments in response to RTIs. For example, in Rajasthan, \nthe Department of Women and Child Development reported 573 \nand 567 incidents of child marriage in 2015-16 and 2016-17, \nrespectively, despite only 576 cases being formally recognized \nby authorities in 2016-17; and\n\n(v) Analysis of data further reveals not only a low number of child \nmarriage cases reported to the police compared to NFHS-4 \ndata but also an exceptionally low conviction rate.\n\n10. Therefore, the Petitioner prays for directives to authorities at multiple \nlevels to prevent and address child marriages, particularly during \nmass events, ensure accountability for officials who fail in this duty, \nand appointment of CMPOs with exclusive powers. They also seek \ncollaboration with NGOs, inclusion of child marriage awareness in \n\n20 \n\n21 \n\n22 \n\n‘CDPOs’\n\n‘RTI’\n\n‘NCRB’\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1534 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nschool curriculums, and comprehensive government support for \naffected child brides.\n\n11. The Union of India has submitted that:\n\n(i) Child marriages persist due to societal perceptions and economic \npressures. Girls are often seen as burdens, with early marriage \nviewed as an appropriate option. Additionally, investment in \na girl’s education is frequently regarded as wasteful, leading \nsome families to end schooling early and consider marriage \ninstead. Poverty and structural inequalities, including gender, \ncaste, and class, further drive child marriages;\n\n(ii) The PCMA was introduced to criminalize the facilitation and \nsolemnization of child marriage, aiming to deter this harmful \npractice. Additionally, the Beti Bachao Beti Padhao23 program \naddresses gender-based issues by promoting girls’ education \nand empowerment, thereby supporting delayed marriage and \npromoting a culture that values girls’ rights and opportunities;\n\n(iii) Census data from 2001 and 2011 indicates a decrease in child \n\nmarriage rates;\n\n(iv) Data from NFHS-4 shows a reduction in the percentage of \nwomen aged 15-19 who were mothers or pregnant, from 16% in \n2005-06 to 7.9% in 2015-16. The National Commission for the \nProtection of Child Rights24 has identified 70 high-risk districts \nacross 13 states with the highest child marriage rates, and 52 \nof these districts are covered under the BBBP scheme;\n\n(v) Programs like the Mahila Shakti Kendra aim to reach rural \nwomen and girls, enhancing awareness and equipping them with \nknowledge on gender equality. The program operates District \nLevel Centres for Women across 640 districts to implement \ninitiatives that improve women’s status and address gender-\nbased challenges; and\n\n(vi) States and Union Territories25 have also taken various measures \n\nfor the elimination of child marriages.\n\n23 \n\n24 \n\n25 \n\n‘BBBP’\n\n‘NCPCR’\n\n‘UTs’\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1535\n\nIII. A vicious cycle: socio-economic determinants and effects \n\nof child marriage\n\n12. All child marriages are forced marriages. Many parents wish to \nmarry their girl child early to guard against any aspersions on the \ngirl’s virtue of virginity and to mitigate the economic costs associated \nwith raising a child, payment of dowry and conducting a wedding. \nThe economic factors of child marriage are borne out by studies \nthat reflect that child marriage in India predominantly occurs in less \neducated, rural and poor families.26 Parents in such families are \ninformed by a survivalist and patriarchal mindset that responds to \nsocial, cultural and religious norms and economic necessity. \n\n13. Culturally embedded concepts of virginity and chastity are used to \ncontrol the sexuality of women by men and the family. They are not \njust markers of control but are also made into identifiers of family and \ncommunity honour. By placing an overemphasis on these constructed \nvirtues, a false sense of protectionism is generated to safeguard \ngirls against their ability of self-exploration and to form meaningful \nbonds on their own. Honour, purity, and decisional incapacity are \npresented as the domain of womanhood and its protection is laid \nin the institution of marriage. Parents marry their daughters early \nto meet the prescription of a society rooted in parochial norms of \ncontrolling a woman’s sexuality. While patriarchy promises respect \nto its adherents, it only leads to the subordination of women who \nare deprived of any meaningful avenue to develop their agency \nand exercise their autonomy. The malleability of a girl child and her \ninability to form informed opinions are looked up to as desirable \nqualities. These qualities are understood to earn her favour in \nthe eyes of her in-laws in serving them as they see fit.27 In less \neducated, rural and poor setups, members of the community lack \neffective opportunities and life chances. Investing in the education \nand development of a girl is seen as unworthy and unrealistic. \nThe lack of alternative means for education, employment and skill \ndevelopment for women also incentivises parents to give their \ndaughters away in child marriage. \n\n26 Sanjay Kumar (2020). Trends, Differentials and Determinants of Child Marriage in India: Evidence from \n\nLarge-scale Surveys. Economic & Political Weekly, 55(6), 57. \n\n27 See RC Roy (1888). Child Marriage in India. The North America Review 147(383) 415-423. University of \n\nIowa.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1536 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n14. Parents also believe that their daughters would be saved from \npregnancy out of wedlock and be guarded against unsolicited \nadvances by men if she were to be married early. Many marry their \ndaughters off but delay the consummation of marriage till the age \nof puberty. A gauna ceremony is performed to mark the growing up \nof the daughter and her departure from the parental home to the \nmarital home upon getting menses. The delay in sending a child bride \nto her marital home is informed only by the bodily development of \nthe girl and is unbothered by any other consideration, such as the \nmental and educational development of the person or indeed her own \nchoice in the matter. The compounding of one evil to emerge out of \npatriarchy with another solution rooted in patriarchy has the effect of \nculturally stunting society and depriving children, girls in particular, \nof any avenue to exit from the cycle of generational oppression. \n\n15. Notably, the very causes of child marriage ensure that members of the \nmarital union and their families are stuck in the vicious cycle of social \nand economic oppression. Early marriage in girls, places a burden on \nthem to discharge their duty of giving offspring to the family. Sexual \nactivity within themarital union is unregulated and even encouraged. \nA child, forced to prove her fertility, is exposed to enormous health \nrisks. Her body is mentally and physically unprepared for sexual \nengagement which is forced upon her. Girls in child marriage report \nearly, frequent and unplanned pregnancies which are linked to \nincreased risk of maternal and infant morbidity and mortality. \n\n16. Adolescent mothers are also likely to experience fistula, pregnancy \ncomplications and death during childbirth.28 Women married as \nchildren are likely to have their first child before the age of eighteen \nand are likely to have had atleast three or more childbirths and a \nrepeat childbirth in less than twenty-four months.29 Currently, between \nthe ages of 15 and 19, 7% of women have begun childbearing; 5% of \nwomen have successfully delivered, while 2% of women are pregnant \nwith their first child.30 The rate of teenage pregnancy is higher in \n\n28 Anita Raj, Niranjan Saggurti, Donta Balaiah, Jay G Silverman (2009). Prevalence of child marriage \nand its effect on fertility and fertility-control outcomes of young women in India: a cross-sectional, \nobservational study. Lancet 373 1993-89.\n\n29 \n\nIbid. \n\n30 NFHS-5, 116. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1537\n\nrural India at 8%.31 States which have reported the highest levels of \nteenage pregnancies are Tripura (22%), West Bengal (16%), Andhra \nPradesh (13%), Assam (12%), Bihar (11%) and Jharkhand (10%).32\n\n17. These factors have a detrimental effect on maternal mortality and \nmorbidity. Adolescent mothers are likely to develop lifelong health \nconsequences from sexual encounters and childbearing. They are \nalso more likely to be sterilized at an early age which is indicative \nof a lack of control over their choices.33 Families after bearing the \ndesired number of offspring, force women to undergo sterilization \nto control further reproduction in the family.34 The high rate of \nsterilization found in women married as children would also lead to \nmore unprotected sex which leads to a risk of contracting sexually \ntransmitted diseases.\n\n18. Lack of healthcare access in rural areas and for poor families \nmay lead to further health complications and unsafe medical \nprocedures including unsafe abortions.35 Further, women married as \nchildren are deprived of educational and employment opportunities \nthereby effacing them from public life. Education has an inversely \nproportional effect on child marriage. 87% of married adolescent \ngirls did not attend school.36 In India, women having twelve or more \nyears of schooling tend to marry much later than other women. \nThe median age at first marriage for women between the age \nof 25-49 increases from 17.1 years for women with no schooling \nto 22.8 years for women with twelve or more years of schooling.37 \nThis is in line with studies conducted at a global level which reflect \nthat child marriages are 66% lower among girls who complete \nsecondary education and 80% lower among those who pursue \nhigher education.38\n\n31 \n\nIbid. \n\n32 NFHS-5, 117.\n\n33 Anita Raj (2010). When the mother is a child: the impact of child marriage on the health and human rights \n\nof girls. Archives of Disease in Childhood, 95(11), 931. BJM Journals.\n\n34 \n\n35 \n\nIbid.\n\n Ibid. \n\n36 Government of India (2011). Census of India 2011.\n\n37 NFHS-5, 208.\n\n38 UNICEF (2019). Evidence Review: Child Marriage interventions and research from 2020 to 2022.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1538 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nIV. A national reckoning: child marriage in India\n\nA. The age of consent\n\n19. The trajectory of child marriage in India is stubborn and persistent. \nIt has travelled centuries, and its opposition seems to have only \nincremental successes each time. Still widely prevalent,39 the first \nmovement against child marriage in modern India began in the \nlatter part of the nineteenth century. Social reformers were trying to \nbuild public opinion against child marriage. Two concerns primarily \nanimated the call against child marriages by early reformers. The \nfirst was the high number of early widows.40 Because the rate of \nmortality was low, many girls found themselves in widowhood in the \nearly years of their lives. The second reason behind seeking child \nmarriage reform was to protect young wives against forcible sexual \nintercourse, often by their husbands who were significantly older.41\n\n20. Reformers like Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar had successfully \nadvocated for widow remarriage which was hitherto believed to be \nimpermissible under Hindu law. These efforts led to the enactment \nof the Hindu Widows’ Remarriage Act 1856. However, the demands \nagainst child marriages were not immediately realised. Child marriage, \nan aversion to widow remarriage and the low mortality rate combined \nand morphed into a lethal destructive element in the Indian society.42\n\n21. To address the devastation caused, in particular to women and girls, \nsocial reformers called for raising the minimum age of consent for \nwomen in penal rape statutes. The idea behind the demand for raising \nthe age of consent was to avoid the bodily harm inflicted on girls \nby their often-elderly husbands. A person below the age of consent \ncould not legally consent to any sexual activity thereby throwing any \nsexual conduct within the confines of statutory rape. Such laws already \nexisted in the presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay as \n\n39 NFHS-5.\n\n40 Tahir Mahmood (1980). Marriage Age in India and Abroad – A Comparative Aspect. Journal of Indian Law \n\nInstitute 22, 39.\n\n41 \n\nJaya Sagade. Child Marriage in India: Socio-legal and human Rights Dimensions. Oxford University \nPress, 2nd ed. (2012) 37.\n\n42 Tahir Mahmood (1980). Marriage Age in India and Abroad – A Comparative Aspect. Journal of Indian Law \n\nInstitute 22, 39.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1539\n\nearly as 1828.43 The laws in these presidency towns stipulated the \nage of consent for girls to be eight years and the offence of rape \nagainst a girl below the age of consent was punishable with death.44 \nIn 1847, when the Law Commission was drafting the Indian Penal \nCode it decided, for the first time, to criminalise the consummation \nof marriage by a husband with his underage wife. The initial version \nof the Indian Penal Code 186045 stipulated the age of consent to be \nten years and criminalised marital rape by a husband against his \nwife under the age of consent.46\n\n22. Raising the age of consent was seen as undue interference by the \ncolonial legislature into the personal laws of Indians.47 The movement \ngained a groundswell of support because of efforts by Behramji \nMalabari, a journalist from Bombay, who began publishing his ‘notes’ \nin his newspaper the ‘Indian Spectator’ in 1884.48 He highlighted \nthe consequences of ‘infant marriages’ and ‘enforced widowhoods’ \nby recounting anecdotal accounts of victims. His polemical style of \nreporting sought to appeal to the humanity of the readers.49 Around \nthe same time, two cases came to the fore and exposed the evils \nwhich come out of child marriage. \n\ni. \n\nRukhmabai’s case\n\n23. \n\nIn 1874, at the age of eleven, Rukhmabai was married off to Dadaji \nBhikaji, a nineteen-year-old boy who was a cousin of her step-father. \nOwing to his reformist views, Rukhmabai’s stepfather did not send her \nto live with Dadaji Bhikaji immediately upon attaining puberty. Under \nhis guidance, Rukhmabai grew fond of studying and took plenty of \nadvantage of the rich collection of books he had accumulated. As \n\n43 The Joshi Committee Report, 9.\n\n44 \n\n45 \n\nIbid.\n\n‘IPC’\n\n46 Ss. 375, 376, IPC 1860 (initial version).\n\n47 Tahir Mahmood (1980). Marriage Age in India and Abroad – A Comparative Aspect. Journal of Indian Law \n\nInstitute 22, 39.\n\n48 \n\nInfant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood in India, Being a Collection of Opinions For and Against, \nRecorded by Mr. Behramji M. Malabari from Representative Hindu Gentlemen and Official and Other \nAuthorities, Bombay (1887); Charles H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform, \nPrinceton University Press (1964), 151.\n\n49 Charles H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform, Princeton University Press (1964), \n151; Geraldine Forbes, Women and Modernity: The Issue of Child Marriage in India, Women’s Studies \nInternational Quarterly, 1979, Vol. 2, 407-419.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1540 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nRukhmabai grew into an intelligent and forward-thinking woman, \nDadaji Bhikaji slipped into indolence. This led Rukhmabai to refuse \nto live with Dadaji.50 In 1884, Dadaji instituted a suit for restitution of \nconjugal rights. At the time, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights \nwas enforceable and its violation was punishable with imprisonment. \nRukhmabai opposed the petition on the grounds of social, economic \nand personal incompatibility with Dadaji.51 She also asserted that she \nhad not ‘arrived at years of discretion’ at the time of her marriage \nand therefore she could not be bound by it.52 Justice Pinhey of the \nBombay High Court dismissed the petition and held that Rukhmabai \nwas married before she could consent to such a marriage and cannot \ntherefore be compelled to live with her husband eleven years later \nwithout having cohabited in all this time. He observed that:\n\n“It is a misnomer to call this a suit for the restitution of \nconjugal rights. When a married couple, after cohabitation \nseparate and live apart, either of them can bring a suit \nagainst the other for the restitution of conjugal rights \naccording to the practice in England, and according to the \nlater practice of the Courts in India. But the present suit is \nnot of that character. The parties to the present suit went \nthrough the religious ceremony of marriage eleven years \nago when the defendant was a child of eleven years of age. \nThey have never cohabited. And now that the defendant \nis a woman of twenty-two, the plaintiff asks the Court to \ncompel her to go to his house, that he may complete his \ncontract with her by consummating the marriage, The \ndefendant, being now of full age, objects to going to live \nwith the plaintiff, objects to allowing him to consummate \nthe marriage, objects to ratifying and completing the \ncontract entered into on her behalf by her guardians while \nshe was yet of tender age. It seems to me that it would \nbe a barbarous, a cruel, a revolting thing to do to \ncompel a young lady under those circumstances to \n\n50 Sudhir Chandra. Enslaved Daughters: Colonialism, Law and Women’s Rights. Oxford University Press, \n\n2nd ed (2008), Ch. 1.\n\n51 \n\nJaya Sagade. Child Marriage in India: Socio-legal and human Rights Dimensions. Oxford University \nPress, 2nd ed. (2012) 39.\n\n52 Sudhir Chandra. Enslaved Daughters: Colonialism, Law and Women’s Rights. Oxford University Press, \n\n2nd ed (2008), Ch. 1.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1541\n\ngo to a man whom she dislikes, in order that he may \ncohabit with her against her will; and I am of opinion \nthat neither the law nor the practice of our Courts either \njustified my malting such an order, or even justifies the \nplaintiff in maintaining the present suit.”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n24. The decision of Justice Pinhey was much ahead of its time. At a time \nwhen child marriage was the norm and the legal standard of consent \nwas inapplicable to marital laws, Justice Pinhey’s judgment was a \nbold declaration of the rights of Indian women to make their own life \nchoices. Unfortunately, the success was short-lived. The judgement \nhad caused an uproar in the public and Dadaji filed an appeal before \nthe Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. The Division Bench \nset aside the judgment of Justice Pinhey and directed Rukhmabai \nto join Dadaji within a month at the pain of penalty to undergo six \nmonths’ imprisonment. The court reasoned that incompatibility was \nno defence under Hindu law against a petition for restitution of \nconjugal rights. Firm as she was, Rukhmabai refused to join Dadaji \nand declared that she would subject herself to the maximum penalty \nadmissible under the law, rather than to live with her husband. \nThe sight of a Hindu woman being imprisoned shocked the public \nconscience. Dadaji entered a compromise and did not press for the \nexecution of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights against an \namount of Rs 2000/-. Rukhmabai went on to study medicine in the \nUK and became one of India’s earliest women doctors. \n\n25. Rukhmabai’s defiance was uncharacteristic for her time and \nthreatened, not only child marriage but also the indomitable idea of \na woman’s inferiority. Her assertion of womanhood and agency in \nrefusing to go with a wayward husband whom she was given to in \nmarriage opened up new ways for women to imagine their autonomy. \nWriting to the editor of the Times of India on 26 June 1885, under \nthe pseudo name ‘A Hindu Lady’, Rukhmabai eloquently drew the \ndifferential plains on which the experiences of boys and girls in a \nchild marriage are placed. She wrote:\n\n“The general apathy towards social improvements which \ncharacterizes our people has been telling upon the \nwhole community, but tells most heavily upon the female \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1542 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nsex. Hindu social customs do not entail on men half the \ndifficulties which they entail upon women. Excepting the \ntwo principal difficulties resulting from infant marriage, they \nenjoy full mental and physical freedom. Religion or social \ncustom does not, in any way, interfere with their liberty. \nMarriage does not interpose any insuperable obstacle in \nthe course of their studies. They can marry not only a \nsecond wife, on the death of the first, but have the right \nof marrying any number of wives at one and the same \ntime, or any time they please. If married early, they are not \ncalled upon to go to the house and to submit to the tender \nmercies of a mother-in-law; nor is any restraint put upon \ntheir actions because of their marriage. But the case with \nwomen is the very reverse of this. If the girl is married at \nthe age of eight (as most of them are), her parents are at \nliberty to send her to school till she is ten years old; but, \nif they wish to continue her at school longer, they must \nobtain the express permission of the girl’s mother-in-law. \nBut even in these advanced times, and even in Bombay—\nthe chief centre of civilization—how many mothers-in-law \nare there who send their daughters to school after they \nare ten years old!”53\n\n26. While Rukhmabai’s case ultimately witnessed an out of court \nsettlement and her freedom, another case around the same time \njolted the conscience of the Indian society. \n\nii. Phulmoni Dasi’s case\n\n27. \n\nIn 1889, Phulmoni Dasi was married off at the age of eleven years \nto a thirty-five-year-old man. At age eleven years and three months, \nshe was subjected to marital rape by her husband, Hari Maiti. She \nsuccumbed to haemorrhage from a rupture of the vagina caused by \nher husband.54 The Court ruled that the law of rape was inapplicable \nbecause Phulmani had reached her tenth birthday and was married \nto Hari. The coverage of the case as well as the trial cast a male \n\n53 Extracted from a letter written by Rukhmabai to the Times of India on 26 June 1885.\n\n54 \n\nJaya Sagade. Child Marriage in India: Socio-legal and human Rights Dimensions. Oxford University \nPress, 2nd ed. (2012) 37.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1543\n\nmedical gaze over the body of the deceased victim. Even after her \ndeath, she was subjected to scrutiny to determine her true age and \ngrowth. Questions of her immaturity and puberty were not sought \nas an ornate way to bring her husband to justice but were rather \nasked to defend him.\n\n28. The gruesome case of Phulmani galvanised support for Malabari’s \ncampaign to raise the age of consent. Phulmani’s case silenced \nthe opposition among those who had opposed any legislative \nintervention as a colonial interference in the private sphere and \npractices.55 The death of Phulmani also cut through the lethargy of \na colonial bureaucracy which was reluctant to intervene in matters \nof religion.56 The law member of the Viceroy’s Legislative Council, \nAndrew Scoble, prominently used Phulmani’s case to advocate for \nraising the age of consent by enacting his Bill, namely, the Age of \nConsent Bill. The Bill was an amendment to the IPC and raised the \nage of consent from ten years to twelve years. The Age of Consent \nAct was passed in 1891. The marital rape exception had come to \nthe defence of Hari. Raising the age of consent by two years meant \nthat any sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of twelve would \nbe statutory rape regardless of the marital status of the aggressor \nwith the victim. \n\nB. Regulating the age of marriage\n\n29. \n\nIn 1921, the League of Nations held a conference on the trafficking \nof women and recommended raising the age of consent to twenty-\none years for girls. In 1922, Bakshi Sohanlal unsuccessfully tried to \nraise the age of consent to 14 by introducing a Bill. Bills that sought \nto raise the age of consent were introduced and thrown out regularly \nfor five years thereafter. Among these bills was an Age of Marriage \nBill which was sought to be introduced by Ranglal Jajodia in 1924 \nin the Legislative Assembly.57 The Bill prescribed a minimum age \nbefore which no marriage could take place. This was a shift from the \n\n55 Ratna Kapur & Brenda Cossman (1996). Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with Law in India.\nSage Publications 49-50; Charles H. Heimsath (1964). Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform.\nPrinceton University Press 163-165.\n\n56 \n\n57 \n\nIshita Pande (2020). Sex, Law, and the Politics of Age Child Marriage in India, 1891–1937. Cambridge \nUniversity Press 32.\n\nJoshi Committee Report, 15; Also see Tahir Mahmood (1980). Marriage Age in India and Abroad – \nA Comparative Aspect. Journal of Indian Law Institute 22, 41.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1544 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\napproach taken by other reformers and legislators of not interfering \nwith the age of marriage but to merely protect girls from forced sex \nby raising the age of consent in penal laws. While this Bill was never \nintroduced, a similar Bill was introduced by Haribilas Sarda in 1927 \nafter another failed attempt to raise the age of consent by Hari Singh \nGour. The ‘Sarda Bill’ was circulated widely to attract opinions. The \nSelect Committee altered various provisions, and the Government \neventually appointed the Age of Consent Committee under the \nchairmanship of MV Joshi. The consideration of the Sarda Bill was \npostponed till the report of the Joshi Committee was received.58\n\n30. The terms of reference of the Joshi Committee did not include \nthe examination of the age of marriage. However, the committee \nfound it impossible to delink the question of marriage age with the \nquestion of age of consent for cohabitation.59 The committee heard \nover twelve hundred oral witnesses out of which one hundred and \nthirty four witnesses strongly opposed any law regulating the age of \nmarriage. The committee submitted its report dated 20 June 1929. It \nrecommended that the age of consent be raised to fifteen years under \npenal statutes as well as the enactment of a law which penalizes \nmarriage below the age of fourteen years.60 The committee was of \nthe opinion that it would be easier to regulate the age of marriage \nby law than to regulate the consummation of marriage after it had \nalready taken place. The committee reasoned that marriage was an \nact of public knowledge and many persons had a chance to notice \nthe age of the couple. Its visibility would allow for its regulation. It was \nalso thought that regulating marriages would avoid the irritation that \nwould follow from the strict regulatory interference of consummation \nwithin a marital union.61\n\n31. After much debate, the Sarda Bill was enacted as the Child Marriage \nRestraint Act 1929 and received the assent of the Governor-General \non 1 October 1929 and was to come into force on 1 April 1930 \nthroughout British India. The Act applied to all religions. The Act \ncontinued to govern the law on the age of marriage till Parliament \nenacted the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006. \n\n58 \n\n59 \n\n60 \n\n61 \n\nJoshi Committee Report, 8.\n\nIbid, 8.\n\nIbid, 196. \n\nIbid, 174, para 379.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1545\n\nC. The Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929\n\n32. The law in colonial times had cast a male gaze upon the women \nand girls of India. It did so by making women the object of the \nlegislation but never its spectator. Women and their bodies were \nmade a subject of legislation without any meaningful attempt to \nattract the perspectives of women, their experiences or their desires. \nThe law did not concern itself with issues of autonomy, agency and \nindividualised dignity of a woman. This had been manifested from \nthe days of the reform movement on the age of consent laws. As Dr \nJaya Sagade argues in her book Child Marriage in India: Socio-legal \nand Human Rights Dimensions, the law on consent was nailed purely \nto the physical capability of women and alien from their aspirations \nor choices. She states that:\n\n“It is unfortunate that all opinions agreed on a definition \nof consent that was nailed to a purely physical capability, \nentirely dissociated from free issues like choice of partner, \nsexual, emotional, or mental compatibility or other social \nconsiderations such as the girl’s personal development. \nConsent was made into a biological category, a stage when \nthe female body was ready to accept sexual penetration \nwithout serious harm. The only difference lay in when this \nstage was reached.”62\n\n33. The Child Marriage Restraint Act 192963 was a first to cover all \nchildren – male and female – within its gamut. The age of consent \nlaws was enacted through a clause in the penal rape statutes which \nonly sought to legislate on girls. The CMRA on the other hand was \napplicable to both boys and girls. \n\n34. Section 2(a) of the CMRA stipulated that a “child” means a person \nwho, if male, is below the age of eighteen, and if female, is below \nthe age of fourteen. Section 2(d) defined a “minor” to be any person \nbelow the age of eighteen. All marriages in which either of the parties \nwas a ‘child’ under Section 2(a) was stipulated to be a “child marriage” \nunder Section 2(b). The CMRA stipulated that child marriage is an \noffence punishable with simple imprisonment which may extend to \n\n62 \n\nJaya Sagade. Child Marriage in India: Socio-legal and human Rights Dimensions. Oxford University \nPress, 2nd ed. (2012) 41.\n\n63 \n\n‘CMRA’\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1546 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\none month or a fine of one thousand rupees or both. Grooms between \nthe ages of eighteen and twenty-one were to be punished only with \na fine and no imprisonment could be awarded to them. The CMRA \noriginally did not allow for the punishment of a ‘child’ for the offence \nof child marriage. The Act only penalised child marriages which had \nalready taken place. However, it did not stipulate any provision for \nthe prevention of child marriage. \n\n35. \n\nIn 1938, the CMRA was amended to stipulate that a court may issue \nan injunction prohibiting a child marriage from taking place. However, \nbefore issuing such an injunction, the court was required to give prior \nnotice to the person sought to be injuncted as well as an opportunity \nto show cause against the issuance of the injunction.64 The CMRA \nfurther underwent substantive amendments in 1949. \n\n36. The amendment increased the age for a girl child to fifteen years and \nincreased penalties for all categories of offenders. A chart of all the \npenalties under the CMRA and its amendments is produced below:\n\nOffender\n\nPenalty under the\n\nGroom between the \nages of 18-21\n\nOriginal CMRA\n\n1949 Amendment\n\nFine of upto Rs 1,000/- Simple imprisonment \nupto 15 days or/and a \nfine upto Rs 1,000/-\n\nGroom above the age \nof 21\n\nSimple imprisonment \nupto 1 month or/and fine \nupto Rs 1,000/-\n\nSimple imprisonment \nupto 3 months and fine\n\nOne who knowingly \nperforms, conducts or \ndirects child marriage\n\nSimple imprisonment \nupto 1 month or/and fine \nupto Rs 1,000/-\n\nSimple imprisonment \nupto 3 months and fine\n\nO n e w h o , b e i n g i n \ncharge of a minor – \npromotes, permits or \nfailed to prevent the child \nmarriage\n\nOne who knowingly \nviolates an injunction \nagainst a child marriage\n\nSimple imprisonment \nupto 1 month or/and fine \nupto Rs 1,000/-\n\nSimple imprisonment \nupto 3 months and fine\n\nImprisonment of either \ndescription upto three \nmonths or/and fine upto \nRs 1,000/-\n\nImprisonment of either \ndescription upto three \nmonths or/and fine upto \nRs 1,000/-\n\n64 Section 12, CMRA.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1547\n\n37. None of these offences were cognizable in nature. The offences \nunder  the CMRA were only made party cognizable through an \namendment in 1978. Accordingly, the offences under the CMRA \nwere to be treated as cognizable for (i) the purpose of investigation, \nand (ii) for the purpose of matters other than (a) Section 42 of CrPC \nand (b) the arrest of a person without a warrant or without an order \nof the Magistrate. By the same amendment, Parliament also raised \nthe age of marriage to eighteen years for girls and twenty-one years \nfor boys. This time too, legislative intervention was largely animated \nby a concern for population control rather than the autonomy or \nagency of children. The Statement of Objects and Reasons expressly \nstated the intent behind the amendment. It states as follows:\n\n“Prefatory Note-Statement of Objects and Reasons. \nThe Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, was enacted with \na view to prevent child marriages, namely, a marriage to \nwhich either of the contracting parties is under a specified \nage. Originally, the age limit for a male was eighteen \nyears and for a female fourteen years. The age limit was \nsubsequently raised in the case of females from fourteen \nto fifteen by the Amending Act 41 of 1949. Violation of the \nprovisions of the Act is made punishable.\n\n2.⁠\n⁠ The question of increasing the minimum age of \nmarriage for males and females has been considered \nin the present context when there is an urgent need to \ncheck the growth of population in the country. Such \nincrease of the minimum age of marriage will result in \nlowering the total fertility rate on account of letter span \nof married life. It will also result in more responsible \nparenthood and in better health of the mother and \nchild. A Bill introduced for this purpose in the Lok Sabha \non 25th August, 1976, lapsed with the dissolution of the \nLok on 18th January, 1977. The matter has examined in \nall its aspects again.\n\n⁠ The Bill seeks to amend the Child Marriage Restraint \n3.⁠\nAct, 1929, to increase the minimum age of marriage from \nfifteen to sixteen for females and from eighteen to twenty-\none for males and to make consequential amendments \nin the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the Indian Christian \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1548 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nMarriage Act, 1872. It is also being provided that offences \nunder the Child Marriage Restraint Act may be investigated \nupon by a police officer under the Code of Criminal \nProcedure as if it were a cognizable offence. The police \nofficer shall, however, not have the power to arrest without \na warrant or an order of a Magistrate.”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n38. The CMRA did not stipulate that child marriages would be void, \nvoidable or invalid. It did not affect the validity of child marriages and \ndid not prohibit the marriage of a girl to an old man. This remained \nunchanged till Parliament repealed the CMRA and enacted the \nProhibition of Child Marriage Act 2006.\n\nV. Contemporary legal framework\n\nA. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006\n\n39. The National Commission for Women65 in its annual report for \nthe year 1995-1996 proposed to amend the CMRA. It proposed \nthat (i) the government should appoint Child Marriage Prevention \nOfficers;  (ii) punishments under CMRA be made more stringent; \n(iii) child marriages be declared void; (iv) a penal obligation be \nimposed on anyone attending a child marriage; and (v)all offences \nunder the CMRA must be made cognizable without any qualification.66 \nThe NCW further recommended that systematic efforts to spread \nawareness about the evils of child marriage be carried out.67\n\n40. \n\nIn 2001-2002, the National Human Rights Commission68 released \nits annual report which inter alia reviewed the CMRA. The NHRC \nproposed certain amendments to the CMRA to (i) provide for higher \npenalties for violation of the CMRA; (ii) stipulate action against \norganisers or associations who organise child marriages at a mass \nscale; (iii) make child marriages voidable at the instance of the minor \nparty within two years of the party attaining the age of majority;  \n\n65 \n\n‘NCW’\n\n66 Annual Report 1995-1996, National Commission for Women, 3.\n\n67 Annual Report 1995-1996, National Commission for Women, 3.\n\n68 \n\n‘NHRC’\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1549\n\n(iv) provide for the maintenance of a minor girl by her husband \nor guardian till she remarries; and (v) stipulate for the return of all \ndowry and gifts exchanged during the child marriage.69 The report \nalso stressed on the need to initiate social action by networking with \nNGOs in the areas where child marriages were prevalent in order to \nsensitize community leaders against such marriages.70\n\n41. On the basis of the two reports, the Government of India consulted \nthe States and the Union Territories. Accordingly, the Parliament \ndecided to repeal the CMRA and enact the PCMA. The Statement \nof Objects and Reasons of the PCMA stated the salient features of \nthe Act as follows:\n\n“4. The salient features of the Bill are as follows:– \n\n(i) To make a provision to declare child marriage as \nvoidable at the option of the contracting party to the \nmarriage, who was a child.\n\n(ii) To provide a provision requiring the husband or, if he \nis a minor at the material time, his guardian to pay \nmaintenance to the minor girl until her remarriage.\n\n(iii) To make a provision for the custody and maintenance \n\nof children born of child marriages\n\n(iv) To provide that notwithstanding a child marriage \nhas been annulled by a decree of nullity under \nthe proposed section 3, every child born of such \nmarriage, whether before or after the commencement \nof the proposed legislation, shall be legitimate for all \npurposes.\n\n(v) To empower the district court to add to, modify or \nrevoke any order relating to maintenance of the \nfemale petitioner and her residence and custody or \nmaintenance of children, etc.\n\n(vi) To make a provision for declaring the child marriage \n\nas void in certain circumstances.\n\n69 Annual Report 2001-2002, National Human Rights Commission, 50-51, 336-348.\n\n70 Annual Report 2001-2002, National Human Rights Commission, 51.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1550 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n(vii) To empower the courts to issue injunctions prohibiting \nsolemnisation of marriages in contravention of the \nprovisions of the proposed legislation.\n\n(viii) To make the offences under the proposed legislation \nto be cognizable for the purposes of investigation \nand for other purposes.\n\n(ix) To provide for appointment of Child Marriage \nPrevention Officers by the State Government.\n\n(x) To empower the State Governments to make rules \n\nfor effective administration of the legislation.\n\n5. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.”\n\n42. The PCMA retained the age of marriage as twenty-one for males \nand eighteen for females.71 The Act provides for governing parties \nto a child marriage after its commission, punitive measures against \noffenders of the Act as well as provisions for the prevention of \nchild marriage. We shall analyse the scheme of the PCMA in three \nparts. In Part i, we shall analyse the provisions that seek to protect \nwomen married as girls as well as children born in child marriages \n(Sections 3 to 8 of the PCMA). Having analysed the remedies of \nparties upon the commission of a child marriage, we shall analyse \nthe provisions which penalise the commission of child marriages in \nPart ii. Lastly, in Part iii we shall analyse the provisions which are \naimed at preventing child marriages. \n\ni. \n\nRecourse to the wedded: maintenance, residence and \ncustody\n\n43. The PCMA prescribes that a petition under the Act may be filed \nbefore a district court having jurisdiction over the place where \n(i) the defendant resides; or (ii) the child resides; or (iii) the marriage \nwas solemnized; or (iv) the parties last resided together; or (v) the \npetitioner is residing at the time of filing the petition. Such a court \nshall have jurisdiction to deal and decree the following reliefs:\n\n(i) \n\nto annul the marriage and issue a decree of nullity under Section \n3 of the PCMA;\n\n71 Section 2(a), PCMA.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1551\n\n(ii) \n\nto provide for maintenance and residence to the female \ncontracting party to a child marriage under Section 4; and \n\n(iii) \n\nfor the custody and maintenance of children of a child marriage \nunder Section 5.\n\n44. The PCMA diverges from the CMRA in its approach towards the \nvalidity of child marriages as well as its enforcement. The PCMA \nprescribes that a child marriage is voidable at the instance of the \ncontracting party who was a child at the time of the marriage.72 \nSection 3 stipulates that a petition for annulling a child marriage by a \ndecree of nullity may be filed before the district court. Such a person \nmust exercise the right to file the petition within two years of attaining \nthe age of majority.73 In case the party is still a minor, the petition may \nbe filed by their guardians or next friend along with the CMPO.74 In \naddition to entitling the minor contracting party to a child marriage \nto a decree of nullity, it also requires the district court to direct both \nparties to the marriage to return all money, valuables, ornaments \nand other articles exchanged as gifts at the time of marriage.75 In \ndoing so, the district court must afford an opportunity to the parties \nagainst whom the order of returning gifts is made.76\n\n45. The PCMA further empowers the district court to provide for the \nmaintenance and residence of the female contracting party to the \nchild marriage. The court may pass an interim or final order directing \nthe grant of maintenance to the female contracting party by the male \ncontracting party.77 Where the male contracting party is a minor, the \ncourt may issue a direction to his parents or guardians to maintain \nthe female contracting party.78 The court may grant such a relief till \nthe female contracting party remarries.79 In computing the amount of \nmaintenance, the court shall have regard to the needs of the child, \nthe lifestyle enjoyed by the child during marriage and the means of \n\n72 Section 3, PCMA. \n\n73 Section 3(3), PCMA. \n\n74 Section 3(2), PCMA. \n\n75 Section 3(4), PCMA. \n\n76 Section 3(4), PCMA.\n\n77 Section 4(1), PCMA. \n\n78 Section 4(1), PCMA.\n\n79 Section 4(1), PCMA.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1552 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nincome of the paying party.80 Clause (4) of Section 4 empowers the \ndistrict court to make a suitable order for the residence of the female \ncontracting party to a child marriage who files an annulment petition. \n\n46. Section 5 of the PCMA provides for the custody and maintenance of \nchildren of child marriages. The PCMA is oriented on the universal \nprincipal of child law, which is that the welfare and beneficial interest \nof the child has to be paramount. The provision governs the custody \nof the child, the visitation rights of parents as well as the maintenance \nof a child born from a child marriage. The district court is empowered \nto make an order as to the custody of a child born from a child \nmarriage81 keeping in mind the welfare and best interest of the child.82 \nThe court may also pass an order granting the other party access \nto the child in a manner that serves its best interest.83 The child or \nits parents or guardians may also be awarded maintenance by the \ncourt.84 Therefore, the PCMA has sought to ensure the upkeep and \nprotection of women and children in families which emerge from a \nchild marriage. \n\n47. One of the critiques against rendering child marriages void is that \nwomen and children would lose the protective shield of the law, which \naccrues to them under a valid marriage. The PCMA has repelled this \ncriticism by specifically providing for the maintenance of women and \nchildren in a child marriage notwithstanding a decree of nullity being \ngranted under Section 3 of the Act. The Act further protects a child \nborn from a child marriage by declaring that such a child, begotten \nor conceived of a child marriage, shall be deemed legitimate for all \npurposes under the law.85\n\n48. The maintenance of women and children has been a feature of our \nfamily laws. It recognises the inherent maldistribution of economic \nresources and life opportunities between men and women. It further \nrecognises the innocence of the children who end up in broken families \ndue to no fault of theirs. The status of these universally recognised \nvulnerable persons is further made tragic in a child marriage because \n\n80 Section 4(2), PCMA.\n\n81 Section 5(1), PCMA.\n\n82 Section 5(2), PCMA.\n\n83 Section 5(3), PCMA.\n\n84 Section 5(4), PCMA.\n\n85 Section 6, PCMA.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1553\n\n49. \n\nall child marriages are forced marriages. Children are made to enter \ninto matrimony before arriving at the age of intelligent consent and \nare often unaware of the responsibilities, duties and rights which \naccrue to members of the marital union in the eyes of the law as \nwell as society. When the party to a child marriage ends up in a \nsituation which is not oftheir making, the vulnerability of the child \nborn from such marriage is heightened. \n\nIn Union of India v. VR Tripathi,86 a two-Judge Bench of this Court \nspeaking through one of us (DY Chandrachud, J) has opined that the \nlegitimacy of a child is a matter of the dignity of the child. When the \nlaw recognises a child as legitimate, it aims to shield the child from \nthe legal fallout of illegitimacy as well as the social stigma attached \nto illegitimate children. It is impermissible to treat children of void \nmarriages, who are statutorily legitimate, as illegitimate. Section 6 \nof the PCMA therefore serves to afford dignity to children born to \nparents who had entered into a child marriage. A decree of nullity \nof marriage passed under Section 3 shall not affect the legitimacy \nof the child born from such a marriage. \n\n50. Section 7 of the PCMA allows the district court to add to, modify or \nrevoke any order which it passes on the maintenance, residency of \nthe woman or the custody and maintenance of the child born from \na child marriage based on change in circumstances. Such a change \nin the order of the court may be made at any time, either during the \npendency of the petition or after it has been disposed of. \n\n51. These provisions seek to safeguard the interest of the vulnerable \nstakeholders involved in a child marriage, namely, a child bride and \nany child born from a child marriage. Parliament, having safeguarded \nthese rights has further stipulated punishments for violation of the \nPCMA and solemnization of child marriages.\n\nii. Penalties for child marriage\n\n52. The PCMA prescribes punishment for three classes of persons, \nnamely, (i) an adult groom in a child marriage,87 (ii) persons \ninvolved in the solemnization of child marriage88 and (iii) persons \n\n86 \n\n(2019) 14 SCC 646.\n\n87 Section 9, PCMA.\n\n88 Section 10, PCMA.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1554 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nwho promote or permit the solemnization of child marriage.89 The \nmaximum punishment prescribed for all three classes is rigorous \nimprisonment of two years and a fine of rupees one lakh. Unlike \nmany social legislations, the PCMA does not prescribe a mandatory \nminimum punishment for committing an offence under the Act. The \neffect of this is that a judge would be at liberty to nominally punish \nthe accused who are convicted under the Act. The non-prescription \nof a minimum mandatory sentence has led to ineffective enforcement \nof the PCMA. \n\n53. Section 15 of the PCMA stipulates that all offences under the Act are \ncognizable and non-bailable. This is a deviation from CMRA which \ninitially did not make the offence of child marriage cognizable. The \neffect of this was to make the prevention of child marriage entirely \ncontingent on the private initiative of citizens to file a complaint before \nthe magistrate and be examined under oath. The CMRA also initially \nrequired a security bond to be executed by the complainant to sustain \ntheir bona fides. This requirement made the enforcement of the Act \nillusory. The requirement of executing a mandatory security bond \nwas eliminated by the Child Marriage Restraint (Second Amendment) \nAct 1938. The offences under the CMRA were further made partially \ncognizable through an amendment in 1978. Section 15 of PCMA \nis therefore a welcome step which aims to better enforce the Act. \n\n54. Section 9 of the PCMA prescribes that a man above the age of \neighteen, who enters into a marriage with a minor girl is liable to be \npunished with rigorous imprisonment which may extend to two years or \nwith a fine which may extend to one lakh rupees or both. The court is \naccordingly empowered to penalise an accused under Section 9 with \nimprisonment or a fine or both. The court is at liberty to exercise its \noptions of imposing punishment based on the gravity of the offence, \nthe circumstance of the marriage and the socio- economic power \nof the male over his child bride. In many instances, the marriage \nbetween a child bride and aged groom occurs at the instance of \nthe groom incentivising the family of the girl to marry her off. The \nprovision deals with such situations but also recognises the relative \nlack of involvement of a man who may be a young adult and enters \ninto matrimony with a minor. The option of imprisonment and fine is \n\n89 Section 11, PCMA.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1555\n\na deviation from the other two penal provisions in the PCMA which \nmandate both, a fine and imprisonment, to be imposed on guilty \nconvicts. The rationale of this option is to allow the judge a degree \nof latitude in assessing the culpability of the groom under Section 9 \nand impose a proportionate criminal sentence.\n\n55. Despite the age of majority for a man to enter into a marriage being \nprescribed as twenty-one under Section 2(a) of the Act, his criminal \nliability for entering into a child marriage with a minor woman begins \nat eighteen. Therefore, two positions of law emerge from Section 9. \nFirst, a woman, regardless of her age is not liable for entering into \na child marriage. Second, a man above the age of eighteen but \nunder the age of twenty one is liable for marrying a girl who is under \nthe age of eighteen. The legislative intent behind making a groom \nliable for entering child marriage is to recognise the relative control \nof the agency that a groom may have in relation to his marriage as \nopposed to a girl.\n\n56. \n\nIn Hardev Singh v. Harpreet Kaur90 the appellant was under the \nage of twenty-one and had married a woman who was twenty-three \nyears old. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana directed an FIR \nto be registered under Section 9 of the PCMA against the wife for \nentering into a marriage with a man who was a minor under the \nPCMA. A two-Judge bench of this Court set aside the judgment \nof the High Court and held that the PCMA does not prescribe any \npunishment for an adult woman who marries a male child. This \nCourt held that the Act recognises women as a vulnerable class \nand seeks to punish adult men who marry child brides. The Court \nfurther rejected the literal interpretation of Section 9 which would \nmake a man between the ages of eighteen and twenty one who \nmarries an adult woman liable for child marriage. Therefore, no child \nas defined in Section 2(a) of the PCMA is liable under Section 9 for \nmarrying an adult person.\n\n57. Section 10 of PCMA stipulates that a person who performs, conducts, \ndirects or abets any child marriage shall be punished with rigorous \nimprisonment which may extend to two years and shall be liable to \na fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. The provision, unlike \n\n90 \n\n[2019] 14 SCR 120 : (2020) 19 SCC 504\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1556 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nSection 9, does not allow the court to choose the option of imposing a \nfine or sentencing a term of imprisonment or both. A court adjudicating \nunder Section 10 is mandated to impose a sentence of imprisonment \nas well as impose a fine.\n\n58. The provision is expansive and would govern any accomplice to \nthe commission of child marriage. This would include the priest who \nperforms the marriage, any family member, relative or person at \nwhose direction the marriage takes place or anyone who abets it. \nThe provision stipulates a defence available to any accused under \nSection 10 which is that a person must demonstrate that he had \nreasonable belief that the marriage was not a child marriage. The \ninbuilt defence stipulated in the provision is to safeguard any person \nwho may unwittingly become a part of the commission of the offence \nof child marriage. \n\n59. Section 11 of the PCMA is a catchall provision against the promotion \nor permitting of child marriage by those in charge of a minor party \nto the marriage. The provision reads as follows:\n\n“11. Punishment for promoting or permitting \nsolemnisation of child marriages.—\n\n(1) Where a child contracts a child marriage, any person \nhaving charge of the child, whether as parent or guardian \nor any other person or in any other capacity, lawful or \nunlawful, including any member of an organisation or \nassociation of persons who does any act to promote the \nmarriage or permits it to be solemnised, or negligently fails \nto prevent it from being solemnised, including attending or \nparticipating in a child marriage, shall be punishable with \nrigorous imprisonment which may extend to two years and \nshall also be liable to fine which may extend up to one \nlakh rupees: Provided that no woman shall be punishable \nwith imprisonment. \n\n(2) For the purposes of this section, it shall be presumed, \nunless and until the contrary is proved, that where a minor \nchild has contracted a marriage, the person having charge \nof such minor child has negligently failed to prevent the \nmarriage from being solemnised.”\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1557\n\n60. Section 11 stipulates that any person having charge of the child– \nwho promotes or permits a child marriage or fails to prevent it – is \nliable to rigorous imprisonment which may extend to two years and \na fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. Similar to the provision \nunder Section 10 of the PCMA, Section 11 also prescribes a mandate \nto the sentencing court to impose a sentence of imprisonment as \nwell as a fine. The provision uses the word ‘and’ between the two \npunishments and the judge does not have the liberty to pick a certain \npunishment to the exclusion of the other. The person liable under \nSection 11 may be the parents of the child or a guardian or any other \nperson or organisation. Further, the means by which a person may \nhave the charge of the child is immaterial as the provision stipulates \nthat the charge may be ‘lawful or unlawful’. The section seeks to \npenalise any person or organisation involved in a child marriage. Its \nexpansive scope allows for the prosecution of any person who may \nhave unlawfully taken the custody of a child and thereafter promoted, \npermitted or failed to prevent the child marriage. Section  11 also \ndeals with organisations, such as orphanages or schools or hostels, \nwhich may have the charge of a child and under whose watch the \nchild is married off. \n\n61. The intention of the provision is to place an obligation on any person \nwho has the charge of a child to ensure that the offence of child \nmarriage is not committed. The provision not only penalises the \nactive participation of the person having charge of a child but also \npenalises the omission on the part of such a person to prevent child \nmarriage. The provision recognises that children lack the ability to \nform intelligent consent and may not necessarily know the full ambit \nof the activity which they are about to commit. Further, children may \nlack the ability and grit to defend themselves and refuse to participate \nin the marriage against the pleasure of their custodians or parents. \n\n62. Clause (2) of Section 11 raises a presumption. It stipulates that any \nperson, who is in charge of a child who was married off, is presumed to \nhave negligently failed to prevent the child marriage. The presumption \nis a rebuttable one and may be defended if the person proves that \nhe could not have prevented the marriage or failed at preventing it, \nhaving tried to do so to the best of their ability. This principle is only \napplicable to an offence under Section 11. \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1558 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n63. Having stipulated penal provisions for the commission of child \nmarriage in Sections 9, 10 and 11, the PCMA further stipulates that \nany child marriage which occurs as a result of another criminal act \nis void ab initio.91 Section 12 stipulates three instances in which the \nmarriage of a child is null and void. These instances are where a \nminor child – \n\n(i) \n\nis taken or enticed out of the keeping of the lawful guardian;92 or\n\n(ii) compelled by force or by any deceitful means induced to go \n\nfrom any place;93 or\n\n(iii) \n\nis sold for the purpose of marriage; and made to go through a \nform of marriage or if the minor is married after which the minor \nis sold or trafficked or used for immoral purposes.94\n\n64. Section 12 provides that the marriage in these instances is non est in \nlaw and has no legal standing from its inception. The declaration of \nthe provision is mandatory and removes the option from the hands of \nthe party to consent to the marriage after its commission. Therefore, \nall marriages done by taking or enticing a child, compelling by force \nor deceit or selling are void. Section 12(c) further stipulates that \nwhere a child marriage occurs and after the marriage, the minor is \nsold or trafficked or used for immoral purposes is void. Therefore, \neven when the commission of marriage was not through force or \ndeceit the marriage would be void from the inception based on the \nacts performed after the marriage takes place. \n\niii. \n\n Preventive measures under the PCMA\n\n65. The PCMA seeks to eliminate child marriages by deterrence and \nprevention. The Act designed the preventive measures in two ways, \ni.e., (i) by an injunction against the commission of child marriage, \nand (ii) by the appointment of CMPOs. We shall analyse the scheme \nof the PCMA in regard to both of these aspects below.\n\n91 Section 12, PCMA.\n\n92 Section 12(a), PCMA.\n\n93 Section 12(b), PCMA.\n\n94 Section 12(c), PCMA.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1559\n\nInjunctions against child marriage\n\n66. Sections 13 and 14 of the PCMA deal with injunctions against child \n\nmarriage. Section 13 reads as follows:\n\n“13. Power of court to issue injunction prohibiting \nchild marriages.—\n\n(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained \nin this Act, if, on an application of the Child Marriage \nProhibition Officer or on receipt of information through \na complaint or otherwise from any person, a Judicial \nMagistrate of the first class or a Metropolitan Magistrate \nis satisfied that a child marriage in contravention of this \nAct has been arranged or is about to be solemnised, such \nMagistrate shall issue an injunction against any person \nincluding a member of an organisation or an association \nof persons prohibiting such marriage. \n\n(2) A complaint under sub-section (1) may be made by any \nperson having personal knowledge or reason to believe, \nand a non-governmental organisation having reasonable \ninformation, relating to the likelihood of taking place of \nsolemnisation of a child marriage or child marriages. \n\n(3) The Court of the Judicial Magistrate of the first \nclass or the Metropolitan Magistrate may also take suo \nmotu cognizance on the basis of any reliable report or \ninformation.\n\n(4) For the purposes of preventing solemnisation of \nmass child marriages on certain days such as Akshaya \nTrutiya, the District Magistrate shall be deemed to be the \nChild Marriage Prohibition Officer with all powers as are \nconferred on a Child Marriage Prohibition Officer by or \nunder this Act. \n\n(5) The District Magistrate shall also have additional powers \nto stop or prevent solemnisation of child marriages and \nfor this purpose, he may take all appropriate measures \nand use the minimum force required. \n\n(6) No injunction under sub-section (1) shall be issued \nagainst any person or member of any organisation or \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1560 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nassociation of persons unless the Court has previously \ngiven notice to such person, members of the organisation \nor association of persons, as the case may be, and has \noffered him or them an opportunity to show cause against \nthe issue of the injunction: \n\nProvided that in the case of any urgency, the Court shall \nhave the power to issue an interim injunction without giving \nany notice under this section. \n\n(7) An injunction issued under sub-section (1) may be \nconfirmed or vacated after giving notice and hearing the \nparty against whom the injunction was issued. \n\n(8) The Court may either on its own motion or on the \napplication of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter an \ninjunction issued under sub-section (1). \n\n(9) Where an application is received under sub-section (1), \nthe Court shall afford the applicant an early opportunity \nof appearing before it either in person or by an advocate \nand if the Court, after hearing the applicant rejects the \napplication wholly or in part, it shall record in writing its \nreasons for so doing.\n\n(10) Whoever knowing that an injunction has been issued \nunder sub-section (1) against him disobeys such injunction \nshall be punishable with imprisonment of either description \nfor a term which may extend to two years or with fine which \nmay extend to one lakh rupees or with both: \n\nProvided that no woman shall be punishable with \nimprisonment.”\n\n67. A Judicial Magistrate of the first class or a Metropolitan Magistrate, \nas the case may be, is empowered to issue an injunction order if \nthey are satisfied that a child marriage has been arranged or is about \nto be solemnised.95 The judge may issue such an order based on \ninformation that may be received as a complaint or otherwise. The \nperson who complains to the judge must have personal knowledge \n\n95 Section 13(1), PCMA.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1561\n\nor reason to believe that a child marriage is likely to occur.96 In case \nthe complainant is a non-governmental organisation, they must have \nreasonable information, relating to the likelihood of the taking place of \nor solemnisation of a child marriage or child marriages. The injunction \norder may be issued against any person or association of persons.97 \nHowever, the court must issue notice to such person, members of \nthe organisation or association of persons, as the case may be, and \noffer them an opportunity to show cause against the issuance of an \ninjunction.98 The court may eschew from this requirement only if it \nis expedient or urgent for the court to act, in which case an interim \ninjunction may be issued. \n\n68. A Judicial Magistrate of the first class or a Metropolitan Magistrate, \nas the case may be, is also empowered to take suo moto cognizance \nof the commission of a child marriage based on a reliable report or \ninformation.99 The PCMA also gives the judge associated powers \nin addition to the power to issue an injunction. These include \nthe power to (i)confirm or vacate the injunction;100 (ii) rescind or \nalter an injunction;101 and (iii) reject the application for injunction \nwholly or in part by a speaking order.102 The punishment for \ndisobeying an injunction issued under Section 13 of the PCMA is \nimprisonment which may extend to two years or a fine which may \nextend to one lakh rupees or both.103 However, no woman can be \nsentenced to imprisonment for violating an injunction order under \nSection 13. Any marriage solemnized in violation of an injunction \norder passed under the PCMA is void ab initio as per Section 14 \nof the PCMA.\n\n69. \n\nIn addition to the power of the Judicial Magistrate of the first class \nor a Metropolitan Magistrate to issue injunctions, Section 13 also \nstipulates the role of the District Magistrate in the prevention of \nchild marriages. Clause (4) of Section 13 stipulates that a District \n\n96 Section 13(2), PCMA.\n\n97 Section 13(1), PCMA.\n\n98 Section 13(6), PCMA.\n\n99 Section 13(3), PCMA.\n\n100 Section 13(7), PCMA.\n\n101 Section 13(8), PCMA.\n\n102 Section 13(9), PCMA.\n\n103 Section 13(10), PCMA.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1562 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n70. \n\nMagistrate is deemed to be a CPMO on certain days to prevent \nthe solemnization of child marriages. The District Magistrate may \nexercise all the powers which accrue to the CMPO under the \nPCMA.104 The intent of empowering the District Magistrate is in \nrecognition of the fact that child marriages may take place in higher \nnumbers on certain days. Since many communities in India believe \nthat marriages may be beneficial if conducted on auspicious days, the \nauthorities may preventively earmark these days for the application \nof Clauses (4) and (5) of Section 13 of the PCMA. Clause (5) of the \nPCMA stipulates that the District Magistrate shall have additional \npowers to stop or prevent the solemnisation of child marriages, for \nwhich he may take appropriate measures and use the minimum \nforce required.\n\nChild Marriage Prohibition Officers\n\nIn addition to injunctions, the PCMA also prescribes the appointment \nof CMPOs for the prevention of child marriage. One of the primary \ncritiques of the CMRA was that the law was dependent on the \nprivate initiative of public-spirited citizens to avoid child marriages. \nThe offences under the CMRA were only partially cognizable and \nits enforcement was met with severe social penalty and the wrath of \nthe two families whose wards were made to tie the knot. The PCMA \nsought to better enforce its provisions by stipulating the appointment \nof a CMPO. Section 2(d) of PCMA defines a CMPO as an officer \nappointed by the State Government under Section 16(1) of PCMA. \nSection 16 empowers the State Government to issue a notification in \nthe official gazette appointing a CMPO for the specified jurisdiction. \nUnder Clause (2) of Section 16 of PCMA, the State may also \nrequest a respectable member of the locality with a record in social \nservice or an officer of the Gram Panchayat or Municipality or an \nofficer of the Government or any public sector undertaking or a non-\ngovernmental organisation to render assistance to the CMPO. The \nCMPO is mandated to carry out the duties stipulated in Clause (3) \nof Section 16 of PCMA. These duties are as follows:\n\n(i) \n\nto prevent solemnisation of child marriages by taking such \naction as he may deem fit;\n\n104 Section 13(4), PCMA.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1563\n\n(ii) \n\n(iii) \n\nto collect evidence for the effective prosecution of persons \ncontravening the provisions of the Act;\n\nto advise either individual cases or counsel the residents of the \nlocality generally not to indulge in promoting, helping, aiding or \nallowing the solemnisation of child marriages;\n\n(iv) \n\nto create awareness of the evil which results from child \nmarriages;\n\n(v) \n\nto sensitise the community on the issue of child marriages;\n\n(vi) \n\nto furnish such periodical returns and statistics as the State \nGovernment may direct; and\n\n(vii) to discharge such other functions and duties as may be assigned \n\nto him by the State Government.\n\n71. The CMPO may move the court for an order of (i) maintenance \nand residence of the child bride under Section 4; (ii) custody of a \nchild born from a child marriage under Section 5;and (iii) injunction \nagainst the solemnization of marriage or against the violation of an \ninjunction under Section 13.105 Additionally, the CMPO may move \nthe court along with a child who has been married off for a decree \nof nullity under Section 3 of PCMA.106\n\n72. The legislative intent behind the appointment of the CMPOs is to \ndesignate an officer to take tailored action against child marriage \nin each district. The prevention of child marriage ensures that \ncommunities can progress whereas the prosecutorial functions of \nthe CMPO ensure effective deterrence. \n\n73. The Petitioner has submitted that the practice widely prevalent is to \nappoint an officer with multifarious duties as the CMPO. The task of the \nCMPO is doled out as an additional task to officers who are already \nburdened with their primary duties. This leads to ineffectiveness and \nallows many child marriages to slip through the cracks. \n\n74. The data provided by the Union in its additional affidavit sheds \nlight on the prevalence of officers holding additional charges as \nCMPOs at the district level. In states like Haryana and Chhattisgarh, \n\n105 Section 16(5), PCMA.\n\n106 Section 16(5), PCMA.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1564 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nofficials such as Sub-Divisional Magistrates107 and District Social \nWelfare Officers are appointed as CMPOs but may also hold other \nresponsibilities. \n\n75. As argued by the Petitioner, the appointment of CMPOs who are \ninundated with other multifarious duties impedes the effectiveness \nof child marriage prevention measures. Officers with multiple duties \nmight struggle to dedicate sufficient time and resources to their \nrole as CMPOs, potentially hindering the effectiveness of child \nmarriage prevention efforts. The appointment of CMPOs is not a \nmere statutory formality as part of an ornate virtue signalling. These \nofficers are in charge of prosecution of child marriages, counselling \nof stakeholders and spreading awareness and sensitization in the \ncommunity. An effective CMPO must make efforts to find their roots \nin the community, engage with communities and organisations in \nthe area and carry out the painstaking, and sometimes thankless, \ntask of reporting specific factors affecting child marriages in the \ndistrict. We observe that the need for dedicated personnel with a \nfocused mandate to tackle child marriage is crucial to ensure that \nresources are utilized effectively and that the objectives of the \nPCMA are met.\n\n76. Additionally, the level at which CMPOs are designated—whether \nat the district, Block, or Gram Panchayat level—is also a critical \nconcern. For instance, states like Karnataka have appointed 58,522 \nofficers across thirty one districts, and Maharashtra has appointed \n25,562 officers across thirty six districts, extending appointments \ndown to the Gram Panchayat level. Andhra Pradesh has appointed \n16,590 officers from the village or ward level up to the district level, \nincluding District Magistrates at the district level. However, Uttar \nPradesh has designated only one CMPO per district, with 75 CMPOs \nfor seventy-five districts. Although high numbers of appointments \nmay suggest extensive coverage, this alone does not ensure \neffectiveness unless there are exclusive officers dedicated solely to \nCMPO duties, free from additional responsibilities. For example, at \nthe Gram Panchayat level, Panchayat Secretaries, Village Revenue \nOfficers, and Patwaris are often given CMPO duties in addition to \n\n107 \n\n‘SDM’\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1565\n\ntheir primary roles, which dilutes their ability to focus solely on child \nmarriage prevention.\n\n77. CMPOs often lack adequate training and are ill-equipped to engage \nsensitively with children. A study analysing child marriage cases \nfiled nationwide between 2008 and 2017 revealed that CMPOs \ninitiated only seven percent of these cases, highlighting a significant \ngap in proactive enforcement.108 In some instances, CMPOs \nredirect complaints to other designated officers under different \nlaws, such as protection officers under the Domestic Violence \nAct 2005109 or the JJ Act110, who then refer the complaints back \nto the CMPOs. This back-and-forth highlights a need for improved \nclarity and streamlined coordination in handling child marriage \ncases effectively.\n\n78. We accordingly hold that, given the significant obligations expected \nto be discharged by a dedicated CMPO, no officer with other \nresponsibilities shall be appointed as the CMPO. States or UTs \nshall appoint exclusive CMPOs in each district in addition to any \nCMPOs already serving in a dual capacity, and they shall equip \nthese officers with adequate resources for the effective discharge \nof their functions. If a State or UT concludes that instances of child \nmarriage have decreased to the extent that appointing exclusive \nCMPOs is no longer necessary, it may file an application before \nthis Court, seeking leave to appoint a CMPO who also holds other \nduties at the District level. \n\nB. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012\n\n79. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012111 was \nenacted by Parliament to safeguard the right of all children to \nsafety, security and protection from sexual abuse and exploitation. \nIt is a self-contained comprehensive legislation for the protection \nof children from sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography.112 \n\n108 Social and Policy Research Foundation. ‘Child and Early Marriage in India, Issue Brief’ (2021) referred \n\nin India Child Protection, Towards Justice: Ending Child Marriages (2024), 21. \n\n109 The Domestic Violence Act, 2005.\n\n110 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. \n\n111 \n\n‘POCSO Act’\n\n112 Statement of Objects and Reasons, POCSO. \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1566 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nThe POCSO Act operates in a manner which promotes the best \ninterest and well-being of a child and ensures their healthy physical, \nemotional, intellectual and social development.113\n\n80. The POCSO Act applies to all children regardless of their gender. \nSection 2(d) defines a child as being under the age of eighteen. The \nAct elevates the age of consent to eighteen years for all persons. \nThe 2013 amendment to the IPC increased the age of consent \nunder the rape provision from sixteen to eighteen. However, the \nmarital rape exception to the rape provision in Section 375 IPC \ncontinued to protect men for having sex with their minor wives. In \nIndependent Thought (supra) this court removed the inconsistency \nand struck down the exception to the penal provision on rape under \nSection 375 IPC in so far as it related to minors. Further, Subclause \n(vi) of clause (d) of Section 63 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023114 \nprescribes the age of consent to be eighteen years. Section 63 BNS \nis pari materia to Section 375 IPC.\n\n81. The principles of the POCSO Act are directly threatened by the \ncommission of child marriage. The intent of the POCSO Act is to \nprotect children from sexual advances. Child marriage on the other \nhand is an institution which puts minor girls directly in harm’s way. \nUnder the POCSO Act, a man is liable to punishment for having sex \nwith his minor wife. Nevertheless, the existence of child marriage \nand its continued recognition in the law as a valid (and voidable) \nmarriage threatens the dignity of children. The institution of child \nmarriage, more directly than any other institution, stipulates for the \nsexual abuse of child brides by design. \n\nC. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) \n\nAct 2015\n\n82. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act115 was first \nenacted in 2000 to provide for the protection of children. The legislation \nunderwent amendments in 2006 and 2011. Thereafter, based on the \nrecorded inadequacies of the legislation, Parliament enacted a new \n\n113 \n\nIbid. \n\n114 \n\n‘BNS’\n\n115 \n\n‘JJ Act’\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1567\n\nJJ Act in 2015. The JJ Act was enacted in furtherance of Article 15 \nand Articles 39(e) and (f),116 45117 and 47118 of the Constitution to \nensure the proper care, protection, development, treatment and \nsocial re-integration of children in difficult circumstances. The JJ Act \napplied a child-friendly approach and is premised on the principle of \nthe best interest of the child.\n\n83. The JJ Act inter alia deals with children in need of care and \nprotection.119 Section 2(14) defines CNCP. Sub-clause (xii) of \nSection 2(14) of the JJ Act prescribes that children at imminent risk \nof marriage are CNCP. The provision reads as follows:\n\n“2. Definitions.–In this Act, unless the context otherwise \nrequires,–\n\n…\n\n(14) “child in need of care and protection” means a child–\n\n…\n\n(xii) who is at imminent risk of marriage before \nattaining the age of marriage and whose parents, \nfamily members, guardians and any other persons \nare likely to be responsible for solemnisation of such \nmarriage;”\n\n116 \n\n“39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State.— The State shall, in particular, direct its \npolicy towards securing—\n…\n\n(e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not \nabused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their \nage or strength; \n(f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions \nof freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against \nmoral and material abandonment.”\n\n117 \n\n118 \n\n“45. Provision for early childhood care and education to children below the age of six years.— The \nState shall endeavour to provide early childhood care and education for all children until they complete \nthe age of six years.”\n\n“47. Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve \npublic health.— The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living \nof its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the \nState shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of \nintoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health.”\n\n119 \n\n‘CNCP’\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1568 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n84. The Act provides a comprehensive framework to deal with CNCP. \nSection 27120 of the JJ Act establishes the Child Welfare Committee121 \nto inter alia handle and resolve complaints in relation to children \nwho are in need of care. The CWC’s role is to ensure the children’s \nbasic needs are met and that they are protected, treated, developed, \nand rehabilitated.\n\n85. Therefore, children who are married off are required to be produced \nbefore the CWC so that they may be rehabilitated and taken care \nof. The JJ Act further provides for the constitution of the State Child \nProtection Society and District Child Protection Unit. Section 106 of the \nJJ Act stipulates that the State shall constitute a State Child Protection \nSociety and a Child Protection Unit in each district. The mandate of \nthe Society and Unit may be prescribed by the State. The constitution \nof these societies and units is to take up matters related to children \nfor the implementation of the Act including inter alia notification of \ncompetent authorities in relation to the children and their rehabilitation \nand co-ordination with various official and non-official agencies \nconcerned. The society and units therefore have the responsibility to \nidentify needs and engage with stakeholders, official and non-official, \nfor the implementation of the JJ Act. As a beneficial social legislation \naimed at children, the society and units constituted under the JJ Act \nare required to proactively identify remedies and strategies for the \nrehabilitation and protection of victims of child marriages.\n\n120 “27. Child Welfare Committee.– (1) The State Government shall by notification in the Official Gazette \nconstitute for every district, one or more Child Welfare Committees for exercising the powers and to \ndischarge the duties conferred on such Committees in relation to children in need of care and protection \nunder this Act and ensure that induction training and sensitisation of all members of the committee is \nprovided within two months from the date of notification.\n\n(2) The Committee shall consist of a Chairperson, and four other members as the State Government \nmay think fit to appoint, of whom at least one shall be a woman and another, an expert on the matters \nconcerning children.\n(3) The District Child Protection Unit shall provide a Secretary and other staff that may be required \nfor secretarial support to the Committee for its effective functioning.\n…\n(8) The Committee shall submit a report to the District Magistrate in such form as may be prescribed \nand the District Magistrate shall conduct a quarterly review of the functioning of the Committee.\n(9) The Committee shall function as a Bench and shall have the powers conferred by the Code of \nCriminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) on a Metropolitan Magistrate or, as the case may be, a Judicial \nMagistrate of First Class.\n(10) The District Magistrate shall be the grievance redressal authority to entertain any grievance \narising out of the functioning of the Committee and the affected child or anyone connected with \nthe child, as the case may be, may file a complaint before the District Magistrate who shall take \ncognizance of the action of the Committee and, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, \npass appropriate order.”\n\n121 \n\n‘CWC’\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1569\n\n86. Section 107 of the JJ Act further provides for the Child Welfare Police \nOfficers122 and Special Juvenile Police Units.123 It stipulates that at \neach police station, at least one police officer shall be appointed as \nthe CWPO. The officer so designated shall not be below the rank \nof Assistant Sub-inspector. The appointment of CWPOs is required \nto be done bearing in mind the aptitude, appropriate training and \norientation of the inspector. The officer so appointed is in charge of \nexclusively dealing with children, either as victims or perpetrators, \nand coordinate with the police and voluntary and non-governmental \norganisations.\n\n87. \n\nIn each district, the State governments are mandated to constitute a \nSJPU for effective coordination of all police-related functions related \nto children. The SJPU shall be headed by an officer of the rank of \nDeputy Superintendent of Police or superior. The SJPU shall comprise \nall the CWPOs appointed in each police station throughout the district \nas well as two social workers who have worked on issues relating \nto child rights. At least one of such social workers who is made part \nof the unit shall be a woman. \n\n88. The JJ Act recognises the inapplicability of standards which accrue \nto adults. It is intended to safeguard children and deal with those \namong them who are in conflict with the law. In the context of child \nmarriage, the principles enunciated in the JJ Act as well as the \nframework established under it are vitally important. Children who \nare at risk of marriage at the hands of their family or relatives are \nexpressly recognised as CNCP under the Act. The JJ Act further \nprescribes for their protection, rehabilitation and development. While \nvictims of child marriage are protected under the JJ Act, it further \nstrengthens the effort to eliminate child marriages by creating a \ntrained and skilled force of police officers to deal with children. The \nSJPUs are marked by their unique ability to inject humanity in law \nenforcement. The task of law enforcement officers, the police in \nparticular, has traditionally been associated by the State’s ability to \ncompel compliance to its norms. The formation of SJPUs reflects \na refreshing outlook toward police work, one which is imperative \nin liberal democracies’ treatment of vulnerable groups. Law with a \n\n122 \n\n‘CWPO’\n\n123 \n\n‘SJPU’\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1570 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\ntouch of humanity and law enforcement with a boost of sensitivity \nand empathy are the cornerstone of the law on children. The JJ Act \ntherefore forms an important instrument in the contemporary legal \nframework concerning child marriages in India.\n\nD. The Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act 2005\n\n89. The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Survival, \nProtection and Development of Children in 1990. In 1989 the UN \nadopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child124 which India \nratified on 11 December 1992. To implement India’s obligations under \nthese international instruments, Parliament enacted the Commissions \nfor Protection of Child Rights Act 2005.125\n\n90. The CPCRA seeks to assure child rights in two ways. Firstly, it \nestablishes National and State Commissions for the protection \nof Child Rights.126 These bodies study, review, and oversee the \nimplementation  of child rights law in India. Secondly, the CPCRA \nestablishes Children’s Courts for providing speedy trial of offences \nagainst children or for violation of child rights.127 Clause (b) of Section 2 \nof CPCRA defines child rights to include the rights stipulated in CRC. \n\n91. The NCPCR under Section 13 and the State Commissions for the \nProtection of Child Rights under Section 24 of CPCRA are inter alia \nentrusted with performing the function of:\n\n(i) \n\n(ii) \n\n(iii) \n\nexamining and reviewing the safeguards provided by any law \nfor the protection of child rights and recommending measures \nfor their effective implementation;\n\ninquiring into violation of child rights and recommend initiation \nof proceedings in such cases; and\n\ninquiring into complaints and taking suo motu notice of matters \nrelating to,- (a) deprivation and violation of child rights; (b) non-\nimplementation of laws providing for protection and development \nof children; (c) non-compliance of policy decisions, guidelines \nor instructions aimed at mitigating hardships to and ensuring \n\n124 \n\n‘CRC’\n\n125 \n\n‘CPCRA’\n\n126 Sections 3 and 17, CPCRA.\n\n127 Section 25, CPCRA.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1571\n\nwelfare of the children and to provide relief to such children, or \ntake up the issues arising out of such matters with appropriate \nauthorities.\n\n92. The NCPCR and SCPCR serve the roles of review, monitoring and \noversight of the legal framework on child rights in India. While the \nCPCRA enables the two commissions to effectively discharge their \nfunctions with appropriate resources, the effective implementation \nof the law is contingent on pro-active initiatives of the NCPCR \nand SCPCRs and the timely appointment of members to the two \ncommissions. The effective implementation of the PCMA also falls \nwithin the subject matter of the NCPCR and SCPCRs. Over time, the \ncommissions have collected data and reviewed the progress of the \nimplementation of the PCMA. The operative directions and guidelines \nthat we shall issue in this judgment shall also stipulate the further \nand specific role that we envision for the NCPCR and SCPCRs to \nperform in the prevention and elimination of child marriages. \n\n93. The MWCD and the NCPCR have been actively engaged in raising \nawareness about the negative consequences of child marriage and \nstrengthening the enforcement of the PCMA. In recent years, the \nNCPCR has conducted multiple review meetings and collaborated \nwith a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including District Magistrates, \nCMPOs, CDPOs, CWCs, and Anganwadi Workers.128 These initiatives \nhave aimed to create a coordinated approach to tackling child marriage \nat the grassroots level.\n\n94. The NCPCR has also concentrated on identifying children at risk \nby compiling school-wise data on those who have dropped out or \nexhibit irregular attendance. In 2023-2024, the NCPCR identified \n645,673 children across India who were either out of school or at \nrisk of early marriage. The Commission directed district authorities \nto pinpoint vulnerable children from this list, prevent their marriages, \nand ensure proper rehabilitation for those affected. While these \nawareness campaigns and data-driven interventions have been vital, \nit is evident that awareness alone is not enough to prevent child \nmarriages effectively. Enforcement of laws, community engagement, \nand support systems for vulnerable children are equally crucial.\n\n128 \n\n ‘AWWs’\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1572 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nE. The Legal Services Authorities Act 1987\n\n95. The Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 was enacted to constitute \nlegal services authorities at the National, State and District levels to \nprovide free and competent legal services to the weaker sections of \nthe society. The constitution of the authorities is aimed at ensuring \nthat opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen \nby reason of economic or other disabilities.\n\n96. Section 12(c) of the Act stipulates that any child who has to file or \ndefend a case is entitled to legal services.129 The Legal Services \nAuthorities are therefore under an obligation under the Act to assist \nminors who file cases under the PCMA to exercise their statutory \nrights. The National Legal Services Authority,130 State Legal Services \nAuthority,131 District Legal Services Authorities,132 Taluk Legal Services \nCommittees, High Court Legal Services Committees, and Supreme \nCourt Legal Services Committee have formulated various schemes \nto be followed while they deal with legal services to children.133 We \nshall make further directions in this regard to legal services authorities \nin the operative portion of this judgment.\n\nF. Policies formulated by the Union Government\n\n97. \n\nIn addition to the legislative apparatus outlined above, the Union has \nsubmitted that the MWCD proposed a National Strategy on Child \nMarriage on 14 February 2013. This strategy emphasized linking \nwith Integrated Child Protection Scheme134 structures and statutory \nbodies to ensure early detection and swift referral of cases needing \ncare and protection. One of its strategic directions was to ensure \nthat children already in child marriages should not face discrimination \nin accessing health, nutrition, education, and employment services. \n\n98. The Union Government has also implemented several schemes \naimed at empowering young girls and women, such as Sukanya \nSamridhi Yojana, Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (Urban & Rural), \n\n129 \n\n Section 12(c), The Legal Services Authorities Act 1987,\n\n130 \n\n‘NALSA’\n\n131 \n\n‘SLSA’\n\n132 \n\n‘DLSA’\n\n133 See for example National Legal Services Authority (Child Friendly Legal Services to Children and their \n\nProtection) Scheme, 2024.\n\n134 \n\n‘ICPS’\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1573\n\nPradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana, and Pradhan Mantri Matru \nVandana Yojana (PMMVY). These initiatives aim to promote social \nwell-being and to create a supportive environment for young girls. \nComplementing these efforts are programs like Samagra Shiksha, \nthe National Overseas Scholarship Scheme, Babu Jagjivan Ram \nChhatrawas Yojana, and the Swachh Vidyalaya Mission, which focus \non making schools girl-friendly, particularly for vulnerable sections of \nsociety. The Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Empowerment of Adolescent \nGirls – SABLA, launched on November 19, 2010,135 in 200 districts, \nfocuses on empowering adolescent girls (aged 11-18) by improving \nnutrition, health, and vocational skills. SABLA provides nutrition at \nRs 5 per day for 300 days, iron and folic acid supplementation, health \ncheck-ups, nutrition and health education, family welfare guidance, \nand vocational training for girls aged sixteen and above under the \nNational Skill Development Programme. It also raises awareness \nabout the importance of marrying at the appropriate age.\n\n99. To enhance the employability of female workers, the Ministry offers \ntraining through a network of Women’s Industrial Training Institutes, \nNational Vocational Training Institutes, and Regional Vocational \nTraining Institutes. Additionally, the Skill India Mission aims to ensure \neconomic independence for women through skill development. \n\n100. The Ministry implements the Beti Bachao Beti Padhao scheme136, \nwhich specifically aims to address issues of gender inequality by \npromoting the education and welfare of girls. It targets high-risk \ndistricts with low child sex ratios and focuses on changing societal \nattitudes toward girls through awareness campaigns, community \nengagement, and promoting girl-friendly educational infrastructure. \nAdditionally, the Union has established CHILDLINE, a 24/7 emergency \noutreach service for children in crisis, which coordinates with police \nand child protection services to address various issues, including \nchild marriage prevention. \n\n101. Despite these efforts, there remains a gap in implementing specific, \ntargeted measures focused solely on the prevention of child marriage. \nExisting schemes, while impactful, do not provide sufficient tools to \ntackle child marriage comprehensively. For instance, while training and \n\n135 See Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Empowerment of Adolescent Girls: Sabla, https://www.india.gov.in/rajiv-\n\ngandhi-scheme-empowerment-adolescent-girls-sabla. \n\n136 See https://www.myscheme.gov.in/schemes/bbbp. \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1574 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\neducational programs are vital, there appears to be a lack of robust \nmechanisms to monitor the long-term outcomes of these initiatives, \nparticularly in rural and underserved areas where child marriage \nrates are often high. Additionally, while financial support is essential \nin empowering women, it may not always effectively reach the most \nvulnerable communities. Therefore, we direct that a special scheme \nbe introduced, specifically focusing on skill development, vocational \ntraining, and economic stability for women and girls who choose to \nleave child marriages. This scheme should include provisions for \nlegal aid, psychological support, and financial assistance to help \nthem transition to a life of self-reliance. \n\nG. States’ efforts to curb child marriage\n\n102. Each State and UT in India has introduced training programs, \nawareness initiatives, and financial incentives as part of a \ncomprehensive approach to enforcing the PCMA137. These efforts \nencompass preventive training, education, financial support, and \ncommunity-based outreach to discourage child marriage and promote \ngirls’ education and empowerment. Relevant up-to-date data on the \nStates’ efforts to curb child marriage over the last three years has \nbeen placed before this Court. As and by way of illustration, we \nshall briefly provide an overview of the efforts made in regard to \n(i) training schemes, (ii) awareness programs, (iii) financial incentives \nand (iv) other incentives. We shall then analyse the impact of these \nschemes broadly.\n\ni. \n\nTraining schemes\n\n103. Across India, States and UTs have conducted extensive training \nprogramsover the past three years to equip officials and communities \nwith the knowledge needed to combat child marriage. States and UTs \nare conducting training programs to equip officials and communities \nwith the knowledge needed to combat child marriage.\n\n104. States like Telangana, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Gujarat, and \nChhattisgarh have conducted training and awareness programs for \nfield workers through DCPUs, providing critical information on the \nPCMA. Some states have partnered with DWCD&SS and UNICEF, with \n\n137 Additional Affidavit, Ministry of Women and Child Development (2023). The data highlights the steps \n\nundertaken by the States in the Past Three Years – 2020 -2023. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1575\n\nsupport from partner organizations, to conduct these training sessions. \nFor instance, Karnataka has established Child Marriage Prohibition \nCells138 under its Spoorthi Yojana139 to train staff in identifying and \npreventing child marriages. Additionally, Rs. 12.51 crores have been \nallocated for training Protection Officers and staff in Special Cells for \nwomen and children140. In Haryana, Protection-cum-Prohibition officers \nreceive intensive training and sensitization from experts with support \nfrom NIPCCCD and HIPA.These initiatives indicate a structured \napproach, focusing not only on immediate prevention but also on \nlong-term societal change by raising awareness and educating local \npopulations about the harms of child marriage.\n\nii. Awareness programs\n\n105. Awareness initiatives play a vital role in changing societal perceptions \nabout child marriage and promoting girls’ education. In terms of the \nnumber of awareness sessions over the last year, most sessions \nhave been reported by Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Odisha \nand Tamil Nadu.141 Andhra Pradesh conducted 37,446 sessions, \nreaching  857,012 participants; Uttar Pradesh conducted 35,377 \nsessions, reaching 1,248,394 participants; and Odisha conducted \n33,276 sessions covering 30,755 blocks and villages.142 Additionally, \nTamil Nadu has actively engaged communities with widespread \nawareness programs tailored to local needs.143\n\n106. States have deployed varied and unique measures in spreading \nawareness such as leveraging local media to economically \nempower girls,144 distributing legal informational pamphlets in rural \n\n138 These cells deal with the administrative Sanction of Spoorthi Yojana, Action Plan, Prohibition of Child \nMarriage Act Systematic Procedure, Coordination and Review Committee, Cell Establishment Details, \nChild Marriage Prohibition Officers Roles and responsibilities and additional CMPOs Orders, Revised \nCommittee Order at Gram panchayat; See details of Government orders and guidelines for major \nschemes and programs of the Department (2024) https://dwcd.karnataka.gov.in/info-4/Details+of+Gove\nrnment+orders+and+guidelines+for+major+schemes+and+programs+of+the+Department/en. \n\n139 The Scheme was first introduced on a pilot basis, has been successful, and will now be extended to a \nfew more districts. It aims to improve nutritional levels and empower 12- to-18-year adolescent girls in 5 \ndistricts covering 50000 adolescent girls from 11 Special Development Plan Taluks.\n\n140 The State cabinet approved the release of Rs 12.51 crore for ‘Spoorthi scheme’ in 2023.\n\n141 NCCPR, Comprehensive Report of Virtual Review Meetings on Child Marriage with Districts All Over \n\nIndia For 2023-2024 (2024). \n\n142 \n\nIbid. \n\n143 \n\nIbid. \n\n144 Delhi Ladli Scheme, 2008 has been operational since 01.01.2009 for controlling female foeticide, \n\nimproving the sex ratio, and empowering girls educationally and financially.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1576 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nareas,145 partnering with NGOs,146 facilitating community meetings,147 \ntargeted awareness programs focusing on high school students and \nschool dropouts,148 and running educational YouTube channels.149\n\n107. This grassroots, multisectoral collaboration is essential, as it leverages \ncommunity-based networks to reach children most at risk, ensuring \nearly intervention and protection against child marriage. It strengthens \ncoordination between state authorities, NGOs, and local stakeholders \nto enhance the impact of these awareness initiatives.\n\niii. Financial incentives\n\n108. Financial incentives play a significant role in these initiatives. In \nTelangana, the Shaadi Mubarak and Kalyana Lakshmi schemes \noffer cash transfers to eligible families; for instance, families \nreceive a one-time grant of approximately Rs. 1 lakh upon the girl \nreaching adulthood.150 Chhattisgarh offers a similar scheme, the \nNoni Suraksha Yojana, while Bihar’s Kanya Utthaan Yojana provides \nfinancial support of Rs. 25,000 per girl to encourage education and \ndelay marriages and Mantri Vivah Yogana aids families by covering \nmarriage expenses for eligible girls. Madhya Pradesh’s Ladli Lakshmi \nYojana links financial support to educational milestones, offering up \nto Rs. 6,000 for completing certain grades.151 In Andhra Pradesh, \n\n145 Haryana has engaged 1,855 stakeholders through targeted campaigns, distributing over 50,000 \ninformational pamphlets in rural areas to explain the legal ramifications and adverse impacts of child \nmarriage; Similarly, Tamil Nadu has created thirteen different types of posters, with 3,77,585 posters \ndistributed across the state, and an allocation of Rs. 50 lakhs specifically for campaigns in ten \neconomically disadvantaged districts.\n\n146 Odisha has partnered with NGOs to conduct 1,500 workshops in schools.\n\n147 Assam facilitated community meetings in 200 villages, highlighting the harmful effects of early marriage \n\non health, education, and economic opportunities.\n\n148 Telangana has organized targeted awareness programs aimed at identifying vulnerable children, \nparticularly with the support of Village Child Protection Committee members. These initiatives focus on \nhigh school students and school dropouts, working in coordination with ICPS, ICDS, ChildLine, Sakhi \nstaff, Anganwadi teachers, ASHA workers, and local Sarpanchs. \n\n149 Tamil Nadu launched an educational YouTube channel and provided 3-6 months of vocational training to \n\nsupport victims of child marriage, equipping them with skills for a better future.\n\n150 The Government of Telangana launched the ‘Kalyana Lakshmi/Shaadi Mubarak scheme provided to \nunmarried girls who are above 18 years of age from SC, ST, BC and Minority families (with a combined \nincome of both parents not exceeding Rs. 2,00,000 per annum) at the time of their marriage. \n\n151 This aims to discourage child marriage, eradicate female infanticide, rectify the falling birth rate of girls, \nimprove the health and educational status, curtail inequality and uphold the status of the girl child in the \nsociety. ln this scheme, there is a provision for a final payment of Rs. 1.00 lakh on completion of 21 years \nof age of the girl child, on appearing in class 12th examination birth and on early marriage Instructions \nwere issued for Akshay Tritiya. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1577\n\nthe Jagananna Amma Vodi program aims to improve the Gross \nEnrollment Rate (GER) and promote higher education for girls. \nRajasthan’s Mukhyamantri Kanyadan Yojana provides financial \nassistance to BPL families from SC, ST, and minority communities \nfor the marriages of girls upon reaching 18 years. \n\n109. These financial incentives serve as a powerful tool in reducing child \nmarriage and enhancing girls’ education by alleviating the financial \nexpenses of families. These States demonstrate promising results \nin increasing girls’ enrolment in schools through targeted financial \nassistance programs. However, these schemes must be supported by \nrobust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure that the funds \nare used effectively and that the intended outcomes are achieved.\n\niv. Other initiatives\n\n110. In addition to training, awareness, and financial support, states have \nimplemented various structural measures to reinforce the PCMA. \nFor example, some States conduct regular meetings with school \nauthorities to identify and reintegrate school dropouts, using education \nas a key tool to prevent child marriages. States like Assam collaborate \nwith NGOs and CBOs to rehabilitate victims, provide compensation, \nand facilitate home visits through DCPU staff. Several states have also \ndrafted action plans: Uttar Pradesh has District Action Plans for ending \nchild marriage and adolescent empowerment, incorporating and \nadapting activities from the State Action Plan. Rajasthan introduced \nits State Action Plan in 2017,152 anchoring multiple interventions \nand activities to address the root causes of child marriage. These \nplans include partnerships and monitorable indicators, ensuring that \nprogress is tracked and evaluated for effectiveness and relevance.\n\n111. Additionally, some States like Karnataka have created online portals \nto monitor child marriage cases, enhancing transparency and \naccountability.153 These structural initiatives, supported by partnerships \nwith community organizations and digital monitoring tools, are crucial \n\n152 Rajasthan Government (2017), ‘State Strategy and Action Plan for Prevention of Child Marriage: Towards \ncreating a child marriage free Rajasthan; The document articulates the principles, strategy, vision, \nobjectives, actions, coordination mechanisms and resources that will ensure effective implementation of \nthe actions/interventions to end child marriage in Rajasthan. \n\n153 Karnataka’s online portal ‘Surakshini’ keeps track of the child’s status, and every department official \n\ninvolved has to log in regularly.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1578 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nto a holistic approach that prevents child marriages and strengthens \nprotection for vulnerable children.\n\nv. \n\n Impact analysis of State schemes\n\n112. The data reveals that a comprehensive, multifaceted approach \ninvolving training schemes, awareness programs, and financial \nincentives is essential for effectively combating child marriage. \nHowever, not all States have adopted this three-pronged strategy. \nStates such as Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, and Bihar showcase \nstrong alignment with this multifaceted approach. For instance, \nthe financial incentive schemes in Telangana and Bihar effectively \nincentivize families to delay marriage. States like Haryana, Uttar \nPradesh and Chhattisgarh focus on training and awareness. The \nabsence of direct financial support could limit their schemes’ impact on \neconomically vulnerable communities. While these efforts contribute \nto raising awareness and promoting societal change, families facing \nfinancial hardships may still lean toward early marriage without \neconomic support for educational or vocational opportunities. The \nabsence of direct financial assistance may limit the reach and impact \nof otherwise well-designed training and awareness programs, as \nfamilies in economically challenged communities may not feel the \nimmediate benefits of delaying marriage without addressing financial \nconstraints.\n\n113. The data on child marriages across various States and UTs shows \na range of outcomes in both prevention and prosecution efforts \nover the last three years. Several states, such as Andhra Pradesh, \nKarnataka, and West Bengal, report a high number of cases, though \nmany of these cases were prevented before the marriages could \nbe solemnized. Karnataka documented 8,348 child marriage cases, \npreventing 7,306 of these, while Andhra Pradesh reported 3,413 \ncases, with 3,136 successfully prevented. This reflects a proactive \napproach to preventing child marriages in some states, where \nauthorities intercept and prevent a significant portion of cases before, \nthey are formalized. \n\n114. Some States illustrate discrepancies between the number of child \nmarriage cases reported, the number prevented, and the number \nof FIRs filed. Maharashtra reported 2043 cases prevented but \nregistered  178 FIRs, suggesting limited legal follow-through. \nSimilarly, Telangana reported 4440 cases of child marriage, of \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1579\n\nwhich only 149 FIRs were filed. Andhra Pradesh, despite having \n3,416 cases registered, filed 10 FIRs. These gaps highlight potential \nobstacles in prosecution and a possible need for streamlined \ncooperation between child marriage prevention authorities and law \nenforcement agencies. Tamil Nadu presents a more comprehensive \napproach, where both prevention and FIR filing are high; with 8,966 \nreported cases, the state successfully prevented 6,436 marriages \nand filed 2,392 FIRs.\n\n115. Interestingly, several States and UTs, such as Dadra and Nagar \nHaveli, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, reported no cases of \nchild marriage over the last three years. While this might indicate \nminimal occurrences of child marriage in these areas, it could also \nsuggest underreporting or a lack of awareness of the issue among \nauthorities and communities. Furthermore, States and UTs like \nChhattisgarh, Chandigarh and Puducherry, which reported very low \nfigures or none at all, raise questions about the consistency and \naccuracy of data reporting processes.\n\n116. A more comprehensive look across all regions also includes \nvariations in the effectiveness of interventions. In addition, the \nnumber of cases leading to FIRs is relatively low across most \nstates compared to the number of marriages reported, highlighting \npotential gaps in legal action and prosecution efforts. Even in states \nwith high intervention rates, the limited legal action suggests that \nadditional support may be needed to ensure accountability and \ndeterrence.\n\nVI. Traversing frontiers: international human rights norms\n\n117. The development of child rights law is highly influenced by the evolving \nlegal standards in international law. The comity of nations has arrived \nat a broad consensus rooted in the goal to realise universal human \nrights of children. Domestically and abroad, various jurisdictions \nhave developed their legal standards under the influence of global \nadvancements in international bodies. It is therefore instructive to \nlook at the progress made and prevailing standards on child rights \nin the context of early and forced marriage in international law. We \nshall therefore trace the universal framework on child rights, various \nregional advancements and the rights-based framework against child \nmarriage presently.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1580 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nA. Universal framework\n\n118. Early international conventions did not explicitly prohibit child marriage. \nWith the evolution of international law, the community of nations inched \ncloser to an agreeable standard against child marriage. We shall \ntrace this evolution in international human rights norms presently. \nFirst, we shall briefly overview the Universal Declaration of Human \nRights,154 then we shall explore the Supplementary Convention on the \nAbolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices \nSimilar to Slavery of 1956155 and the International Covenant on Civil \nand Political Rights 1966.156 Lastly we shall look at the two seminal \nconventions on the issue of child marriage, namely, the Convention \non the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women \n1979157 and the CRC 1989. \n\ni. \n\nUniversal Declaration of Human Rights\n\n119. The UDHR adopted as General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) in \n1948,158 set forth fundamental principles regarding the right to marry. \nArticle 16(1) of the UDHR stipulates that men and women of full age, \nwithout any limitation due to race, nationality, or religion, have the \nright to marry and to found a family.159 They are entitled to equal rights \nas to marriage, during marriage, and at its dissolution. Article 16(2) \nfurther stipulates that marriage shall be entered into only with the \nfree and full consent of the intending spouses.160 Although it does \nnot specify a minimum age for marriage, the UDHR establishes that \nmarriage should be based on free and full consent, laying an early \nframework for safeguarding autonomy and protecting individuals \nfrom coerced or forced marriages.161\n\n120. In the years following the UDHR, International Human Rights Law162 \nbegan to recognize and address the specific vulnerabilities and \n\n154 \n\n‘UDHR’\n\n155 The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and \n\nPractices Similar to Slavery of 1956; India ratified it on 23 June 1960. \n\n156 \n\n‘ICCPR’\n\n157 \n\n‘CEDAW’. \n\n158 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). \n\n159 \n\nIbid, article 16(1); See also Maja Eriksson, ‘Article 16’ in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A \nCommentary, ed. Aide Eide et al. (Oxford: Scandinavian University Press, 1992), 243.\n\n160 \n\nIbid, article 16(2).\n\n161 \n\nIbid. \n\n162 \n\n‘IHRL’\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1581\n\nabuses associated with child marriage. This shift was a response to \ngrowing evidence that child marriage disproportionately harms girls, \nundermining their education, health, and prospects for economic \nindependence. Recognizing that such marriages are often non-\nconsensual and perpetuate cycles of poverty and inequality, the \ninternational community began drafting conventions aimed at setting \nprotective standards for marriageable age and conditions.\n\nii. Recognition in political conventions\n\n121. The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave \nTrade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956163 \nexpanded on these protections by directly addressing practices \nsimilar to slavery, including child marriage. Article 2 of the Convention \nmandates that State Parties prescribe, where appropriate, suitable \nminimum ages of marriage and encourage the use of facilities whereby \nthe consent of both parties to a marriage may be freely expressed \nin the presence of a competent civil or religious authority.164 This \nprovision reflects a recognition that child marriage can be exploitative \nand akin to slavery. In aligning marriage requirements with those \ndesigned to end slavery-like practices, the Convention highlights \nthe UN’s stance against child marriage as a form of coercion and \nexploitation.\n\n122. These standards were developed as a matter of political rights \nguarantee in the ICCPR.165 Article 23(2) establishes the right of men \nand women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family.166 \nArticle 23(3) prescribes that no marriage shall be entered into \nwithout the free and full consent of the intending spouses.167 Finally, \nArticle 23(4) requires that State Parties take measures to ensure \nequality in marriage, signalling the UN’s increasing recognition \nof individual autonomy, choice, and consent in marriage.168 This \nframework not only advocates for minimum marriageable age \nrequirements but also emphasizes free and full consent. The framers \n\n163 The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and \n\nPractices Similar to Slavery, 1956. \n\n164 \n\nIbid, Article 2. \n\n165 UN General Assembly (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, United Nations, \n\nTreaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. \n\n166 \n\nICCPR, Article 23 (2). \n\n167 \n\nICCPR. Article 23(3). \n\n168 \n\nICCPR. Article 23(4). \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1582 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nof these documents aimed to prevent child marriage by specifically \nusing the terms “men and women,” rather than “males and females,” \nto imply an age of maturity and decision-making capacity necessary \nfor marriage.169\n\niii. Targeted focus: the Convention on the Elimination of All \nForms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention \non the Rights of the Child.\n\n123. The progress of the international community led to the ground-\nbreaking inclusion of child marriage as an expressly recognised \nillegality in the CEDAW.170 Article 16(2) explicitly invalidates child \nbetrothals and marriages, calling for legislation to establish a minimum \nage for marriage and mandate official registration.171 This is crucial to \nCEDAW’s objective of safeguarding women’s rights and autonomy, \nhighlighting that child marriage undermines the agency, equality, \nand dignity of girls and women. By emphasizing that child marriages \nshould have no legal effect, CEDAW directly addresses the systemic \ninequalities perpetuated through such practices.\n\n124. The guarantee to women in CEDAW was further tailored as a matter \nof child rights in 1989 with the adoption of the CRC.172 It was essential \nto establish a global framework dedicated to children because, despite \nprevious human rights treaties, there remained gaps in protections \nfor children who, due to their age and vulnerability, require special \nsafeguards. The CRC acknowledges the unique needs of children \nfor development,173 care, and protection from abuse, exploitation, \nand neglect.174 The international community recognized that children \nare often marginalized, and their rights overlooked, which made it \ncritical to implement specific provisions tailored to them.\n\n169 See Maja Eriksson, ‘Article 16’ in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary, ed. Aide \n\nEide et al. (Oxford: Scandinavian University Press, 1992), 243.\n\n170 UN General Assembly (1989). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against \n\nWomen, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13. \n\n171 CEDAW, Article 16 (2). \n\n172 UN General Assembly (1989). Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. \n\n1577, p. 3. \n\n173 CRC, Article 6(2); State Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and \n\ndevelopment of the child.\n\n174 CRC, Article 19 (1); Requires States to take all appropriate measures to protect the child from all forms \n\nof abuse, neglect, or maltreatment while in the care of parents. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1583\n\n125. Article 1 of the CRC defines a child as a person below the age of \neighteen unless, under the law applicable to the child, a majority is \nattained earlier.175 In the context of child marriage, this provision sets \na clear threshold for defining who is considered a child, ensuring \nthat international standards focus on the protection of minors from \nearly and forced marriages. Article 19(1) of the CRC requires State \nParties to take all necessary legislative, administrative, social, and \neducational measures to protect children from all forms of physical \nor mental violence, injury, abuse, neglect, or exploitation, including \nsexual abuse, whether committed by parents, guardians, or others \nresponsible for the child’s care.176 This article recognizes that children, \ndue to their vulnerability, require comprehensive protection across \nvarious domains of life, especially from forms of violence that may \noccur within the family or caregiving environment. This is particularly \nrelevant in cases of child marriage, where minors may face abuse \nor exploitation under the guise of familial or cultural practices. \nArticle 19(2) further emphasizes the need for protective measures, \nincluding the creation of social programs, support services for children \nand caregivers, and judicial mechanisms to address and prevent \nmaltreatment.177 This highlights the importance of establishing a \nrobust framework for the identification, reporting, and follow-up of \nchild abuse cases, offering practical measures for intervention and \nprevention.\n\nB. Regional framework\n\n126. In addition to international conventions, three important regional \nconventions have addressed the issue of child marriage. Regional \nconventions reflect the targetter focus of a region to pivot their \nshared values and goals into obligatory and tangible outcomes. We \nshall elucidate the framework developed in the African Union, the \nEuropean Union and the SAARC.\n\ni. \n\nAfrican Union\n\n127. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,178 \n\n175 CRC, Article 1. \n\n176 CRC, Article 19(1). \n\n177 CRC. Article 19(2) \n\n178 \n\n‘ARWRC’\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1584 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nadopted in 1990,179 builds upon international frameworks by requiring \nState Parties to enact legislation setting eighteen as the minimum \nage for marriage. Article 21 of the Charter specifically addresses \n“Protection against Harmful Social and Cultural Practices,” stating \nthat all necessary measures should be taken to eliminate customs \ndetrimental to children’s health, dignity, and development.180Under \nArticle 21(2), child marriage and betrothal are prohibited, with a \nmandate that states enact laws setting a minimum marriageable \nage of eighteen and ensuring compulsory marriage registration.181\n\n128. In Association pour le Progrès et la Défense des Droits des \nFemmes Maliennes (APDF) and the Institute for Human Rights \nand Development in Africa (IHRDA) v. Republic of Mali,182 the \nAfrican Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights addressed significant \nissues regarding child marriage. The applicants argued that Mali’s \nFamily Code of 2011, which set the minimum marriage age for girls \nat sixteen (with exceptions allowing marriage as young as fifteen), \nviolated key international agreements such as the African Charter \non Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa183 \nand the ACRWC both of which require a minimum marriage age of \neighteen to protect the rights of children. Furthermore, the applicants \nraised concerns that religious authorities in Mali often performed \nmarriages without ensuring full and free consent from both parties, \nleading to forced marriages that particularly affected young girls.184\n\n129. The court found that Mali’s Family Code was incompatible with \nits obligations under multiple international instruments, including \nthe Maputo Protocol, the ACRWC and CEDAW.185 Specifically, the \nFamily Code’s provisions on minimum marriage age and the lack of \nmandatory consent were seen as violations of these treaties, which \nseek to eliminate harmful practices and ensure gender equality and \n\n179 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990). OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, entered \ninto force Nov. 29, 1999; See also IPAS, African Alliance for Women’s Reproductive Health Rights – A \nHandbook for Advocacy in the African Human Rights System (Chapel Hill: IPAS, 2006), 29. \n\n180 ARWRC, Article 21(1). \n\n181 ARWRC, Article 21(2). \n\n182 Association pour le progrès et la défense des droits des femmes Maliennes (APDF) and the Institute for \nHuman Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) v. Republic of Mali, App. No. 046/2016, Judgment, \nAfrican Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Ct. H.P.R.] (May 11, 2018). \n\n183 \n\n‘Maputo Protocol’\n\n184 \n\nIbid, para 59, 60, 62.\n\n185 \n\n Ibid, para 124. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1585\n\nchild protection.186 Consequently, the court ordered Mali to amend \nits Family Code to align it with these international standards by \nsetting a minimum marriage age of eighteen, ensuring free consent \nto marriage, and providing equal inheritance rights for all children, \nincluding those born outside of marriage.\n\n130. This ruling is significant because it highlights the enforceability of \ninternational human rights treaties at the regional level, compelling \nMali to amend its laws to meet international obligations. By holding \nMali accountable, the court reinforced the legally binding nature \nof the Maputo Protocol, ACRWC, and CEDAW, promoting the \nstandardization of human rights protections across Africa. This \ndecision also sets a precedent for other African nations, emphasizing \nthe duty to harmonize domestic laws with international child protection \nstandards.\n\nii. \n\n European Union\n\n131. In the European Union, the European Convention on Human \nRights187 is a key legal instrument that impacts issues of marriage and \nchild protection. 188 Specifically, Article 12 of the ECHR grants men \nand women of marriageable age the right to marry189, while Article 8 \nprotects the right to respect for private and family life.190 These articles \ndo not directly set a minimum age for marriage but do highlight the \nimportance of individual autonomy and respect for personal and family \nlife, which are relevant to child marriage discussions. Article 3, which \nprohibits inhuman or degrading treatment, has also been interpreted \nto protect vulnerable individuals, including children, from practices \nthat may be harmful or coercive, such as child marriage.191\n\n132. Early marriage in the European Region is described as an abrupt \nand premature transition from childhood to adult life for the affected \nminors, who are predominantly girls192. At the EU level, the resolution \n\n186 \n\nIbid, para 125. \n\n187 “ECHR”\n\n188 The European Convention on Human Rights, 1950; See https://www.echr.coe.int/european-convention-\n\non-human-rights\n\n189 ECHR, Article 12. \n\n190 ECHR, Article 8. \n\n191 \n\nIbid, Article 3. \n\n192 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Forced Marriage in Europe (2018), Resolution 2233, \npara. 2; Recognised that Early marriage thereby typically leads to restricted opportunities for education \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1586 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nof the European Parliament of 4 October 2017 on “Ending Child \nMarriage” references the considerable negative effects of child \nmarriage on the rights of children, in particular those of girls affected \nby the practice.\n\n133. A landmark case in the German Federal Constitutional Court193 \ninvolved a Syrian couple who married in 2015 under Syrian law, \nwith the wife being 14 at the time. Fleeing the Syrian conflict, they \narrived in Germany, where the authorities took the young wife \ninto care due to her minor status. Citing the Act to Prevent Child \nMarriages 2017, the German courts automatically invalidated the \nmarriage under Article  13(3) no. 1 of the Introductory Act to the \nCivil Code (EGBGB), which prohibits the recognition of marriages if \none spouse was under 16 at the time. The husband contested this, \narguing that their marriage was valid under Syrian law and should \nbe recognized in Germany.\n\n134. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany ruled that, although \nthe state has a legitimate interest in protecting minors from child \nmarriage, the automatic invalidation of marriages involving minors \nunder 16 was unconstitutional.194 The Court found that the law lacked \nprovisions for dealing with the legal consequences of invalidation, \nand it failed to offer the possibility of validating the marriage once \nboth parties reached adulthood. This automatic invalidation was \nseen as conflicting with Article 6(1) of the German Basic Law, \nwhich protects the right to marry and form a family195. It is a right \nthat is based on the free will, equality and autonomy of the partners \nand involves special mutual obligations, with the official ceremony \nof marriage serving to substantiate the marriage through a formal \nact.196\n\n135. The Court recognised that the invalidation of such marriages not \nonly safeguards minors from the inherent risks associated with \nmarital cohabitation but also enhances the legal options available to \nguardians. They can determine the living arrangements of married \n\nand economic development of women, who are mostly affected. \n\n193 See BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 1 February 2023 - 1 BvL 7/18 (Germany). \n\n194 \n\nIbid, Para 44-45. \n\n195 \n\nIbid, Para 107. \n\n196 \n\nIbid, Para 114 -116. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1587\n\nminors without considering their marital status, ensuring that decisions \nprioritize the child’s best interests under IHRL197. Protecting minors \nfrom early marriage aligns with the state’s duty to uphold life and \nphysical integrity under Article 2(2) of the German Basic Law and \naddresses the need to eliminate disadvantages faced by women. \nAs a result, the court ordered the legislature to amend the law by \n30 June 2024, to address these gaps, thus providing legal clarity on \nthe status of such marriages and offering a pathway for validation \nafter reaching adulthood.198 This case illustrates the complexities \ninvolved in addressing child marriage within Europe, particularly in \nthe context of refugees and migration. While the German law aimed \nto protect minors, the Federal Constitutional Court emphasized the \nneed for balance. \n\n136. In India, the PCMA protects child brides and any child born from a \nchild marriage by prescribing for their maintenance, residence and \ncustody. Further, any child born from such a marriage is deemed \nlegitimate. These provisions apply even when the marriage has been \nnullified at the instance of the minor contracting party. India therefore \ndoes not have the same legal gap that the Federal Constitutional \nCourt observed in German law. Protections of maintenance, residence \nand custody under family law are a recognition of the responsibilities \nthat society places on families after marriage. The philosophy is that \na law must not merely penalise criminal action – in this case child \nmarriage – but must also compensate and address the harm meted \nout to the victim. \n\niii. SAARC\n\n137. Child marriage is a significant concern in South Asia, where \napproximately one in four young women are first married or in union \nbefore reaching the age of eighteen.199 The prevalence of child \nmarriage varies greatly across the region, with over 50% of girls \nmarried before eighteen in Bangladesh, compared to only 2% in the \nMaldives.200 Furthermore, even within individual countries, disparities \n\n197 \n\nIbid. \n\n198 \n\nIbid, Para 190-192. \n\n199 UNICEF (2023). A Profile of Child Marriage in South Asia; UN (2022). United Nations Department of \n\nEconomic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects.\n\n200 \n\nIbid. \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1588 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nexist; for example, Afghanistan shows a tenfold difference in child \nmarriage rates across its provinces.201 Although child marriage is less \ncommon among boys, it still occurs, with nearly 1 in 10 young men \nin Nepal reporting childhood marriages.202 Despite these challenges, \nSouth Asia is recognized for its progress in reducing child marriage \nrates, showcasing a potential pathway for other regions facing similar \nissues.\n\n138. The SAARC Charter,203 established in 1985, lays the foundation \nfor regional cooperation among the eight South Asian countries—\nAfghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, \nand Sri Lanka. It emphasizes the need for collaboration in various \nsectors, including social development, which encompasses \nthe protection of children’s rights. The Convention on Regional \nArrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia, \nadopted in 2002,204 specifically addresses the alarming prevalence \nof child marriage in the region. This Convention recognizes child \nmarriage as a violation of children’s rights and advocates for legislation \nto set a minimum marriage age, promote awareness, and protect \nchildren from harmful practices.\n\n139. The Convention reinforces the commitment of SAARC member \nstates to create a protective environment for children by calling \nfor effective measures to combat child marriage. This includes the \nestablishment of monitoring systems, the promotion of education, \nand the mobilization of community resources to challenge cultural \nnorms that perpetuate child marriage.\n\nC. Rights based framework\n\n140. Child marriage is forced marriage and international law recognises \nit as such. Early marriage, or child marriage involves children under \n\n201 \n\nIbid. \n\n202 \n\nIbid. \n\n203 The Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; The objectives of the association \nare to: a) promote the welfare and quality of life of the peoples of South Asia; b) accelerate economic \ngrowth, social progress, and cultural development, ensuring individuals can live with dignity and realize \ntheir full potential; c) enhance collective self-reliance among South Asian countries; d) foster mutual \ntrust, understanding, and appreciation of shared challenges; e) encourage collaboration and mutual \nassistance in economic, social, cultural, technical, and scientific areas; (f) strengthen cooperation with \nother developing countries; g) collaborate in international forums on common interests; h) engage with \ninternational and regional organizations with similar goals\n\n204 The Convention on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia, 2002. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1589\n\neighteen years. The majority of child marriages involve minor girls. The \njoint General Recommendation and Comment on harmful practices \nfrom the CRC and the CEDAW Committee states205:\n\n“A child marriage is considered to be a form of forced \nmarriage, given that one and/or both parties have not \nexpressed full, free, and informed consent. As a matter \nof respecting the child’s evolving capacities and autonomy \nin making decisions that affect her or his life, a marriage \nof a mature, capable child below 18 years of age may be \nallowed in exceptional circumstances, provided that the \nchild is at least 16 years of age and that such decisions \nare made by a judge based on legitimate exceptional \ngrounds defined by law and on the evidence of maturity, \nwithout deference to culture and tradition.”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n141. The joint General Recommendation and Comment proposed a detailed \nregime of laws to address forced and early marriage, including raising \nawareness, addressing root causes, ensuring proper registration \nof births and marriages, protection orders, and ensuring access to \nremedies and reparations, including the use of criminal law.206\n\n142. This issue has been dealt with in international case laws as well. \nIn Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen,207 the International Criminal \nCourt’s Appeals Chamber focused on a former commander of the \nLord’s Resistance Army who was charged with war crimes and \ncrimes against humanity. The court had to adjudicate whether the \nlegal characterization of ‘forced marriage’ could be classified as an \n‘other inhumane act’ under Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.208 The \nTrial Chamber noted that forced marriage is similar in nature and \ngravity to the acts listed in Article 7(1).209\n\n205 Joint general recommendation No. 31 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against \nWomen /General comment No. 18 of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on harmful practices”, UN \nDocCEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC18 (2014), para 20. \n\n206 \n\nIbid. \n\n207 No. ICC-02/04-01/15 A A2 (Ongwen Trial Judgment). \n\n208 The Rome Statute, Article 7(1); “Other inhumane Act” is defined as (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar \n\ncharacter intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”\n\n209 Ongwen Trial Judgment, para. 2751.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1590 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n143. The violation of relational autonomy has been characterized in \nvarious ways under international law. Within the framework of \ninternational human rights law, forced marriage fundamentally \ndenies individuals the right to freely and consensually enter into a \nconjugal union. This denial not only infringes upon personal liberty \nbut also undermines the essential dignity and agency of individuals, \nparticularly women, who are disproportionately affected by such \npractices. The Court noted: \n\n“The first type of harm caused by forced marriage, the \nviolation of relational autonomy, has been described in \nvarious ways under international law. Under international \nhuman rights law, the crux of forced marriage is the \ndenial of the right to freely and consensually enter into \nmarriage. In other words, the focus is on consent to \nmarriage. For example, the International Covenant \non Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) states that \n“No marriage shall be entered into without the free \nand full consent of the intending spouses”. Similarly, \nthe Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of \nDiscrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”). The \nsame right freely to choose a spouse and to enter \ninto marriage only with their free and full consent”. \nInternational human rights law bodies have recognized \nthat forced marriage, as defined under international human \nrights law, can take place both in peacetime and in armed \nconflict. International criminal law similarly recognizes the \ndeprivation of relational autonomy through the imposition \nof a “conjugal union” on a victim. This union need not \nbe marriage as recognized under domestic law, as it \nalso includes relationships in which the victim is forcibly \nattached to a particular person outside of the context of \ndomestic marriage law. These forced conjugal unions \ncan take place during armed conflict or ‘peacetime’ mass \natrocity, and under oppressive regimes, and can occur \nregardless of the victim’s existing marriage status.”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\ni. \n\nRight to free choice and autonomy\n\n144. The issue of forced marriage is intricately linked to child marriage, as \nboth practices deny individuals, particularly minors, the fundamental \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1591\n\nright to make autonomous decisions regarding their lives. The imposition \nof forced marriage reflects the broader systemic issue of coerced \nrelationships that deny the victims agency and autonomy. This lack of \nagency is heightened in the context of child marriage, where children \nare subjected to societal and familial pressures that undermine their \nability to give informed consent. This mirrors the definition of forced \nmarriage as articulated in international law, where relational autonomy \nis violated, and the individual’s right to freely choose a partner is \ndisregarded. International law has evolved a rights-based framework \nto address myriad issues. Child marriage is an evil against which the \ninternational community has reflected its commitment through the \nrecognition of rights. These rights are traced below.\n\n145. This encompasses the right to free and informed consent and the \nright against gender-based violence.210 These interconnected rights \nform the foundation for ensuring that marriage is a consensual \npartnership rather than a coercive arrangement, particularly when \naddressing the issue of child marriage.\n\na. Right to free and informed consent\n\n146. Various international instruments211 emphasize the necessity for \nparties entering into marriage to provide free and full consent. \nCEDAW’s General Recommendations on Marriage and family \nrelations further elucidate that when men and women marry, they \nassume important responsibilities. Consequently, marriage should \nnot be permitted before they attain full maturity and capacity to act.212 \nFor women to exercise full, free, and informed consent as outlined \nin Article 16(1)(b) of CEDAW,213 they must possess the cognitive \ncapacity to comprehend the meaning and responsibilities associated \nwith marriage. This entails having access to comprehensive \ninformation about their potential spouse, understanding the institution \n\n210 \n\n‘GBV’\n\n211 See Article 16(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, Article 10(1) of the \nInternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 1966, Article 23(3) of \nthe ICCPR, Article 1 of the UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and \nRegistration of Marriages 1962, Article 16(1)(b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of \nDiscrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 1975, Article 17(3) of the American Convention on Human \nRights 1969, and Article 33 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004. \n\n212 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW General Recommendation \n\nNo. 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations 1994, para 16. \n\n213 CEDAW, article 16(1)b states ‘The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only \n\nwith their free and full consent’. \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1592 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nof marriage, and recognizing their rights to choose if, when, and \nwhom to marry. \n\n147. This principle has been elucidated in different judgments, reinforcing \nthe right to free and informed consent within the context of marriage. \nIn National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister \nof Justice214 the Constitutional Court of South Africa emphasized \nthat autonomy encompasses more than mere freedom from state \ninterference; it acknowledges the need for individuals to choose their \npartners freely. The court in that case held that:\n\n“117. Autonomy must mean far more than the right to occupy \nan envelope of space in which a socially detached individual \ncan act freely from interference by the state. What is crucial \nis the nature of the activity, not its site. While recognising \nthe unique worth of each person, the Constitution does \nnot presuppose that a holder of rights is as an isolated, \nlonely and abstract figure possessing a disembodied and \nsocially disconnected self. It acknowledges that people \nlive in their bodies, their communities, their cultures, their \nplaces and their times. It is not for the state to choose or \nto arrange the choice of partner, but for the partners to \nchoose themselves”\n\n148. Similarly in Artavia Murillo ET AL v. Costa Rica,215 the Inter-\nAmerican Court of Human Rights addressed the question of whether \nthe State’s prohibition on the practice of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) \nconstituted an arbitrary interference with the right to private life. The \ncourt affirmed that the right to private life extends beyond privacy to \ninclude personal autonomy and the freedom to establish relationships. \nThe Court held that:\n\n“The scope of the protection of the right to private life \nhas been interpreted in broad terms by the international \nhuman rights courts, when indicating that this goes \nbeyond the right to privacy. The protection of private \nlife encompasses a series of factors associated with \nthe dignity of the individual, including, for example, \nthe ability to develop his or her own personality and \n\n214 1999 (1) SA 6, CC (South Africa). \n\n215 \n\nInter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 257 (American Court of Human Rights). \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1593\n\naspirations, to determine his or her own identity and \nto define his or her own personal relationships. The \nconcept of private life encompasses aspects of physical \nand social identity, including the right to personal autonomy, \npersonal development and the right to establish and \ndevelop relationships with other human beings and with the \noutside world. The effective exercise of the right to private \nlife is decisive for the possibility of exercising personal \nautonomy on the future course of relevant events for a \nperson’s quality of life. Private life includes the way in which \nindividual views himself and how he decides to project this \nview towards others, and is an essential condition for the \nfree development of the personality.”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n149. These judgments emphasize the critical role of free and informed \n\nconsent in marriage, particularly regarding child marriage. \n\nb. Right against gender-based violence\n\n150. Further, the right against GBV is recognised. Article 34 of the \nCRC provides a right to protection from sexual exploitation and \nabuse, defining child marriage as a form of sexual exploitation.216 \nArticle 19 prohibits all forms of physical or mental violence, abuse, or \nexploitation, with many young brides suffering these consequences.217 \nChild marriage frequently leads to violence against child wives, \nand although CEDAW does not specifically label child marriage as \nviolence against women, it identifies forced marriage as a form of \nfamily violence in General Recommendations 19 on violence against \nwomen.218 The Committee interprets Articles 2(f), 5, and 10(c) \ntogether, recognizing that traditional attitudes regarding women’s \nsubordination perpetuate practices involving violence or coercion, \nsuch as forced marriage.219\n\n151. The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, \nadopted by the General Assembly, defines violence as any act \n\n216 CRC, Article 34. \n\n217 CRC, Article 19. \n\n218 See CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against Women, Adopted at the Eleventh \nSession of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1992), Document \nA/47/38 [Para 11]. \n\n219 \n\nIbid, [Para 24]. \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1594 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nof GBV that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or \npsychological harm or suffering to women.220 The Declaration calls on \nStates to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish \nacts of violence against women. Article 4 requires member states to \ncondemn violence against women and not invoke custom, tradition, \nor religion to evade their obligations to eliminate such violence.221\n\n152. The Istanbul Convention is the first international treaty to contain \na definition of gender as a socially constructed category that \ndefines “women” and “men” according to socially assigned roles, \nbehaviours, activities, and attributes.222 It firmly establishes the link \nbetween achieving gender equality and the eradication of violence \nagainst women. Based on this premise, it recognizes the structural \nnature of violence against women and that it is a manifestation \nof the historically unequal power relations between women and \nmen. The Convention specifically asks State parties to ensure that \nculture, custom, religion, tradition or so-called ‘honour’ shall not be \nconsidered as justification for any acts of violence. Evidently, the \nhuman and fundamental right against GBV has found firm roots \nin the international sphere. This affords protection against child \nmarriage, as it is a form of GBV that disproportionately affects \ngirls and women. It subjects them to early and forced marriages \nperpetuating power imbalances and often leading to physical, \nemotional, and sexual abuse. \n\nii. Right to education\n\n153. The right to education is violated by the commission of child marriage \nunder international law. These rights are manifested in the rights \nof children to – primary education, information, and sex education. \n\na. Right to primary education\n\n154. The CRC mandates that States ensure primary education is free and \ncompulsory. Article 28 states that the child has the right to education,223 \n\n220 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, A/RES/48/104, UN \n\nGeneral Assembly (20 December 1991). \n\n221 DEVAW, Article 4. \n\n222 Council of Europe (2014). The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence \n\nagainst Women and Domestic Violence. \n\n223 CRC, Article 28. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1595\n\nwhile Article 29 emphasizes that education should develop the \nchild’s personality, talents, and abilities, as well as promote respect \nfor human rights and fundamental freedoms.224\n\n155. The CRC’s Guidelines for Periodic Reports require States to outline \nspecific measures taken to ensure compulsory primary education, \nincluding minimum age for enrolment and compulsory education.225 \nThe Committee further extends this obligation to include secondary \neducation, reinforcing the need for comprehensive educational \npolicies. The Concluding Comments of the CEDAW Committee has \nexpressed ongoing concern regarding the impact of early and forced \nmarriages on school dropout rates among girls and urged States to \nadopt all available measures to eliminate child marriage.226\n\n156. Research from UNESCO highlights that, in many countries, marriage \nand schooling are seen as mutually exclusive.227 In South Asia, \nparticularly in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, child brides are four \ntimes more likely to be out of school than their unmarried peers.228 \nWhile the relationship between education and child marriage is clear, \nthe mechanisms driving this connection are complex, suggesting \nthat interventions must be multifaceted to address both issues \nsimultaneously.\n\nb. Right to be informed\n\n157. International obligations also emphasize the importance of awareness \nand education regarding the adverse effects of child marriage. \nArticle 12 of the CRC asserts that children should be provided with \ninformation that aids their understanding of issues affecting them, \nincluding the potential consequences of early marriage.229 The right \nto be informed empowers young individuals to make autonomous \n\n224 CRC, Article 29. \n\n225 Concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2002-2023) – extracts \nconcerning inclusive education and disability, gender and ethnic background and related issues. \n\n226 See Concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women \n(2002-2010) – extracts concerning inclusive education; Also see CEDAW Committee Concluding \nObservations, India (Jan 1990). UN Doc. A/55/38, Para 78. \n\n227 UNESCO (2021). Reimagining our futures together: a new social contract for education, International \nCommission on the Futures of Education; See also UNFPA (2012). Marrying Too Young: End Child \nMarriage, 76 p. \n\n228 \n\nIbid. \n\n229 CRC, Article 12. \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1596 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nchoices about their lives, fostering an environment conducive to \nresisting harmful practices such as child marriage. Education plays \na critical role in this regard; when girls are aware of their rights and \nthe detrimental effects of early marriage on their health, education, \nand economic prospects, they are better equipped to advocate for \nthemselves and their peers.\n\nc. Right to sex education\n\n158. Major United Nations conferences of the 1990s, such as the \nInternational Conference on Population and Development230 held \nin Cairo in 1994, emphasized the importance of human rights, \ngender equality, sexual and reproductive health, and HIV/AIDS \nawareness.231 The ICPD’s Programme of Action affirmed that \nsexual health is a vital component of overall health, stating that \nall individuals should have access to information and services \nrelated to sexual and reproductive health.232 In subsequent years, \ndocuments like the Yogyakarta Principles233 and the Bali Global \nYouth Forum have built upon these foundations, addressing the \nrights of marginalized groups, including adolescents, to access \ncomprehensive sexuality education. In 2012, the UN Commission \non Population and Development reaffirmed these principles - calling \nstates to provide evidence-based comprehensive education on \nhuman sexuality, sexual and reproductive health, human rights, \nand gender equality, enabling youth to engage with their sexuality \npositively and responsibly.234\n\n159. In a landmark ruling, the European Court of Human Rights235 upheld \nyoung people’s right to sexuality education in schools. This case \n\n230 “ICPD”\n\n231 UN Population Fund (1995). Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, \nCairo, 5-13 September 1994, A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1; UN coordinated an International Conference on \nPopulation and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, Egypt. Its resulting Programme of Action is the steering \ndocument for the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).\n\n232 \n\nIbid. \n\n233 \n\nInternational Commission of Jurists (2007). Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of \nInternational Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. International \nCommission of Jurists. \n\n234 See UNESCO (2018). International technical guidance on sexuality education: an evidence-informed \n\napproach. \n\n235 A.R. and L.R. v. Switzerland, application no. 22338/15 (EtCHR). \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1597\n\ninvolved a refusal by a primary school to grant a request from a \nparent seeking to exempt her daughter, then seven years old, from \nsex education lessons. The EtCHR opined that this refusal violated \nthe right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. It also \nviolates Article 2 (the right to life) and Article 8 (the right to respect \nfor private and family life). The Court recognized that one of the \naims of sex education is to prevent sexual violence and exploitation, \nthreats that compromise children’s physical and mental health.236 It \nalso stressed that state education should prepare children for social \nrealities, justifying the inclusion of sexual education for even very \nyoung children in primary education.\n\niii. Right to development of children\n\n160. A lack of education denies girls their right to personal development \nas guaranteed in the CRC which is crucial for them to prepare \nfor adulthood and effectively contribute to the future well-being \nof their families and society. The CRC highlights the significance \nof personal development, emphasizing that every child has the \ninherent right to develop their personality, talents, and mental and \nphysical abilities to their fullest potential.237 The right to personal \ndevelopment is intricately linked to various aspects of a child’s \nwell-being, particularly health. The CRC interrelates with five other \narticles,238 which collectively address eight specific dimensions of \nchild development that require protection: physical development, \nmental development, moral development, social development, \ncultural development, spiritual development, development of the \npersonality, and development of talent.\n\n161. Under Article 29(1)(a) of the CRC, States Parties agree that the \neducation of the child shall be directed toward the development \nof the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities \nto their fullest potential.239 Article 29(1)(d) further emphasizes that \neducation should be oriented toward the preparation of the child \nfor a responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, \n\n236 \n\nIbid. \n\n237 See OHCHR (2013). Realising the Right to Development: Essays in Commemoration of 25 Years of the \n\nUnited Nations Declaration on the Right to Development. \n\n238 CRC, Articles 18(1), 23(3), 27(1), 29(1)(a), and 32(1).\n\n239 CRC, Article 29(1)(a)\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1598 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\npeace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all \npeoples.240 Similarly, Article 13(1) of the International Covenant on \nEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights241 stipulates that education \nshall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society.242 \nArticle 13(2) reinforces this by asserting that education should be \ndirected to the full development of the human personality and the \nsense of its dignity.”243\n\n162. As Professor Nico Schrijver argues, the right to development \nfunctions as a cluster right, encompassing a range of interconnected \nrights.244 These include the right to a decent standard of living, which \nencompasses the right to food, water, clothing, and housing; the \nright to work; the right to education; the right to life; and the right to \nfreedom of expression and organization. Together, these rights form \na comprehensive ‘human right to development,’ which is essential for \nempowering children, particularly girls, to realize their full potential \nand actively participate in their communities. As we shall explore \nbelow, these rights ought to influence our understanding of the law \nin dealing with child rights in India.\n\nVII. India’s obligation\n\n163. Article 51 of the Indian Constitution emphasizes the importance of \ninternational law and treaty obligations, urging the Indian state to \nmake concerted efforts to adhere to and respect international legal \nstandards245. This provision establishes a foundation for integrating \ninternational human rights law into domestic legal frameworks, \nparticularly concerning the protection of vulnerable populations such \nas children.\n\n164. This Court has consistently affirmed India’s obligation with regard \ninternational conventions and norms when interpreting domestic \n\n240 CRC, Article 29(1)(d). \n\n241 UN General Assembly (1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, United \n\nNations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3. \n\n242 \n\nICESCR, Article 13(1). \n\n243 \n\nICESCR, Article 13(2). \n\n244 Nico Schrijver, Development without Destruction: The UN and Global Resource Management \n\n(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2010), p. 221. \n\n245 The Constitution of India, Article 51; The article deals with Promotion of international peace and security - \nThe State shall endeavour to--(a) promote international peace and security; (b) maintain just and \nhonourable relations between nations;(c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the \ndealings of organised peoples with one another; and (d) encourage settlement of international disputes \nby arbitration.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1599\n\nlaws.246 In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,247 this Court formulated \nbasic principles and guidelines based on international instruments \naimed at preventing sexual harassment at the workplace.248 In Vellore \nCitizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India249 this Court recognized \naspects related to sustainable development as part of customary \ninternational law.\n\n165. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. AK Chopra250 this Court \nhad the occasion to opine on the judiciary’s obligation to give due \nregard to international conventions, particularly when there is no \ninconsistency between these conventions and domestic laws, or \nwhen domestic law is silent on a particular issue.\n\n“This Court has in numerous cases emphasized that \nwhile discussing constitutional requirements, court and \ncounsel must never forget the core principle embodied \nin the international conventions and instruments and as \nfar as possible, give effect to the principles contained in \nthose international instruments. The courts are under an \nobligation to give due regard to international conventions \nand norms for construing domestic laws, more so, when \nthere is no inconsistency between them and there is a \nvoid in domestic law.” \n\n166. In M/s Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. M/s Super Cassette \nIndustries Ltd.251 this Court expressed its willingness to adopt \nprinciple of international conventions to which India is not a signatory \nwhere they were compatible with Indian law. This approach was \nfurther exemplified in Ravindra Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India252 \n\n246 See Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admn. (1980) 3 SCC 526; Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd. v. \nAudrey D’ Costa (1987) 2 SCC 469; Sheela Barse v. Secy., Children’s Aid Society [(1987) 3 SCC 50, 51] \nSCC at p. 54; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union \nof India (1997) 3 SCC 433 and D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. (1997) 1 SCC 416, 438. \n\n247 \n\n[1997] Supp. 3 SCR 404 : 1997 AIR 3011\n\n248 These guidelines were informed by several international instruments, including the Convention on \nthe Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Universal Declaration of \nHuman Rights, and the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 111 on discrimination in \nemployment.\n\n249 1996 INSC 952; The Court incorporated principles like the “precautionary principle” and the “polluter \n\npays principle” into domestic law.\n\n250 \n\n[1999] 1 SCR 117 : (1999) 1 SCC 759\n\n251 This position has been reiterated by various other decisions of this Court. See, for instance, National \n\nLegal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438. \n\n252 Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v Union of India, 2021 INSC 916.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1600 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nwhere this Court maintained that even when India is not a signatory \nto certain international treaties, the principles enshrined within them \ncould still inform the interpretation of domestic legislation.\n\n167. The overarching theme emerging from these judgments is that India \nhas a dual obligation: to respect its commitments under international \ntreaties and to interpret domestic laws in a manner consistent with \ninternational human rights standards. This is particularly relevant \nconcerning child marriage, as India has ratified several international \ninstruments that set the minimum age for marriage at eighteen, \nincluding CEDAW253 and the CRC254. Moreover, even if India is not \na party to certain regional conventions that address child marriage \ndirectly, the principles of non-discrimination, the best interests of the \nchild, and the right to free and informed consent should guide national \nlegislation and policy in this area. These fundamental principles are \nembedded in various international human rights instruments and \nform the backbone of child protection efforts globally.\n\n168. As Prof. Rangita De Silva-De Alwis argues in her report, Child \nMarriage and the Law – Legislative Reform Initiative Paper Series255 \nchild marriage must be treated as a human rights issue to highlight its \nseriousness and prompt state parties to amend their laws and policies \naccordingly.256 She also emphasises that framing child marriage \nwithin international treaties compels States to be accountable for their \ninaction on this issue. If a treaty establishes a monitoring body or a \nmechanism to address complaints, any non-compliant state party may \nface public rulings against it.257 We believe that such public scrutiny \ncan pressure the state to implement effective measures that protect \nchildren from the harmful effects of early marriage.\n\nVIII. Constitutional guarantees against child marriage\n\n169. The right to free choice and autonomy, education and development \nof the child with all their offshoots are firmly recognised in this \n\n253 \n\nIndia ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women on July 9, \n1993. \n\n254 \n\nIndia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1992. \n\n255 Rangita De Silva De-Alwis, Child Marriage and the Law – Legislative Reform Initiative Paper Series \n\n(New York: Division of Policy and Planning, UNICEF, 2007), para 28. \n\n256 \n\nIbid, 6. \n\n257 \n\nIbid; See also Douglas, ‘The Significance of International Law’, 89-90. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1601\n\nCourt’s jurisprudence and the myriad legislations in India which \nwe have traced above. The evolution and progress of child rights \nin the international arena have simultaneously been evolved and \nrecognised in India.\n\n170. The material deprivation of health, education, employment and life \nopportunities wreaked by child marriage is an affront to cherished \nconstitutional principles of equality, liberty and free expression. \nChildren who are thrown into forced marriages are deprived of their \nright to development of the child. Three quarters of a century after \nthe commencement of the Constitution, child marriage remains a \npresent and continuous threat to our society, social progress and \nindividual liberty. The Constitution does not countenance such an \naffront. We shall trace the gamut of rights accruing against child \nmarriage from the Constitution. \n\n171. The right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution258 \nis violated by the commission of child marriage. All children married \nas minors are denied their right to choice and autonomy, right to \neducation, right to sexuality and the right to development of the child. \nGirls who are married as children are denied their right to health. \nFirst, we shall analyze the right to choice, autonomy and sexuality, \nthen we shall explore the right to health. We shall thereafter trace \nthe right to childhood which includes the right to education and \ndevelopment.\n\nA. Right to self-determination: choice, autonomy and sexuality \n\nof children\n\n172. Life’s meaning for any person is animated by their dignity, the ability \nto make free choices, the autonomy to have them translated into \nreality and to plan the peaks and troughs of life in good health. The \njourney a person travels from birth to death is made meaningful and \nenjoyable by the realization of these rights which are guaranteed \nunder Article 21. \n\n173. Child marriage deprives children of their agency, autonomy and \nright to fully develop and enjoy their childhood. The right to free \nchoice and autonomy in marriage encompasses three fundamental \nrights: the right to free and informed consent, the right against \ngender based violence, and the right to sexual autonomy. These \n\n258 Article 21, The Constitution of India. \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1602 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\ninterconnected rights form the foundation for ensuring that marriage \nis a consensual partnership rather than a coercive arrangement, \nparticularly when addressing the issue of child marriage.\n\n174. Girls who are married off early are not only denied their childhood \nbut are also forced into social isolation on account of being cutoff \nfrom their natal family, friends and other support systems. They are \nleft to the mercies of their marital home and in-laws and denied their \ninnocence which is native to a meaningful childhood experience. Boys \nwho are married early are forced to take up more responsibilities and \nare pressured to play the role of a provider to the family, earlier in \nlife. Patriarchy requires members of a marital union to play specific \nroles. It forces men to play the public role in a marriage and fend for \nthe family by being responsible for its economic and occupational \ndevelopment. Both sexes are adversely affected by forced and early \nmarriage. \n\n175. In India, marriage has traditionally been a religious ceremony \norganised by the families of the bride and groom. The union is looked \nat as an integration of the two families and the object of facilitating \nan organically compatible relationship between the bride and the \ngroom is inconsequential. The mandate to recreate a patriarchal \nfamily structure is tied to social norms and expectations. One of the \nprimary manifestations of this is the control over sexuality. While \nsocial norms rooted in a patriarchal mindset seek to control the \nsexuality of all persons, its nexus with child marriage is undeniable. \n\n176. Patriarchy offends the most basic rights of people by creating a \nhierarchy-based order of subjugation and static power distribution in \nsociety. When an institution of patriarchy operates, it never denies \nrights in a unidimensional way. The frontal assault of patriarchal \ninstitutions is in, all at once, denying any deviance and valuing some \nover others. In the instance of child marriage, the right to sexuality \nof a person is systematically dismantled. The assault starts with the \nsexualisation of the child at a tender age. As we have stated above, \nmarriage is an institution with legal standing in which sexual conduct \nis legitimised and promoted by the State and society. Marrying in \nchildhood has the effect of objectifying the child. The practice of child \nmarriage imposes mature burdens on children who are not physically \nor mentally prepared to comprehend the significance of marriage. \nWhen women are forced into marriages to protect their ‘chastity’ \nand ‘virginity’ she is denied her right to sexuality, bodily autonomy \nand the freedom to make choices for herself as she sees fit.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1603\n\n177. The minor is then boxed with the expectation of compulsory \nheterosexuality. The ability of a person to experience sexual desire \norganically and to navigate their choice in intimacy is effaced \nat the altar of tradition and social norm. At an age which must \nbe instructed by the ability to make mistakes and learn from life \nexperiences, children are stunted and forcibly fit into boxes. The \nmulti-dimensional assault of child marriage is therefore not only \noppressive to heterosexual girls and boys but also to all gender \nand sexual minorities. Choices in matters of sexuality are integral \nto human desire. Our Constitution recognises the right a person \nhas over all aspects of their sexuality.259 The control of the sexuality \nof a girl child from orthodox moral virtues restricts her ability to \nexperience life in its fullest dimension. Sexuality is not only the \norientation a person may have in matters of romance and intimacy \nbut also the ability to navigate the desires of a person regardless \nof their choice of partner or the option not to have a partner. Men \nand women alike are victimised by compulsory heterosexuality. In \nchild marriage, their limited agency within heteropatriarchy is also \ntaken away in infancy.\n\n178. Upon marriage, a girl is expected to bear children and prove her \nfertility. Decisions of reproduction are withdrawn from the girl and \nplaced in the hands of the family. The right to choice and autonomy \nof a woman who is married as a child is violated by the system \nof child marriage. When minor girls are forced to make conjugal \nrelations, they experience post-traumatic stress and depression \nemanating from sexual abuse by an elder partner.260 Child marriage \nleads to irreversible physical and psychological damage in girls. \nHer choice is eviscerated in matters of selection of partner, time of \nmarriage, reproductive freedom and sexuality. Article 21 protects \nthese rights.261\n\n179. In X v. Principal Secretary,262 a three-Judge Bench of this Court \nspeaking through one of us (DY Chandrachud, CJ) held that the right \nto choice and autonomy includes the right to reproductive freedom. \nElucidating on the contours of this right, the Court held as follows:\n\n259 Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1; Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39.\n\n260 NCPCR (2017). A Statistical Analysis of Child Marriage in India, Based on Census, 2011. Young Lives \n\nand National Commission for Protection of Child Rights.\n\n261 Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan KM (2018) 10 SCC 1; X v. Principal Secretary (2023) 9 SCC 433\n\n262 \n\n[2022] 12 SCR 246 : (2023) 9 SCC 433\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1604 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n“101. The ambit of reproductive rights is not restricted to \nthe right of women to have or not have children. It also \nincludes the constellation of freedoms and entitlements that \nenable a woman to decide freely on all matters relating to \nher sexual and reproductive health. Reproductive rights \ninclude the right to access education and information \nabout contraception and sexual health, the right to decide \nwhether and what type of contraceptives to use, the \nright to choose whether and when to have children, the \nright to access safe and legal abortions, and the right \nto reproductive healthcare. Women must also have the \nautonomy to make decisions concerning these rights, free \nfrom coercion or violence.”\n\n180. This Court has also articulated the right to self-determination in \nNational Legal Services Authority v. Union of India.263 Choice \nand autonomy are the vocabulary in which self-determination is \nexercised. This court held that the right to self-determination which \nis protected under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right \nof a person to determine their gender. The meaningful realisation \nof this right assumes that the underlying conditions in the society \nare feasible for its free exercise. This Court in NALSA (supra) has \nheld that the right to self-determination is an integral part of personal \nautonomy and self-expression and falls within the realm of personal \nliberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.\n\n181. A nine-Judge Bench of this Court in KS Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J) \nv. Union of India,264 held that the fundamental right to privacy \nconnotes the right to spatial control, decisional autonomy, and \ninformation control. This Court held that privacy is an essential aspect \nof dignity and protects the ability to make choices for oneself. This \nCourt has conclusively held that personal aspects of life, including \nfamily, marriage, procreation and sexual orientation are intrinsic to \nthe dignity of an individual and enjoys protection under Article 21. \nFrom this emerges the ability of a person to retain autonomy of their \nbody and mind. \n\n182. The Court held that liberty enables the individual to have a choice \nof preferences on various facets of life including what and how one \n\n263 \n\n[2014] 5 SCR 119 : (2014) 5 SCC 438\n\n264 \n\n[2017] 10 SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1 at 298\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1605\n\nwill eat, the way one will dress, the faith one will espouse and a \nmyriad other matters on which autonomy and self-determination \nrequire a choice to be made within the privacy of the mind. In Anuj \nGarg v. Hotel Association of India,265 a three-Judge Bench of this \ncourt held that the right to self-determination is an integral offshoot \nof gender justice discourse. Justice SB Sinha speaking for the Court \nheld that the law and its enforcement strategies must reflect the right \nof women to freedom. \n\n183. Despite the enactment of the PCMA, the abysmal number of \nprosecutions and the continued existence of the practice violates the \nessence of this Court’s holding. These rights and values are equally \niterated in international law to which India owes an obligation. \n\nB. Right to health\n\n184. The right to reproductive freedom which we have traced above is \npart of the constellation of rights in which the right to the health of a \nperson also finds its place. Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees \nthe right to life and personal liberty. Neither of these elements could \nbe completely fulfilled without the ability of individuals to lead a healthy \nlife. Our Constitution recognises the right to health as an inalienable \naspect of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.266 \nWomen who are married young are forced to bear children earlier \nin life. They are likely to have their first childbirth before the age of \neighteen and are likely to conceive more than once within twenty-four \nmonths. The health penalty imposed on women in child marriages is \nwrit large in the complications arising from adolescent pregnancies. \nTeenage pregnancy leads to health complications such as fistula, \npregnancy complications and death during childbirth. Early childbirth \nalso leads to the deterioration of maternal mortality and morbidity. \n\n185. The maternal morbidity is associated with adolescent fertility – typical \nto child marriage. It is marked by common negative health outcomes \nsuch as anaemia, high blood pressure, toxaemia, delayed or obstructed \nlabour, complications in pregnancy and weight loss during lactation.267 \n\n265 \n\n[2007] 12 SCR 991 : (2008) 3 SCC 1\n\n266 Pt. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 286; Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samiti v. State \n\nof West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37\n\n267 Jaya Sagade. Child Marriage in India: Socio-legal and human Rights Dimensions. Oxford University \n\nPress, 2nd ed. (2012) 17.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1606 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nThe adverse health effects of early marriage and pregnancy have \ndented the nutritional status of adolescent girls in India. These ill \nhealth outcomes haunt the woman throughout her life cause severe \nimpediments in navigating the daily trifles and occasions of life. \n\n186. Studies have shown that women married as children are more likely to \nbe sterilized earlier in life. The sterilization is associated with families \ngetting the desired number of children earlier in the marital life of the \ncouple. Sterilization of women in child marriage is indicative of loss \nof control of a woman over her own reproductive choices. This also \nleads to more unprotected sex which may expose women to risks \nof contracting sexually transmitted diseases like HIV.\n\n187. In Independent Thought v. Union of India,268 this Court struck \ndown the marital exception to rape in Section 375 IPC as it relates \nto underage wives. The Court had the opportunity to delve into the \neffects of child marriage and its interposition with the right to health. \nJustice Deepak Gupta in his opinion has traced the right to health \nin the context of child marriage as follows:\n\n“179. There can be no dispute that every citizen of this \ncountry has the right to get good healthcare. Every citizen \ncan expect that the State shall make best endeavours \nfor ensuring that the health of the citizen is not adversely \naffected. By now it is well settled by a catena of judgments \nof this Court that the “right to life” envisaged in Article 21 \nof the Constitution of India is not merely a right to live an \nanimal existence. This Court has repeatedly held that \nright to life means a right to live with human dignity. \nLife should be meaningful and worth living. Life has \nmany shades. Good health is the raison d’être of a \ngood life. Without good health there cannot be a good \nlife. In the case of a minor girl child good health would \nmean her right to develop as a healthy woman. This \nnot only requires good physical health but also good \nmental health. The girl child must be encouraged to \nbloom into a healthy woman. The girl child must not \nbe deprived of her right of choice.....”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n268 \n\n[2017] 13 SCR 821 : (2017) 10 SCC 800\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1607\n\n188. Child marriage inflicts tangible and lifelong physical and mental injuries \nto its members. The right to health is made illusory by all accounts \nwithin such an institution. The effect of child marriage denies women \ntheir health which is vital to lead a dignified life. \n\nC. Right to childhood: education and development\n\n189. Childhood represents the best of what human life has to offer. A \ngood childhood is marked by limitless imagination and the ability \nto dream big. The audacity to envision futures filled with success, \nhappiness, divergence and enjoyment occurs naturally to all – but \nis manifested most authentically in childhood. The right to childhood \nis the right to be able to develop the experiences of childhood \ninto tangible life skills and intellectual pursuits. It is marked by \nthe expectation of the child that they are not on their own but are \nentitled to the supportive network of their parents, siblings, family, \nfriends and the entire society. As the saying goes – it takes a village \nto raise a child. The foremost method by which society commits to \ndeveloping a child is by imparting education. Institutions of learning \nare centres for society to channel knowledge and experience and \nmake them available to children. Education allows its recipients to \nbenefit from the best of human advances and claim a degree of \nownership in its fruits. \n\n190. Education allows a person to develop and articulate their thoughts \nand learn the language of global engagement. It is a call for greater \nemancipation of the mind. Education breathes life into intellect, \ndimension into perspective and openness in minds. It opens doors \nto employment opportunities and enables people to stand on their \nown feet in professional and personal pursuits of life. The detrimental \neffect of not being educated affects girls most starkly since they are \nalready vulnerable to agents of oppression on account of their gender. \nMarriage for most women in patriarchal societies is an announcement \nof educational conclusion. \n\n191. It is uncommon for women to continue education after marriage \nwithout the express approval and wish of the in-laws and husband. \nThe imposition of a marital family on the education of women may \nbe an experience common to all women. But when the woman is \nmarried as a child, her education is arrested in place during a pivotal \nperiod of brain development. The minority of a woman’s age at the \ntime of her marriage has a heightened impact on her education. The \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1608 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nright to primary education is a fundamental right expressly enshrined \nunder Article 21-A. \n\n192. However, the right to education under Article 21 holds broader \nsignificance. The right to information about routine ways to make \nlife meaningful and be educated on the adverse effects of child \nmarriage falls under Article 21. Children are entitled to be aware \nof their rights and the ill effects that marriage unleashes on them. \nThe entitlement of the child flows from the right to education. \nEducation cannot be restricted to pedantic and bookish classroom \nlearning. The State certainly has an obligation to provide free and \ncompulsory education to all between the ages of six and fourteen. \nThe mandatory minimum prescribed by Article 21-A, however, \ncannot restrict the right of children to be informed of significant \nand life altering dangers.\n\n193. In a litany of judgments, this Court has firmly grounded the right to \neducation into our constitutional jurisprudence.269 While dealing with a \nPIL against physically and mentally challenged children being kept in \njails, this Court in Sheela Barse II v. Union of India270 has recognised \nthat it is the duty of the State to ensure the full development of a \nchild’s personality. The articulation of the right to development of \na child puts a positive obligation on the State to create conditions \nfeasible and resources necessary for the full development of children. \nIn addition to the rights tracible to Part III of the Constitution, the \ndevelopment of child is also a part of the Directive Principles of State \nPolicy.271Article 39 stipulates certain principles of policy to be followed \nby the State. Clause (f) of Article 39 reads as follows:\n\n“(f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to \ndevelop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom \nand dignity and that childhood and youth are protected \nagainst exploitation and against moral and material \nabandonment.”\n\n194. The duty of the State corresponds to the right to development of a \nchild which is tracible to Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 21 and 15. The right \n\n269 Unni Krishnan JP v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645; Society For Unaided Private Schools of \nRajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1; Avinash Mehrotra v. Union of India, 2009 INSC 498; Bachpan \nBachao Andolan v. Union of India (2011) 5 SCC 1; Maharishi Mahesh Yogi Vedic Vishwavidyalaya v. \nState of M.P. (2013) 15 SCC 677; Sampurna Behura v. Union of India (2018) 4 SCC 433. \n\n270 \n\n[1983] 2 SCR 337 : 1983 AIR 378 \n\n271 \n\n‘DPSP’\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1609\n\ncomprehends the ability of a child to exercise free speech, express \nauthenticity and live a life of liberty and dignity. It falls on the State \nto ensure that children are informed of ways in which their life is \nlikely to interact with society and the cautions to bear in the journey \nthey chart out in life so that they may enjoy and exercise their rights \nunder Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(a) and 21. \n\n195. Child marriage is one such threat. Sexual conduct within this relation, \nor for that matter outside marriage, is another aspect of education \nand information. Sex education becomes imperative for children \nto process experiences which they are to inevitably encounter. In \nJust Rights for Children Alliance v. S Harish,272 one of us (JB \nPardiwala, J) has lucidly reflected on the importance of sex education. \nThe Court has opined that:\n\n“238. In India, the misconceptions about sex education are \nwidespread and contribute to its limited implementation \nand effectiveness. Many people, including parents and \neducators, hold conservative views that discussing sex \nis inappropriate, immoral, or embarrassing. This societal \nstigma creates a reluctance to talk openly about sexual \nhealth, leading to a significant knowledge gap among \nadolescents.\n\n239. One prevalent misconception is that sex education \nencourages promiscuity and irresponsible behaviour \namong youth. Critics often argue that providing information \nabout sexual health and contraception will lead to increased \nsexual activity among teenagers. However, research has \nshown that comprehensive sex education actually delays \nthe onset of sexual activity and promotes safer practices \namong those who are sexually active. [Padminin Iyer & \nPeter Aggleton, Seventy years of sex education - A Critical \nReview, 74(1) HEALTH EDUC. J. 3 (2015).]\n\n240. Another common belief is that sex education is a \nWestern concept that does not align with traditional Indian \nvalues. This view has led to resistance from various \nstate governments, resulting in bans on sex education in \nschools in some states. This type of opposition hinders \n\n272 \n\n[2024] 10 SCR 154 : 2024 INSC 716.\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1610 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nthe implementation of comprehensive and effective sexual \nhealth programs, leaving many adolescents without \naccurate information. This is what causes teenagers and \nyoung adults to turn to the internet, where they have \naccess to unmonitored and unfiltered information, which \nis often misleading and can plant the seed for unhealthy \nsexual behaviours.\n\n241. Additionally, there is a misconception that sex \neducation only covers biological aspects of reproduction. \nEffective sex education encompasses a wide range of \ntopics, including consent, healthy relationships, gender \nequality, and respect for diversity. Addressing these topics \nis crucial for reducing sexual violence and promoting \ngender equity.”\n\n196. In the context of child marriage, we have demonstrated the \nheightened risk of health complications to arise out of adolescent \nsex and childbearing. While girls married as children have to \nbear the consequences of this, they are not the only party to the \nsexual relation which causes negative health outcomes. Boys \nmarried at young age equally feel pressures associated with sexual \nperformance. Often, the only resource available to them is their \npeer group. The performance of sexual activity is an avenue for \nmen to exhibit their masculinity. Because of their tender mind and \npatriarchal notions of masculinity and sexual dominance, they are \nlikely to fall into egregious misinformation by their peers and commit \nviolence on their child brides. The issue of approaching boys in \nchild marriage with care, compassion and affection is unfortunately \nlost in some mainstream discourse on child marriage. While girls \nare undoubtedly affected by child marriage disproportionately, we \nought to also account for the tender minds of men who are forced \ninto marriages as children. \n\n197. The right to childhood belongs to all sexes. Education- primary, sexual \nand life enhancing – is integral to the right to childhood. Realisation of \nthis right is crucial in dealing with the evils of child marriage. Abuses \nof patriarchy are learnt behaviours. What is learnt can be unlearned \nor better yet, disabused early on. Education in all aspects allows for \nthe debunking of harmful life choices and conducts which children \nmay adopt in the absence of better guidance. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1611\n\nD. Reiterating the States’ obligations towards combatting \n\nchild marriage\n\n198. Under IHRL, the State has a concrete, enforceable obligation to \nprevent and eliminate child marriage by ensuring that laws, policies, \nand social services align with international standards such as those \nin the CRC and the CEDAW. The state must establish and enforce a \nlegal framework that explicitly prohibits child marriage, accompanied \nby robust mechanisms for implementation and redress. \n\n199. States also have an obligation to monitor and enforce compliance \nwith these laws and to work closely with civil society organizations \nto implement effective interventions. The State’s role is not limited \nto merely punishing offenders but extends to creating an enabling \nenvironment where children can exercise their rights freely. This \nincludes the responsibility to not only to legislate against child marriage \nbut also to address the underlying socio-economic factors—poverty, \nlack of education, and gender discrimination—that perpetuate this \npractice.\n\n200. The Directive Principles of State Policyin Part IV of the Constitution lay \ndown the fundamental principles in the governance of the country and \npress upon the State to apply them while making laws. Article 38(2) \nof the Constitution273 requires the state to promote the welfare of \npeople and eliminate inequalities in opportunities: It states that:\n\n“38. State to secure a social order for the promotion \nof welfare of the people – \n\n…\n\n(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimize \nthe inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate \ninequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only \namongst individuals but also amongst groups of people \nresiding in different areas or engaged in different vocations.”\n\n201. This Article mandates the State to actively reduce inequalities and \npromote welfare, which is essential in addressing child marriage—a \npractice that disproportionately affects children from economically \nand socially disadvantaged backgrounds. By targeting inequalities \n\n273 Article 38(2), the Constitution of India 1950. \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1612 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nin income, status, and opportunities, Article 38(2) supports creating \nconditions where vulnerable children have better access to education, \nhealthcare, and social support. This, in turn, reduces the pressures \nthat often lead to early marriage, such as economic dependency \nand limited future prospects, and enables children to pursue a life \nfree from the constraints imposed by early marital commitments.\n\n202. This Court has, in several landmark judgments, reinforced the State’s \npositive obligation to protect children’s rights. In Sheela Barse II \n(supra) this court dealt with abandoned or destitute children lodged \nin various jails across the country for ‘safe custody.’The Court noted \nthat the National Policy for the Welfare of Children contained the \nfollowing preamble:\n\n“The nation’s children are a supremely important asset. \nTheir nurture and solicitude are our responsibility. \nChildren’s programmes should find a prominent part \nin our national plans for the development of human \nresources, so that our children grow up to become \nrobust citizens, physically fit, mentally alert and \nmorally healthy, endowed with the skill and motivations \nneeded by society. Equal opportunities for development \nof all children during the period of growth should be our \naim, for this would serve our large purpose of reducing \ninequality and ensuring social justice.”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n203. This Court observed that if a child is a “national asset” as per the \nNational Policy, the State bears the duty to nurture and ensure their \nfull development, underscoring the expectation that children not be \nsubjected to custodial detention. Here, the principles of care and \nprotection are directly relevant to child marriage, as the practice \nobstructs the full and healthy development of minors by imposing \non them responsibilities and roles they are neither physically nor \nemotionally prepared to undertake. Such an arrangement undermines \ntheir potential and violates their rights to education, health, and \npersonal development, reinforcing cycles of poverty and inequality. \n\n204. In this context, the principle of parens patriae—where the State \nassumes a protective role akin to that of a guardian—is particularly \nrelevant. The State’s intervention in preventing child marriage aligns \nwith its duty to act in the best interest of children, ensuring their \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1613\n\nsafety, development, and freedom from practices that harm their \nphysical, emotional, and educational prospects. This principle has \nbeen repeatedly upheld by the judiciary as essential in upholding \nchild rights and creating a supportive environment that upholds their \nwell-being and growth into empowered, healthy citizens.\n\n205. Similarly, in Society for Unaided Private Schools v. Union of \nIndia274 the Court addressed the constitutionality of Section 12 of the \nRight of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2009. This \nprovision, which mandates a 25% reservation in schools for children \nfrom disadvantaged backgrounds, was challenged on the grounds \nthat it violated Articles 19(1)(g) and 30 of those who had established \nschools in the private sector. The Court upheld the constitutionality \nof this provision, finding the following:\n\n“222. The provisions referred to above and other provisions \nof international conventions indicate that the rights have \nbeen guaranteed to the children and those rights carry \ncorresponding State obligations to respect, protect and \nfulfil the realisation of children’s rights. The obligation \nto protect implies the horizontal right which casts an \nobligation on the State to see that it is not violated \nby non-State actors. For non-State actors to respect \nchildren’s rights casts a negative duty of non-violation \nto protect children’s rights and a positive duty on them \nto prevent the violation of children’s rights by others, \nand also to fulfill children’s rights and take measures \nfor progressive improvement. In other words, in the \nspheres of non-State activity there shall be no violation \nof children’s rights.”\n\n…\n\n224. The primary responsibility for children’s rights, \ntherefore, lies with the State and the State has to respect, \nprotect and fulfil children’s rights and has also got a duty \nto regulate the private institutions that care for children, to \nprotect children from violence or abuse, to protect children \nfrom economic exploitation, hazardous work and to ensure \nhuman treatment of children. Non-State actors exercising \n\n274 \n\n[2012] 2 SCR 715 : (2012) 6 SCC 1\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1614 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nthe State functions like establishing and running private \neducational institutions are also expected to respect and \nprotect the rights of the child, but they are, not expected \nto surrender their rights constitutionally guaranteed.”\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n206. These judgments affirm that the State must regulate private as well \nas non-State actors in ensuring children’s welfare and that the State \nholds primary responsibility for protecting children’s rights. Applied \nto child marriage, these principles reiterate that the State must \nenact and enforce laws that prohibit child marriage while ensuring \nthat social, educational, and economic protections are in place to \nprevent the practice.\n\nIX. Way forward\n\n207. In light of the foregoing analyses, we seek to formulate specific \nguidelines for achieving the elimination of child marriage while bearing \nin mind the delicate socio-economic interplay. The Union submits \nthat the PCMA focuses on two key pillars: (a) raising awareness \nand (b) prosecution. Despite progress in awareness campaigns, \nthere is still a pressing need to enhance accountability mechanisms, \nensure mandatory reporting, and rehabilitate minors affected by \nchild marriages. Further attention is required to make the legal \nframework more effective by addressing loopholes and ensuring \nswift action against offenders, particularly in areas with high child \nmarriage prevalence.\n\n208. Addressing child marriage requires an intersectional approach that \nacknowledges the overlapping vulnerabilities experienced by children, \nespecially girls from marginalized communities. Intersectionality \ninvolves considering factors like gender, caste, socioeconomic status, \nand geography, which often increase the risks of early marriage. \nPreventive strategies should therefore be tailored to the unique needs \nof various communities and focus on addressing the root causes of \nchild marriage, such as poverty, gender inequality, lack of education, \nand entrenched cultural practices.\n\n209. The PCMA as a social legislation will only succeed through the \ncollective efforts of all stakeholders to address the issue within \na broader social framework which emphasises the need for \nmulti-sectoral coordination. This necessitates the enhancement of \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1615\n\nreporting mechanisms, expansion of public awareness campaigns, \nand investment in the training and capacity-building of law \nenforcement officers and related actors. It is also crucial to regularly \nmonitor the implementation of the Act, conduct evaluations to identify \ngaps, and establish feedback mechanisms to continually refine and \nimprove responses to child marriage. As we issue these directions, \nwe emphasize the need for more comprehensive approaches and \ncommunity-driven strategies to ensure the complete eradication of \nchild marriages.\n\n210. We frame the following guidelines for the effective and useful \nimplementation of the PCMA. The orientation of these guidelines \nis to prioritise prevention before protection and protection before \npenalisation. We are cognizant of the impact that criminalisation \nhas on families and communities. To ensure effective use of penal \nprovisions in the PCMA, it is imperative that there is widespread \nawareness and education about child marriage and the legal \nconsequences of its commission. We therefore direct that the following \nguidelines be interpreted to expand effective implementation of the \npreventive measures under PCMA analysed in Part V(A)(iii) of this \njudgment.\n\n211. We must not be understood to discourage prosecution of those \nwho commit illegal acts. However, the aim of the law enforcement \nmachinery must not be solely focused on increasing prosecutions \nwithout making the best efforts to prevent and prohibit child marriage. \nThe focus on penalisation reflects a harms-based approach which \nwaits for a harm to occur before taking any steps. This approach \nhas proven to be ineffective at bringing about social change. We \ntherefore direct as follows:\n\nA. Legal Enforcement\n\n1. Appointment and accountability of CMPO\n\n1.1. State Governments and Union Territories (UTs) must \nappoint officers solely responsible for discharging the \nfunctions of CMPO at the district level. These officers \nshould not be burdened with additional duties that could \nimpede their focus on preventing child marriage;\n\n1.2. If a CMPO believes that they lack the necessary resources \nto safely and comprehensively fulfil their functions, they \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1616 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nmust submit a request to the relevant State Ministry \nof Women and Child Development. The Ministry shall \nconduct an assessment and address the resource needs \nwithin three months of the date on which the request \nwas made;\n\n1.3. To enable personal accountability and ensure immediate \npreventive measures are taken against any planned \nsolemnization of child marriages - each State and UT is \ndirected to upload quarterly reports from CMPOs on their \nofficial websites. These reports should detail the steps \ntaken to prevent child marriages and the outcomes of \ninvestigations; \n\n1.4. The Ministry of Women and Child Development and \nMinistry of Home in each State/UT shall conduct quarterly \nperformance reviews of CMPOs and law enforcement \nagencies to assess:\n\n1.4.1. The effectiveness of child marriage prevention \n\ninitiatives; \n\n1.4.2. Response times and outcomes of reported case; \n\n1.4.3. The level of cooperation and communication \nbetween CMPOs and local law enforcement \nagencies; \n\n1.4.4. The engagement with communities and stakeholders \n\nin prevention efforts; \n\n1.4.5. The status of CMPOs regarding deployment to \nadditional duties, including the reasons for such \nassignments, to ensure that their primary focus on \nchild marriage prevention is not compromised; and\n\n1.4.6. Recommendations for improvements based on the \nassessments, including identifying areas requiring \nadditional support or resources. \n\n1.5. The Ministry of Women and Child Development is directed \nto execute mandatory training refreshers for CMPOs every \nsix months. These refreshers will ensure that all personnel \nare updated on:\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1617\n\n1.5.1. Legal changes relevant to child marriage prevention; \n\n1.5.2. Best practices and effective strategies for combating \n\nchild marriage; \n\n1.5.3. Community engagement techniques to foster \n\ncollaboration with local stakeholders; \n\n1.5.4. Advocacy skills to effectively promote child rights \nand raise awareness about the negative impacts \nof child marriage; \n\n1.5.5. Cultural sensitivity training to address the social \nfactors contributing to child marriage, ensuring \na nuanced understanding of local contexts and \npractices; and\n\n1.5.6. Evaluation and reporting mechanisms to assess \nthe effectiveness of their initiatives and adjust \nstrategies accordingly.\n\n2. District-Level Responsibility for Prevention of Child \n\nMarriages\n\n2.1. In addition to the mandate of the CMPO under \nSection 16(3)(a) – the Collectors and Superintendents of \nPolice in each district across India shall also be responsible \nfor actively preventing child marriages within their \ndistricts. They shall have the authority and responsibility \nto prosecute all individuals who facilitate or solemnize \nchild marriages, including those who knowingly assist, \npromote, or bless such marriages, even if reported in \npublic events or media; \n\n2.2. The CMPO, the Collectors and Superintendents of \nPolice in each district shall inform the State Government \nabout any impediments they encounter in the discharge \nof their functions, including but not limited to, social \nboycotts; and\n\n2.3. Specific emphasis must be placed on preventing \nmass marriages, often conducted in public, where the \nparticipation of government or law enforcement officials \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1618 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\ncould inadvertently lend legitimacy to child marriage \nceremonies. Any failure by district authorities to act in \naccordance with this mandate will warrant immediate \nadministrative action and disciplinary proceedings against \nthe responsible officials.\n\n3. Establishment of a Specialized Police Unit\n\n3.1. Recognizing the sensitivity and unique aspects of child \nmarriage cases, a specialized police unit is deemed \nessential. The State Ministries of Home Affairs shall \nconsider the viability of integrating the Special Juvenile \nPolice Unit into the child marriage prevention framework. \nThe SJPU, already trained in handling juvenile and \nsensitive cases, shall be deployed to manage cases of \nchild marriage;\n\n3.2. The Ministry should evaluate the effectiveness of this \nintegration and provide necessary resources and support \nto the SJPU for optimal performance in addressing child \nmarriage issues;\n\n3.3. The SJPU, supported by trained personnel and resources, \nwill ensure that child marriage cases are handled with \nappropriate sensitivity and urgency. The unit shall work in \ncoordination with CMPOs and district authorities to ensure \nswift preventive action and enforce legal accountability; and\n\n3.4. The Ministry of Women and Child Development is directed \nto consider the viability and prescribe a format for the \nSJPUs to biannually report the following:\n\n3.4.1. The outcomes of legal actions taken against \nperpetrators of child marriage, including any \nconvictions or pending cases; \n\n3.4.2. The number of awareness programs conducted \nand the community engagement efforts made to \nprevent child marriages; \n\n3.4.3. The status of collaboration with local law enforcement \nand child protection agencies in addressing child \nmarriage; and\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1619\n\n3.4.4. Any challenges faced in the reporting period and \nrecommendations for improving child marriage \nprevention efforts.\n\n4. Establishment of a Special Child Marriage Prohibition Unit\n\n4.1. The State Governments and UTs shall constitute a State \nSpecial Child Marriage Prohibition Unit and where there \nare more than one CMPOs in any district, a District level \nSpecial Child Marriage Prohibition Unit;\n\n4.2. The Unit shall comprise of all the CMPOs of the State \nor the District, as the case may be, and shall include \nfive social workers having experience of working against \nchild marriage or on child rights. At least two of such \nsocial workers shall be women. All the CMPOs of the \nUnit shall be provided special training on dealing with \nchild marriages; \n\n4.3. The Units shall tailor courses and resources with the help \nof professionals dealing with the mental health concerns of \nthe CMPOs. The Unit shall also provide forums for CMPOs \nto raise any difficulties or grievances they encounter in \ndischarge of their functions, including but not limited to, \nany difficulty relating to social ostracization for preventing \nchild marriages; and\n\n4.4. The Unit shall act as a forum of sharing best practices, \ninviting trained professionals to dispense knowledge and \ncollectivise and redress grievances.\n\nB. Judicial Measures\n\n1. Empowering Magistrates to Take Suo Moto Action and \n\nIssue Preventive Injunctions\n\n1.1. All Magistrates vested with authority under Section 13 of the \nProhibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, are directed to take \nproactive measures, including issuing suo motu injunctions \nto prevent the solemnization of child marriages; and\n\n1.2. Magistrates are encouraged to particularly focus on \n“auspicious days” known for mass weddings, when the \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1620 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\noccurrence of child marriages is notably high. Upon \nreceiving credible information or even upon suspicion, \nMagistrates should use their judicial powers to halt such \nmarriages and ensure child protection.\n\n2. Exploration of Special Fast-Track Courts for Child Marriage \n\nCases\n\n2.1. The Union Government, in coordination with State \nGovernments, is directed to assess the feasibility of \nestablishing special fast-track courts exclusively to handle \ncases under the PCMA. These courts will expedite case \nproceedings, thereby preventing prolonged delays that \noften lead to additional harm for the affected children; and\n\n2.2. A status report on the establishment, resource allocation, \nand potential effectiveness of these fast-track courts shall \nbe submitted to this Court within a year from now onwards. \n\n3. Mandatory Action Against Neglectful Public Servants\n\n3.1. It is directed that strict disciplinary and legal action be \ntaken against any public servant found to be in deliberate \nneglect of duty concerning child marriage cases within \ntheir jurisdiction. As stipulated under Section 199(C) of the \nBharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNS), 2023, public \nofficials who fail to act in child marriage cases, particularly \nthose with knowledge of imminent marriages, shall be \nsubject to stringent punishment. This direction is aimed \nat reinforcing accountability among public officials and \nensuring that child marriage cases receive immediate and \nappropriate action at all administrative and enforcement \nlevels.\n\nC. Community Involvement\n\n1. Annual Action Plans and Community-Centric Capacity \n\nBuilding\n\n1.1. Each State and UTs is directed to develop an Annual \nAction Plan to prevent child marriages, incorporating Key \nPerformance Indicators (KPIs) that reflect local cultural \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1621\n\nand social contexts. This plan should include measurable \ngoals tailored to address community-specific beliefs and \npractices related to child marriage; and\n\n1.2. States and UTs shall incorporate regular orientation \nprograms, seminars, and workshops in their annual \nschedules aimed at building the capacity of all stakeholders. \nThese initiatives should target CMPOs, Gram Panchayat \nor Municipality office holders, government officials, \nschool principals and teachers, representatives of non-\ngovernmental organizations, local representatives, and \nPara Legal Volunteers (PLVs), fostering a collaborative \napproach to child marriage prevention. \n\n2. Adoption of the Child Marriage Free Village Initiative\n\n2.1. Inspired by the “Open Defecation Free Village” model \nunder the Swachh Bharat Mission, a “Child Marriage \nFree Village” initiative should be launched, encouraging \nPanchayats and community leaders to play an active role \nin preventing and reporting child marriages; and\n\n2.2. This initiative will mobilize local communities to collectively \ndiscourage child marriages, with the involvement of \nPanchayats in monitoring and promoting “Child Marriage \nFree” certifications for villages and Gram Panchayats. \nThis designation should be publicly celebrated to reinforce \na culture where the rights and well-being of children are \nparamount. \n\nD. Awareness Campaigns\n\n1. Awareness Campaigns Led by CMPOs in Schools, Religious \n\nInstitutions, and Panchayats\n\n1.1. CMPOs are directed to conduct regular, structured \nawareness campaigns across schools, religious institutions, \nand Panchayats. These campaigns must include impactful \nhoardings and slogans in local languages that highlight the \nlegal penalties for child marriage, health risks associated \nwith early and forced marriages, and their socio-economic \nconsequences; and\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1622 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n1.2. Schools and local institutions must conduct monthly \ninformational sessions, leveraging creative methods like \nplays, storytelling, and interactive sessions to engage \nyoung people on the topic of child marriage prevention, \nemphasizing gender equality, reproductive rights, and \npersonal agency.\n\n2. Comprehensive Sexuality and Rights Education\n\n2.1. All States and Union Territories are directed to integrate \ncomprehensive sexuality education275 into school curricula \nin line with the framework prescribed by the World Health \nOrganisation276 and leading thoughts in the field of CSE. \nThis education must include clear information on the legal \naspects of child marriage, gender equality, reproductive \nhealth rights, and the impacts of child marriage on physical \nand mental well-being; and\n\n2.2. Educational content should be tailored for age- appropriateness \nand be culturally sensitive, with particular emphasis on \nempowering students with knowledge of their legal rights, \nthe importance of delaying marriage, and understanding of \nsexual and reproductive health. \n\n3. Educational Materials and Community Awareness Tools\n\n3.1. Schools in regions where child marriage prevails must \ninclude information on child marriage prevention within \nthe curriculum, with a dedicated section in textbooks that \noutlines legal protections, health risks, and preventive \nmeasures. Visible posters or charts summarizing this \ninformation should be displayed prominently in schools, \nGram Panchayats, and public institutions; and\n\n3.2. Schools must adhere to a reporting protocol whereby \nprincipals or teachers are required to report potential cases, \nsuch as sudden drop out of a girl child, to the appropriate \nauthorities immediately.\n\n275 \n\n‘CSE’\n\n276 CSE is the imparting of accurate, age-appropriate information about sexuality and their sexual and \nreproductive health – which is critical for their health and survival; See World Health Organization, \n(2023), “What is Comprehensive Sexuality Education?”. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1623\n\n4. Targeted Community Awareness Campaigns\n\n4.1. Regular community-based campaigns are mandated, \nspecifically targeting parents, respected members of the \ncommunity (including but not limited to teachers, principals \nand local body leaders) and local influencers. CMPOs \nare instructed to work with these groups to challenge \nentrenched social norms, using community discussions, \nmultimedia presentations, and testimonials from child \nmarriage survivors to shift perceptions; and\n\n4.2. Community-focused initiatives should also include public \nforums where the adverse effects of child marriage are \nopenly discussed, alongside the benefits of educating \nyoung women.\n\n5. Empowerment Programs for Girls and Young Women\n\n5.1. All States and Union Territories are directed to implement \nmentorship and leadership programs that encourage young \ngirls to become active participants in their communities. \nThese programs should include workshops on leadership \nskills, public speaking, and advocacy training, enabling \ngirls to become local ambassadors for change; and\n\n5.2. Schools and local organizations should establish peer \ngroups led by trained mentors, where girls can safely \ndiscuss personal issues of home, family and public ongoings \nwhich may potentially force a girl into child marriage. \n\n6. Helpline Awareness and Reporting Mechanisms\n\n5.1. Comprehensive awareness of helpline numbers such \nas Childline (1098) and Women Helpline (181) should \nbe included in all educational materials and community \ncampaigns. Schools, Panchayats, and local institutions are \nrequired to display these numbers prominently and ensure \nthat children and adolescents are aware of how to seek help.\n\nE. Training/Capacity Building\n\n1. Training for Community Health Workers and Educators\n\n1.1. All State and UTs will impart specialized training to \nAnganwadi Workers (AWW), Auxiliary Nurse-Midwives \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1624 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n(ANM), and Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA) \nto enhance their role in the prevention of child marriage \nthrough active community engagement. This training \nshould cover:\n\n1.1.1. Identification of at-risk children and families, effective \ncommunication strategies to engage communities, \nand understanding the legal framework surrounding \nchild marriage; \n\n1.1.2. Workshops on the socio-economic impacts of child \nmarriage on girls and families, enabling them to \neffectively communicate these consequences to \ncommunity members; and\n\n1.1.3. Effective ways and strategies to deal with \ncrisis-management and render immediate and \nlong-term support to victims who may be in a crisis \nassociated to child marriage. This may include \npersons such as a girl vulnerable to child marriage \nherself; a peer, sibling or other person who fears that \nanother person may be at risk of child marriage; or \ngirls who have witnessed early or forced marriages \naround them. \n\n2. Training for Law Enforcement and Judicial Officers\n\n2.1. Police officers, particularly those in the Special Juvenile \nPolice Units (SJPU), must undergo training focused on \nthe legal aspects of the PCMA, child rights, and sensitivity \ntowards cases involving minors. This training should \ninclude:\n\n2.1.1. Protocols for handling child marriage cases, ensuring \nthe protection of victims, and understanding the \npsychological impact of child marriage on children \nand those affected around them; and\n\n2.1.2. Regular refresher courses on human rights and \nthe ethical treatment of victims in accordance \nwith the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of \nChildren) Act. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1625\n\n3. Capacity Building for Teachers and School Administrators\n\n3.1. Teachers and school administrators will be trained to \nrecognize signs of potential child marriage and engage \nwith students regarding their rights and the importance \nof education. \n\n4. Empowerment of Local Leaders and Community Influencers\n\n4.1. Training programs will be designed for local leaders, \nincluding members of Panchayati Raj Institutions and \ncommunity influencers, focusing on their critical role in \npreventing child marriage. This training should cover \nstrategies to challenge and change harmful social norms \nand practices that perpetuate child marriage within their \ncommunities.\n\n5. Engagement with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)\n\n5.1. Collaborations with NGOs that focus on women’s rights \nand child protection will be established to train volunteers \nand staff on child marriage prevention. State authorities \nincluding the CMPO and SJPU must proactively identify \nand collaborate with NGOs on the practical and procedural \ndifficulties in preventing, prohibiting and prosecuting child \nmarriages. \n\n6. Training for Health Care Providers\n\n6.1. Healthcare providers, including doctors and counsellors, \nwill be trained to address the specific health risks \nassociated with child marriage. This training will include:\n\n6.1.1. Counselling techniques for young women and girls, \nfocusing on reproductive health rights and the health \nconsequences of early marriage; and\n\n6.1.2. Awareness of available resources for girls at risk \nand the referral processes for victims seeking help.\n\nF. Educational and Social Support\n\n1. Educational Incentives and Scholarships\n\n1.1. The Ministry of Women and Child Development is directed \nto consider the viability of implementing comprehensive \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1626 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\neducational incentive programs specifically targeted at \ngirls at risk of child marriage. This includes:\n\n1.1.1. Providing scholarships to girls for secondary and \nhigher education to encourage families to prioritize \neducation over early marriage; \n\n1.1.2. Offering stipends or financial support for families \nwith daughters who remain in school beyond the \nage of fifteen, as a tangible incentive for delaying \nmarriage; and\n\n1.1.3. Creating mentorship programs that connect at-\nrisk girls with role models who have successfully \npursued education and career opportunities. \n\n2. Social Welfare Programs\n\n2.1. The Ministry of Women and Child Development will also \nconsider developing and implementing social welfare \nprograms to assist families at risk of engaging in child \nmarriage, including:\n\n2.1.1. Conditional cash transfer programs that provide \nfinancial support to families in exchange for \ncommitments to keep their daughters in school and \ndelay marriage until legal adulthood; \n\n2.1.2. Access to vocational training and skill development \nprograms for families, enabling them to improve \ntheir economic status and lessen reliance on \nmarrying off daughters for financial relief; and\n\n2.1.3. Support services for families facing economic \nhardships, such as food assistance, healthcare \nservices, and access to microfinance opportunities \nto promote sustainable livelihoods.\n\n3. Convergence and Continuity of Services\n\n3.1. The Chief Secretaries of all States/UTs shall designate an \nappropriate authority who shall ensure the convergence \nof services across various government departments \nand agencies to create a cohesive support system for \nvulnerable and at-risk communities. This includes:\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1627\n\n3.1.1. Regular inter-departmental meetings to coordinate \nefforts and resources among education, health, social \nwelfare, and law enforcement sectors to address the \nmultifaceted nature of child marriage; and\n\n3.1.2. Establishing community-based resource centres \nthat provide information and support related to \neducation, legal rights, and social services to \nfamilies at risk of child marriage.\n\nG. Monitoring and Accountability\n\n1. Development of Standard Operating Procedures\n\n1.1. The National Legal Services Authority277 is directed to \nformulate a Standard Operating Procedure278 that provides \ncomprehensive guidelines for legal-support services, and \nlong-term rehabilitation plans related to the prevention, \nprotection, and rehabilitation of victims of child marriage \nfor lawyers and law-enforcement officers. NALSA is further \ndirected to dispatch this SOP to all States and District \nLegal Services Authority where it may be used in assisting \naggrieved victims;\n\n1.2. The Ministry of Women and Child Development, in \nconsultation with State Child Protection Societies279 \nand local government bodies, shall draft SOPs focused \non maintaining detailed registers. These registers will \ndocument:\n\n1.2.1. The number of awareness programs and \n\ncapacity-building initiatives conducted;\n\n1.2.2. The number of child marriages prevented and \n\nreported; and\n\n1.2.3. Follow-up actions taken in each case.\n\n1.3. The SOPs must clearly define the duties and responsibilities \nof CPMOs, and other stakeholders involved in community \nprotection efforts, such as police authorities, Sarpanchs, \n\n277 “NALSA”\n\n278 \n\n “SOP”\n\n279 “SCPS”\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1628 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nvillage Pradhans, school teachers, AWWs, and ASHA. \nSpecial emphasis shall be placed on these responsibilities \nduring critical periods and other wedding seasons and\n\n1.4. The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights \nis directed to expedite the process of drafting an SOP \nto establish accountability for the non-reporting of child \nmarriages, provide rehabilitation for minor survivors, and \ninitiate prosecution procedures.\n\n2. Role of Panchayats and Local Leaders\n\n2.1. All Panchayats, Sarpanchs, and local leaders must:\n\n2.1.1. Complete a training program on child marriage \n\nprevention and reporting within three months; \n\n2.1.2. Report any suspected child marriages within 48 \n\nhours of awareness to relevant authorities; and\n\n2.1.3. Actively participate in community awareness \nprograms to educate families on the legal \nconsequences of child marriage and promote \nalternative practices to early marriage.\n\n3. \n\nIndividual Care Plans for At-Risk Girls\n\n3.1. State authorities must develop and implement Individual \nCare Plans (ICP) for at-risk girl children, ensuring \ncompliance with Section 10 of the JJ Act, which mandates \nindividualized care and rehabilitation for children in need \nof care and protection. It shall include:\n\n3.1.1. Immediate access to educational resources tailored \n\nto the child’s needs;\n\n3.1.2. Regular psychological support sessions, including \n\ncounselling and therapy, as necessary;\n\n3.1.3. Establishment of peer support groups to help \nat-risk girls connect with one another and share \nexperiences;\n\n3.1.4. Monitoring by Child Welfare Officers/District \nChild Protection Unit (DCPU) should occur \nevery month for the first year post-intervention to \nensure successful reintegration into education and \ncommunity life; and\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1629\n\n3.1.5. Follow-up assessments should be conducted \nevery three months to evaluate the effectiveness \nof the ICP, adjusting support services as needed \nto address any emerging challenges faced by the \nchild.\n\nH. Technology-Driven Initiatives for Reporting Child Marriage\n\n1. Creation of a Centralized Reporting Portal\n\n1.1. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in collaboration with the \nMinistry of Women and Child Development and the NALSA, \nshall establish a designated portal for online reporting \nof child marriages. This portal will include features for \nanonymous reporting, allowing victims and concerned \ncitizens to easily lodge complaints and access support \nservices; and\n\n1.2. The portal will serve as a centralized platform for collecting \nand analyzing data on child marriage incidents, enabling \ntargeted interventions. It will enhance accessibility, \ntransparency, and accountability by ensuring that all \nreports are addressed promptly by enforcement agencies \nand CMPOs.\n\n2. Leveraging Technology for Support Services\n\n2.1. Each State and UT shall make all endeavours to \ndisseminate information against child marriage across all \nprint, digital and social media – with a focus on regions \nwhere child marriages are likely to occur in high numbers. \nThey shall also consider the viability of data analytics to \nidentify high-risk areas and patterns of child marriage, \nenabling swift interventions. \n\n3. Technology-Driven Monitoring of Attendance\n\n3.1. The Ministry for Women and Child Development, in \ncoordination with the relevant State Ministries, shall \nconsider the viability of a technology-driven monitoring \nsystem to track daily attendance for school-going girls up \nto the 12th grade, ensuring compliance with the privacy \nstandards outlined in the Supreme Court judgment in \nKS Puttaswamy (9J) (supra).\n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1630 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nI. \n\nFunding and Resources\n\n1. Dedicated Annual Budget Allocation\n\n1.1. The relevant ministries of the Union Government are \ndirected to recommend the allocation of a dedicated yearly \nbudget for each State specifically aimed at preventing child \nmarriage and supporting affected individuals. This budget \nshould encompass:\n\n1.1.1. Community awareness programs; \n\n1.1.2. Educational initiatives targeting at-risk populations; \n\n1.1.3. Training programs for frontline workers, including \n\nCMPOs and local law enforcement; \n\n1.1.4. Rehabilitation services for victims, including \n\ncounselling and vocational training; and\n\n1.1.5. Provisions for regular monitoring, home visits, \nand follow-up support for victims to ensure their \nreintegration into society.\n\n2. \n\nJuvenile Justice Fund Institutionalization\n\n2.1. The State Governments are directed to institutionalize the \nJuvenile Justice Fund established under Section 105 of \nthe JJ Act. This fund will provide financial assistance in \nthe form of scholarships and stipends specifically for girls \nat imminent risk of child marriage or whose marriages \nhave been annulled, promoting their educational and \nsocial empowerment.\n\n3. Compensation for Girls Opting Out of Marriage\n\n3.1. The Ministry of Women and Child Development \nis requested to consider the viability of providing \ncompensation to girls who opt out of marriage upon \nreaching the age of majority under the NALSA Victim \nCompensation Scheme or respective State Victim \nCompensation Schemes. This compensation should be \nequivalent to that provided to rape victims, ensuring \nadequate support for those who have escaped child \nmarriage. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1631\n\n4. \n\nIdentification and Support for At-Risk Children\n\n4.1. Superintendents of Police and Collectors are directed to \nidentify instances of child marriage and monitor children \nat risk of dropping out of school due to socio-economic \nchallenges or threats of early marriage. This initiative \nshould ensure:\n\n4.1.1. Comprehensive access to education and health \n\nservices for at-risk children; and\n\n4.1.2. Provision of stipends and fellowships to support \ntheir continued education and mitigate the factors \ncontributing to child marriage.\n\nX. Suggestions\n\n212. In the course of this judgment, we have traced the full breadth of \nthe law against child marriage. The PCMA is the central legislation \ngoverning the issue on the subject. In light of the Constitutional \nguarantees accruing to children, we observe certain gaps in the \nPCMA. Absent a Constitutional challenge or a case being argued, \nwe resist from making declarations and restrict ourselves to making \nsuggestions for the scrutiny of the Union. The legal question on \nthese issues, however, is kept open if it were to come before a \nConstitutional court in an appropriate proceeding.\n\n213. The issue of the interface of personal laws with the prohibition of child \nmarriage under the PCMA has been a subject of some confusion. \nThe Union in its note of submission filed after the judgment was \nreserved in the case has stated that this Court may direct that the \nPCMA prevails over personal law. The note states as follows:\n\n“9. As a way forward, Ministry of Women & Child \nDevelopment has following inputs to provide for kind \nconsideration of the Hon’ble Court –\n\nThere are conflicting pronouncements by various \nHigh Courts about the precedence of the Prohibition \nof Child Marriage Act (PCMA), 2006 over the personal \nlaws. Hence, Hon’ble Court may consider issuing \ndirections pronouncing that the PCMA will prevail \nover the personal laws governing marriage.\n\ni. \n\n…”\n\n214. Details of the conflicting opinions were not furnished in the submissions \nby either party to these proceedings. The PCMA states nothing on \n\nSociety for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.\f1632 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nthe validity of the marriage as we have noted above. The Prohibition \nof Child Marriage (Amending) Bill 2021 was introduced in Parliament \non 21 December 2021. The Bill was referred for examination to the \nDepartment Related Standing Committee on Education, Women, \nChildren, Youth and Sports. The Bill sought to amend the PCMA to \nexpressly state the overriding effect of the statute over various personal \nlaws. The issue, therefore, is pending consideration before Parliament. \n\n215. Lastly, we note that while the PCMA seeks to prohibit child marriages, \nit does not stipulate on betrothals. Marriages fixed in the minority \nof a child also have the effect of violating their rights to free choice, \nautonomy, agency and childhood. It takes away from them their choice \nof partner and life paths before they mature and form the ability to \nassert their agency. International law such as CEDAW stipulates \nagainst betrothals of minors. Parliament may consider outlawing child \nbetrothals which may be used to evade penalty under the PCMA. \nWhile a betrothed child may be protected as a child in need of care \nand protection under the JJ Act, the practice also requires targeted \nremedies for its elimination. \n\nII. Conclusion\n\n216. A copy of this Judgment will be transmitted to the Secretaries of all \nconcerned Ministries, the Government of India which includes the \nMinistry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Women and Child Development, \nMinistry of Panchayati Raj, Ministry of Education, Ministry of \nInformation and Broadcasting, Ministry of Rural Development, \nstatutory authorities, institutions, and organizations under the control \nof the respective ministries.\n\n217. The Ministry of Women and Child Development is directed to circulate \nthis judgment to the Chief Secretaries/Administrators of all the States \nand Union Territories, as well as NALSA, and NCPCR for strict \ncompliance with the directions. This shall be done within a period \nof four weeks from the date of delivery of this judgment.\n\n218. The writ petition is disposed of.\n\n219. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.\n\nResult of the case: Writ petition disposed of.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f"}