{"file_name": "2024_10_1709_1725_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1709 : 2024 INSC 797\n\nHorrmal (Deceased) Through His LRs & Ors. \nv. \nState of Haryana & Ors.\n\n(Civil Appeal No. 11758 of 2024)\n\n21 October 2024 \n\n[Surya Kant* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\n(1) Whether the appellants are entitled to higher compensation \nfor their acquired lands, and if so, to what extent; and \n\n(2) Whether the methodology for calculating the quantum of such \n\ncompensation has been appropriately applied.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nLand Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.4, 6, 23(1) – Assessment \nof Market Value for Acquired Lands – Comparable Sales \nMethod – Deduction for Developmental Charges:\n\nHeld: Compensation for acquired lands must reflect their fair \nmarket value as of the date of the Section 4 notification – The \n\"comparable sales method\" is the preferred approach, using \nbona fide sales exemplars of similar land – The ‘market value’ is \nto be assessed with reference to factors such as standing crops \nand trees, the severance of part of the land, damage to movable \nor immovable property or earnings, the need to relocate one’s \nresidence or business, and any loss of profits from the land \nbetween the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and \nthe Collector's assumption of possession – Sale deeds of smaller \nparcels can be considered but must undergo appropriate deductions \nto account for developmental charges – Deductions may range from \n20% to 75%, depending on the nature and location of the land. \n[Paras 18, 19, 26, 30]\n\nCompensation – Reliance on Best Sale Exemplars – Judicial \nGuidelines for Determination of Fair Value:\n\nHeld: When multiple comparable sale exemplars exist, the highest \nbona fide exemplar should be preferred, provided it meets legal \n\n* Author\n\n\f1710 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\ncriteria – Even when averaging values, the highest exemplar may \nbe considered to ensure fair compensation – The Reference Court’s \nvaluation of ₹92,62,500 per acre aligns with market potential and \nstatutory requirements, and the High Court erred in reducing it. \n[Paras 28, 35, 37]\n\nPrinciple of Potentiality – Strategic Location of Acquired \nLand – Enhancement of Compensation:\n\nHeld: The acquired land’s strategic location and potential for non-\nagricultural development must be factored into the compensation. \nLands situated near urban areas, major highways, or industrial \nzones have higher potential value – Deductions should not \nundermine this potentiality. [Paras 32, 33, 36]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nMehrawal Khewaji Trust v. State of Punjab [2012] 4 SCR 24  : \n(2012) 5 SCC 432; A. Natesam Pillai v. Tahsildar [2010] 10 SCR \n1 : (2010) 9 SCC 118; General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas \nCorporation Ltd. v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel [2008] 11 SCR \n927 : (2008) 14 SCC 745; Kanwar Singh v. Union of India [1998] \nSupp. 2 SCR 505 : (1998) 8 SCC 136; Subh Ram v. State of \nHaryana [2009] 15 SCR 287 : (2010) 1 SCC 444; Chimanlal \nHargovinddas v. LAO [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 531 : (1988) 3 SCC \n751; Shaji Kuriakose v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. [2001] Supp. 1 \nSCR 573 : (2001) 7 SCC 650; Administrator General of West \nBengal v. Collector, Varanasi [1988] 2 SCR 1025 : (1988) 2 SCC \n150; Atma Singh v. State of Haryana and Others [2007] 12 SCR \n1120 : (2008) 2 SCC 568; Balwan Singh v. State of Haryana and \nothers, 2022 SCC Online SC 637; Karan Singh v. Union of India \n[1997] Supp. 4 SCR 237 : (1997) 8 SCC 186; Rishi Pal Singh \nv. Meerut Development Authority [2006] 2 SCR 508 : (2006) 3 \nSCC 205; Sh. Himmat Singh v. State of M.P., (2013) 16 SCC \n392 – relied on.\n\nDollar Co. v. Collector of Madras, AIR 1975 SC 1670; Special \nLand Acquisition Officer v. T. Adinarayan Setty, AIR 1959 SC 429; \nMaya Devi v. State of Haryana [2018] 1 SCR 225 : (2018) 2 SCC \n474 – referred to.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1711\n\nList of Acts\n\nLand Acquisition Act, 1894; Haryana Urban Development Authority \nAct, 1977.\n\nList of Keywords\n\nLand Acquisition; Market Value; Comparable Sales Method; \nDevelopment Charges; Potentiality of Land.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11758 of 2024\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 23.08.2022 of the High Court \nof Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RFA No. 13554 of 2018\n\nWith\n\nCivil Appeal Nos. 11759-11760, 11761, 11762-11766, 11767-11770, \n11771-11772, 11773-11779, 11780-11786, 11787-11796, 11797, \n11798, 11799, 11800-11806, 11807, 11808, 11809, 11810, 11811-\n11812, 11813,11814, 11815, 11816, 11817, 11818-11819, 11820, \n11821, 11822, 11823, 11824, 11825-11828, 11829-11830, 11831-\n11832, 11833, 11834, 11835, 11836-11838, 11839-11840, 11841, \n11842, 11843, 11844, 11845-11846, 11847-11848, 11849-11850, \n11851-11852, 11853-11854, 11855-11856, 11857, 11858, 11859-\n11860, 11861-11862, 11863-11869, 11870-11871, 11872, 11873-\n11874, 11875-11876, 11877-11878, 11879, 11880-11881, 11882-\n11883, 11884-11890, 11891-11894, 11895-11917, 11918-11947, \n11948-11951, 11952-11953, 11954-11955, 11956-11959, 11960-\n11961, 11962, 11963-11964, 11965-11966, 11967-11968, 11969, \n11970-11971, 11972-11973, 11974-11975, 11976-11977, 11978, \n11979-11980, 11981-11987, 11988-11989, 11990-11991,11992-\n11993, 11994-11995, 11996-11997, 11998-11999 and 12000 of 2024\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nNarender Hooda, Rameshwar Singh Malik, Gagan Gupta, Sunil \nDalal, Sr. Advs., Tishampati Sen, Ms. Riddhi Sancheti, Anurag \nAnand, Mukul Kulhari, Pardeep Dahiya, Ms. Mahima Benipuri, \nDeepak Goel, Ms. Harshita Maheshwari, Ms. Urvashi Sharma, \nMs. Alka Goyal, Ms. Archana Preeti Gupta, Jitesh Malik, Gaurav \nPratap Singh, Arjun Singh, Mrs. Leelawati Suman, Satish Kumar, \nAjay Gupta, Ashok Anand, Ms. Manisha Saroha, Nikhil Beniwal, \n\nHorrmal (Deceased) Through His LRs & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.\f1712 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nNavish Bhati, Vikram Singh Dalal, Ms. Rakhi Ray, Deepkaran Dalal, \nRaunaq Dalal, Karan Singh Dalal, A. Venayagam Balan, Gaurav \nPal, R.V.Kameshwaran, C. M. Sundaram, Kiritkumar Govindlal \nSheth, Ashray Behura, Deepak Parashar, Prakhar Singh, Dipak \nKumar Jena, Prasanna Kumar Parhi, R.K. Poswal, Ranjita Dhal, \nPradeep Kumar Verma, Parmod Kumar, Sunil Kumar Mund, Raj \nSekhar Jena, Ms. Sandhya Mishra, Siddharth Mittal, Abhijeet \nVarshney, Deepak Agarwal, Darshan, Prabhat Kumar, Mrs. Shilpa \nG Mittal, Devesh Pratap Singh, N S Dalal, Anshuman Nayak, Rahul \nKulhare, Ms. Rachana Dalal, Krishan Mourya, Abhishek Kumar, \nMs. Sweta Kadyan, Sharad Mrinal, Tanishq Tyagi, Ms. Ankita \nPandey, Sanjay Tyagi, Ms. Disha Singh, S.K. Pabbi, Shivendu \nGaur, Ms. Nidhi Sharma, Ms. Nisha Sharma, Ajay Kumar Singh, \nSomvir Singh Deswal, Manoj Kumar, Neeraj Singh, Diwan Singh \nChauhan, Ms. Amit Kumari Saroha, Nischal Kumar Neeraj, Davesh \nBhatia, Ms. Chaya, Rakesh Dahiya, Aditya Dahiya, Akaash Dahiya, \nAditya Singh, Gagan Gupta, Ananta Prasad Mishra, Saurabh Gupta, \nAdvs. for the Appellants.\n\nVikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Samar Vijay Singh, Keshav Mittal, Ms. \nSabarni Som, Fateh Singh, R.K. Singh, Rajeev Kumar Gupta, \nParminder Singh Bhullar, Advs. for the Respondents.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nSurya Kant, J.\n\nDelay condoned. \n\nLeave granted.\n\n2. These appeals are preferred by the expropriated landowners \n(hereinafter ‘Appellants’), impugning the judgement dated \n23.08.2022 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court at \nChandigarh (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), whereby their appeals \nseeking further enhancement in compensation for their acquired \nlands, have been dismissed. As a necessary corollary, the High \nCourt has allowed the cross appeals filed by the Respondent \nState, challenging the enhancement in compensation made by \nthe Reference Court. Consequently, the Awards passed by the \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1713\n\nReference Court have been set aside and the compensation as \nwas granted by the Land Acquisition Collector (hereinafter, ‘LAC’) \nhas been restored. \n\nA. FActs\n\n3. The instant dispute regarding the grant of just and fair compensation \noriginated with the issuance of a notification under Section 4 of the \nLand Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, ‘1894 Act’) on 11.02.2011, \nfor the acquisition of approximately 302.75 acres of land by the \nRespondent State. This land, including the Appellants’ lands, is \nsituated in the revenue estate of Tauru village in Mewat District. \nThe acquisition process was initiated for the development and \nutilisation of land for public purposes, specifically for carving out \nResidential and Utility Areas in Sectors 7, 8 and 11 in Mewat \nDistrict under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, \n1977. A notification under Section 6 of the 1894 Act was thereafter \nissued on 10.02.2012. \n\n4. The LAC passed the award on 22.10.2013 in respect of the land \nadmeasuring 302.75 acres and estimated the compensation at \nRupees 45,00,000/- per acre, along with 30% solatium and an \nadditional amount of 12% per annum for the acquired land. Further, \ncompensation for the lands abutting the Mohammadpur—Sohna—\nTauru bypass road were enhanced by 20% and 25%, respectively, \nover the already fixed rate. The LAC assessed the compensation \nprimarily based on the rates fixed by the Divisional Level Rate \nFixation Committee in the following manner: (a) 2057 Kanal at \nRupees 45,00,000/- per acre; (b) 113 Kanals and 9 Marlas at \nRupees 54,00,000/- per acre; and (c) 251 Kanals and 11 Marlas at \nRupees 56,25,000/- per acre. In addition to this, the LAC also affixed \ncompensation for building structures and trees wherever subsisting \non the acquired lands. \n\n5. Aggrieved by the award dated 22.10.2013, the Appellants filed \nReference(s) under Section 18 of the 1894 Act before the Additional \nDistrict Judge, Mewat (hereinafter, ‘Reference Court’). The \nReference Court, vide separate awards, enhanced the market value \nof the acquired land to Rupees 92,62,500/- per acre, in addition \nto granting other statutory benefits. The Reference Court, in this \n\nHorrmal (Deceased) Through His LRs & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.\f1714 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n6. \n\ninstance, relied upon a sale exemplar, Ex. P76, to assess the \nmarket value of the acquired land as on the date of the issuance of \nSection 4 notification, and subsequently increased the compensation \namount. Both the Appellants and the Respondent, being dissatisfied \nwith the decision of the Reference Court, preferred appeals before \nthe High Court.\n\nIn this vein, the High Court allowed the appeals preferred by the \nRespondent State while dismissing those filed by the Appellants. \nThe High Court held that the Reference Court had incorrectly \nestimated the market value and enhanced the compensation as it \nignored various sale instances of comparable parcels of land that \nhad been produced by the Respondents. Additionally, the High \nCourt also doubted the reliability of Ex. P76, which was the basis \nof the Reference Court’s decision, on the ground that this sale deed \nbelonged to a commercial plot of land and was post the notification \nissued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. Accordingly, the High Court \nset aside the award(s) of the Reference Court and reverted the \ncompensation amount to that initially granted by the LAC. Hence, \nthese appeals. \n\nB. contentions oF the pArties\n\n7. We have heard Learned Senior Counsel for the parties at a \nconsiderable length and meticulously perused the documents \nsubmitted on record.\n\n8. S/Shri Narender Hooda, Sunil Dalal and Gagan Gupta, Learned Senior \nCounsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants, first demonstrated \nthe potentiality of the acquired land. They contended that the High \nCourt had overlooked the fact that the acquired lands fell squarely \nwithin the municipal limits of Tauru city and were surrounded by \ncivic amenities such as a Bus Stand, Hospital, School, College, a \nPower Station and Industrial as well as Residential establishments. \nThey further asserted that the acquired land was located on the \nSohna-Tauru bypass and was in close proximity to the Gurgaon-\nNational Capital Region, as also the Industrial Township established \nat Bhiwadi, Rajasthan. Additionally, the land is situated between the \nSohna—Rewari metal road on one side and the KMP Highway on \nthe other. This strategic location, they argued, indicated that the \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1715\n\n9. \n\nmarket value of the acquired land, having immense potential at the \ntime of acquisition, could not have been valued at less than Rupees \n5,00,00,000/- per acre.\n\nIt was contended that the sale exemplars, particularly Ex. RW1/D and \nRW1/F, which have been relied upon by the LAC and the High Court \nwhile assessing the rate of compensation at Rupees 45,00,000/- per \nacre, appertained to the smaller pieces of land and were inferior in \nnature, as the sale consideration mentioned therein was lower than \nthe rate estimated by the LAC itself. Instead, they urged that Ex. P76 \nand Ex. P3 ought to have been relied upon, owing to their similarity \nand proximity to the acquired land, as well as their temporal proximity \nto the date of issuance of the Section 4 notification. They further \nemphasised that these sale exemplars are the best sale instances \nto be considered since Ex. P76 was registered only a few months \nafter the Section 4 notification, whereas Ex. P3 was executed prior \nto the said notification. \n\n10. Given what had been adduced, Learned Senior Counsels relied on \na plethora of decisions in support of their arguments, including the \njudgment of this Court in Dollar Co. v. Collector of Madras,1 wherein \nit was held that a sale deed of a recent date could be considered \nthe best evidence. Additionally, they placed reliance on the decision \nin Special Land Acquisition Officer and another  v. M.K. Rafiq \nSaheb,2 where this Court held that sale deeds pertaining to smaller \nareas could be taken into consideration by applying a cut. \n\n11. Conversely, Mr. Vikramjit Bannerjee, learned Additional Solicitor \nGeneral of India, representing the Respondents, contended that \nthe sale deeds produced by the Appellants could not be relied upon \nas they pertained to sale instances of tiny plots of land constituting \nonly a few Marlas. More specifically, he argued that Ex. P3 was not \nreliable since it measured only 1 Kanal and 10.5 Marlas, making it \nsignificantly smaller in comparison to the acquired land. Similarly, \nwith respect to Ex. P76, which was also heavily relied upon by \nthe Appellants, he asserted that it ought to be discarded, not only \n\n1 \n\n2 \n\n[1975] Supp. 1 SCR 403 : AIR 1975 SC 1670\n\n[2011] 8 SCR 1088 : (2011) 7 SCC 714\n\nHorrmal (Deceased) Through His LRs & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.\f1716 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nbecause it was subsequent to the Section 4 notification but also \nsince the land therein was purchased for a commercial purpose by \na private company for warehousing, and thus would not accurately \nreflect the market value of the acquired land.\n\n12. \n\nInstead, Mr. Bannerjee urged that the sale instances placed on \nrecord by the Respondents should be relied upon despite having \nbeen recorded post the Section 4 notification, as they lend proper \nguidance for estimating the market value of the acquired land on \nthe crucial date of 11.02.2021. Lastly, he asserted that even if the \nCourt were to consider the sale instance of a smaller parcel of land, \nonly those sale exemplars where the land has been used towards \ndevelopmental purposes should be relied upon, and after applying \nthe appropriate deduction towards development charges. \n\nc. \n\nissues\n\n13. Having considered the factual background out of which the dispute \nhas arisen and the contentions put forth, the questions that fall for \nour deliberation are set out as follows:\n\ni. Whether the Appellants are entitled to higher rate of compensation \n\nand if so, to what extent; and \n\nii. How should the quantum of such compensation be calculated?\n\nD. AnAlysis\n\n14. As already elucidated in the facts of this case, there has been a \nsignificant difference in the evaluations conducted by the Reference \nCourt and, subsequently, the High Court. The High Court has reduced \nthe valuation affixed by the Reference Court by half and, instead, \nrestored the compensation amount granted by the LAC. Given the \ndifferences in the approaches adopted by these courts and the \nvariation in outcomes faced by the Appellants, it becomes imperative \nfor us to assess the evidence placed on record by both parties and \ndetermine whether sufficient grounds subsist for us to enhance the \ncompensation so awarded. \n\n15. \n\nIn this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the table prepared \nby the High Court, which, in its decision, has aptly summarised the \ndifferent evidence produced by the parties as follows:\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1717\n\nSr. \nNo.\n\nEx. No Vasika \n\nDated\n\nNo.\n\nSale \nConsideration \n(In Rs.)\n\nArea of \nLand Sold \n(K.M.S)\n\nRate Per \nacre\n\nVillage\n\nSale Deeds Produced by the respective parties in the Award dated: \n06.01.2017,01.03.2017, 19.07.2017, 20.07.2017, 03.10.2017, 01.08.2017\n\nSale Deeds Produced by the Landowners\n\n1.\n\nP2\n\n1539\n\n2.2.2010\n\n1,75,000\n\n2.\n\nP3\n\n960\n\n27.8.2010 32,27,000\n\n3.\n\nP4\n\n387\n\n31.5.2010 3,36,000\n\n4.\n\nP5\n\n1725\n\n17.12.2010 2,81,000\n\n5.\n\nP6\n\n1707\n\n9.3.2010\n\n2,62,500\n\n6.\n\nP7\n\n2076\n\n24.1.2011\n\n5,25,000\n\n7.\n\nP8\n\n2187\n\n7.2.2011\n\n3,50,000\n\n8.\n\nP9\n\n4633\n\n18.1.2012 7,50,000\n\n9.\n\nP10\n\n2186\n\n7.2.2011\n\n2,10,000\n\n50 Sq. \nYds.\n\n922 Sq. \nYds.\n\n96 Sq. \nYds.\n\n75 Sq. \nYds.\n\n75 Sq. \nYds\n\n150 Sq. \nYds.\n\n100 Sq. \nYds.\n\n140 Sq. \nYds.\n\n30 Sq. \nYds.\n\n1,69,40,000 Tauru\n\n1,69,40,000 Tauru\n\n1,69,40,000 Tauru\n\n1,81,33,867 Tauru\n\n1,69,40,000 Tauru\n\n1,69,40,000 Tauru\n\n1,69,40,000 Tauru\n\n2,59,28,571 Tauru\n\n16,94,000\n\nTauru\n\n10 P76\n\n1220\n\n4.7.2011\n\n10,18,87,500 66k (1320 \n\n1,23,50,000 Tauru\n\nSale Deeds Produced by the State\n\nM)\n\n11 RW1/C 2481\n\n29.8.2011\n\n3,25,000\n\n12.5 M\n\n41,60,000\n\nTauru\n\n12 RW1/D 1220\n\n21.06.2012 60,00,000\n\n13 RW1/E 1802\n\n6.8.2012\n\n17,25,000\n\n14 RW1/F 3798\n\n25.11.2011 60,00,000\n\n15 RW1/G 1779\n\n3.8.2012\n\n18,25,000\n\n1 Acre 4 K \n(240 M)\n\n3K-9M \n(69M)\n\n1 Acre 4k \n(240 M)\n\n3K-13M \n(73 M)\n\n40,00,000\n\nTauru\n\n40,00,000\n\nTauru\n\n40,00,000\n\nTauru\n\n40,00,000\n\nTauru\n\nHorrmal (Deceased) Through His LRs & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.\f1718 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n16 RW1/H 4339\n\n13.03.2013 8,32,500\n\n17 R8\n\n1724\n\n17.12.10\n\n2,00,000\n\n18 R9\n\n1591\n\n01.12.10\n\n4,80,000\n\n19 R10\n\n1304\n\n20.10.2010 10,23,750\n\n225 Sq. \nYds.\n\n10 M\n\n17 M\n\n4K-11M \n(91M)\n\n1,79,08,000 Tauru\n\n32,00,000 Gvarka\n\n45,17,648 Gvarka\n\n18,00,000 Gvarka\n\n20 R11\n\n1396\n\n3.11.2010\n\n1,05,000\n\n5M\n\n33,60,000 Gvarka\n\n21 R12\n\n2116\n\n31.1.2011\n\n2,31,000\n\n330 Sq. \nYds.\n\n33,88,000 Gvarka\n\n22 R13\n\n1851\n\n29.12.2010 1,05,000\n\n5M\n\n33,60,000 Gvarka\n\n23. R14\n\n2124\n\n1.2.2011\n\n53,000\n\n2.5M\n\n33,92,000 Gvarka\n\n24. R15\n\n2243\n\n14.2.2011\n\n1,63,350\n\n25 R16\n\n1404\n\n8.11.2010\n\n75000\n\n26 R18\n\n2211\n\n9.2.2011\n\n36,300\n\n9M\n\n6M\n\n2M\n\n29,04,000 Gvarka\n\n20,00,000 Gvarka\n\n29,04,000 Gvarka\n\n16. Upon further examination of the details of this table, it seems to \nus that these exemplars can be classified in the following manner: \n(a) sale instances executed prior to the issuance of Section 4 \nnotification; and (b) sales instances executed after the issuance \nof the Section 4 notification. Thereupon, we have taken the liberty \nof further representing this recalibrated categorisation in a tabular \nform as follows:\n\nPre-Section 4 \nnotification\n\nAppellants\n\nP2-P8, P10\n\nPost Section-4 \nnotification\n\nP9 and P76\n\nRespondents\n\nR8-14, R16, R18\n\nR15, RW1/C-H\n\n17. Having distinguished between the two sets of sale instances executed \nbefore and after the issuance of the Section 4 notification, we would \nnow proceed to determine whether the Appellants are entitled to \ncompensation at a rate higher than the one determined by the High \nCourt. \n\n18. The process of assessing or affixing compensation is not tethered \nto precision but is rather aimed at a nuanced estimation of pertinent \nfactors. This task is governed by Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition \nAct of 1894, which mandates that, in determining compensation for \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1719\n\nacquired land, the Court must consider the ‘market value’ of the land \nas of the ‘date of publication of the notification under Section 4’. The \n‘market value’ is to be assessed with reference to factors such as \nstanding crops and trees, the severance of part of the land, damage \nto movable or immovable property or earnings, the need to relocate \none’s residence or business, and any loss of profits from the land \nbetween the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and the \nCollector’s assumption of possession.\n\n19. This Court has through various judicial precedents, including a \nthree-judge bench decision in Special Land Acquisition Officer v. \nT. Adinarayan Setty,3 held that the ‘market value’ connotes the \nprice that a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, taking into \naccount the land’s current conditions and its advantages and \npotentialities. For this, typically, the best approach is the comparable \nsales method, under which the bona fide sale exemplars of similar \nlands are relied upon to ascertain the market value of the land \nunder acquisition. However, to ensure that the valuation is just \nand proper, this Court has explained that such sale exemplars \nmust satisfy certain criteria, including that: (a) the sale must be a \ngenuine transaction; (b) the sale deed must have been executed \naround the time of the Section 4 notification; (c) the land must \nbe situated near the acquired land; (d) the nature of the land \ncovered in the sale instance must be similar to the acquired land; \nand (e) the size of the plot covered by the sale instance should \nbe comparable to the land acquired.4 \n\n20. Apart from satisfying these factors, it is also imperative that the sale \nexemplars reflect the price of the land on the ‘date of publication of \nthe notification under Section 4’. On account of this express condition, \nthere are numerous instances where this Court has laid down that \nthe sale exemplars executed after the Section 4 notification should \nnot ordinarily be relied upon.5 This is grounded in the reasoning that \nonce the acquisition process begins, it can impact the valuation of \nthe land, rendering subsequent sale exemplars to be potentially \ninaccurate reflections of the true valuation of the acquired land. This \n\n3 \n\n4 \n\n5 \n\n[1959] Supp. 1 SCR 404 : AIR 1959 SC 429\n\nShaji Kuriakose v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (2001) 7 SCC 650.\n\nGeneral Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel, 2008 (14) \nSCC 745; Maya Devi v. State of Haryana (2018) 2 SCC 474. \n\nHorrmal (Deceased) Through His LRs & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.\f1720 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nprinciple was cogently addressed by this Court in A. Natesam Pillai \nv. Tahsildar,6 which held that the commencement of acquisition often \nleads to an increase in the market values of adjacent lands, thereby \ndiscrediting post-notification transactions as reliable indicators of the \nacquired land’s value.\n\n21. Having been equipped with the factors to be considered while \nselecting a comparable sale instance to draw an estimate from, it \nis perhaps suitable to tackle the core issue and ascertain which of \nthe sale exemplars produced before us may be most appropriate to \nbe utilised in this exercise.\n\n22. \n\nIn the case at hand, the High Court and the Reference Court have \ndisagreed on what sale exemplars could be used to determine fair \ncompensation. While the Reference Court relied on Ex P76, the \nHigh Court has rejected the same because it was executed after \nthe issuance of the Section 4 notification. Nevertheless, the High \nCourt has fallen prey to the same error and has relied upon the \nRespondents’ sale exemplars, which were also executed after the \nacquisition had already begun.\n\n23. As discussed above, post-notification sales can only be considered \nwhen better evidence is not available on record and when the party \nrelying on it can convincingly demonstrate that there has been no \nupward trend in market prices due to the acquisition.7 Consequently, \nin light of this analysis, the sale deeds numbered P9, P76, R15 and \nRW1/C-H, which were executed after the date of the issuance of the \nSection 4 notification, will invariably have to be excluded from any \nfurther consideration, save and except for exceptional and compelling \ncircumstances.\n\n24. Apart from these sale deeds that were not proximate temporally, \nwe also deem it appropriate to exclude the sale deeds that are not \ncomparable geographically. It is now a firmly entrenched principle of \nlaw that, in the ordinary course, sale exemplars of lands located in \nthe surrounding villages should generally not be relied upon, as land \nvaluation may vary significantly by locality. In the landmark decision of \n\n6 \n\n7 \n\n[2010] 10 SCR 1 : (2010) 9 SCC 118\n\nKaran Singh v. Union of India (1997) 8 SCC 186; Rishi Pal Singh v. Meerut Development Authority (2006) \n3 SCC 205\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1721\n\n25. \n\nKanwar Singh v. Union of India,8 this Court held that sale exemplars \nof lands situated in an adjacent village cannot be used to determine \nthe market value of the acquired land since such lands may differ in \nterms of quality and other attributes. On this ground, the sale deeds \nenumerated Ex. R8 to Ex. R16 and Ex. R18 shall also have to be \nexcluded from consideration, as they pertain to a different village, \nnamely Gwarka, whereas the acquired land is situated in village Tauru.\n\nIn light of the exclusions made thus far, we are presently left with \nsale deeds numbered Ex. P2 to Ex. P8 and Ex. P10. In this context, \nthe Respondents have sought to argue that considering the total \narea of the land in these sale deeds being very small in size, they \nare also liable to be discarded. True it is, that such sale deeds \nought not to directly form the basis for determining the rate at which \ncompensation is to be awarded. Indeed, a thorough review of relevant \nprecedents in this backdrop does reveal that smaller parcels of \nland conventionally command higher prices. Relying on such sale \nexemplars also, especially when only single solitary such instances \nare presented, may thus not be appropriate.9 \n\n26. However, there is no bar in law against considering sale exemplars of \nsmaller plots, provided they are subjected to adequate developmental \ncharges. The rationale behind applying such cuts lies in the \nfact that smaller plots often command higher prices due to their \ndeveloped nature, whereas a larger tract of land which is acquired \nfor development may require significant allocation for creating roads, \nparks, essential services, etc.10 Accordingly, these sale exemplars \ncan be relied upon only after applying appropriate cuts. This Court in \nChimanlal Hargovinddas v. LAO,11 authoritatively ruled that when \nvaluing a large block of land, appropriate deduction must be made \nfor setting aside areas for roads, open spaces and dividing the land \ninto smaller plots suitable for the construction of buildings.\n\n27. \n\nIn the instant case, there are multiple sale deeds of smaller plots, \nand these represent the best available evidence for estimating \ncompensation. Since there is no legal impediment to considering such \n\n8 \n\n9 \n\n10 \n\n11 \n\n[1998] Supp. 2 SCR 505 : (1998) 8 SCC 136\n\nAdministrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi (1988) 2 SCC 150\n\nIbid; Atma Singh v. State of Haryana and Others (2008) 2 SCC 568\n\n[1988] Supp. 1 SCR 531 : (1988) 3 SCC 751\n\nHorrmal (Deceased) Through His LRs & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.\f1722 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nsale deeds, the logical progression in the compensation estimation \nprocess would be to identify the most suitable sale deed(s) for \ndetermining the market value and subsequently, to apply adequate \ndeductions on the same. The solution to this state of flux may thus be \nfound in the case of Mehrawal Khewaji Trust v. State of Punjab,12 \nwhere this Court laid down as follows:\n\n“....It is clear that when there are several exemplars with \nreference to similar lands, it is the general rule that the \nhighest of the exemplars, if it is satisfied that it is a bona fide \ntransaction, has to be considered and accepted. When the \nland is being compulsorily taken away from a person, \nhe is entitled to the highest value which similar land \nin the locality is shown to have fetched in a bona fide \ntransaction entered into between a willing purchaser and \na willing seller near about the time of the acquisition.”\n\n[Emphasis supplied]\n\n28. This view has been reiterated in Sh. Himmat Singh v. State of \nM.P.,13 where a three-judge bench of this Court consolidated various \nprecedents to affirm that in circumstances where there are multiple \nsale deeds available for consideration, the Court shall rely on the \nhighest valued exemplars unless the prices fall within a narrow \nrange, in which case calculating an average of the values therein \nmay be more congruous. \n\n29. \n\nIn these extenuating circumstances, there exists significant disparity \namong the sale exemplars presently under consideration. Amongst \nthese sale exemplars, being Ex. P2-P8 and Ex. P10, the highest sale \ninstance values the land at Rupees 1,81,33,867 per acre, whereas \nthe lowest values it at Rupees 16,94,000 per acre. Given this wide \nrange and in light of the judicial precedents cited above, we are \nof the opinion that we should rely upon the highest sale exemplar, \nwhich is Ex. P5, rather than solely depending upon an average of the \nmultiple sale deeds produced before us. Despite the Respondents’ \nvehement contention that Ex. P5 should not be relied upon owing to \nit being a significantly smaller parcel of land—the detailed analysis \n\n12 \n\n13 \n\n[2012] 4 SCR 24 : (2012) 5 SCC 432\n\n(2013) 16 SCC 392\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1723\n\nconducted above indicates no reason why Ex. P5 cannot be utilised \nto determine the amount of compensation to be awarded to the \nAppellants for the acquired land.\n\n30. Thus, having established the sale exemplar being relied upon and \nconsequentially the base price to be Rupees 1,81,33,867 per acre, we \nnow proceed to the aspect of deductions to be applied to the amount \nso determined. In this regard, there is no hard and fast rule on the \namount of deduction to be applied towards development charges. \nInstead, such deductions may, for the purpose of making a small \narea of land comparable to larger tracts, range from a minimum of \n20% to a maximum of 75%.14 \n\n31. Since the degree of application of cuts is essentially a question \nof fact dependent on the unique circumstances of each case, the \nparticulars to be reckoned with in determining the extent of such \ndeduction often include a myriad of factors, such as the relative \ndifference in the size of the land in the sale exemplar vis a vis the \nacquired land, proximity to a road, nearness to developed areas, \netc.15 Additionally, several decisions have also taken into account \nthe nature of the lands because of the stark difference that may \nexist between the valuation of an agricultural or undeveloped land \nand the sale price of a small developed plot in a private layout.16 \n\n32. Circling back to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the \nland in Ex. P5 is similar in nature to the acquired land, both being \nagricultural land. Its proximity to the acquired land and the fact \nthat it is situated in the same village of Tauru, are relevant when \ndetermining the extent of deductions to be applied in calculating the \ncompensation to be granted to the Appellants. Additionally, what is \nalso of utmost importance is that the value of the land is corroborated \nby surrounding circumstances, which point towards its potentiality. \nAlthough Ex. P76 cannot be relied upon since it was executed after \nthe Section 4 notification, it nonetheless reflects the land’s potential \nfor being used other than for agricultural purposes. Moreover, the \nacquired land’s strategic location near the Bus Stand, Grain Market \n\n14 Balwan Singh v. State of Haryana and others, 2022 SCC Online SC 637; Chandrashekar v. LAO (2012) \n\n1 SCC 390\n\n15 Subh Ram v. State of Haryana (2010) 1 SCC 444\n\n16 \n\nIbid.\n\nHorrmal (Deceased) Through His LRs & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.\f1724 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nand Main Bazaar, besides being located near Palwal-Sohna-Rewari \nState Highway, as well as its proximity to the Industrial Township \nat Bhiwadi, and nearby schools and colleges, further supports the \nassertion that the land possesses immense potentiality. \n\n33. On the face of these distinctive factors lies the challenge of ascertaining \nthe appropriate extent of deduction to be made. As already established, \njudicial precedents dictate that the amount of deduction to be applied \ntowards developmental charges can range from anywhere between \n20% to 75%. On the one hand, we must acknowledge and recognise \nthe stark disparity between the size of the land covered by the sale \nexemplar and the acquired land. On the other hand, it is incumbent \nthat we take note of the various advantageous factors associated with \nthe acquired land at the time of issuance of the Section 4 notification. \nA balanced approach in adjudicating this particular issue is therefore \nnecessary. Considering these militating aspects, we cannot justify \napplying deduction at either extreme end of the spectrum. A prudent \ncourse of action might be to steer a middle path, aiming for a range \napproximately between 46% to 50%.\n\n34. Having said that, even if we were to apply the higher end of deductions \nfrom this middle course, at 50%, the compensation to be granted to \nthe Appellants would still surpass the amount initially determined by \nthe LAC and would in fact, be closer in range to the rate granted by \nthe Reference Court. \n\n35. Alternatively, and only to bolster our above arrived conclusion, even \nif the principle of averaging were applied, the most suitable sale \ninstances for this purpose, as discussed earlier, would be Ex. P2 to \nEx. P8 and Ex. P10, which are noted to be in close proximity to the \nacquired land. Upon evaluation, the average price of these lands is \nRupees 1,49,71,733 per acre, which exceeds the sale consideration \nshown in most comparable sale examples. This leaves no room for \ndoubt that the compensation awarded by the Reference Court, at \nthe rate of Rupees 92,62,500 per acre, was neither excessive nor \nbeyond the fair and just value of the acquired land.\n\n36. However, considering the totality of the circumstances and recognizing \nthat the subject land has not been acquired for profiteering or \ncommercial purposes, but primarily for the development of a \nresidential area, we find it appropriate to rely on the valuation \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1725\n\nreflected in the best exemplar, Ex. P/5, as a fair and reasonable \nbasis for compensation.\n\n37. Thus, upon careful consideration, we are of the considered opinion \nthat the High Court erred in reducing the valuation of the land \nand affirming the figures granted by the LAC. As demonstrated by \nour analysis above, the evaluation conducted by the Reference \nCourt was nearly accurate and aligned with the evidence of the \nsale deeds and potentiality, despite the fact that the sale exemplar \nEx. P76, on which it relied upon, may not have been ideal, given \nthe circumstances and its commercial nature.\n\nE. Conclusion\n\n38. For the reasons stated above, these appeals are allowed, the \nimpugned leading judgment dated 23.08.2022 of the High Court, \nas well as all other judgments following the said leading judgment \nwhich are under challenge in this batch of appeals, are hereby set \naside, and the compensation amount granted by the Reference \nCourt is hereby restored.\n\n39. The compensation amount, if already not paid, wholly or partly, as \nper the award of the Reference Court, shall be paid to the Appellants \nand other land-owners along with all the statutory benefits including \ninterest, within eight weeks.\n\n40. All the matters stand disposed of in the aforementioned terms.\n\nResult of the case: Appeals allowed.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by: Harshit Anand, Hony. Associate Editor \n\n(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)\n\nHorrmal (Deceased) Through His LRs & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.\f"}