{"file_name": "2024_10_1876_1889_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1876 : 2024 INSC 823\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh \nv. \nRamjan Khan & Ors.\n\n(Criminal Appeal No. 2129 of 2014)\n\n25 October 2024\n\n[C.T. Ravikumar* and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nWhether the High Court was right in setting aside the conviction \nof the respondents-accused under Section 302, IPC read with \nSection 34, IPC.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nEvidence – Dying declaration, allegedly made to a close \nrelative  – Reliance upon – When not proper – Respondents \nwere convicted inter alia relying on the dying declaration \nallegedly made to the mother of the deceased (PW-8) – \nConviction set aside by High Court – Correctness:\n\nHeld: Oral dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire \nfull confidence of the Court in its correctness – Dying declaration \nis not a strong piece of evidence and therefore, when it is verbal \nand that too, allegedly made to a close relative, it ought to be \ntreated with care and caution – In the present case, the trial Court \ndealt with the same without due care and caution – Prosecution \nattempted to establish the existence of an oral dying declaration \nthrough the evidence of PW-8, the mother of the deceased-\ninformant   – However, neither in the FIR nor in her statement \nrecorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., PW-8 stated about the oral \ndying declaration made to her by the deceased – Except her \nstatement in the Court there is no evidence in that regard – High \nCourt justified in taking note of the serious omissions in the oral \ntestimony of PW-8 and discrediting it – Further, the eyewitnesses \nPW-2 and PW-17 did not support the case of the prosecution \nand also the omissions on part of PWs 5 and 9 (minor brothers \nof the deceased) amounted to material contradiction going into \nthe core of the prosecution’s case  – In view of the omissions \nand contradictions, the oral testimonies of the witnesses are not \nreliable – Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the respondents \n\n* Author\n\n\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1877\n\nbeyond reasonable doubt – Respondents entitled to benefit of \ndoubt, acquitted – Judgment of the High Court not interfered with. \n[Paras 17, 20, 27-30]\n\nCriminal Law – FIR:\n\nHeld: FIR is an important document but, not a substantial piece of \nevidence – Even though it is not an encyclopedia containing chronicle \nof all intricate and minute details, it could be used to corroborate \nits maker viz., the informant under Section 157 of the Evidence \nAct or to contradict him under Section 145 of the Evidence Act to \nestablish whether he is a trustworthy witness or not – Whether the \nomission(s) is one which seriously impeaches the credibility of the \nwitness and is sufficient to reject the testimony of the informant \nwould depend upon whether it is of an important fact and whether \nthat fact was within the knowledge of the informant. [Paras 14, 15]\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.374 – Appeals from \nconvictions – Acquittal – Appeal against acquittal – Interference \nwith, when – Discussed. [Paras 6, 7, 8]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nJai Karan & Ors. v. State of U.P. [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 995 : (2003) \n12 SCC 655; Govindaraju v. State by Sivaramapuram PS [2012] 5 \nSCR 67 : (2012) 4 SCC 722; State of U.P. v. Dharmaraj and Anr. \n(2003) 9 SCC 39; Superintendent of Police, CBI & Ors. v. Tapan \nKumar Singh [2003] 3 SCR 485 : (2003) 6 SCC 175; State of UP v. \nNaresh & Ors. [2011] 4 SCR 1176 : (2011) 4 SCC 324; Lalitha \nKumari v. Government of UP & Ors. [2013] 14 SCR 713 : (2014) 2 \nSCC 1; Amish Devgan v. UOI & Ors. [2020] 14 SCR 198 : (2021) \n1 SCC 1; Dharma Rama Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra [1973] \n3 SCR 92 : (1973) 1 SCC 537; Anil Phukan v. State of Assam \n[1993] 2 SCR 389 : (1993) 3 SCC 282; Chandu Bhai Shana Bhai \nParmar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1982 SC 1022  – referred to.\n\nList of Acts\n\nPenal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence \nAct, 1872.\n\nList of Keywords\n\nDying declaration made allegedly to a close relative; Ocular \nevidence; Benefit of doubt; Verbal/Oral dying declaration; Dying \n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors.\f1878 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\ndeclaration not a strong piece of evidence; Eyewitnesses; Material \ncontradiction; Omissions and contradictions; Guilt not proved \nbeyond reasonable doubt; FIR not a substantial piece of evidence; \nFIR not encyclopedia; Appeal against acquittal.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. \n2129 of 2014\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 31.01.2013 of the High Court \nof M.P at Gwalior in CRLA No. 602 of 1998\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nMs. Rukhmini Bobde, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Ms. Maitreyee \nJagat Joshi, Ms. Soumya Priyadarshinee, Ankit Ambasta, Amit \nSrivastava, Amlaan Kumar, Astik Gupta, Ms. Akanksha Tomar, \nMs. Priyanka, Advs. for the Appellant.\n\nLokesh Kumar Choudhary, Devmani Bansal, Ajay Kumar Rai, \nShubham Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nC.T. Ravikumar, J.\n\n1. This appeal is against the judgment of acquittal dated 31.01.2013 \npassed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in Criminal \nAppeal No. 602 of 1998 in reversal of the judgment of conviction \nrecorded against the appellants therein viz., the respondents herein, \nby the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Sironj in Sessions Trial \nNo. 320 of 1996 dated 28.10.1998.\n\n2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant State and learned counsel \nfor the respondents, the convicts who were acquitted by the High \nCourt vide the impugned judgment.\n\n3. The case of the prosecution, in succinct, was as under: -\n\n‘On 01.10.1996, at about 1.00 pm, the respondents herein viz., \nRamjan Khan, Musaf Khan @ Musab Khan and Habib Khan, by \ncutting/beating with sickle, axe and stick caused death of Naseem \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1879\n\nKhan, near the village well of Karaikheda and thereby committed \nthe crime punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34, of the \nIndian Penal Code (for short the ‘IPC’).’\n\n4. As mentioned above, the respondents herein were tried by the Court \nof Additional Sessions Judge, Sironj. The prosecution had examined \n19 witnesses including Haseen Khan (PW-5) and Farid Khan (PW-\n9), who are the real brothers of deceased Naseem Khan and eye \nwitnesses. Documentary evidence including the postmortem report \nprepared by Dr. S.S. Thakur (PW-1) were tendered by the prosecution. \nOn the side of the defence two witnesses were examined. \n\n5. The trial Court relied on the oral testimonies of PW-5 and PW-9, \nthe minor brothers of the deceased besides the testimony of PW-8, \nthe mother of the deceased who happened to be the informant and \nthe further found that the ocular evidence got corroboration from the \nmedical evidence, to enter conviction on the appellants for having \ncommitted murder of Naseem Khan. Consequently, the respondents \nherein were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a \nfine of Rs. 35,000/-. The respondents herein, the convicts preferred \nappeal jointly, against the judgment of conviction for the offence \npunishable under Section 302, IPC read with Section 34, IPC and \nthe life sentence imposed therefor, the High Court acquitted them of \nthe offences with which they were charged and allowed the appeal \nin the impugned judgment of acquittal.\n\n6. Before dealing with the rival contentions raised before us, we think \nit only appropriate to refer to some of the relevant decisions of this \nCourt laying law in regard to appeal against acquittal. It is true that the \njudgment of acquittal was passed after setting aside the judgment of \nconviction passed against the respondents herein by the trial Court.\n\n7. \n\nIn the decision in Jai Karan & Ors. v. State of U.P.1 this Court \nheld that where the trial Court and the High Court had concurrently \nfound the accused guilty, the Supreme Court would not scrutinize \nthe evidence once again, unless there has been a total miscarriage \nof justice. We may hasten to add here that this Court may have \nto re-appreciate evidence in cases where a prima facie perverse \nappreciation of evidence is brought out, even in such cases. We \nshall also not be understood to have held that merely because the \n\n1 \n\n[2003] Supp. 4 SCR 995 : (2003) 12 SCC 655\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors.\f1880 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\ntrial Court and the High Court have rendered divergent findings, this \nCourt should invariably scrutinize the evidence once again and in that \nregard this Court should entertain an appeal. In an appeal, against \nconviction in murder case under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal \nProcedure (for short the ‘Cr.P.C.’), a proper analysis of the evidence \nand accepting or rejecting, the appreciation of evidence by the trial \nCourt must reflect in the judgment of the High Court. In other words, \nthe disposal of the appeal under Section 374, Cr.P.C., shall not be \nby cryptic or non-reasoned order. In the decision in Govindaraju v. \nState by Sivaramapuram PS,2 this Court held that a very vital \ndistinction has to be kept in mind while dealing with appeal under \nSection 374, Cr.P.C., that interference would be justifiable only when \ndistinction is kept between perversity in appreciation of evidence and \nmere possibility of another view. Furthermore, it was held therein \nthat it would not be appropriate for the High Court to merely record \nthat the judgment of the trial Court was perverse without specifically \ndealing with the facets of perversity relating to the issues of law and/\nor appreciation of evidence, as otherwise such observation of the \nHigh Court would not be sustainable in law.\n\n8. Having taken note of the position settled thus we may add that \nwhen the High Court acquitted the convict(s) in the appeal filed \nunder Section 374, Cr.P.C., in reversal of conviction, by granting the \nbenefit of doubt after a proper appreciation of evidence interference \nis permissible and justifiable only if it is infected with perversity in \ntroth, the prosecution was not successful in establishing the guilt of \nthe accused beyond reasonable doubt. In the decision in State of \nU.P. v. Dharmaraj and Anr.,3 which involved a challenge against \na judgment of acquittal in a murder case by the High Court, this \nCourt held that when on facts the view taken by the High Court was \na reasonably possible view, though not the only view that could be \ntaken, interference with acquittal would be uncalled for. \n\n9. Bearing in mind the aforesaid decisions and the fact that the trial \nCourt and the High Court are at issue on the question whether \nthe respondents are guilty in the case on hand, we will proceed to \nconsider the captioned appeal. Obviously, the trial Court relied on \n\n2 \n\n3 \n\n[2012] 5 SCR 67 : (2012) 4 SCC 722\n\n(2003) 9 SCC 39\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1881\n\nthe oral testimonies of PWs 5, 8 and 9 whereas in the appeal the \nHigh Court found the oral evidence of PWs 5, 8 and 9 as unreliable.\n\n10. Before dealing with the oral testimonies of the minor brothers of \nthe deceased (PWs 5 and 9), we will deal with the oral evidence of \nPW-8, the mother of the deceased. She is the informant at whose \ninstance FIR No.78/96 was registered against the respondents herein. \nThough she was believed by the trial Court, on re-appreciation the \nHigh Court found her unreliable owing to the material improvements \nand omissions made while being examined as PW-8. It was brought \nout while being cross-examined that she had not deposed at all \nabout a dying declaration made to her by the deceased son. Before \nanalysing her evidence further, it is not inappropriate to refer to a \nfew decisions having bearing on her testimony. \n\n11. FIR is not an encyclopedia disclosing all facts and details relating the \nentire prosecution case. (See the decisions in Superintendent of \nPolice, CBI & Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh;4 State of UP v. Naresh \n& Ors.;5 Lalitha Kumari v. Government of UP & Ors.,6 and Amish \nDevgan v. UOI & Ors.7).\n\n12. \n\nIt is true that the aforementioned decisions would undoubtedly reveal \nthe position that an FIR is not meant to be a detailed document \ncontaining chronicle of all intricate and minute details.\n\n13. Even after, referring to the decisions mentioned above, we think \nit equally relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in Dharma \nRama Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra.8 It was held therein thus: -\n\n\"The first information report, it may be pointed out, is never \ntreated as a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be \nused for corroborating or contradicting its maker when he \nappears in court as a witness.”\n\n14. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that the prime \nobject of FIR, from the point of view of the informant is to set the \ncriminal law in motion and from the point of the investigating authorities \n\n4 \n\n5 \n\n6 \n\n7 \n\n8 \n\n[2003] 3 SCR 485 : (2003) 6 SCC 175\n\n[2011] 4 SCR 1176 : (2011) 4 SCC 324\n\n[2013] 14 SCR 713 : (2014) 2 SCC 1\n\n[2020] 14 SCR 198 : (2021) 1 SCC 1\n\n[1973] 3 SCR 92 : (1973) 1 SCC 537\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors.\f1882 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nis to obtain information about the alleged activity so as to enable to \ntake suitable steps to trace and book the guilty. Thus, it can be said \nthat FIR is an important document, though not a substantial piece of \nevidence, and may be put in evidence to support or contradict the \nevidence of its maker viz., the informant. Whether the omission(s) \nis one which seriously impeaches the credibility of the witness and \nis sufficient to reject the testimony of the informant would depend \nupon the question whether it is of an important fact and whether that \nfact was within the knowledge of the informant, going by the case \nof prosecution unraveled through the witness concerned.\n\n15. Thus, the position with respect to FIR is clear from the decisions \nreferred supra that even though it is not meant to be an encyclopedia \ncontaining chronicle of all intricate and minute details, it could be \nused to corroborate its maker under Section 157 of the Evidence Act \nor to contradict its maker viz., the informant under Section 145 of the \nEvidence Act to establish whether he is a trustworthy witness or not. \n\n16. Realising and recognizing the aforesaid position with respect to FIR \nwe will proceed to consider whether the disinclination on the part \nof the High Court to rely on, rather, treating the evidence of the \ninformant – PW8 as unreliable is justifiable and sustainable in law.\n\n17. Through the evidence of PW8, the mother of the deceased, who is \nalso the informant, the prosecution has attempted to establish the \nexistence of an oral dying declaration. It is to be noted that dying \ndeclaration itself is not a strong piece of evidence and therefore, \nwhen it is verbal and that too, allegedly made to a close relative \n(in this case allegedly to the mother), evidence of mother about the \noral dying declaration was to be treated with care and caution. To \nshow that the trial Court dealt with the same without due care and \ncaution self- evident from paragraph 32 of the judgment of the Trial \nCourt, which reads thus: - \n\n\"32. During the arguments, ld. Counsel for the accused \nargued that complainant Sitara Bi has stated in her court \nstatement that when she reached at well, at that time, \nher son Naseem Khan told her that all the three accused \nRamjan Khan, Musab Khan and Habib Khan have caused \nhis murder after beating him with sickle, axe and lathi. \nThough, this fact is not written in the police statement \nExh. D-3 of Sitara Bi that when he reached, at that time, \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1883\n\naccused Naseem had told her to be beaten by accused \npersons, even thereafter, I don’t find it proper to give it’s \nbenefit to the accused persons because I don’t find any \nreason to disbelieve the statement, which has been given \nby her before the court.”\n\n18. Paragraph 42 of the judgment of the Trial Court carries the further \nrecital with respect to the aforesaid aspect and it, in so far as relevant, \nreads thus: - \n\n\"42… Sitara Bi (PW-8) has stated in para-5 of her cross-\nexamination that if the police has not written the fact of \ngoing of Farid Khan and Haseen Khan alongwith Naseem \nKhan for bathing is not written in the police statement of \nExh. D-3, then, she cannot tell its reason. Similarly, when \ncomplainant Sitara Bi reached on the spot, at that time, \nNaseem Khan was lying on the ground and Naseem Khan \ntold her that accused have beaten him. If, this fact is also \nnot written in her police statement, then she cannot tell \nits reason...”\n\n19. The Judgment of the Trial Court would reveal that after considering \nthe aforesaid aspect in such a light manner, believing the oral \nevidence of PW8 as well, the Trial Court arrived at the finding \nthat accused Ramjan Khan had beaten Naseem Khan with sickle, \naccused Musab had beaten him with bamboo lathi (equipped with \nFarsa) and accused Habib inflicted axe blow on Naseem Khan and \nthereby caused his murder.\n\n20. The undisputed and indisputable position obtained from the evidence \non record is that the defence had brought out that neither in Ext. \nP12 FIR nor in Ext. D3 statement of PW8 recorded under Section \n161, Cr.P.C., PW8 stated about the oral dying declaration made \nto her by the deceased. That apart, the prosecution had failed \nto establish that when PW8 reached the place of occurrence the \ndeceased was in a fit state of mind to speak or talk relevantly. Except \nthe statement of PW8 in the Court there is no scrap of evidence in \nthat regard in the case on hand. As a matter of fact, on this aspect \nnothing was brought out from PW5 and PW9 or from any other \nwitnesses. There can be no doubt that oral dying declaration should \nbe of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its \ncorrectness. In the contextual situation revealed as above, we have \n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors.\f1884 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nno hesitation to hold that the High Court was perfectly justified in \nconsidering the oral testimony of PW8 and taking serious note of \nthe serious omission brought out from her, on being confronted with \nExt. P12 FIR and Ext. D3, which is her previous statement made to \npolice, that she had not stated anything about such an oral dying \ndeclaration made by her deceased son. The High Court also took \nnote of the fact that neither PW5 nor PW9 had spoken about any \nsuch oral dying declaration made by the deceased brother to their \nmother- PW8. Add to it, the oral testimony of PW8 would reveal \nthat while being examined-in-chief she deposed what Haseen Khan \n(PW5) and Fareed Khan (PW9) divulged to her. She would depose: \n“When my sons Fareed Khan and Haseen Khan told me at home \nthat accused persons have killed Naseem Khan then I reached the \nplace of incident.” \n\n(underline supplied)\n\n21. \n\nIn this context, it is also relevant to refer to her oral evidence while \nbeing cross-examined. She deposed thus on being cross-examined: - \n\n“It is incorrect to say that Fareed and Haseen did not tell \nme that accused persons have killed Naseem.\"\n\n22. The oral testimony of PW-8 would further go to show that with \nrespect to the attack allegedly done by the three accused persons \nviz., the respondents herein on her deceased son Naseem Khan, \nher evidence is nothing but ‘hearsay evidence’ as according to her \nshe was told about their attack on Naseem Khan only by her sons, \nPW-5 and PW-9 and there is no case for the prosecution that she \nhad witnessed the respondents herein attacking Naseem Khan.\n\n23. A scanning of the oral testimony of PW-8 would show that on many \nother materials points the defence could brought out, upon confronting \nher with Ext.P12-FIR, Ext.D3-previous statement, various serious \nomissions. About her statement in Court that PW-5 and PW-9 went \nalong with deceased Naseem Khan on 01.10.1996 for taking bath \nnothing was seen recorded in Ext.D3. As noted earlier, as to the \nalleged oral dying declaration made to her by the deceased from the \nplace of occurrence after sustaining injuries nothing was recorded \nin Ext.P12-FIR as also in Ext.D3. Though she deposed that upon \nseeing her Ramjan, Musaf Khan and Habib Khan ran away from the \nplace of occurrence this fact was not recorded in Ext.D3. So also, \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1885\n\nabout the attack by the accused persons on deceased Naseem Khan \nthough she deposed that PW-5 and PW-9 told her and in turn she \ntold such facts to police they were not recorded in Ext.D3. She would \ndepose that she got no enmity with the family of accused persons \nand got no dispute in respect of land. In view of the aforementioned \naspects revealed from the testimony of PW-8 which were not given \ndue weight by the trial Court while considering whether PW-8 is \nreliable or not, we are of the considered view that the High Court \nhad rightly given due consideration to all such aspects and ultimately \ndiscredited her testimony. \n\n24. Before considering the oral testimonies of the witnesses claimed \nby the prosecution as eye witnesses, it is to be noted that with \nrespect to the nature of death of Naseem Khan there is actually no \ncleavage in the findings of the trial Court and the High Court. The \nconcurrent finding is that it is culpable homicide amounting to murder. \nThe necroscopical evidence consists of the oral testimony of PW-1, \nDr. S.S. Thakur, and the postmortem report prepared and proved by \nhim as Ext.P1. Going by the said necroscopical evidence the following \nantemortem injuries were present on the body of the Naseem Khan: -\n\n\"1. A punctured wound measuring ½ inch x ½ inch on \nthe left side of face, clotted blood was present.\n\n2. An incised wound measuring 1 inch x ½ inch on \nthe ½, 1/3 portion back side of left wrist, which was \nhaving the clotted blood. \n\n3. An incised wound measuring 3 inch x ½ inch x deep \nto bone, margin on the occipital region of head having \nclotted blood. \n\n4. An incised wound measuring 3 inch x. ½ inch x deep \nbone, on the frontal region of head, having clotted \nblood. \n\n5. An incised wound measuring 3 x ½ inch x dee on \nthe temporal region of left side of head, in which the \nclotted blood was present.”\n\n25. PW-1 opined that all the aforesaid injuries except injury Nos.1 and 2 \nwere sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and \nthat the cause of death was comma as a result of head injuries. In \n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors.\f1886 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nshort, in view of the necroscopical evidence as above the Courts \nwere perfectly right in holding that the death of Naseem Khan is \nculpable homicide amounting to murder.\n\n26. Now, the surviving question is only whether the prosecution had \nsucceeded in establishing conclusively beyond any reasonable doubt \nthat the culprits for the murder of Naseem Khan, are the respondents \nherein as held by the trial Court or whether they are entitled to the \nbenefit of doubt and consequential acquittal as held by the High \nCourt. In the decision in Anil Phukan v. State of Assam,9 this Court \nheld that conviction could be based on testimony of a single witness \nprovided his testimony is found reliable and inspires confidence. In the \ndecision in Chandu Bhai Shana Bhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat,10 \nthis Court held that when the ocular evidence in a murder case is \nunreliable benefit of doubt to be given to all accused. \n\n27. We have already held, for the reasons given earlier, that the High \nCourt had rightly held the oral testimony of PW-8 as unreliable. \nAs a matter of fact, the case of the prosecution is that Isab Khan \n(PW-2), Haseen Khan (PW-5), Fareed Khan (PW-9), and Anees Khan \n(PW-17) had witnessed the incident that led to the death of Naseem \nKhan. In the light of the decisions in Anil Phukan’s case and Chandu \nBhai’s case (supra) the oral testimonies of PWs 2, 5, 9 & 17 are \nto be appreciated to answer the aforementioned surviving question. \nPW-2 was declared hostile by the prosecution and concurrently his \nevidence was held unreliable. Though PW-17 also turned hostile, the \ntrial Court held that on that account the accused / the respondents \nherein are not entitled to any benefit as PW-5 and PW-9 proved \nthe fact that accused/the respondents herein had caused murder \nof Naseem Khan using sickle, danda affixed with farsa, and axe. \nHowever, the High Court held the evidence of PW-17 as unreliable. \nThe High Court found that though PW-17 was declared hostile prior \nto such declaration he deposed that the accused Ramjan/the first \nrespondent herein had thrown the deceased on a stone boulder. \nHe had not deposed anything against the other accused / the other \nrespondents herein. The High Court found his testimony unreliable \nas according to him the first respondent Ramjan threw the deceased \n\n9 \n\n[1993] 2 SCR 389 : (1993) 3 SCC 282\n\n10 AIR 1982 SC 1022\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1887\n\n28. \n\non a stone boulder which caused head injuries, but that is not the \ncase of the prosecution at all and that apart he had stated so, for \nthe first time only in the Court. In that regard he was confronted \nwith his previous statement - Ext.P22. Besides the same, there is \nnothing in the opinion of PW-1, the Doctor who conducted autopsy \non the body of Naseem Khan, which would indicate that the head \ninjury was caused on account of the deceased being thrown on the \nstone boulder. When that be the nature of evidence of PW-17, it \ncan only be held that the finding of the trial Court that the evidence \nof PW-17 would not fetch any benefit for the accused cannot be \nsustained. Hence, according to us, the High Court held his evidence \nunreliable correctly.\n\nIn the aforesaid circumstances the question is with respect to the \nreliability on the oral testimonies of PW-5 and PW-9 who are the \nyounger brothers of deceased Naseem Khan. As noticed hereinbefore, \ntheir oral testimonies were held as reliable by the trial Court and at \nthe same time the High Court found their testimonies as unreliable. \nAt the outset, it is to be noted that as in the case of PW-8, the \ndefence had succeeded in bringing out the fact that both PW-5 and \nPW-9 had omitted to mention certain material facts to police while \ntheir statements were recorded. The question is whether they were \nomissions tantamounting to discredit the said witnesses. PW-5, while \nbeing examined in chief, deposed to have seen Ramjan causing injury \nby parena (sickle), Musaf Khan causing injury by stick and Habib \ncausing injury by axe on his brother Naseem Khan. However, during \ncross-examination he would depose that regarding the infliction of \ninjuries by the respondents using the aforementioned weapons on \nNaseem Khan, he did not make any statement before the police and \nstated so for the first time before the Court. PW-2, Isab Khan, and \nPW-17, Anees Khan, are respectively the sons of Yaseem Khan and \nMohar Khan, who are the cousin brothers of Munne Khan, the father \nof PWs 5 and 9. As noticed hereinbefore, both PW-2 and PW-17 \ndid not support the case of the prosecution. High Court also took \nnote of the fact that PW-5 did not depose that when he along with \nhis mother (PW-8) reached the place of occurrence the deceased \nwas alive and gave oral dying declaration to PW-8.\n\n29. While being cross-examined PW-9 deposed that he did not tell the \npolice that Ramjan with parena, Musaf Khan with farsa and, Habib \nKhan with axe assaulted his brother Naseem Khan. While being \n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors.\f1888 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nexamined in chief he would depose that his mother was also beaten \nby the accused persons. It is to be noted that there is absolutely \nno such case even for PW-8, the mother of PW-9. As can be seen \nfrom paragraph 6 of his oral testimony the defence had brought \nout some other omissions and contradictions. The aforementioned \nomissions on the part of PWs 5 and 9 cannot be said to be minor \ncontradictions to be taken lightly as according to them they did \nnot name the accused persons in their previous statements made \nto the police. Hence, omissions thus brought amount to material \ncontradiction which will go into the core of the prosecution case. Their \noral testimonies would reveal that they stated about the infliction of \ninjuries on Naseem Khan, their elder brother by the respondents \nwith the weapons mentioned above for the first time only before \nthe Court while being examined. That apart, it is to be noted that \nthough the case of the prosecution is that both PWs 5 and 9 had \ngone with deceased Naseem Khan for taking bath on the fateful day \nthe evidence of PW-8 would reveal that in her previous statement to \nthe police she had not disclosed the said fact to the police. In this \ncontext, it is relevant to note that the prosecution had not revealed, \nrather established, the genesis of the incident that led to the death \nof Naseem Khan. In other words, none of the witnesses including \nPWs 5 and 9 had deposed as to the genesis of the incident. This \nassumes relevance as PW-8 herself deposed that she got no enmity \nwith the families of the accused and got no land dispute with them. \nWhen this be the nature of the evidence of PWs 5 and 9 as also the \nevidence of PWs 2, 8 and 17, we are of the considered view that there \ncan be no good reason to hold that the prosecution had succeeded \nin conclusively proving the guilt of the accused/respondents herein \nbeyond reasonable doubt warranting displacement of the finding of \nthe High Court that in view of the omissions and contradictions, the \noral testimonies of the aforesaid witnesses are not reliable and the \nrespondents herein are entitled to the benefit of doubt. We have \nalready taken note of the decision in Dharmaraj’s case (supra) \ninvolving a challenge against judgment of acquittal in a murder \ncase in reversal of conviction entered against the accused by the \ntrial Court holding that if on facts the view taken by the High Court \nis a reasonable possible view, though not the only view that could \nbe taken, interference with acquittal would be uncalled for. In view \nof the nature of the evidence discussed above and the finding of \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R. \n\n1889\n\nthe High Court that the respondents/accused are entitled to benefit \nof doubt and consequently for acquittal, we do not find any reason \nto hold that it is not a reasonably possible view though not the only \nview that could be taken. \n\n30. The long and short of the above discussion is that we are not \ninclined to interfere with the judgment of acquittal passed by the \nHigh Court in Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 1998. Hence the appeal \nstands dismissed.\n\nResult of the case: Appeal dismissed.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors.\f"}