{"file_name": "2024_10_1890_1901_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1890 : 2024 INSC 918\n\nBijay Agarwal \nv. \nM/s Medilines \n\n(Criminal Appeal No(s). 4301 of 2024)\n\n21 October 2024\n\n[C.T. Ravikumar* and Sanjay Karol, JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nWhether  the  signatory  of  a  cheque  authorized  by  the  Company \nis  a  drawer  and  whether  such  a  signatory  could  be  directed  to \ndeposit any sum out of the fine or compensation awarded by the \ntrial Court u/s.148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as a \ncondition for suspending the sentence in an appeal filed against \nhis conviction u/s.138 of the NI Act.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nNegotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138 and 148 – Appellant \nis  the  authorized  signatory  of  the  company  –  The  signed \ncheques  were  presented  in  the  bank  –  The  cheques  were \ndishonoured  and  returned  with  the  endorsement  “payment \nstopped  by  the  drawer”  –  Trial  Court  found  appellant  guilty \nand accordingly was convicted and sentenced – Appellant filed \ncriminal appeals before the Principal City Civil and Session \nJudge  –  The  sentence  was  suspended  with  condition  to \ndeposit 20% of the fine/compensation – It is against the said \ndirection  to  deposit  20%  of  the  compensation  amount  that \nthe appellant approached the High Court, which culminated \nin the impugned common order dated 09.01.2024:\n\nHeld: In the case of the position qua Section 143A, NI Act, merely \nbecause  an  officer  of  a  company  concerned  is  the  authorised \nsignatory  of  the  cheque  concerned  by  itself  will  not  make  such \nan officer ‘drawer of the cheque’ under Section 148, NI Act, so as \nto empower the Appellate Court, in an appeal against conviction \nfor  an  offence  under  Section  138,  NI Act,  to  direct  to  deposit \ncompensation of any sum under Section 148(1), of the NI Act – It \nis settled that an Appellate Court in an appeal against conviction \nunder Section 138, NI Act, could not place a condition to deposit \n\n* Author\n\n\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1891\n\nan  amount  invoking  the  power  under  Section  148(1),  NI  Act, \nmechanically  without  considering  whether  the  case  falls  within \nexceptional circumstances – In view of the said exposition of law, \nthe Appellate Court ought to have considered the aforesaid aspects \nas  it  would  certainly  be  an  exceptional  circumstance  to  exempt \nthe appellant who is not the ‘drawer’ of the cheque concerned to \ndeposit the amount payable under Section 148(1) by an appellant \nwho is the ‘drawer’ of the cheque – In the instant case, the High \nCourt  has  failed  to  consider  these  crucial  aspects  in  the  light  of \nthe dictum laid down by this Court in its various decisions while \nconsidering  the  application  for  suspension  of  sentence  for  the \nconviction under Section 138 of the NI Act in the pending appeal – \nIn view of the discussion, the impugned order passed by the High \nCourt is set aside and the orders passed by the Principal City Civil \n& Sessions Judge stands quashed and set aside to the extent it \nput  the  condition  to  deposit  of  20%  of  the  fine  amount  payable. \n[Paras 16, 17, 18]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nShri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao \nDeshmukh & Ors. [2024] 7 SCR 1211 : (2024) SCC OnLine SC \n1800; K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vohra and Another [2009] 9 SCR 1144 : \n(2009) 10 SCC 48; N. Harihara Krishnan v. Godfather Travels and \nTours  P.  Ltd.  (2018)  13  SCC  663;  Jamboo  Bhandari  v.  Madhya \nPradesh  State  Industrial  Development  Corporation  Limited  and \nOrs. (2023) 10 SCC 446 – referred to.\n\nNegotiable Instruments Act, 1881.\n\nList of Acts\n\nList of Keywords\n\nSignatory of a cheque authorized by the Company; Section 148 \nof  Negotiable  Instruments Act,  1881;  Suspension  of  sentence; \nCondition to deposit an amount out of fine or compensation; Ex-\nceptional circumstances.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION  :  Criminal Appeal  No.   \n4301 of 2024\n\nBijay Agarwal v. M/s Medilines \f1892 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 09.01.2024 of the High Court \nof Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP No. 13095 of 2023\n\nWith\n\nCriminal Appeal No. 4302 of 2024\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nSiddharth  Aggarwal,  Sr.  Adv.,  Anjan  Datta,  Sumon  Pathak,   \nMs. Ishita Srivastava, Ms. Arshiya Ghose, Ashish Raghvuvanshi, \nVishal Arun Mishra, Advs. for the Appellant.\n\nGautam S. Bharadwaj, Ashwin Kumar D.S., Ishan Roy Chowdhury, \nMs. Surbhi Mehta, Advs. for the Respondent.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nC.T. Ravikumar, J.\n\nLeave granted. \n\nOn the consent of the parties, the matter was finally heard.\n\n1.  The captioned appeals by a special leave are directed against the \nimpugned  common  order  dated  09.01.2024  passed  by  the  High \nCourt of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Petition Nos. 13095 of \n2023 and 13153 of 2023 respectively. \n\n2.  Heard  the  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  and \n\nthe learned counsel appearing for the respondent.\n\n3. \n\nIn view of the factual background obtained in these cases, a question \nof  seminal  importance  arises  for  consideration  viz.,  “whether  the \nsignatory of a cheque authorized by the Company is a drawer and \nwhether  such  a  signatory  could  be  directed  to  deposit  any  sum \nout  of  the  fine  or  compensation  awarded  by  the  trial  Court  under \nSection 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘NI \nAct’)”, as a condition for suspending the sentence in an appeal filed \nagainst his conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act?\n\n4.  The  contention  of  the  appellant  is  that  he  is  only  an  authorized \nsignatory  of  the  company  M/s.  Gee  Pee  Infotech  Private  Limited, \nwhich  was  held  liable  to  adequately  compensate  the  complainant \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1893\n\ncompany by the trial Court. The status of the appellant authorised \nsignatory  of  the  aforesaid  company  is  undisputed  rather,  it  is \nindisputable  as  it  is  the  very  case  of  the  respondent  complainant. \nBefore the trial Court the said company was the first accused and the \nappellant herein was the second accused. In unambiguous terms, the \nrespondent-complainant described the appellant Sri. Bijay Agarwal as \nthe authorized signatory/ Director of M/s. Gee Pee Infotech Pvt. Ltd. \n\n5.  Bearing in mind the said indisputable and undisputed fact, we will \n\nbriefly refer to the other relevant facts of the case. \n\nThe  complaint  being  C.C.  No.  13938  of  2013  was  filed  by  the \nrespondent  company  against  M/s.  Gee  Pee  Infotech  Private  Ltd. \nand  appellant,  under  Section  138  of  the  NI Act.  The  crux  of  the \ncomplaint was as under: -\n\nThe  Accused  No.1  is  a  Company  incorporated  under \nprovisions of Companies Act 1956. The second accused \nis an  authorised signatory/Director of  the  first accused \ncompany  and  he  is  incharge  and  responsible  for  the \nday  today  administrative  affairs  and  functioning  of  the \naccused  No.1  Company. The  accused  by  representing \nthat  they  are  the  Pan  Indian  circle  licence  holder  for \ndistribution of Electronic Pin Recharge BSNL, induced the \ncomplainant to pay advance amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/- \nand  to  become  the  Master  Distributor  for  BS  recharge \npin  for  Karnataka  State  and  accordingly  entered  in \nagreement  with  the  complainant  on  01/10/2011.  By \nvirtue  of  said  Agreement,  the  accused  appointed  the \ncomplainant  Master  Distributor  for  BSNL  E-recharge \npin  for  Karnataka  and  collected  the  advance  payment \nwhile undertaking liquidate/transfer BSNL E-recharge pin \nload to the complainant as to enable them to distribute \nthrough their constituents of the State of Karnataka. After \nentering  into  the  Agreement  accused  supplied  certain \nBSNL  E-recharge  pin  to  the  complainant.  However,  to \ntheir  utter  shock,  surprise  and  dismay,  it  came  to  the \nknowledge of the complainant through their constituents \nthat  99%  of  the  BSNL  E-recharge  pin  supplied  by  the \naccused are fake and the talk time under the said BSNL \nE-recharge load supplied to them could not be uploaded \nto the Mobile Numbers of the customers.\n\nBijay Agarwal v. M/s Medilines \f1894 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n6. \n\nIt  was  the  further  case  that  on  being  told  that  appropriate  action \nwould be initiated they executed a Memorandum of Understanding on \n10.04.2012 and assured return of the amount advanced and issued \nfive  post-dated  cheques.  The  cheque  presented  was  dishonoured \nand  thereupon  the  complainant  caused  legal  notice.  Pursuant  to \nthe same, the accused issued two fresh post-dated cheques each \nfor a sum of Rs.25 lakhs in lieu of the old cheques. Later, cheque \nbearing No.955437 dated 24.04.2013 for a sum of Rs.25 lakhs was \npresented,  but  dishonoured  and  returned  with  the  endorsement \n“payment  stopped  by  the  drawer”.  The  complaint  was,  thereupon, \nfiled  after  complying  with  the  requisite  procedures  and  was  taken \non file as C.C. No.13938/2013\n\n7.  After appreciating the evidence, the trial Court arrived at the following \n\nfinding as against issue No.2:\n\n32.  Point  No.2:-  Complainant  Company  paid  a  sum  of   \nRs. 1,00,00,000/- to the accused Company for purchasing \nBSNL E recharge pins but was supplied fake E-recharge \npins  which  the  complainant  Company  demanded \nrepayment,  the  accused  not  be  uploaded  to  the  Mobile \nnumbers  of  the  customers.  W  a  sum  of  Rs.50,00,000/- \nand  for  the  balance  Company  repaid  amount  it  issued \nthe  cheque  in  question  which  came  to  be  dishonoured \non presentation. Complainant Company has been deprive \nof its money for all these years, i.e. for a period of more \nthan  years.  Hence,  accused  Company  shall  adequately \ncompensate the complainant for the same.\n\n8.  As relates the latter appeal, the complaint that was taken on file as \nC.C. No.13937/2013 was filed pursuant to the dishonour of cheque \nNo.955421 dated 24.12.2012 for a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs under similar \ncircumstances.  On  appreciating  the  evidence  the  trial  Court,  as \nper a separate order passed on 30.09.2023 itself arrived at similar \nconclusion as in C.C. No.13938/2013.\n\n9.  Based on the aforesaid conclusions, in both the cases the trial Court \nfound the appellant guilty and accordingly convicted and sentenced, \nas per judgment and order dated 30.09.2023 as under: - \n\n“Accused  is  found  guilty  of  the  offence  punishable   \nU/Sec. 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act 1881.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1895\n\nActing U/sec. 255(2) of Cr.PC accused is hereby convicted \nfor  the  offence  punishable  U/Sec.  138  of  Negotiable \nInstruments Act 1881 and he is sentenced to pay to pay \nfine of Rs. 40,00,000/-.\n\nIn default, accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for \na period of six months.”\n\n10.  Feeling  aggrieved  by  the  conviction  and  sentence  passed  in \nC.C.  No.13937/2013,  the  appellant  preferred  Criminal  Appeal \nNo.1536/2023  and  against  the  conviction  and  sentence  passed  in \nC.C.  No.13938/2013  filed  Criminal Appeal  No.1537/2023,  before \nthe  Principal  City  Civil  and  Sessions  Judge  Court  at  Bangalore. \nIn  the  appeals,  the  appellant  herein  filed  separate  applications \nand  sought  for  suspension  of  sentence  passed  in  both  the  cases, \nunder Section 389 of the Cr.PC. Separately, but on the very same \nlines  orders  were  passed  in  both  the  appeals  on  10.11.2023. The \nsentence  was  suspended  with  condition  to  deposit  20%  of  the \nfine/compensation amount in each of the appeals. It is against the \nsaid  direction  to  deposit  20%  of  the  compensation  amount  that \nthe appellant approached the High Court by filing Criminal Petition \nNos.13095/2013 and 13153/2013 seeking that part of the order dated \n10.11.2023 requiring deposit of fine be quashed, which culminated \nin the impugned common order dated 09.01.2024.\n\n11.  Now, the self-same appellant raised the contention in both the appeals \nthat in the light of the decision of this Court in Shri Gurudatta Sugars \nMarketing Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors.,1 \nhe could not have been directed to pay any amount payable under \nSection 148 (1) of the NI Act, for this Court laid down the law that \nmerely because an officer of a company being the authorised signatory \nof the cheque by itself would not make him its drawer. It is submitted \nthat though the said decision was dealing with Section 143A of the \nNI Act in view of its analogicalness to Section 148, NI Act, the dictum \nlaid down in the said decision is to be followed as relates Section 148 \nas well and hence, an authorized signatory of an accused company \nnot being the drawer of the cheque could not be directed to deposit \nany particular percentage of the fine or compensation awarded by \nthe trial Court under Section 148, NI Act. The learned counsel for the \n\n1 \n\n[2024] 7 SCR 1211 : (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1800\n\nBijay Agarwal v. M/s Medilines \f1896 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nrespondent resisted the contention and canvassed for the dismissal \nof the appeals. According to the learned counsel, the exposition of \nlaw in the decision in Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. \ncase (supra) is inapplicable in the cases on hand.\n\n12.  To  appreciate  rival  contentions,  it  is  only  appropriate  to  refer  to \n\nSections 143- A and 148 of the NI Act: - \n\n“S.143  –  A.  Power  to  direct  interim  compensation  –   \n(1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  Code  of \nCriminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court trying an \noffence  under  Section  138  may  order  the  drawer  of  the \ncheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant- \n\n(a) \n\nin a summary trial or a summons case, where \nhe pleads not guilty to the accusation made in \nthe complaint; and\n\n(b) \n\nin any other case, upon framing of charge.\n\n(2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall \nnot exceed twenty per cent of the amount of the cheque.\n\n(3)  The  interim  compensation  shall  be  paid  within  sixty \ndays from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or \nwithin  such  further  period  not  exceeding  thirty  days  as \nmay  be  directed  by  the  Court  on  sufficient  cause  being \nshown by the drawer of the cheque.\n\n(4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall \ndirect the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount \nof interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as \npublished by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the \nbeginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days \nfrom the date of the order, or within such further period not \nexceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on \nsufficient cause being shown by the complainant.“\n\n“S.148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending \nappeal against conviction. \n\n(1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  Code  of \nCriminal  Procedure,  1973  (2  of  1974),  in  an  appeal  by \nthe  drawer  against  conviction  under  Section  138,  the \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1897\n\nAppellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such \nsum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the \nfine or compensation awarded by the trial Court:\n\nProvided that the amount payable under this sub-section \nshall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by \nthe appellant under Section 143-A.”\n\n(Underline supplied)\n\n13.  A  scanning  of  Sections  143A  and  148  would  reveal  that  the \nformer  deals  with  the  power  of  the  Court  trying  an  offence  under \nSection  138  of  the  NI Act  to  direct  the  drawer  of  the  cheque  to \npay  interim  compensation  to  the  complainant  whereas  the  latter \nSection  deals  with  the  power  of  the Appellate  Court  in  an  appeal \nby  the  drawer  against  the  conviction  under  Section  138  to  the \nappellant  to  deposit  such  sum  which  shall  be  a  minimum  of  20% \nof the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court. The proviso \nto  Section  148(1)  would  further  reveal  that  the  amount  payable \nthereunder  shall  be  in  addition  to  any  interim  compensation  paid \nby the appellant under Section 143A, NI Act. Thus, a scanning of \nboth the Sections would reveal that the said sections empower to \nissue such directions only to the ‘drawer’ of the cheque. We have \nalready  noted  that  in  ‘Shri  Gurudatta  Sugars  Marketing  Pvt.  Ltd.’ \nCase  (supra)  after  referring  to  the  earlier  decisions  of  this  Court \nincluding  in  ‘K.K. Ahuja  v.  V.K.  Vohra  and Another,2’  and  in  ‘N. \nHarihara Krishnan v. Godfather Travels and Tours P. Ltd.,3’ this \nCourt held that the primary liability for an offence under Section 138 \nlies with the company and the company’s management is vicariously \nliable only under specific conditions provided in Section 141 and for \nthe purpose of Section 143A of the NI Act and a signatory merely \nauthorised  to  sign  on  behalf  of  the  company  would  not  become \nthe ‘drawer’ of the cheque and, therefore, could not be directed to \npay  interim  compensation  under  Section  143A.  In  the  contextual \nsituation, it is relevant to refer to paragraphs 28 to 30, 34 and 35 \nof ‘Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd.’s case to the extent \nit is relevant for the purpose of this case, as under: -\n\n2 \n\n3 \n\n[2009] 9 SCR 1144 : (2009) 10 SCC 48\n\n(2018) 13 SCC 663\n\nBijay Agarwal v. M/s Medilines \f1898 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n“28.  The  High  Court’s  interpretation  of  section  7  of  the \nNegotiable  Instruments Act,  1881  accurately  identified \nthe  “drawer”  as  the  individual  who  issues  the  cheque. \nThis  interpretation  is  fundamental  to  understanding \nthe  obligations  and  liabilities  under  Section  138  of  the \nNegotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which makes it clear that \nthe drawer must ensure sufficient funds in their account at \nthe time the cheque is presented. The appellants’ argument \nthat  directors  or  other  individuals  should  also  be  liable \nunder Section 143A misinterprets the statutory language \nand  intent.  The  primary  liability,  as  correctly  observed \nby the High Court, rests on the drawer, emphasizing the \ndrawer’s responsibility for maintaining sufficient funds.\n\n29. The general rule against vicarious liability in criminal \nlaw  underscores  that  individuals  are  not  typically  held \ncriminally liable for acts committed by others unless specific \nstatutory provisions extend such liability. Section 141 of the \nNegotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is one such provision, \nextending  liability  to  the  company’s  officers  for  the \ndishonour of a cheque. The appellants’ attempt to extend \nthis  principle  to  section  143A,  to  hold  directors  or  other \nindividuals  personally  liable  for  interim  compensation,  is \nunfounded. The High Court rightly emphasized that liability \nunder  section  141  arises  from  the  conduct  or  omission \nof the individual involved, not merely their position within \nthe company.\n\n30. The distinction between legal entities and individuals \nacting  as  authorized  signatories  is  crucial.  Authorized \nsignatories act on behalf of the company but do not assume \nthe company’s legal identity. This principle, fundamental to \ncorporate  law,  ensures  that  while  authorized  signatories \ncan bind the company through their actions, they do not \nmerge  their  legal  status  with  that  of  the  company.  This \ndistinction supports the High Court’s interpretation that the \ndrawer under section 143A refers specifically to the issuer \nof the cheque, not the authorized signatories.\n\n34. The respondents correctly argued that an authorised \nsignatory  is  not  a  drawer  of  the  cheque,  as  established \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1899\n\nin  N.  Harihara  Krishnan.  This  judgment  clarified  that \na  signatory  is  merely  authorised  to  sign  on  behalf  of \nthe  company  and  does  not  become  the  drawer.  The \nrespondents’  interpretation  aligns  with  the  principle  that \npenal  statutes  should  be  interpreted  strictly,  particularly \nin  determining  vicarious  liability.  The  judgment  in   \nK.K. Ahuja further supports this approach, emphasising that \npenal provisions must be read strictly to determine liability.\n\n35.  In  conclusion,  the  High  Court’s  decision  to  interpret \n“drawer”  strictly  as  the  issuer  of  the  cheque,  excluding \nauthorised signatories, is well-founded.”\n\n14.  As noted earlier, Section 148 would make it clear that it empowers \nthe Appellate  Court  in  an  appeal  by  the  drawer  against  conviction \nunder Section 138, NI Act, to direct to deposit a sum which shall be \na minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial \nCourt and the same shall be in addition to any interim compensation \npaid by the appellant under Section 143A. When this be the position \nrevealed from Sections 143A and 148 there cannot be any doubt with \nrespect  to  the  position  that  the  term  ‘drawer’  referred  to  in  Section \n148 and 143A means ‘drawer of the cheque concerned’. Ergo, the \nquestion is whether the law laid down in the decision in Shri Gurudatta \nSugars  Marketing  Pvt.  Ltd.’s  case  (surpa)  is  applicable  proprio \nvigore  in  cases  involving  the  question  of  liability  to  pay  additional \ncompensation,  as  contemplated  under  Section  148(1),  NI Act. The \nproviso  to  Section  148(1)  itself  makes  it  specifically  clear  that  the \namount payable under Section 148(1), NI Act, if the Appellate Court \nso directs, shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by \nthe appellant concerned under Section 143A, NI Act. It is nobody’s \ncase that the appellant was made to pay interim compensation under \nSection  143A,  in  relation  to  the  original  proceedings.  Be  that  as  it \nmay,  the  other  question  is  whether  an  authorised  signatory  of  the \ncheque can be said to be the drawer of the cheque concerned? We \nmay hasten to add here that we were not addressed on the question \nwhether the appellant herein could be saddled with the liability to pay \nsuch additional compensation in terms of Section 148(1) by virtue of \nthe provision under Section 141, NI Act which extends liability to the \nofficers of the company for the dishonour of a cheque and as such, \nwe do not propose to consider that aspect as it need be considered \nonly when pointedly posed for consideration based on proven facts.\n\nBijay Agarwal v. M/s Medilines \f1900 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n15.  There can be no doubt with respect to the position that Section 143A \nand 148 empowers the Court trying an offence under Section 138 \nand the Appellate Court considering an appeal by a drawer against \nhis  conviction  under  Section  138  respectively  to  fasten  liability \nto  pay  interim  compensation  and  additional  compensation  under \nSection  148(1),  as  the  case  may  be,  and  therefore,  the  question \nwhether  any  particular  officer  of  the  company  concerned  can  be \nmade to pay interim compensation or deposit additional compensation \nunder  the  aforesaid  relevant  provision(s)  would  depend  upon  the \nquestion  whether  he  is  only  a  signatory  of  the  cheque  or  whether \nhe is the drawer of the cheque. It is that question with reference to \nSection 143A, NI Act, that was answered as above in the decision \nin Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd.’s case (surpa). In \nview  of  the  analogicalness  of  Section  143A  to  Section  148,  that \nboth  the  provisions  are  under  the  same Act  though  applicable  at \ndifferent stage of proceedings under Section 138 of NI Act and that \nthe proviso to Section 148(1) makes it abundantly clear that deposit \nunder Section 148(1) of the NI Act shall be an additional compensation \npaid  by  the  appellant  under  Section  143A  thereof,  it  can  only  be \nsaid  that  the  decision  in  Shri  Gurudatta  Sugars  Marketing  Pvt. \nLtd.’s case (supra) is applicable to the extent it holds an officer of \na company who is an authorised signatory of the cheque issued by \na company is not the drawer of the same subject to what is held in \nthe said decision with reference to Section 141, NI Act, as relates \nSection 148 thereof.\n\n16.  To  wit,  as  in  the  case  of  the  position  qua  Section  143A,  NI Act, \nmerely because an officer of a company concerned is the authorised \nsignatory of the cheque concerned by itself will not make such an \nofficer  ‘drawer  of  the  cheque’  under  Section  148,  NI Act,  so  as  to \nempower the Appellate Court, in an appeal against conviction for an \noffence under Section 138, NI Act, to direct to deposit compensation \nof any sum under Section 148(1), of the NI Act.\n\n17. \n\nIn  the  decision  in  ‘Jamboo  Bhandari  v.  Madhya  Pradesh  State \nIndustrial Development Corporation Limited and Ors.4’ this Court \nheld that an Appellate Court in an appeal against conviction under \nSection 138, NI Act, could not place a condition to deposit an amount \n\n4 \n\n(2023) 10 SCC 446\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1901\n\ninvoking the power under Section 148(1), NI Act, mechanically without \nconsidering whether the case falls within exceptional circumstances. \nIn  view  of  the  said  exposition  of  law,  the Appellate  Court  ought  to \nhave considered the aforesaid aspects as it would certainly be an \nexceptional  circumstance  to  exempt  the  appellant  who  is  not  the \n‘drawer’  of  the  cheque  concerned  to  deposit  the  amount  payable \nunder  Section  148(1)  by  an  appellant  who  is  the  ‘drawer’  of  the \ncheque. In the case on hand, the High Court has failed to consider \nthese crucial aspects in the light of the dictum laid down by this Court \nin the decisions referred supra while considering the application for \nsuspension of sentence for the conviction under Section 138 of the \nNI Act in the pending appeal. \n\n18.  The upshot of the discussion is that these appeals should succeed \nand consequently, it is allowed. The impugned common order dated \n09.01.2024  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  at  Bengaluru \nin  Criminal  Petition  Nos.13095/2023  and  13153/2023  is  set  aside. \nAccordingly,  the  orders  dated  10.11.2023  passed  by  the  Principal \nCity  Civil  &  Sessions  Judge  at  Bangalore  respectively  in  Criminal \nAppeal No. 1537/2023 and 1536/2023 stands quashed and set aside \nto the extent it put the condition to deposit of 20% of the fine amount \npayable under orders in CC Nos.13937/2023 and 13938/2013, passed \nby  the  Court  of  XXXVI Additional  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate, \nBangalore City and restore the orders dated 10.11.2023 suspending \nthe sentence of the appellant in both the cases, with the condition(s) \nimposed qua execution of bond and on such execution it will remain \nin  force  till  the  disposal  of  the  above  mentioned  appeals  pending \nbefore the First Appellate Court concerned. \n\n19.  The First Appellate Court shall endeavour to dispose of the appeals \n\nexpeditiously.\n\n20.  The appeals stand allowed as above.\n\n21.  Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. \n\nResult of the case: Appeals allowed.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan\n\nBijay Agarwal v. M/s Medilines \f"}