{"file_name": "2024_10_1902_1917_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1902 : 2024 INSC 807\n\nHDFC Bank Ltd. \nv. \nThe State of Bihar & Ors.\n\n(Criminal Appeal No. 4324 of 2024)\n\n22 October 2024\n\n[B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nWhat is the nature of enquiry while determining quashing of a First \nInformation Report u/s.482 Cr.P.C., against a Bank and its Officials.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nCriminal law – Essential ingredients for offence under Section \n420 of IPC – Question of mens rea does not arise for a juristic \nperson:\n\nHeld: The FIR must disclose the following ingredients to make out \nan offence u/s.420 : (i) That the Accused has induced anyone since \ninception;  (ii)  That  the  inducement  was  fraudulent  or  dishonest; \n(iii) That  mens  rea  existed  at  the  time  of  such  inducement. The \nAccused/Bank is a jurisdiction person, and as such, the question of \nmens rea does not arise. However, on reading of the F.I.R., there \nis nothing to show that the Accused/Bank or its staff members had \ndishonestly induced someone to deceived to deliver any property \nto any person, and that the mens rea existed at the time of such \ninducement – Thus, the ingredients to attract the offence u/s.420 \nI.P.C. would not be available. [Paras 20 and 21]\n\nCriminal law – Section 482 CrPC – Quashing of FIR – Prima \nfacie inquiry as to whether the ingredients of the offence in \nthe FIR are made out or not.\n\nCriminal law – Essential ingredients for offence under Section \n406, 409 and 462 of IPC:\n\nHeld: The following ingredients will have to be made out for the \noffence u/s.409 I.P.C. – (a) That there has been any entrustment \nwith the property, or with any dominion over property on a person \nin  the  capacity  of  a  public  servant  or  banker,  etc.;  (b)  That  the \nsaid  person  commits  criminal  breach  of  trust  in  respect  of  that \nproperty  –    For  bringing  out  the  case  under  criminal  breach  of \n\n* Author\n\n\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1903\n\ntrust,  it  will  have  to  be  pointed  out  that  a  person,  with  whom \nentrustment of a property is made, has dishonestly misappropriated \nit,  or  converted  it  to  his  own  use,  or  dishonestly  used  it,  or \ndisposed  of  that  property  –  In  the  present  case,  there  is  no \nallegation of entrustment of property which the Accused/Bank has \nmisappropriated, and thus, the provisions of Section 406 and 409 \nI.P.C. are not applicable – Since there was no entrustment of any \nproperty  with  the Accused/Bank,  the  ingredients  of  Section  462 \nI.P.C. are also not applicable. [Paras 22 to 25]\n\nCriminal Law – Quashing of F.I.R.:\n\nHeld: Relied upon the Judgment in State of Haryana and others \nv. Bhajan Lal and Others, [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : 1990 INSC \n363 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335, wherein it was held that an F.I.R. \ncan be quashed where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not disclose \na cognizable offence, or where the uncontroverted allegations made \nin the F.I.R. and the evidence collected in support of the same do \nnot disclose the commission of any offence. [Paras 28 and 29]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nArnab  Manoranjan  Goswami  v.  State  of  Maharashtra  &  Ors. \n[2020] 11 SCR 896 : 2020 INSC 665 : (2021) 2 SCC 427 – relied \nupon\n\nState  of  Haryana  and  Others  v.  Bhajan  Lal  and  Others  [1990] \nSupp. 3 SCR 259 : 1990 INSC 363 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335 – \nrelied upon.\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.\n\nList of Acts\n\nList of Keywords\n\nQuashing of F.I.R.; Ingredients of offence u/s.420 IPC; Ingredients \nof offence u/ss.406 and 409 IPC.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Criminal  Appeal  No. \n4324 of 2024\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 08.06.2022 of the High Court \nof Judicature at Patna in CWJC No. 1375 of 2021\n\nHDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.\f1904 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nNeeraj  Kishan  Kaul,  Sr. Adv.,  Vikram  B.  Trivedi,  Faisal  Sayyed, \nNagarkatti  Kartik  Uday,  Sanidhya  Kumar,  Ms.  Pritha  Suri,   \nAdvs. for the Appellant.\n\nManish Kumar, Divyansh Mishra, Venkatraman Chandrashekhara \nBharathi, H R Rao, Ms. Priyanka Terdal, Udai Khanna, Shashank \nBajpai, Advs. for the Respondents.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nB.R. Gavai, J.\n\n1. \n\nLeave granted.\n\n2.  This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 8th June, 2022 \npassed by the learned Single Bench of the High Court of Judicature \nat Patna in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1375 of 2021 wherein \nthe  learned  Single  Judge  dismissed  the  Writ  Petition  preferred  by \nthe present appellant, HDFC Bank1, to quash the First Information \nReport2 being Case No. 549 of 2021 registered at Gandhi Maidan \nPolice Station, Patna on 22nd November, 2021, against certain officials \nof the appellant-bank working at its Exhibition Road Branch, Patna \nfor the offences punishable under Sections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 206, \n217, 406, 409, 420 and 462 of the Indian Penal Code, 18603. \n\n3.  The facts which give rise to the present appeal are as under:-\n\n3.1 \n\nIn  October,  2021,  Smt.  Priyanka  Sharma,  Deputy  Director  of \nIncome Tax (Investigation), Unit-2(2), Respondent No. 5 in the \npresent proceedings, conducted a search and seizure operation \nin the case of several income-tax assessees including Shri Sunil \nKhemka (HUF), Smt. Sunita Khemka and Smt. Shivani Khemka \nat  the  third  floor  of  Khataruka  Niwas,  South  Gandhi  Maidan, \nPatna. The said search and seizure operation was conducted \n\n1 \n\n2 \n\n3 \n\nHereinafter referred to as the ‘appellant-bank’.\n\n‘FIR’ for short.\n\n‘IPC’ for short.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1905\n\non the basis of warrants of authorization issued under Section \n132(1) of the Income Tax Act, 19614. During the course of the \nsearch,  it  was  found  that  Smt.  Sunita  Khemka  held  a  bank \nlocker  bearing  No.  462  in  the  appellant-bank  at  its  Exhibition \nRoad Branch, Patna. \n\n3.2  On the basis of the said operation, on 5th October, 2021, an order \nunder Section 132(3) of the IT Act was served upon the Branch \nManager of the appellant-bank at its Exhibition Road Branch, \nPatna  by  the  concerned Authorized  Officer,  thereby  directing \nthe said branch of the appellant-bank to stop the operation of \nany bank lockers, bank accounts and fixed deposits standing in \nthe names of Shri Sunil Khemka (HUF), Smt. Sunita Khemka \nand  Smt.  Shivani  Khemka,  among  several  other  individuals \nand entities, with immediate effect. It was further clarified that \ncontravention of the order would render the Branch Manager \nliable  under  Section  275A  of  the  IT Act  and  the  same  would \nresult in penal action.\n\n3.3 \n\nIn  compliance  of  the  aforesaid  order,  the  appellant-bank \nstopped the operation of the bank accounts, bank lockers and \nfixed deposits of the individuals/entities mentioned in the order. \nFurther, on 7th October, 2021, the appellant-bank blocked the \nbank accounts of the income-tax assesses named in the order \nand also sealed the bank locker bearing No. 462 belonging to \nSmt. Sunita Khemka.\n\n3.4  Subsequently, on 1st November, 2021, Respondent No. 5 issued \nan  order  to  the  Branch  Manager  of  the  appellant-bank  at  its \naforementioned branch thereby directing the appellant-bank to \nrevoke the restraint put on the bank accounts of Smt. Sunita \nKhemka  and  three  other  persons,  in  view  of  the  restraining \norder dated 5th October, 2021 passed under Section 132(3) of \nthe IT Act. Accordingly, the said persons, including Smt. Sunita \nKhemka, were to be allowed to operate their bank accounts. The \nsaid order was received by the concerned Branch Manager of \nthe appellant-bank of 8th November, 2021 at 4:00 p.m. However, \n\n4 \n\n‘IT Act’ for short.\n\nHDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.\f1906 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\non 2nd November, 2021 at 11:24 a.m., an email was sent to the \nBranch Manager which contained the same order. \n\n3.5  Thereafter,  on  9th  November,  2021,  the  concerned  branch  of \nthe appellant-bank allowed Smt. Sunita Khemka to operate her \nbank locker bearing No. 462 and proper entries recording the \noperation of the said locker were made in the bank’s records.\n\n3.6  Subsequently,  on  20th  November,  2021,  Respondent  No.  5 \nconducted a search and seizure operation at the aforementioned \nbank  locker  in  the  concerned  branch  of  the  appellant-bank \nwherein  it  was  found  that  Smt.  Sunita  Khemka  had  operated \nher bank locker with the assistance of the concerned officers of \nthe appellant-bank. This was validated by the entry made in the \nbank’s records and the CCTV footage of the bank. Resultantly, \nthe  concerned  officials  of  the  aforementioned  branch  of  the \nappellant-bank  were  found  to  have  breached  the  restraining \norder dated 5th October, 2021.\n\n3.7  Accordingly, on 20th November, 2021, Respondent No. 5 issued \nsummons under Section 131(1A) of the IT Act to Abha Sinha-\nBranch Manager, Abhishek Kumar-Branch Operation Manager \nand  Deepak  Kumar-Teller  Authoriser  being  the  concerned \nofficials of the appellant-bank at its aforementioned branch.\n\n3.8  The aforementioned officials attended the office of Respondent \nNo. 5 and their statements were recorded wherein Abha Sinha \nand Abhishek Kumar stated that there had been an inadvertent \nerror on the part of the bank officials and they had misinterpreted \nthe  order  dated  1st  November,  2021.  Since  the  said  order \npertained  to  the  bank  accounts  of  the  concerned  individuals \nincluding Smt. Sunita Khemka, the bank officials had misread the \norder to understand /assume that the revocation of the restraint \nextended  to  the  bank  lockers  as  well.  Having  misunderstood \nthe order, the bank officials under a bona fide assumption that \nbank  locker  had  been  released  as  well,  allowed  Smt.  Sunita \nKhemka to operate the same.\n\n3.9  The statement of Smt. Sunita Khemka had also been recorded \nwherein she stated that her accountant Surendra Prasad, after \nspeaking with Deepak Kumar, had informed her that the restraint \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1907\n\non the aforementioned bank locker had been revoked and she \ncould operate the said locker. This was specifically denied by \nDeepak Kumar in his statement. \n\n3.10 Dissatisfied  with  the  said  explanations,  Respondent  No.  5 \nsubmitted  a  written  complaint  to  the  SHO,  Gandhi  Maidan \nPolice Station seeking to register an FIR against Smt. Sunita \nKhemka and the concerned bank officials on the ground that \nthe order dated 5th October, 2021 had been violated owing to \nthe unlawful operation of the aforementioned locker. \n\n3.11  On the basis of the said complaint, on 22nd November, 2021, \nan  FIR  being  Case  No.  549  of  2021  came  to  be  registered \nagainst Smt. Sunita Khemka and the staff of the appellant-bank \nat its aforementioned branch for the offences punishable under \nSections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 207, 217, 406, 409, 420 and 462 \nof the IPC at the Gandhi Maidan Police Station, Patna.\n\n3.12 Aggrieved  by  the  registration  of  the  FIR,  the  appellant-bank \npreferred  a  Criminal  Writ  Jurisdiction  Case  thereby  invoking \nthe  inherent  power  of  the  High  Court  under  Section  482  of \nthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 19735 for the quashing of the \nFIR.  The  High  Court  vide  the  impugned  order  dismissed  the \nwrit petition finding it to be devoid of merit.\n\n3.13 Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.\n\n4.  We  have  heard  Mr.  Neeraj  Kishan  Kaul,  learned  Senior  Counsel \nappearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Manish Kumar, learned \nAdvocate-on-Record appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and \nMr.  Venkataraman  Chandrashekhara  Bharathi,  learned  counsel \nappearing on behalf of the respondent No.5.\n\n5.  Shri  Neeraj  Kishan  Kaul,  learned  Senior  Counsel  submits  that \ntaking the FIR at its face value, it does not disclose any mens rea \nof the officials of the appellant-bank and it also fails to disclose the \ncommission  of  any  offence.  He  further  submits  that  the  complaint \nalso does not disclose any specific allegation with regard to collusion \n\n5 \n\nHereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’\n\nHDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.\f1908 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nbetween  the  unnamed  staff  of  the  appellant-bank  with  Ms.  Sunita \nKhemka.  The  only  allegation  against  the  unnamed  staff  members \nof  the  appellant-bank  is  that  while  the  Prohibitory  Order  dated  5th \nOctober  2021  was  in  force  in  relation  to  the  bank  locker  No.462, \nMs. Sunita Khema, customer of the appellant-bank, was permitted \nto operate the said bank locker. \n\n6.  The  learned  Senior  Counsel  submits  that  taking  the  allegations  at \ntheir  face  value,  they  do  not  disclose  commission  of  the  alleged \noffences of Sections 420, 409, 406, 462, 206, 217, 201, 34, 120B \nand 37 of the IPC. It is submitted that it is settled law that the High \nCourt while considering a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. \nfor  quashing  the  FIR  must  examine  as  to  whether  prima  facie  the \ningredients of the offence have been made out in the FIR or not. In \nthis regard, a reference is placed on the judgment of this Court in \nthe case of Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra \nand others6 and in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and \nothers v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another.7\n\n7.  Shri Kaul, relying on the judgments of this Court in the case of State \nof  Haryana  and  others  v.  Bhajan  Lal  and  others,8  submits  that \nthe continuation of the prosecution of the appellant-bank and/or its \nstaff  under  IPC  would  amount  to  undue  hardship  and  miscarriage \nof justice. \n\n8.  Shri  Manish  Kumar,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the \nrespondents  Nos.  1  to  4,  on  the  contrary,  submits  that  the  High \nCourt  while  exercising  powers  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  cannot \nconduct  a  mini  trial.  It  is  submitted  that  this  Court  in  the  case  of  \nR. Venkatkrishnan v. Central Bureau of Investigation 9 has held \nthat though a bank or a financial institution may not suffer ultimate \nloss  but  if  the  money  has  been  allowed  to  be  used  by  another \nperson illegally for illegal purposes, the ingredients of Section 405 \nIPC would be attracted. \n\n6 \n\n7 \n\n8 \n\n9 \n\n[2020] 11 SCR 896 : (2021) 2 SCC 427\n\n[2024] 8 SCR 670 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2248\n\n[1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335\n\n[2009] 12 SCR 762 : (2009) 11 SCC 737\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1909\n\n9. \n\n10. \n\nIt  is  submitted  that  access  of  the  bank  locker  given  to  Ms.  Sunita \nKhemka in violation of Section 132(2) of the IT Act would attract the \noffence under Section 409 read with Section 405 of the IPC.\n\nIt  is  submitted  that  the  High  Court  has  rightly,  relying  on  various \njudgments of this Court including Neeharika Infrastructure Private \nLimited v. State of Maharashtra and others,10 held that the High \nCourt  cannot  thwart  any  investigation  into  a  cognizable  offence, \nwhich is the statutory right and duty of the Police under the relevant \nprovisions of the Cr.P.C. \n\n11.  He  further  submits  that  it  is  equally  settled  that  the  Court  cannot \nembark  upon  an  enquiry  as  to  the  reliability  or  genuineness  or \notherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.\n\n12.  With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, we have \nscrutinized the record. It will be relevant to refer to the Prohibitory \nOrder issued by the Authorized Officer on 5th October 2021, which \nreads thus:\n\n“Sub:  Order  under  132(3)  of  the  Income- Tax Act,  1961 \nin  respect  of  bank  Accounts,  Lockers,  Fixed  Deposits \netc.- regarding, \n\nSir,\n\nIn  connection  with  search  operation  conducted  under \nsub-section  (1)  of  section  132  of  the  Income-Tax  Act, \n1961,  in  the  office/residential/business  premises  of  the \nunder noted\n\nperson,  you  are  directed  to  STOP  OPERATION, \nimmediately, of Bank Lockers, Bank Accounts and Fixed \nDeposits, if any, standing in the below mentioned names(s) \neither singly or jointly, in terms of provisions of sub section \n(3) of section 132 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961.\n\n10 \n\n[2021] 4 SCR 1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401\n\nHDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.\f1910 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nSl. \nNo.\n\nName & Address of the \nperson\n\nDetail \nof Bank \nLockers/ \nAccounts/ \nDeposits\n\n1.\n\n2.\n\n3.\n\n4.\n\n5.\n\n6.\n\n7.\n\n8.\n\n9.\n\nSunil Kumar Khemka\n\nSunil Kumar Khemka (HUF)\n\nSunita Khemka\n\nSaloni Khemka\n\nShivani Khemka\n\nSharda Devi Khemka\n\nSharda Tradelinks Pvt. Ltd. \n\nGravity Sales Agency Pvt. Ltd.\n\nSparsh Tie Up Pvt. Ltd.\n\n10. S.S. Biolife Pvt. Ltd. \n\n11. NCL Synthetic Pvt. Ltd.\n\n12. Green Engicon Pvt. Ltd. \n\n13. Gulmohar Vyapaar Pvt. Ltd.\n\n14.\n\nLord Dealcom Pvt. Ltd.\n\n15. Paramount Financial Management\n\n16. Maa Jagdamba Seva Samiti Trust\n\n2. The contravention of this order shall render you liable, \nunder  section  275A  of  the  Income-Tax  Act,  1961,  to \npunishment of rigorous imprisonment which may extend \nto two years and also render you liable to fine.\n\n3.  You  are  requested  to  intimate  the  balance  standing \nin  these  accounts  IMMEDIATELY  to  the  bearer  of  this \nletter  and  send  a  statement  of  the  said  accounts  since \nthe  opening  of  the  accounts  along  with  copy  of  account \nopening form to this office within 7 (seven) days of receipt \nof this order.”\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1911\n\n13. \n\nIt  will  also  be  relevant  to  refer  to  the  Revocation  Order  dated  1st \nNovember 2021, issued by the Deputy Director of Income-Tax (Inv.) \nUnit-2(2), Guwahati, which reads thus:\n\n“Sub:  Revocation  of  order  under  section  132(3)  of  the \nIncome Tax Act, 1961 in respect of Bank Accounts, Lockers, \nFixed Deposits, etc.-reg.\n\nRef:- This office’s letter No.DIN/AC/DDIT/U 2(2)/GHY/2021-\n22, dated 05.10.2021.\n\nIn  this  connection  this  is  to  state  that,  restrain  order \nu/s.132(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, were put on the \nfollowing bank accounts of the persons as stated below. \nThe  restrain  order  put  on  the  following  bank  accounts \nonly may be revoked by your kind self and they may be \nallowed to operate these accounts.\n\nSl. \nNo.\n\n1.\n\n2.\n\n3.\n\n4.\n\nName of Account Holder\n\nAccount No.\n\nSunil Kumar Khemka (HUF) 01861000049315\n\nSunil Kumar Khemka\n\n01861530001080\n\nSunita Khemka\n\nShivani Khemka\n\n01861530001097\n\n01861460006152\n\n14. \n\nIt  could  thus  be  seen  that  though  vide  order  dated  5th  October \n2021,  a  restraint  order  was  imposed  in  respect  of  Bank  Lockers, \nBank Accounts and Fixed Deposits, the Revocation Order dated 1st \nNovember 2021 only refers to the Bank Accounts. \n\n15. \n\nIn the statements of the Officers of the appellant-bank, it is stated \nthat  the  bank  locker  was  inadvertently  permitted  to  be  operated, \nby misinterpreting the Revocation Order dated 1st November 2021. \n\n16. \n\nIn the present case, we are only considering the FIR registered for \nthe offences punishable under the different provisions of the IPC. \n\n17.  The  FIR  is  registered  on  the  basis  of  the  complaint  lodged  by  the \nDeputy Director of Income-Tax (Inv.) Unit-2(2), Guwahati, respondent \nNo.5  herein.  The  only  statement/allegation  in  the  complaint  with \nregard to the bank and its officers is thus:\n\nHDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.\f1912 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n“However, it has come to the light, that the restraint order \nimposed under section 132(3) dated 05.10.21 has been \nbreached and violated. During the course of execution of \nsearch  &  seizure  operation  on  the  Bank  Locker  no  462 \nunder warrant of authorization dated 20.11.21, it is found \nthat  Smt  Sunita  Khemka  has  operated  the  bank  Locker \nno-462 on 09.11.21. The bank locker register maintained \nat the HDFC bank states that the Smt Sunita Khemka has \noperated the Bank Locker at 11.53 am. The CCTV footage \nwas has validated the fact that Smt Sunita Khemka aided \nby the HDFC Bank Exhibition Branch, Patna has breached \nthe order under section 132(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 \nand  has  unlawfully  operated  her  Bank  locker  no  462  in \nthe HDFC Bank.”\n\n18. \n\nIt will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court \nin the case of Arnab Manoranjan Goswami (supra):\n\n“62. Now in this backdrop, it becomes necessary to advert \nbriefly to the contents of the FIR in the present case. The \nFIR recites that the spouse of the informant had a company \ncarrying on the business of architecture, interior design and \nengineering consultancy. According to the informant, her \nhusband was over the previous two years “having pressure \nas  he  did  not  receive  the  money  of  work  carried  out  by \nhim”. The FIR recites that the deceased had called at the \noffice of the appellant and spoken to his accountant for the \npayment of money. Apart from the above statements, it has \nbeen stated that the deceased left behind a suicide note \nstating that his “money is stuck and following owners of \nrespective companies are not paying our legitimate dues”. \nPrima facie, on the application of the test which has been \nlaid  down  by  this  Court  in  a  consistent  line  of  authority \nwhich  has  been  noted  above,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the \nappellant was guilty of having abetted the suicide within \nthe meaning of Section 306 IPC. These observations, we \nmust  note,  are  prima  facie  at  this  stage  since  the  High \nCourt is still to take up the petition for quashing. Clearly \nhowever, the High Court in failing to notice the contents \nof the FIR and to make a prima facie evaluation abdicated \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1913\n\nits role, functions and jurisdiction when seized of a petition \nunder Section 482 CrPC. The High Court recited the legal \nposition that the jurisdiction to quash under Section 482 \nhas to be exercised sparingly. These words, however, are \nnot  meaningless  incantations,  but  have  to  be  assessed \nwith reference to the contents of the particular FIR before \nthe High Court. If the High Court were to carry out a prima \nfacie evaluation, it would have been impossible for it not to \nnotice the disconnect between the FIR and the provisions \nof Section 306 IPC. The failure of the High Court to do so \nhas led it to adopting a position where it left the appellant \nto pursue his remedies for regular bail under Section 439. \nThe  High  Court  was  clearly  in  error  in  failing  to  perform \na duty which is entrusted to it while evaluating a petition \nunder Section 482 albeit at the interim stage.\n\n63. The petition before the High Court was instituted under \nArticle 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 CrPC. While \ndealing with the petition under Section 482 for quashing \nthe FIR, the High Court has not considered whether prima \nfacie the ingredients of the offence have been made out \nin the FIR. If the High Court were to have carried out this \nexercise, it would (as we have held in this judgment) have \nbeen apparent that the ingredients of the offence have not \nprima  facie  been  established. As  a  consequence  of  its \nfailure to perform its function under Section 482, the High \nCourt  has  disabled  itself  from  exercising  its  jurisdiction \nunder Article  226  to  consider  the  appellant’s  application \nfor  bail.  In  considering  such  an  application  under Article \n226, the High Court must be circumspect in exercising its \npowers on the basis of the facts of each case. However, \nthe High Court should not foreclose itself from the exercise \nof the power when a citizen has been arbitrarily deprived \nof their personal liberty in an excess of State power.”\n\n19. \n\nIn the present case, the FIR does not show that the appellant-bank \nhad induced anyone since inception.\n\n20.  For bringing out the offence under the ambit of Section 420 IPC, the \n\nFIR must disclose the following ingredients:\n\nHDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.\f1914 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n(a)  That the appellant-bank had induced anyone since inception;\n\n(b)  That the said inducement was fraudulent or dishonest; and \n\n(c)  That mens rea existed at the time of such inducement.\n\n21.  The  appellant-bank  is  a  juristic  person  and  as  such,  a  question \nof  mens  rea  does  not  arise.  However,  even  reading  the  FIR  and \nthe complaint at their face value, there is nothing to show that the \nappellant-bank or its staff members had dishonestly induced someone \ndeceived to deliver any property to any person, and that the mens \nrea existed at the time of such inducement. As such, the ingredients \nto attract the offence under Section 420 IPC would not be available.\n\n22. \n\nInsofar  as  the  provisions  of  Section  409  IPC  is  concerned,  the \nfollowing ingredients will have to be made out:\n\n(a)  That there has been any entrustment with the property, or with \nany  dominion  over  property  on  a  person  in  the  capacity  of  a \npublic servant or banker, etc.;\n\n(b)  That the said person commits criminal breach of trust in respect \n\nof that property.\n\n23.  For bringing out the case under criminal breach of trust, it will have \nto be pointed out that a person, with whom entrustment of a property \nis  made,  has  dishonestly  misappropriated  it,  or  converted  it  to  his \nown use, or dishonestly used it, or disposed of that property.\n\n24. \n\nIn the present case, there is not even an allegation of entrustment \nof  the  property  which  the  appellant-bank  has  misappropriated  or \nconverted for its own use to the detriment of the respondent No.5. \nAs such, the provisions of Section 406 and 409 IPC would also not \nbe applicable. \n\n25.  As already discussed hereinabove, since there was no entrustment \nof any property with the appellant-bank, the ingredients of Section \n462 IPC are also not applicable. \n\n26.  Likewise, since the offences under Section 206, 217 and 201 of the \nIPC  requires  mens  rea,  the  ingredients  of  the  said  Sections  also \nwould not be available against the appellant-bank. \n\n27.  The FIR/complaint also does not show that the appellant-bank and its \nofficers acted with any common intention or intentionally cooperated \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1915\n\nin the commission of any alleged offences. As such, the provisions \nof section 34, 37 and 120B of the IPC would also not be applicable. \n\n28. \n\nIt will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court \nin the case of Bhajan Lal and others (supra):\n\n“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various \nrelevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of \nthe principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series \nof decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary \npower  under Article  226  or  the  inherent  powers  under \nSection  482  of  the  Code  which  we  have  extracted  and \nreproduced  above,  we  give  the  following  categories  of \ncases  by  way  of  illustration  wherein  such  power  could \nbe  exercised  either  to  prevent  abuse  of  the  process  of \nany  court  or  otherwise  to  secure  the  ends  of  justice, \nthough  it  may  not  be  possible  to  lay  down  any  precise, \nclearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible \nguidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list \nof myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be \nexercised.\n\n(1)  Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  first  information \nreport  or  the  complaint,  even  if  they  are  taken  at  their \nface  value  and  accepted  in  their  entirety  do  not  prima \nfacie constitute any offence or make out a case against \nthe accused.\n\n(2)  Where  the  allegations  in  the  first  information  report \nand other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not \ndisclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation \nby police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except \nunder an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section \n155(2) of the Code.\n\n(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR \nor complaint and the evidence collected in support of the \nsame do not disclose the commission of any offence and \nmake out a case against the accused.\n\n(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a \ncognizable  offence  but  constitute  only  a  non-cognizable \n\nHDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.\f1916 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\noffence,  no  investigation  is  permitted  by  a  police  officer \nwithout an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under \nSection 155(2) of the Code.\n\n(5)  Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  FIR  or  complaint \nare so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of \nwhich no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion \nthat there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the \naccused.\n\n(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any \nof the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under \nwhich a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution \nand  continuance  of  the  proceedings  and/or  where  there \nis a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, \nproviding  efficacious  redress  for  the  grievance  of  the \naggrieved party.\n\n(7)  Where  a  criminal  proceeding  is  manifestly  attended \nwith mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously \ninstituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance \non the accused and with a view to spite him due to private \nand personal grudge.\n\n103.  We  also  give  a  note  of  caution  to  the  effect  that \nthe  power  of  quashing  a  criminal  proceeding  should  be \nexercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that \ntoo in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be \njustified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability \nor genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the \nFIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent \npowers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court \nto act according to its whim or caprice.”\n\n29.  We find that the present case would squarely fall within categories (2) \nand (3) of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal \nand others (supra).\n\n30.  We are of the considered view that the continuation of the criminal \nproceedings against the appellant-bank would cause undue hardship \nto the appellant-bank. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n1917\n\n31. \n\nIn the result, we pass the following order.\n\n(i)  The appeal is allowed.\n\n(ii)  The impugned judgment and order dated 8th June 2022 passed \nby the learned Single Bench of the High Court of Judicature at \nPatna  in  Criminal  Writ  Jurisdiction  Case  No.  1375  of  2021  is \nquashed and set aside.\n\n(iii)  The  First  Information  Report  being  Case  No.  549  of  2021 \nregistered  at  Gandhi  Maidan  Police  Station,  Patna  on  22nd \nNovember, 2021, against certain officials of the appellant-bank \nworking at its Exhibition Road Branch, Patna for the offences \npunishable under Sections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 206, 217, 406, \n409,  420  and  462  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  1860  is  also \nquashed and set aside qua the appellant-bank. \n\nResult of the case: Appeal allowed.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by:  Vidhi Thaker, Hony. Associate Editor \n\n(Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)\n\nHDFC Bank Ltd. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.\f"}