{"file_name": "2024_10_2227_2239_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2227 : 2024 INSC 801\n\nRatilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors.  \nv.  \nState of Gujarat and Ors.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 11000 of 2024 \n\n21 October 2024\n\n[Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nWhether the delay of more than one year in issuing a reasoned \norder after oral dismissal in open court proceedings as ante-dated \nby the High Court constitutes a breach of the principles of fairness, \npropriety, and discipline required to be followed by the judiciary in \nthe administration of justice?\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nAppellant filed a civil application u/Art.227 of the Constitution \nbefore the High Court – Dismissed on 01.03.2023 in open Court \nwithout  saying  “reasons  would  follow”  – Appellant  pleaded \nthat he was under the impression that the High Court had only \nreserved the order on 01.03.2023 in the proceeding – Reasoned \norder was uploaded on High Court website on 30.04.2024 and \nante-dated the same to 01.03.2023 – Report of Registrar General \nof  High  Court  was  called  which  established  the Appellant’s \nallegations as being substantially correct:\n\nHeld: Breach of norms of ethics – The concerned judge did not \neven express that “reasons would follow” for dismissal of the petition \nand hence the concerned judge ceased to retain jurisdiction over \nthe petition and foreclosed assignment of reasons for the dismissal \nlater in time – Even if the concerned judge were to express that \nreasons  for  the  dismissal  would  follow,  no  valid  reason  to  pass \ndetailed reasoned order after lapse of one year rather the correct \napproach would have been to bring matter on board again, recall \nthe verbal order of dismissal and place before the Hon’ble Chief \nJustice of High Court to reassign the matter to another bench for \nfresh consideration. [Paras 12-15, 17]\n\n* Author\n\n\f2228 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nJustice  must  not  only  be  done,  but  must  also  be  seen \nto  be  done  –  Guidelines  issued  to  High  Courts  for  timely \npronouncement of judgments – Principles enshrined in Order \nXX of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 discussed:\n\nHeld: Practice of High Courts of pronouncing operative parts without \ntimely passing reasoned order/judgment criticised – Reliance placed \non  observations  made  in  Balaji  Baliram  Mupade  vs  State  of \nMaharashtra (2021) 12 SCC 603 that judicial discipline demands \npromptness in judgment delivery as knowing result without reasons \nbrings aggrieved party to a standstill and violates their right u/Art.21 \nof the Constitution. [Para 5] \n\nOrder  XX  CPC  governs  “pronouncements  of  judgments”  – As  a \nmatter of practice, the learned judge dictates judgment in open court \nimmediately after the hearing is over which, in their assessment, \nmay not consume more than 15/20 minutes however if a judgment, \nin  their  assessment,  is  likely  to  take  more  than  20/25  minutes, \nthe  learned  judge  tends  to  pronounce  operative  part  together \nwith  the  outcome  while  expressing  “reasons  to/would  follow”  to \nmake  optimum  use  judicial  time  and  hear  more  cases  that  are \non board – However, the said practice is seemingly turning into a \ncounterproductive exercise and is rather delaying justice delivery. \n[Para 19]\n\nIt  would  be  prudent  to  leave  to  it  to  learned  Judges  to  pick  any \nof  three  options:  (i)  dictation  of  the  judgment  in  open  court,   \n(ii) reserving the judgment and pronouncing it on a future day, or  \n(iii) pronouncing the operative part and the outcome, i.e., “dismissed” \nor “allowed” or “disposed of”, while simultaneously expressing that \nreasons would follow in a detailed final judgment supporting such \noutcome – In case third option is chosen, it would be in interest \nof  justice  to  make  reasons  available  in  public  domain  within  a \ntime frame work of 2-5 days – In case the suggested timeframe \ncannot be followed owing to workload, it would be a better option \nto reserve the judgment. [Para 19]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nAnil Rai v. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318; Vinod Kumar Singh \nv.  Banaras  Hindu  University  (1988)  1  SCC  80;  Tirupati  Balaji \nDevelopers (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2004) 5 SCC 1; Balaji Baliram \nMupade v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 12 SCC 603; R. v. Sussex \nJJ., ex p McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256 – relied on.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2229\n\nConstitution of India, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.\n\nList of Acts\n\nList of Keywords\n\nJudicial discipline; Pronouncement of judgments; Delay in reasoned \norder; Reserving of orders; Workload; Public trust; Judicial integrity; \nArticle  21  of  Constitution  of  India;  Order  XX  of  Code  of  Civil \nProcedure.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11000 of 2024\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2023 of the High Court \nof Gujarat at Ahmedabad in SCA No. 10912 of 2015\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nMs. Anushree  Prashit  Kapadia,  Dr.  Shailesh  R.  Patel,  Ganesh \nKhemka, Ms. Ekta Kundu, Advs. for the Appellants.\n\nMs. Deepanwita Priyanka, Adv. for the Respondents.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nDipankar Datta, J.\n\n1. \n\nIn recent times, on more occasions than one, this Court has suo motu \ninitiated proceedings having noticed attitudinal and thought patterns \nof learned Judges of various high courts across the country which \ntended to lower the image of the judiciary in general and the high \ncourts in particular. While some of the proceedings are still pending, \none  such  proceeding  has  been  disposed  of  recently  emphasising \nthe need for learned Judges to exercise restraint while expressing \none’s views in open court. \n\n2.  Yet  again,  a  fortnight  back,  this  Court  set  aside  a  judgment  of  a \nhigh  court  on  the  ground  that  such  judgment  had  been  signed  by \nthe learned Judge after demitting office.\n\n3.  These are distressing trends indeed. \n\nRatilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.\f2230 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n4.  As if there is no end to it, the present case unfolds facts which are \n\nequally disturbing and meets with our disapproval.\n\n5.  However,  before  we  refer  to  the  factual  matrix  giving  rise  to  this \ncivil  appeal,  noticing  a  decision  of  fairly  recent  origin  of  this  Court \nin Balaji Baliram Mupade vs State of Maharashtra1 is considered \nimperative. Relevant excerpts from such decision read as follows: \n\n“1. … Judicial discipline requires promptness in delivery \nof judgments—an aspect repeatedly emphasised by this \nCourt.  The  problem  is  compounded  where  the  result  is \nknown but not the reasons. This deprives any aggrieved \nparty of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal \nin the next tier of judicial scrutiny.\n\n* * * * *\n\n10. We must note with regret that the counsel extended \nthrough various judicial pronouncements including the one \nreferred to aforesaid appear to have been ignored, more \nimportantly where oral orders are pronounced. In case of \nsuch orders, it is expected that they are either dictated in \nthe court or at least must follow immediately thereafter, to \nfacilitate any aggrieved party to seek redressal from the \nhigher court. The delay in delivery of judgments has been \nobserved to be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution \nof  India  in  Anil  Rai  case  [(2001)  7  SCC  318]  and  as \nstated aforesaid, the problem gets aggravated when the \noperative portion is made available early and the reasons \nfollow much later.\n\n11. It cannot be countenanced that between the date of the \noperative portion of the order and the reasons disclosed, \nthere is a hiatus period of nine months! This is much more \nthan  what  has  been  observed  to  be  the  maximum  time \nperiod for even pronouncement of reserved judgment as \nper Anil Rai case.\n\n12. The appellant undoubtedly being the aggrieved party \nand prejudiced by the impugned order is unable to avail of \n\n1 \n\n(2021) 12 SCC 603\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2231\n\nthe legal remedy of approaching this Court where reasons \ncan be scrutinised. It really amounts to defeating the rights \nof the appellant to challenge the impugned order on merits \nand  even  the  succeeding  party  is  unable  to  obtain  the \nfruits of success of the litigation.\n\n13.  We  are  constrained  to  pen  down  a  more  detailed \norder and refer to the earlier view on account of the fact \nthat recently a number of such orders have come to our \nnotice and we thought it is time to send a reminder to the \nHigh Courts.”\n\n6.  We  are  surprised,  not  a  little,  that  the  strong  reminders  issued  by \nthis Court from time to time have had little effect on the high courts \nin  the  country  and  that  decisions,  binding  under Article  141  of  the \nConstitution,  are  being  persistently  ignored.  It  has  been  stressed \ntime and again over the years and we feel pained to observe, once \nmore, that neglect/omission/refusal to abide by binding precedents \naugurs ill for the health of the system. Not only does it tantamount \nto  disservice  to  the  institution  of  the  judiciary  but  also  affects  the \nadministration  of  justice.  For  a  learned  Judge  to  deviate  from  the \nlaid down standards would be to betray the trust reposed in him by \nthe nation. We sincerely hope that learned Judges of the high courts \nwhile being careful and cautious will remain committed to the service \nof the litigants, for whom only they exist, as well as the oath of office \nthat  they  have  taken  so  that,  in  future,  we  are  not  presented  with \nanother case of similar nature to deal with. \n\n7. \n\nIn this case, which is a civil appeal arising from a judgment and order \nbearing the date 1st March, 2023, we find the High Court of Gujarat \nat Ahmedabad2 to have egregiously breached the law. \n\n8.  The bare facts necessary for decision, without any reference to the \nfacts and law involved in the case before the High Court, culled out \nfrom the pleadings before us are these. \n\n9.  R/Special Civil Application No. 10912 of 20153, being a petition under \nArticle  227  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  was  filed  by  the  appellant \nbefore  the  High  Court  challenging  an  order  dated  16th  June,  2015 \n\n2 \n\n3 \n\nHigh Court, hereafter\n\npetition, hereafter\n\nRatilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.\f2232 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\npassed  by  the  Deputy  Collector,  Kamrej  Prant,  District  Surat.  The \nDeputy Collector, by such order, had confirmed the order dated 23rd \nFebruary, 2015 of the Mamlatdar, Kamrej. The petition came up for \nconsideration on 1st March, 2023 before a learned Judge, having been \nlisted in the cause-list as Item No.17. According to the appellant, he \nwas represented before the learned Judge by his counsel. Hearing \nhaving concluded on 1st March, 2023, “he was under the belief that \nthe  detailed  order  is  reserved  in  the  proceeding.  However,  even \nan order recording the reserving of orders has not been passed or \nmade available on the official website of the Hon’ble High Court till \ndate”. Since the detailed order was not pronounced, the appellant’s \ncounsel did not also apply for the certified copy. In the process, more \nthan a year passed by. On 30th April, 2024, the appellant’s counsel \nreceived from the IT Cell of the High Court soft copy of a reasoned \norder dated 1st March, 2023 containing the reasons for dismissal of \nthe petition.\n\n10.  The impugned order is part of the records. At the beginning of the \nsaid order, “ORAL ORDER” is printed in bold font, i.e., it is supposed \nto be an order which has been dictated in open court. However, the \nappellant  has  alleged  something  rather  serious  :  that  the  learned \nJudge  had  passed  the  reasoned  order  more  than  a  year  after  1st \nMarch, 2023 and ante-dated the same to project that the reasoned \norder was passed on 1st March, 2023. \n\n11.  Such allegation prompted us to seek, by an order dated 12th August, \n2024, a report4 from the Registrar General of the High Court as to \nwhether the allegation of the appellant that the reasoned order bearing \nthe date 1st March, 2023 was communicated to him for the first time \non 30th April, 2024 is correct or not. A report has since been filed by \nthe  Registrar  General  and  on  perusal  thereof,  we  have  found  the \nallegation of the appellant to be substantially correct. It is revealed \nthat  the  learned  Judge  dictated  the  reasoned  order  on  12th April, \n2024  to  His  Lordship’s  personal  secretary,  whereafter  such  order \nwas uploaded on the website of the High Court on 30th April, 2024 \nas well as communicated to the appellant’s counsel by the IT Cell.\n\n12.  Having regard to the nature of controversy raised by the appellant, \nwe  also  had  the  occasion  to  witness  (on  the  virtual  platform)  the \n\n4 \n\nthe report, hereafter\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2233\n\nrecorded version of the proceedings dated 1st March, 2023 before \nthe  learned  Judge  of  the  High  Court. After  briefly  hearing  counsel \nfor the appellant and his adversary, the learned Judge was heard to \nsay, “I will dismiss” and a few seconds thereafter, pronounced the \noutcome  of  the  petition  as  “dismissed”.  Counsel  representing  the \nappellant before the High Court being present could hear what the \nlearned Judge said while his adversary acknowledged that he was \n“grateful”.  Immediately  thereafter,  the  next  item  on  the  board  was \ncalled. This  is  precisely  what  happened  on  1st  March,  2023,  while \ndealing with the petition.\n\n13.  There  can  be  no  two  opinions  that  if  not  the  appellant,  but  his \ncounsel certainly did have knowledge of dismissal of the petition by \nthe learned Judge; also, we have no doubt that the appellant feigned \ncomplete ignorance and deliberately did not plead that his counsel \nwas  well  and  truly  aware  of  the  outcome  of  the  petition  moments \nafter hearing stood concluded before the learned Judge. \n\n14.  At the same time, from the proceedings of the court of the learned \nJudge available on the virtual platform, it is patently clear that His \nLordship  did  not  even  express  that  the  ‘reasons  would  follow’  for \nthe dismissal of the petition. Not having so expressed, His Lordship \npractically rendered the court functus officio. We say so because it \nis not too clear as to whether any order of dismissal was signed by \nHis Lordship on 1st March, 2023, or at any point of time immediately \nthereafter, although we have noted from the report that the Disposal \nLog Report of 1st March, 2023 of His Lordship’s court duly recorded \nthat  the  petition  stood  disposed  of.  In  Vinod  Kumar  Singh  v. \nBanaras Hindu University,5 this Court held that when a judgment \nis pronounced in open court, parties act on the basis that it is the \noperative judgment and that signing is a mere formality; however, in \nexceptional circumstances, an order pronounced in open court can \nbe amended or even altered before the same has been authenticated \nby  the  Judge  by  signing  the  order  but  such  a  course  ought  to  be \nadopted  judicially,  sparingly  and  for  adequate  reasons  and  upon \nputting  the  parties  to  notice.  Such  is  not  the  case  here.  We  are \ninclined  to  the  view  that  the  learned  Judge  not  having  expressed \nthat  reasons  for  the  dismissal  would  follow,  His  Lordship  ceased \n\n5 \n\n(1988) 1 SCC 80\n\nRatilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.\f2234 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nto retain jurisdiction over the petition and foreclosed assignment of \nreasons for the dismissal.\n\n15.  Assuming  that  His  Lordship  were  to  express  that  reasons  for  the \ndismissal would follow, still there could be no valid reason to write \na  detailed  reasoned  order  after  lapse  of  a  year  having  expressed \n“dismissed”  and  upload  such  order  on  the  website.  No  doubt,  as \nper  the  good  practice  prevailing  in  the  High  Court,  the  order  was \ncommunicated to the appellant’s counsel by the IT Cell but that is \nlittle consolation in a case of the present nature.\n\n16.  Having said thus, and bearing in mind the onerous responsibilities \nthat learned  Judges of the high courts  across the  country have  to \nshoulder on a daily basis, we are persuaded to think that the duty \nand responsibility of assigning reasons for dismissal of the petition \ncompletely escaped the mind of the learned Judge. Perhaps, there \nis  hardly  any  individual  including  any  Judge  who  can  truly  claim \nto  have  committed  no  mistake  in  his  life.  It  is  a  feature  of  human \nfallibility that people are prone to commit mistakes. It is how lessons \nthat  individuals  learn  from  mistakes  which  facilitate  in  putting  the \npast behind for moving forward.\n\n17.  Nonetheless,  we  regret  to  observe  that  the  learned  Judge  having \nrealised in April, 2024 of having omitted to assign reasons for dismissal \nof  the  petition  although  His  Lordship  had  pronounced  “dismissed” \nin open court proceedings on 1st March, 2023, could have avoided \ncommitting an act of indiscretion, by breaching all norms of ethics, in \nproceeding to assign reasons more than a year later. In accordance \nwith the highest standards of fairness, propriety and discipline, the \nneed  of  the  hour  required  the  learned  Judge  to  bring  the  matter \nback on board once again, recall the verbal order of dismissal and \nplace  it  before  the  Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  High  Court  for \nassigning it to some other Bench for fresh consideration. \n\n18. \n\nIt cannot be gainsaid that in today’s world, particularly when more \nand  more  people  are  showing  interest  in  court  proceedings  and \nthere  is  wide  coverage  thereof  on  social  media  platforms,  the \npresiding officers of courts are equally at the centre of attention as \nthe controversy that is involved and the manner of its resolution. The \nsociety expects every Judge of a high court, so to say, to be a model \nof rectitude, an epitome of unimpeachable integrity and unwavering \nprinciples, a champion of moral excellence, and an embodiment of \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2235\n\nprofessionalism,  who  can  consistently  deliver  work  of  high-quality \nguaranteeing justice. Although, on the whole, the weight of work on \nlearned  Judges  of  the  high  courts  across  the  country  is  immense \nand  the  Judges  have  also  been  performing  commendably  despite \nvarious odds, instances such as the one under consideration, which \nwe view as nothing more than an aberration, bring disrepute to the \njudicial system of the country and show the entire judiciary in poor \nlight. This, in our opinion, could have well been avoided with a little \nbit of care and caution, and deference to the decisions on the point \nby this Court.\n\n19.  The  situation  presents  us  with  an  opportunity  where  we  feel  it \nexpedient  to  share  our  thoughts  only  for  the  purpose  of  future \nguidance to overcome adversity. Having regard to the demands of \nchanging times, one of the significant aspects of judging that has \nbeen at the forefront of discussion in many a conference/conclave \nor legal circle is the need for prompt ‘pronouncement of judgments’. \nOrder  XX  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  ordains  that  a \njudgment  can  be  pronounced,  in  an  open  court,  either  at  once  or \nas soon thereafter as may be practicable on a future day. Guided \nby the principles enshrined in Order XX, number of learned Judges \nscrupulously  follow  the  same.  Learned  Judges  do  come  across \ncases  requiring  short  orders  which,  in  their  assessment,  may  not \nconsume  more  than  15/20  minutes.  These  orders  are  generally \ndictated in open court immediately after a hearing is over. On the \nother  hand,  if  in  any  given  case  the  judgment  could  justifiably  be \nreserved  after  hearing  of  extensive  arguments,  it  would  not  be \nproper  to  criticize  a  learned  Judge  if  he  dictates  the  judgment  in \nopen court notwithstanding the length of time to be taken therefor. \nAs  per  the  ordainment  of  Order  XX,  the  learned  Judge  would  be \nperfectly justified in doing so. In such cases, it could roughly take \nany  time  between  20  minutes  to  a  couple  of/few  hours  or  even \nmore spilling over to the next day (in rare cases) to accomplish the \ntask. This approach could result in the board (if it is heavy) getting \nchoked and the remaining cases on the board having slim chances \nof  being  considered. As  the  saying  goes,  necessity  is  the  mother \nof invention. The necessity to strike a balance, in turn, has led to \nan innovative approach (many a times followed even by this Court) \nwhich, though not strictly in tune with Order XX, has transitioned into \na regular practice by passage of time. This contemplates a rough \n\nRatilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.\f2236 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nassessment made by a learned Judge of the time to be taken for \ndictating a judgment after hearing in a matter is concluded and if, in \nsuch assessment, it is likely to take more than 20/25 minutes, the \nlearned Judge proceeds to pronounce the operative part together \nwith  the  outcome  while  expressing  “reasons  to/would  follow”  and \nthen concludes the exercise of pronouncing the final judgment by \nproviding the reasons as soon as possible thereafter. Having regard \nto  the  exploding  docket  of  a  majority  of  the  high  courts,  learned \nJudges consider it wise and prudent to make optimum use of judicial \ntime by not dictating lengthy judgments in court. This practice, no \ndoubt, seeks to serve a salutary purpose. People unversed with the \nfunctioning of the judicial system are perhaps unaware as to how \ndevelopment of this practice has contributed to saving of precious \njudicial time, which the learned Judges invariably devote and utilize \nfor hearing more cases that are on board in the anxiety to consider \nand  decide  as  many  cases  as  are  possible  during  the  scheduled \nworking orders. Burdened though with immense pressure of work and \nbrushing aside fatigue, which is quite likely to develop, the learned \nJudges after retiring for the day dictate the judgment in their court \nchambers  or  in  their  residential  offices  either  on  the  same  day  or \nwithin a few days thereafter. The hearing having concluded not too \nlong back, the arguments remain fresh in the mind of the learned \nJudges and it becomes all the more easy to dictate the judgment. \nWhile  this  approach  without  a  doubt  has  its  own  benefits,  recent \nhappenings  leave  us  to  lament  that  reasons  for  the  conclusion \nreached  are  being  placed  in  the  public  domain  much  too  late,  as \nin the case of Balaji Baliram Mupade (supra) as well as this case. \nIn an attempt to save time to attend to as many cases as possible, \ncertain learned Judges unwittingly are contributing to justice being \ndelayed  in  given  cases  which,  concomitantly,  have  been  giving \nrise to criticism of unpleasant flavours. Critics of such practice (to \npronounce the operative part with the outcome and to provide the \nreasons later in detailed final judgments) could and do legitimately \nargue in favour of reserving judgments as required by the procedural \nlaws  if  the  particular  case  so  demands  but  as  Judges,  we  know, \nreserving  too  many  judgments  has  its  own  pitfalls.  Once  the  files \npile  up,  it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  to  remember  the  minute \ndetails  of  the  case  and  the  arguments  advanced  by  the  parties \nin  support  of  their  respective  cases  which  leads  to  a  shift  to  rely \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2237\n\non  the  written  notes  of  arguments.  However,  if  only  written  notes \nwere  enough,  there  would  be  no  need  of  oral  hearing  in  court. \nAdditionally,  drawing  from  our  experience  on  the  bench,  we  can \nsafely say that inclination of learned Judges to reserve judgments \nis  invariably  the  course  adopted  where  cases  involving  complex \nand  intricate  points  of  law  do  call  upon  learned  Judges  to  craft \nwell-researched  and  well-reasoned  judgments.  That  apart,  there \nare  cases  arising  from  recent  enactments  involving  questions  of \nlaw  not  having  arisen  hitherto  and  consequently  such  questions \nhave never been answered. Such categories of cases demand the \nhigh courts to lay down the law in clear terms for comprehension \nof all concerned. Obviously, this process is time consuming and the \ntime limit for delivering judgments by the high courts as laid down \nin Anil Rai vs State of Bihar,6 at times, is breached. We have full \ntrust and confidence in the learned Judges of the high courts since \nthey  are  well-equipped  to  tackle  any  kind  of  pressure  situation. \nHowever, while it would be prudent to leave it to the learned Judges \nto  pick  any  one  of  the  three  options  [(i)  dictation  of  the  judgment \nin open court, (ii) reserving the judgment and pronouncing it on a \nfuture day, or (iii) pronouncing the operative part and the outcome, \ni.e., “dismissed” or “allowed” or “disposed of”, while simultaneously \nexpressing  that  reasons  would  follow  in  a  detailed  final  judgment \nsupporting  such  outcome],  it  would  be  in  the  interest  of  justice  if \nany  learned  Judge,  who  prefers  the  third  option  (supra),  makes \nthe  reasons  available  in  the  public  domain,  preferably  within  2 \n(two)  days  thereof  but,  in  any  case,  not  beyond  5  (five)  days  to \neliminate any kind of suspicion in the mind of the party losing the \nlegal battle. If the pressure of work is such that in the assessment \nof the learned Judge the reasons in support of the final judgment \ncannot be made available, without fail, in 5 (five) days, it would be \na better option to reserve the judgment. Also, if the ultimate order \nwould have the effect of changing the status of the parties or the \nsubject  matter  of  the  lis,  it  would  always  be  advisable  to  stick  to \nthe course envisaged in Order XX. Since, the fraternity of learned \nJudges  of  all  the  courts  are  interested  to  preserve  the  dignity  of \nthe  respective  judicial  institutions  with  which  they  are  associated, \n\n6 \n\n(2001) 7 SCC 318\n\nRatilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.\f2238 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nall  learned  Judges  must  be  mindful  of  the  impact  of  their  actions \non the society at large. Dealing with lakhs of litigation is no mean \ntask, but at the same time we must realize that instances do emerge \nleaving absolutely no margin for error. It is our duty as Judges to \nstand tall and rise to the challenge. \n\n20.  While concluding, we are reminded of the universal truth “to err is \nhuman,  to  forgive  is  divine”  emphasizing  the  human  tendency  of \ncommitting mistakes and the importance of forgiving a human error.\n\n21.  Conscious that we are of learned Judges of the high courts working \novertime  to  render  justice  to  the  litigants  by  conducting  judicial \nproceedings, at times, by sitting in excess of normal working hours, \ndischarging administrative duties in addition to judicial work, etc, and \nin the process overlooking health issues and sacrificing all pleasures \nof social life, we need to look at the issue wearing glasses of grace \nand compassion. As has been held by this Court in Tirupati Balaji \nDevelopers (P) Ltd. vs State of Bihar,7 in the unified hierarchical \njudicial structure that we have under the Constitution, vertically the \nSupreme Court is placed over the high courts; but if the Supreme \nCourt and the high courts were thought of as brothers, we as Judges \nof the apex court in the country remain as the elder brother only to \nthe extent of exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Promoting empathy \nand  understanding  by  encouraging  forgiveness,  which  is  a  divine \nquality transcending human limitation, should be preferred to anything \nelse in the given circumstances, particularly when the learned Judge \nhas  not  been  put  on  notice  and  is  unable  to  place  His  Lordship’s \nversion.  This  approach  is  considered  to  be  a  better  option  rather \nthan remarking adversely or giving unsolicited advice.\n\n22.  We, thus, allow the controversy to rest here. \n\n23. \n\nIt is now time for us to give our decision. Notwithstanding that the \nappellant  has  not  been  entirely  clean  in  his  approach  but  having \nregard to the famous words of Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice \nof England in R. vs Sussex JJ., ex p McCarthy 8 that “justice must \nnot  only  be  done,  but  must  also  be  seen  to  be  done”,  meaning \nthereby that the outcome of proceedings should be visibly just, the \n\n7 \n\n8 \n\n(2004) 5 SCC 1\n\n(1924) 1 KB 256\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2239\n\nimpugned order bearing the date 1st March, 2023 has to be set aside \nwhich we do hereby order. This would result in revival of the petition \nof  the  appellant  and  it  shall  stand  restored  on  the  file  of  the  High \nCourt. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court is requested \nto place the petition before the learned Judge currently having the \nassignment to hear the same.\n\n24.  Needless to observe, the petition shall be considered and decided by \nthe High Court uninfluenced by any observation made in the order \nbearing the date 1st March, 2023.\n\n25.  The appeal stands allowed on the aforesaid terms.\n\n26.  We make it clear that we have not examined the rival claims on merits.\n\nResult of the case: Appeal allowed.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by:  Niti Richariya, Hony. Associate Editor \n\n(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)\n\nRatilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Ors.\f"}