{"file_name": "2024_10_2248_2264_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2248 : 2024 INSC 1059\n\nM/s S.S. Production and Anr. \nP1: M/s S. S. Production \nP2: TR. S. Subbiah \nv. \nTR. Pavithran Prasanth\n\n(Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No(s). 13981-13985 of 2024)\n\n01 October 2024\n\n[Sudhanshu Dhulia and  \nAhsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nIssue  arose  as  to  whether  the  courts  below  were  justified  in \nconvicting  the  petitioners  u/s.138  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments \nAct,  1881  for  dishonour  of  cheques  and  sentencing  them  to  six \nmonths of simple imprisonment and to pay the cheque amounts \nas compensation, in each of the complaints.\n\nHeadnotes\n\nNegotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 139 – Dishonour \nof  cheque  for  insufficiency  of  funds  –  Petitioners  borrowed \ncertain  sum  in  five  instalments  as  a  hand  loan  from  the \ncomplainant and promised to repay the same on demand with \ninterest – Issuance of five cheques in order to discharge the \nliability but the same got dishonoured on being presented by \nthe complainant, with the endorsement ‘funds insufficient’ – \nFive complaints in respect of the five dishonoured cheques \nagainst the petitioners – Case of the petitioners that money \nwas  given  to  them  in  the  course  of  producing  a  film  jointly \nby  the  complainant  and  the  petitioners  and  since  the  film \nfailed,  the  cheques  and  receipts  given  by  the  petitioners \nwere  misused  by  the  complainant  –  Trial  court  convicted \nthe  petitioners  u/s.138  and  sentenced  them  to  six  months \nof  simple  imprisonment  and  to  pay  the  cheque  amounts  as \ncompensation, in each of the complaints – Said order upheld \nby the courts below – Interference:\n\n* Author\n\n\f[2025] 4 S.C.R.  \n\n2249\n\nHeld:  Not  called  for  –  Reasoning  of  the  courts  below  is  sound \nthat evidence had to be adduced by the petitioners that the said \namounts were given for producing a film and were not by way of \nreturn of any loan taken, which was not done – Just by taking a \ncounter-stand to raise a probable defence would not shift the onus \non the complainant in such a case for the plea of defence has to \nbe buttressed by evidence, either oral or documentary – Liability \nhas to be discharged by the person concerned and that would be \na legally enforceable debt repayable, under the purview of s.138 – \nIf  the  amount  were  by  way  of  investments  in  a  film  being  jointly \nproduced,  the  need  per  se  to  issue  cheques,  including  interest \nwould not have arisen at all, which has not been explained by the \npetitioners at all – Onus to first prove as to how the amount that \nis said to have been given by the complainant to the petitioners \ncould have been given, would not be fatal as receipt of the amount \nhas not been denied, much less disputed by the petitioners – No \nerror  in  the  High  Court  opining  that  in  view  of  the  denial  by  the \nGeneral Power of Attorney holder of the complainant with regard \nto  any  joint  deal/venture  with  the  petitioners  in  film  production, \nthe onus would not shift on the complainant and would remain on \nthe petitioners to prove that such receipt of money was not with \nregard to repayment of an amount legally due to the complainant – \nAccused have not been able to dislodge the statutory presumption \nu/s.139 – Exercising the judicial discretion, it is directed that the \nsentences  of  imprisonment  awarded  in  each  complaints,  would \nrun concurrently. [Paras 8-14]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nTedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant [2022] 4 SCR 442 : (2022) 6 \nSCC 735; Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh [2023] 13 SCR 788 : (2023) \n10 SCC 148; Rafiq v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1981] 1 SCR 402 : \n(1980)  4  SCC  262;  Mohd. Akhtar  Hussain  v. Assistant  Collector \nof  Customs  (Prevention)  [1988]  Supp.  2  SCR  747  :  (1988)  4 \nSCC  183;  V  K  Bansal  v.  State  of  Haryana  [2013]  7  SCR  617  : \n(2013) 7 SCC 211; O M Cherian v. State of Kerala (2015) 2 SCC \n501 – referred to.\n\nNegotiable Instruments Act, 1881.\n\nList of Acts\n\nState (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma\f2250 \n\n[2025] 4 S.C.R.\n\nList of Keywords\n\ns.138  of  the  Negotiable  Instruments  Act,  1881;  Dishonour  of \ncheques; Pay the cheque amounts as compensation; Dishonour \nof  cheque  for  insufficiency  of  funds;  Discharge  the  liability; \nEndorsement ‘funds insufficient’; Capacity of complainant u/s.138 \nNI Act; Statutory presumption u/s.139 NI Act; Onus to prove amount \nlegally due; Six months of simple imprisonment; Legally enforceable \ndebt; Statutory presumption; Sentences to run concurrently; Judicial \ndiscretion.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Special  Leave  Petition \n(Criminal) Nos. 13981-13985 of 2024\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 15.06.2023 of the High Court \nof Judicature at Madras in CRLRC Nos. 394, 395, 396, 403 and \n406 of 2020\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nAdvs. for the Petitioners:\nSameer Aslam, Adv. Ms. M. Venmani.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nAhsanuddin Amanullah, J.\n\nDelay condoned.\n\n2.  The  present  petition  assails  the  common  Final  Judgment  and \nOrder  dated  15.06.2023  in  Crl.  R.  C.  Nos.394-396,  403  &  406  of \n2020  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ‘Impugned  Order’)  passed  by \nthe  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras  (hereinafter  referred  to  as \nthe ‘High Court’), whereby the five Criminal Revision cases filed by \nthe  petitioners  were  dismissed  and  the  conviction  and  sentence, \nas awarded by separate Judgments and Orders dated 31.10.2017 \npassed by the Metropolitan Magistrate (Fast Track Court III), Saidapet, \nChennai (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) in C.C. Nos.137-\n141 of 2016 and confirmed by separate Judgments and Orders dated \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2025] 4 S.C.R.  \n\n2251\n\n31.10.2019 passed by the VII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil \nCourt, Chennai (hereinafter referred to as the ‘First Appellate Court’) \nin Crl. A. Nos.380-384 of 2017, were upheld.\n\nBRIEF FACTS:\n\n3.  The sole respondent is the complainant. The petitioner no.2 is the \nproprietor  of  petitioner  no.1  and  both  are  arrayed  as  accused.  It \nwas alleged that the petitioner no.2 was in the business of Cinema \nProduction and for his urgent business needs, he had approached \nthe complainant and borrowed a total sum of Rs.41,28,000/- (Rupees \nForty-One  Lakhs Twenty-Eight Thousand)  in  five  instalments  as  a \nhand loan on 29.08.2015 and promised to repay the same on demand \nwith  interest  at  the  rate  of  2%  per  month.  Separate  Promissory \nNotes dated 29.08.2015 were executed for each of the instalments \nin favour of the complainant.\n\n4. \n\n1 \n\nIn order to discharge the liability of Rs.42,08,000/- (Rupees Forty-\nTwo Lakhs Eight Thousand), a total of five cheques were issued by \nthe  accused,  which  on  being  presented  by  the  complainant,  were \nreturned with the endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. Statutory Notice \nwas  issued  by  the  complainant  pursuant  to  which  he  lodged  five \ncomplaints in respect of the five dishonoured cheques against the \npetitioners. The Trial Court convicted the accused under Section 1381 \nof the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as \n\n‘138.  Dishonour  of  cheque  for  insufficiency,  etc.,  of  funds  in  the  account.—Where  any  cheque \ndrawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money \nto another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other \nliability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of \nthat account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from \nthat account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an \noffence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for \na term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, \nor with both:\nProvided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—\n(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is \ndrawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;\n(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the \npayment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within \nthirty  days  of  the  receipt  of  information  by  him  from  the  bank  regarding  the  return  of  the  cheque  as \nunpaid; and\n(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or \nas the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the \nsaid notice.\nExplanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt \nor other liability.’\n\nState (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma\f2252 \n\n[2025] 4 S.C.R.\n\nthe ‘Act’) and sentenced them to six months of Simple Imprisonment \nand  to  pay  the  cheque  amounts  as  compensation,  in  each  of  the \ncomplaints. This order of conviction and sentence has been upheld \nby the First Appellate  Court  and thereafter by the High Court vide \nthe Impugned Order.\n\n5.  The details of the five cases are tabulated hereinunder:\n\nDate of Loan\n\nLoan Amount\n\nCheque Date\n\n29.08.2015\n\nRs.41,28,000 with interest @ 2% per mensem\n\n29.09.2015\n\nDrawn On\n\nSouth Indian Bank, Gandhipuram, Coimbatore Branch\n\nCheques No.\n\n500834\n\n500830\n\n500831\n\n500832\n\n500833\n\nCheque \nAmounts \n[In Rs. (Lakhs)]\n\nTotal Cheque \nAmount\n\nDate Cheque \npresented\n\nDate Cheque \nreturned\n\nReturned with \nEndorsement\n\nDate of Legal \nNotice\n\nDate Postal \nCover returned\n\nPostal Cover \nreturned as\n\nComplaint \nCC ___/2016\n\nCrl. A. No. \n___/2017\n\n1.28\n\n10.2 each x 4 cheques = 40.8\n\nRs.42,08,000 \n(inclusive of interest)\n\n29.09.2015\n\n15.10.2015\n\n29.09.2015\n\n16.10.2015\n\n‘Funds Insufficient’\n\n07.10.2015\n\n12.11.2015\n\n19.11.2015 24.11.2015\n\n26.11.2015\n\n‘Unclaimed’\n\n137\n\n380\n\n138\n\n381\n\n139\n\n382\n\n140\n\n383\n\n141\n\n384\n\nSUBMISSIONS BY THE PETITIONERS:\n\n6. \n\nLearned  counsel  for  the  petitioners  submitted  that  the  cheque(s) \nmust be proved to have been issued for a legally enforceable debt, \nbut  in  the  present  cases,  the  complainant  has  not  produced  any \nstatement of accounts and/or Income Tax Returns showing that the \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2025] 4 S.C.R.  \n\n2253\n\n7. \n\ncomplainant  lent  money  to  the  accused  and  the  accused  did  not \nrepay the said money. Hence, the complainant failed to prove that \nthe cheques were issued for a legally enforceable debt.\n\nIt  was  contended  that  the  complainant  claims  that  he  lent  cash  of \nRs.41,28,000/-  (Rupees  Forty-One  Lakhs  Twenty  Eight  Thousand) \nto the accused with rate of interest of 2% per month. However, the \nmatter of fact is that the said money was given to the accused in the \ncourse of producing a film jointly by the complainant and the accused \nand  since  the  film  failed,  the  cheques  and  receipts  given  by  the \naccused were misused by the complainant. Further, the complainant \nfailed to establish that the amount given by the complainant is a loan \nand not for any other purpose by placing the statement of accounts \nand/or Income Tax Returns. Hence, the complaint would not attract \nSection 138 of the Act as the accused has rebutted the presumption \nunder  Sections  118  and  139  of  the Act  by  probable  defence.  This \ndefence has been established by cross-examining PW1/the General \nPower of Attorney-holder of the complainant. Accordingly, the accused \nhad  shifted  the  burden  on  the  complainant.  Hence,  the  statutory \npresumption  under  Section  139  of  the Act  would  not  continue  and \nit  was  for  the  complainant  to  discharge  the  onus  by  bringing  on \nrecord evidence/material to show that the amount(s) given is/are for \na legally enforceable debt. Moreover, the complainant failed to assail \nthe defence of the accused. On these grounds, learned counsel for \nthe petitioners urged the Court to issue notice and thereafter, admit \nand allow the appeals.\n\nANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:\n\n8.  From the order impugned, it is clear that though the contention of \nthe petitioners was that the said amounts were given for producing \na film and were not by way of return of any loan taken, which may \nhave been a probable defence for the petitioners in the case, but \nrightly, the High Court has taken the view that evidence had to be \nadduced on this point which has not been done by the petitioners. \nPausing here, the Court would only comment that the reasoning of \nthe High Court as well as the First Appellate Court and Trial Court \non  this  issue  is  sound.  Just  by  taking  a  counter-stand  to  raise  a \nprobable defence would not shift the onus on the complainant in such \n\nState (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma\f2254 \n\n[2025] 4 S.C.R.\n\na case for the plea of defence has to be buttressed by evidence, \neither  oral  or  documentary,  which  in  the  present  cases,  has  not \nbeen done. Moreover, even if it is presumed that the complainant \nhad  not  proved  the  source  of  the  money  given  to  the  petitioners \nby way of loan by producing statement of accounts and/or Income \nTax Returns, the same ipso facto, would not negate such claim for \nthe reason that the cheques having being issued and signed by the \npetitioners has not been denied, and no evidence has been led to \nshow that the respondent lacked capacity to provide the amount(s) \nin  question.  In  this  regard,  we  may  make  profitable  reference  to \nthe  decision  in  Tedhi  Singh  v  Narayan  Dass  Mahant  (2022)  6 \nSCC 735:\n\n‘10.  The  trial  court  and  the  first  appellate  court  have \nnoted  that in  the  case  under  Section  138  of  the  NI Act \nthe complainant need not show in the first instance that \nhe  had  the  capacity.  The  proceedings  under  Section \n138  of  the  NI Act  is  not  a  civil  suit. At  the  time,  when \nthe  complainant  gives  his  evidence,  unless  a  case  is \nset  up  in  the  reply  notice  to  the  statutory  notice  sent, \nthat  the  complainant  did  not  have  the  wherewithal,  it \ncannot  be  expected  of  the  complainant  to  initially  lead \nevidence to show that he had the financial capacity. To \nthat extent, the courts in our view were right in holding \non  those  lines.  However,  the  accused  has  the  right  to \ndemonstrate  that  the  complainant  in  a  particular  case \ndid not have the capacity and therefore, the case of the \naccused  is  acceptable  which  he  can  do  by  producing \nindependent  materials,  namely,  by  examining  his \nwitnesses  and  producing  documents.  It  is  also  open  to \nhim to establish the very same aspect by pointing to the \nmaterials produced by the complainant himself. He can \nfurther, more importantly, achieve this result through the \ncross-examination of the witnesses of the complainant. \nUltimately, it becomes the duty of the courts to consider \ncarefully and appreciate the totality of the evidence and \nthen come to a conclusion whether in the given case, the \naccused has shown that the case of the complainant is \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2025] 4 S.C.R.  \n\n2255\n\nin peril for the reason that the accused has established \na probable defence.’\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n9.  The High Court has also rightly noted that the petitioners have not \ndenied receipt of the sum of Rs.41,28,000/- (Rupees Forty-One Lakhs \nTwenty-Eight Thousand) but have taken the defence that it was given \nin the course of jointly producing a film with the complainant. Even \nthen, the liability has to be discharged by the person(s) concerned \nand that would be a legally enforceable debt repayable, under the \npurview of Section 138 of the Act.\n\n10.  Moreover, as per the defence proffered by the petitioners themselves, \nthe money was given to the accused in the course of producing a \nfilm jointly by the complainant. The accused urge that since the film \nfailed, the cheques and receipts given by the accused were misused \nby the complainant. Thus, arguendo, if the same is correct, and the \naccused and respondent-complainant were indeed jointly producing \na film, no reason/occasion to issue the cheques and receipts to the \ncomplainant is forthcoming, inasmuch as, if the amount(s) were by \nway  of  investments  in  a  film  being  jointly  produced,  the  need  per \nse to issue cheques, including interest would not have arisen at all. \nThis crucial aspect has not been explained by the petitioners at all.\n\n11.  Further, the High Court has also rightly observed that even assuming \nthe  petitioners  and  the  complainant  engaged  together  in  film \nproduction  and  were  in  the  course  of  jointly  producing  a  film,  the \nfact that the transaction occurred as a joint investment has not been \nsubstantiated by the petitioners before the Courts. In this background, \nthe onus to first prove as to how the amount that is said to have been \ngiven by the complainant to the petitioners could have been given, \nwould not be fatal as receipt of the amount(s) has not been denied, \nmuch less disputed by the petitioners. In this regard, specifically, a \nsuggestion given to the GPA-holder of the complainant i.e., PW1 that \nthe complainant and petitioners were engaged in film production has \nbeen emphatically denied by PW1.\n\n12.  We also find no error in the High Court opining that in the backdrop \nof emphatic denial by PW1 with regard to any joint deal/venture with \n\nState (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma\f2256 \n\n[2025] 4 S.C.R.\n\nthe  petitioners  in  film  production  and  acceptance  and  non-rebuttal \nof  receipt  of  Rs.41,28,000/-  (Rupees  Forty-One  Lakhs  Twenty-\nEight Thousand), the onus would not shift on the complainant and \nwould remain on the petitioners to prove that such receipt of money \nwas not with regard to repayment of an amount legally due to the \ncomplainant. In fact, the accused have not been able to dislodge the \nstatutory presumption under Section 139 of the Act. In this context, \nin a decision of recent vintage, Rajesh Jain v Ajay Singh, (2023) \n10 SCC 148, the Court stated:\n\n‘33. The  NI Act  provides  for  two  presumptions  :  Section \n118  and  Section  139.  Section  118  of  the Act  inter  alia \ndirects  that  it  shall  be  presumed,  until  the  contrary  is \nproved,  that  every  negotiable  instrument  was  made  or \ndrawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates \nthat “unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, \nthat the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the \ndischarge of, whole or part of any debt or liability”. It will \nbe seen that the “presumed fact” directly relates to one of \nthe crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction \nunder Section 138. [The rules discussed hereinbelow are \ncommon to both the presumptions under Section 139 and \nSection  118  and  are  hence,  not  repeated—reference  to \none can be taken as reference to another]\n\n34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a \n“shall presume” clause is illustrative of a presumption of \nlaw.  Because  Section  139  requires  that  the  Court  “shall \npresume”  the  fact  stated  therein,  it  is  obligatory  on  the \nCourt  to  raise  this  presumption  in  every  case  where \nthe  factual  basis  for  the  raising  of  the  presumption  had \nbeen established. But this does not preclude the person \nagainst whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it \nand proving the contrary as is clear from the use of the \nphrase “unless the contrary is proved”.\n\n35. The  Court  will  necessarily  presume  that  the  cheque \nhad been issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable \ndebt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer \nof  the  cheque  admits  issuance/execution  of  the  cheque \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2025] 4 S.C.R.  \n\n2257\n\nand secondly, in the event where the complainant proves \nthat  cheque  was  issued/executed  in  his  favour  by  the \ndrawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s) \nwhich bring about the activation of the presumptive clause. \n[Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal \n[Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal, \n(1999) 3 SCC 35]]\n\n36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding \nthat presumption takes effect even in a situation where the \naccused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily \nsigned and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir \nSingh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) \n4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) \n40]]. Therefore, mere admission of the drawer’s signature, \nwithout  admitting  the  execution  of  the  entire  contents  in \nthe cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption.\n\n37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to \nprove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by \nthe accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device \nunder  Section  139  of  the Act  helps  shifting  the  burden \non  the  accused.  The  effect  of  the  presumption,  in  that \nsense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused \nof proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank \ntowards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential \nburden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact \nwill  have  to  be  taken  to  be  true,  without  expecting  the \ncomplainant to do anything further.\n\nxxx\n\n39.  The  standard  of  proof  to  discharge  this  evidential \nburden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations \nwhere the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an \naccused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-\nexistence of the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt. \nThe accused must meet the standard of “preponderance of \nprobabilities”, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding. \n[Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) \n\nState (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma\f2258 \n\n[2025] 4 S.C.R.\n\n11 SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) \n184: AIR 2010 SC 1898]]\n\n40.  In  order to  rebut  the  presumption  and  prove  to  the \ncontrary,  it  is  open  to  the  accused  to  raise  a  probable \ndefence  wherein  the  existence  of  a  legally  enforceable \ndebt  or  liability  can  be  contested.  The  words  “until  the \ncontrary is proved” occurring in Section 139 do not mean \nthat the accused must necessarily prove the negative that \nthe  instrument  is  not  issued  in  discharge  of  any  debt/\nliability but the accused has the option to ask the Court \nto consider the non-existence of debt/liability so probable \nthat a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the \ncase,  to  act  upon  the  supposition  that  debt/liability  did \nnot exist. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa \nv. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) \n571:  AIR  2019  SC  1983];  see  also  Kumar  Exports  v. \nSharma  Carpets  [Kumar  Exports  v.  Sharma  Carpets, \n(2009)  2  SCC  513:  (2009)  1  SCC  (Civ)  629:  (2009)  1 \nSCC (Cri) 823] ]\n\n41.  In  other  words,  the  accused  is  left  with  two  options. \nThe  first  option—of  proving  that  the  debt/liability  does \nnot  exist—is  to  lead  defence  evidence  and  conclusively \nestablish with certainty that the cheque was not issued in \ndischarge of a debt/liability. The second option is to prove \nthe non-existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of \nprobabilities  by  referring  to  the  particular  circumstances \nof  the  case.  The  preponderance  of  probability  in  favour \nof  the  accused’s  case  may  be  even  fifty-one  to  forty-\nnine  and  arising  out  of  the  entire  circumstances  of  the \ncase,  which  includes:  the  complainant’s  version  in  the \noriginal  complaint,  the  case  in  the  legal/demand  notice, \ncomplainant’s  case  at  the  trial,  as  also  the  plea  of  the \naccused in the reply notice, his Section 313 CrPC statement \nor  at  the  trial  as  to  the  circumstances  under  which  the \npromissory  note/cheque  was  executed. All  of  them  can \nraise a preponderance of probabilities justifying a finding \nthat there was “no debt/liability”. [Kumar Exports v. Sharma \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2025] 4 S.C.R.  \n\n2259\n\nCarpets [Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC \n513: (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 629: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 823]]\n\n42. The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential \nburden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e. oral \nor  documentary  evidence  or  admissions  made  by  the \nopposite  party;  it  may  comprise  circumstantial  evidence \nor presumption of law or fact.\n\n43.  The  accused  may  adduce  direct  evidence  to  prove \nthat  the  instrument  was  not  issued  in  discharge  of  a \ndebt/liability and, if he adduces acceptable evidence, the \nburden again shifts to the complainant. At the same time, \nthe accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence \nand, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, \nthe  burden  may  likewise  shift  to  the  complainant.  It  is \nopen  for  him  to  also  rely  upon  presumptions  of  fact, \nfor  instance  those  mentioned  in  Section  114  and  other \nsections  of  the  Evidence Act.  The  burden  of  proof  may \nshift by presumptions of law or fact. In Kundan Lal case \n[Kundan  Lal  Rallaram  v.  Custodian  (Evacuee  Property), \n1961 SCC OnLine SC 10: AIR 1961 SC 1316] when the \ncreditor had failed to produce his account books, this Court \nraised a presumption of fact under Section 114, that the \nevidence, if produced would have shown the non-existence \nof  consideration.  Though,  in  that  case,  this  Court  was \ndealing with the presumptive clause in Section 118 NI Act, \nsince  the  nature  of  the  presumptive  clauses  in  Sections \n118 and 139 is the same, the analogy can be extended \nand applied in the context of Section 139 as well.\n\n44. Therefore, in fine, it can be said that once the accused \nadduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that on a \npreponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/liability \nin  the  manner  pleaded  in  the  complaint  or  the  demand \nnotice  or  the  affidavit-evidence,  the  burden  shifts  to  the \ncomplainant and the presumption “disappears” and does \nnot haunt the accused any longer. The onus having now \nshifted  to  the  complainant,  he  will  be  obliged  to  prove \nthe existence of a debt/liability as a matter of fact and his \n\nState (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma\f2260 \n\n[2025] 4 S.C.R.\n\nfailure to prove would result in dismissal of his complaint \ncase.  Thereafter,  the  presumption  under  Section  139 \ndoes not again come to the complainant’s rescue. Once \nboth  parties  have  adduced  evidence,  the  Court  has  to \nconsider  the  same  and  the  burden  of  proof  loses  all  its \nimportance. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa \nv. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) \n571: AIR 2019 SC 1983]; see also, Rangappa v. Sri Mohan \n[Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC \n(Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184: AIR 2010 SC 1898]]’\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n13.  For reasons aforesaid, we do not find any ground to interfere in the \norder impugned and accordingly, the petition(s) shall stand dismissed. \nWe refuse special leave, being cognizant of Rafiq v State of Uttar \nPradesh (1980) 4 SCC 262:\n\n‘3. Concurrent findings of fact ordinarily acquire a deterrent \nsanctity and tentative finality when challenged in this Court \nand we rarely invoke the special jurisdiction under Article \n136 of the Constitution which is meant mainly to correct \nmanifest injustice or errors of law of great moment. …’\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\n14.  However,  before  parting,  the  Court  would  clarify  that  though  there \nare separate judgments and orders of the Trial Court, in each case, \nsix  months’  simple  imprisonment  and  direction  to  pay  the  cheque \namount as the compensation has been awarded; the orders being of \nthe same date between the same parties and in connection with the \nsame transaction of the same nature, albeit in different tranches, the \nsentences of imprisonment awarded shall run concurrently. Further, \nin case of failure of the petitioners to pay the compensation amount \nwithin six months from today, the same shall be recovered from them \nas a public debt under the relevant law, and it shall be paid to the \ncomplainant/respondent  by  the  competent  authority  post-recovery. \nIn  directing  the  sentences  to  run  concurrently,  we  have  exercised \njudicial  discretion  [reference  to  ‘judicial  discretion’  herein  is  to  be \nunderstood as per Gudikanti Narasimhulu v Public Prosecutor, \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2025] 4 S.C.R.  \n\n2261\n\nHigh Court of Andhra Pradesh (1978) 1 SCC 240] guided by the \nprinciples governing the field, which are noted infra:\n\nI.  Mohd.  Akhtar  Hussain  v  Assistant  Collector  of  Customs \n\n(Prevention) (1988) 4 SCC 183 [2-Judge Bench] \n\n‘10. The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the \nso-called single transaction rule for concurrent sentences. \nIf a given transaction constitutes two offences under two \nenactments  generally,  it  is  wrong  to  have  consecutive \nsentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent \nsentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction \nrelating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting \nthe two offences are quite different.’\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\nII.  V K Bansal v State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 211 [2-Judge \n\nBench]\n\n‘18. Applying the principle of single transaction referred to \nabove to the above fact situations we are of the view that \neach one of the loan transactions/financial arrangements \nwas  a  separate  and  distinct  transaction  between  the \ncomplainant on the one hand and the borrowing company/\nappellant  on  the  other.  If  different  cheques  which  are \nsubsequently  dishonoured  on  presentation,  are  issued \nby the borrowing company acting through the appellant, \nthe same could be said to be arising out of a single loan \ntransaction  so  as  to  justify  a  direction  for  concurrent \nrunning of the sentences awarded in relation to dishonour \nof cheques relevant to each such transaction. That being \nso, the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant in \neach case relevant to the transactions with each company \nreferred to above ought to run concurrently. We, however, \nsee no reason to extend that concession to transactions \nin which the borrowing company is different no matter the \nappellant  before  us  is  the  promoter/Director  of  the  said \nother companies also. Similarly, we see no reason to direct \nrunning of the sentence concurrently in the case filed by \nState Bank of Patiala against M/s Sabhyata Plastics and \n\nState (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma\f2262 \n\n[2025] 4 S.C.R.\n\nM/s Rahul Plastics which transaction is also independent \nof  any  loan  or  financial  assistance  between  the  State \nFinancial  Corporation  and  the  borrowing  companies. \nWe make it clear that the direction regarding concurrent \nrunning  of  sentence  shall  be  limited  to  the  substantive \nsentence  only.  The  sentence  which  the  appellant  has \nbeen  directed  to  undergo  in  default  of  payment  of  fine/\ncompensation shall not be affected by this direction. We do \nso because the provisions of Section 427 CrPC do not, in \nour opinion, permit a direction for the concurrent running \nof the substantive sentences with sentences awarded in \ndefault of payment of fine/compensation.’\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\nIII.  O M Cherian v State of Kerala (2015) 2 SCC 501 [3-Judge \n\nBench]\n\n‘18.  While  referring  the  matter  to  a  larger  Bench,  the \nBench  observed  that  in  Mohd.  Akhtar  Hussain  case \n[Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4 \nSCC 183: 1988 SCC (Cri) 921], Section 31 CrPC was not \nnoticed by this Court. It is to be pointed out that in Mohd. \nAkhtar Hussain case [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector \nof Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183: 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] and \nManoj case [(2014) 2 SCC 153: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 763], \nthe appellants who were convicted for different counts of \noffences arose out of a single transaction, favouring the \nexercise of discretion to the benefit of the accused that the \nsentences shall run concurrently. Those decisions are not \ncases arising out of conviction at one trial of two or more \noffences and therefore, reference to Section 31 CrPC in \nthose cases was not necessitated.\n\n19. As  pointed  out  earlier,  Section  31  CrPC  deals  with \nquantum of punishment which may be legally passed when \nthere is (a) one trial; and (b) the accused is convicted of \ntwo  or  more  offences.  The  ambit  of  Section  31  is  wide, \ncovering  not  only  a  single  transaction  constituting  two \nor more offences but also offences arising out of two or \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2025] 4 S.C.R.  \n\n2263\n\nmore transactions. In the two judgments in Mohd. Akhtar \nHussain [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs, \n(1988) 4 SCC 183: 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] and Manoj [(2014) \n2  SCC  153:  (2014)  1  SCC  (Cri)  763],  the  issue  that  fell \nfor consideration was the imposition of sentence for two \nor  more  offences  arising  out  of  the  single  transaction.  It \nis in that context, in those cases, this Court held that the \nsentences shall run concurrently.\n\n20. Under Section 31 CrPC it is left to the full discretion \nof the court to order the sentences to run concurrently in \ncase of conviction for two or more offences. It is difficult \nto  lay  down  any  straitjacket  approach  in  the  matter  of \nexercise of such discretion by the courts. By and large, trial \ncourts and appellate courts have invoked and exercised \ntheir discretion to issue directions for concurrent running \nof  sentences,  favouring  the  benefit  to  be  given  to  the \naccused.  Whether  a  direction  for  concurrent  running \nof sentences ought to be issued in a given case would \ndepend  upon  the  nature  of  the  offence  or  offences \ncommitted and the facts and circumstances of the case. \nThe discretion has to be exercised along the judicial lines \nand not mechanically.\n\n21. Accordingly, we answer the reference by holding that \nSection  31  CrPC  leaves  full  discretion  with  the  court  to \norder sentences for two or more offences at one trial to \nrun concurrently, having regard to the nature of offences \nand attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances. We \ndo not find any reason to hold that normal rule is to order \nthe sentence to be consecutive and exception is to make \nthe sentences concurrent. Of course, if the court does not \norder the sentence to be concurrent, one sentence may \nrun after the other, in such order as the court may direct. \nWe also do not find any conflict in the earlier judgment in \nMohd. Akhtar Hussain [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector \nof Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183: 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] and \nSection 31 CrPC.’\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\nState (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma\f2264 \n\n[2025] 4 S.C.R.\n\n15.  Exemption  from  surrendering  granted  earlier  vide  Order  dated \n03.05.2024  in  favour  of  petitioner  no.2  will  cease  to  operate.  The \npetitioner no. 2 is hereby directed to surrender within three weeks \nfrom  the  date  of  communication  of  this  Judgment  to  serve  the \nremaining period of sentence. Registry shall intimate the petitioners \nand their AOR forthwith. \n\n16.  Pending IA(s), if any, stand closed.\n\nResult of the case: Petition dismissed.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f"}