{"file_name": "2024_10_2278_2302_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2278 : 2024 INSC 796\n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority  \nv.  \nAbhishek Gupta etc.\n\n(Civil Appeal No(s). 7420-7421 of 2010) \n\n21 October 2024\n\n[Surya Kant* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] \n\nIssue for Consideration\n\n(i)  Whether  the  mandatory  procedure  under  Section  5A  of  the \nLand  Acquisition  Act,  1894,  was  followed  while  considering \nobjections  against  the  acquisition;  (ii)  Whether  the  acquisition \nproceedings were vitiated on grounds of violation of Article 14 of \nthe  Constitution  due  to  differential  treatment  of  similarly  placed \nlandowners;  (iii)  Whether  appeals  are  liable  to  be  dismissed  as \ninfructuous in view of subsequent developments like ‘settlement’ \nbetween the parties; (iv) Whether the doctrine of merger applies, \ngiven  prior  dismissal  of  other  appeals  by  the  State  against  the \nsame impugned judgment.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nLand Acquisition Act, 1894 [‘LA Act’] –  s.5A, LA Act codifies the \nfundamental safeguard of audi alteram partem – Landowners \nhave  the  opportunity  to  demonstrate  that  the  acquisition  is \nagainst public purpose or marred by mala fides – Appropriate \ngovernment  may  exempt  such  land  from  acquisition  –  s.5A \nenvisions  a  modus  of  deliberation  and  consultation  –  Must \nbe  construed  to  be  mandatory,  akin  to  a  right  –  Objections \nunder  s.5A  proceed  in  four  distinct  stages  –  Discussed  – \nProcedure  mandated,  not  a  particular  outcome  –  Collector \nhas  no  power  to  “decide”  the  case  and  can  only  give \n“recommendations” to the Government which is the ultimate \narbiter – Government decision not beyond judicial review – Can \nbe challenged as arbitrary or passed without due application \nof  mind  –  Respondents  have  not  placed  any  evidence  on \nrecord  to  lay  such  foundation  –  Decision  to  go  ahead  with \nacquisition  as  Respondents’  structures  were  unauthorised \nwas not whimsical – Predicated on findings of a High-Powered \nCommittee  –  Departure  from  Collector’s  recommendations \n\n* Author\n\n\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2279\n\nmade in public interest, with due application of mind and was \nfully justified – Appeal allowed: \n\nHeld: Respondents failed to substantiate claims under Section 5A – \nState Government followed the four-stage procedure – Section 5A \nmandates  a  procedure,  not  a  particular  outcome  –  Respondents \nguaranteed a hearing and consideration, not relief –  Interpretation of \nbare text of Section 5A –  Legislature intended different roles for the \ncollector and the Government –  Collector has no power to “decide” \nthe case and can only give ‘recommendations” to the Government \nwho  is  the  ultimate  arbiter  –  Government’s  decision  not  beyond \njudicial review – Can be challenged as arbitrary or passed without \ndue application of mind –  Onus on Respondents to point flaws in \nprocedure – Respondents did not place any evidence on record to \nlay  such  foundation  –  Government/Appellant  have  demonstrated \nthat  their  decision  was  not  whimsical  but  was  predicated  on  the \nfindings of a High-Powered Committee which found Respondents’ \nstructures  to  be  unauthorized  and  not  in  conformity  with  the \nDevelopment Plan – Government’s departure from the Collector’s \nrecommendation  made  in  public  interest,  with  due  application  of \nmind and was fully justified. [Paras 4,5,7, 14,15, 17, 18, 20]\n\nLand  Acquisition  –  Construction  on  land  –    Orders  of \nCommissioner and ADJ permitting constructions specifically \nfor  agricultural  land,  not  residential  land  –  Respondents’ \nusage  of  land  not  limited  to  ‘agricultural  purposes’  and  it \nwas  intended  to  be  ‘residential’  in  nature  as  well  –  Orders \npermitting  agricultural  structures  do  not  preclude  the  State \nGovernment from conducting an on-ground inspection as to \nthe actual useof land – Serious doubts raised on jurisdictional \ncompetence  of  the  Civil  Court  in  holding  that  agriculture \nrelated structures could be raised without prior permission:\n\nHeld:  Orders  of  the  Commissioner  and  ADJ  were  caveated \napprovals  for  prospective  construction  of  the  agricultural \nstructures  –  Respondents  admitted  that  the  usage  of  the  land \nwas not limited to ‘agricultural purposes’ and that it was intended \nto  be  ‘residential’  in  nature  as  well  –  The  Respondents  had  not \nproduced any reliable material to prove that the constructions on \ntheir land were authorised – In any case, exempting lands bearing \nconstructions  from  acquisition  is  a  matter  of  State  Policy,  not  of \nlaw  –  Outcome  would  not  be  materially  affected  if  construction \nwas  authorised  –  Prior  authorization  of  the  constructions  is  also \n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2280 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nnot the definitive saving grace – State of Haryana v. Vinod Oil & \nGeneral Millsrelied on. [Paras 12-26]\n\nConstitution of India, Article 14 – Acquisition of Appellant’s \nland not discriminatory – Acquisition of 99.78% of the initially \nnotified land shows State’s intention to acquire uniformly – \nMere  Plea  regarding  differential  treatment  insufficient  –\nArticle  14  cannot  be  ordinarily  employed  as  a  ground  to \nclaim  negative  equality–  Illegality,  if  any,  has  since  been \nremedied  –  Material  subsequent  event  should  have  been \nnoted by High Court:\n\nHeld:  Respondents  claimed  that  land  belonging  to  Maharaja \nHarinder  Singh  ‘Khalaf’  Maharaja  Varinder  Singh  had  been \nexempted  from  acquisition  –  The  High  Court  accepted  this \nargument  and  quashed  the  acquisition,  holding  that  similarly \nplaced landowners had been left out of acquisition process – Held, \norder  patently  erroneous  – Acquisition  of  99.78%  of  the  initially \nnotified land shows State’s intention to acquire uniformly – Mere \nplea regarding differential treatment insufficient; burden lies on the \nRespondents to not only prove disparate treatment of equals, but \nthat it amounts to hostile discrimination as well – Article 14 cannot \nbe used to claim negative equality – Solution to some lands being \nunjustifiably left out is to direct their acquisition, not encourage the \nexclusion of more lands – High Court should have annulled illicit \nbenefit received by the similarly placed person – Land of Maharaja \nHarinder  Singh  ‘Khalaf’  Maharaja  Varinder  Singh  subsequently \nacquired before impugned order – Illegality, if any, has since been \nremedied  –  Material  subsequent  event  should  have  been  noted \nby High Court. [Paras 27-31]\n\nLand  Acquisition  –  State  Government’s  decision  to  release \nRespondents’ land from acquisition – If suffers from manifest \narbitrariness:\n\nHeld: During the pendency of proceedings, the State Government \nconveyed  its  decision  to  release  the  Respondents’  land  from \nacquisition on the condition that a portion be used for building of \nroads and other public amenities and the rest only for charitable, \ni.e.  non-commercial,  purposes,  and  the  Respondents  agreed  – \nPerusal of records casts cloud of doubt on legal necessity of release \nof land – Crucial policy decisions finalised by very junior officials; \nfiles receiving approval at exceptional speed; important issues not \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2281\n\nconsidered  –  Decision  manifestly  arbitrary  –  State  Government \npossesses the power to release the land for lawful considerations – \nCannot do so whimsically, irrationally, without any application of mind, \nor selectively – Parties’ compromise not accepted. [Paras 32-46]\n\nDoctrine/ Principles – Doctrine of Merger – Effect of previous \nSLPs  against  same  impugned  judgment  being  dismissed \nafter grant of leave – Doctrine of merger neither adoctrine of \nconstitutional law nor of statutory recognition – Common law \nprinciple  directed  towards  judicial  propriety  should  not  be \napplied in a straitjacket manner – Exercise of powers under \nArticle  142  of  the  Constitution  used  to  carve  out  exception \nto doctrine of merger: \n\nHeld: Earlier SLPs by the State challenging the same impugned \njudgment  of  the  High  Court  had  been  dismissed  after  grant  of \nleave – Arguably doctrine of merger would be attracted – However, \nimpugned judgement of the High Court found to be patently unjust \nand  could  adversely  affect  the  subject  acquisition,  leading  to \nsignificant harm to the public at large –Fit case to invoke powers \nunder Article 142 and carve out an exception to do complete justice \nto the parties –Reliance on Kunhayammed, Khoday Distilleries and \nGNCTD v BSK Realtors. [Paras 47-53]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nShri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [1975] 1 SCR  597 : \n(1975) 4 SCC 298; Women's Education Trust v. State of Haryana \n(2013) 8 SCC 99 – referred to.\n\nNOIDA  v.  Darshan  Lal  Bohra,  2024  SCC  Online  SC  1690; \nKunhayammed  v.  State  of  Kerala  [2000]  Supp.  1  SCR    538  : \n(2000) 6 SCC 359; Anand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2005) \n9 SCC 164; State of Haryana v. Vinod Oil & General Mills [2014] \nSCR 13 524 : (2014) 15 SCC 410;  Khoday Distilleries Limited v. \nSri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal \n[2019] 3 SCR 411 : (2019) 4 SCC 376; GNCTD v. BSK Realtors, \n2024 INSC 455 : [2024] 5 SCR 1159; Gurcharan Singh & Ors. v. \nNew  Delhi  Municipal  Committee  &  Ors.  [1996]  1  SCR  1154  : \n(1996) 2 SCC 459; Vivek Coop. House Building Society Ltd. v. \nState  of  Haryana,  2016  SCC  OnLine  P&H  15802;  Chandigarh \nAdministration v. Jagjit Singh [1995] 1 SCR 126 : (1995) 1 SCC \n745 – relied upon.\n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2282 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nList of Acts\n\nConstitution  of  India;  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894;  Haryana \nDevelopment and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975\n\nList of Keywords\n\ns.5A of the Land Acquisition; Objections of s.5A; Public interest; \nUnauthorized  structures; Article  14  of  the  Constitution  of  India; \nDiscrimination; Doctrine of merger; Public trust doctrine.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7420-7421 \nof 2010\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 15.07.2008 of the High Court \nof Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP Nos. 12510 and 12513 \nof 2000\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nLokesh  Sinhal,  Sr.  A.A.G.,  Samar  Vijay  Singh,  Nikunj  Gupta,   \nMs. Himanshi Sakhya, Keshav Mittal, Fateh Singh, Manish Verma, \nVarun Prasad, Advs. for the Appellant.\n\nRajive  Bhalla,  Dr.  Bharat  Bhushan  Parsoon,  Sanjeev  Sharma,   \nSr.  Advs.,  Sanjay  Sarin,  Shekhar  Verma,  Vikram  Sharda,   \nMs. Sonam Priya, Ayush Singh, Ms. Aditi Singh, Shantanu Tyagi, \nMs. Neha Goel, S. S. Shroff, Advs. for the Respondents.\n\nJudgment / Order of the S.upreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nSurya Kant, J.\n\n1.  These  appeals  have  been  preferred  by  the  Haryana  Urban \nDevelopment Authority (HUDA, now HSVP) (hereinafter, ‘Appellant’) \nagainst the judgement dated 15.07.2008 of the High Court of Punjab \nand Haryana (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), whereby the land acquisition \nproceedings  initiated  by  the  State  of  Haryana  were  annulled  by \nquashing the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land \nAcquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter, ‘1894 Act’). \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2283\n\nA.  FACTS\n\n2.  A notification was issued on 16.03.1999 under Section 4(1) of the \n1894 Act for acquiring 952.18 acres land, of which 748.56 acres fall \nin Village Saketri and 203.62 acres in Village Bhainsa Tiba, both in \nTehsil and District Panchkula, Haryana. The land was being acquired \nfor development and utilization for residential, commercial, institutional \nand recreational purposes.\n\n3. \n\nLocated between the Union Territory of Chandigarh and the Shivalik \nRange, the lands are bordered on one side by the Sukhna Lake, and \na designated Forest Area on the other. It is also adjacent to several \nother  residential  sectors  that  the Appellant  has  fully  developed  as \npart of the Mansa Devi Complex in the Panchkula Urban Area.\n\n4.  The Respondents submitted their objections under Section 5A of the \n1894 Act  on  16.04.1999,  contending  that  their  portion  of  the  land \nunder acquisition ought to be exempted as they contained fruit trees \nand  the  state  policy  mandates  the  exemption  of  such  lands  from \nacquisition. Additionally, they claimed that a cattle-shed, greenhouse, \nand  an  attendant  room  were  also  erected  on  the  land,  for  which \nauthorization  had  been  granted  by  the  Commissioner, Ambala,  on \n23.12.1992 under the Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, \n1952 (hereinafter, ‘Punjab Periphery Act’). Similarly, a farmhouse \nwas also claimed to have been constructed with the approval of the \nAdditional District Judge, Ambala, (hereinafter, ‘ADJ’) vide judgement \ndated 05.04.1994. \n\n5.  The  Collector  accepted  these  objections,  noting  that  since  the \nCommissioner and the ADJ had authorized the construction on the \nland,  it  could  be  exempted  from  acquisition.  However,  the  State \nGovernment  went  ahead  with  the  acquisition,  asserting  that  the \nstructures were unauthorized. A declaration under Section 6 of the \n1894 Act  was  issued  on  16.03.2000  to  acquire  both  the  land  and \nthe constructions thereon. \n\n6.  Aggrieved, the Respondents approached the High Court, pleading \nthat their objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act had not been \nappropriately considered. \n\n7.  Subsequently, vide the impugned judgement dated 15.07.2008, the \nHigh  Court  allowed  the  Respondents’  writ  petition  and  quashed \nthe notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act. \n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2284 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nThis  finding  stood  on  two  primary  legs:  (i)  the  Respondents’ \nobjections  were  wrongfully  rejected  as  the  constructions  were \nduly  authorized;  and  (ii)  it  was  discriminatory  to  acquire  the \nRespondents’  land  when  similarly  situated  land  belonging  to \nMaharaja  Harinder  Singh  ‘Khalaf’  Maharaja  Varinder  Singh  had \nbeen exempted from acquisition. \n\n8.  Discontented  with  the  quashing  of  the  notifications  issued  under \nSections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act, the Appellant—beneficiary of the \nacquisition,  is  before  us  in  these  appeals.  This  Court,  vide  order \ndated 01.09.2008, directed the parties to maintain status quo which \nis operating till date. \n\nB.  CONTENTIONS\n\n9.  Mr. Lokesh Sinhal, Learned Senior Additional Advocate General of \nHaryana,  appearing  on  behalf  of  the Appellant—beneficiary  of  the \nacquisition  contended  that  the  High  Court  erred  in  quashing  the \naforementioned notifications. In support of this assertion, he made \nthe following submissions:\n\n(a)  The  constructions  undertaken  by  the  Respondents  were \nunauthorized.  Although  permission  was  granted  by  the \nCommissioner, Ambala, it was conditioned on the Respondents \nsubmitting  the  building  plan.  However,  there  is  no  evidence \nsubstantiating  that  such  a  plan  was  ever  submitted.  Hence  it \ncannot be presumed that the construction was duly authorized, \nand  consequently,  the  Competent Authority  was  justified  in \nrepudiating the Appellant’s objections under Section 5A of the \n1894 Act.\n\n(b)  The Collector did not recommend the release of the Respondents’ \nland. He merely stated that the State Government may consider \nsuch  release.  The  issue  of  exemption  from  acquisition  was \nconsequently  left  open  for  consideration  by  the  Competent \nAuthority.\n\n(c)  Even  if  it  is  assumed  that  the  Collector  recommended  the \nrelease of the land, it would not bind the State Government. \nAfter  due  inspection,  the  High-Powered  Committee  had \ndetermined  that  the  construction  was  unauthorized  and \nnot  in  conformity  with  the  Developmental  Plan.  The  State \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2285\n\nGovernment,  therefore,  committed  no  error  on  disagreeing \nwith  the  Collector  and  proceeding  with  the  acquisition,  as \nbuttressed by this Court’s decision in Anand Buttons Ltd. v. \nState of Haryana.1 \n\n(d)  The land belonging to Maharaja Harinder Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja \nVarinder Singh had also been subsequently acquired through \nthe  notification  dated  17.05.2007.  It  could  not  be  acquired \nearlier  on  account  of  pending  public  interest  litigations.  It  is \nthus incorrect to assert that the State Government discriminated \nagainst  the  Respondents  by  releasing  similarly  placed  lands. \nIn any case, the Respondents had also not demonstrated that \nthis land was similarly placed as their own land. Furthermore, \nthe acquisition proceedings do not violate the provisions of the \nPunjab Periphery Act.\n\n10. \n\n Per  contra,  Mr.  Rajive  Bhalla,  Dr.  Bharat  Bhushan  Parsoon,  and \nMr.  Sanjeev  Sharma,  Learned  Senior  Counsels  representing  the \nRespondents, have supported the impugned judgement by arguing \nthat:\n\n(a)  The burden of proving that the constructions were not supported \nby the building plan lies on the Appellant. Since the same has not \nbeen proved, there cannot be any adverse presumption against \nthe  legality  of  the  construction.  In  any  case,  as  confirmed  by \nthe order dated 05.04.1994 of the ADJ, the Appellant was not \nobligated to seek any permission and hence, non-submission \nof the building plan is not material.\n\n(b)  There is a flagrant violation of Section 5A as the Respondents’ \nobjections have not been considered in accordance with law. \nSince Section 5A of the 1894 Act provides a valuable safeguard \nto an expropriated land owner, it warrants mandatory compliance \nand cannot be treated as an empty formality.\n\n(c)  Furthermore,  doubt  can  be  cast  on  the  thoroughness  of \nthe  inspection  conducted  by  the  High-Powered  Committee \nconstituted by the State Government, given that a vast tract of \nland is claimed to have been inspected in a very short duration. \n\n1 \n\n(2005) 9 SCC 164.\n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2286 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nAdditionally, the composition of the committee formed for the \ninspection  indicates  a  complete  abdication  of  power  by  the \nState government.\n\n(d)  Even if the land of Maharaja Harinder Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja \nVarinder Singh was re-acquired, it was done at a rate prevalent \nin  2007,  which  was  higher  in  comparison  to  1999.  Denying \nthe  higher  rate  to  the  Respondents  amounts  to  arbitrary  and \ndiscriminatory conduct.\n\n(e) \n\nIn any case, there is a significant subsequent development, as \nduring the pendency of the proceedings, the State of Haryana \nhas  agreed  on  releasing  the  subject  land,  provided  that  the \nRespondents  provide  a  part  of  the  land  for  basic  amenities \nfree  of  cost  and  use  the  remaining  for  charitable  purposes. \nSince  the  Respondents  have  consented  to  put  their  land  to \nsuch  conditional  use,  this  Court  should  give  effect  to  such  a \nconscionable agreement between the parties and may, therefore, \ndismiss the instant appeals in light thereof.\n\n(f)  Since  this  Court  has  dismissed  the  previous  appeals  filed  by \nthe  State  of  Haryana  against  the  same  impugned  order,  the \npresent  set  of  appeals  are  not  maintainable  and  attract  the \nauspices of the doctrine of merger. \n\nC. \n\nISSUES\n\n11.  Having  given  our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the  submissions  at \nlength, we find that the following four issues are to be analysed:\n\ni.  Whether the mandatory procedure contemplated under Section \n\n5A of the 1894 Act has been complied with?\n\nii.  Whether the land acquisition proceedings deserve to be vitiated \non  the  ground  that  similarly  placed  landowners  have  been \ntreated differently?\n\niii.  Whether  the  instant  appeals  are  liable  to  be  dismissed  as \ninfructuous  in  view  of  the  subsequent  developments  like \n`settlement’ between the parties?\n\niv.  Whether doctrine of merger is attracted in view of the fact that \nState  appeals  against  the  same  impugned  judgment  have \nalready been dismissed?\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2287\n\nD.  ANALYSIS\n\nD.1  Evaluation of objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act \n\n12.  The  focal  contention  of  the  Respondent-landowners  is  that  the \nacquisition  proceedings  stand  vitiated  and  ought  to  be  quashed \nas they were carried out in violation of Section 5A of the 1894 Act, \nwhich mandates due consideration of their objections.\n\n13. \n\nIt  would  be  pertinent  to  understand  the  object  that  Section  5A \nof  the  1894  Act  seeks  to  fulfil.  A  plain  reading  of  the  provision \nindicates that it codifies the fundamental safeguard of audi altrem \npartem. Landowners have the opportunity to demonstrate that the \nacquisition  is  against  public  purpose  or  marred  by  mala  fides.  In \nthe event the landowner presents a cogent case, the appropriate \ngovernment may exempt such land from acquisition. By enabling \nlandowners  to  put  forward  their  perspective  and  elucidate  their \nremonstrances, Section 5A envisions a modus of deliberation and \nconsultation, which must therefore be construed to be mandatory, \nakin to a right.2\n\n14.  Objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act most often proceed in \n\nfour distinct stages: \n\ni. \n\nii. \n\niii. \n\n The  filing  stage:  Landowners  can  file  objections  within  thirty \ndays of the notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act;3 \n\n The hearing stage: The Collector must provide an oral hearing to \nthe objecting landowners, either in person or through a pleader/\nauthorized representative;4 \n\n The  recommendation  stage:  The  Collector—after  hearing \nobjections  and  upon  further  inquiry—makes  a  report  to  the \nappropriate government containing their recommendations; and\n\niv. \n\n The decision stage: The appropriate government considers the \nCollector’s report and takes a final decision on the objections.\n\n15.  Reverting  to  the  case  in  hand,  although  the  Respondents  have \naverred that their right under Section 5A has been infringed, however, \n\n2  Women’s Education Trust v. State of Haryana (2013) 8 SCC 99, para 1.\n\n3 \n\n4 \n\nSection 5A (1), 1894 Act.\n\nNOIDA v. Darshan Lal Bora, 2024 INS 508.\n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2288 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nthey  have  failed  to  substantiate  such  claim.  Onus  was  on  the \nRespondents to identify any fault in the procedure adopted by the \nState, which we find tracks closely with the aforementioned four-stage \nprocess. When the Section 4 notification was issued on 16.03.1999, \nobjections  were  invited  from  the  landowners.  These  objections \nwere  duly  heard,  and  a  report  was  prepared  by  the  Collector. \nSubsequently,  the  State  Government  constituted  a  High-Powered \nCommittee, and based on its findings and opinion, the Government \nultimately  took  a  final  decision  to  acquire  the  Respondents’  land. \nSection  5A  mandates  a  procedure,  not  a  particular  outcome. The \nlandowners in this case were thus certainly guaranteed a hearing \nand consideration, not relief.\n\n16.  Regarding the fourth stage, the Respondents have specifically argued \nthat since the Collector had recommended the release of their land \nand  the  State  Government  deviated  from  such  recommendation \nwithout any valid and sufficient reasons, its decision is bad in law. In \neffect, their claim seems to be that the Collector’s recommendation \nought  to  be  final  and  binding  on  the  Government.  However,  such \nan interpretation is at odds with the bare text of Section 5A, which \nstates that the Collector shall “either make a report in respect of the \nland  which  has  been  notified  under  Section  4,  sub-section  (1),  or \nmake  different  reports  in  respect  of  different  parcels  of  such  land, \nto the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations \non the objections, together with the record of the proceedings \nheld by him, for the decision of that Government. The decision \nof the appropriate Government on the objections shall be final.” \n[Emphasis supplied]\n\n17.  The choice of different terminologies for the role of the Collector and \nthe  role  of  the  Government  makes  it  evident  that  the  Legislature \nintended  different  roles  for  each  of  them.  The  Collector  has  no \npower to “decide” the case and can only give “recommendations” to \nthe Government. It is the Government which is the ultimate arbiter \nfor determining whether the land is to be released or not. No other \nauthority can dictate the outcome of Section 5A proceedings—neither \nthe Collector nor the landowner.5 While the Collector’s report can form \n\n5 \n\nShri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 298, para 5.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2289\n\n18. \n\nthe “basis” of such decision, the Government is free to independently \nevaluate and take a final decision, of course, based on relevant and \nlawful considerations. \n\nIt is therefore patently clear that the State Government possessed \nthe  ability  to  disagree  with  the  Collector’s  report  and  decide  a \ndifferent course. This is not to say that the Government’s decision \ncannot be challenged or is beyond judicial review. Indeed, had the \nRespondents demonstrated that the decision was arbitrary or passed \nwithout due application of mind, then they could have been victorious \nin their challenge. However, the Respondents have not placed any \nevidence  on  record  to  lay  such  foundation.  On  the  contrary,  the \nState Government/Appellant have demonstrated that their decision \nwas  not  whimsical  but  was  predicated  on  the  findings  of  a  High-\nPowered  Committee,  which  comprised  qualified  individuals,  like \nofficers of the Indian Administrative Services, officials working with \nthe Appellant, experts from the Town Planning Department and the \nDepartment  of Agriculture,  etc.  Having  duly  inspected  the  subject \nland,  this  Committee  deduced  that  the  building  structures  on  the \nland were unauthorized and not in conformity with the Development \nPlan.  Relying  on  this  analysis,  the  Government  deviated  from  the \nCollector’s recommendation and proceeded with the acquisition. We \nare of the considered view that such departure was made in public \ninterest, with due application of mind and was fully justified.\n\n19.  The Respondents have also assailed that the State Government’s \ndecision  was  at  odds  with  the  earlier  orders  of  the  Commissioner \nand the ADJ, who had authorized such constructions. We find this \nsubmission  disingenuous.  These  orders  of  the  Commissioner  and \nADJ permitted constructions that were to be erected specifically for \nagricultural purposes, not residential. The order dated 23.12.1992, \nspecifically  notes  that  only  structures  like  cattle  sheds  and  green \nhouses would be permitted, as they are subservient to agricultural \nactivities,  whereas  a  modern  farm  house  would  be  unauthorized \nunder the Punjab Periphery Act. Similarly, the order dated 05.04.1994 \nnoted  that  no  such  authorization  would  be  necessary,  provided \nthe land was to be utilized for agricultural purposes. However, the \nsubmissions  proffered  by  the  Respondents  undermine  their  own \ncase. While attempting to attack the public purpose element of the \nacquisition  proceedings,  they  admitted  that  the  usage  of  the  land \n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2290 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nwas not limited to ‘agricultural purposes’ and that it was intended to \nbe  ‘residential’  in  nature  as  well.  This  disharmony  is  visible  in  the \nRespondents’ Section 5A objections:\n\n“6.  That  the  above  said  land  of  the  objector  is  situated \nadjacent  to  sector  4  Mansa  Devi  Complex  and  the \nobjector  has  purchased  this  costly  land  with  a  view  to \nset  up  a  farm  house  thereon,  since  the  purpose  of \nAcquisition  is  also  residential,  it  would  be  against \nthe principal of natural justice to uproot the objector \nfirst and then to develop the same land for residential \npurpose meaning thereby the State would be providing \nresidential accommodation to one of after taking away \nthe  residential  land  from  the  objector,  which  would \nserve no public purpose as stated in the notice. Hence, \nthe  notice  under  section  4  of  the  Land Acquisition Act \nis liable to be withdrawn qua the above said land of the \nobjector.”\n\n[Emphasis supplied]\n\n20.  Given  how  the  Respondents  have  themselves  admitted  to  the \nintention of developing their lands and structures for non-agricultural \nactivities, we do not wish to second guess the fact-finding exercise \nconducted by the High-Powered Committee. We must also note that \nthe orders of the Commissioner and ADJ were caveated approvals \nfor prospective construction of the agricultural structures. We do not \nsee how these would preclude the State Government from conducting \nan actual on-ground inspection and coming to a different conclusion \nas  to  their  actual  use.  It  is  indeed  possible  that  following  the  said \norders, the land may have had unauthorized structures, which were \nbeing  used  beyond  mere  agricultural  purposes.  This  possibility  is \nonly further enhanced by the Respondents’ own stated intention of \nputting the lands to residential use.\n\n21.  Regardless, we may also hasten to add here that there are serious \ndoubts  on  the  jurisdictional  competence  of  the  Civil  Court,  in \nholding  that  agriculture  related  structures  could  be  raised  without \nprior permission. Such a hasty declaration by the ADJ was ex facie \nuncalled for and beyond its jurisdictional authority, given that it was \nexpressly barred under the Punjab Periphery Act.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2291\n\n22.  However, the Respondents’ strategy of arguing that their constructions \nwere authorized (being agricultural), while simultaneously seeking \nexemption  from  acquisition  on  the  ground  that  their  lands  were \nsubserving the same intention as the acquisition (being residential), \nis  not  only  contradictory  but  also  ill-advised.  Furthermore,  in  first \nplacing themselves at par with the object of acquisition, and then \nvitiating that very purpose by claiming that it contravenes the Punjab \nPeriphery Act,  the  Respondents  have  effectively  shot  themselves \nin the foot.\n\n23.  The  Respondents  have  also  failed  to  discharge  their  burden  of \nproof. They have not produced any reliable material to prove that the \nconstructions  on  their  land  were  authorized,  and  if  anything,  have \nfurther  created  doubts,  as  to  whether  these  structures  are  indeed \npermitted under the auspices of the Punjab Periphery Act. \n\n24.  On the contrary, there is ample material on record to show that the \nHigh-Powered Committee comprised of senior officials, made their \nassessment after having properly inspected the site. This Committee \nemphatically recommended that the whole of the land, including the \nunauthorized  structures,  be  acquired  for  the  proposed  regulated \ndevelopment. Such a decision, in our considered view, is in conformity \nwith  the  legislative  object  behind  the  Haryana  Development  and \nRegulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975, whereunder no construction on \nan agricultural land is permissible save and except when the change \nof  land  use  is  granted  by  the  appropriate  authority,  in  accordance \nwith the procedure prescribed therein.\n\n25. \n\nIn  any  case,  even  if  the  constructions  were  to  be  authorized,  it \nwould not materially affect our outcome. As has been held by this \nCourt on several occasions, exempting lands bearing constructions \nfrom acquisition is a matter of State Policy, and not of law.6 In case \nthe Government finds that exempting such lands would adversely \naffect the larger Development Plan or any other purpose behind the \nacquisition, then it can still continue with the acquisition.7 Private \ninterest of a few, should give way to the public interest of the many. \n\n6 \n\n7 \n\nNOIDA v. Darshan Lal Bohra, 2024 SCC Online SC 1690.\n\nAnand Buttons Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2005) 9 SCC 164.\n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2292 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nPrior  authorization  of  the  constructions  is  also  not  the  definitive \nsaving  grace  that  the  Respondents  imagine  it  to  be.  In  fact,  this \nCourt  has  repeatedly  allowed  acquisitions  even  in  cases  where \nthe  construction  was  specifically  authorized  by  the  government \nbeforehand, as was the case in State of Haryana v. Vinod Oil & \nGeneral Mills:8 \n\n“8.  Acquisition  of  the  respondents’  lands  was  held \nto  be  vitiated  on  the  ground  that  the  State  having \ngranted permission to the respondents for change of \nland use and develop the area as an industry cannot \nturn around after twenty-six years to acquire the land \nsaying that the same is required to be developed for \nresidential purposes and the action of the respondent \nState was held to be arbitrary. Of course, the Director \nof  Town  and  Country  Planning,  Haryana  earlier  granted \npermission to the respondents herein for change of land \nuse for construction of Oil and General Mills in their lands \nin  23  kanals  6  marlas  in  Khasra  Nos.  148/1,  148/2  and \n149/10. The fact that the factory and building was put \nup in the land with the approval of the authority cannot \nbe  a  bar  for  acquisition  of  the  land.  Public  interest \noverrides  individual  interests.  In  our  view,  the  High \nCourt was not justified in saying that the acquisition \nis bad since permission was earlier granted for change \nof  land  use  and  developing  the  area  as  an  industry \nand that the Government is estopped from initiating \nacquisition proceeding”\n\n[Emphasis supplied]\n\n26.  The existence of constructions on the Respondents’ land, whether \nauthorized or not, legal or not, cannot be by themselves an absolute \nembargo  on  the  Government’s  power  of  eminent  domain.  The \nchallenge  brought  by  the  Respondents  on  the  anvil  of  Section  5A \nof the 1894 Act, therefore, falls flat. \n\n8 \n\n(2014) 15 SCC 410, para 8.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2293\n\nD.2.  Discrimination and Article 14 of our Constitution\n\n27. \n\nIn addition to seeking refuge under Section 5A of the 1894 Act, the \nRespondents contend that the acquisition of their land was violative \nof Article 14 of the Constitution. They claim that the land of Maharaja \nHarinder Singh ‘Khalaf’ Maharaja Varinder Singh had been exempted \nfrom  the  acquisition.  This  contention  was  also  accepted  by  the \nHigh Court, which held the subject-acquisition to be discriminatory \nin nature, for leaving out lands of similarly placed owners from the \nprocess of acquisition.\n\n28.  We  find  this  patently  erroneous,  for  three  reasons.  First,  the  High \nCourt overlooked the fact that the total land proposed to be acquired \nthrough  the  Section  4  notification  was  952.18  acres,  out  of  which \nland  admeasuring  950.14  acres  eventually  stood  acquired.  The \nacquisition of 99.78% of the initially notified land demonstrated the \nintention of the State to acquire the land uniformly, and not pick and \nchoose individual parcels of land.\n\n29.  A  mere  plea  regarding  differential  treatment  is  insufficient;  the \nclaimant  must  instead  demonstrate  that  similarly  placed  classes \nhad been treated dissimilarly, unjustifiably.9 The burden lies on the \nRespondents  to  not  only  prove  disparate  treatment  of  equals,  but \nthat it amounts to hostile discrimination as well.\n\n30.  Second, we disagree with the remedy, even if discrimination was to \nhave been established. The solution to some lands being unjustifiably \nleft  out  is  to  direct  their  acquisition,  not  encourage  the  exclusion \nof more lands. The latter approach only furthers the discrimination \nand  creates  more  aggrieved  landowners.  Moreover,  it  is  settled \nlaw  that Article  14  cannot  be  ordinarily  employed  as  a  ground  to \nclaim  negative  equality,  i.e.,  it  cannot  be  used  for  claiming  illicit \nbenefits simply because someone else has been allowed such an \nundue favour, especially when doing so would jeopardize the entire \nacquisition  by  undermining  its  contiguity.10  Therefore,  instead  of \nmultiplying the illegality, the High Court ought to have exercised its \n\n9 \n\nState of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., 1964 SCC Online SC 121, para 11.\n\n10  Gurcharan Singh & Ors. v. New Delhi Municipal Committee & Ors. (1996) 2 SCC 459.\n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2294 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nwrit jurisdiction to annul such illicit benefit received by the similarly \nplaced person.11 \n\n31.  Third, and most crucially, the illegality, if any, has since been remedied. \nIt could not be disputed before us that the land of Maharaja Harinder \nSingh  ‘Khalaf’  Maharaja  Varinder  Singh  had  been  subsequently \nacquired  through  notifications  dated  16.05.2007  and  27.03.2008. \nThe very basis of discrimination, thus, stood denuded of its factual \nfoundation  as  of  the  date  the  High  Court  passed  the  impugned \njudgement  on  15.07.2008.  The  High  Court  ought  to  have  taken \nnote of this material subsequent event which took place during the \npendency of the proceedings before it, considering its serious impact \non the outcome of the entire acquisition process. \n\nD.3.  Events before this Court\n\n32.  We may now advert to certain unpalatable events which occurred \nduring  the  pendency  of  these  appeals  before  this  Court.  On \n10.05.2023, when the matter was posted for hearing, a joint request \nwas  made  to  list  these  matters  for  final  hearing  on  26.07.2023. \nOn  the  date  fixed,  learned  Senior  Additional  Advocate  General \nof Haryana bona fidely conveyed the State’s consent to drop the \nacquisition  process qua  the  Respondents’  land  only,  if  they  were \nto  agree,  to  provide  a  part  of  the  subject  land  for  the  building \nof  roads  and  other  public  amenities  free  of  cost,  along  with  an \nundertaking  that  the  remaining  land  shall  be  utilized  only  for \ncharitable purposes, i.e., non-commercial activities. Learned Senior \nCounsel for the Respondents was consequently  directed  to  seek \nformal instructions in this regard. Respondents meanwhile filed a \nformal  undertaking  stating  that  they  would  use  the  land  only  for \nnon-profit and charitable purposes. \n\n33.  On 13.09.2023, we directed the State Government / Appellant to file \n\nan affidavit responding to the following queries:\n\n(a)  Why the State Government is agreeable to release the land of \n\nthe Respondents from acquisition? \n\n11  Vivek Coop. House Building Society Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 15802; Chandigarh \n\nAdministration v. Jagjit Singh (1991) 1 SCC 745\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2295\n\n(b)  Whether  such  release  of  land  will  affect  the  acquisition  of \n\nadjoining lands or not?\n\n(c)  Whether the subject-land falls within or near the Sukhna Lake \n\ncatchment area? \n\n(d)  Whether the land in dispute falls in any non-construction zone?\n\n(e) \n\nIf not, what type of construction is permissible in and around \nthe area of subject-land? \n\n34. \n\nIn response thereto, the State of Haryana filed an affidavit stating, \ninter alia, as follows: \n\n(a)  The land can be released because the acquisition proceedings \nfor the same were quashed by the High Court and are under \nabeyance in view of the status quo order passed by this Court \nand because the Respondents undertake to utilize the land for \ncharitable purposes;\n\n(b)  The present case has unique circumstances;\n\n(c)  The  site  does  not  fall  within  the  Sukhna  Catchment  Area, \nhowever,  the  exact  area  that  falls  under  Eco  Sensitive  Zone \nwould be known once the notification for such zone is finalized; \nand\n\n(d)  Construction is permissible in the land.\n\n35.  The  Respondents  also,  without  any  delay,  filed  their  affidavits  in \nconsonance and agreement with the State Government’s affidavit. \nSince the parties have reached a ‘settlement’ during the pendency \nof these appeals, we are introspecting as to whether or not to allow \nthe Government to make such exemption for the Respondents’ land.\n\n36.  We  are  not  oblivious  to  ground  realities.  This  Court  is  aware  that \nthe subject land is prime real estate. The proposed acquisition and \ndevelopment is located between the Shivalik Range and the Union \nTerritory  of  Chandigarh.  One  side  touches  the  Sukhna  lake,  while \nthe  other  side  abuts  a  notified  forest.  The  land  is  contiguous  with \nwell-developed residential areas like the Mansa Devi Complex. Its \nidyllic  natural  surroundings  and  strategic  proximity  to  urban  areas \nand limited supply of similarly placed alternative areas, makes the \nland priceless. \n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2296 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n37.  Furthermore, we are also aware of the fact that the acquisition, in \nits entirety, was under challenge before the High Court, with a batch \nof  writ  petitions  pending  at  the  stage  of  final  hearing,  at  the  time \nwhen  the  State  Government  agreed  to  release  the  subject  land. \nThe High Court has meanwhile dismissed those petitions, upholding \nthe acquisition, and presently, Special Leave Petitions (hereinafter \n‘SLPs’) are pending before this Court. \n\n38.  Be that as it may, given the land’s premium nature, and its criticality \nto  the  subject  acquisition,  it  is  rather  intriguing  why  the  State \nGovernment has opted to enter into a compromise, knowing full well \nthat doing so would weaken its case in defending the major chunk of \nthe acquisition. We, therefore, in order to satisfy ourselves that the \nState Government has considered thoroughly all the pros and cons \nand acted in a bona fide manner to serve the public interest, before \nmaking the offer of release, deemed it imperative to delve deeper.\n\n39.  A perusal of the original record casts a cloud of doubt on the legal \nnecessity of the entire exercise and has disappointed us regarding \nthe  manner  in  which  the  State  Government’s  decision  to  release \nthe  land  has  been  taken.  The  record  reveals  that  this  issue  was \nfirst discussed in the letter dated 08.09.2023, in which the Appellant \n(HUDA) noted on record that the land in question cannot be spared. \nNevertheless, the Appellant deferred the final decision to the State \ngovernment.  This  note  was  authored  by  an  official  in  the  rank  of \nan Assistant. Following this, the file moved with remarkable celerity \nand  received  approval  from  various  departments  and  officials, \nincluding  as  high  as  the  office  of  the Additional  Chief  Secretary, \nUrban  Development  on  the  very  same  date.  Unfortunately,  none \nof  the  officers  thought  it  appropriate  to  write  even  a  single  word \nwhile  agreeing  with  the  proposal  to  release  the  land.  This  rapid \nprogression raises questions on whether all relevant factors were \nconsidered  before  recommending  such  approval.  The  only  so \ncalled self-speaking note is of the Director General, Urban Estate \nof the even date, i.e., 08.09.2023, which noted that the file may be \n“submitted to govt. for approval so that Honorable Apex Court may \nbe  informed  about  view  of  state…”.  The  proposal  was  reportedly \napproved by the State Government within a period of 3 days only, \ni.e., on 11.09.2023. Res ipsa loquitor. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2297\n\n40.  Even the responses to the questions posed by this Court in its order \ndated  13.09.2023,  moved  with  extraordinary  swiftness,  securing \napproval  at  an  astonishingly  expedited  pace  upwards,  without  the \naddition of even a single word at any level. The responses the record \nshows, were drafted by an Assistant.\n\n41.  We  hasten  to  add  here  that  we  have  no  intention  to  suggest  that \nbureaucratic swiftness necessarily undermines the thoroughness of \nthe process. Indeed, our administrative setup can do with more such \nalacrity.  Rather,  the  confluence  of  circumstances—  the  land  being \nprime real estate and yet suddenly and inexplicably being excluded \nfrom  acquisition,  crucial  policy  decisions  with  wide  ranging  public \ninterest  of  enormous  financial  ramifications  being  discussed  and \nfinalized by very junior officials, files receiving approval at exceptional \nspeed, etc.—collectively do not inspire confidence as to the objectivity \nof the entire process.\n\n42.  Despite  meticulously  analyzing  all  relevant  documents  appended \nwith  the  file,  including  the  cryptic  brief  notes  of  the Assistant,  we \nare  unable  to  get  any  qualitative  assistance  from  the  government \nrecord. As noted above, there is little discussion about: (i) the effect \nof release of the Respondents’ land on the remaining acquisition, in \nlight of the challenge pending before the High Court or this Court;  \n(ii)  the  cascading  effect  that  this  compromise  would  have  on  the \nother  landowners  along  with  the  arguments  it  would  invite  on  the \nquestion  of  hostility  of Article  14,  and  if  so;  (iii)  the  basis  of  such \nclassification and whether it would be reasonable; (iv) whether the \nrelease  of  the  land  would  affect  the  contiguity  of  the  land  under \nacquisition and if so, would it impair the planned development of the \narea under acquisition; and (v) whether the State was competent to \nrelease the land in purported exercise of its powers under Section 48 \nof the 1894 Act when the matter was sub judice before this Court.\n\n43.  None of these issues have been discussed, considered, or analyzed. \nThe decision regarding release of the Respondents’ land is, therefore, \nmanifestly  arbitrary.  While  the  State  Government  undoubtedly \npossesses the power to release the land for lawful considerations, \nit  cannot  do  so  whimsically,  irrationally,  without  any  application \nof  mind,  or  selectively.  Condoning  such  action  would  encourage \nfurther  monocratic  release  of  other  lands  in  complete  disregard  of \n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2298 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nthe consequences and impact on public  interest. This would  likely \nresult in the creation of small islands of unacquired lands within large \nswathes of acquired land. These private enclaves would undoubtedly \nupset  the  effectiveness  of  the  rest  of  the  acquisition—making  it \npatently unfair for all other landowners, laying to waste perhaps the \nvery purpose for which their lands were acquired in the first place. \nTurning futile the acquisition would also render mindless dissipation \nof the State Exchequer, already expended earlier in the process—\nreducing returns for all. Although the State Government possesses \nacknowledgeable power in the lifecycle of the acquisition process, it \nalso bears great responsibility of ensuring its judicious exercise. We \ncannot, therefore, treat the compromise or release lightly.\n\n44.  Keeping in view the entirety of the exercise and the sum totality of \nall factors, both apparent and others more insidious, we are unable \nto accept the parties’ compromise, in terms whereof the disposal of \ninstant appeals is suggested.\n\n45.  Having held so, we are not enthused by the Respondents’ conduct \neither. These unusual events create more than just suspicion that the \nRespondents have been able to influence the representations of the \nmany, as well as twist and undermine institutions and process meant \nfor the protection of public interest. In their hurry to curry favour with \nthe Respondents, the senior bureaucrats have unfortunately failed to \nvisualise the serious ramifications their actions could have had on the \nentire acquisition of more than 950 acres land and the law in general.\n\n46.  We are thus, of the considered view that this is a case where the \nbureaucracy  abdicated  its  duty  and  failed  to  objectively  assist  the \nDecision-Making Authority, in arriving at a just and fair conclusion in \nconformity with larger public interest. Had the senior officers flagged \nall the relevant issues on file, we have no reason to doubt that the \nCompetent Authority  would  have  never  approved  the  proposal  to \nrelease the subject land.\n\nD.4  Doctrine of merger\n\n47.  We must also note that the previous Civil Appeals preferred by the \nState  Government,  challenging  the  same  impugned  order  were \ndismissed  on  account  of  non-prosecution.  Hence,  there  arises  an \nimportant question with regard to the maintainability of the present \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2299\n\nappeals. This issue may be conclusively determined by examining \nthe  applicability  of  the  doctrine  of  merger  to  the  peculiar  set  of \ncircumstances of the instant case. \n\n48. \n\nIn this respect, in the landmark case of Kunhayammed v. State of \nKerala,12 it was held that:\n\n“44. To sum up, our conclusions are:\n\n(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order \npassed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before \nsuperior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses \nor affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision \nby  the  subordinate  forum  merges  in  the  decision  by  the \nsuperior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains \noperative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law\n\n[…]\n\n(vi)  Once  leave  to  appeal  has  been  granted  and \nappellate  jurisdiction  of  Supreme  Court  has  been \ninvoked  the  order  passed  in  appeal  would  attract \nthe doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, \nmodification or merely affirmation.”\n\n[Emphasis supplied]\n\n49.  The same principle was reiterated in the case of Khoday Distilleries \nLimited  v.  Sri  Mahadeshwara  Sahakara  Sakkare  Karkhane \nLimited, Kollegal,13 where this Court held that merger would result \nif  the  SLPs  were  dismissed  after  granting  leave,  irrespective  of \nwhether reasons were given or not:\n\n“20. The Court thereafter analysed number of cases where \norders of different nature were passed and dealt with these \njudgments by classifying them in the following categories: \n\n(i) Dismissal at the stage of special leave petition—without \nreasons—no res judicata, no merger. \n\n12 \n\n13 \n\n(2000) 6 SCC 359\n\n(2019) 4 SCC 376\n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2300 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n(ii)  Dismissal  of  the  special  leave  petition  by  speaking \nor reasoned order—no merger, but rule of discipline and \nArticle 141 attracted. \n\n(iii)  Leave  granted—dismissal  without  reasons—\nmerger results.”\n\n[Emphasis supplied]\n\n50. \n\nIn  the  instant  case,  leave  to  appeal  was  granted  vide  the  order \ndated  27.08.2010,  and  the  Civil Appeals  preferred  by  the  State  of \nHaryana  were  then  dismissed  on  16.11.2016. Therefore,  since  the \nprevious  SLPs  arising  out  of  the  same  impugned  judgement  were \ndismissed after granting leave, arguably, the doctrine of merger would \nbe attracted. \n\n51.  However,  we  may  hasten  to  add  that  in  Kunhayammed  (supra), \nthis  Court  held  that  the  doctrine  of  merger  is  neither  a  doctrine  of \nconstitutional law nor of statutory recognition. Since it is a common \nlaw  principle  directed  towards  judicial  propriety,  the  same  should \nnot be applied in a straitjacket manner, and the nature of facts and \ncircumstances of that particular case should be considered. \n\n52.  Still further, a three-judge bench of this Court—to which one of us \n(Surya  Kant,  J.)  was  a  member—in  GNCTD  v.  BSK  Realtors,14 \nanalyzed the aforementioned exception to the doctrine of merger and \nheld that the exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, \nwhich enables the Court to do complete justice, would fall under the \nfour corners of such exception.\n\n53.  Applying the afore-cited principle to the facts and circumstances of \nthe instant case, we have found that the impugned judgement of the \nHigh Court is patently unjust and could adversely affect the subject \nacquisition, leading to significant harm to the public at large. In light \nof this, we find it a fit case to invoke our powers under Article 142 \nof  the  Constitution  and  carve  out  an  exception  to  the  doctrine  of \nmerger so as to do complete justice to the parties.\n\n14  GNCTD v. BSK Realtors, 2024 INSC 455.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n2301\n\nE.  CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS\n\n54.  We, thus, deem it appropriate to allow these appeals and dispose \n\nof the matter in the following terms and directions:\n\ni. \n\nii. \n\niii. \n\niv. \n\nv. \n\nThe  Appeals  are  allowed;  the  impugned  judgment  dated \n15.07.2008 of the High Court, which is under challenge in this \nbatch of appeals, is hereby set aside;\n\nIf  there  is  any  other  judgement  or  order  of  the  High  Court \nwhich  is  passed  following  the  main  judgement  dated \n15.07.2008,  thereby  quashing  or  adversely  impacting  the \nsubject  acquisition,  such  judgements  or  orders  are  also \ndeemed to be set aside;\n\nIn case no ‘award’ for the land owned by the Respondents was \npassed  earlier,  the  same  shall  be  passed  expeditiously,  and \nin any case within a period of 3 (three) months in accordance \nwith the provisions of the 1894 Act;\n\nIf  an  award  in  respect  of  the  Respondent’s  land  has  already \nbeen  passed  under  the  1894 Act,  in  that  event,  there  will  be \nno necessity to pass a fresh award. However, liberty is granted \nto the Respondents to avail their remedy under Section 18 of \nthe  1894 Act,  if  so  advised.  Such  reference,  if  moved  by  the \nRespondents within a period of 2 (two) months from the date \nof uploading of this order on the website, the Reference Court \nwill not dismiss it on the ground of limitation and shall proceed \nto decide the same on merits and in accordance with law;\n\nIn  case  the  land  of  the  Respondents  is  found  to  have  same \npotentiality  and  utility  as  that  of  Maharaja  Harinder  Singh \n‘Khalaf’ Maharaja Varinder Singh (i.e., land which was acquired \nvide  the  notifications  dated  16.05.2007  and  27.03.2008),  the \nRespondents will also be entitled to seek compensation at the \nsame  rate  as  has  been  granted  for  the  said  similarly  located \nland; and\n\nvi.  The  State  of  Haryana  and  the  HSVP  are  directed  to  take \npossession  of  the  subject-land  in  accordance  with  law  and \ncommence development works without any delay. The land shall \nbe utilized for the public purposes for which it has been acquired. \n\nHaryana Urban Development Authority v. Abhishek Gupta etc.\f2302 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n55.  We  are  sanguine  that  the  State  Government  is  conscious  of  the \nprinciples evolved by this Court in a catena of decisions in regard \nto the violation of public trust doctrine15 and will thus ensure that the \nacquired land is utilised in public interest in accordance with provisions \nof  the  Haryana  Development  and  Regulation  of  Urban Areas Act, \n1975.  Consequently,  the  HSVP  will  take  on  the  responsibility  to \ndevelop the entire acquired land strictly in accordance with the public \npurpose of its acquisition. \n\n56. \n\nIn this regard, compliance report shall be filed before this Court after \nsix months i.e. before 30.04.2025.\n\n57.  Ordered accordingly.\n\nResult of the case: Appeals allowed.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by:  Aishani Narain, Hony. Associate Editor \n\n(Verified by: Shibani Ghosh, Adv.)\n\n15  Uddar  Gagan  Properties  v.  Sant  Singh  and  others  (2016)  11  SCC  378;  Greater  Noida  Industrial \n\nDevelopment Authority v. Devender Kumar and others (2011) 12 SCC 375\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f"}