{"file_name": "2024_10_315_383_EN.pdf", "text": "[2024] 10 S.C.R. 315 : 2024 INSC 718\n\nFuleshwar Gope \nv. \nUnion of India & Ors.\n\n(Criminal Appeal No. 3923 of 2024)\n\n23 September 2024\n\n[C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]\n\nIssue for Consideration\n\nIssue arose as to whether the validity of the Sanction Order can be \nchallenged at any stage; whether violation of s.45(2) of the UAPA r/w \nrr.3 and 4 of the 2008 Rules, if any, vitiates the proceedings, whether \nviolation of statutory timelines and the requirement of independent \nreview which includes application of mind, are necessary aspects \nof  procedure;  whether  the  appellant’s  involvement  were  actually \nindependent  of  the  ones  in  which A-6  and  other  members  were \narrayed as accused; and whether the statutory exemption u/s.22 \nA of the UAPA applies to the appellant who claims to be unaware \nof the affairs of the company.\n\nHeadnotes†\n\nUnlawful  Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1967  –  s.45(2)  – \nCognizance  of  offences  –  Unlawful  Activities  (Prevention) \n(Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 – \nrr.3 and 4 – Time limit for making a recommendation by the \nAuthority – Time limit for sanction of prosecution – Appellant’s \ncase  that  he  was  made  an  accused  and  a  member  of  the \nlarger conspiracy – Allegations against him that on directions \nof A  6,  a  terrorist  and  chief  of  People’s  Liberation  Front  of \nIndia-PLFI,  the  appellant  formed  a  company,  which  used \nto  directly/indirectly  collect  funds  for  the  use  of  activities \nof  PLFI;  and  that  the  appellant  criminally  conspired  and \nformed  an  unlawful  association  with  members  of  PLFI-A  7 \nand 14 – FIR against six persons alleging that Rs.25.83 lakhs \nof demonetized currency brought to the concerned Bank by \nA-6 – Appellant sought to quash suo motu letter in respect \nof  the  investigation;  sanction  letter  granting  sanction  qua \nprosecution  of  the  appellant  as  accused;  and  cognizance \norder under IPC and UAPA – Division Bench refused to quash \nthe same – Challenge to:\n\n* Author\n\n\f316 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nHeld:  No  infirmity  in  the  order  granting  sanction  against  the \nappellant  –  It  is  not  incumbent  upon  the  authority  to  record \ndetailed reasons to support its conclusion and, as such, the orders \nchallenged,  cannot  be  faulted  with  on  that  ground  –  Since  trial \nis  underway  and  numerous  witnesses  already  stand  examined, \nthe  challenge  to  the  validity  of  the  sanction  qua  the  appellant \nleft  it  to  be  raised  before  the  trial  judge  –  Whether  or  not  both \nA-6 and the appellant are part of the same, continuing, ongoing  \ntransactions, is to be decided on the basis of evidence adduced \nat  trial,  and  not  at  this  stage,  by  this  Court,  thus,  left  to  the \nappellants to raise this issue before the trial judge – Furthermore, \nas regards, application of exemption u/s.22A, this is a matter for the  \ntrial  court  to  consider  and  not  for  this  Court  to  decide  at  this \nstage,  keeping  in  view  that  the  trial  is  underway  and  proceeded \nsubstantially. [Paras 18, 41, 46, 50]\n\nUnlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.45(2) – Cognizance \nof  offences  –  Validity  of  Sanction  Order  –  Challenged  to,  at \nwhat stage:\n\nHeld:  Validity  of  sanction  should  be  challenged  at  the  earliest \ninstance available, before the Trial Court – If such a challenge is \nraised at an appellate stage it would be for the person raising the \nchallenge to justify the reasons for bringing the same at a belated \nstage – Such reasons would have to be considered independently \nso as to ensure that there is no misuse of the right of challenge \nwith the aim to stall or delay proceedings – On facts, keeping in \nview the submission made that the trial is underway and numerous \nwitnesses (113 out of 125) already stand examined, no finding given \non the challenge to the validity of the sanction qua the appellant \nand leave it to be raised before the trial judge, who shall, if such \na question is raised decide, it promptly. [Paras 18, 51.1]\n\nUnlawful  Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1967  –  s.45(2)  – \nCognizance  of  offences  –  Unlawful  Activities  (Prevention) \n(Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 – \nrr.3 and 4 – Time limit for making a recommendation by the \nAuthority – Time limit for sanction of prosecution – Timelines \nin accordance with s.45(2) r/w rr.3 & 4 and the requirement of \nindependent review, if necessary aspects of procedure, and \nnon-adherence of which would vitiate proceedings under the \nUAPA:\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n317\n\nHeld: Timelines mentioned in rr.3 and 4 are couched in mandatory \nlanguage and, thus, have to be strictly followed – This is keeping in \nview that UAPA being a penal legislation, strict construction must be \naccorded to it – Timelines imposed by way of statutory Rules are \na way to keep a check on executive power which is a necessary \nposition  to  protect  the  rights  of  accused  persons  –  Independent \nreview  by  both  the  authority  recommending  sanction  and  the \nauthority granting sanction, are necessary aspects of compliance \nwith  s.45  of  the  UAPA  – As  regards  appellant’s  case  that  the \ntimelines were not followed, the first sanction was granted more than \na year after the recommendation was moved; and that there was \nno independent review on the part of both recommending authority \nand central government, as the sanction was merely granted within \na day each, the gap between the first action against A-6 and the \narrest  of  the  appellant  is  a  result  of  continuing  investigation,  as \nthe appellant was made an accused in the second supplementary \nchargesheet, arising out of the same FIR; and since the investigation \ncontinued,  the  gap  cannot  be  termed  fatal  so  as  to  render  the \narrest  of  the  appellant  as  unlawful  or  illegal  –  Grant  of  sanction \nis within the stipulated time – Furthermore, it cannot be said that \nthere was non application of mind and lack of independent review. \n[Paras 20, 28.4, 41, 51.2]\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.218-222 – Misjoinder \nof charges – Violation of CrPC – Plea of the appellant that the \ntransactions in connection with which he has been brought \nto the book were actually independent of the ones in which \nA-6  and  other  members  were  arrayed  as  accused;  and  that \nthat there has been gross misuse of powers by the NIA and \na violation ss.218-224 CrPC:\n\nHeld:  ss.218-222  not  violated  – Appellant  falls  under  the  latter \ncategory-multiple persons in the same trial (appellant is A-17 out \nof  a  total  of  20  accused  persons)  –  Joint  or  separate  trial  is  a \ndecision to be taken by the trial judge at the beginning of the trial \nconsidering the possibility of prejudice; and causing judicial delay, \nif any – Language of s.223 is directory in nature, signified by the \nuse of word ‘may’ – Joint trial, if held, after having considered the \ntwo  factors  given,  cannot  be  said  to  be  ipso  facto  prejudicial  to \nthe parties – It is alleged that A-6 who is the Chief of PLFI, extorts \nmoney from various persons and that the company A-20 of which \nthe  appellant  is  a  director,  is  used  to  legitimise  the  proceeds  of \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f318 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nsuch unlawful actions – However, appellant’s case that there is no \nconnection between the charges levied on A-6 and the transactions \nbecause  of  which  he  has  been  made  an  accused,  whereas  the \nprosecution submits that both A-6 and A-17 are part of the same, \ncontinuing, ongoing transactions – Whether or not actually the case \nis a question to be decided on the basis of evidence adduced at \ntrial,  and  not  at  this  stage,  by  this  Court  –  Thus,  it  is  left  to  the \nappellants  to  raise  this  issue  before  the  trial  judge,  who  shall,  if \nsuch  a  question  is  raised,  decide  it  promptly  at  the  appropriate \nstage. [Paras 44.3, 45, 46, 52.1]\n\nUnlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.22A – Offences \nby companies – Statutory exemption u/s.22 A – Applicability \nto  the  appellant  who  claims  to  be  unaware  of  the  affairs  of \nthe company:\n\nHeld: Whether or not the exemption u/s.22A applies is a matter to \nbe established by the way of evidence for the person claiming such \nexemption  has  to  demonstrate  that  either  he  was  not  in  charge \nof the affairs of the company which has allegedly committed the \noffence,  or  that  he  had  made  reasonable  efforts  to  prevent  the \ncommission of the offence – This is a matter for the trial court to \nconsider  and  not  for  this  Court  to  decide  at  this  stage,  keeping \nin  view  that  the  trial  is  underway  and  proceeded  substantially. \n[Paras 50, 52.2]\n\nUnlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 – s.22A – Offences \nby companies – Applicability of s.22A:\n\nHeld:  For  application  of  s.22A,  offence  has  to  committed  by  a \ncompany; all persons who at the time of the offence were in control \nof,  or  responsible  for,  the  company’s  affairs  shall  be  deemed \nguilty; such person would be saved from guilt as under if they can \ndemonstrate that such act was not in their knowledge; they had \ntaken reasonable care to prevent such offence from taking place – \ns.22A  further  provides  that  if  it  can  be  proved  that  the  offence \ncommitted  by  the  company  was  with  consent;  in  connivance  of; \nand  attributable  to  neglect  on  the  part  of  any  promoter,  director, \nmanager, secretary or any other officer of the company, then they \nshall be held guilty. [Para 48]\n\nUnlawful  Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1967  –  s.45(2)  – \nCognizance  of  offences  –  Unlawful  Activities  (Prevention) \n(Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 – \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n319\n\nrr.3 and 4 – Time limit for making a recommendation by the \nAuthority – Time limit for sanction of prosecution – Timelines, \nwhether directory or mandatory:\n\nHeld: Timelines, generally speaking, as part of statutory framework \nare  extremely  essential  to  an  effective,  efficient  and  focused \nmachinery  of  criminal  investigation,  prosecution  and  trial  – All \nstakeholders  to  the  smooth  functioning  of  these  procedures  of \nlaw  must  do  their  part  in  realising  such  timelines  –  They  are \nthe essential aspects of right to speedy trial, which is enshrined  \nu/Art.21 of the Constitution of India. [Para 22]\n\n‘Application of mind’ – Concept of:\n\nHeld: Application  of  mind  must  form  part  of  any  judicial,  quasi-\njudicial  or  administrative  order  –  To  demonstrate  the  same, \nconsideration  of  material  placed  before  such  authority  must  be \nreflected  –  It  being  a  cerebral  exercise,  it  is  not  within  reason \nto  set  out  any  formula  to  explain  what  application  of  mind  may \nactually  mean  or  look  like  –  It  is  to  be  ascertained  in  the  facts \nand circumstances of each case – In the context of penal laws, \nauthorities  tasked  with  evaluating  material  prior  to  granting  of \nsanction  for  prosecution,  or  the  act  of  granting  sanction  itself \nmust  apply  their  mind  to  each  and  every  facet  of  the  material \nplaced before it to arrive at the conclusion particularly so because \nthe  effect  of  the  task  at  hand  is  immense  –  Grant/non-grant  of   \nsanction is what sets in motion the machinery of strict laws such \nas UAPA or TADA. [Paras 25, 26]\n\nUnlawful  Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1967  –  s.45(2)  – \nCognizance  of  offences  –  Procedure  for  sanction  provided \nunder the UAPA:\n\nHeld: Court is enjoined from taking cognizance without previous \nsanction either by the Central Government or the State Government, \nas  applicable,  and  such  sanction  shall  only  be  given  after  the \nreport of the authority appointed by the Central Government or the \nState Government, as the case may be, has been considered – \nThis authority is to make an independent review of the evidence \ngathered and make a recommendation to the government within a \ntime bound manner – If any Court takes cognizance without prior \nsanction of the Government, Centre or State, the same shall be \nin contravention of the Act and thus, bad in law – This sanction is \nnot a function of the Government alone and it can only be granted \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f320 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nafter an independent body, albeit appointed by the Government, \nmakes an independent review of the evidence. [Paras 28, 28.1]\n\nUnlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation & Sanction \nof  Prosecution)  Rules,  2008  –  rr.3  and  4  –  Time  limit  for \nmaking  a  recommendation  by  the Authority  –  Time  limit  for   \nsanction of prosecution – Construction of:\n\nHeld: Penal statutes are statutes to be interpreted strictly – Rules \nflowing from statutory power, have the effect of a statute – s.52 of \nthe UAPA grants power to the Central Government to make Rules \nfor the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act – s.52(2)(ee) \nenables the Government to prescribe the time for recommendation \nand grant of sanction u/s.45 – Rules are unequivocal in both, using \nthe  word  ‘shall’  as  also  providing  a  specfic  time  period  for  both \nactivities, i.e., making recommendation and granting sanction – In \nmatters of strict construction, when a timeline is provided, along \nwith the use of the word ‘shall’ and particularly when the same is \nin the context of a law such as the UAPA, it cannot be considered \na mere technicality or formality – It demonstrates clear intention on \nthe part of the Legislature – Compulsion has been imposed, and  \nfor compliance with that compulsion, a timeline has been provided – \nWhile  the  legislation  is  aimed  at  curbing  unlawful  activities  and \npractices detrimental to national security and accordingly, provides \nthe authorities of the Government ample power to undertake and \ncomplete all procedures and processes permissible under law to \nthat end, at the same time the interest of accused persons must \nalso  be  safeguarded  and  protected  –  Time  granted  is  only  for   \nconsideration of the material collected by way of an independent \nreview  and  then  making  a  recommendation  whereafter  the \nsanctioning authority may then consider the materials as well as \nrecommendation to finally, grant or deny the sanction – It is not for \nthe purpose of the investigation itself, which understandably can be \na time-consuming process, given the multiple variables involved – \nTimelines in such cases, serve as essential aspects of checks and \nbalances and of course, are unquestionably important – Legislative \nintent is clear – Rules made by virtue of statutory powers prescribe \nboth a mandate and a time limit – Same has to be followed – Strict \nadherence  to  the  timeline  mentioned  in  rr.  3  and  4  of  the  2008, \nRules to apply prospectively. [Paras 31, 32, 33]\n\nUnlawful  Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1967  –  s.45(2)  –   \nCognizance  of  offences  –  Independent  review  –  Meaning  –   \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n321\n\nPlea  that  since  both  the  recommending  and  the  granting \nauthorities  took  merely  a  day  each  in  performing  their \nrespective functions, the requirement of an independent review \nwhich is to be undertaken by both authorities has been left \nunfulfilled thereby vitiating the sanction in question: \n\nHeld: Independent review would mean a contemplation or study \nof  the  material  gathered  by  the  investigating  officer  to  conclude \nas to whether or not a sanction to proceed under the provisions \nof  the  UAPA  ought  to  be  granted  –  Similarly,  at  the  next  stage, \nthe  sanctioning  authority  is  to  mull  over  and  critically  notice \nboth  the  materials  gathered  as  also  the  conclusion  drawn  by \nthe  recommending  authority,  in  its  act  of  granting  sanction  – \nIndependence  of  this  authority  is  sine  qua  non,  without  which  it \nwould have lost its entire purpose – Plea of the appellant that short \namount  of  time  taken  in  recommending  and  granting  sanction, \nagainst him which is a sign of non-application of mind and lack of \nindependent review, cannot be accepted – There is no question, \nas  there  rightly  cannot  be,  on  the  competence  of  either  of  the \nauthorities – Thus, solely on the ground that the time taken was \ncomparatively short or even that other orders were similarly worded \ncannot  call  the  credibility  of  the  sanction  into  question  –  Thus, \nindependent review as well as application of mind are questions to \nbe determined by way of evidence and as such should be raised \nat the stage of trial, so as to ensure that there is no undue delay \nin the proceedings reaching their logical and lawful conclusion on \nthese grounds – If it is raised belatedly, however, the Court seized of \nthe matter, must consider the reasons for the delay prior to delving \ninto the merits of such objections – Belated challenges on these \ngrounds cannot be allowed to act as roadblocks in trial or cannot \nbe  used  as  weapons  in  shirking  away  from  convictions  arising \nout of otherwise validly conducted prosecutions and trials – Order \npassed by an administrative authority is not to be tested by way \nof judicial review on the same anvil as a judicial or quasi-judicial \norder – While it is imperative for the latter to record  reasons  for \narriving  at  a  particular  decision,  for  the  former  it  is  sufficient  to \nshow  that  the  authority  passing  such  order  applied  its  mind  to \nthe relevant facts and materials – Thus, no infirmity in the order \ngranting sanction against the appellant – It is not incumbent upon \nsuch authority to record detailed reasons to support its conclusion \nand,  as  such,  the  orders  challenged,  cannot  be  faulted  with  on \nthat ground. [Paras 37, 40, 41]\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f322 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nWords and phrases – Word independent – Meaning of:\n\nHeld: Act, or evaluation is made in a way which is lone standing \nor  which  does  not  rely  on  any  other  factor,  such  as  previous \nconsideration  or  evaluation  by  another  authority,  to  arrive  at  its \nconclusion – Independence, which is the state of being independent \nwould  also  be  instructive  in  the  understanding  –  Review,  as  a \nconcept is to be understood for it is the coming together of these \ntwo  aspects  which  would  form  the  understanding  of  the  term \n‘independent review’ – Import of the term independent review as \ncan  be  understood,  is  a  re-examination,  scrutiny  or  critique  of \nsomething  which  is  not  dependent  or  subject  to  control  by  any \nother factor or authority. [Paras 35-37]\n\nCase Law Cited\n\nA.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak [1984] 2 SCR 914 : (1984) \n2 SCC 500 – followed.\n\nState of Karnataka v. S. Subbegowda [2023] 11 SCR 19 : 2023 \nSCC OnLine SC 911; Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab [2021] 13 \nSCR 566 : (2022) 2 SCC 89; State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh \n[2009] 8 SCR 85 : (2009) 6 SCC 372; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot \nSandhu [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 79 : (2005) 11 SCC 600; Union of \nIndia v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1991] 3 SCR 873 : 1992 Supp \n(1) SCC 323; Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price \nWaterhouse [1997] Supp. 2 SCR 267 : (1997) 6 SCC 312; Shiv \nShakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers [2003] 3 SCR \n762 : (2003) 6 SCC 659 – relied on. \n\nPradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. [2019] 8 SCR 824 : \n(2019)  17  SCC  326;  Bhushan  Kumar  & Anr.  v.  State  (NCT  of \nDelhi) [2012] 2 SCR 696 : (2012) 5 SCC 424; State of Gujarat \nv. Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta [2019] 1 SCR 1104 : (2019) 20 \nSCC 539; Ashraf Khan v. State of Gujarat (2012) 11 SCC 606; \nState  of  Gujarat  v.  Anwar  Osman  Sumbhaniya  [2019]  2  SCR \n749  :  (2019)  18  SCC  524;  Anirudhsinhji  Karansinhji  Jadeja  v. \nState of Gujarat [1995] Supp. 2 SCR 637 : (1995) 5 SCC 302; \nRambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat  [1997] Supp. 3 \nSCR 356 : (1997) 7 SCC 744; Seeni Nainar Mohammed v. State \n[2017]  3  SCR  312  :  (2017)  13  SCC  685;  Jamiruddin Ansari  v. \nCBI [2009] 7 SCR 759 : (2009) 6 SCC 316; Peoples’ Union for \nCivil  Liberties  v.  Union  of  India  [2004]  1  SCR  232  :  (2004)  9 \nSCC 580; Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI [1994] Supp. 3 SCR \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n323\n\n263 : (1994) 5 SCC 410; Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam [2023] \n8 SCR 496 : (2023) 8 SCC 745; Central Bureau of Investigation \nv. Ashok  Kumar Aggarwal  (2014)  14  SCC  295;  Parkash  Singh \nBadal  v.  State  of  Punjab  [2006]  Supp.  10  SCR  197  :  (2007) \n1  SCC  1;  Dinesh  Kumar  v. Airport Authority  of  India  [2011]  13 \nSCR  260  :  (2012)  1  SCC  532  Central  Bureau  of  Investigation \n& Ors. v. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal (2020) 17 SCC 664; \nP.K.  Pradhan  v.  State  of  Sikkim  [2001]  3  SCR  1119  :  (2001)  6 \nSCC 704; Rangku Dutta v. State of Assam [2011] 8 SCR 639 : \n(2011) 6 SCC 358; Hussein Ghadially v. State of Gujarat [2014] \n9 SCR 364 : (2014) 8 SCC 425; Mahesh Kariman Tirki v. State \nof Maharashtra, SLP (Crl.) Nos.11072-11073/2022; Binod Ganjhu \nv.  Union  of  India,  W.P(Crl)  308  of  2022;  State  of  Rajasthan  v. \nMohinuddin Jamal Alvi (2016) 12 SCC 608; Roopesh v. State of \nKerala, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 1372; Vijay Rajmohan v. Central \nBureau of Investigation (Anti-Corruption Branch) [2022] 19 SCR \n563 : (2023) 1 SCC 329; Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate \nof Enforcement [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 49 : (2005) 4 SCC 530; State \nof Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 125 : (2005) \n1 SCC 368; Manjit Singh v. CBI [2011] 1 SCR 997 : (2011) 11 \nSCC 578; State of T.N. v. Sivarasan [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 243 : \n(1997)  1  SCC  682;  Priya  Indoria  v.  State  of  Karnataka  [2023] \n15  SCR  525  :  (2024)  4  SCC  749;  State  of  U.P.  v.  Manbodhan \nLal  Srivastava  [1958]  1  SCR  533  :  1957  SCC  OnLine  SC  4; \nState  of  U.P.  v.  Babu  Ram  Upadhya [1961]  2  SCR  679  :  1960 \nSCC OnLine SC 5; Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur \n[2008] 2 SCR 424 : (2008) 12 SCC 372; Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima \nMamtaj [2014] 4 SCR 171 : (2014) 14 SCC 638; Union of India v. \nA.K. Pandey (2009) 10 SCC 552; C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of \nKarnataka [2005] 2 SCR 1163 : (2005) 4 SCC 81; State of M.P. \nv.  Harishankar  Bhagwan  Prasad  Tripathi  [2010]  9  SCR  1148  : \n(2010)  8  SCC  655;  State  of  Maharashtra  v.  Mahesh  G.  Jain \n[2013] 3 SCR 850 : (2013) 8 SCC 119; Judgebir Singh v. National \nInvestigation Agency  [2023]  6  SCR  1  :  2023  SCC  OnLine  SC \n543; State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti [2009] 11 SCR 790 : \n(2009) 17 SCC 92; State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) \nSCC 222; Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary \n[1995] Supp. 2 SCR 818 : (1995)  6 SCC  225; Mohd. Iqbal  M. \nShaikh  v.  State  of  Maharashtra  [1998]  2  SCR  734  :  (1998)  4 \nSCC 494; Balbir v. State of Haryana [1999] Supp. 4 SCR 120 : \n(2000) 1 SCC 285; R. Dineshkumar v. State [2015] 5 SCR 605 : \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f324 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n(2015) 7 SCC 497; S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla \n[2007] 2 SCR 862 : (2005) 8 SCC 89; Susela Padmavathy Amma \nv.  Bharti Airtel  Ltd  [2024]  3  SCR  647  :  2024  SCC  OnLine  SC \n311; N. Rangachari v. BSNL [2007] 5 SCR 329 : (2007) 5 SCC \n108;  Central  Bank  of  India  v. Asian  Global  Ltd.  [2010]  7  SCR \n694 : (2010) 11 SCC 203; Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta \n[2014] 10 SCR 1117 : (2015) 1 SCC 103; Rajesh Viren Shah v. \nRedington India Ltd. (2024) 4 SCC 305 – referred to.\n\nMontreal  Street  Railway  Company  v.  Normandin,  LR  (1917) AC \n170 – referred to.\n\nBooks and Periodicals Cited\n\nMaxwell  in  Interpretation  of  Statutes  (11th  Edn.);  Cambridge \ndictionary;  Merriam  Webster  dictionary;  Black’s  Law  Dictionary; \nBurton’s Legal Thesaurus Third Edition Page 473. \n\nList of Acts\n\nUnlawful  Activities  (Prevention)  Act,  1967;  Unlawful  Activities \n(Prevention) (Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, \n2008;  Criminal  Law  Amendment  Act,  1908;  Code  of  Criminal \nProcedure, 1973; National Investigation Agency Act, 2008.\n\nList of Keywords\n\nValidity  of  Sanction  Order;  Violation  of  statutory  timelines; \nRequirement  of  independent  review;  Application  of  mind; \nStatutory  exemption  u/s.22  A  of  the  UAPA;  Time  limit  for \nmaking  recommendation  by Authority; Time  limit  for  sanction  of \nprosecution;  Terrorist  and  chief  of  People’s  Liberation  Front  of \nIndia-PLFI; Activities of PLFI; Unlawful association; Demonetized \ncurrency;  Quash  suo  motu  letter;  Investigation;  Sanction  letter; \nPenal  legislation;  Strict  construction;  Grant  of  sanction;  Non-\napplication of mind; Violation of CrPC; Timelines, whether directory \nor  mandatory;  Procedure  for  sanction  under  the  UAPA;  Strict \nadherence to timeline.\n\nCase Arising From\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 3923 \nof 2024\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21.03.2023 of the High Court \nof Jharkhand at Ranchi in WPCR No. 443 of 2022\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n325\n\nAppearances for Parties\n\nBalaji Srinivasan, Rohan Dewan, Vishwaditya Sharma, Ms. Harsha \nTripathi, Advs. for the Appellant.\n\nVikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, Sr. Adv., \nMs. Rukhmini Bobde, Raghav Sharma, Madhav Singhal, Ms. Zeenat \nMalick, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.\n\nJudgment / Order of the Supreme Court\n\nJudgment\n\nSanjay Karol, J.\n\nLeave granted.\n\n2. \n\nImpugned in this appeal by special leave is a judgment of the High \nCourt of Jharkhand at Ranchi dated 21st March, 2023 in W.P.(Crl.) \nNo.443  of  2022,  whereby  the  learned  Division  Bench  refused  to \nquash – \n\n(a)  Suo motu letter No.F.No.11011/51/2017/IS-IV dated 16th January, \n2018  in  respect  of  the  investigation  of  Bero  P.S.  Case  No. \n67/2016 dated 10th November, 2016;\n\n(b)  Sanction  letter  No.11011/51/2017/NIA  dated  22nd  July,  2020 \ngranting sanction qua prosecution of the present appellant as \naccused No.17 in R.C.-02/2018/NIA/DLI; and\n\n(c)  Cognizance order dated 25th July, 2020 u/s 120B of the Indian \nPenal Code r/w Section 17, 18, 21 & 22 of U.A. (P) Act, 1967, \nu/S  17(i)  &  (ii)  of  CLA Act,  1908  and  charges  framed  on  16th \nMarch, 2021 pending trial before the Court of learned Special \nJudge, NIA, Ranchi;\n\nIt is to be noted that initially quashing was also sought in respect \nof sanction vide letter No.06/Avi-01/21/2017-2637 dated 12th May, \n2017  granted  by  the  Principal  Secretary,  Department  of  Home, \nPrisons  &  Disaster  Management,  Ranchi.  However,  paragraph  4 \nof the impugned judgment records that this specific prayer was not \npressed before it. \n\nBACKGROUND FACTS \n\n3.  The  facts  necessary  for  the  disposal  of  the  present  appeal,  shorn \n\nof unnecessary detail are :-\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f326 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n3.1 \n\nIt is alleged that the appellant, Fuleshwar Gope1 is an associate \nof the People’s Liberation Front of India2 and is acquainted with \nthe facts that Dinesh Gope @ Kuldeep Yadav @ Banku (A-6) \nis a terrorist and the chief of PLFI who collects money through \nextortion.  He  is  further  said  to  have  criminally  conspired  and \nformed an unlawful association with members of PLFI, namely, \nDinesh Gope, Sumant Kumar @ Pawan Kumar (A-7) and Hira \nDevi @ Anita Devi (A-14).\n\n3.2  On the direction of A-6, it is alleged that the appellant formed \na  company  M/s.  Shiv  Shakti  Samridhi  Infra  Pvt.  Ltd.  (A-20) \nalong with A-14 which was more in the nature of a partnership. \nThis  company’s  bank  account  was  used  to  directly/indirectly \ncollect funds from legitimate or illegitimate sources for the use \nof activities of PLFI on the directions of A-6. \n\n3.3  On 10th November, 2016, FIR No.67 of 2016 at Bero, Jharkhand \nwas registered against six persons under Section 212, 213/34, \n414 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 13, 17, 40 \nof the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 19673 and Section \n17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 on the allegation \nthat  Rs.25.83  lakhs  of  demonetized  currency  was  brought  to \nthe concerned branch of the State Bank of India by A-6. \n\n3.4  On 9th January, 2017, chargesheet No.01/2017 was filed and \nthe  learned  Judicial  Magistrate  1st  Class  took  cognizance \nthereof.  On  18th  March,  2017,  Deputy  Commissioner,  Ranchi \nsought  sanction  to  prosecute  which  was  granted  by  the \nPrincipal Secretary, Department of Home, Prisons & Disaster \nManagement.  However,  subsequently,  the  Ministry  of  Home \nAffairs,4 Government of India issued a transfer order in respect \nthereto  on  16th  January,  2018  and  as  such  the  FIR  was  re-\nregistered as a case under the National Investigation Agency.5 \nMHA further initiated suo-motu sanction on 16th October, 2019 \nagainst twelve accused persons, A-1 to A-12. \n\n1 \n\n2 \n\n3 \n\n4 \n\n5 \n\nHereinafter referred to as A-17\n\nAbbreviated as ‘PLFI’\n\nAbbreviated as ‘UAPA’\n\nAbbreviated as ‘MHA’\n\nAbbreviated as “NIA”\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n327\n\n3.5  On 21st October, 2019, a supplementary chargesheet was filed \nby NIA wherein the Appellant was named as a witness for the \nProsecution, as PW-65. On 5th November, 2019, Special Judge \nNIA took cognizance of the same. \n\n3.6  The Appellant  was  subsequently  arrested  on  13th  July,  2020. \nOn 22nd July, 2020, suo-motu sanction was issued against an \nadditional seven persons (A-13 to A-20), the Appellant is A-17. A \nsecond Supplementary Chargesheet was filed the next day i.e. \n23rd July, 2020 under Sections 17, 18, 21, and 22C of the UAPA. \n\n3.7  On  14th  November,  2022,  the Appellant  filed  a  Writ  Petition \nbefore  the  High  Court  seeking  for  quashing  of  the  Sanction \nOrder  dated  22nd  July,  2020,  taking  of  the  cognizance  of  the \nsecond  Supplementary  Chargesheet  vide  an  order  25th  July, \n2020 and framing of charges by order dated 16th March, 2021. \n\n3.8 \n\nIt is in this backdrop, that the judgment impugned was passed.\n\nIMPUGNED JUDGMENT\n\n4.  Before  the  High  Court  it  was  contended  primarily  that  Sections \n6(2) & (3) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 20086 were not \ncomplied with and thereby the statutory timelines mentioned therein \nwere completely ignored. Further, it was argued that Sections 45(1) \n& (2) of the UAPA were not adhered to. \n\n5.  The High Court framed the following issues for its consideration:\n\n“8. …\n\n(i)  Whether  the  Central  Government  has  got  suo-moto \npower to handover the investigation to the N.I.A. once the \ninvestigation has been completed by the District Police.\n\n(ii) Whether the Order of Sanction dated 22.07.2020 issued \nby  the  Under  Secretary  to  the  Government  of  India  in \nexercise of power conferred under Section 45(2) of U.A.(P) \nAct, 1967 suffers from any illegality.\n\n(iii)  Whether  the  order  taking  cognizance  against  the \npetitioner under Section 120B I.P.C read with Sections 17, \n\n6 \n\nHereinafter ‘NIA, 2008’\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f328 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n18, 21 & 22C of U.A.(P) Act, 1967 and Section 17(i) & (ii) \nof C.L.A Act, 1908 suffers from any infirmity.”\n\n5.1  The Court in deciding the first issue placed reliance on Pradeep \nRam  v.  State  of  Jharkhand  &  Anr.,7  and  more  particularly \nparagraph 49 thereof, to hold that there is no lack of jurisdiction \non the part of NIA to carry out further investigation and submit \nthe supplementary report(s). \n\n5.2  The  second  issue  concerned  the  legality  and  propriety  of \nsanction  which  was  challenged  on  the  ground  that  Rule  3 \nof  the  Unlawful Activities  (Prevention)  (Recommendation  & \nSanction of Prosecution) Rules, 20088 was not followed. The \nCourt referred to the contents of the sanction order dated 22nd \nJuly,  2020,  impugned  before  it,  and  then  concluded  that  the \ntimeline stipulated in Rule 3 referred to supra, has been strictly \nadhered to.\n\n5.3  The third issue is as to whether the cognizance order is afflicted \nby non-application of mind. The Court considered the judgment \nin Bhushan Kumar & Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi)9 and State \nof Gujarat v.  Afroz Mohammed Hasanfatta10 to examine the \npower  of  the  Magistrate  at  the  stage  of  issuing  process  or \nsummons.  It  was  finally  concluded  that  the  approach  of  the \nlearned Special Judge in dealing with the material placed before \nthem by way of case diary, statements of various prosecution \nwitnesses, other documents and material objects, requires no \ninterference. \n\n6.  Aggrieved by the above findings of the High Court, the appellant is \n\nbefore this Court.\n\nARGUMENTS ADVANCED\n\n7.  We have heard Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned Advocate-on-Record for \nthe appellant and Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor \nGeneral  of  India  and  Ms.  Swarupama  Chaturvedi,  learned  Senior \nCounsel for the Union of India. \n\n7 \n\n8 \n\n9 \n\n[2019] 8 SCR 824 : (2019) 17 SCC 326\n\nHereinafter ‘2008 Rules’\n\n[2012] 2 SCR 696 : (2012) 5 SCC 424\n\n10 \n\n[2019] 1 SCR 1104 : (2019) 20 SCC 539\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n329\n\n8. \n\nIn assailing the impugned judgment, the appellants have advanced \nthe following contentions. \n\n8.1  Section  45  of  UAPA  read  with  Rules  3  and  4  of  the  2008 \nRules provided for a detailed procedure with respect to grant \nof  sanction  along  with  a  timeline  within  which  the  same  is  to \nbe granted. The impugned sanction is not in consonance with \nthe statutory mandate as the same was issued 2 years and 11 \nmonths after the incident and 2 years and 6 months after the \nletter dated 12th May, 2017. \n\n8.2  Clause  (2)  of  Section  45  of  the  UAPA  was  violated  as  the \nrequirement of ‘independent review’ while according sanction \nwas not complied with. It is contended that the sanction order \nwas  passed  mechanically  without  supplying  any  reasons  or \napplication of mind. The orders are stereotypical and standard. \nIt is submitted that Section 45 requires independent scrutiny and \napplication of mind at each stage – by requisitioning authority; \nby an independent agency and then by the sanctioning authority. \nSince,  in  the  present  facts  the  same  was  not  complied  with, \nsanction orders are liable to be quashed.\n\n8.3  Validity  of  sanction  is  a  question  that  can  be  raised  at  any \nstage of proceedings. There are instances of this Court setting \naside  convictions  after  completion  of  trial  and  even  quashing \nentire proceedings upon the filing of bail application, before trial \non  the  ground  of  invalidity  of  sanction.  In  furtherance  of  this \nsubmission, various judgments have been referred to. Ashraf \nKhan v. State of Gujarat;11 State of Gujarat v. Anwar Osman \nSumbhaniya;12 Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State of \nGujarat;13 Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat;14 \nSeeni Nainar Mohammed v. State;15 and Jamiruddin Ansari \nv. CBI.16 \n\n11 \n\n12 \n\n13 \n\n14 \n\n15 \n\n16 \n\n[2012] 12 SCR 1033 : (2012) 11 SCC 606\n\n[2019] 2 SCR 749 : (2019) 18 SCC 524\n\n[1995] Supp. 2 SCR 637 : (1995) 5 SCC 302\n\n[1997] Supp. 3 SCR 356 : (1997) 7 SCC 744\n\n[2017] 3 SCR 312 : (2017) 13 SCC 685\n\n[2009] 7 SCR 759 : (2009) 6 SCC 316\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f330 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n8.4  Both  the  requisitioning  and  sanctioning  authorities  have  not \nconsidered that mens rea is absent which, as is well established, \nis  a  requisite  to  constitute  a  criminal  offence  unless  explicitly \nexcluded.  Reference  is  made  to  Peoples’  Union  for  Civil \nLiberties v. Union of India17 and Sanjay Dutt v. State through \nCBI.18 In referring to latter judgment, reliance is placed on the \nholding that if a reasonable interpretation exists which permits \nthe avoidance of penalty, Courts are bound to take that approach. \n\n8.5  The  appellant  was  not  made  an  accused  in  the  first  module, \ni.e., FIR No.67/2016 nor in the second module (initiated by an \nalleged hawala transaction which took place on 22nd May 2018) \nand  sanction  in  respect  thereof  was  granted  by  the  Central \nGovernment on 16th October, 2019. He was, in fact, made an \naccused in an independent transaction involving A-20 regarding \nwhich the sanction order (impugned herein) was issued on 22nd \nJuly, 2020. \n\n8.6  The  proviso  to  Section  22A  exempts  a  person  who  is  not  in \ncharge of and responsible for the affairs of the company, from \nprosecution. The appellant contends that he has wrongly been \nroped into the proceedings even when he is a Munshi working as \na daily wager. He is illiterate and does not understand business \ntransactions. A-6 took undue advantage of his situation, once \nA-7 and A-14 stole his identity. \n\n8.7  No particular role has been ascribed to the appellant. This case \nby the NIA has been thrust upon him given, (a) he is a director \nin the company which is A-20; (b) the said company allegedly \nreceived funds that were to be used by PLFI; (c) he hails from \nthe same locality and is a distant acquaintance of Dinesh Gope \nwho is the leader of the PLFI. \n\n9.  The stand of the respondent - Union of India, as can be understood \n\nfrom the materials on record and the written submissions, is that -\n\n9.1  The  sanction  order  that  has  led  to  the  present  proceedings \nhas  been  granted  after  following  due  process.  The  NIA \nrecommended  prosecution  of  the  accused  persons  including \n\n17 \n\n18 \n\n[2004] 1 SCR 232 : (2004) 9 SCC 580\n\n[1994] Supp. 3 SCR 263 : (1994) 5 SCC 410\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n331\n\nthe present appellant vide its letter dated 14th July, 2020. The \nCentral Government, in accordance with Section 45(2) of the \nUAPA referred the investigation report to the authority by letter \ndated 15th July, 2020, comprising two members for the purpose \nof independent review. The authority by its letter dated 16th July, \n2020 forwarded its report to the Ministry within the stipulated \ntime period under Rule 3 of 2008 Rules. In other words, there \nis no violation of the Rules. \n\n9.2  The impugned sanction order has been passed considering all \nthe relevant materials on record, including the recommendation \nof the authority constituted under Section 45(2) of the UAPA. \nThe authority consisted of a retired High Court Judge and the \nretired Law Secretary.\n\n9.3 \n\nIndependent review took place at all relevant stages pursuant to \nwhich Central Government accorded sanction. Merely because \nthe sanction was granted within one day of the recommendation, \nit cannot be said that there was non-application of mind. \n\n9.4  Second and Third Module as explained in the supplementary \nchargesheets are not independent and separate transactions \nfrom that initiated in the FIR, but rather, are a part of the same \ncontinuing transaction undertaken by the accused persons to \nchannel the Proceeds of Terrorism. The NIA on being entrusted \nwith the investigation, had investigated the same and submitted \nthe two supplementary chargesheets. \n\n9.5  The appellant is an active member of a terrorist gang and a close \nassociate of Dinesh Gope (A-6) and was involved in collecting \nand channelizing funds by forming companies. A-20 of which \nthe Appellant/A-17 was a director, served as a front to launder \nproceeds  of  terrorism.  The  claim  of  the  appellant  that A-7  & \nA-14  stole  his  identity  is  unsustainable  and  quashing  cannot \nbe placed on such a vague plea. \n\n9.6  The trial is at a very advanced stage, and as such, no discretion \n\nbe exercised in quashing the criminal proceedings. \n\n10.  At  the  outset,  we  clarify  that  despite  the  last  of  the  submissions \nmade  by  the  learned Additional  Solicitor  General,  the Appellant \ninvited  findings  on  his  submissions.  Hence,  we  proceed  to  decide \nthe issue on merits. \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f332 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nQUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BEFORE THIS COURT\n\n11.  Having considered the factual matrix and the submissions advanced \nby the learned counsel for the parties the following questions arise \nfor our consideration:-\n\n(i)  Whether the Validity of the Sanction Order can be challenged \n\nat any stage?\n\n(ii)  Whether a violation of Section 45(2) of the UAPA r/w Rules 3 \n& 4, if any, vitiates the proceedings? In other words, whether \nviolation of - (a) statutory timelines and (b) the requirement of \nindependent  review  which  includes  application  of  mind,  are \nnecessary aspects of procedure without which, any transaction \nunder the UAPA shall be compromised to a point that its sanctity \nis rendered questionable?\n\n(iii)  Whether  in  the  present  facts,  the  argument  of  the  appellant \nthat  the  transactions  in  connection  with  which  he  has  been \nbrought to the book were actually independent of the ones in \nwhich Dinesh Gope (A-6) and other members were arrayed as \naccused, has any merit? \n\n(iv)  Whether,  in  the  facts,  the  statutory  exemption  under  Section \n22 A  of  the  UAPA  applies  to  the  appellant  who  claims  to  be \nunaware of the affairs of the company?\n\nCONSIDERATION\n\n(a)  UAPA : An Introduction\n\n12.  The preamble of the Act reads as under:-\n\n“An Act  to  provide  for  the  more  effective  prevention  of \ncertain unlawful activities of individuals and associations \n[,and for dealing with terrorist activities,] and for matters \nconnected therewith.”\n\n13.  A  Bench  of  Three  Judges  of  this  Court  (of  which  both  of  us  were \nmembers) considered the objective of the Act in the following terms \nin Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam19:-\n\n19 \n\n[2023] 8 SCR 496 : (2023) 8 SCC 745\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n333\n\n“85. The main objective of the UAPA is to make powers \navailable  for  dealing  with  activities  directed  against  the \nintegrity  and  sovereignty  of  India.  It  is  also  required  to \nbe  noted  that  pursuant  to  the  recommendation  of  the \nCommittee  on  National  Integration  and  Regionalisation \nappointed by the National Integration Council Act on whose \nrecommendation the Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) \nAct, 1963 was enacted, UAPA has been enacted. It appears \nthat the National Integration Council appointed a Committee \non  National  Integration  and  Regionalisation  to  look  into, \ninter  alia,  the  aspect  of  putting  reasonable  restrictions \nin  the  interests  of  sovereignty  and  integrity  of  India  and \nthereafter  the  UAPA  has  been  enacted.  Therefore,  the \nUAPA  has  been  enacted  to  make  powers  available  for \ndealing  with  the  activities  directed  against  integrity  and \nsovereignty of India.\n\n86.  Now  let  us  consider  the  Preamble  to  the  UAPA, \n1967.  As  per  Preamble,  the  UAPA  has  been  enacted \nto  provide  for  the  more  effective  prevention  of  certain \nunlawful  activities  of  individuals  and  associations  and \ndealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected \ntherewith. Therefore the aim and object of enactment of \nthe UAPA is also to provide for more effective prevention \nof certain unlawful activities. That is why and to achieve \nthe  said  object  and  purpose  of  effective  prevention  of \ncertain  unlawful  activities  Parliament  in  its  wisdom  has \nprovided that where an association is declared unlawful \nby a notification issued under Section 3, a person, who \nis  and  continues  to  be  a  member  of  such  association \nshall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which \nmay  extend  to  2  years,  and  shall  also  be  liable  to  fine. \nTherefore, Parliament in its wisdom had thought it fit that \nonce an association is declared unlawful after following \ndue procedure as required under Section 3 and subject \nto the approval by the Tribunal still a person continues to \nbe a member of such association is liable to be punished/\npenalised.”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f334 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n(b)  Relevant Statutory Provisions\n\n14.  At this juncture, we may refer to the applicable statute and rules.\n\n14.1  The  requisite  clauses  of  Section  2  (definitions  clause  of  the \n\nAct) are as under:-\n\n  “2.  Definitions.-(1)  In  this Act,  unless  the  context \notherwise requires,-\n\n…                                 …                                    …\n\n(e)  “Designated  Authority”  means  such  officer  of \nthe Central Government not below the rank of Joint \nSecretary to that Government, or such officer of the \nState  Government  not  below  the  rank  of  Secretary \nto that Government, as the case may be, as may be \nspecified  by  the  Central  Government  or  the  State \nGovernment, by notification published in the Official \nGazette;\n\n…                                 …                                    …\n\n(ec)  “person”  includes—  (i)  an  individual,  (ii)  a \ncompany,  (iii)  a  firm,  (iv)  an  organisation  or  an \nassociation  of  persons  or  a  body  of  individuals, \nwhether incorporated or not, (v) every artificial juridical \nperson, not falling within any of the preceding sub-\nclauses, and (vi) any agency, office or branch owned \nor  controlled  by  any  person  falling  within  any  of \nthe  preceding  sub-clauses;]  (f)  “prescribed”  means \nprescribed by rules made under this Act;\n\n…                                 …                                    …\n\n(g) “proceeds of terrorism” means,— (i) all kinds of \nproperties which have been derived or obtained from \ncommission of any terrorist act or have been acquired \nthrough funds traceable to a terrorist act, irrespective \nof person in whose name such proceeds are standing \nor in whose possession they are found; or \n\n(ii) any property which is being used, or is intended \nto  be  used,  for  a  terrorist  act  or  for  the  purpose  of \nan individual terrorist or a terrorist gang or a terrorist \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n335\n\norganisation.  Explanation.—For  the  purposes  of \nthis Act,  it  is  hereby  declared  that  the  expression \n“proceeds of terrorism” includes any property intended \nto be used for terrorism;”\n\n14.2  Section 45 of the Act is extracted below for ready reference.\n\n“45. Cognizance of offences.— [(1)] No court shall \ntake cognizance of any offence— \n\n(i) under Chapter III without the previous sanction of \nthe Central Government or any officer authorised by \nthe Central Government in this behalf; \n\n(ii)  under  Chapter  IV  and  VI  without  the  previous \nsanction of the Central Government or, as the case \nmay  be,  the  State  Government,  and  where  such \noffence  is  committed  against  the  Government  of  a \nforeign country without the previous sanction of the \nCentral Government. \n\n(2)  Sanction  for  prosecution  under  sub-section  (1) \nshall be given within such time as may be prescribed \nonly  after  considering  the  report  of  such  authority \nappointed by the Central Government or, as the case \nmay be, the State Government which shall make an \nindependent review of the evidence gathered in the \ncourse of investigation and make a recommendation, \nwithin such time as may be prescribed, to the Central \nGovernment  or,  as  the  case  may  be,  the  State \nGovernment.”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n14.3  Rules 3 & 4 of the 2008 Rules read as follows:-\n\n“3. Time limit for making a recommendation by the \nAuthority. – The Authority shall, under sub-section \n(2) of Section 45 of the Act, make its report containing \nthe recommendations to the Central Government [or, \nas  the  case  may  be,  the  State  Government]  within \nseven  working  days  of  the  receipt  of  the  evidence \ngathered by the investigating officer under the Code. \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f336 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n4.  Time  limit  for  sanction  of  prosecution.-The \nCentral Government [or, as the case may be, the State \nGovernment] shall, under sub-section (2) of Section \n45 of the Act, take a decision regarding sanction for \nprosecution within seven working days after receipt \nof the recommendations of the Authority.”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nISSUE No. 1- Challenge to validity of sanction – at what stage?\n\n15.  Now,  we  proceed  to  examine  the  first  question  before  this  Court. \nIn order to do so it is essential to extract the relevant portion of the \nsanction order:-\n\n“5. And  whereas,  the  Central  Government  in  terms  of \nthe provisions of Section 45(2) of the Unlawful Activities \n(Prevention) Act,  1967  (as  amended)  and  the  Unlawful \nActivities (Prevention) (Recommendation and Sanction of \nProsecution)  Rules,  2008  referred  the  above  mentioned \nInvestigation Report vide this Ministry’s letter of even no. \ndated  15th  July,  2020  to  the Authority  comprising  of  two \nmembers namely Justice Dr. Satish Chandra (Retired) and \nDr TK Vishwanathan, Law Secretary (Retired), constituted \nvide  this  Ministry’s  order  No.  11034/1/2009/IS-IV  dated \n03.07.2015  for  making  an  independent  review  of  the \nevidence gathered in the course of investigation (term of \nthe Authority extended till 31.07.2021 vide this Ministry’s \norder dated 12.06.2020);\n\n6. And whereas, the Authority vide letter dated 16th July, \n2020 forwarded its report to this Ministry within the time \nlimit as prescribed in rule Unlawful Activities (Prevention) \n(Recommendation  and  Sanction  of  Prosecution)  Rules, \n2008 and, after being satisfied with the material available on \nrecord and facts and circumstances therein, recommended \nfor sanction for prosecution against the above mentioned \naccused  persons/entities  under  the  relevant  sections  of \nlaw including the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967;\n\n7.  And  now,  therefore,  the  Central  Government,  after \ncarefully  examining  the  material  placed  on  record  and \nthe recommendations of the Authority, is satisfied that a \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n337\n\nprima facie case is made out against the accused persons/\nentities  under  the  relevant  sections  of  law  and  hereby \naccords  sanction  for  prosecution  under  section  45(1)  of \nthe Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967…”\n\nBY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF  \nTHE PRESIDENT OF INDIA \nSd/- \n(Dharmendar Kumar) \nUnder Secretary to the Government of India”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n16.  The question of validity of sanction being challenged, and at what \nstage it may be permissible, has engaged this Court on few previous \noccasions,  albeit  in  context  of  different  statutes.  It  shall  be  useful \nto refer to them.\n\n16.1  In  Central  Bureau  of  Investigation  v.  Ashok  Kumar \nAggarwal 20  this  Court  noted  the  importance  of  the  process \nof grant of sanction. It has been termed “not an acrimonious \nexercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act ” in the context of the \nPrevention of Corruption Act, 1988.21 The Court summarised \nthe essentials for validity of prosecution as under:-\n\n“16. In view of the above, the legal propositions can \nbe summarised as under:\n\n16.1. The prosecution must send the entire relevant \nrecord to the sanctioning authority including the FIR, \ndisclosure  statements,  statements  of  witnesses, \nrecovery  memos,  draft  charge-sheet  and  all  other \nrelevant  material.  The  record  so  sent  should  also \ncontain  the  material/document,  if  any,  which  may \ntilt the balance in favour of the accused and on the \nbasis of which, the competent authority may refuse \nsanction.\n\n16.2.  The  authority  itself  has  to  do  complete  and \nconscious scrutiny of the whole record so produced \n\n20 \n\n[2013] 14 SCR 983 : (2014) 14 SCC 295\n\n21  Hereinafter, ‘PC Act’\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f338 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nby the prosecution independently applying its mind \nand  taking  into  consideration  all  the  relevant  facts \nbefore  grant  of  sanction  while  discharging  its  duty \nto give or withhold the sanction.\n\n16.3. The power to grant sanction is to be exercised \nstrictly  keeping  in  mind  the  public  interest  and  the \nprotection  available  to  the  accused  against  whom \nthe sanction is sought.\n\n16.4. The  order  of  sanction  should  make  it  evident \nthat  the  authority  had  been  aware  of  all  relevant \nfacts/materials  and  had  applied  its  mind  to  all  the \nrelevant material.\n\n16.5. In every individual case, the prosecution has to \nestablish and satisfy the court by leading evidence \nthat the entire relevant facts had been placed before \nthe sanctioning authority and the authority had applied \nits mind on the same and that the sanction had been \ngranted in accordance with law.”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n16.2  In  Parkash  Singh  Badal  v.  State  of  Punjab,22  this  Court \nheld that an authority, which is the sanctioning authority is not \nrequired  to  separately  specify  each  of  the  offences  against \nthe accused public servant. This is to be done at the stage of \nframing of charge. What the law requires is that materials must \nbe placed before the sanctioning authority so as to enable the \napplication of mind in arriving at a decision. \n\n16.3  In Dinesh Kumar v. Airport Authority of India,23 Lodha, J. \n\n(as he then was) observed:\n\n“10. In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction \norder exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like \nnon-availability  of  material  before  the  sanctioning \nauthority  or  bias  of  the  sanctioning  authority  or \nthe  order  of  sanction  having  been  passed  by  an \n\n22 \n\n23 \n\n[2006] Supp. 10 SCR 197 : (2007) 1 SCC 1\n\n[2011] 13 SCR 260 : (2012) 1 SCC 532\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n339\n\nauthority not authorised or competent to grant such \nsanction.  The  above  grounds  are  only  illustrative \nand not exhaustive. All such grounds of invalidity or \nillegality of sanction would fall in the same category \nlike  the  ground  of  invalidity  of  sanction  on  account \nof  non-application  of  mind—a  category  carved  out \nby this Court in Parkash Singh Badal [(2007) 1 SCC \n1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193] , the challenge to which \ncan always be raised in the course of trial.”\n\n16.4  In  Central  Bureau  of  Investigation  &  Ors.  v.  Pramila \nVirendra Kumar Agarwal,24 while referring to Dinesh Kumar \n(supra), this Court reiterated the distinction between absence \nof sanction and the alleged invalidity of sanction on account of \nnon-application of mind. It was held that absence as in issue \ncan be raised at the threshold, however, invalidity, as in issue \ncan only be raised at trial. \n\n16.5  A  Bench  of  three  learned  Judges  in  P.K.  Pradhan  v.  State \nof  Sikkim25  discussed  the  application  of  Section  197  of  the \nCode of Criminal Procedure, 1973.26 Having referred to a host \nof precedents, it was concluded that: \n\n“15. …It is well settled that question of sanction under \nSection 197 of the Code can be raised any time after \nthe cognizance; maybe immediately after cognizance \nor framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion \nof trial and after conviction as well. But there may be \ncertain cases where it may not be possible to decide \nthe  question  effectively  without  giving  opportunity \nto the defence to establish that what he did was in \ndischarge  of  official  duty.  In  order  to  come  to  the \nconclusion whether claim of the accused that the act \nthat he did was in course of the performance of his \nduty was a reasonable one and neither pretended nor \nfanciful, can be examined during the course of trial \nby giving opportunity to the defence to establish it. In \n\n24 \n\n25 \n\n(2020) 17 SCC 664\n\n[2001] 3 SCR 1119 : (2001) 6 SCC 704\n\n26  Hereinafter ‘CrPC’\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f340 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nsuch an eventuality, the question of sanction should \nbe  left  open  to  be  decided  in  the  main  judgment \nwhich may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial.”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n16.6  In  recent  past,  this  court,  in  State  of  Karnataka  v.  S. \nSubbegowda,27 while addressing the question of sanction and \nits validity in the context of PC Act underscored that challenge \nto  sanction  should  be  brought  at  the  earliest  stage  possible \nand held that:\n\n“10.  …  It  is  also  well  settled  proposition  of  law  that \nthe  question  with  regard  to  the  validity  of  such \nsanction  should  be  raised  at  the  earliest  stage  of \nthe  proceedings,  however  could  be  raised  at  the \nsubsequent stage of the trial also. In our opinion, the \nstages of proceedings at which an accused could raise \nthe  issue  with  regard  to  the  validity  of  the  sanction \nwould be the stage when the Court takes cognizance \nof  the  offence,  the  stage  when  the  charge  is  to  be \nframed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is \ncomplete i.e., at the stage of final arguments in the \ntrial. Such issue of course, could be raised before the \nCourt in appeal, revision or confirmation, however the \npowers of such court would be subject to sub-section \n(3) and sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the said Act. \nIt  is  also  significant  to  note  that  the  competence  of \nthe court trying the accused also would be dependent \nupon  the  existence  of  the  validity  of  sanction,  and \ntherefore it is always desirable to raise the issue of \nvalidity of sanction at the earliest point of time. It cannot \nbe gainsaid that in case the sanction is found to be \ninvalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and \nrelegate the parties to a stage where the competent \nauthority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution \nin accordance with the law.”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n27 \n\n[2023] 11 SCR 19 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 911\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n341\n\n17.  The  afore-cited  authorities  point  to  only  one  conclusion  which  is \nthat sanction, though should be challenged at the earliest possible \nopportunity,  it  can  be  challenged  at  a  later  stage  as  well.  These \njudgments, although not specifically in the context of laws such as \nUAPA, posit a generally acceptable rule that a right available to the \naccused, which may provide an opportunity to establish innocence, \nshould  not  be  foreclosed  by  operation  of  law,  unless  specifically \nprovided within the statutory text. At the same time, challenging validity \nof sanction cannot and should not be a weapon to slow down or stall \notherwise  valid  prosecution.  Other  legislations  such  as  the  CrPC \nprovide mechanisms for the sanction and subsequent actions to be \nsaved from being invalidated due to any irregularity etc. Section 465 \nCrPC provides for the possibility that a sanction granted under Section \n197 CrPC can be saved by its operation. Similarly, a sanction under \nthe PC Act, if found that there was any error, omission or irregularity \nwould not be vitiated unless the same has resulted in failure of justice. \n\n18.  The UAPA does not provide for any such saving of the sanction. This \nimplies that, in the wisdom of the legislature, the inbuilt mechanism \nof the Act of having two authorities apply their mind to the grant of \na  sanction,  is  sufficient.  This  emphasizes  the  role  and  sanctity  of \nthe operation to be carried out by both these authorities. In order to \nchallenge the grant of sanction as invalid, the grounds that can be \nurged  are  that  (1)  all  the  relevant  material  was  not  placed  before \nthe authority; (2) the authority has not applied its mind to the said \nmaterial; and (3) insufficiency of material. This list is only illustrative \nand  not  exhaustive.  The  common  thread  that  runs  through  the \nthree grounds of challenge above is that the party putting forward \nthis challenge has to lead evidence to such effect. That, needless \nto say, can only be done before the Trial Court. In that view of the \nmatter, we have no hesitation in holding that while we recognise the \ntreasured right of an accused to avail all remedies available to him \nunder  law,  in  ordinary  circumstances  challenge  to  sanction  under \nUAPA should be raised at the earliest possible opportunity so as to \nenable the Trial Court to determine the question, for its competence \nto proceed further and the basis on which any other proceeding on \nthe  appellate  side  would  depend  on  the  answer  to  this  question. \n[See: S. Subbegowda (supra)]\n\nIn the attending facts and circumstances of the present case, keeping \nin  view  the  submission  made  at  the  bar  that  the  trial  is  underway \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f342 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nand numerous witnesses (113 out of 125) already stand examined, \nwe refrain from returning any finding on the challenge to the validity \nof the sanction qua the present appellant and leave it to be raised \nbefore the Trial Judge, who shall, if such a question is raised decide, \nit promptly. \n\nISSUE No.2 :\n\n19.  The  next  issue  that  we  must  consider  is  whether  the  timelines  in \naccordance  with  Section  45(2)  of  the  UAPA  r/w  Rules  3  &  4  of \nthe  2008  Rules  and  the  requirement  of  independent  review  are \nnecessary  aspects  of  procedure,  non-adherence  of  which  would \nvitiate proceedings. As already reproduced above, the rules provide \na  seven  day  period  within  which  the  concerned  authority  is  to \nmake  its  recommendation  on  the  basis  of  materials  gathered  by \nthe  investigating  officer  and  a  further  seven  days  period  for  the \ngovernment  to  grant  sanction  for  prosecution,  having  considered \nthe report of the authority. \n\n20.  The ins and outs of the Appellant’s contention is that the said timelines \nwere not followed and, in fact, the first sanction was granted more \nthan a year after the recommendation was moved. This contention \nties into another submission that there was no independent review \non the part of both recommending authority and central government, \nas the sanction was merely granted within a day each. \n\nTimelines, whether directory or mandatory?\n\n21.  Let us now consider one of the primary arguments of the appellants, \n\ni.e., non-following of the statutory timelines. \n\n22.  Timelines,  generally  speaking,  as  part  of  statutory  framework  are \nextremely essential to an effective, efficient and focused machinery \nof criminal investigation, prosecution and trial. It cannot be gainsaid \nthat all stakeholders to the smooth functioning of these procedures \nof  law  must  do  their  part  in  realising  such  timelines. They  are  the \nessential aspects of right to speedy trial, which is enshrined under \nArticle 21 of the Constitution of India. \n\n23.  The appellant’s objections regarding timelines is two-fold. One, that \nthere is a large gap between the first sanction and his own arrest, given \nthat he is allegedly part of the same continuing transaction according \nto  the  respondent  union,  and  two,  that  since  the  authority  despite \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n343\n\nhaving been granted a seven day period to consider the materials \ngathered by the investigating officers and make their recommendation, \ndid so within barely a day, and that to in a manner which could be \ntermed mechanical, thereby afflicting the recommendations from the \nvice of non-application of mind. \n\n24.  The first objection appears to us, to be superficial at best. In order to \nunderstand this objection some important dates must be referred to:\n\nS. No.\n\nDetails\n\n1.\n\n2.\n\n3. \n\n4. \n\n5.\n\n6.\n\n7.\n\nFirst Information Report (F.I.R.)\n\nChargesheet \n\n(It is noted that investigation \ncontinues against A-6)\n\nSanction against A-6\n\nFirst Supplementary Chargesheet\n\n(A-6 is named herein; A-17 is \nbrought in as a prosecution witness; \nInvestigation continues still further)\n\nArrest of A-17\n\nSanction against A-17\n\nSecond Supplementary Chargesheet\n\n(A-17 is named herein)\n\nDate\n10th November 2016\n9th January 2017\n\n16th October 2019\n21st October 2019\n\n13th July 2020\n22nd July 2020\n23rd July 2020\n\nThe gap between the first action against A-6 and the arrest of the \nappellant  is  a  result  of  continuing  investigation,  as  evidenced  by \nthe  fact  that  the  appellant  was  made  an  accused  in  the  second \nsupplementary  chargesheet,  arising  out  of  the  same  FIR  under \nwhich A-6 was initially named an accused. Since the investigation \ncontinued, the gap cannot be termed fatal so as to render the arrest \nof the appellant as unlawful or illegal. It is also to be noted that in \nthe  first  supplementary  chargesheet  the  appellant  was  initially  a \nwitness for the prosecution and with further investigation was made \nan accused thereafter. \n\n25. \n\nIn order to consider the merits of the second objection, ‘application of \nmind’ as a concept must be understood. It is trite in law that application \nof mind must form part of any judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative \norder.  To  demonstrate  the  same,  consideration  of  material  placed \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f344 \n\n26. \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nbefore such authority must be reflected. At the same time, it being \na cerebral exercise, it is not within reason to set out any formula to \nexplain what application of mind may actually mean or look like. It \nis to be ascertained in the facts and circumstances of each case. \n\nIn the context of penal laws, authorities tasked with evaluating material \nprior  to  granting of sanction for prosecution,  or the act of granting \nsanction itself must apply their mind to each and every facet of the \nmaterial  placed  before  it  to  arrive  at  the  conclusion  particularly  so \nbecause the effect of the task at hand is immense. The grant/non-\ngrant of sanction is what sets in motion the machinery of strict laws \nsuch as UAPA or the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) \nAct,  1987.28  Given  the  severity  of  these  laws  and  the  nature  of \nactivities with which they are associated, the effect that they have \non the person accused thereunder is not only within the realm of law \nbut also drastically effects social and personal life. It is only after the \nauthority  having  been  handed  this  task,  is  of  the  considered  view \nthat sanction can be granted, should it be so done. \n\n27.  The procedures qua sanctions provided in such legislations are meant \nto  be  followed  strictly,  to  the  letter  more  so  to  the  spirit.  Even  the \nslightest of variation from the written word may render the proceedings \narising  therefrom  to  be  cast  in  doubt. The  general  principle,  when \nthe provision is couched negatively has been noticed by this court \nin Rangku Dutta v. State of Assam 29 in the following terms:\n\n“18.  It  is  obvious  that  Section  20-A(1)  is  a  mandatory \nrequirement of law. First, it starts with an overriding clause \nand, thereafter, to emphasise its mandatory nature, it uses \nthe expression “No” after the overriding clause. Whenever \nthe  intent  of  a  statute  is  mandatory,  it  is  clothed  with  a \nnegative command. Reference in this connection can be \nmade to G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation, \n12th Edn., at pp. 404-05, the learned author has stated:\n\n“…  As  stated  by  Crawford:  ‘Prohibitive  or \nnegative words can rarely, if ever, be directory. \nAnd this is so even though the statute provides \n\n28  Hereinafter referred as ‘TADA’\n\n29 \n\n[2011] 8 SCR 639 : (2011) 6 SCC 358\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n345\n\nno  penalty  for  disobedience.’  As  observed \nby  Subbarao,  J.:  ‘Negative  words  are  clearly \nprohibitory  and  are  ordinarily  used  as  a \nlegislative device to make a statute imperative.’ \nSection 80 and Section 87-B of the Code of Civil \nProcedure,  1908;  Section  77  of  the  Railways \nAct, 1890; Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act, \n1947; Section 213 of the Succession Act, 1925; \nSection 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, \n1947; Section 7 of the Stamp Act, 1899; Section \n108 of the Companies Act, 1956; Section 20(1) \nof  the  Prevention  of  Food  Adulteration  Act, \n1954;  Section  55  of  the  Wild  Life  (Protection) \nAct, 1972; the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the \nIndustrial  Disputes Act,  1947  (as  amended  in \n1956); Section 10-A of the Medical Council Act, \n1956 (as amended in 1993), and similar other \nprovisions  have  therefore,  been  construed  as \nmandatory. A provision requiring ‘not less than \nthree months’ notice’ is also for the same reason \nmandatory.”\n\nWe  are  in  respectful  agreement  with  the  aforesaid \nstatement of law made by the learned author.”\n\nFor instance, under the TADA, it has been held that if the sanctioning \nauthority as mentioned under Section 20-A is not the one who granted \nsanction  and  instead  it  was  a  higher  authority,  even  then  the  said \nsanction would be illegal. Reference in this regard may be made to \nHussein Ghadially v. State of Gujarat 30 and State of Rajasthan \nv. Mohinuddin Jamal Alvi.31 \n\n28.  Now turning to the procedure for sanction provided under the UAPA, \nwe  find  that  a  Court  is  enjoined  from  taking  cognizance  without \nprevious  sanction  either  by  the  Central  Government  or  the  State \nGovernment, as applicable, and such sanction shall only be given \nafter the report of the authority appointed by the Central Government \nor the State Government, as the case may be, has been considered. \n\n30 \n\n31 \n\n[2014] 9 SCR 364 : (2014) 8 SCC 425\n\n(2016) 12 SCC 608\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f346 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nThis  authority  is  to  make  an  independent  review  of  the  evidence \ngathered and make a recommendation to the government within a \ntime bound manner. \n\n28.1  What  flows  from  the  above  description  of  Section  45  is  that \nif  any  Court  takes  cognizance  without  prior  sanction  of  the \nGovernment, Centre or State, the same shall be in contravention \nof  the Act  and  therefore  bad  in  law.  This  sanction  is  not  a \nfunction of the Government alone and it can only be granted \nafter an independent body, albeit appointed by the Government, \nmakes an independent review of the evidence. \n\n28.2  The fact that sanction has been granted is not in dispute. What \nis disputed by the appellant is in which the manner the same \nhas been granted. According to the case put up by him, the \nauthority’s  recommendation,  and  immediately  thereafter  the \nGovernment’s grant of sanction is evidence of non-application \nof mind and stereotypical or ‘cyclostyle’ orders. \n\n28.3  Although we have taken note of the facts leading up the present \nappeal, for immediate reference we may recall here that the NIA \nvide its letter dated 14th July 2020 recommended prosecution \nfor  further  seven  persons  (A-13  to A-20);  the  Ministry  vide \nletter dated 15th July 2020 forwarded the investigation report \nto the authority; the authority, the next day, i.e., 16th July 2020, \nrecommended  sanction  for  prosecution  against  the  seven \npersons. \n\n28.4  Rules  3  &  4  of  the  2008  Rules,  reproduced  supra,  grant \nthe  authority  as  also  the  Government  a  week’s  time  each \nto  recommend  and  then  grant  sanction.  On  the  face  of  it, \nthe  present  grant  of  sanction  is  within  the  stipulated  time. \nHowever, as is submitted by the appellant, is the fact that the \nrecommendation,  consideration  and  grant  of  sanction  took \nplace  within  three  days  enough  to  vitiate  the  prosecution  to \nits entirety?\n\n28.5  One  week’s  time,  given  to  both  the  authorities  is  to  enable \nthem to independently evaluate, first the materials placed on \nrecord  then  recommend  the  grant  of  sanction;  and  second, \nto  evaluate  the  material  and  the  recommendation  so  made \nabove, to finally ink the order of sanction. If the time so granted \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n347\n\nis  thoroughly  under-utilised  or  if  either  of  the  two  authorities \novershoot  the  time,  as  stipulated  in  the  rules,  what  is  the \nfate  of  the  sanction  which  was  underway?  We  find  there  to \nbe  divergent  views  taken  on  this  issue  by  the  High  Courts. \nIt  is  a  recognised  principle  of  law  that  the  law  should  apply \nequally to all persons which then implies that there should be \nuniformity,  despite  various  jurisdictions  being  at  play,  in  how \nthe law is applied. The Law Commission of India in its 136th \nReport recognised that “the want of uniformity” is “an evil”. The \nproblem has been recognised stating thus :-\n\n“1.2  Want  of  uniformity  an  evil.-  It  is  needless \nto  point  out  that  want  of  uniformity  in  law  not  only \nimpairs the quality or the substantive or procedural \nlaw but also causes serious inconvenience to citizens \nin  general.  Those  whose  business  is  to  advise \npersons who consult them on questions of law, find \nit difficult to give such advice with confidence where \nthe decisions are conflicting. Those who are entrusted \nwith  the  functions  of  adjudicating  on  questions  of \nlaw  must  spend  considerable  time  in  between  two \nor  more  possible  views  on  a  subject  which  falls  to \nbe  considered  before  them,  In  this  process,  there \nis  bound  to  result  considerable  waste  of  time  and \nenergy. That apart, it is not a satisfactory situation \nthat  on  a  given  topic,  the  rule  of  law  prevailing  in \none  part  of  the  country  should  be  different  from \nthe  rule  prevailing  in  another  part  of  the  country \nwhen  the  disparity  arises  from  conflicting  judicial \ninterpretations.”\n\n28.5.1 The High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Nagpur Bench), in \nCriminal Appeal Nos.136 & 137 of 2017 titled as Mahesh Kariman \nTirki v. State of Maharashtra’ on remand from this Court (by order \ndated 19th April 2023 passed in SLP (Crl.)Nos.11072-11073/2022 for \ndecision on merits as also validity of sanction), regarding timelines \nmentioned in the 2008 Rules, held as under:\n\n“153.  Though  the  word  “shall”  no  doubt  connotes \nthe sense of urgency, but the consequence of non-\ncompliance  in  strict  sense  which  flows  from  the \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f348 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nwordings in the rule, has not been spelt out under the \nstatute. Neither at an initial stage of the prosecution \nnor  even  before  us  the  defence  has  projected  any \nprejudice from strict non-compliance of time frame. \n\n154. The very purport of the provision is to convey that \nthe process has to be complied with and completed \nin an expeditious manner. Particularly, we have taken \ninto account the contingency which may occur, if the \nword “shall” in the context is held mandatory. In that \ncase,  even  if  a  single  days  delay  would  stifle  the \nprosecution  intending  to  curb  the  act  of  terrorism. \nCertainly, the legislative intent behind incorporating \nthe  term  “shall”  is  not  to  stifle  the  prosecution  on \nsuch  insignificant  technicality,  but  conveys  that  the \nprocess  ought  to  be  completed  in  an  expeditious \nmanner.  We  are  unable  to  persuade  ourselves  to \naccept  the  contention  that  the  term  “shall”  is  to  be \nstrictly treated as a mandatory provision and failure to \ncomply with the timeline strictly vitiates the process. \nTherefore, we respectfully defer with the view taken \nby  the  Kerala  High  Court  in  the  case  of  Roopesh \n(supra) in that regard. \n\n155. We are of the view that and accordingly hold that \nto achieve legislative intent the dual mandate is to be \ncomplied with in its true spirit. Though a minuscule \ndelay would not thwart the legislative intent, but delay \nif  writ  large  from  the  record,  which  is  unexplained, \nwould certainly have its own adverse impact on the \nprocess of sanction.”\n\nThe  import  of  the  above  extract  is  that  the  timelines  mentioned  in \nRules 3 and 4 of the 2008 Rules, despite having the word ‘shall’ in \nthem, are to be taken as directory for, if the timeline is interpreted \nstrictly, it may thwart the purpose of the legislation which is to curb \nunlawful activities of a specified nature.\n\nWe  notice  that  an  appeal  from  the  judgement  extracted  above,  is \npending before this Court. In the course of the present judgement, \nwe  make  no  comments  on  the  merits  thereof  and  clarify,  that  the \nabove extract is only for the purpose of determining the question of \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n349\n\nlaw, in respect of the timelines mentioned in the 2008 Rules, being \neither mandatory or directory in nature.\n\n28.5.2 The Jharkhand High Court, recently, in Binod Kumar Ganjhu \n@Vinod Kumar Ganjhu @Binod Ganjhu v. Union of India32 made \nsimilar observations and held that the timelines in the 2008 Rules \nare directory. It was observed-\n\n“23. The decision in “Roopesh” is not a binding precedent \nand we do not find ourselves bound by the considerations \nof judicial comity and propriety. We are unable to record our \nagreement to the observations made by the Kerala High \nCourt in “Roopesh” that the time-line provided under Rules \n3 and 4 of the Sanction Rules is mandatory. It is indeed \nnot an issue for debate that the expression “shall” would \nnot always convey mandatory compliance of the provision \nin law. In our opinion, the Sanction Rules lay down a time-\nline which is in the nature of a guideline keeping in mind \npersonal liberty of a person but such time-line cannot be \nheld to be mandatory and, that too, in cases where serious \nallegations of commission of offence under UAP Act have \nbeen made and found prima-facie true by the NIA.\n\n24. Long back, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme \nCourt  that  the  only  principle  which  governs  the  criminal \njustice system is miscarriage of justice. This rule has its \norigin in the rules of principles of natural justice and that \nis  why  time  and  again  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  has \nlaid  stress  on  fair  trial.  Even  on  conclusion  of  the  trial, \nthe  judgment  rendered  by  a  competent  Court  was  not \nheld illegal where a charge was not framed by the Court \n[refer, “Begu v. King-Emperor” ILR (1925) 6 Lah 226]. In \nthis  context,  we  may  also  refer  to  the  provisions  under \nsections  468  to  473  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure \nwhich  provide  period  of  limitation  for  taking  cognizance \nand exclusion as well as extension of period of limitation \nin  certain  cases.  The  scheme  of  the  Code  of  Criminal \nProcedure  thus  indicates  that  it  is  not  every  irregularity \nwhich vitiates the trial and except in very exceptional kind of \n\n32  W.P(Crl) 308 of 2022\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f350 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\ncases the Court would not step into and hold the judgment \nrendered illegal. The fundamental right of an accused is \nof fair trial in which he has sufficient opportunity to defend \nhimself  by  cross-examining  the  prosecution  witnesses \nto  bring  out  falsity  in  the  prosecution  case.  But  beyond \nthis,  an  accused  has  only  a  statutory  right  to  establish \nthat  the  procedure  as  prescribed  under  the  law  has  not \nbeen followed and such non-adherence to the procedure \nprescribed has deprived him a fair opportunity to defend \nhimself  which  occasioned  in  miscarriage  of  justice. As \nnoticed  above,  the  Court  has  taken  cognizance  of  the \noffence  under  the  UAP Act  and  charge  has  also  been \nframed  for  committing  such  offence.  In  our  considered \nopinion, the Sanction Rules would have no application in \nthe  cases  of  this  nature  because  a  criminal  prosecution \ncannot be frustrated on mere technicalities.”\n\nThough the Special Leave Petition against this Order was dismissed, \nhowever, it was clarified that the question of sanction under Section \n45 of the UAPA was not considered. \n\n28.5.3 Taking a diametrically opposite view, the Kerala High Court in \nRoopesh v. State of Kerala,33 held that the timeline stipulated cannot \nbe taken to be directory, keeping in view the Legislature’s express \ninclusion of the same, departing from the practice adopted in other \nsimilarly placed laws such as TADA or Prevention of Terrorism Act, \n2002,34 it held as under:\n\n“12.  The  word  ‘shall’  used  in  the  Rules  of  2008  has  a \nwell defined texture as available from the identical ‘shall’ \nemployed  in  the  text  of  sub-section  (1)  &  (2)  of  S.45  of \nthe  UA(P)A;  and  the  power  conferred  on  the  Central \nGovernment  by  S.52  to  make  rules  for  carrying  out  the \nprovisions of the Act. The Rules of 2008 prescribed the time \nof seven days; as spoken of in the enactment. The Act itself \nis enacted, to prevent unlawful activities of individuals and \nassociations as also dealing with terrorist activities, which \nterms are specifically defined under the enactment itself. \n\n33 \n\n34 \n\n2022 SCC OnLine Ker 1372\n\n‘POTA’ for short. \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n351\n\nThe  colour  is  perceivable  from  the  context  in  which  the \nenactment is saved from the challenge of having infringed \nthe fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution, \nonly on the ground of a reasonable restriction; which has \nto be construed very strictly. The Parliament, in bringing \nout the enactment and the Government, in promulgating \nthe Rules had the prior experience of the TADA and POTA \nas also S.196 Cr.P.C; none of which had a time frame for \nissuance of sanction. UA(P)A as it was originally enacted, \nin its Statements of Objects and Reasons, declared it to \nbe in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, \nintended to bring in reasonable restrictions to (i) freedom \nof speech and expression, (ii) right to assemble peaceably \nand  without  arms;  and  (iii)  right  to  form  associations  or \nunions. The original enactment by S.17 required a sanction \nfrom the Central Government or the authorised officer to \ninitiate prosecution.\n\n…\n\n14. The Parliament, in 2008, while enacting Amending Act \n35  of  2008  had  consciously  incorporated  the  provision \nrequiring  a  recommendation  from  an  Authority  and \nretained the requirement of sanction from the appropriate \nGovernment, as provided in sub-section (1). It was by sub-\nsection (2) that an Authority was contemplated, to make \nrecommendations after reviewing the evidence gathered \nand a specific time was permitted to be prescribed by rules. \nThe Central Government having brought out the Rules of \n2008 specifying the time, within which the recommendation \nand sanction has to be made, the time is sacrosanct and \naccording to us, mandatory. It cannot at all be held that \nthe  stipulation  of  time  is  directory,  nor  can  it  be  waived \nas  a  mere  irregularity  under  S.460  (e)  or  under  S.465 \nCr.P.C.  S.460  saves  any  erroneous  proceeding,  inter-\nalia  of  taking  cognizance;  if  done  in  good  faith.  When \nsanction  is  statutorily  mandated  for  taking  cognizance \nand  if  cognizance  is  taken  without  a  sanction  or  on  the \nstrength  of  an  invalid  one,  it  cannot  be  said  to  be  an \nerroneous proceeding taken in good faith and the act of \ntaking cognizance itself would stand vitiated.”\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f352 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nThe State of Kerala, being aggrieved by the final conclusion that the \nsanction was bad in law, carried in appeal to this Court. The Special \nLeave Petition bearing number SLP (Crl.) Nos.6981-6983 of 2022, \nwas dismissed as withdrawn with the question of law left open. \n\n28.5.4 A  similar  view  was  taken  by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and \nHaryana in Manjeet Singh v. State of Punjab.35 Although decided in \nthe context of bail, it was held that if no decision is taken, in keeping \nwith the timelines of the Rules 2008, the accused would be entitled \nto interim bail. It concurred with the view expressed by the Kerala \nHigh Court in Roopesh (supra). \n\n29.  This  Court  has  considered  the  issue  of  time-bound  sanction. \nWhile dealing with sanctions under the PC Act, it was observed by \nPamidighantam  Sri  Narsimha  J.  speaking  for  this  Court,  in  Vijay \nRajmohan  v.  Central  Bureau  of  Investigation  (Anti-Corruption \nBranch) 36 as under:\n\n“23. Grant of sanction being an exercise of executive power, \nit is subject to the standard principles of judicial review such \nas application of independent mind; only by the competent \nauthority,  without  bias,  after  consideration  of  relevant \nmaterial  and  by  eschewing  irrelevant  considerations. As \nthe  power  to  grant  sanction  for  prosecution  has  legal \nconsequences,  it  must  naturally  be  exercised  within  a \nreasonable period. This principle is anyway inbuilt in our \nlegal  structure,  and  our  constitutional  courts  review  the \nlegality and proprietary of delayed exercise of power quite \nfrequently…\n\n…\n\n29.  The  sanctioning  authority  must  bear  in  mind  that \npublic  confidence  in  the  maintenance  of  the  rule  of  law, \nwhich is fundamental in the administration of justice, is at \nstake here. By causing delay in considering the request \nfor  sanction,  the  sanctioning  authority  stultifies  judicial \nscrutiny, thereby vitiating the process of determination of \nthe  allegations  against  the  corrupt  official  Subramanian \n\n35 \n\n36 \n\n[2022] 19 SCR 563 : CRA-D-5 of 2023 \n\n(2023) 1 SCC 329\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n353\n\nSwamy [Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) \n3  SCC  64  :  (2012)  1  SCC  (Cri)  1041  :  (2012)  2  SCC \n(L&S) 666] . Delays in prosecuting the corrupt breeds a \nculture  of  impunity  and  leads  to  systemic  resignation  to \nthe existence of corruption in public life. Such inaction is \nfraught with the risk of making future generations getting \naccustomed to corruption as a way of life. …\n\n…\n\n32. In the first place, non-compliance with a mandatory \nperiod  cannot  and  should  not  automatically  lead  to  the \nquashing of criminal proceedings because the prosecution \nof  a  public  servant  for  corruption  has  an  element  of \npublic interest having a direct bearing on the rule of law \n[Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC \n64 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666. \nPer A.K. Ganguly, J. : (SCC p. 102, paras 76-77)“76. The \nsanctioning  authority  must  bear  in  mind  that  what  is  at \nstake is the public confidence in the maintenance of the \nrule of law which is fundamental in the administration of \njustice. Delay in granting such sanction has spoilt many \nvalid prosecutions and is adversely viewed in public mind \nthat in the name of considering a prayer for sanction, a \nprotection  is  given  to  a  corrupt  public  official  as  a  quid \npro quo for services rendered by the public official in the \npast or may be in the future and the sanctioning authority \nand the corrupt officials were or are partners in the same \nmisdeeds.  …77.  By  causing  delay  in  considering  the \nrequest  for  sanction,  the  sanctioning  authority  stultifies \njudicial  scrutiny  and  determination  of  the  allegations \nagainst  corrupt  official  and  thus  the  legitimacy  of  the \njudicial institutions is eroded. It, thus, deprives a citizen \nof  his  legitimate  and  fundamental  right  to  get  justice  by \nsetting the criminal law in motion and thereby frustrates his \nright to access judicial remedy which is a constitutionally \nprotected right.”]. This is also a non-sequitur. It must also \nbe  kept  in  mind  that  the  complainant  or  victim  has  no \nother remedy available for judicial redressal if the criminal \nproceedings  stand  automatically  quashed. At  the  same \ntime,  a  decision  to  grant  deemed  sanction  may  cause \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f354 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nprejudice to the rights of the accused as there would also \nbe non-application of mind in such cases.”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n30.  The observations in Vijay Rajmohan (supra) regarding the power of \nsanction being open to the standard principle of judicial review; the \nsame being inbuilt in our legal structure; public confidence being at \nstake if a rule of law is violated, are principles that in our considered \nview it will apply equally to sanctions under UAPA. In context of the \nPC Act, it has been held that non-compliance of a mandatory period \ncannot ipso facto lead to quashing of criminal proceedings. This is \nwhere a difference emerges between the PC Act and the UAPA. The \nimplication,  social  as  well  as  legal  of  both  these  acts  diverges,  in \nas much as the latter entails far graver consequences. [See: State \nof T.N. v. Sivarasan; 37 Rambhai Nathabhai Gadhvi (supra); and \nAshrafkhan (Supra)] The UAPA provides for a detailed procedure \nwhich is to be followed in granting of sanction and undoubtedly, the \nsame must be followed in absolute letter and spirit. \n\nConstruction of 2008 Rules\n\n31. \n\nIt is well understood that penal statutes are statutes to be interpreted \nstrictly.  This  canon  of  construction  has  been  reiterated  time  and \nagain. It is apposite here to refer to certain authorities in this context. \n\n31.1  Maxwell  in  The  Interpretation  of  Statutes  (11th  Edn.)  has \n\nobserved:\n\n“The  effect  of  the  rule  of  strict  construction  might \nalmost  be  summed  up  in  the  remark  that,  where \nan equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a \nreasonable doubt of its meaning which the cannons \nof  interpretation  failed  to  solve,  the  benefit  of  the \ndoubt  should  be  given  to  the  subject  and  against \nthe legislature which has failed to explain itself. But \nit yields to the paramount rule that every statute is to \nbe expounded according to its expressed or manifest \nintention and that all cases within the mischief aimed \nat our, if the language permits, to be held to fall within \nits remedial influence”\n\n37 \n\n[1996] Supp. 8 SCR 243 : (1997) 1 SCC 682\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n355\n\nObservations  in  the  twelfth  edition,  in  this  context,  are  also \neducative:\n\n“The  strict  construction  of  penal  statutes  seems  to \nmanifest  itself  in  four  ways  :  In  the  requirement  of \nexpress language for the creation of an offence; in \ninterpreting  strictly  words  setting  out  the  elements \nof an offence; in requiring the fulfillment to the letter \nof  statutory  conditions  precedent  to  the  infliction  of \npunishment; and in insisting on the strict observance \nof technical provisions concerning criminal procedure \nand jurisdiction.”\n\n31.2  In Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement,38 \na  Constitution  Bench  while  discussing  the  interpretation  of \npenal statutes, held as under:\n\n“36.  The  rule  of  interpretation  requiring  strict \nconstruction  of  penal  statutes  does  not  warrant  a \nnarrow  and  pedantic  construction  of  a  provision  so \nas  to  leave  loopholes  for  the  offender  to  escape \n(see Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra \n[(1976) 3 SCC 684 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 493] ). A penal \nstatute has to also be so construed as to avoid a lacuna \nand to suppress mischief and to advance a remedy \nin the light of the rule in Heydon’s case [(1584) 3 Co \nRep 7a : 76 ER 637] . A common-sense approach for \nsolving a question of applicability of a penal statute \nis not ruled out by the rule of strict construction. (See \nState  of A.P.  v.  Bathu  Prakasa  Rao  [(1976)  3  SCC \n301  :  1976  SCC  (Cri)  395]  and  also  G.P.  Singh  on \nPrinciples of Statutory Interpretation, 9th Edn., 2004, \nChapter 11, Synopsis 3 at pp. 754 to 756.)”\n\n31.3  In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements,39 a Bench of three \njudges, while dealing with an issue relating to Bihar Industrial \nPromotion  Policy,  1995,  discussed  the  construction  of  penal \nstatutes. The Court observed that:\n\n38 \n\n39 \n\n[2005] Supp. 1 SCR 49 : (2005) 4 SCC 530\n\n[2004] Supp. 6 SCR 125 : (2005) 1 SCC 368\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f356 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n“26. Whenever the statute prescribes that a particular \nact is to be done in a particular manner and also lays \ndown that failure to comply with the said requirement \nleads  to  severe  consequences,  such  requirement \nwould  be  mandatory.  It  is  the  cardinal  rule  of \ninterpretation  that  where  a  statute  provides  that  a \nparticular thing should be done, it should be done in \nthe manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is \nalso settled rule of interpretation that where a statute \nis  penal  in  character,  it  must  be  strictly  construed \nand  followed.  Since  the  requirement,  in  the  instant \ncase,  of  obtaining  prior  permission  is  mandatory, \ntherefore, non-compliance with the same must result \nin  cancelling  the  concession  made  in  favour  of  the \ngrantee, the respondent herein.”\n\n31.4  The  course  of  action  to  be  adopted  by  Courts,  in  view  of \nlanguage used in the statutes has been noticed by this Court \nin  Manjit  Singh  v.  CBI,40  wherein  it  has  been  observed, \nreferring to certain other authorities, that when the language of \na provision is unambiguous it would not be open to Courts to \nadopt a hypothetical approach, leading to a different conclusion \non  the  ground  that  such  different  conclusion  would  be  more \nin sync with the objective of the statute. \n\n31.5  In Priya Indoria v.  State of Karnataka,41 the position of law \n\nwas stated as under:\n\n“84.  Maxwell  in  his  treatise  on  Interpretation  of \nStatutes (10 Edn.), p. 284 states that “the tendency \nof  modern  decisions  on  the  whole  is  to  narrow \nmaterially the difference between strict and beneficial \nconstruction”. It follows that criminal statutes such as \nthe CrPC are interpreted with rational regard to the \naim and intention of the legislature. What has to be \nborne in the judicial mind is that the interpretation of \nall statutes should be favourable to personal liberty \n\n40 \n\n41 \n\n[2011] 1 SCR 997 : (2011) 11 SCC 578\n\n[2023] 15 SCR 525 : (2024) 4 SCC 749\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n357\n\nsubject to fair and effective administration of criminal \njustice.”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n32.  Rules flowing from statutory power, have the effect of a statute. Section \n52 of the UAPA grants power to the Central Government to make Rules \nfor the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. Specifically, \nSection 52 (2)(ee) deals with the present situation, i.e., enables the \nGovernment to prescribe the time for recommendation and grant of \nsanction under Section 45. The 2008 Rules are unequivocal in both, \nusing the word ‘shall’ as also providing a specific time period for both \nactivities,  i.e.,  making  recommendation  and  granting  sanction.  In \nthe views of the High Courts discussed above, two have taken the \nview that the timelines are directory, while the other two hold them \nto be mandatory. In the former view, the word ‘shall’ is interpreted \nas  ‘may’. At  this  juncture,  it  would  be  apposite  to  refer  to  certain \npronouncements. Prior to going into that question, we may also refer \nto the well-established principles qua criminal statutes. \n\n32.1  In  Montreal  Street  Railway  Company  v.  Normandin,42  the \nJudicial Committee of the Privy Council considered the question \nof whether a certain provision in a statute imposing a duty on \na  public  body  or  authority  was  mandatory  or  directory.  The \nCourt observed that:\n\n“…The question whether provisions in a statute are \ndirectory  or  imperative  has  very  frequently  arisen \nin this country, but it has been said that no general \nrule  can  be  laid  down,  and  that  in  every  case  the \nobject  of  the  statute  must  be  looked  at. The  cases \non the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on \nStatutes, 5th ed., p. 596 and following pages. When \nthe provisions of a statute relate to the performance \nof  a  public  duty  and  the  case  is  such  that  to  hold \nnull and void acts done in neglect of this duty would \nwork  serious  general  inconvenience,  or  injustice  to \npersons  who  have  no  control  over  those  entrusted \nwith the duty, and at the same time would not promote \n\n42 \n\nLR (1917) AC 170\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f358 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nthe  main  object  of  the  Legislature,  it  has  been  the \npractice to hold such provisions to be directory only, \nthe neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting \nthe validity of the acts done.”\n\n32.2  A Bench of five learned Judges in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan \nLal Srivastava,43 while construing Article 320 of the Constitution \nof India, interpretated the words ‘shall’ and ‘may’ as under:\n\n“11. …Hence, the use of the word “shall” in a statute, \nthough generally taken in a mandatory sense, does \nnot necessarily mean that in every case it shall have \nthat effect, that is to say, that unless the words of the \nstatute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or \nthe outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. On \nthe  other  hand,  it  is  not  always  correct  to  say  that \nwhere the word “may” has been used, the statute is \nonly  permissive  or  directory  in  the  sense  that  non-\ncompliance with those provisions will not render the \nproceeding invalid. In that connection, the following \nquotation from Crawford on Statutory Construction  — \nArticle 261 at p. 516, is pertinent:\n\n“The  question  as  to  whether  a  statute \nis  mandatory  or  directory  depends  upon \nthe  intent  of  the  legislature  and  not \nupon  the  language  in  which  the  intent  is \nclothed.  The  meaning  and  intention  of \nthe  legislature  must  govern,  and  these \nare  to  be  ascertained,  not  only  from  the \nphraseology of the provision, but also by \nconsidering its nature, its design, and the \nconsequences  which  would  follow  from \nconstruing it the one way or the other….”\n\n32.3  In State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya,44 a Constitution Bench \nconsidered the interpretation of the word ‘shall’ as mandatory \nand observed as under:\n\n43 \n\n44 \n\n[1958] 1 SCR 533 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC 4\n\n[1961] 2 SCR 679 : 1960 SCC OnLine SC 5\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n359\n\n“29.  The  relevant  rules  of  interpretation  may  be \nbriefly  stated  thus  :  When  a  statute  uses  the  word \n“shall”,  prima  facie,  it  is  mandatory,  but  the  Court \nmay ascertain the real intention of the legislature by \ncarefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. \nFor ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature \nthe Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the \ndesign of the statute, and the consequences which \nwould  follow  from  construing  it  the  one  way  or  the \nother,  the  impact  of  other  provisions  whereby  the \nnecessity of complying with the provisions in question \nis avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute \nprovides for a contingency of the non-compliance with \nthe provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with \nthe provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the \nserious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, \nand, above all, whether the object of the legislation \nwill be defeated or furthered.”\n\n32.4  In Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur,45 this Court \nconsidered at length this rule of interpretation. It was observed:\n\n“21.  The  ultimate  rule  in  construing  auxiliary  verbs \nlike  “may”  and  “shall”  is  to  discover  the  legislative \nintent; and the use of the words “may” and “shall” is \nnot decisive of its discretion or mandates. The use \nof the words “may” and “shall” may help the courts \nin  ascertaining  the  legislative  intent  without  giving \nto either a controlling or a determinating effect. The \ncourts have further to consider the subject-matter, the \npurpose of the provisions, the object intended to be \nsecured by the statute which is of prime importance, \nas also the actual words employed.”\n\nAlthough in this case the Court was concerned with a land dispute, \nthe observation in respect of the use of the words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ \nare  general  principles  of  statutory  construction  and  are  therefore \nrelevant to the present discussion. \n\n45 \n\n[2008] 2 SCR 424 : (2008) 12 SCC 372\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f360 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n32.5  In Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj,46 this Court interpreted \n\nthe words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the context of CrPC as under:\n\n“12. …The use of the expression “shall” prima facie \nmakes the inquiry or the investigation, as the case \nmay  be,  by  the  Magistrate  mandatory.  The  word \n“shall” is ordinarily mandatory but sometimes, taking \ninto  account  the  context  or  the  intention,  it  can  be \nheld to be directory. The use of the word “shall” in \nall  circumstances  is  not  decisive.  Bearing  in  mind \nthe aforesaid principle, when we look to the intention \nof the legislature, we find that it is aimed to prevent \ninnocent persons from harassment by unscrupulous \npersons from false complaints. Hence, in our opinion, \nthe use of the expression “shall” and the background \nand  the  purpose  for  which  the  amendment  has \nbeen  brought,  we  have  no  doubt  in  our  mind  that \ninquiry or the investigation, as the case may be, is \nmandatory before summons are issued against the \naccused  living  beyond  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of \nthe Magistrate.”\n\n32.6  Crawford’s  Statutory  Construction  (1989  reprint),47  notes  as \nfollows in regard to ‘mandatory’ and ‘directory’ words:\n\n“Ordinarily the words ‘shall’ and ‘must’ are mandatory, \nand  the  work  ‘may’  is  directory,  although  they  are \noften used inter-changeably in legislation. This use \nwithout regard to their literal meaning generally makes \nit necessary for the courts to resort to construction in \norder to discover the real intention of the legislature. \nNevertheless, it will always be presumed by the court \nthat  the  legislature  intended  to  use  the  words  in \ntheir usual and natural meaning. If such a meaning, \nhowever, leads to absurdity, or great inconvenience, \nor  for  some  other  reason  is  clearly  contrary  to  the \nobvious  intention  of  the  legislature,  then  words \nwhich  ordinarily  are  mandatory  in  their  nature  will \n\n46 \n\n[2014] 4 SCR 171 : (2014) 14 SCC 638\n\n47  Cited in Union of India v. A.K. Pandey, (2009) 10 SCC 552\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n361\n\nbe  construed  as  directory,  or  vice  versa.  In  other \nwords, if the language of the statute, considered as \na whole and with due regard to its nature and object, \nreveals that the legislature intended the words ‘shall’ \nand ‘must’ to be directory, they should be given that \nmeaning. Similarly, under the same circumstances, \nthe word ‘may’ should be given a mandatory meaning, \nand especially where the statute concerns the rights \nand  interests  of  the  public,  or  where  third  persons \nhave a claim de jure that a power shall be exercised, \nor whenever something is directed to be done for the \nsake of justice or the public good, or is necessary to \nsustain the statute's constitutionality.\n\nYet the construction of mandatory words as directory \nand  directory  words  as  mandatory  should  not  be \nlightly  adopted.  The  opposite  meaning  should  be \nunequivocally  evidenced  before  it  is  accepted  as \nthe  true  meaning;  otherwise,  there  is  considerable \ndanger  that  the  legislative  intent  will  be  wholly  or \npartially defeated.”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n33. \n\nIn matters of strict construction, when a timeline is provided, along \nwith  the  use  of  the  word  ‘shall’  and  particularly  when  the  same  is \nin the context of a law such as the UAPA, it cannot be considered \na  mere  technicality  or  formality.  It  demonstrates  clear  intention  on \nthe  part  of  the  Legislature. A  compulsion  has  been  imposed,  and \nfor compliance with that compulsion, a timeline has been provided. \nWhile  the  legislation  is  aimed  at  curbing  unlawful  activities  and \npractices detrimental to national security and accordingly, provides \nthe  authorities  of  the  Government  ample  power  to  undertake  and \ncomplete  all  procedures  and  processes  permissible  under  law  to \nthat  end,  at  the  same  time  the  interest  of  accused  persons  must \nalso be safeguarded and protected. It is expected of the Executive, \nin  furtherance  of  the  ideal  of  protection  of  national  security,  that  it \nwould work with speed and dispatch. The concern expressed by the \nBombay High Court is that a strict interpretation of the timeline may \ndefeat  the  objective  of  the  legislation.  While  on  first  blush,  such  a \nstatement is attractive, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the time \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f362 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\ngranted is only for consideration of the material collected by way of an \nindependent review and then making a recommendation whereafter \nthe  sanctioning  authority  may  then  consider  the  materials  as  well \nas  recommendation  to  finally,  grant  or  deny  the  sanction.  It  is  not \nfor the purpose of the investigation itself, which understandably can \nbe a time-consuming process, given the multiple variables involved. \nThere  have  to  be  certain  limitations  within  which  administrative \nauthorities  of  the  Government  can  exercise  their  powers.  Without \nsuch limitations, power will enter the realm of the unbridled, which \nneedless to state is, antithetical to a democratic society. Timelines \nin such cases, serve as essential aspects of checks and balances \nand  of  course,  are  unquestionably  important.  If  the  view  of  the \nBombay and Jharkhand High Courts is allowed to stand it would be \ntantamount to the Judicial Wing supplanting its view in place of the \nlegislature which is impermissible in view of the doctrine of separation \nof  powers.  We  find  support  for  our  view  in  the  Constitution  Bench \ndecision  in  A.R.  Antulay  v.  Ramdas  Sriniwas  Nayak,48  wherein \nD.A. Desai, J., held as under:\n\n“18.  It  is  a  well-established  cannon  of  construction  that \nthe  court  should  read  the  section  as  it  is  and  cannot \nrewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does any cannon of \nconstruction permit the court to read the section in such \nmanner as to render it to some extent otiose.”\n\n[See also: Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal;49 Institute \nof  Chartered Accountants  of  India  v.  Price  Waterhouse;50*  and \nShiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers51] \n\nThe  legislative  intent  is  clear.  Rules  made  by  virtue  of  statutory \npowers  prescribe  both  a  mandate  and  a  time  limit. The  same  has \nto be followed. Here itself we may clarify that the conclusion arrived \nat by us in respect of the strict adherence to the timeline mentioned \nin  Rules  3  &  4  of  the  2008,  Rules  shall  not  affect  any  decision  of \nthe authorities where the same may or may not have been followed \n\n48 \n\n49 \n\n50 \n\n[1984] 2 SCR 914 : (1984) 2 SCC 500\n\n[1991] 3 SCR 873 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 \n\n[1997] Supp. 2 SCR 267 : (1997) 6 SCC 312\n*dissenting opinion of Saghir Ahmad, J. \n\n51 \n\n[2003] 3 SCR 762 : (2003) 6 SCC 659\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n363\n\nas on date of this judgment. For ample clarity, it is stated that the \nobservations made in this judgment shall apply prospectively. \n\nIndependent Review\n\n34.  The  bone  of  contention  in  this  regard  is  that  since  both  the \nrecommending and the granting authorities took merely a day each \nin  performing  their  respective  functions,  the  requirement  of  an \nindependent  review  which  is  to  be  undertaken  by  both  authorities \nhas been left unfulfilled thereby vitiating the sanction in question. \n\n35.  The  meaning  of  the  word  independent,  as  is  well  understood,  is \nthat the act, or as in this case, evaluation is made in a way which \nis lone standing or which does not rely on any other factor, such as \nprevious consideration or evaluation by another authority, to arrive \nat its conclusion.\n\n35.1  The  Cambridge  dictionary  defines  the  word  independent  to \n\nmean: –\n\n“not  influenced  or  controlled  in  any  way  by  other \npeople, events, or things” \n\n35.2  The Merriam Webster dictionary defines the word independent \n\nas:-\n\n“1: not dependent: such as\n\na (1): not subject to control by others ; (2): not affiliated \nwith a larger controlling unit\n\nb  (1):  not  requiring  or  relying  on  something  else  : \nnot  contingent;  (2):  not  looking  to  others  for  one’s \nopinions or for guidance in conduct; (3): not bound \nby or committed to a political party\n\nc (1): not requiring or relying on others (as for care \nor livelihood); (2): being enough to free one from the \nnecessity of working for a living\n\nd: showing a desire for freedom”\n\n35.3  The Black’s Law Dictionary defines:\n\n“INDEPENDENT.  Not  dependent;  not  subject  to \ncontrol, restriction, modification, or limitation from a \ngiven outside source.”\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f364 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nIndependence, which is the state of being independent would also \nbe instructive in our understanding. \n\n“INDEPENDENCE.  The  state  or  condition  of  being  free \nfrom dependence, subjection, or control. A state of perfect \nirresponsibility.  Political  independence  is  the  attribute  of \na  nation  or  state  which  is  entirely  autonomous,  and  not \nsubject  to  the  government,  control,  or  dictation  of  any \nexterior power.”\n\n36.  Review, as a concept is to be understood for it is the coming together \nof these two aspects which will form our understanding of the term \n‘independent review’. \n\n36.1  The Cambridge dictionary defines the word review as:\n\n“to  think  or  talk  about  something  again,  in  order  to \nmake changes to it or to make a decision about it”\n\n36.2  The  Merriam  Webster  dictionary  defines  the  word  review  to \n\nmean as:\n\n“  …2:  to  examine  or  study  again  especially  :  to \nreexamine judicially\n\n…\n\n4 a: to go over or examine critically or deliberately; \nb: to give a critical evaluation of”\n\n36.3  The  Burton’s  Legal  Thesaurus52  lists  the  following  words  as \nbeing similar to ‘review’ – analyse; comment upon; contemplari; \ncriticize;  critique;  investigate;  mull  over;  notice;  critically; \nreconsider; reexamine; scrutinize; study and weigh.\n\n37.  The  import  of  the  term  independent  review  as  can  be  understood \nfrom the above is a re-examination, scrutiny or critique of something \nwhich is not dependent or subject to control by any other factor or \nauthority.  In  the  present  facts,  independent  review  would  mean  a \ncontemplation or study of the material gathered by the investigating \nofficer to conclude as to whether or not a sanction to proceed under \nthe provisions of the UAPA ought to be granted. Similarly, at the next \n\n52  Third Edition; Page 473\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n365\n\nstage, the sanctioning authority is to mull over and critically notice \nboth  the  materials  gathered  as  also  the  conclusion  drawn  by  the \nrecommending authority, in its act of granting sanction. \n\n38.  The  legislative  intent  in  bringing  about  the  aspect  of  independent \nreview,  by  way  of  an  amendment  brought  into  effect  from  31st \nDecember  2008,  within  Section  45  of  the  UAPA  is  required  to  be \nnoticed. \n\n39.  The  Minister  for  Home Affairs  in  moving  the  draft  Bills  before  the \nCouncil of States, highlighted the intent behind such introduction as \nherein below reproduced:\n\n“Finally, Sir, we have incorporated a very salutary provision. \nTo  the  best  of  our  knowledge-I  don’t  know,  I  may  be \ncorrected by the Law Minister or the Law Secretary later - \nit is the first time we are introducing this. In a prosecution \nunder  the  UAPA,  now,  it  is  the  executive  Government \nwhich registers the case through a police officer. It is the \nexecutive Government which investigates the case through \nan investigating agency, namely, the police department. It \nis the executive Govt. which sanctions u/s. 45. Therefore, \nthere is a fear that a vindictive or a wrong executive Govt. \ncould register a case, investigate and sanction prosecution. \nThere is a fear. May be, it is not a fear that is entirely justified \nbut you cannot say that it is entirely unjustified. So what \nare we doing? The executive Govt. can register the case \nbecause no one else can register a case. The executive \nGovt., through its agency, can investigate the case. But, \nbefore sanction is granted under 45(1) we are interposing \nan  independent  authority  which  will  review  the  entire \nevidence, gathered in the investigation, and then make a \nrecommendation whether this is a fit case of prosecution. \nSo, here, we are bringing a filter, a buffer, an independent \nauthority  who  has  to  review  the  entire  evidence  that  is \ngathered and, then, make a recommendation to the State \nGovt. or the Central Govt. as the case may be, a fit case \nfor sanction. I think, this is a very salutary safeguard. All \nsections of the House should welcome it. This is a biggest \nbuffer against arbitrariness which many Members spoke \nabout. Sir, these are the features in the Bill.”\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f366 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nIn  the  statement  extracted  above,  the  idea,  purpose  and  intent \nbehind bringing in an independent authority to scrutinize the material \ngathered by the investigating agency prior to the government being \nable to issue or deny a sanction, has been clearly laid out. It was so \ndone to have checks over the power of the executive in this regard. \n\n40.  What flows from the above is that independence of this authority is \nsine qua non, without which it would have lost its entire purpose. The \nquestion, now to be considered is as to how it may be determined \nthat a particular process shone with independence or was the same \ncompromised by the clouds of influence, which may compromise its \ncharacter.\n\n40.1  In  C.S.  Krishnamurthy  v.  State  of  Karnataka,53  the  Court \nspeaking in the context of a sanction order under PC Act held:\n\n“9. Therefore, the ratio is sanction order should speak \nfor  itself  and  in  case  the  facts  do  not  so  appear, \nit  should  be  proved  by  leading  evidence  that  all \nthe  particulars  were  placed  before  the  sanctioning \nauthority  for  due  application  of  mind.  In  case  the \nsanction  speaks  for  itself  then  the  satisfaction  of \nthe sanctioning authority is apparent by reading the \norder…”\n\nThis was also referred to in State of M.P. v. Harishankar Bhagwan \nPrasad Tripathi.54\n\n40.2  In State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain,55 after considering \na host of authorities, including some that have been cited before \nin the present case, the following factors were culled out:\n\n“14.1. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that \nthe valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning \nauthority after being satisfied that a case for sanction \nhas been made out.\n\n14.2. The sanction order may expressly show that the \nsanctioning authority has perused the material placed \n\n53 \n\n54 \n\n55 \n\n[2005] 2 SCR 1163 : (2005) 4 SCC 81\n\n[2010] 9 SCR 1148 : (2010) 8 SCC 655\n\n[2013] 3 SCR 850 : (2013) 8 SCC 119\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n367\n\nbefore it and, after consideration of the circumstances, \nhas granted sanction for prosecution.\n\n14.3.  The  prosecution  may  prove  by  adducing  the \nevidence  that  the  material  was  placed  before  the \nsanctioning authority and its satisfaction was arrived \nat upon perusal of the material placed before it.\n\n14.4.  Grant  of  sanction  is  only  an  administrative \nfunction and the sanctioning authority is required to \nprima facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts \nwould constitute the offence.\n\n14.5.  The  adequacy  of  material  placed  before  the \nsanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court \nas it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order.\n\n14.6. If the sanctioning authority has perused all the \nmaterials  placed  before  it  and  some  of  them  have \nnot  been  proved  that  would  not  vitiate  the  order  of \nsanction.\n\n14.7.  The  order  of  sanction  is  a  prerequisite  as \nit  is  intended  to  provide  a  safeguard  to  a  public \nservant against frivolous and vexatious litigants, but \nsimultaneously  an  order  of  sanction  should  not  be \nconstrued  in  a  pedantic  manner  and  there  should \nnot be a hypertechnical approach to test its validity.”\n\nIn the very same judgment, it was observed that “grant of sanction is \na sacrosanct and sacred act” whose aim is to protect a public servant \nagainst vexatious litigation. However, when the order of sanction is \n(a) by a competent authority and (b) after due application of mind, it \ncannot be dealt with lightly or, in other words, summarily discarded. \n\n40.3  Recently,  in  Judgebir  Singh  v.  National  Investigation \nAgency,56 while examining the application of Rules 3 & 4 of \n2008 Rules, this court observed:\n\n“50. …We place emphasis on the expression “within \n7  working  days  of  the  receipt  of  the  evidence \n\n56 \n\n[2023] 6 SCR 1 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 543\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f368 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\ngathered  by  the  investigating  officer  under  the \nCrPC”.  This  evidence  which  Rule  3  of  the  Rules, \n2008  contemplates  is  the  final  report  i.e.,  filed  by \nthe  investigating  agency  under  Section  173  of  the \nCrPC.  How  can  one  expect  the  authority  under \nsub  section  (2)  of  Section  45  to  make  its  report \ncontaining the recommendations without looking into \nthe chargesheet thoroughly containing the evidence \ngathered by the investigating officer. On the contrary, \nRule  3  of  the  Rules,  2008  makes  it  explicitly \nclear that the authority under sub section (2) of \nSection 45 of the UAPA is obliged in law to apply \nits mind thoroughly to the evidence gathered by \nthe  investigating  officer  and  thereafter,  prepare \nits report containing the recommendations to the \nCentral Government or the State government for \nthe grant of sanction. The grant of sanction is not \nan  idle  formality.  The  grant  of  sanction  should \nreflect proper application of mind.\n\n(Emphasis in original)\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n40.4  In  State  of  Punjab  v.  Mohd.  Iqbal  Bhatti,57  the  position  of \n\nlaw was stated thus:\n\n“7.  Validity  of  an  order  of  sanction  would  depend \nupon application of mind on the part of the authority \nconcerned  and  the  material  placed  before  it.  All \nsuch  material  facts  and  material  evidence  must  be \nconsidered by it. The sanctioning authority must apply \nits mind on such material facts and evidence collected \nduring  the  investigation.  Even  such  application  of \nmind  does  not  appear  from  the  order  of  sanction, \nextrinsic  evidence  may  be  placed  before  the  court \nin that behalf. While granting sanction, the authority \ncannot take into consideration an irrelevant fact nor \ncan  it  pass  an  order  on  extraneous  consideration \n\n57 \n\n[2009] 11 SCR 790 : (2009) 17 SCC 92\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n369\n\nnot germane for passing a statutory order. It is also \nwell  settled  that  the  superior  courts  cannot  direct \nthe sanctioning authority either to grant sanction or \nnot to do so…”\n\n40.5  In  State  (NCT  of  Delhi)  v.  Navjot  Sandhu,58  this  Court \nconsidered in extenso the provisions and scheme of the TADA \nin connection with the ‘2001 Parliament Attack’. For the present \njudgment certain observations made in regard to sanctions are \nrelevant. They are summarised as follows:- \n\n40.5.1  What is to be considered is whether the material \nwhich  formed  the  raison  d’être  of  the  allegations  was \nactually placed before the authority.\n\n40.5.2  A  reiteration  of  the  contents  of  the  FIR  or \ndraft  chargesheet  does  not  constitute  consideration  or \napplication of mind. It has to be something further than \nthat. \n\n40.5.3  The  order  of  sanction  or  recommendation  or \ngrant  of  sanction,  both  should  on  their  face  indicate \nconsideration of all relevant material. \n\n40.5.4  The standard to be applied in ‘judging’ sanction \norders is not the same as that applied to orders of quasi-\njudicial bodies for it is a purely an administrative function. \n\n40.6  The  observations  of  this  Court  in  State  of  Bihar  v.  P.P. \nSharma,59 are instructive. Relevant extract is as under:\n\n“27.  The  sanction  under  Section  197  CrPC  is  not \nan empty formality. It is essential that the provisions \ntherein are to be observed with complete strictness. \nThe object of obtaining sanction is that the authority \nconcerned should be able to consider for itself the \nmaterial  before  the  Investigating  Officer,  before  it \ncomes  to  the  conclusion  that  the  prosecution  in \nthe  circumstances  be  sanctioned  or  forbidden.  To \ncomply  with  the  provisions  of  Section  197  it  must \n\n58 \n\n59 \n\n[2005] Supp. 2 SCR 79 : (2005) 11 SCC 600\n\n1992 Supp (1) SCC 222\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f370 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nbe  proved  that  the  sanction  was  given  in  respect \nof  the  facts  constituting  the  offence  charged.  It  is \ndesirable that the facts should be referred to on the \nface of the sanction. Section 197 does not require \nthe sanction to be in any particular form. If the facts \nconstituting the offence charged are not shown on \nthe face of the sanction, it is open to the prosecution, \nif  challenged,  to  prove  before  the  court  that  those \nfacts were placed before the sanctioning authority. \nIt should be clear from the form of the sanction that \nthe  sanctioning  authority  considered  the  relevant \nmaterial  placed  before  it  and  after  a  consideration \nof  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  it  sanctioned \nthe prosecution.”\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n41.  Having given our attention to the position of law as above, let us now \nturn to the instant facts. Simply put, the objection of the appellant \narises from the short amount of time taken in recommending and \ngranting sanction, against him which he claims to be sign of non-\napplication of mind and lack of independent review. We are unable \nto  accept  such  a  contention.  There  is  nothing  on  record  to  show \nthat relevant material was not placed before the authorities. There \nis  no  question,  as  there  rightly  cannot  be,  on  the  competence  of \neither  of  the  authorities.  Therefore,  solely  on  the  ground  that  the \ntime taken was comparatively short or even that other orders were \nsimilarly  worded  cannot  call  the  credibility  of  the  sanction  into \nquestion. As has been noted in Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. \nDeepak  Chowdhary,60  the  authorities  are  required  only  to  reach \na  prima  facie  satisfaction  that  the  relevant  facts,  as  gathered  in \nthe  investigation  would  constitute  the  offence  or  not.  In  Mahesh \nG.  Jain  (supra)  it  has  been  held  that  the  prosecution  is  to  prove \nthat a valid sanction has been granted. This needless to state, can \nonly be done by adducing evidence at trial, where the defence in \nchallenge thereto, will necessarily have to be given an opportunity \nto question the same and put forward its case that the two essential \nrequirements  detailed  above,  have  not  been  met.  Furthermore, \n\n60 \n\n[1995] Supp. 2 SCR 818 : (1995) 6 SCC 225\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n371\n\nin  Mohd.  Iqbal  M.  Shaikh  v.  State  of  Maharashtra,61  a  case \nunder the TADA, this Court was faced with a similar situation, the \nsanction wherein was granted by the competent authority, i.e., the \nCommissioner of Police, Greater Bombay on the same day that he \nreceived the papers in that regard. The contention of non-application \nof mind was not accepted by the Court observing that so long as \nthe  sanction  was  by  a  competent  authority  and  after  applying  its \nmind to all materials and the same being reflected in the order, the \nsanction  would  hold  to  be  valid.  It  was  further  held  that  when  an \norder  does  not  so  indicate,  the  prosecution  is  entitled  to  adduce \nevidence aliunde of the person who granted the sanction and that \nwould be sufficient compliance. The Court would then, look into such \nevidence to arrive at a conclusion as to whether application of mind \nwas  present  or  absent.  In  conclusion,  we  hold  that  independent \nreview as well as application of mind are questions to be determined \nby way of evidence and as such should be raised at the stage of \ntrial, so as to ensure that there is no undue delay in the proceedings \nreaching  their  logical  and  lawful  conclusion  on  these  grounds. As \na result of the conclusion drawn by this Court on the first issue, it \nis also to be said that if the sanction is taken exception to, on the \nabove grounds, it has to be raised at the earliest instance and not \nbelatedly,  however,  law  does  not  preclude  the  same  from  being \nchallenged at a later stage. It is to be noted that the scheme of the \nUAPA  does  not  house  a  provision  such  as  Section  19  of  the  PC \nAct62 which protects proceedings having been initiated on the basis \nof sanctions which come to be questioned at a later point in time \n\n61 \n\n62 \n\n[1998] 2 SCR 734 : (1998) 4 SCC 494\n\n19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.— \n…\n(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— \n(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in \nappeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, \nthe sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in \nfact been occasioned thereby; \n(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity \nin the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has \nresulted in a failure of justice; \n(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise \nthe powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other \nproceedings. \n\n(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity \nin, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact \nwhether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f372 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nand,  therefore,  Courts  ought  to  be  careful  in  entertaining  belated \nchallenges. If it is raised belatedly, however, the Court seized of the \nmatter, must consider the reasons for the delay prior to delving into \nthe merits of such objections. This we may say so for the reason \nthat belated challenges on these grounds cannot be allowed to act \nas  roadblocks  in  trial  or  cannot  be  used  as  weapons  in  shirking \naway  from  convictions  arising  out  of  otherwise  validly  conducted \nprosecutions and trials.\n\nAn order passed by an administrative authority is not to be tested by \nway of judicial review on the same anvil as a judicial or quasi-judicial \norder. While it is imperative for the latter to record reasons for arriving \nat a particular decision, for the former it is sufficient to show that the \nauthority  passing  such  order  applied  its  mind  to  the  relevant  facts \nand  materials  [See:  P.P.  Sharma  (supra);  Navjot  Sandhu  (supra) \nand Mahesh G. Jain (supra)] That being the accepted position we \nfind no infirmity in the order granting sanction against A-17. It is not \nincumbent upon such authority to record detailed reasons to support \nits  conclusion  and,  as  such,  the  orders  challenged  herein,  cannot \nbe faulted with on that ground. \n\nISSUE No.3 – Misjoinder of Charges and Violation of CrPC\n\n42.  The appellant contends that two disjointed transactions have been \ntaken together, to make him an accused and a member of the larger \nconspiracy.  The  respondent-Union  on  the  other  hand  argues  that \nall the transactions (First Module, Second Module, as also the one \nfor which the Appellant was made an accused) are inter-connected \nand flow from the first sanction. Further, it has been alleged by the \nappellants that there is a gross misuse of powers by the NIA and a \nviolation of Sections 218-224 of CrPC. \n\n43.  Section 218 features in Chapter XVII of the CrPC titled ‘The Charge’ \nand more specifically Part B thereof, which is joinder of charges. In \na sense, the appellant has alleged violation of an entire part of the \nchapter,  which  submission  on  the  face  of  it  is  difficult  to  accept.  It \n\nExplanation.—For the purposes of this section,— \n(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; \n(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall \nbe at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement \nof a similar nature.\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n373\n\nrequires no reiteration that a person when alleging the contravention \nof a section or portion of statute, has to substantiate the same by \ndemonstrating which aspect of the section stood not complied with \nand how such non-compliance has prejudicially affected him. In the \npresent case, however, we are confronted with a sweeping statement \nof contravention of provisions of the CrPC with little to no explanation \nas to how that may be the case. \n\n43.1  Section  218  provides,  first,  that  there  should  be  a  separate \ncharge for each distinct offence; and secondly, that there should \nbe a separate trial for every such charge, except in the four \ncases mentioned in Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223. \n\n43.2  Section 219 provides that the three charges of three offences \nof the same kind committed within one year be tried together. \nThe  section  contemplates  a  joint  trial  for  three  separate \noffences only when the offences are essentially of a simple \nkind and do not require the framing of a multitude of different \ncharges. \n\n43.3  Section  220  relates  to  the  joinder  of  charges  of  offences \ncommitted  by  the  same  person.  It  applies  to  a  case,  when \ndifferent offences form part of the same transaction, and are \ncommitted by the same person, then he may be charged with \nand tried at one trial for, every such offence. \n\n43.4  Section 221 provides for cases where it is doubtful what offence \nhas been committed. If a single act or series of acts is of such \nnature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts, \nwhich can be proved will constitute, the charge can be framed \nfor  all  offences  or  alternative  charges  can  be  framed. At  the \ntrial,  if  it  is  established  that  the  accused  has  committed  an \noffence, he may be convicted though he may not have been \ncharged with the offence. \n\n43.5  Section  222  applies  to  cases  in  which  the  charge  is  of  an \noffence  which  consists  of  several  particulars,  a  combination \nof some only of which constitutes a complete minor offence. \n\n43.6  Section 223 provides for joinder of charges against more than \none accused person in the same trial. It deals with the plurality \nof persons, who can be tried together, in other words, the joint \ntrial of more than one person. \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f374 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\n43.7  Section  224  deals  with  withdrawal  of  remaining  charges  on \n\nconviction on one of several charges. \n\n44.  Sections  218  to  222  pertain  to  the  joinder  of  charges  against  the \nsame  person  in  the  same  trial.  Section  223  deals  with  plurality  of \npersons,  i.e.,  more  than  one  accused  in  the  same  trial.  We  may \nnotice a few decisions of this Court, to put the application of these \nprovisions, in context.\n\n44.1  In  Balbir  v.  State  of  Haryana,63  a  Bench  of  three  learned \n\nJudges observed as under: \n\n“11.  …In  both  the  aforesaid  clauses  the  primary \ncondition is that persons should have been accused \neither  of  the  same  offence  or  of  different  offences \n“committed  in  the  course  of  the  same  transaction”. \nThe expression advisedly  used is  “in  the course  of \nthe  same  transaction”.  That  expression  is  not  akin \nto saying “in respect of the same subject-matter”. It \nis  pertinent  to  point  out  that  the  same  expression \nis  employed  in  Section  220(1)  of  the  Code  also \n[corresponding  to  Section  235(1)  of  the  old  Code]. \nThe meaning of the expression “in the course of the \nsame transaction” used in Section 223 is not materially \ndifferent from that expression used in Section 223(1) \n[sic 235(1)]. It is so understood by this Court in State \nof A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao [AIR 1963 SC \n1850 : (1964) 3 SCR 297] . The following observation \nin the said judgment is contextually quotable:\n\n“The  series  of  acts  which  constitute  a \ntransaction must of necessity be connected \nwith  one  another  and  if  some  of  them \nstand  out  independently,  they  would  not \nform  part  of  the  same  transaction  but \nwould  constitute  a  different  transaction \nor  transactions.  Therefore,  even  if  the \nexpression  ‘same  transaction’  alone  had \nbeen used in Section 235(1) it would have \n\n63 \n\n[1999] Supp. 4 SCR 120 : (2000) 1 SCC 285\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n375\n\nmeant  a  transaction  consisting  either  of \na  single  act  or  of  a  series  of  connected \nacts.  The  expression  ‘same  transaction’ \noccurring  in  clauses  (a),  (c)  and  (d)  of \nSection  239  as  well  as  that  occurring  in \nSection 235(1) ought to be given the same \nmeaning  according  to  the  normal  rule  of \nconstruction of statutes.”\n\n12.  For  several  offences  to  be  part  of  the  same \ntransaction,  the  test  which  has  to  be  applied  is \nwhether they are so related to one another in point \nof purpose or of cause and effect, or as principal and \nsubsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. \nThus,  where  there  is  a  commonality  of  purpose  or \ndesign, where there is a continuity of action, then all \nthose persons involved can be accused of the same \nor different offences “committed in the course of the \nsame transaction”.”\n\n44.2  In R. Dineshkumar v. State,64 this Court considered the aspect \n\nof ‘transaction’ in the following terms:\n\n“…19.3. This Court after taking note of the fact that \nthe clause “same transaction” is not defined under the \nCrPC opined that the meaning of the clause should \ndepend upon the facts of each case. However, this \nCourt indicated that where there is a proximity of time \nor place or unity of purpose and design or continuity \nof action in respect of a series of acts, it is possible \nto infer that they form part of the same transaction. \nThis  Court  also  cautioned  that  every  one  of  the \nabovementioned  elements  need  not  co-exist  for  a \ntransaction to be regarded as the “same transaction”.\n\n20.  According  to  us,  the  principle  enunciated  in \nGaneswara Rao case [AIR 1963 SC 1850 : (1963) 2 \nCri LJ 671] is that where several persons are alleged \nto have committed several separate offences, which, \n\n64 \n\n[2015] 5 SCR 605 : (2015) 7 SCC 497\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f376 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nhowever, are not wholly unconnected, then there may \nbe a joint trial unless such joint trial is likely to cause \neither embarrassment or difficulty to the accused in \ndefending themselves.”\n\n44.3  In  Nasib  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab,65  DY  Chandrachud,  J \n(as his Lordship then was) speaking for a three-judge Bench \nformulated  the  following  principles  in  respect  of  joint  or \nseparate trials:\n\n“51.1. Section 218 provides that separate trials shall \nbe  conducted  for  distinct  offences  alleged  to  be \ncommitted  by  a  person.  Sections  219-221  provide \nexceptions to this general rule. If a person falls under \nthese  exceptions,  then  a  joint  trial  for  the  offences \nwhich a person is charged with may be conducted. \nSimilarly, under Section 223, a joint trial may be held \nfor persons charged with different offences if any of \nthe  clauses  in  the  provision  are  separately  or  on  a \ncombination satisfied.\n\n51.2.  While  applying  the  principles  enunciated  in \nSections 218-223 on conducting joint and separate \ntrials, the trial court should apply a two-pronged test, \nnamely, (i) whether conducting a joint/separate trial \nwill prejudice the defence of the accused; and/or (ii) \nwhether conducting a joint/separate trial would cause \njudicial delay.\n\n51.3.  The  possibility  of  conducting  a  joint  trial  will \nhave  to  be  determined  at  the  beginning  of  the  trial \nand  not  after  the  trial  based  on  the  result  of  the \ntrial. The appellate court may determine the validity \nof  the  argument  that  there  ought  to  have  been  a \nseparate/joint  trial  only  based  on  whether  the  trial \nhad prejudiced the right of accused or the prosecutrix.\n\n51.4. Since the provisions which engraft an exception \nuse  the  phrase  “may”  with  reference  to  conducting \na joint trial, a separate trial is usually not contrary to \n\n65 \n\n[2021] 13 SCR 566 : (2022) 2 SCC 89\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n377\n\nlaw  even  if  a  joint  trial  could  be  conducted,  unless \nproven to cause a miscarriage of justice.\n\n51.5. A conviction or acquittal of the accused cannot \nbe  set  aside  on  the  mere  ground  that  there  was  a \npossibility of a joint or a separate trial. To set aside \nthe order of conviction or acquittal, it must be proved \nthat the rights of the parties were prejudiced because \nof the joint or separate trial, as the case may be.”\n\nThe case of appellant, as is evident from the record, falls under the \nlatter category, i.e., multiple persons in the same trial (appellant is \nA-17  out  of  a  total  of  20  accused  persons).  It  has  been  held  that \njoint or separate trial is a decision to be taken by the learned trial \nJudge at the beginning of the trial considering (a) the possibility of \nprejudice; and b) causing judicial delay, if any. Further, the language of \nSection 223 is directory in nature, signified by the use of word ‘may’. \n\n45.  Naseeb  Singh  (supra)  holds  that  a  separate  trial  would  not  be \ncontrary to law unless a miscarriage of justice can be demonstrated. \nSimilarly,  we  are  of  the  view  that  a  joint  trial,  if  held,  after  having \nconsidered the two factors given above, cannot be said to be ipso \nfacto prejudicial to the parties. \n\n46. \n\nIt  is  alleged  that  Dinesh  Gope  (A-6),  who  is  the  Chief  of  PLFI, \nextorts money from various persons and that this company (A-20) \nof which the present appellant is a director, is used to legitimise the \nproceeds of such unlawful actions. The appellant, however, contends \nthat there is no connection between the charges levied on A-6 and \nthe transactions because of which he has been made an accused, \nwhereas the Prosecution submits that both A-6 and A-17 are part of \nthe same, continuing, ongoing transactions. Whether or not actually \nthe case is a question to be decided on the basis of evidence adduced \nat trial, and not at this stage, by this Court. In State of U.P. v. Paras \nNath Singh,66 the Court observed as under:\n\n“8.  …As  the  provision  itself  mandates  that  no  finding, \nsanction  or  order  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction \nbecomes invalid unless it is so that a failure of justice has \nin fact been occasioned because of any error, omission or \n\n66 \n\n[2009] 8 SCR 85 : (2009) 6 SCC 372 \n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f378 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nirregularity in the charge including in misjoinder of charge, \nobviously,  the  burden  is  on  the  accused  to  show  that  in \nfact a failure of justice has been occasioned.”\n\nTherefore, we leave it to the appellants to raise this issue before the \nTrial Judge, who shall, if such a question is raised, decide it promptly \nat the appropriate stage.\n\nISSUE No. 4 – Whether Section 22A applies to the Appellant?\n\n47.  Section 22A of the UAPA reads as under: \n\n“22A. Offences by companies.—\n\n(1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed \nby a company, every person (including promoters of the \ncompany)  who,  at  the  time  the  offence  was  committed, \nwas  in  charge  of,  and  was  responsible  to,  the  company \nfor the conduct of the business of the company, as well as \nthe company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence \nand shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished \naccordingly: \n\nProvided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall \nrender  any  such  person  (including  promoters)  liable  to \nany punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the \noffence was committed without his knowledge or that he \nhad exercised reasonable care to prevent the commission \nof such offence. \n\n(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-section \n(1), where an offence under this Act has been committed \nby  a  company  and  it  is  proved  that  the  offence  has \nbeen committed with the consent or connivance of, or is \nattributable to, any neglect on the part of, any promoter, \ndirector, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, \nsuch promoter, director, manager, secretary or other officer \nshall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall \nbe liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. \n\nExplanation.—For  the  purposes  of  this  section,—  (a) \n“company” means any body corporate and includes a firm \nor  other  association  of  individuals;  and  (b)  “director”,  in \nrelation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n379\n\n48.  For Section 22A to apply :- (a) offence has to committed by a company; \n(b)  all  persons  who  at  the  time  of  the  offence  were  in  control  of, \nor  responsible  for,  the  company’s  affairs  shall  be  deemed  guilty; \n(c) such person would be saved from guilt as under (b) if they can \ndemonstrate  that  such  act  was  (i)  not  in  their  knowledge;  (ii)  they \nhad taken reasonable care to prevent such offence from taking place. \nThe section further provides that if it can be proved that the offence \ncommitted by the company was (1) with consent; (2) in connivance \nof; (3) attributable to neglect on the part of any promoter, director, \nmanager, secretary or any other officer of the company, then they \nshall be held guilty. \n\n49.  The case put forward by the appellant is that he, who is allegedly a \ndirector of A-20 is saved by the statutory language which provides \nthat  if  a  person  could  demonstrate  and  prove  that  the  offence \nwas  committed  without  his  knowledge,  he  would  be  exempt  from \nprosecution. This exemption is recognized in other statutes as well. \nWe may take support of pronouncements of this Court with reference \nto Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 188167 \nsince the latter is similarly worded and phrased. \n\n“141. Offences by companies.—\n\n(1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 \nis a company, every person who, at the time the offence \nwas  committed,  was  in  charge  of,  and  was  responsible \nto,  the  company  for  the  conduct  of  the  business  of  the \ncompany, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be \nguilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded \nagainst and punished accordingly: \n\nProvided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall \nrender any person liable to punishment if he proves that \nthe  offence  was  committed  without  his  knowledge,  or \nthat  he  had  exercised  all  due  diligence  to  prevent  the \ncommission of such offence: \n\nProvided  further  that  where  a  person  is  nominated  as \na  Director  of  a  company  by  virtue  of  his  holding  any \noffice or employment in the Central Government or State \n\n67 \n\n‘NI Act’ for short\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f380 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nGovernment or a financial corporation owned or controlled \nby the Central Government or the State Government, as \nthe  case  may  be,  he  shall  not  be  liable  for  prosecution \nunder this Chapter.\n\n(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), \nwhere  any  offence  under  this Act  has  been  committed \nby  a  company  and  it  is  proved  that  the  offence  has \nbeen committed with the consent or connivance of, or is \nattributable  to,  any  neglect  on  the  part  of,  any  director, \nmanager, secretary or other officer of the company, such \ndirector, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be \ndeemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to \nbe proceeded against and punished accordingly. \n\nExplanation.—For the purposes of this section, — \n\n(a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a \nfirm or other association of individuals; and \n\n(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the \nfirm.”\n\n49.1  In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla,68 a Bench of \nthree Judges held that only a person who is in charge of the \naffairs of the company, i.e., a director, manager or secretary \nand  alongside  that  was  connected  to  the  criminal  act  being \ncommitted, would be liable under this section. Relevant portion \nthereof reads thus: \n\n“10. …What is required is that the persons who are \nsought to be made criminally liable under Section 141 \nshould  be,  at  the  time  the  offence  was  committed, \nin charge of and responsible to the company for the \nconduct of the business of the company. Every person \nconnected with the company shall not fall within the \nambit of the provision. It is only those persons who \nwere in charge of and responsible for the conduct of \nbusiness of the company at the time of commission \nof an offence, who will be liable for criminal action. It \n\n68 \n\n[2007] 2 SCR 862 : (2005) 8 SCC 89 \n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n381\n\nfollows from this that if a director of a company who \nwas not in charge of and was not responsible for the \nconduct of the business of the company at the relevant \ntime, will not be liable under the provision. The liability \narises from being in charge of and responsible for the \nconduct of business of the company at the relevant \ntime  when  the  offence  was  committed  and  not  on \nthe  basis  of  merely  holding  a  designation  or  office \nin a company. Conversely, a person not holding any \noffice or designation in a company may be liable if \nhe satisfies the main requirement of being in charge \nof and responsible for the conduct of business of a \ncompany at the relevant time. Liability depends on the \nrole one plays in the affairs of a company and not on \ndesignation or status. If being a director or manager \nor  secretary  was  enough  to  cast  criminal  liability, \nthe  section  would  have  said  so.  Instead  of  “every \nperson” the section would have said “every director, \nmanager or secretary in a company is liable”…, etc. \nThe legislature is aware that it is a case of criminal \nliability which means serious consequences so far as \nthe  person  sought  to  be  made  liable  is  concerned. \nTherefore,  only  persons  who  can  be  said  to  be \nconnected  with  the  commission  of  a  crime  at  the \nrelevant time have been subjected to action.”\n\n49.2  This is the settled position of law which has been subsequently \nbeing  reiterated  in  numerous  judgments  of  this  Court. \nIllustratively, the recent judgment in Susela Padmavathy Amma \nv.  Bharti Airtel  Ltd.,69  referring  to  S.M.S.  Pharmaceuticals \n(supra) acquitted the appellant therein of the offences under \nSection  138  NI Act.  Gavai,  J.,  speaking  for  the  Bench  held \nas under:\n\n“21.  It  was  held  that  merely  because  a  person  is \na  director  of  a  company,  it  is  not  necessary  that \nhe  is  aware  about  the  day-today  functioning  of  the \ncompany. This Court held that there is no universal \n\n69 \n\n[2024] 3 SCR 647 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 311\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f382 \n\n[2024] 10 S.C.R.\n\nrule that a director of a company is in charge of its \neveryday affairs. It was, therefore, necessary, to aver \nas to how the director of the company was in charge \nof day-to-day affairs of the company or responsible \nto the affairs of the company. This Court, however, \nclarified that the position of a managing director or a \njoint managing director in a company may be different. \nThis  Court  further  held  that  these  persons,  as  the \ndesignation  of  their  office  suggests,  are  in  charge \nof  a  company  and  are  responsible  for  the  conduct \nof the business of the company. To escape liability, \nthey  will  have  to  prove  that  when  the  offence  was \ncommitted, they had no knowledge of the offence or \nthat they exercised all due diligence to prevent the \ncommission of the offence.”\n\n[See also: N. Rangachari v. BSNL;70 Central Bank of India v. Asian \nGlobal Ltd.;71 Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta;72 and Rajesh \nViren Shah v. Redington India Ltd.73]\n\n50.  Turning  our  attention  to  the  facts  of  the  present  case  once  more, \nwe find that in opposing the stand that he is a director, the appellant \nsubmits that he, in fact, is an uneducated person who is a munshi and \nwhose identity has been stolen by A-7 & A-14. That being the case, \nthis Court cannot, at this stage, decide whether Section 22A applies \nto the appellant or not. This is once again a matter for evidence. \n\nCONCLUSION\n\n51.  Consequent to the discussion made herein above, the conclusions \ndrawn  by  this  Court  in  respect  of  the  questions  of  law  for  our \nconsideration, are as under:\n\n51.1  The  validity  of  sanction  should  be  challenged  at  the  earliest \ninstance available, before the Trial Court. If such a challenge is \nraised at an appellate stage it would be for the person raising \nthe challenge  to justify the reasons for bringing the same at \n\n70 \n\n71 \n\n72 \n\n73 \n\n[2007] 5 SCR 329 : (2007) 5 SCC 108\n\n[2010] 7 SCR 694 : (2010) 11 SCC 203\n\n[2014] 10 SCR 1117 : (2015) 1 SCC 103\n\n(2024) 4 SCC 305\n\nDigital Supreme Court Reports\f[2024] 10 S.C.R.  \n\n383\n\na belated stage. Such reasons would have to be considered \nindependently so as to ensure that there is no misuse of the \nright of challenge with the aim to stall or delay proceedings. \n\n51.2  The  timelines  mentioned  in  Rules  3  &  4  of  the  2008  Rules \nare  couched  in  mandatory  language  and,  therefore,  have  to \nbe strictly followed. This is keeping in view that UAPA being \na penal legislation, strict construction must be accorded to it. \nTimelines imposed by way of statutory Rules are a way to keep \na check on executive power which is a necessary position to \nprotect the rights of accused persons. Independent review by \nboth  the  authority  recommending  sanction  and  the  authority \ngranting sanction, are necessary aspects of compliance with \nSection 45 of the UAPA.\n\n52.  For  the  next  two  questions,  which  depend  on  analysis  of  facts  for \n\ntheir conclusions, their answers are as below :\n\n52.1  Sections 218-222, CrPC, are not violated. In respect of Section \n223, the position of law is the one taken in Paras Nath Singh \n(supra). Therefore, this Court prudently leaves it for the Trial \nCourt to decide, if such an issue is raised before it. \n\n52.2  Whether or not the exemption under Section 22A applies is a \nmatter to be established by the way of evidence for the person \nclaiming such exemption has to demonstrate that either he was \nnot in charge of the affairs of the company which has allegedly \ncommitted the offence, or that he had made reasonable efforts \nto prevent the commission of the offence. This, once again, is \na matter for the Trial Court to consider and not for this Court to \ndecide at this stage, keeping in view that the trial is underway \nand proceeded substantially. \n\n53.  For the reasons afore-stated, the appeal lacks merit and, accordingly, \nis dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. \n\nResult of the Case: Appeal dismissed.\n\n†Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain\n\nFuleshwar Gope v. Union of India & Ors.\f"}