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README.md
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---
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dtype: float64
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splits:
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- name: train
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num_bytes: 242348
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num_examples: 550
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download_size: 150183
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dataset_size: 242348
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configs:
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- config_name: default
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data_files:
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- split: train
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path: data/train-*
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license: mit
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task_categories:
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- text-classification
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language:
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- en
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tags:
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- safety
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- jailbreak
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- gcg
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- adversarial
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- llm
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# harmeval-gcg-llama3-1b
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HarmEval ([SoftMINER-Group/HarmEval](https://huggingface.co/datasets/SoftMINER-Group/HarmEval)) augmented with adversarial suffixes generated via the **Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG)** attack method, optimized specifically against **Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct**.
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Each harmful prompt is paired with a GCG-optimized adversarial suffix that, when appended to the original question, maximizes the probability of the model producing a target harmful response.
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## Columns
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| Column | Description |
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|---|---|
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| `question` | Original harmful prompt from HarmEval |
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| `target` | Target response prefix used during GCG optimization (e.g. `"Sure, here is the answer:"`) |
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| `attack` | Raw GCG adversarial suffix (gibberish token sequence) |
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| `adv_prompt` | Full adversarial prompt: `question + attack` (ready to use as model input) |
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| `best_loss` | Cross-entropy loss of the target at the end of optimization (lower = stronger attack) |
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## Statistics
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- **550 rows** (one per HarmEval question)
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- Suffix search run for a fixed budget of GCG steps targeting Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct
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## Intended use
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Evaluating the robustness of safety classifiers (e.g. linear probes, GLP diffusion models) against GCG-style adversarial inputs at the activation level.
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