{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00261/2020","text":"The Spanish DPA held that the access request was properly fulfilled, in spite of being properly attended after claim admission, so it decided not to impose any fine nor warning to the defendant.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - TD/00261/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/526196/ HA RK / 21-01","text":"First, the Court acknowledged that the right to inspection under article 15 GDPR is not absolute or unlimited, but that its purpose is to enable the data subject to check if their personal data has been processed lawfully and in a correct manner. Moreover, the court acknowledged that an exception to this right are circumstances where it is impossible to fulfill this obligation adequately.\nIn addition, the court acknowledged that the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity must be complied in the recording of the personal data, as well as the maintaining of the data and subsequent changes. Moreover, the interference with personal data is only allowed for the purposes served by the processing, where the processing is the only possible way to achieve these purposes successfully.\nIn relation to the first request, the Court concluded that the information which was initially provided by the controller to the data subject was sufficient, meeting all the requirements in article 12 GDPR. Precisely, this information was provided in a clear and concise manner.\nIn relation to the fourth request, the Court concluded that the data controller was under no obligation to provide the data subject with the complete file. Precisely, in relation to the data subject’s medical personal data, the Court found that the data controller was right to inform the data subject of the medical adviser who had his personal data at disposal and concluded that this was done in a clear and concise manner. Therefore, the data controller did not breach the duty to inform.\nIn relation to the obligation to inform the data subject of the information submitted by Ms D, the Court found that the data controller was under no such obligation due to the circumstances of the case. In particular, the information submitted by Ms D was the divorce covenant. Therefore, it was reasonable of the controller to assume that the data subject had the divorce covenant at his disposal, which is why it was not necessary to inform him about this. For this argument, reference was made to article 14(5)(a) GDPR.\nMoreover, the Court concluded that the data controller did not communicate the data subject's personal data to third parties, other than Ms D. Specifically, the Court found that this claim by the data subject was found on an unsound factual basis.\nThe court also concluded that the data controller had a sufficient and plausible legal basis to request information from Ms D for the purposes of arriving at a correct financial settlement.\nIn relation to a summary and transcripts of conducted (phone) conversations, emails and apps, the Court concluded that the data controller did not violate their obligation. To specify, the Court explained that according to article 15 GDPR, the data subject is only entitled to an inspection of the personal data in these email conversations relating to him. The data controller argued that after verification, such personal data was included in the information initially provided to the data subject before the proceeding in Court. The data subject did not sufficiently object to this.\nMoreover, the Court noted that the possible internal notes in the data subjects’ file by the data controller’s employees also fall under the grounds of restriction under article 23 GDPR.\nThe court found two infringements by the data controller.\nFirst, it found that the controller wrongfully disclosed the data subject’s email address and policy number to Ms D. Precisely, because the data subject did not consent to this, nor did the controller satisfy any on the grounds mentioned under article 6 GDPR. However, the Court concluded that an immediate notification sent to the data subject was not necessary under article 34 GDPR. In particular because the disclosed information did not represent a high risk to the data subject.\nThe second infringement concerns the processing of special personal data which was not in accordance with article 9 GDPR. Specifically, a reference was made to the data subject’s condition known as severe rheumatism. The Court concluded that the processing of this personal data constitutes a violation of the proportionality and subsidiarity principles.\nIn respect of the fifth question, the Court established that this is not a breach of the GDPR, but a dispute which should be solved under national civil law. Hence, the GDPR is not applicable.\nIn relation to the sixth question, the Court concluded that considering that the insurance still has not been settled, the personal data is still necessary for the purposes of the settlement. Hence, the data controller still has a legal basis for the processing of the data. However, once the dispute is settled, the data should be delighted in accordance with article 17 GDPR.\nIn relation to the 7th and final question, the Court gave a thorough analysis.\nFirst, the Court confirmed that the GDPR and in particular article 82 provide a legal basis for compensation in procedures like the one at hand.\nSecond, the GDPR does not specify how (im)material damages should be determined and calculated, but leaves it up to all MS to decide this question due to the lack of common legislation. However, recital 146 states that the data controller should compensate the data subject in respect to all of the damages, while the concept of damages should be interpreted broadly in accordance with the CJEU’s case law.\nThe damages to be compensated must be real and certain. For the purposes of this case, the Court relied on article 6:95 et seq. of the Civil Code. The burden of proof was on the data subject.\nIn relation to immaterial damages, the data subject argued that he suffered a mental injury as a consequence of the disclosure of his information to Ms D. Furthermore, he argued that because of this mental injury he was forced to move to Spain. However, the Court found this claim is not sufficiently substined, and that the data subject failed to establish a causal connection.\nIn relation to the material damages, the data subject is seeking compensation for the move to Spain, medical and extrajudicial expenses. However, the Court found again that the data subject's arguments were not sufficient and that he failed to establish a connection between the costs and the data controller’s infringement.\nThe court ordered the data subject to pay the costs of the proceedings, which are assessed on the part of the data controller at a total amount of € 2,904 until the present judgment.","title":"Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/526196/ HA RK / 21-01"}
{"_id":"holding_Datainspektionen - DI-2019-7782","text":"The Swedish DPA held that, although the intention of the Social Affairs Committee was to protect the resident from harming himself, the installation of CCTV cameras in the resident's bedroom is considered a big intrusion of the resident's privacy. This means that the processing of personal data has been disproportionate to the purpose. The processing of personal data that has taken place through the camera surveillance has thus not complied with Articles 5(1)(a)(i), 6, 9(2), and 13 GDPR.","title":"Datainspektionen - DI-2019-7782"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Nottinghamshire County Council","text":"The ICO held that the manager's oversight procedure was not sufficiently robust, as evident from the failure in this case. Also, Nottinghamshire County Council had not provided detailed training to its staff on redaction. The ICO held the breach to be serious as it could have resulted in actual physical harm to the mother and the children, given that it pertained to domestic violence carried out on the mother and children.\nThe ICO took note of the remedial steps taken by Nottinghamshire County Council, including comprehensive guidance in relation to the redaction of documents, and after taking into account all relevant materials and facts, reprimanded Nottinghamshire County Council under Article 58(2)(b) (UK) GDPR, for infringing Article 32(1) (UK) GDPR.","title":"ICO (UK) - Nottinghamshire County Council"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS (Netherlands) - 202001625/1/A3","text":"In establishing which data is being processed, the Court took note of the fact that Connexxion uses a Payment Service Provider (PSP) to process its financial transactions and applies the PAN Masking technique to secure these transactions. This technique only provides the last four digits of the bank account number to be stored at Connexxion while the preceding digits are anonymized.\nThe Court further noted that a contract is established when the passenger boards the bus and the mere fact that the passenger has no choice as to whom he concludes this contract with does not negate the existence of said contract. It went on to consider whether there is an agreement in place and held that “there is no evidence to suggest that an agreement with Connexxion does not qualify as an agreement within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR.”\nThe Court further clarified that “the processing of personal data may be lawful if it is necessary for the performance of the contract.” In its application to this matter and whether the processing was necessary, the Court set out a three-step approach to its assessment and elaborated with reference to case law:\nFirst, the Court turned to whether the purpose for processing said data was “well-defined and explicitly described\". Second, the Court considered whether the processing of said data actually achieved that purpose. Thirdly, the Court concluded with a balancing of interests by stating that “[i]f the processing of the personal data is necessary to achieve the specific purpose in this sense, it must be assessed whether the invasion of privacy is proportionate to the interests served by the processing of the personal data.” The Court referred to the judgment of 20 September 2017 where it was held that “it must be assessed in light of the EU Charter whether the invasion of privacy is limited to what is strictly necessary to achieve the purpose. In particular, it must be assessed whether the purpose for which the personal data are processed cannot reasonably be achieved in another manner that is less detrimental to the persons involved in the processing of personal data.” The intensity of this investigation depends on the specificity of alternative which are tabled.\nIn its assessment for necessity, the Court noted that “[t]he mere fact that the processing of data is covered by or related to a contract does not mean that such processing is necessary for the performance of the contract.” It compared Article 7(b) Directive 95/46/EC to Article 6(1)(b) GDPR and found that the two are “almost identical”. Hence, it found that the Opinion and Guidelines (opinion 06/2014 of the former Article 29 Working Party and Guideline 2/2019 of the European Data Protection Board) were also relevant when interpreting the GDPR.\nThe Court then referred to various provisions in the General Terms and Conditions for City and Regional Transport 2015 in order to ascertain the terms of the contract in this particular matter. It clarified that “[t]he essential content of the agreement is therefore that a passenger can be transported from A to B in a safe manner in return for payment. This safety does not only relate to the competence of the driver and the quality of the means of transport, but also to the social safety of the traveller. In the opinion of the Department, ensuring safety of the traveller is an essential part of the obligations arising from the transport contract. Thus, the objective of the measure to require debit card payment on the bus is an integral part of that agreement.”\nWhilst investigating the purpose behind processing the data, the Court found that the card payment measures were introduced as a safety mechanism for public transport operators and passengers alike. It took note of figures reflecting incidents (such as theft, robbery, threats with a weapon and more, known under the collective category of A-incidents) and the added vulnerability of passengers and operators to such incidents when payment is accepted in cash. The absence of cash on board makes public transport less attractive for those committing these deeds and the number of incidents was proven to the court to have dropped after the implementation of these measures. Therefore, the Court found that “the AP was entitled to consider safety a legitimate objective for the introduction of compulsory debit card payments...” and that “the mandatory debit card payment achieves the purpose for which it was established.”\nIn considering the requirement of proportionality the Court assessed the PSP used by Connexxion and the PAN technique put in place. It found that this limits the processing of personal data. It further took note of the fact that one can still travel on the bus without a card payment, by simply purchasing a ticket in advance (in cash) from any sales point or by paying with an anonymous chipcard. Therefore, the court held that “the invasion of privacy is proportionate to the interests served by the processing of the personal data.”\nThus, the appeal failed and the attacked decision was confirmed.","title":"RvS (Netherlands) - 202001625/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 201906880/1/A3","text":"The Dutch Council of State held that the appeal was unfounded, and that the judgment under appeal should be upheld. The District Court correctly held that the AP was entitled to take the position that the Municipality no longer violates the GDPR if the order is lifted, and the District Court gave sufficient grounds for this opinion.\nThe Council of State agreed with the appellant that the short-term processing of personal data on the volatile memory of the card reader is processing within the meaning of the GDPR. However, it did not agree with the appellant that processing on the basis of Article 6(1)(e) GDPR must derive from law in a formal sense. Neither the GDPR, nor the Dutch Constitution, nor the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights require this. Instead, it follows from Recitals 41 and 45 that the GDPR does not require specific legislation for each individual processing operation; it is sufficient to have legislation that serves as a basis for several processing operations. The processing only has to be traceable to a law, which may therefore also be a lower regulation.\nThe Council of State found that the responsibility of the municipality to ensure the collection of household waste can be regarded as a task carried out in the public interest. The duty to exercise this task arises from Section 10.21 of the Environmental Management Act ('the Act'), the National Waste Management Plan adopted pursuant thereto, and the municipal waste plan 2012-2020. The Act instructs the Municipality to collect waste, as well as to into take account the current municipal waste management plan. In view of this, the processing of personal data in to prevent the use of waste containers by non-residents, in order to keep residual waste to a minimum - which is a principle outlined in the municipality waste management plan - falls under the Municipality's public interest. The Council of State highlighted here that generally, the purpose of data processing does not necessarily have to be aimed at a certain group of data subjects, rather it can be aimed at excluding another group, e.g. in this case non-residents.\nThe Council of State also held that, in determining whether the processing of personal data was necessary to prevent non-residents from using the waste containers, the Municipality was not required to review all possible alternatives; the fact that an alternative exists, does not in and by itself make the processing unnecessary, as controllers have some degree of freedom to decide how they carry out their tasks. That said, the Council of State emphasised that the more detailed, or 'intensive' the description of an alternative by a data subject, the more comprehensive the AP's investigation must be.\nIn addition, the Council of State emphasized that the fact that the processing of data must be necessary, does not mean that the processing is lawful only if the task in the public interest cannot be fulfilled without the processing of data. Processing will only not be necessary if there are other methods that can achieve the same objective, or if the processing is disproportionate.\nThe Council of State considered that the AP was entitled to take the position that the Municipality sufficiently demonstrated that the proposed alternatives do not achieve the intended purpose. For example, if the containers were open, it would not be possible to prevent non-residents from dumping their waste in them. Further, the use of a waste pass that is not linked to an address cannot achieve the aim of preventing abuse. In that case the circulation of waste cards cannot be monitored by the municipality and there is a chance that the waste cards will end up with companies or non residents. objective cannot reasonably be achieved in another manner that is less detrimental to data subject.\nFurther, the Council of State found that the necessity test in the ECHR is not stricter than the necessity test in the GDPR. Therefore, as the processing of data complies with Article 6 GDPR, the AP was entitled to take the view that the data processing does not violate Article 8 ECHR. Further, contrary to what the appellant argues, the extent of the processing plays a role in the consideration of the proportionality of the processing under Article 8(2), since from waste disposal pass are stored briefly on the volatile memory of the card reader so they can be checked against data on authorisation list. Data is then anonymised. and is thereafter not stored. This is limited in scope and restricted to what is necessary.\nFinally, the Council of State noted that it did not follow the appellant's argument that the data processing conflicts with the principle of data minimisation. It stated that the starting point of the GDPR is not the prohibition of the processing of regular personal data, rather, the GDPR regulates such processing. There is also no fundamental right not to process regular personal data.","title":"RvS - 201906880/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00082/2020","text":"Thus, the AEPD understood that the video surveillance system infringed the data minimisation principle (Article 5(1)(c) GDPR) and, after considering certain factors [(i) the defendant has collaborated with the AEPD, (ii) there is no intentionality by the defendant, and (ii) the video surveillance system has been uninstalled and the property has been left by the defendant, but (iii) in the end, the alleged facts have been proven], it imposed a minor warning to the defendant.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00082/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_High Court - McShane v Data Protection Commission (2025) IEHC 191","text":"In respect of the question as to whether the data subject should have pursued a statutory appeal in lieu of judicial review, the Court held that in this instance, this failure would not preclude his application for judicial review. The Court referenced the language adopted by the DPC in their communication to the data subject, noting that they used the term “concerns” rather than a complaint and that it was not expressly stated that they were “dismissing” or “rejecting” the matter. The Court found that in their email, the DPC should have used the language in the legislation and informed the data subject that he had a right of appeal. In the present circumstances, it would be unfair to deny the data subject judicial review on this ground.\nIn assessing the reasonableness of the DPC’s conduct and their obligation to investigate the alleged infringement, the Court referenced the data subject’s initial complaint. The Court noted that the data subject made their complaint entirely about the alleged breach of his non-work-related personal data on the work device. This, it was held, was addressed by the DPC in their response to him. The Court found that DPC’s decision did not err sufficiently so as to warrant the Court's intervention, and that there were no grounds for finding that the test set out in Meadows was satisfied.\nAccordingly, the Court refused the data subject’s application for judicial review.","title":"High Court - McShane v Data Protection Commission (2025) IEHC 191"}
{"_id":"holding_DSB (Austria) - 2020-0.303.727","text":"The DSB held, that the respondent qualifies as a media company under § 1(1)(6) of the Austrian Media Act, because it is a company which creates the content of the medium and handles the production, distribution, broadcasting and retrievability of the medium. It further held, that the data processing (publishing the complainant's personal data in an online article) was carried out for journalistic purposes. As the complainant is an former politician and the article revolved around legal procedures that she is involved in there was a public interest in mentioning the complainant's name.\nUnder Article 9(1) DSG, Chapter III and Chapter VI of the GDPR do not apply on data processing carried out by media companies for journalistic purposes. Such GDPR violations must be tried before civil courts. Hence, the DSB considered itself not competent, rejected the complaint and did not investigate the alleged violation of Article 17 GDPR.","title":"DSB (Austria) - 2020-0.303.727"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202205791","text":"The DPA recalled the controller's obligation to answer requests regarding data subject rights contained in Articles 15 to 22 GDPR in the period of one month or, depending on the complexity of the request, at least provide a justification for the delay.\nIn this case, the DPA also referred to the case law of the CJEU, specifically judgement C-131/12, and the Spanish Supreme Court about the right to be forgotten. The DPA made the following observations.\nFirstly, the right to be forgotten can be found in Article 17 GDPR and Article 93 of the LOPDGDD, the Spanish data protection law. It establishes a right to request, among others, search engines to erase from the list of results links that contain personal data. However, this right is not unlimited. It must be balanced with conflicting interests of the public, including their right of access to information as well as freedom of expression. In order to balance the interests at stake, aspects such as the type of information, the time of the publication, if the information is of public interest or not should be taken into consideration.\nSecondly, according to case law, search engines are considered controllers. They process information available on the internet, collect data, register, and organise it according to their indexing programmes, retain it in their servers and make it available to users. Hence, they control the purposes and means of processing.\nThirdly, the right of data subjects to directly request search engines to erase their data is essential due to the importance of Internet nowadays. The DPA held that a request cannot be simply ignored. An answer must be issued by the controller, even when no data of the requesting party was processed. Furthermore, the controller is obliged to require the correction of the deficiencies observed or, where appropriate, deny the request indicating the reasons and considering the above-discussed law.\nIn the present case, the information available through the URL links was considered personal data not related at all to the data subject's professional life or of public interest. In light of the above, the DPA upheld the complaint, claiming that the requested data should have been deleted. However, the DPA did not fine the controller because they proceeded to comply with the request during the course of the proceedings.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202205791"}
{"_id":"holding_KamR Göteborg - 2232-21","text":"The right to erasure\nThe Gothenburg Court of Appeals partly reversed the findings of the the FiS and found that Google had complied with Article 17 GDPR on the right to erasure with respect to both Complaint No. 2 and Complaint No. 8. In particular:\nWith respect to Complaint No. 2, the Gothenburg Court of Appeals found that the data subject had first only provided the main web address (URL) of the discussion thread where his/her name was mentioned, but had failed to provide the specific URLs where his/her name was mentioned each time. The Gothenburg Court of Appeal noted in this respect that Google's instructions on erasure requests clearly require the data subject to provide each and every URL that is part of the erasure request, as even small changes to the URL can lead to a different website. The Gothenburg Court of Appeal further noted that Google has set up a help page explaining the importance of providing each URLs in details. Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that, once the data subject had completed his/her erasure request by providing the specific URLs where his/her name was mentioned, Google had proceeded to the erasure of these pages without undue delay. Based on these considerations, the Court of Appeals concluded that Google had complied with Article 17 GDPR.\nWith respect to Complaint No. 8, the Court of Appeals agreed with FiS that Google had complied with Article 17 GDPR by removing the concerned search result three days before IMY had ordered Google to do so. Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded that Google had deleted the requested search results without undue delay, in accordance with Article 17 GDPR.\n\nGoogle's practice of informing webmasters\nThe Gothenburg Court of Appeal upheld the FiS decision that Google's practice to regularly inform webmasters of the removal of search results was contrary to Article 5(1)(a) GDPR (principle of lawfulness), Article 5(1)(b) GDPR (principle of purpose limitation) and Article 6 GDPR (absence of valid legal basis for the processing). The Gothenburg Court of Appeals found in this respect that Google had systematically ignored the Article 29 Working Party's Opinion on the right to erasure over an extended period of time. Although the Opinion is not strictly binding, the Gothenburg Court of Appeal pointed out that the Article 29 Working Party's mandate is to ensure that the European Union's data protection rules are applied consistently in all Member States, and that controllers should thus consider such opinions and guidelines. In conclusion, the Gothenburg Court of Appeal found that Google's practice to inform webmaster of deleted search results was contrary to the GDPR, and upheld the fine of €4,800,000 million (SEK 50 million) imposed on Google by FiS.","title":"KamR Göteborg - 2232-21"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00427/2021","text":"The AEPD considers that BBVA's actions breached the principle of lawfulness in Article 6(1) GDPR because it had no legal basis for processing the complainant's data. The initial sanction the AEPD envisaged was €100,000 but BBVA was able to terminate the sanctioning procedure by paying €60,000 and acknowledging its responsibility, as provided for in Spanish administrative law.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00427/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00142/2020","text":"Firstly the AEPD decided to initiate a sanctioning procedure against the entity BUBO MEDIA, S.L. for the alleged infringement of Article 21.1 of the LSSI, typified as minor infringement in Article 38(4) (d). The fine associated with this infringement is calculated in EUR 1500. However, two attenuating circumstances of the Spanish Law on Common Administrative Procedure of Public Administrations (Article 85) can be applied, which may respectively reduce the fine by 20%. The first mitigating factor is to acknowledge their responsibility within the time allowed for the submission of claims. The second mitigating factor is, at any time prior to the resolution of the proceedings, to make voluntary payment of the proposed penalty.\nOn June 9, 2020, BUBO MEDIA, S.L. proceeded to pay the sanction in the amount of EUR 900, applying therefore the two previously mentioned reductions. This implied the recognition of their responsibility and the resignation to any action or appeal in administrative channels against the sanction. After these events, the AEPD decided to terminate the procedure.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00142/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202318430","text":"The AEPD found that the controller had violated Article 5(1)(f) GDPR and Article 32 GDPR.\nThe AEPD highlighted that the controller could only show that its employees had signed a confidentiality agreement but that there were no other organizational measures in place which would have prevented this data breach. In addition, the AEPD criticized that apart from a one-hour training session at the beginning of the employment relationship, employees were not adequately informed on complying with the GDPR in their delivery functions.\nAs there was no system in place to see whether letters had actually reached the intended address, the AEPD found that the controller’s function as a postal service provider proved an aggravating factor in this case as it requires the controller to have such a system in place.\nTherefore, the AEPD imposed a €120,000 fine for the infringement of Article 5(1)(f) GDPR and a fine of €80,000 for the infringement of Article 32 GDPR. Additionally, the AEPD ordered the controller to implement a tracking system as well as training for employees informing on GDPR compliant delivery of letters.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202318430"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-012","text":"The French DPA held that Google's updated cookie system was compliant, as the implementation of the \"reject all\" button offered a means of users refusing the storage of and access to their information, pursuant to Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act.\nConsequently, the French DPA decided to dismiss the periodic fine of €100,000 per day in the case of non-compliance, as the updated cookie banner was lawful.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-012"}
{"_id":"holding_Datainspektionen - DI-2018-9274","text":"The DPA held that Google had not complied with the previous order by the DPA by failing to remove search links sufficiently and within a reasonable time. Google had, therefore, processed personal data in violation of the GDPR.\nThe DPA also held that Google had processed personal data in violation of Articles 5(1)(b) and 6 GDPR by sending notifications to webmasters that search results had been deleted. Furthermore, the notice given to data subjects concerning these notifications was found misleading in a manner contrary to Article 5 (1)(a) GDPR.","title":"Datainspektionen - DI-2018-9274"}
{"_id":"holding_TRL - 7159/08.7TBCSC-A.L1-7","text":"The Court held that those responsible for processing personal data, as well as those who, in the course of their duties, have knowledge of the personal data processed, are bound by professional secrecy, even after the end of their functions (Article 10 of Lei 58/2019), which directly mentions Article 38(5) GDPR. Lei 58/2019 is a national law for GDPR implementation). This duty of secrecy must give way to the duty to provide legally required information, particularly to the judicial authorities, and to the duties of the National Commission for Data Protection (Article 8 of Lei 58/2019).\nThe Court held that the records collected by the controller are personal data which fall under the concept of protection of privacy and for which there is an obligation of confidentiality for the controller. The court considered the possibility of creating \"individual driver profiles\" with these records and held that this information is likely to limit the freedom of movement of clients of the controller and that this information could involve risks of intrusion in private life if strict mechanisms for processing, storage and access to the information are not established.\nThe Court stated that this case presented a conflict between the duty of professional secrecy and the duty to cooperate with the administration of justice, which should be resolved through a judgment of proportionality through a judgment of weighting and coordination between these duties.\nIn a balancing test of the interests at stake, the Court concluded that making the information available about the controller's clients and their private matters was not proportional in relation to the scope of the availibillity of the information.. The Court further stated a failure to obtain the information didn't jeopardize the applicant's interest in locating the vehicles. The success or failure of seizing the vehicles would not depend on the lifting of the profesional secrecy of the controller. The Court held that is was therefore not appropriate to lift the professional secrecy of the controller.","title":"TRL - 7159/08.7TBCSC-A.L1-7"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 85/2021","text":"The litigation chamber of the Belgian DPA closed the case, considering that there was not enough elements to find a violation of the GDPR by the defendant who was still alive.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 85/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Amsterdam - C/13/673049 / HA RK 19-338","text":"The court ruled that the plaintiff did not provide enough indications to contradict the statement of the defendant that the removed phrases did not contain personal data. The request to provide the removed phrases is denied.\nThe court rules that the internal notes and correspondence must be qualified as personal thoughts from employees which are only intended for internal consultation and deliberation and therefore can’t be qualified as personal data in the sense of the GDPR. Besides, the purpose of the request is not consistent with the purpose of Article 15 GDPR. The request was made in relation to a family dispute, while the purpose of Article 15 GDPR is to enable data subjects to verify whether their personal data is correct and to verify whether their personal data is processed lawfully. The request is denied.","title":"Rb. Amsterdam - C/13/673049 / HA RK 19-338"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-31-5085","text":"The DPA limited its decision to the content of the controller's reply to the data subject access request and did not consider whether they replied within the time limits set out in Article 12(3) GDPR.\nThen, the DPA held that the large number of documents which could contain information about the data subject essentially related to the controllers where the data subject worked as a board member and a managing partner, as well as to ongoing legal proceedings. In this respect, the DPA assumed that any personal information from those documents appeared to be an \"accessory\" to the processing purpose (in this context, business operations) and thus must be considered as describing the function that the data subject performed.\nMoreover, the data subject did not specify their request enough for the controller to reduce the number of documents to check. As a result, responding to the request would require the identification, collection, review and assessment of more than one million documents distributed among different controllers to determine whether personal data about the data subject would have to be handed over.\nConsequently, the DPA held that the controllers were not obliged to search for and review the documents to identify and hand over information about the data subject because the request was excessive, according to Article 12(5)(b) GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-31-5085"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00234/2020","text":"The AEPD concluded that the defendant could have breached Article 13 GDPR, Article 7 GDPR and Article 22(2) LSSI: there was no identification of the data controller, no possibility to give a separate consent for each purpose, and there was not enough information on the use of cookies. Consequently, after considering some aggravating circumstances [(i) intentionality by the defendant, (ii) period of time in which the infringements had been happening], the AEPD understood that, in case the sanction procedure resulted in a successful decision, this infringement would be fined with 13,000 € to the defendant. In this sense, the AEPD offered the defendant the possibility to settle the issue before the decision took place by agreeing to a voluntary payment of part of the fine and by acknowledging its liability. The defendant agreed and the sanction procedure was closed by the AEPD.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00234/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W274 2237071-1","text":"The BVwG ruled that the union unjustifiably requested proof of identity of the data subject and had not dealt with the latter's request for deletion. In this regard, it followed a previous position of the Austrian DPA according to which the union had not informed the data subject about why it had reasonable doubts regarding their identity.\nThe Court held that since the union did not doubt the identity of the person with regard to their resignation, it cannot raise such doubts regarding to the deletion of personal data in terms of Article 12(6) GDPR. A bona fide recipient can be either be in doubt with the identity of the declarant or not.\nAny further request for proof of identity contradicts the facilitation requirement of exercising data subjects right pursuant to Article 12(2) GDPR. The union had therefore violated the data subject's right to erasure by not dealing with the content of the data subject's request for erasure pursuant to Article 17 GDPR.","title":"BVwG - W274 2237071-1"}
{"_id":"holding_UODO (Poland) - DKN.5112.13.2020","text":"The DPA held that the agreements between the GGK and the poviat starosties concerned the creation and maintenance of common elements of the technical infrastructure intended to store and make available certain data filing systems, but did not constitute a legal basis for making available the data, including the land register numbers. Such a basis would need to result from commonly binding legal provisions.\nSince the GGK could not provide a valid legal basis for its processing of personal data, the UODO held that the publishing on the GEOPORTAL2 was not in line with the principle of lawfulness in Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, as none of the conditions of Article 6 GDPR were satisfied. The data disclosed in the land register of natural persons includes, among others, names, surnames, parents’ names, PESEL number (personal identification number), and property address. The DPA therefore held that a large number of data subjects may be exposed to identity theft in such a situation.","title":"UODO (Poland) - DKN.5112.13.2020"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-003","text":"Firstly, the CNIL indicated that Article 6(1) GDPR establishes the legal bases of processing. The DPA also pointed out that commercial prospecting by telephone can be carried out on the legal basis of the controller’s legitimate interest or on the basis of consent.\nRegarding the controller’s legitimate interest, the CNIL added that the controller must ensure that the processing does not infringe the rights and interests of the data subject, taking into account their reasonable expectations. The CNIL held that regarding the fact that the controller was not listed as a partner from the data supplier, the controller could not rely on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR to justify its commercial canvassing operations by telephone, as the protection of the interests, freedoms and fundamental rights of the data subjects took precedence over the legitimate interests of the controller.\nRegarding consent, the CNIL stressed that concerning commercial canvassing operations, when the data subject’s data has not been collected directly from them by the canvassing organization, consent may be obtained by the initial collector on behalf of the organization that will carry out subsequent canvassing operations. If this is not the case, it is up to the prospecting organization to obtain such consent before proceeding with the processing. The CNIL considered that the design of the forms on the data supplier’s website did not allow data subject’s to express a valid choice as the interfaces particularly highlight the “Validate”, “I validate” or “I answer questions to apply” button, whose size and color make it stand out from the other information provided. The words used also suggested the conclusion of the data subject’s registration process rather than the transmission of data to partners and the location of the button on the form gave the impression that it must be clicked to complete the registration and take part in the competition. The CNIL also found that the hyperlink text which allowed data subjects to partake in the competition without agreeing to the transmission of their data to partners was presented in the body of the text in characters much smaller in size than those used for the buttons and without any particular emphasis. The CNIL also found that the forms submitted by the controller in its observations did not sufficiently inform the data subjects either. Therefore, the CNIL considered that the consent was not unambiguous and free as per required under Article 4(11) GDPR.\nIn the absence of a legal basis enabling the controller to base its commercial canvassing operations by telephone, the CNIL considered that a breach of Article 6 GDPR was constituted.\nSecondly, the CNIL also pointed out that a simple contractual commitment by a data broker to comply with the GDPR as well as the rules applicable to commercial prospecting do not constitute a sufficient measure (see CNIL, SAN-2022-021). Thus, the DPA considered that the contractual obligations that the controller imposed on its suppliers did not exonerate the controller from its liability, despite the possible existence of liability on part of suppliers.\nFinally, the CNIL noted that during the phase of current use, which corresponds to the time required to achieve the purpose of the processing, the data is kept in an “active base” and is accessible to all departments responsible for implementing and processing. At the end of this phase, when the data is no longer used to achieve the set objective, but is still of administrative use to the controller (for example the management of a possible dispute), it must be possible to consult only on an ad hoc basis and for a specific reason, by specially authorized people. With regards to this case, the CNIL held that the information they found did not make it possible to establish that persons would have access to the data without having a need to know. Therefore, the DPA concluded that there was no breach of Article 32 GDPR.\nThus, the CNIL imposed a €310,000 fine on the controller for breaching Article 6 GDPR.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-003"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00303/2020","text":"Without prejudice to the results of the final investigations corresponding to the sanction procedure, the AEPD understood that the defendant could have breached the lawfulness of processing principle as per article 6(1) GDPR: on the basis of the available evidences, the defendant did not take the due diligences to ensure the lawfulness of the data processing activity, and it neither proved the lawfulness of such when required by the AEPD. Consequently, after considering some aggravating circumstances [(i) there is a negligence/intentionality by the defendant, and (iii) basic personal data have been affected], the AEPD understood that, in case the sanction procedure resulted in a successful decision, this infringement would be fined with 60,000 € to the defendant. In this sense, the AEPD offered the defendant the possibility to settle the issue before the decision takes place by agreeing to a voluntary payment of part of the fine, with two possible discounts based on earliness (48,000 €) and acknowledging of guiltiness (36,000€). The defendant agreed to both, so it paid 36,000 € and the sanction procedure was closed by the AEPD.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00303/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 202100213/1/A3","text":"The Council of State rejected the appeal.\nFirst, the Council stated that the municipality complied with the data subject's access request within the decision time of one month as per Article 12(3) GDPR. Second, the Council of State held that the right to rectification of personal data pursuant to Article 16 GDPR only applies to inaccuracies that can be easily and objectively ascertainable. Since the letter of 14 Novemer 2018 concerned impressions and conclusions with which data subject did not agree, the Council found that the rejection of the request for rectification was well-founded.\nLastly, although it is not disputed between parties that the forwarding of email of 13 January 2017 without removing data subject's email address was unlawful, the Council of State had previously considered that a violation of the GDPR does not automatically entitle the data subject to compensation. Because the data subject could not plausibly demonstrate that the infringement caused damages, this ground of appeal was also rejected.","title":"RvS - 202100213/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 138/2022","text":"The DPA held that it had the jurisdiction to decide this complaint. First, the recordings of natural persons with surveillance cameras are personal data. Second, the fact that the controller placed the cameras on his own property does not trigger the \"household exemption\" under Article 2(2)(c) GDPR. When the cameras also record, as in this case, public or private spaces, this provisions doesn’t apply. Therefore, the GDPR was applicable.\nThe DPA held the controller had violated the principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency under Article 5(1)(a). For instance, had not installed a public sign signalling a video recording was taking place as required among the others by Article 7(2)(6) Camerawet.\nThe DPA held that the controller did not comply with the legal obligation to register the purpose of video surveillance at the local police office. Since it was obligatory to register the purpose of camera surveilance to the police, the controller violated Article 5(1)(b) GDPR. The DPA also held that a late registration would not remedy the initial violation.\nThe DPA held that the controller violated the \"data minimisation\" principle under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR because the camera used to record more than the controller's private premises. The SA confirmed the violation even if the controller had corrected the camera's orientation during the proceedings by making sure the surveillance cameras only recorded his own backyard. The controller stated that the camera had a ‘moving function’, where the camera could automatically chance the angle to get a different view. The controller disabled this function at the advice of the police.\nThe DPA held that the controller violated the accountability principle (Article 5(2) GDPR and Article 24(1) GDPR) on two grounds. The first ground was the fact that the controller was unable to show how data subjects were informed in a transparent and fair way, unable to show that the data was processed with specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and unable to show that not more personal data was processed than what was necessary for the purposes pursued by the controller. The second ground was the fact that the controller also didn’t have a registry for video footage and for activities altering this footage. This was however an obligation for the controller according to Article 7(2)(5) Camerawet and Articles 7, 8 and 9 Camerabesluit.\nThe DPA held that it had to be assessed whether or not the controller could use legitimate interests as a legal ground for processing (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR). Following the CJEU's case law, there must be a legitimate interest, the processing must be necessary for this interest and a balancing test has to take place of the legitimate interest of the controller/third party against the interests and fundamental rights of data subjects. The DPA held that preventing burglary, vandalism or theft can be seen as a legitimate interest, with a reference to the EDPB Guidelines 3/2019. The DPA held that the necessity-test should be assessed with the data-minimisation principle (Article 5(1)(c) GDPR ) in mind, which states that processing must be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed. It was already decided that the controller had violated this principle. The constant recording of neighbours private premises cannot be seen ‘relevant’, so processing could certainly not be ‘necessary’ for the legitimate interest of the controller. The DPA also held that the legitimate interest in question failed the balancing test. It held that the constant recording of the data subjects was a serious infringement on their fundamental rights. There was also a less intrusive option available in the form of putting a casing around the camera to obstruct part of its view. The DPA also considered it a factor that it was beyond the objective expectations of the data subjects that the surveillance camera was positioned in a way such as in this decision.\nThe DPA gave the controller a warning.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 138/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 202305323/1/A3","text":"First, the court stated that the controller should take all reasonable measures to verify the identity of a data subject who is making a request referred to in Articles 15 to 21 GDPR and can request further information regardless of whether he has doubts about the identity (Article 12(6) GDPR and [Recital 64]). Furthermore, the court ruled that the minister had discretion to the manner in which it established the identity of the data subjects. Therefore, the measures proposed by the minister were valid, especially considering that the relevant data are special category of personal data (Article 9(1) GDPR).\nSecond, the court stated that Minister could not have used the proposed identification method at the time of the decision due to technical reasons.\nLastly, the court found the appeal unfounded and rejected the data subject's request for damages.","title":"RvS - 202305323/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-018","text":"Firstly, Article 37(1)(a) GDPR establishes that the controller shall designate a DPO when the processing is carried out by a public authority or body. This article applies to the municipality and the DPA reiterated the importance of a DPO in order to ensure compliance with said article, especially within public authorities who process large amounts of personal data, some of which is sensitive data. The CNIL found that the municipality did not designate a DPO and therefore failed to comply with Article 37(1)(a) GDPR.\nSecondly, Article 31 GDPR states that the controller should cooperate within the DPA in the performance of its tasks. The CNIL noted that the municipality did not respond to the different letters, formal notices and decisions addressed to it by the DPA, thus failing to comply with Article 31 GDPR.\nThe DPA fined the municipality €5,000 and ordered the controller to appoint a DPO with a penalty of €150 per day of delay at the end of a period of 2 months following the notification of the decision. The CNIL also ordered the municipality to put a message on their official website for 4 days, informing the users of said decision.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-018"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-009","text":"The DPA found five breaches of the GDPR against the controller:\n 1. Regarding the failure to demonstrate consent, the DPA held that Criteo failed to ensure that data subjects gave their consent to the placement of the tracker on their devices in violation of Article 7(1) GDPR. The DPA discovered instances in which the controller’s tracker was used by several of the controller's commercial partners without data subjects’ consent. According to the DPA, obtaining consent from Internet users for the processing of data concerns both Criteo and its commercial partners pursuant to Article 7 GDPR. The DPA insisted on a dual system of responsibility (joint controllership) to ensure an effective right to consent at every stage of the processing.\n 2. Concerning the lack of information and transparency, the DPA considered Criteo's privacy policy to be incomplete and unclear about the intended purposes of the data processing, thus violating Articles 12 and 13 GDPR. Some purposes were only vaguely formulated, so that data subjects could not fully understand which personal data were used for which purposes.\n 3. As to the failure to comply with the right of access, the DPA established that Criteo did not adequately fulfil data subjects’ right of access in breach of Article 15(1) GDPR. When data subjects requested access to their personal data, Criteo only provided data from a subset of its database tables and did not disclose the information from other relevant tables.\n 4. As to the failure to respect the right to withdraw consent and delete data, the DPA found a violation of Articles 7(3) and 17(1) GDPR. When data subjects exercised their right to withdraw consent or requested deletion of their data, Criteo stopped displaying personalised ads but failed to remove the identifier assigned to the data subject or delete the related browsing events.\n 5. Lastly, the DPA highlighted the lack of agreement between the joint controllers in breach of Article 26 GDPR. The agreements between Criteo and its commercial partners did not contain specific obligations in relation to the requirements of the GDPR, such as data subjects' rights, data breach notification or impact assessments.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-009"}
{"_id":"holding_VG Berlin - 1 K 391/20","text":"The Administrative Court of Berlin dismissed the data subjects' claim. The court agreed with the DPA that it had rightfully declared itself incompetent in the matter.\nFirst, it held that church data protection such as in the case is subject to church supervision and not to state supervision. According to Article 91(2) GDPR, churches are entitled to establish their own independent supervisory authorities. While the wording of the provision does not clearly state whether such authority must be of an official nature or independent, the court interpreted the provision based on its systematic nature. As Article 91(2) GDPR explicitly mentions that the specific supervisory authority must fulfill the conditions of Chapter VI of the GDPR, such reference would be redundant if only state authorities were allowed since such authorities have to fulfill these regulations in any case. This position is also supported by Recital 128 GDPR. Therefore, the court found the independent nature of the church supervisory authorities to be GDPR-compliant.\nSecond, it clarified that church data protection law must be understood as a comprehensive data protection rule within the meaning of the GDPR. According to Article 91(1) GDPR, churches may apply their own comprehensive rules relating data protection if they are in line with the GDPR. The court saw that compliance was sufficiently given in the data protection laws of the two big Christian churches in Germany.\nThird, the court dismissed the argument of the data subjects that the church supervisory is only competent for members of the respective religious community and that for non-members the state authorities are competent. It underlined that the competence of the church supervisory authority is only dependent on the fact that a church institution has acted and that Article 91(1) GDPR does not establish any additional requirements like the data subjects being members of the respective religious community.\nIn a last step, the court found that the DPA did indeed have no obligation to further investigate the case. Also, its decision had been correct as the court could not find a data protection violation by the controller because the information requested by the questionnaire was necessary for the controller to fulfill their obligations for church taxing purposes.","title":"VG Berlin - 1 K 391/20"}
{"_id":"holding_Corte di Cassazione - 18168","text":"The Supreme Court established an infringement of Article 2 of the Italian Worker’s Statute, Article 3 of the Italian Worker’s Statute and Article 4 of the Italian Worker’s Statute and Article 113 of the Italian Privacy Code, Article 114 of the Italian Privacy Code and Article 160 of the Italian Privacy Code in connection with the protection of the confidentiality of the employee, Article 8 ECHR, and based on the set of principles expressed in the Privacy Code and the GDPR, specifically those of data minimisation, proportionality, purpose limitation, transparency and fairness.\nThe Supreme Court stated that it is necessary to ensure a proper balance between the requirements of the protection of corporate interests and assets related to the freedom of economic initiative and the protection of the dignity and privacy of the worker, depending on the circumstances of the claim.\nIn this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the monitoring of all the communications on the defendant’s company laptop was unjustified as it was indiscriminate, unbounded and because the applicant did not inform the defendant of the possible monitoring of his company laptop’s communications or the nature and extent of the monitoring.","title":"Corte di Cassazione - 18168"}
{"_id":"holding_Raad van State - ECLI:NL:RVS:2023:4155","text":"The Council of State held that the District Court had correctly interpreted the scope of Article 2(1)(d) GDPR, as a result they were correct to dismiss the data subject’s claims.\nThe Council of State held that the processing activities of the FIOD fell under Article 2(1)(d) GDPR, regardless of whether it is under the administration of the Ministry of Finance. The determining factor of whether a ‘competent authority’ falls under the scope of Article 2(1)(d) GDPR is its purpose. In this case, the FIOD is tasked with preventing criminal offences and thus its purpose is to maintain the rule of law. Consequently, their processing activities fell under Article 2(1)(d) GDPR and so, this excluded the application of the GDPR from the FIOD’s processing activities.","title":"Raad van State - ECLI:NL:RVS:2023:4155"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 104/2022","text":"The DPA noted that the right to be forgotten (Article 17(1) GDPR) is not applicable when processing is necessary to exercise the right to freedom of expression and information (Article 17(3)(a)). It explained that balance must be found between the freedom of expression of information and the right to protection of personal data.\nThe DPA agrees with the data subject that the inclusion of an article in name-based search results may constitute a more serious interference with the right to privacy, since it is more accessible and can play a decisive role in the spread of that information. However, the data subject did not address a search engine, but an online archive. The DPA will therefore only address the applicability of Article 17(1)(c) and it's exception laid down in Article 17(3)(a).\nThe DPA stated that the freedom of expression and journalistic liberty (Article 10 ECHR) are an important pillar in a democratic society. Online archives specifically are of special importance because of their accessibility to the general public. Only very pressing reasons justify an intervention with these fundamental rights. The mere fact that an article has negative connotation is not sufficient to compromise the integrity of online archives. The DPA further noted that the article has societal relevance (for investors and entrepreneurs) contained no factual inaccuracies. In addition, the data subject could reasonably expect media attention, as he initiated contact with them. Lastly, access to the article was limited to subscribers. The DPA thus found the processing in line with the adequate measures of Article 89 GDPR.\nThe DPA therefore held that the controller lawfully refused the data subject's request for erasure pursuant to Article 17(3)(a).","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 104/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_GHSHE - 200.297.497 01","text":"First, the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal. It considered that Veilig Thuis processes personal data and carries out a task in the public interest and for reasons of public health, as follows from the Dutch Social Support Act 2015 (Wmo). Therefore, Article 13(3)(b) and Article 17(3)(c) GDPR apply, and the deletion request must be assessed on basis of the Wmo. After the assessment, the Court confirmed District Court’s Decision, since it considered that the substantial interest of Veilig Thuis outweighed the interest of the mother.\nSecond, the Court of Appeal did not order the mother to pay the cost of proceedings made both in the first instance and in the appeal proceedings. It considered that the right to an effective remedy, pursuant to Article 79 GDPR, entails that “irrespective of the outcome of the substantive side of the appeal, if a difference of opinion regarding the implementation of the [GDPR] is actually at issue.” The Court considered the height of the costs (€ 5,856.00) and found that it was disproportionate to order the mother to pay the costs of proceedings because this would preclude her right to an effective remedy.","title":"GHSHE - 200.297.497 01"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 13/2024","text":"The HDPA imposed a fine of € 175,000, concluding that the controller violated Articles 5(1)(a), 6(1), 12, 13, 14, 15(e), 25, 30, 35, 58(1)(e).\nFirst, the HDPA considered it ambiguous which and when legal bases may apply to the processing of data carried out by the 'Hyperion' and 'Centaurus' systems. In particular, the HDPA considered that Article 6(1)(f) GDPR is expressly excluded from provisions of the GDPR discussing processing carried out by public authorities in the exercise of their functions. It also observed that there was no specification of legal basis according to the category of data subjects (workers, vulnerable groups, minors, NGO workers, etc.). With regard to the processing of data, the HDPA found no evidence for the controller's claims that special categories of data were not processed. It considered that the Centaurus system's surveillance could process religious beliefs, racial or ethnic origin, or other special categories of data. It thus found that the controller should have articulated an appropriate legal basis for such processing under Article 9 GDPR.\nSecond, the HDPA also found a violation of the principle of lawfulness under Article 5(1a) of the GDPR. It found that the information provided to the data subjects was inadequate, as it was clear from the file that the data subjects did not understand Greek or English. Thus, the information did not comply with transparency requirements in violation of Articles 12, 13, and 14 GDPR.\nThe HDPA also considered the controller's lack of cooperation. In particular, it noted that the controller failed to submit data protection contracts had been concluded with data processors because it claimed they were confidential. As a result, the HDPA found a violation of Articles 15(e) and 58(1)(e) GDPR, which permit supervisory authorities to obtain all information necessary for the performance of its tasks. The vague, incomplete, confusing and contradictory information provided also resulted in a violation of Article 31 GDPR.\nFourth, the HDPA noted the controllers failure to complete the record of activities prior to the start of the programmes. Accordingly, it found a violation of Article 30(1) GDPR.\nFifth, as noted by the controller, the data protection impact assessments were limited and was not carried out prior to the start of each processing operation. The HDPA thus found a violation of Article 35(1), (2) and (3) GDPR. It also found that this failure to carry out a comprehensive and coherent data protection impact assessment by default and prior to processing violated Article 25(1) and (2) concerning data protection by design and default.\nFinally, the HDPA noted that the interconnections of the systems with other government data systems were not explained and these potential risks were not assessed. Such failure to comply with the principle of accountability by not providing complete, accurate and clear information or adequately documenting the lawfulness processing constituted a violation of Article 31 GDPR.\nThe Greek DPA imposed a fine of € 175,000 for this violation and instructed the controller bring processing into compliance within 3 months.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 13/2024"}
{"_id":"holding_LG Stuttgart - 27 O 60/24","text":"The court recognised the controller’s interest in lowering its financial risk. If the controller enters into a contract in which it periodically charges the client for its services without a pre-paid system, there is a certain risk of the client not paying for services made in advance. This risk increases when the client is handed a mobile phone at the beginning of the long term contract. Therefore, a risk of being defrauded exists for the controller.\nThe court further recognises the possible advantage of a standardised notification about the contract conclusion to Schufa. In cases where a (potential) client enters several mobile phone contracts by using their real name without a sensible reason, this can thus be noticed.\nHowever, concerning the standardised transfer of data to Schufa without any specific suspicion the court concludes that in the balancing test necessary under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR the data subject’s interest override the interest of the controller. This is due to the fact that a client typically doesn’t expect this kind of data transfer. Especially, customers can expect being asked for their explicit consent prior to such a transfer. If the controller insists to transmit data to Schufa it can condition the closure of a contract on the data subject’s consent to the data transfer.\nDue to this possibility, the automated transfer of data to Schufa goes beyond the strictly necessary criterion referred to in Recital 47.\nIf the controller does not ask for consent upon closure of the contract it might still transmit data to Schufa if circumstances appear that make it likely that the customer has provided misleading information, especially about their creditworthiness, or if specific risk factors occur.\nTherefore, the controller unlawfully submitted the data subject's personal data to Schufa. This constituted an infringement in terms of Article 82(1) GDPR.\nHowever, the court held that there is no damage and rejected the respective claim. The burden of proof lies with the data subject even though there is no specific threshold of severity that needs to be met. The data subject failed to prove a non-material damage.\nOn the one hand, the data subject did not confirm in the oral hearing the previously claimed constant fear of uncomfortable further inquiries, a general uncomfortable feeling, and a feeling of powerlessness. The court therefore considers the previous written statement a text module.\nOn the other hand, the court believed the data subject that he was angry about the data transfer. This, however, did not amount to a non-material damage.\nThe court does not believe the claim made by the data subject that he has trouble sleeping at night due to the data transfer.","title":"LG Stuttgart - 27 O 60/24"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 7587/163/20","text":"The DPA held that the controller violated Article 17(1)(a) GDPR by not complying with the data subject's right to have their data deleted. Instead, the controller should have deleted the data to the extent that it was no longer necessary to store it. Additionally, the controller violated Articles 12(3) and 12(4) GDPR by providing the data subject neither with information on the measures taken in response to the request nor with the reasons for not taking any actions. As a result, the DPA reprimanded the controller.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 7587/163/20"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02178","text":"The DPA (Datatilsynet) held that the company had breached Article 6(1)(f) GDPR for lack of legal basis, Article 21 for lack of considering an objection, Article 13 for lack of information and Article 24 for lack of internal controls concerning the company's access to employees' inboxes (emails). The DPA also found that the company had breached the fundamental principles as per the GDPR, specifically Article 5(1)(a) and 5(2).\nFor this, they were fined NOK 400 000 (€38,800) and required to update their internal routines and submit a written confirmation of the latter, including documentation, to the DPA within four weeks (unless they appeal the decision).","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02178"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 9707/152/19","text":"The DPA first stated that the data subject's access request was submitted correctly and that a third party may make a request under Article 15 GDPR on behalf of the data subject.\nIt then proceeded by holding that the data controller did not comply with Article 12(3) GDPR and Article 12(4) GDPR, to ensure the data subject's right of access without undue delay.\nThe DPA stated that Article 12(3) GDPR provides for time limits within which the controller must inform the data subject of the action taken to respond to an access request. Considering that the data subject submitted a request under Article 15 GDPR several times in 2017, 2018 and 2019, that the controller did not refuse to implement the right of the petitioner, nor did it indicate that it needed additional time to implement the right and that it implemented the data subject's right in April 2021, the controller breached Article 12(3) GDPR by failing to implement the right of the data subject under Article 15 GDPR within the time limit.\nThe DPA also addressed Article 12(4) GDPR, which states that if the controller does not intend to exercise the data subject's right, it must inform the data subject without undue delay and at the latest within one month of receipt of the request. In this regard, the controller also breached Article 12(4) GDPR since it did not inform the data subject for almost three years of the reasons why the right under Article 15 GDPR could not be implemented within the time-limit.\nThe DPA, thus, fined the data controller €1,600 on the basis of Article 83 GDPR.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 9707/152/19"}
{"_id":"holding_VG Ansbach - AN 14 K 20.00941","text":"On the controller's violation of Article 15 GDPR\nThe court found that the controller did not comply with its legal obligation to the data subject under Article 15(1) GDPR between 22 January 2020 and 5 April 2020 despite two explicit requests from the DPA. The court found that the negative information provided by the controller to the data subject on 5 April 2024 was clearly inadequate. As the controller was still processing the data subject’s email address at that time, the controller was obliged under Article 15(1)(c) GDPR to inform the data subject of the recipients or categories of recipients the email address had been disclosed or was still being disclosed. The controller’s initial failure to provide information to the data subject and its subsequent failure to provide sufficient information therefore each constituted a violation of Article 15(1) GDPR.\nOn the DPA's discretion on taking corrective measures\nThe court held that if the DPA finds a violation of the GDPR, it is obliged to react in an appropriate manner in order to remedy the violation. This is why they have corrective powers under Article 58(2) GDPR. Although the DPA has the discretion to choose whether to exercise their corrective powers, the court held that the DPA may need to adopt a corrective measure if the violation interferes so severely with the rights of the data subject, that taking corrective measures is the only lawful course of action for the DPA, or if only taking these measures will lead to the creation of lawful conditions.\nAlthough the DPA requested the controller twice to provide information, the court found that this was not a formal corrective measure under Article 58(2)(c) GDPR. The requests lacked a binding nature and did not use the term “order”. Therefore, the court found that the DPA did not exercise any corrective powers under Article 58(2) GDPR at the time of the decision.\nThe court also found that the DPA closed the case by sending a final notification to the data subject without ensuring that the data subject’s request was or would be remedied. The court held that the DPA concluded its investigation prematurely and failed to fulfil its duty to process the data subject’s complaint with all due care and to remedy the violation.\nMoreover, the court held that without information about the recipients of the data subject’s personal data, the data subject could not make an informed decision as to whether they wanted to exercise their rights under the GDPR, in particular the right of access and the right to rectification, against these recipients. The court held that this is precisely the essential meaning and purpose of the right of access. The court held that this showed the necessity of taking a formal corrective measure, especially as the data subject did not have the opportunity so far to exercise their rights under the GDPR towards the recipients and will no longer have it in view of the deletion.\nTherefore, the court held that the DPA did not fulfil its obligation to take corrective measures, even though there were clear violations of Article 15(1) GDPR by the controller. The court found that issuing a reprimand under Article 58(2)(b) GDPR or imposing an administrative fine under Article 58(2)(i) GDPR would be considered most appropriate. Although the court held that it was up to the DPA’s discretion to choose which corrective measure was most appropriate, it stated that the DPA could only choose between these two measures.\nConclusion\nThus, the court ordered the DPA to take a corrective measure against the controller under Article 58(2) GDPR, revoking the DPA’s final notification of 24 March 2020.","title":"VG Ansbach - AN 14 K 20.00941"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against a Property Owners Association","text":"The DPA fined the Property Owners Association for failing to provide the requested information, in violation of Articles 83(5)(e) and 58(1)(a) and (e), and asked for the relevant information to be sent within five working days following the communication of the decision.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against a Property Owners Association"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO - FS50848833","text":"The ICO starts its ruling by stating that complying with the present request would not be a burden for the DfE, and moved on to consider if the requested information constituted personal data as defined by the Data Protection Act 2018 (‘DPA’).\nBy referring to section 3(2) of the DPA, the ICO stated that the withheld information in the audio record falls within the definition of ‘personal data’, it relates to and identifies the data subjects concerned. Audio recording would reveal the identities of individuals involved and would capture information related to religious views due to the hearing relating to alleged extremism. Moreover, the requested data does include special category data. Here, the commissioner refers to article 9 of the GDPR. ‘There will be clear references to the religious beliefs of some of the individuals’ and it would be difficult to separate out the special category data without rendering some of the remaining information meaningless, particularly as the request concerns audio recordings. As none of the conditions required by article 9 of GDPR for processing special category data are satisfied there is no legal basis for its disclosure. Processing any special category data in the recordings would therefore breach principle of DP and so this information is exempt under section 40(2) of the FOIA.\nThe ICO has gone on to consider if there are conditions defined by an article 6 of GDPR (in this case art.6 (1)(f)) to allow for the lawful processing of the remaining personal data in the audio recordings that is not special category data. The ICO considered three-part test: Legitimate interest Necessity and Balancing tests. While the ICO acknowledges that the disclosure of the requested information is necessary to meet the legitimate interests identified by the complainant, it determined that that legitimate interest is insufficient to outweigh the data subjects’ fundamental rights and freedoms.","title":"ICO - FS50848833"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9815665","text":"Firstly, the Italian DPA held that the dissemination of personal data (such as publications on the Internet) by public entities is permitted, when provided for by law. Secondly, the matriculation number is considered an identification number, as it allows third parties to trace the identity of the data subject, and not authorised personnel only. Consequently, the DPA held that a matriculation number on online publications falls under the definition of \"personal data\" in Article 4(1) GDPR.\nThe DPA reminded the controller that, as defined in Recital 26 GDPR, pseudonymisation is a mere technical measure and still makes it possible to trace the identity of a data subject in an indirect way or through use of additional information. With regards to the press release, the DPA held that there was no derogation from the principles on the protection of personal data. The DPA also reiterated that the principles of lawfulness and data minimisation apply to publication on online public notice boards, as clarified in the \"Guidelines on the processing of personal data, also contained in administrative acts and documents, carried out for the purposes of publicity and transparency on the web by public entities and other obligated entities\".\nThe DPA found a violation of Article 2-ter of the Code on the Protection of Personal Data, as the provisions cited by the controller did not meet the requirement of a valid legal basis. Furthermore, the DPA found a breach of Articles 5(1)(a)(c) and 6 GDPR because the online dissemination of the data subject's personal data lacked an appropriate legal basis. The DPA confirmed that the controller did not meet the requirement of lawful processing of personal data.\nIn conclusion, the DPA imposed a €3,000 fine on the controller for the violation of Articles 5(1)(a)(c) and 6 GDPR.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9815665"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - E/10529/2021","text":"The AEPD decided to accept the allegations of the controller and considered that the controller had not violated Article 45 GDPR nor any of the subsequent Articles from Chapter V of the GDPR. The AEPD took into account that the controller had stopped using Google Analytics short after the Schrems II ruling and that it had never used the obtained information to identify specific users.\nTherefore, the DPA concluded that, at the time of issuing the decision, the controller was not in breach of the GDPR under the competential scope of the AEPD.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - E/10529/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_ΣτΕ - 658/2025","text":"First, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the Party implemented sufficient technical and organisation measures designed to implement data protection principles, (Article 25(1) and Article 25(2) GDPR), ensure the security of processing against risks and adequately supervise all users (Article 32(1) and Article 32(4) GDPR). All measures included the activities of the Secretariats as well, according to their privacy and cybersecurity policy. The Supreme Administrative Court also pointed out that the assessment of the appropriateness of the measures is based upon their capacity to mitigate, not eliminate the risks. Additionally, according to the Party’s privacy policy, their official internal means of communication is done through the user’s official email accounts and any communication using other digital media or online applications are personal communications of those who use them which the Party cannot and in any case has no legitimacy to control.\nSecond, the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was not justified beyond reasonable doubt that the Minister processed personal data for statistical purposes in relation to his official duties as an executive of the Party or was in any case instructed to do so. Therefore, the Party was not the controller of this processing.\n\nConsequently, the Supreme Administrative Court annulled the contested decision in so far as it imposes a fine of €30,000 to the Party for the infringement of Article 25(2) and Article 32 GDPR and the related obligation to remedy the deficiencies found in the measures for the protection of personal data. It also annulled the contested decision for the part it imposed a €10,000 fine for the infringement of Article 5(1)(a) and Article 6(1) GDPR for processing of personal data relating to statistical analysis as inadequately reasoned.","title":"ΣτΕ - 658/2025"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-432-0047","text":"First, the DPA found that the Næstved Municipality violated the principle of lawfulness, fairness, and transparency, Article 5(1)(a) GDPR. It emphasised that \"the texts on the website led visitors to believe that the municipality processed personal data for marketing purposes, even if this was not the case\".\nSecond, the DPA found that Næstved Municipality's processing of website visitors' personal data for statistical purposes took place in the scope of the municipality's public authority, and thus within the framework of Article 6(1)(e) GDPR. The DPA considered that the processing of personal data for statistics was related directly to its duty to guide and assist citizens, since the website's efficiency and ease were optimised through the statistics. In this regard, the DPA found it important that these statistics were provided by a third party who anonymised the statistics irreversibly. Lastly, the DPA considered that the sub-processing that was carried out by AWS, did not lead to an international data transfer because this was laid down in an agreement and \"publicly guaranteed\".","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-432-0047"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 74/2020","text":"First of all, the DPA recalls that:\n- a video surveillance system falls under the provisions of the GDPR when the equipment used makes it possible to collect and store personal data;\n- such processing of personal data must at all times be consistent with the principles of data protection found in Article 5 of the GDPR, and fulfill one of the lawful bases for processing as set out in Article 6 of the GDPR.\n\nRecording and use of images from the surveillance cameras\nAs the complainants had not given their consent to the processing of their personal data, no other condition for the lawfulness of processing was possible in this context, except the \"legitimate interests\" under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR.\nThe Belgian DPA therefore conducts a \"legitimate interests assessment\" by following the three-part test:\n\nPurpose test\nIs there a legitimate interest behind the processing?\nThe DPA found that the defendants had a legitimate interest in placing the surveillance cameras in order to ensure the protection of their property and fight burglary, vandalism or theft. The damages caused to the goods belonging to the defendants in the period prior to the installation of the surveillance cameras show that the legitimate interest on the part of the defendants was moreover real and currently existing (and therefore not a purely hypothetical).\n\nNecessity test\nIs the processing necessary?\nThe DPA found that some surveillance cameras were set up in a way that cannot be regarded as necessary and in accordance with the data minimisation principle. The extensive and constant filming of the public highway cannot indeed be regarded as 'relevant', let alone 'necessary', for the defendants to safeguard their legitimate interests.\n\nBalancing test\nIs the legitimate interest overridden by the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject?\nThe surveillance cameras also did not withstand the weighting test, considering the seriousness of the infringement of the rights and freedoms of the complainants.\nTo come to this conclusion, the DPA pointed out that:\n- Continuous monitoring of the public highway, i.e. 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, constitutes a serious breach of the fundamental rights of the complainants. This also applies to the continuous monitoring of private domains of the complainants.\n- This is all the more true when other less intrusive processing proves possible, by adjusting the position of the surveillance cameras.\n- The rights of many other people were violated, such as the complainants’ children, or drivers of vehicles passing by on public roads in front of the defendants’ homes.\n- It is beyond the objective expectations of the data subjects concerned by the surveillance cameras.\n- The surveillance cameras were not installed in accordance with the provisions on the installation of security cameras under national law (law of 21 March 2007 regulating the positioning and use of video surveillance cameras).\nThe DPA Litigation Chamber therefore upheld that the images made by the surveillance cameras were not processed in a lawful way under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. Those unlawful processing operations were, by their very nature, sufficient in themselves to show that insufficient measures have been taken by the defendants to respect the data protection principles of the GDPR, and therefore also constitute an infringement of Article 25(1) of the GDPR.\n\nTransmission of the images to third parties\nAccording to the DPA, the transmission of the images made by the surveillance cameras in the context of the environmental law litigation also constituted a breach of article 6.1(f) of the GDPR, as the images were unlawfully made in the first place, thus constituting unlawful processing impacting the further processing.\n\nTaking of photographs in the event of an (alleged) offence\nOn the other hand, the making of a picture and the further processing thereof, was judged lawful under Article 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, as the processing was necessary for the defendants to safeguard a legitimate interests (i.e. to collect evidence of an infringement and bring this to the attention of the competent authorities), and did not appear to be so intrusive for the fundamental rights of the data subjects to outweigh the legitimate interests of the defendants. The taking of the photograph therefore withstood the assessment test.\nThe DPA Litigation Chamber therefore imposed a fine of € 1500 for the infringements of Article 6 of the GDPR. In addition, it issued a reprimand to the defendants for not respecting article 25.1 of the GDPR while placing their video surveillance system.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 74/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00285/2020","text":"The AEPD held that the federation had violated Article 37 GDPR for not having appointed a DPO. They also held that the federation had violated Article 13 for not having provided in their privacy policy the mandatory information provided by the GDPR.\nFor both these violations, the AEPD issued a warning.\nHowever, the AEPD held that there was no violation regarding consent due to the fact that it is a public federation that, according to the law, processes the data that the sports clubs collect, and that therefore the obligations regarding consent lay on such clubs.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00285/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_IP - 07120-1/2021/181","text":"The DPA held that the legal basis for the processing of personal data of members of the council of parents and employees of a public institution may be the Access to Public Information Act. Therefore (taking into account exceptions from free access) the publication of minutes of parents' council, which contain only public information, is permissible.\nIf the minutes of the meetings of the council of the institution or of the parents' council contain protected personal data or other data, the disclosure of which is not admissible (exceptions are specified in paragraphs 5a and 1 of the ZDIJZ), these parts of the minutes must be covered before publication.\nData related to the use of public funds or to the performance of a public function or employment relationship of a civil servant pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 6 of the ZDIJZ do not belong to protected personal data.","title":"IP - 07120-1/2021/181"}
{"_id":"holding_Cass.Civ. (Italy) - 28358","text":"The Supreme Court stated that the first two claims of the appellant had to be considered together as they were interrelated. It noted that the previous court had ruled that data processing by an algorithmic system could be considered transparent when the data subjects knew how the algorithm worked.\nRegardless of the explanation, the Supreme Court focused on the lawfulness of the processing and found that it is necessary for the data processing carried out by an algorithm to be subject to consent. This means that the data subjects had to give their consent freely for a specific data processing and that information on the data processing had to be provided on the basis of Article 13 of the (now updated) Italian Privacy Code.\nTherefore, because the data subjects were able to recognize the algorithm and the data processing, which was described to them by the appellant in an unambiguous and specific way, the Supreme Court repealed the judgment by the Court of Rome. Thus, it also found that it was not necessary to consider the third reason brought by the appellant.","title":"Cass.Civ. (Italy) - 28358"}
{"_id":"holding_Commissioner (Cyprus) - Decision of 27 November 2023","text":"After further investigations, the DPC concluded that the controller had failed to implement appropriate technical and security measures, thereby violating Article 32 GDPR and the principle of accountability under Article 5(2) GDPR.\nIn light of Article 83 GDPR and taking all the above into account and also the fact that the controller is part of the wider public sector, the DPC considered it appropriate to impose a fine in the amount of €45,000 on the controller.","title":"Commissioner (Cyprus) - Decision of 27 November 2023"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - 13.03.2023","text":"The DPA found that by requiring to the data subject to submit his request in a written, signed and dated form, the controller imposed excessive conditions for the exercise of the data subjects' rights, in breach of Articles 12. Also, the DPA found that the data controller violated Article 13 GDPR since the information notice did not provide complete, correct, accurate, and updated information.\nThe DPA imposed a fine of RON 9871 (approximately €2000) for these violations. In accordance with Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, the DPA also imposed corrective measures.\nFirst, the DPA ordered the data controller to facilitate the exercise of data subjects' rights by removing the excessive condition of requesting the data subjects to submit a \"written, dated and signed\" request, when exercising their rights.\nSecond, it ordered the controller to take appropriate measures in order to comply with the GDPR provisions, so that, in the future, the personal data used for direct marketing will only be processed based on the data subject's consent, to implement related internal procedures in this respect and to amend the relevant sections on the website to reflect such flow.\nThird, the DPA ordered the data controller to amend its information notice, in order to provide the data subjects complete, correct, accurate and updated information in respect to the processing of their data.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - 13.03.2023"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/00872","text":"The DPA held that the controller had violated Article 6(1) GDPR and Article 6(3) GDPR, thus also Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, for lack of legal basis for publishing CVs online. Further, as the controller is subject to a national regulation stipulating that the information in the CVs is confidential, the DPA held that they had violated Article 5(1)(f) GDPR.\nFor these violations, the DPA fined NAV (the controller) €486,700 (NOK 5,000,000).","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/00872"}
{"_id":"holding_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 05-10-2023","text":"DPA has concluded: 1. The controller did not take appropriate technical measures to protect the processing of the personal data contained in the storage systems, which is contrary to Article 32 paragraph 1 point b) and paragraph 2 of the GDPR; 2. The controller processed the personal data of respondents who are not in a debtor-creditor relationship in their database without the existence of a legal basis from Article 6, paragraph 1 of the GDPR; 3. The controller processed special category (health data) in its database without the existence of a legal basis from Article 6, paragraph 1, and in connection with this, Article 9, paragraph 2 of the GDPR; 4. The data controller did not inform the data subjects in a transparent and prescribed manner about the processing of their health data in the privacy policies, which is contrary to Article 12 paragraph 1 of the GDPR and, in this regard, to Article 13 paragraphs 1 and 2; 5. For the recording of telephone conversations with data subjects in the period from May 25, 2018 to January 16, 2019, the data controller did not have an established legal basis from Article 6, paragraph 1 of the GDPR, and in this connection there was also a violation of Article 5, paragraph 2; 6. The controller did not inform the data subjects in an understandable and clear way about the processing of personal data in the form of recording telephone conversations, and thus acted contrary to Article 12, paragraph 1 of the GDPR.\nRegarding the point 1 it was determined that the data controller did not implement sufficient TOM that could timely recognize in the processing system (the main database in which personal data of about 370,000 data subjects are processed) activities that deviate from the usual ones (e.g. increased number of retrievals data in the database, transfer of data outside the system, compromise of user access, etc.). Precisely because of deficiencies in the security system, the insecure processing of personal data on a large scale number of respondents, and the company lost control over the movement of data and could not explain the causes or methods of data exfiltration.\nIt was established that EOS Matrix also processed data of data subjects who are not debtors nor legal representative (most often telephone number and first and last name and residential address).\nRegarding the processing of health data, it was established that EOS Matrix, after communication with respondents, actively recorded comments related to the debtor's state of health in the internal database. Particularly worrying is the situation where the health condition of the subjects was monitored down to the details of individual diagnoses, which included terminal illnesses, and which almost exposes privacy to the maximum level to persons who are authorized to access the application (database) used by EOS Matrix employees. The arguments of EOS Matrix was that data subject had provided such information. DPA stressed that this does not mean that the same can be actively entered into the database. As a result of the above, it cannot be considered that there is an exception for the processing of health data from Article 9, paragraph 2, point e) of the GDPR. Furthermore, the reference to the legal basis regarding the execution of the contract, as well as the legitimate interest (which was referred to by the company in question) cannot be a legal basis either, since the processing of health data is not necessary to achieve the intended purpose. If the goal is better collection towards the debtor and avoidance of communication due to the health condition, then the same purpose could be achieved by recording a general comment about the need to avoid contact for a certain period of time due to the personal condition of the debtor, without highlighting precise health data.\nAlso, and related to the processing of health data, it was determined that EOS Matrix defined that it does not and will not process health data. This method resulted in non-transparent processing of data.\nAlso, in the period from May 25, 2018 to January 16, 2019, the data of 49,850 data subjects were processed, i.e. telephone conversations were recorded without determining the legal basis. The test of legitimate interest was conducted on January 16, 2019.\nFurthermore, regarding the recording of telephone conversations, it was established that EOS Matrix since 2014 has been using the functionality of recording telephone conversations with debtors, but indicating that the conversation \"may\" be recorded.\nIt has not been determined how exactly 181,641 personal data were exfiltrated, and considering that in this specific case it is a question of the possible commission of the criminal offense of unauthorized use of personal data and criminal offenses against computer systems, programs and data, and also under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. The DPA actively cooperates with the Zagreb Police Department and the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney's Office, which conduct investigative activities.\nAs a result of the above, it was undoubtedly established that the personal data submitted to the DPA via USB stick were excluded from the database of EOS Matrix!","title":"AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 05-10-2023"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2020-009","text":"The CNIL ordered CARREFOUR BANQUE to pay an administrative fine of €800000. Insofar as the company took the necessary measures to put an end to the breaches of which it was accused before the end of the proceedings, the CNIL did not issue an injunction against it.\nHowever, in view of the seriousness of the breaches sanctioned and the number of people concerned, the restricted formation pronounced an additional publication sanction for a period of two years.\n\nOn the violation of the obligation to fairly process personal data\nWhen a subscriber to the payment card also wanted to join the CARREFOUR loyalty programme, he had to tick a box which provided: “I accept that CARREFOUR BANQUE communicates to CARREFOUR FIDELITE my surname, first name and email”. CARREFOUR BANQUE undertakes not to transmit any other information to CARREFOUR FIDELITE”. Nonetheless, the French DPA noticed that CARREFOUR BANQUE also transmits to CARREFOUR FRANCE other information: postal address, telephone numbers, and the number of children declared by the subscriber.\nThe French DPA concluded that this was a violation of the principle of fairness within Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, as the information given to data subjects are imprecise and misleading. The French DPA outlined that despite the lack of definition of fairness in the GDPR, this was linked to the requirement of transparency within Article 12. More specifically, the CNIL highlights that:\n  * CARREFOUR BANQUE transmits to CARREFOUR FRANCE more data than those restrictively listed at the time of subscription.\n  * CARREFOUR BANQUE mentions CARREFOUR FIDELITE as the recipient of the data communicated by data subjects, whereas this service, attached to the company CARREFOUR FRANCE, had never been presented to the subscriber prior to this mention.\n\nOn the lack of accessibility to information on processing of personal data\nQuoting Articles 12 GDPR, the French DPA distinguishes between :\n  * Access to information relating to personal data protection: In this case, the user could access the information relating to the processing of his or her data, either by clicking directly on the \"Protection of Banking Data\" tab at the bottom of the page, or by accessing the Legal Notice which referred to the privacy policy, thus requiring several actions by the user. On this point, the CNIL recalls the WP29 guidelines on transparency, according to which data subjects should not have to search for information, but should have to immediate access to it. So the French DPA held that there was a violation of the obligation of transparency as per Article 12 GDPR. On the one hand, the vagueness of the title \"Protection of Banking Data\" does not make it easy for the data subjects that this tab refers the personal data protection. On the other hand, with regard to access to the privacy policy via the legal notices, the CNIL notes that users must first undertake several actions before being able to access this tab.\n  * The information provided to data subjects throughout the online subscription process: According to the CNIL, the information provided throughout the payment card subscription process was not easily accessible by data subjects. Although CARREFOUR BANQUE did provide the information expected as first level information on the page presenting the payment card subscription process (identity of the controller, purposes of the processing, description of the rights recognized to data subjects), the CNIL nevertheless emphasizes that CARREFOUR BANQUE neglected to complement these mentions by allowing people to read complete information by means of a link to this information. This was a violation of Article 12.\n\nOn the vagueness of data retention periods\nBased on Article 13(2)(a) GDPR and WP29 guidelines on transparency, the CNIL noted that the CARREFOUR BANQUE’s privacy policy were imprecise and vague about data conservation information.\nIndeed, the privacy policy contained vague and undefined formulations that confused data subjects as to the extent and nature of the data collected. Furthermore, the information policy did not specify the retention periods for all data and did not specify the criteria used to determine these periods.\n\nOn the use of cookies on the website\nThe French DPA recalls the provisions of Article 82 of the French data protection law (loi informatique et libertés), which requires that any deposit of cookies or tracers must be preceded by the information and consent of users. This requirement does not apply to cookies whose sole purpose is to enable or facilitate communication by electronic means or which are strictly necessary for the provision of an online communication service at the express request of the user.\nIn this case, the CNIL notices that 31 cookies were automatically deposed on users’ device upon arrival on the site’s home page and before any action by the user. More specifically, two of them were intended to trace the user and three of them were intended for advertising targeting.\nConcluding that these five cookies do not fall within the scope of the exceptions detailed in Article 82 of the French Data Protection law, the CNIL noted the breach of Article 82 and underlines that the deposit of these five cookies should have required the company to obtain the user's prior consent.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2020-009"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Rotterdam - 9519423 \\ CV EXPL 21-35975","text":"First, the court referred to the provisions of the Protocol Incident Warning System Financial Insitutions 2021, specifically Article 5(2)1 which lists the requirements for deletion of registers.\nIn the present case, tt concluded that a fraud was indeed committed and stated that this qualified as a criminal offence under Article 350 of the CPS.\nTherefore, the Court considered that the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity were respected and that the controller had a legitimate interest in protecting the financial sector from fraud.\nNo violation was found and the data processing was considered as legal.","title":"Rb. Rotterdam - 9519423 \\ CV EXPL 21-35975"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9861289","text":"The DPA pointed out that medical records constitute 'data relating to health' in the sense of Article 4(15) GDPR. Pursuant to Article 9 GDPR, this special category of data can only be disclosed to third parties on the basis of an appropriate legal ground or prior written authorisation by the data subject. It emphasized that the data controller must comply with the principle of \"integrity and confidentiality\", according to which personal data must be processed in such a way as to ensure appropriate security. This includes the protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing by appropriate technical and organisational measures (Art. 5(1)(f) GDPR). The DPA acknowledged that the controller acted immediately to minimise the damage and took measures to prevent further breaches, having cooperated with the investigations. However, it held that the disclosure of the data subject’s health data to an unauthorised third party violated Articles 5(1)(f), 9 and 32 GDPR. In view of this, it imposed a fine of €5.000.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9861289"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00315/2019","text":"The AEDP found that the information provided was in breach of Article 13 GDPR. Therefore, the authority warned the controller (Article 83(5) GDPR) and requested to complete the notice respecting the criteria of Article 13 GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00315/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_CNPD (Luxembourg) - Délibération n° 16FR/2022","text":"The DPA generally agreed with the opinion of the head of the investigation. It considered firstly that for some cameras, the field of view was not limited to what was necessary to achieve the purpose of the processing, which was violating Article 5(1)(c), i.e. the principle of data minimisation. This was the case for example for cameras filming public area.\nSecondly, the DPA found a failure to comply with Article 13, which imposes an obligation to provide information. It considered that multi-level information is not excluded. As regards employees, it held that the first level of information (warning sign) should include the most essential information such as identity of the controller, the purposes of processing and a reference to more detailed information (e.g. via a QR code). As for the third parties (customers, service providers, etc.), the DPA considered the same : first level of information (warning sign) should also include the most essential elements of the processing operation and a reference to the second level of information. In this case, the sign didn't include essential information nor a reference to a second level of information. The DPA underlined the fact that Article 13 requires information to be given at the time the data is obtained, which does not imply that a document must be hand-delivered to all third parties but that a reference to detailed information must be indicated on the signs.\nConsidering the violations of Article 5(1)(c) and Article 13, the Luxembourg DPA therefore imposed a fine of €10,000 in accordance with Article 83(2).\nTaking into account the measures already taken by Company A, the DPA also ordered corrective measures: in particular 1) to stop filming the employees' workplans and, if this cannot be avoided at all, to arrange for their faces to be blurred, and 2) to obscure the public area within the cameras' field of vision. Another measure is the obligation to have a single place where all the information required by Article 13 is available.","title":"CNPD (Luxembourg) - Délibération n° 16FR/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9872646","text":"First, the Italian DPA held that the processing of personal data carried out by the controller through the use of a video surveillance camera violated Articles 5 (1)(a) and 13 GDPR. The DPA stated that the processing of personal data must always comply with the general principles of Article 5, in particular the principle of transparency, which demands that data subjects must always be informed that they are entering a video surveillance area. Information that must be provided when personal data are collected from a data subject is listed in Article 13 GDPR. In this case, the controller failed to put up the required information signs, which is why he was convicted of the violation of the aforementioned articles.\nSecond, the Italian DPA held that the controller violated Article 114 of the Personal Data Protection Code (Codice in materia di protezione dei dati personali), an Italian national law. The Article refers to a different Italian national provision (Art 4 L. 300/1970), which provides rules for when and under which conditions video surveillance of employee's activities is allowed. In particular, it states that authorization from the Italian labor inspectorate is needed, which the controller did not obtain. The provision is applicable thanks to Article 88 GDPR, which holds that it is permissible for national laws to provide a greater standard of protection than already given by the GDPR with regard to the processing of workers' personal data.\nDue to these violations, the DPA imposed a €3,000 administrative fine on the controller. The DPA took into consideration the severity of the violations, the lack of any previous convictions for data protection violations against the controller and the fact that the controller had sent evidence of the removal of the surveillance camera.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9872646"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 38/2021","text":"Before giving its decision on the question in dispute, the Belgian DPA reminded the defendant that the plaintiff's notary's mistake of publishing unnecessary data, was no reason for justifying that the defendant should not be held liable for a possible unlawful processing, as the SPF argued. A data controller always being accountable for the data they process, no matter in what way obtained, the liability of the defendant could indeed also be sought in this case.\nThereupon, the DPA states that even if the publication was an obligation under the applicable corporate law and the data processing herewith found its legal basis in Article 6(1)(c) GDPR, the principle of minimization of data pursuant to Article 5(1)(c) could not be undermined as it had been by the defendant. It is not because a data processing is justified by the law, that its controller can process data within its framework as pleases them. Saying otherwise would mean questioning the very essence of the principle of minimization. Thus, the plaintiff was right in claiming that the processing of the data linked with the publication had no legal basis as per Article 6 GPDR, since the data was not necessary for the defined purposes, and that it meant that the defendant had not been within their right to refuse an erasure of the plaintiff's data pursuant to Article 17 GPDR. The DPA therefore issued a reprimand towards the defendant according to their powers resulting from the Belgian law establishing the national data protection authority and ordered them to grant the plaintiff's request and erase the litigious data.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 38/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_AP (The Netherlands) - z2019-28837","text":"The DPA held that under Article 17(1) GDPR read together with Article 12(3) GDPR the controller needed to comply with erasure requests without undue delay and in any event within one month of receipt of the requests. According to the DPA, the fact that the data subjects did not use the designated email address, but the email address of the recruiter that approached them, does not change the controller’s duty to comply. The DPA noted that it also did not detract from the severity of the violation.\nThe DPA also stated that the controller bears responsibility for the actions of its employees who, in this case, failed to respond to the erasure requests. This responsibility includes preventing human mistakes. Although the controller had complied with more than 650 erasure requests and only three incidents occurred due to human mistake, the DPA held that it did not excuse the controller from its responsibility.\nThe DPA took into account the fact that the failure of complying with the erasure requests was most probably a human mistake of one of the controller’s employees, the fact that the controller described in detail how to handle (erasure) requests and GDPR-related complaints they receive in their personal inbox or via telephone, and the fact that the controller has now strengthened its policy regarding (erasure) requests to prevent cases like this in the future. Therefore, the DPA found the €130,000 base fine of the Dutch Fining Policy Rules 2019 disproportionately high. As a consequence, the DPA only issued a fine of €6,000 on the grounds of Article 58(2)(i) GDPR and Article 83(4) GDPR.","title":"AP (The Netherlands) - z2019-28837"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202213437","text":"The DPA was critical of the failure of the controller’s system to prevent unauthorised access to bank account information, despite the repeated requests from the data subjects. Accordingly, the DPA ruled that the controller violated Article 5(1)(f) GDPR.\nThe DPA also found that the unauthorised access was attributable to a failure on the controller’s part to implement appropriate technical and organizational security measures. The DPA held that the controller thus also violated Article 32 GDPR.\nFurthermore, the DPA attributed the unauthorised access to the poor design of the bank’s online banking system. The DPA rejected the argument from the controller that the issue was attributable to the data subject’s configuration of the display of their account, finding that an appropriate banking application should not allow access to anyone who is not the account holder or authorized person. The DPA thus found the design of the online banking system to be deficient, thus violating Article 25 GDPR.\nThe DPA imposed a fine of €3,500,000 on the controller for these infringements. The controller was also required to implement the appropriate technical and organisational measures necessary to ensure the confidentiality of customer’s banking data through their online banking platform.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202213437"}
{"_id":"holding_GHDHA - 200.274.807 / 01","text":"The Court agreed with the appellant: legal basis of the processing of her personal data by ING is legitimate interest and not the legal obligation under the Dutch Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het financieel toezicht). This means, that she has the right to object to her personal data processing based on Article 21(1).\nHowever, the Court rejects the appeal as such because the principles of necessity and proportionality are respected in this case. The appellant could not demonstrate that maintaining the registration would disproportionately affect her. The fact that she is financial reliable (even though challenged by ING) does not mean that she does not need protection from excessive loans. The mortgage rejection was done via phone and the appellant did not make use of the internal complaint procedure to challenge the rejection. Temporarily withdrawal of the record until the appellant gets another loan would represent disproportionate risks to the financial institutions.","title":"GHDHA - 200.274.807 / 01"}
{"_id":"holding_AN - SAN 1863/2021","text":"The Spanish National High Court (AN) analysed Recital 171 GDPR and noted that the Regulation had entered into force 20 days after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, that is, on May 24, 2016,\nHowever, the Regulation only became directly applicable and mandatory in all its elements in each Member State as of May 25, 2018, therefore providing, the Member States and their respective Supervisory Authorities, of a period of 2 years for their preparation, application and interpretation of the different rights and obligations that it establishes. Therefore, both Directive 95/46 and the former Spanish Data Protection Act were fully valid and applicable to the case at hand at the time of the infringement, while the AEPD applied the GDPR to the case.\nThe AN held that the GDPR was not applicable when the alleged infringement happened, in April 2018, and that it had been retroactively applied by the AEPD, what goes against the constitutional principle of non-retroactivity of the law, enshrined in Article 9(3) of the Spanish Constitution.\nThe Court further clarified that the GDPR only could have been applicable if it had been more favourable to the infringer than the law that was in effect at the moment. Consequently, the AN upheld the appeal and annulled the sanction imposed by the AEPD on the controller, ordering the refund of the amount of the fine.","title":"AN - SAN 1863/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 47/2022","text":"The DPA issued a fine of €100,000 against the controller (0.34 % of the 2020 turnover).\nAdditionally, the DPA issues a reprimand for non-compliance with Article 30 GDPR.\n\n1. Sensitive data\nFirst, the DPA clarified that the processing of temperature of passengers via thermal cameras is a processing of sensitive data (health data) and the airport is the controller.\n\n2. Legal basis\nThe DPA held that the airport relied on Articles 6(1)(c) and 9(2)(i) GDPR to process the data. Regarding Article 9(2)(i) GDPR, the DPA recognised that the the protection against COVID-19 was a matter of public interest in the area of public health. The DPA considered that no legal obligation existed since the protocol invoked by the controller to justify the processing was not legally binding and did not contain the obligation to conduct a monitoring of the temperature of the passengers. Moreover, the protocol was not precise enough regarding the purposes pursued and the circumstances of the monitoring. Additionally, it was not published and therefore not accessible to the passengers. The DPA also decided that the necessity was not demonstrated since the protocol itself referred to the recommendations of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control that considered that the temperature control was not proven to be efficient.\n\n3. Transparency principle\nThe DPA also concluded that transparency principle was violated (Articles 5(1)(a), 12 and 13 GDPR). The fact that thermal cameras were used was not mentioned in the privacy policy or any other document. Also, the controller cannot rely on press articles to consider that passengers were properly informed. There was not reference to the exact and precise legal basis to which the airport referred as being basis for the legal obligation to monitor the temperature of passengers. The mere fact that the legal basis was available at the official journal is not sufficient (and such publication occured after the beginning of the processing).\n\n4. Purpose limlitation\nThe DPA found that the purpose was, though explained, not sufficiently and explicitly defined, finding a violation of Article 5(1)(b) GDPR.\n\n5. Obligation to conduct a data protection impact assessment (DPIA)\nThe DPA agreed with the inspection service and considered that a DPIA was required prior to the start of the processing operation. The fact that there was an alleged emergency is not exception to this obligation. The DPA also concluded that the quality of the DPIA was not meeting the requirements of the GDPR since the consequences and risks for rights and freedoms for the data subjects were not mentioned. The DPA concluded that the DPIA did not assess correctly the necessity of the processing. The lack of tools provided by the DPA for DPIAs is not an excuse to have a DPIA that is not meeting the requirements of the GDPR. Consequently, the DPA found a violation of Article 35 GDPR.\n\n6. Security and integrity of the data\nThe DPA did not consider that the security of the data was compromised due to the low risk of illegal access to the images. It still advised to hold the password and the login to access the images in a different document (Articles 5(1)(g) and 32 GDPR).\n\n7. Data protection by default and data minimisation\nThe DPA concluded that there was no violation of Articles 25 and 5(1)(c) GDPR, since the images were deleted every day, no names of the persons were stored, and the period of storage of the images was limited to what was necessary to find a person in the airport.\n\n8. Records of processing activities\nThe DPA considered that the record of processing activities (Article 30(1) GDPR) was not complete enough, considering that the categories of recipient were not mentioned in the record.\n\n9. Involvement and independence of the data protection officer (DPO)\nFinally, the DPA did not share the conclusion of the inspection service that the controller's DPO was not independent enough (considering the position of the DPO in the hierarchy of the controller). The fact that the DPO needs to report every two weeks to the legal director is not incompatible with the requirement of independence, as it is accepted that a DPO has to report to a superior. However, the DPA expressed concerns regarding the suspension of the activities of the DPO due to the crisis, which could prevent the DPO from being fully involved in the in all issues relating to the processing operations of the airport. The DPA thus did not find a violation of Article 38 GDPR.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 47/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Amsterdam - AWB 21/3724","text":"The District Court Amsterdam rejected the claim.\nFirst, it considered that the DPA has limited resources and receives tens of thousands complaints every year. Hence, the DPA has to consider which complaints they handle, and which complaints have a higher priority to be dealt with. The Court found that it follows from Article 57(1)(f) GDPR that the DPA has this margin to decide whether or not a complaint must be dealt with. The Court also acknowledged the DPA’s argument that this case was not that important in terms of societal impact. The Court therefore rejected the data subject’s claim.","title":"Rb. Amsterdam - AWB 21/3724"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 52/2021","text":"After reviewing the facts of the case, the HDPA first stated that the telephone number of an individual constitutes \"personal data\" under Article 4(1) GDPR because it makes a person identifiable. Moreover, the HDPA held that ZENITH, who transferred the contact details of its customers to the processor based on a contract signed between them in order for the latter to conduct calls for marketing purposes, must be considered as a \"controller\" under Article 4(7) GDPR and the latter company as a \"processor\" under Article 4(8) GDPR.\nFurthermore, the HDPA stated that both the controller and the processor companies were in breach of GDPR provisions. Specifically, the processor failed to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring an appropriate level of security under Article 32(2) GDPR since it was their employee who made the relevant mistake. On the other hand, the controller was responsible for offering the appropriate tools and guidelines in order to prevent unlawful calls from being conducted and for supervising the processor's methods. Lastly, the HDPA states that it was the controller's duty to act upon the individuals' complaints. However, according to the HDPA, instead of addressing the problem and offering specific guidelines to the processor, the controller only provided them with general and inadequate guidelines.\nTherefor, the HDPA fined the processor €30,000 under Article 58(2) GDPR and Article 83(4) GDPR for the breach of Article 32(2), Article 32(4) GDPR and Article 28(3) GDPR. As for the controller, the HDPA issued a reprimand under Article 58(2) GDPR for the breach of Article 28(3) GDPR.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 52/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/02293","text":"The DPA held that the company had conducted an unlawful credit rating in violation of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, issued a €20,000 fine and ordered them to implement internal controls of their credit rating process in line with Article 24 GDPR.\nDespite the controller's arguments against a fine, the DPA noted the following aggravating factors in support of a fine:\n  * Credit ratings are a significant intrusion into data subjects' private life.\n  * The significant number of credit ratings the controller conducts.\n  * Lack of sufficient routines for conducting credit ratings (that would likely have prevented the mistake).\n  * The mistake could have been easily avoided by confirming the address directly with the new customer.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/02293"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-023","text":"On the request for a stay of proceedings\nFirst, the companies requested that per Article 66 of the CNIL's rules of procedure, the CNIL stay these proceedings pending the decision to be handed down by the Council of State in the appeal against its first decision against Google and pending the conclusions of the new EDPB working group on cookies.\nThe CNIL rejected this request, as it considered that there were no acceptable grounds for staying the proceedings.\n\nOn the complaint alleging breach of the ne bis in idem principle\nSecond, the companies argued that the restricted formation cannot rule again on the same facts as those concerned by deliberations No. SAN-2020-012 and No. SAN-2021-004, without violating the ne bis in idem principle, as it considered the parties and material facts in those case to be identical.\nThe CNIL responded that the two procedures do not concern the same facts, as these cases included an injunction relating to the information of users on the purposes of cookies subject to consent and on the means available to refuse cookies, whereas the one at hand concerned the refusal methods themselves, and not only the information. It also highlighted that this procedure concerned both the websites \"google.fr\" and \"youtube.com\", whereas the previous procedure concerned only the website \"google.fr\".\nAs such, the CNIL rejected the complaint based on the violation of the ne bis in idem principle.\n\nOn the competence of the CNIL\n\nThe material competence of the CNIL and the non-application of the \"one-stop shop\" mechanism provided for by the GDPR\nThe processing operations investigated by the CNIL in this case were carried out in the context of the provision of publicly available electronic communications services via a public electronic communications network offered within the European Union. As such, it considered they fell within the material scope of the ePrivacy Directive. Article 5(3) of that directive was transposed into domestic law through Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act. The CNIL therefore considered itself materially competent under these provisions to monitor and sanction the access or registration of information by companies in the terminals of users of the \"google.fr\" and \"youtube.com\" websites in France.\nThe companies contested the jurisdiction of the CNIL. They argued they should be subject to the procedural framework provided for by the GDPR, or the 'one-stop shop' mechanism, under which the Irish DPA (DPC) would be the lead supervisory authority (LSA). They considered that the absence of specific rules on determining the competence of the supervisory authority in the case of cross-border processing operations falling within the scope of the ePrivacy Directive should be replaced by the application of the procedural framework provided for by the GDPR. Interestingly, the companies further argued that the EDPB's announcement regarding the creation of a working group on cookie banners in response to the significant number of complaints recently filed with supervisory authorities by noyb was evidence that the EDPB considers that cookie-related breaches fall directly within the scope of the GDPR and, therefore, the 'one-stop shop' mechanism.\nFirst, the CNIL responded that a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, the operations consisting in depositing and reading a cookie on a user's terminal and, on the other hand, the subsequent use that is made of the data generated by these cookies (\"subsequent/further processing\"). The former are governed by special rules, set by the ePrivacy Directive - in this case, by its Article 5(3) - and transposed into national law, the latter is governed by the GDPR and, as such, may be subject to the \"one-stop-shop\" mechanism in the event that they are cross-border. This case only concerned the read and write operations carried out on the terminal of the user located in France visiting the Google Search and YouTube search engines.\nSecond, it held that where a processing operation may fall within both the material scope of the ePrivacy Directive and the material scope of the GDPR, reference should be made to the relevant provisions of the two texts which provide for their articulation. The rule laid down in Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive, according to which reading and/or writing operations must systematically be subject to the prior consent of the user, after having been informed, constitutes a special rule with regard to the GDPR, since it prohibits the legal bases mentioned in Article 6 GDPR from being invoked in order to be able to lawfully carry them out. The control of this rule is therefore a matter for the special control and sanction mechanism provided for by the ePrivacy Directive, and not for the data protection authorities and the EDPB under the GDPR. It stated that the French legislator entrusted this task to the CNIL. Thus, the \"one-stop shop\" mechanism provided for by the GDPR could not be applied to the processing operations covered by the Directive, as the companies claimed.\nThird, the CNIL confirmed that the 'one-stop-shop' mechanism is not applicable to facts that are materially covered by the ePrivacy Directive, by referring to the Opinion No 5/2019 of the EDPB and the CJEU decision C-645/19 (Facebook Belgium) upholding this opinion.\nFinally, the CNIL stated that the creation of a working group on cookies in response to the large number of complaints filed by noyb did not mean that the EDPB considered that all violations related to cookies necessarily fall within the scope of the GDPR. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 70(1)(u) GDPR, one of the EDPS's tasks is to promote cooperation and the effective bilateral and multilateral exchange of information and best practices between supervisory authorities. The purpose of the working party was thus only to exchange views on the analysis of the numerous complaints lodged by noyb.\nThus, the CNIL held that the \"one-stop shop\" mechanism provided for by the GDPR was not applicable to the present procedure and that it was competent to control and sanction processing operations consisting of reading and/or writing information in the terminal of users located in France implemented by companies falling within the scope of the \"ePrivacy\" Directive, provided that they fall within its territorial jurisdiction.\n\nOn the territorial jurisdiction of the CNIL\nThe CNIL considered it was territorially competent under Article 3 GDPR since the processing that was the subject of the present procedure, namely consisting of accessing or recording information on the terminals of users residing in France when using the Google Search engine and YouTube, in particular for advertising purposes, was carried out within the \"framework of the activities\" of the company Google France, which constituted the \"establishment\" of the Google group in France. In response, Google argued that its establishment in the EU was located in Ireland. The CNIL considered a range of CJEU case law (included but not limited to Google Spain C-131/12, Weltimmo C-230/14) and its findings in the previous decision SAN-2020-012, which pointed towards a broad interpretation of 'establishment' and 'in the context of the activities' and rejected this argument. As such, it held that French law was applicable and that it was materially and territorially competent to exercise its powers, including the power to impose sanctions on processing operations falling within the scope of the ePrivacy Directive.\n\nThe determination of the controller\nThe CNIL held that Google LLC and Google Ireland Limited jointly determined the purposes and means of the processing consisting of accessing or recording information in the terminal of users residing in France when using the Google Search engine and YouTube.\n\nOn the failure to comply with the obligations relating to cookies\nThe CNIL finally assessed whether the companies had complied with Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act.\nIt noted that, in order to give consent to the reading and/or writing of information on their terminal, users visiting the home page of the sites \"google.fr\" and \"youtube.com\" only had to click on the \"I accept\" button on the pop-up window, which made the window disappear and allowed them to continue browsing. On the other hand, the users going to these same home pages and wishing to refuse cookies had to click on the \"Personalise\" button of this first window, which took them to an interface on both the \"google.fr\" and \"youtube.com\" sites, offering them the choice of activating or deactivating cookies, on which they had the possibility of carrying out various actions.\nThe investigator for the CNIL considered that making the mechanism for refusing cookies more complex than the one for accepting them amounted to discouraging users from refusing cookies and encouraging them to opt for the \"I accept\" button. This led to their conclusion that the methods of refusing cookies implemented by the companies on the sites \"google.fr\" and \"youtube.com\" did not comply with the provisions of Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act, as clarified by the enhanced consent requirements set out in the GDPR.\nIn response, the companies argued that neither the ePrivacy Directive, nor the RGPD, nor Article 82 of the Data Protection Act provided that the action of refusing cookies should be as simple as accepting them. \"They [also added] that, for many years, the CNIL itself had not deduced this principle even though the regulations in question had remained unchanged since the RGPD came into force. They point out that the CNIL cannot, through its guidelines and recommendations, introduce new requirements relating to the refusal of consent and consider that it is up to each data controller to choose the most appropriate method of obtaining consent.\"\nThe CNIL rejected this, restating its powers, which include drawing up and publishing guidelines, recommendations or benchmarks intended to facilitate the compliance of personal data processing with the texts relating to the protection of personal data. It was in this context the DPA had issued its previous deliberations which provided guidance to stakeholders on the implementation of concrete measures to ensure compliance with these provisions, so that they implemented these measures or measures of equivalent effect. Indeed, the guidelines' main purpose \"is to recall and clarify the law applicable to the reading and/or writing of information [...] in the subscriber's or user's electronic communications terminal equipment, and in particular to the use of cookies\".\nIt thus considered that it had not created any new obligations for the actors in its recommendation, but has limited itself to illustrating in concrete terms how Article 82 of the law should be applied. The position according to which it must be as simple for users to refuse cookies as to consent to them was even endorsed by the French Council of State in CE, 19 June 2020, No. 434684, pt 15.\nFurther, the CNIL highlighted that users residing in France who visit the Google Search engine and/or YouTube had to perform a single action to accept cookies, whereas they had to perform five to refuse them. It was therefore not as simple to refuse cookies as to accept them. It referred to studies that showed that having a \"refuse all\" button on the first-level consent interface led to a decrease in the rate of consent to accept cookies. It therefore considered that making the mechanism for refusing cookies more complex than the one for accepting them actually discourages users from refusing cookies and encourages them to prefer the ease of the \"accept all\" button.\n\"In view of the above, the [CNIL held] that there [had] been a breach of the provisions of Article 82 of the [French] Data Protection Act, interpreted in the light of the GDPR, insofar as the companies [did] not provide users located in France, on the websites \"google.fr\" and \"youtube.com\", with a means of refusing to read and/or write information to their terminal that is as simple as the one provided for accepting its use.\nThus, the CNIL:\n  * imposed a fine of €90,000,000 on Google LLC for failing to comply with Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act,\n  * imposed a fine of €60,000,000 on Google Ireland Limited for failing to comply with Article 82 of the French Data Protection Act,\n  * ordered Google LLC and Google Ireland Limited to modify, on the websites \"google.fr\" and \"youtube.com\", the methods for obtaining the consent of users located in France to the reading and/or writing of information in their terminal, by offering them a means of refusing these operations that is as simple as the mechanism provided for their acceptance, in order to guarantee the freedom of their consent;\n  * attached to the injunction a penalty of 100,000 euros (one hundred thousand euros) per day of delay at the end of a period of three months following notification of this decision, with proof of compliance to be sent to the restricted panel within this period;\n  * made its decision public on the CNIL website and on the Légifrance website, which will no longer identify the companies by name at the end of a two-year period from the date of its publication.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-023"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00367/2019","text":"The AEPD ruled that the sending of email without Bcc: the email recipients constituted a violation of the principle of integrity and confidentiality (Article 5(1)(f) GDPR). Regarding the fining, the authority decided to issue a warning sanction instead of a fine, although the sanction is still mentionning that the infringement at stake is subject to a fine according to Article 83.5 GDPR, in the lights of Recital (148) GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00367/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_FiS - 7565-20","text":"The two complaints\nOn the question of whether Google had failed to remove search results without undue delay, the court upheld the DPA's decision on one of the complaints and dismissed the other. The latter was dismissed because the court concluded that the actual date on which the DPA's supervisory decision became legally binding was three days after Google removed the search result at issue.\n\nInforming webmasters\nThe court ruled that Google's routine of regularly sending information to webmasters constituted a processing of personal data incompatible with the purpose for which the data was originally collected, and that there was no legal basis for the processing.\nThe court clarified that where a search engine invokes a legitimate interest and considers that the removal of a search result infringes freedom of expression and information [Article 17(3)], an assessment of the legitimate interest must be carried out before the search engine agrees to remove the search result. The court held that once a search engine removes a search result, this means that the competing legitimate interests have already been weighed against each other and the result was considered to be in favor of the data subject. The court concluded that a search engine should not undertake a new balancing of legitimate interests as to whether the webmaster should be notified. The court found that carrying out a new balancing of legitimate interests would mean that the data subject's right to be forgotten was not effectively and fully protected.\n\nSanction fee\nWhile the court found Google's practice unlawful, it also ruled that the fine imposed on Google for failing to delete individual search results without undue delay should be substantially reduced. The reduction was due to the fact that the findings of the DPA on one of the complaints were rejected. The Administrative Court therefore reduced the penalty fee from a total of SEK 75 million to SEK 52 million.","title":"FiS - 7565-20"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00293/2021","text":"The DPA reversed its previous decision, upholding the data subject's appeal for reconsideration and requiring the controller to answer the data subject's access request within 10 business days.\nThe DPA noted that bank transactions are personal data under Article 4(1) GDPR and are as such subject to the right of access guaranteed by Article 15 GDPR. The DPA did not, however, explicitly decide on the parties' arguments regarding the LCCC.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - TD/00293/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Noord-Holland - HAA 21/6573","text":"The court found no violation of Article 15 GDPR, but found a violation of Articles 16 and 17 GDPR.\nFirstly, the controller’s response was GDPR-compliant for the purposes of Article 15 GDPR. An incomplete response to an access request was not inherently a violation of Article 15(3) GDPR. The controller had provided a summary of the data subject’s personal data, along with an explanatory note outlining the processing purposes. In reaching its conclusion, the court referenced CJEU judgment of 4 May 2023 (ECLI: EC: C: 2023: 369), wherein it was established that Article 15(3) GDPR does not confer the right to obtain a copy of complete documents if these are not necessary to enable the data subject to effectively exercise the rights conferred on him by the GDPR. This response was sufficient to fulfil the specificity requirements of Article 15(3) GDPR, thus there was no violation of Article 15(3) GDPR.\nSecondly, the controller’s failure to enforce the data subject’s erasure request was a violation of Article 17 GDPR. Given that the data subject’s data was unlawfully processed to begin with, they were entitled to the erasure of their personal data under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR. Moreover, the court concluded that the controller had no grounds to argue the application of Article 17(3) GDPR, which outlines instances where a controller may lawfully refuse an erasure request. The court found that “the defendant (controller) could not reasonably have considered it necessary to retain the claimant’s personal data in connection with archiving, investigation or legal proceedings.”\nThirdly, the court found that the controller’s refusal to rectify the data subject’s data was a violation of Article 16 GDPR. However, the right to rectification under Article 16 GDPR was to be disregarded in this case, as the data subject’s erasure request was upheld.\nThe controller (defendant) was ordered to reimburse the data subject’s court fees and legal costs.","title":"Rb. Noord-Holland - HAA 21/6573"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-0076","text":"The CNIL issued a favourable opinion on the DPIA and approved the processing.\nFirstly, the CNIL noted that the basis for processing were legal and fell within the provisions that the controller was seeking to rely upon. In this instance, the controller sought to rely upon Article 6(1)(e) GDPR and Article 9(2)(j) GDPR. Article 6(1)(e) GDPR establishes a lawful basis for the processing of data related to the performance of tasks carried out in the public interest. While, Article 9(2)(j) GDPR establishes a lawful basis for the processing of sensitive data (in this case health data) for purposes in the public interest. The CNIL decided that as the research concerned a national study on epilepsy for the purpose of improving the national health care system, the controller’s reliance on the above grounds was lawful, as it was fell within the definition of “public interest.”\nSecondly, in its DPIA, the controller argued that to fulfil its disclosure obligations under Article 14 GDPR to the data subjects involved would involve a disproportionate effort given the number of data subjects concerned in the study. In total, this amounted to approximately 1.84 million people. The controller proposed instead of communicating the information required by Article 14 GDPR to each individual data subject, to publish the relevant information on its website, as well as the website of the Paris hospitals, and on the website of the French Association of Epilepsy. The CNIL approved of this and allowed for the controller to rely on the Article 14(5)(b) GDPR exception.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-0076"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Noord-Nederland - 8187989","text":"The Subdistrict Court concluded that the municipality has violated the GDPR by causing data leaks and is therefore liable for damages towards the claimant. In the circumstances of this case there was no reason to award material damages compensation, but there is reason to award (limited) immaterial damages to the claimant. The Court considered the damage compensation claim based on the Dutch Civil Code. The Subdistrict Court arrived at the conclusion that the security measures taken by the claimant could not be regarded as reasonable costs to prevent or limit damage because of the data leaks. The municipality can only be responsible for the breach of the social security number, phone number and email address of the claimant, and nothing else. It was taken into account that the claimant opted in for the public application process, making his address and name publicly available. Against this background it cannot be seen that, because of the data leaks, claimant was forced to secure his home to protect himself, his family, and his possessions. When it comes to the non-material damage compensation, the Subdistrict Court rules that the claimant had not, or at least insufficiently, demonstrated that he has suffered psychological injury because of the unlawful actions of the municipality. Only a strong psychological discomfort, such as temporary feelings of stress or anxiety, are sufficient for compensation of immaterial damage. However, the privacy of the claimant has been violated repeatedly by the municipality because of the unlawful publication of his social security number, the e-mail address, and the telephone number without his consent. These data are sensitive by nature, especially the social security number. The adverse consequences of leaking these, such as identity fraud, are obvious. Therefore, the Court ruled that the claimant was eligible for 500 EUR in non-material damages compensation.","title":"Rb. Noord-Nederland - 8187989"}
{"_id":"holding_IMY (Sweden) - DI-2020-10696","text":"First, the DPA confirmed that Nordax Bank was the controller because it decided both the purposes and the means of the processing. The processing in question was the selection of addresses from Iper's address register for direct marketing purposes. This selection was carried out on behalf of Nordax and was based on selection criteria determined by Nordax. Because Nordax Bank was the controller, it was also responsible for handling the data subject's requests. The fact that Nordax claimed that Iper was responsible for the address register did not change this. Also, the fact that Nordax only received de-identified data from Iper was also irrelevant for its responsibility for the processing.\nSecond, the DPA held that the controller violated Article 15 GDPR by failing to handle the data subject's request for access. It should have given the personal data and information to the data subject with the assistance of its processor Iper. It also should have recognised the data subject's initial request as an access request.\nThird, the DPA determined that the controller violated Article 17 GDPR by not handling the data subject's request for erasure. None of the exceptions in Article 17(3) GDPR were applicable. Nordax therefore violated Article 17(1) GDPR.\nFourth, The DPA determined that the controller violated Article 12(3) GDPR because the controller had provided incorrect information. The controller had incorrectly informed the data subject on 12 February 2019 that he was blocked from the controller's direct marketing operation, while this was not the case at the time.\nFifth; The DPA determined that the controller violated Article 12(6) GDPR by requesting additional information of the data subject before complying with the data subject's second objection request on 9 July 2019. Nordax already had access to all the information necessary to comply with the objection of the data subject.\nLastly, the DPA concluded that the controller violated Article 12(3) GDPR once more by not informing the data subject that, in accordance with his second objection request of 9 July 2019, he would no longer be subject to the controller's direct marketing operation.\nThe DPA held that this was a minor infringement and reprimanded the controller pursuant of Article 58(2)(b) GDPR. The DPA further ordered the controller to comply with the access request pursuant of Article 58(2)(c) GDPR and to deal with the erasure request pursuant of Article 58(2)(d) GDPR. Also, the DPA ordered the controller pursuant of Article 58(2)(d) GDPR to provide the data subject information on the measures taken to comply with the data subject's objection to the processing in accordance with Article 12(3) GDPR.","title":"IMY (Sweden) - DI-2020-10696"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Gelderland - C/05/404834 / HA ZA 22-245","text":"Concerning the data subject's claim under Article 15 GDPR, the Court noted that the controller stated, with reasons, that a significant portion of the requested recordings could not be provided, because they did not exist. The Court held that it was the data subject's responsibility to assert and provide evidence that the controller actually had these recordings available. The data subject, however, did not provide such evidence. The Court deemed it not plausible that the controller had more recordings at its disposal than it claimed to have, and rejected the claim under Article 15 GDPR on this point.\nRegarding the residual recordings, the Court pointed out that Article 15(3) GDPR gives the data subject the right to be provided with a copy of the personal data being processed. The Court followed that this right does not automatically entitle a data subject to access a copy or transcript of the original document on which their data is recorded. For example, a data subject is not entitled to the latter, in so far as the objective pursued by that right of access can be fully satisfied by another form of provision (CJEU 17 July 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081).\nThe Court recalled that, in its defence against the counterclaim, the controller stated that if the data subject wanted to know if and what personal information it stored relating to them, they could have sent an access request to the controller. The Court came to the conclusion that the data subject did not request such access to their data prior to their claim. Moreover, the data subjects did not substantiate that they were not able to check whether their personal data was correct and lawfully processed by relying on the rules in Article 15 GDPR. In addition, the court concluded that the data subject did not clarify their intent to safeguard the rights of others whose personal data was also processed in the conversation. Hence, the controller could not provide the data subjects access to the full Zoom conversations. In other words, the Court held that the GDPR does not oblige the controller to provide the defendants with access to the records to the extent claimed by the data subjects. The Court thus also rejected this claim.\nTherefore, The Court denied the data subjects’ claim based on Article 15(3) for the access to the Zoom-call recordings. The Court did grant the data subject's claim under article 843a CCP for two Zoom calls.","title":"Rb. Gelderland - C/05/404834 / HA ZA 22-245"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00454/2019","text":"Thus, the AEPD understood that the video surveillance system may have infringed the data minimisation principle and, after considering some circumstances [(i) the defendant is a natural person, and (ii) there is no evidence of the actual images recorded by the video surveillance system], it decided to impose a minor warning to the defendant. The AEPD also requires the defendant (i) to prove the actual images recorded by the video surveillance system, (ii) to prove the reason for the installation of the video surveillance system and (iii) to include the corresponding information poster in a visible area. Additionally, the AEPD also reminds that, in case the defendant does not comply with these requirements, this could lead to an economic sanction procedure due to a serious breach of the 73(o) of Spanish Data Protection Law (LOPDGDD).","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00454/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W274 2246166-1","text":"The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwatungsgericht – BVwG) upheld the decision and reasoning of the DSB.\nFirst, the court elaborated on Article 15 GDPR though these statements were not necessary for the decision of the case. It held that a data subject has no general duty to cooperate, but at most an obligation to specify if the controller processes a large amount of data and the data subject makes a very general request or is only interested in specific information or data processing. In these cases, the controller can request clarification from the data subject, but has no right to do so. The data subject may nevertheless insist that all data be disclosed. This means that the two-stage information procedures that occur in practice, in which the data controller initially only provides information on master data and only provides comprehensive information at the express request of the applicant, are perfectly permissible, provided that the applicant is made aware of this fact.\nSecond, the court determined that the DSB was not allowed to close the proceedings informally but should have issued a formal notice according to § 24(6) BDSG because the data subject had objected with reasons against the termination of the proceedings.\nThird, the court stipulated that the complaint about the delayed (Article 12(3) GDPR) response by the controller does not amount to a new complaint under § 13(8) AVG but is encompassed by the original complaint as a minus to it. However, it reasoned that a data subject has no right to have a past infringement of the GDPR determined by the data protection authority since § 24(1) BDSG and Article 77(1) GDPR refer to “infringes” in the present tense and not “has infringed”. Moreover, the court referred to Recital 63 according to which the right of access is intended to enable data subjects to be aware of the processing of personal data concerning them and to verify its lawfulness. In order to achieve this goal, it is not necessary for data subjects to have infringements which have been remedied in the meantime declared as unlawful. It also cited the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court of Austria (Verwaltungsgerichtshof – VwGH, 2006/06/0330) and of the Austrian Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof – VfGH, VfSgl. Nr. 12.768).\nAt last, the court determined that the \"matter\" of a proceeding (§ 13(8) AVG) which alleged non-disclosure under Article 15 GDPR cannot be entirely severed from the question of the completeness of the answer to the request. The core of the right of access is that the controller must disclose the specific content of all data being processed. However, the objective of Article 15 GDPR to enable the data subject to exercise their other rights must be considered as well. Therefore, if this objective is achieved by the answer, disputes about the sufficiency of specific parts of the answer may be considered as a different matter. This does, naturally, not apply to expressly limited requests of confirmation as to whether data about the data subject is being processed under the first part of Article 15(1) GDPR. Such matters are resolved with a simple yes or no answer.","title":"BVwG - W274 2246166-1"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00080/2022","text":"The DPA first held that not ensuring the appropriate security of the personal data of the data subject by sending their medical information to third parties violated the principle of integrity and confidentiality under Article 5(1)(f) GDPR.\nFurthermore, the controller was responsible for implementing appropriate security measures according to Article 32(1)(b) GDPR, for guaranteeing no alteration of the personal data and evaluating the possible risks related to the processing. The DPA remarked that the type of data that was exposed fell within Article 9(1) GDPR. With this in mind, the Spanish DPA found a violation of Article 32 GDPR since the lack of security measures adopted represented a structural problem of the controller.\nLastly, the DPA found a violation of Article 33 GDPR when the controller did not notify the personal data breach, which entailed a risk to the rights and freedoms of the data subjects, to the competent authority no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of it.\nThe DPA also considered aggravating circumstances in relation to Article 5 and Articles 32 and 33 GDPR. First, there was the duration of the infringement under Article 83(2)(a) GDPR; second, there was the categories of the data affected under Article 83(2)(g) GDPR; and third, there was the linking of the controller's activity with the processing of personal data under Article 76(2)(a) LOPDGDD.\nConsequently, the DPA imposed a fine of €132,000 after applying reductions of 20% for a voluntary payment and another 20% for the acknowledgment of responsibility before the final resolution.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00080/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_IP (Slovenia) - 0603-56/2024/6","text":"The IP held that the Slovenian Police had misinterpreted their obligations under the consultation procedure under Regulation (EU) 2018/1861. This obligation requires that where an entry ban is issued against a third country national who holds valid residence in another Member State, the imposing country should consult them. If, as was the case here, the third country can confirm the existence of the residence, the entry ban should be removed from the SIS II.\nThe IP also rejected the Slovenian Police’s argument that Cyprus’ status as a non-Schengen country absolved them of their duty to consult under Regulation (EU) 2018/1861.\nAccordingly, the IP found that the Slovenian Police had unlawfully refused the data subject’s request for erasure under Article 17 GDPR. The IP ordered the deletion of the SIS II alert within three days.","title":"IP (Slovenia) - 0603-56/2024/6"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS-00085-2024","text":"The Spanish DPA finalized an agreement with the data controller after the start of an investigation of a probable infraction to Article 5(1)(f) GDPR. The alleged and possible GDPR breach was connected to the controller message sent to all community residents with individualized information about their heating consumption. Since this information is considered personal data, it could be understood as an illegal sharing of personal information.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS-00085-2024"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Birmingham Children's Trust Community Interest Company","text":"The ICO determined that BCTCIC were responsible for certain infringements of the UK GDPR resulting in a personal data breach in relation to Article 5(l)(f) UK GDPR and Articles 32(1)(b,) and 32(2) UK GDPR.\nThe Commissioner acknowledged that when the incident occurred BCTCIC was aiming to deliver its services between two neighbouring families and in the absence of certain data necessary to complete the CP Plan, BCTCIC attempted to act upon initiative using data copied from a related meeting statement with West Midlands Police. The Commissioner also acknowledged representations from BCTCIC and that whilst the disclosure caused no actual harms; there was an expectation of harm in the form of distress to both the data subject and family.\nThe Commissioner concluded that BCTCIC fell short of achieving appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the security of the personal data in this case. However the Commissioner welcomed the remedial steps taken and decided to issue a reprimand to BCTCIC in relation to the infringements of Articles 5(1)(f), 32(1)(b) and 32(2) of the UK GDPR.","title":"ICO (UK) - Birmingham Children's Trust Community Interest Company"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-442-13989","text":"The Danish DPA held that the controller did not implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk under Article 32 GDPR. The DPA was of the opinion that controllers must perform adequate testing in order to be able to identify and assess conditions that may, for example, lead to changes or reset previously selected settings. The controller's liability cannot lapse simply because the software provider had not adequately disclosed the extent of the update.\nThe Danish DPA therefore issued a serious reprimand.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-442-13989"}
{"_id":"holding_TS - 1039/2022","text":"Ultimately, the Court rejected the controller's arguments and dismissed the appeal.\nThe Court first addressed whether, in a case where the controller carries out a processing activity that the data subject considers to be excessive and data has been already collected, the data minimisation principle from Article 5(1)(c) GDPR is directly enforceable, or whether the data subject must first exercise the right to the restriction of processing provided for in Article 18 GDPR.\nAs explained by the Court, Article 18(1) GDPR, in particular in paragraph (d), is linked to Article 21(1) GDPR, which guarantees the right to object to processing. Both rights are of a temporary nature and relate to a disputed deletion of personal data collected on the basis of Article 6(1) (e) or (f). At no point had the data subject sought the deletion of her personal data by the controller, so Articles 18 and Article 21 were not applicable.\nThe Court interpreted the controller as arguing for a procedural or enforceability prerequisite that would make the the competence of a DPA to launch an infringement procedure conditional on the exercise of a right by the data subject. Neither the GDPR nor the Spanish Data Protection Act (LOPDGDD) contain a provision that establishes such prerequisite, so the Court rejected the controller's argument.\nArticle 63 LOPDGDD differentiates between two different procedures for GDPR enforcement: procedures in which a data subject claims that their data protection rights have been violated and procedures that relate to an investigation of a GDPR violation. Hence, the exercise of data protection rights from Articles 15 to 22 GDPR is a different and independent procedure than investigation into a possible infringement of the GDPR or LOPDGDD. Consequently, a data subject may exercise their personal rights alternately or simultaneously to filing a complaint when they consider that a controller has acted contrary to the GDPR.\nRegarding the controller's argument that the DPA failed to consider that the medical record in question was intended solely for the data subject, the Court explained that in this case the DPA did not find an infringement of the duty of confidentiality in Articles 5(1)(f) GDPR and Article 5(1) LOPDGDD. The circumstances alluded to by the controller were not relevant to an infringement of the principle of data minimisation.","title":"TS - 1039/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_VG Magdeburg - 1 A 217/22 MD","text":"The court dismissed the controller’s appeal. The only possible legal ground for the processing of personal data in this case is Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. But in this case the processing cannot be based on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The court held that cold calling might fall out of the scope of application of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR because Article 13(3) of the Directive 2002/58/EC (ePrivacy Directive) in conjunction with § 7(2)(1) German law against unfair competition (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb - UWG) could be lex specialis. § 7(2)(1) UWG states that advertising by means of a telephone call made to a consumer without his or her prior express consent, or made to another market participant without at least the latter’s presumed consent constitutes an unacceptable nuisance to a market participant and is illegal.\nHowever, the court’s decision does not depend on this question since the processing of personal data in this case also fails the balancing test under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. This is due to the fact that the processing of phone numbers for cold calling purposes fails to match the criteria of § 7(2)(1) UWG which can be taken into consideration.\nThe court dismissed the controller’s argument that German competition law and the GDPR had different purposes and therefore, the DPA should not enforce competition law through the application of Data protection law. The court argued that an overall view would lead to the conclusion that it the cold calling was a uniform process in a way that the processing of personal data has the purpose of illegal cold calling. Therefore, the controller cannot argue that the DPA was not competent to enforce competition law.","title":"VG Magdeburg - 1 A 217/22 MD"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant - AWB- 20 9345","text":"The court first considered the provisions on which the claim was based. The court found that the application was an access request based on Article 15 GDPR in conjunction with 7.3.10 of the Youth Act.\nSecondly, the court considered whether it had jurisdiction to determine the matter. The court looked at the provisions of the General Administrative Law Act (AwB).\nArticle 1:3(1) of the AwB defines what an administrative decision is under Dutch administrative law: a written decision on an administrative body acting on the basis of a public law. Furthermore, Article 6:2(b) of the AwB stipulates that if an administrative body fails to respond to an individual's request in a timely manner, the request is deemed to be rejected so that the applicant can file an administrative appeal.\nThe court noted that Article 7.3.17 of the Youth Act was amended on January 1, 2015. This provision clarifies that private youth assistance providers are no longer considered administrative bodies. The court also referred to the already settled case law which also establishes the same thing.\nThe court therefore found that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the case. This was because the mother had brought an administrative claim against a non-administrative body. The court could not see that the alleged violations of the ECHR would lead to a different conclusion.\nFinally, the court informed the mother that she could instead file her complaint as a civil dispute.","title":"Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant - AWB- 20 9345"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 202202762/1/A3","text":"The court rejected the appeal.\nThe court explained that under Article 2(2)(d) GDPR the GDPR doesn’t apply to processing of personal data within criminal proceedings. The feedback report was drafted as a part of criminal proceedings against the data subject. The purpose of the feedback report was to monitor the quality of the final report, disclosed to the court. For the court, the feedback report served then as the prosecution the criminal proceedings.\nConsequently, the GDPR, including Article 15, didn’t apply to the data subject’s request and the Minister was entitled to reject that request.","title":"RvS - 202202762/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 04-22-2024 (gambling websites)","text":"The Croatian DPA (AZOP) found that the controllers lacked a legal basis for processing in violation of Article 6(1) GDPR and failed to inform data subjects pursuant to Article 13 GDPR. In addition, one of the controllers violated Article 5(1)(a) GDPR after it began processing data before obtaining consent from data subjects. The AZOP imposed fines of €15,000 and €20,000, respectively, on the controllers.\nWhere processing is based on consent and has multiple purposes, cookie banners must indicate the purposes in a clear and understandable manner. They also must clearly distinguish the purposes from each other. In this case, the controllers did not distinguish different purposes for processing in obtaining user consent. Such consent, the AZOP found, did not meet the GDPR's requirements. As a result, consent was not a valid legal basis in this case and the controllers violated Article 6(1) GDPR.\nThe AZOP also found that the controllers failed to properly inform data subjects of the processing pursuant to Article 13(1) and (2) GDPR. In particular, their privacy policies did not contain information about the legal basis for processing, types of cookies, purpose of each cookie or cookie storage period.\nFinally, the AZOP also noted that one of the controllers was processing personal data from the moment that the data subject opened the webpage even though it had not yet obtained consent. It considered this a violation of the principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR.","title":"AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 04-22-2024 (gambling websites)"}
{"_id":"holding_LG Kiel - 13 O 220/23","text":"The court held that the action for a declaratory judgement was inadmissible. The data subject failed to present the court with a sufficient legal interest which is needed for such a declaratory judgement under § 256 German Civil Process Order (Zivilprozessordnung – ZPO). In cases of declaratory judgements concerning future material damages the admissibility of such an action is depends on the probability of such a damage. The data subject needs to present the court with sufficient facts and bears the burden of proof.\nEven when considering just the data subject’s claims, the court found that there was no plausible future damage.\nConcerning the non-material damages, the lawsuit was dismissed. The criteria of Article 82(1) GDPR were not met. The court held that there was no GDPR infringement since the controller could rely on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR for the data transfer to Schufa.\nThe court admitted that in the German case law there is a controversy on the question whether the right to privacy and data protection of the data subject outweighs the controller’s claimed legitimate interests (fraud prevention, overborrowing, and credit risk prognosis). In similar cases, some other courts held that the rights and interests of the data subject took precedence over the controller's legitimate interests (see for example LG Stuttgart 27 O 60/24). The court in the present case, however, decided that the interests of the controller superseded.\nThe court held that also the data subject had an indirect interest in the transfer of their data since risk minimization for the controller had to result in lower prices for the consumer. Furthermore, the so called positive data (like the data about the conclusion of the contract) were less invasive than negative data (e. g. about customers failing to pay). Also, a lack of positive data can lead to a negative bias in the scoring of the controller. The data subject also failed to present the court with facts that the transfer of the personal data in this case had a negative effect on his score. These facts had to be taken into account in the weighing of the conflicting positions at hand.\nFinally, the court stated that the constant fear of negative questions about his creditworthiness claimed by the data subject were not plausible because the transferred data are neutral.","title":"LG Kiel - 13 O 220/23"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 6629/163/21","text":"On the basis of the information provided by the controller, the DPA stated that data subjects do not need to know how to invoke a specific provision of the GDPR in order to obtain their personal data free of charge under the right of access. Instead, the controller has an obligation to facilitate the exercise of the right of access and to inform the data subjects of the possibility of obtaining a copy of their personal data free of charge pursuant to Article 15 GDPR.\nThe DPA considered that the data subject cannot, therefore, be required to familiarise themselves with, for example, the price list in order to be able to submit an access request. Also, by default, the controller may not charge a fee for the provision of MRIs to the data subject directly from the MRI scanning.\nOn the basis of the information gathered, the DPA held that the controller had violated Article 12(2) GDPR by not facilitating the exercise of the right of access under Article 15 GDPR. As a result, the DPA issued a reprimand to the controller in accordance with Article 58(2)(b) GDPR. Pursuant to Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, the DPA also ordered the controller to bring its processing operations into compliance with the aforementioned provisions of the GDPR.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 6629/163/21"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 21/2022","text":"Language of the procedure\nFirst, the DPA explained some background information on the language of the procedure. On 13 October 2020, the Litigation Chamber sent a letter to the parties informing them of the language of the procedure (French), and inviting them to present their written submissions. The parties contested this, which led to this judgment and this appeal of said judgment. Ultimately, whilst the DPA's correspondence with the parties was conducted in Dutch and the preliminary and final decisions of the Litigation Chamber were in Dutch, the parties were free to use the language of their choice.\n\nRTB and TCF\nSecond, the DPA defined and described the Real-Time Bidding system as well as IAB Europe's Transparency & Consent Framework.\nRegarding the former, the DPA defined and provided some schematic representations[1] (of) the processing operations that underpin Real-Time Bidding. It then listed some of the risks associated with these, including: \"profiling and automated decision-making; large-scale processing (including special categories of personal data); innovative use or application of new technological or organisational solutions; matching or merging of datasets; analysis or prediction of behaviour, location or movements of natural persons; invisible processing of personal data.\" It explained these operations carried out within the framework of RTB \"can create a significant risk to the rights and freedoms of individual\", particularly due to the large ecosystem of companies involved.\nRegarding the latter, it principally highlighted the differences and connections between the OpenRTB protocol developed by IAB Tech Lab (based in New York) and the TCF developed by IAB Europe, namely that \"the main players [publishers, adtech vendors, CMPs] within the TCF correspond to a large extent to the parties participating in the OpenRTB\".\n\nProcedure\nAfter providing the information above, the Belgian DPA explained every step of the administrative procedure (from p.15-62). Whilst this is interesting to better understand the different arguments put forward by the parties (including some peculiar ones, such as that \"IAB Europe does not participate in the TCF nor does it act as a data controller\") this summary focuses on the reasoning of the DPA. It will therefore not consider these procedural elements.\n\nReasoning\n\nProcessing of personal data in the context of the Transparency and Consent Framework\nThe Belgian DPA started its explanation of the reasoning behind its decision with an assessment of whether personal data was processed by IAB Europe within the context of the Transparency and Consent Framework.\nFirst, it restated that the concept of personal data and the notion of processing are to be interpreted broadly in light of both the GDPR and the CJEU's interpretation or European data protection law more generally. It cited the Breyer and Nowak cases to demonstrate that as long as information can be linked to an identified or identifiable natural person, it should be considered personal data.\nThe complaints argued that the TC String \"is a unique character string which is also written into a cookie as a unique identifier and is then stored on a user's device\", and that IAB Europe collected additional information about users, including special categories of personal data (Article 9 GDPR). The respondent argued that the TC String does not contain any personal data, that it does not constitute a unique identifier, and that a link between \"the preferences conceived in the TC String and the user will be established only\" in the context of the OpenRTB, which is not covered by the Transparency & Consent Framework. The DPA disagreed with the respondent's argument, holding that storing \"the preferences of users in a TC String do constitute personal data, as these preferences relate to a singled out, identifiable natural person.\"\nSecond, the complaints argued that \"the generation of the TC String corresponds to the automated creation of a unique string of characters associated with a specific user, through which their data exchange preferences are captured by the intervention of a CMP connected to the TCF\" and \"that the storage of a TC String in a specific euconsent-v2 cookie, on a storage system chosen by the CMP or associated with the consensu.org internet domain managed by IAB Europe\" both constitute processing of user preferences. The DPA agreed, and held that \"the Transparency and Consent Framework inherently entails the collection, processing, storage and subsequent sharing of users' preferences with other parties, whether or not in combination with additional personal data in the context of the OpenRTB\", which amounts to processing of personal data per Article 4(2) GDPR.\n\nResponsibility of IAB Europe for the processing operations within the Transparency and Consent Framework\nThen, the Belgian DPA assessed whether IAB Europe can be held responsible for the processing operations within the Transparency and Consent Framework. IAB Europe argued it was neither a data controller nor jointly responsible for the processing of personal data collected by the participating organisations in the context of the TCF. The DPA disagreed because (i) the concept of a data controller must be interpreted broadly, and (ii) IAB Europe has a decisive influence on the purpose and means of the processing by imposing compulsory TCF parameters.\nIndeed, it concluded that regardless of whether the defendant itself came into contact with the personal data, the participating parties (i.e. publishers and adtech vendors) would not be able to achieve the goals set by IAB Europe without the TCF. It therefore played a decisive role with regard to the collection, processing and dissemination of users' preferences, consents and objections. Further, it held that IAB Europe established \"the purpose of the TC String, and in the broader sense of the processing of the TC String within the TCF as translated into the TCF Policies\" and determined \"the means of generating, storing and sharing the TC String by which the preferences, objections and consent of users are processed\".\nIn particular, the DPA found IAB Europe to be a controller because it (i) defined how CMPs could collect the aforementioned data, (ii) developed the technical specifications of the API with which adtech vendors could access the preferences of the users, (iii) determined the storage location and method for both service-specific and globally scoped consent cookies, (iv) managed the lists of registered CMPs and adtech vendors, and (v) determined the way in which organisations participating in the TCF had to make these TC Strings available to it.\n\nJoint controllership of publishers, CMPs and adtech vendors with regard to the means and purposes of the processing of personal data within the context of the TCF and of the OpenRTB\nIt continued its reasoning by assessing whether other data controllers implementing the TCF and relying on the OpenRTB protocol had \"their own or shared responsibility for the personal data processing operations\" they performed. It stated that the question \"to be asked is whether the intended processing of personal data would be impossible without the participation of all parties, more specifically, whether the processing activities carried out by each party are inseparable and indivisible.\"\nIAB Europe argued that the TCF and the OpenRTB system were completely independent from each other, as even without participating in the TCF, adtech vendors could freely process personal data within the context of the OpenRTB. The DPA disagreed, stating that it was \"certain that the TCF was never intended to be a stand-alone, independent ecosystem.\" Thus, the DPA held that IAB Europe and the participating organisations were joint controllers because \"the decisions translated by IAB Europe into the provisions of the TCF policies and technical specifications, on the one hand, and the means and purposes determined by the participating organisations in relation to the processing - whether or not in the context of OpenRTB - of users' personal data, on the other hand, [had to] be regarded as convergent decisions. IAB Europe provide[d] an ecosystem within which the consent, objections and preferences of users are collected and exchanged not for its own purposes or self-preservation, but to facilitate further processing by third parties (i.e. publishers and adtech vendors).\"\nThus, the DPA held that IAB Europe and the participating CMPs, adtech vendors and publishers were joint controllers for the collection and subsequent dissemination of users' consent, objections and preferences, as well as for the related processing of their personal data. The responsibility of these organisations did not detract from IAB's own responsibility.\nHowever, it specified that:\n  * if CMPs apply TCF policies, IAB Europe is responsible for the essential means of processing and therefore jointly responsible;\n  * if CMPs deviate from TCF policies, they are fully responsible per Article 28(10) GDPR\n  * if CMPs follow publishers' instructions to decide which adtech vendors they share data with, publishers bear the main responsibility for this transfer - without prejudice to IAB Europe's responsibility\n\nBreaches of the GDPR\n\nLawfulness and fairness of processing - Article 5(1)(a) and 6 GDPR\nThe DPA distinguished between two processing activities:\n1. The registration of the consent signal, objections and users' preferences by means of the TC String\nIAB Europe argued that because the TC String is not personal data, no basis for processing was required. The DPA disagreed, and held the processing should have been based on a lawful basis under Article 6 GDPR. Thus, the DPA assessed whether the processing could have been based on Articles 6(1)(a), (b) and (f) GDPR. It found that the first was de facto not applicable, the second prima facie not applicable, and that the company did not meet the third condition (the 'balancing test' between the interests of the controller and fundamental rights of the data subject) set out in C-13/16 / Rigas because no option whatsoever was offered to users to completely oppose the processing of their preferences in the context of the TCF, as the CMP will always generate a TC String before linking it to the user's unique User ID through a 'euconsent-v2' cookie placed on the data subject's end device - without informing them of this processing or their right to object to it. As such, the DPA held that IAB Europe's processing in the context of the TCF (of which it was the 'Managing Organisation') violated Article 6 GDPR by capturing the preferences of online users in a TC string without a legal basis.\n2. Collection and dissemination of personal data in the context of the RTB\nThen, the DPA first restated that the TCF aimed to capture users' consent or lack of objection to the legitimate interests of participating adtech vendors, two bases which relate to processing activities that take place under the RTB. It then nonetheless stated that Article 6 GDPR was violated because (i) the consent of the data subjects obtained through CMPs is not legally valid (ii) nor is the (pre)contractual necessity applicable, and (iii) that the legitimate interest does not meet the threefold test of the CJEU (as set out in C-13/16; C-708/18).\nFirst, it held the consent of the data subjects obtained by the CMPs (via the TCF) is not valid in light of Article 7 GDPR. Indeed, the DPA found (amongst other things) that the proposed processing purposes were not sufficiently clearly described, and in some cases were even misleading. For example, the notion of 'measuring content performance' provided no insight into the scope of the processing, the nature of the personal data used, or how long the latter would be retained. Additionally, the user interface ('UI') failed to provide an overview of the categories of data collected and the identities of the data controllers to whom consent was given, making it impossible for data subjects to give sufficiently informed consent. As such, the DPA held that Article 6(1)(a) did not \"constitute a valid legal basis for the processing and dissemination of personal data in the context of the OpenRTB, insofar as such consent was obtained in accordance with the TCF in its current format.\"\nSecond, it held that the legitimate interest of the participating organisations did not outweigh the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects. To come to this conclusion, it assessed to \"what extent the organisations participating both in the TCF and the OpenRTB (adtech vendors) [could] legitimately rely on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR for the predefined processing purposes that entail targeted advertising or profiling of the users, as opposed to non-marketing related purposes such as audience measurement and performance measurement.\" It first restated that an assessment of the necessary safeguards to prevent a disproportionate impact on data subjects needs to be performed jointly by all controllers involved in a processing activity and that both positive and negative consequences need to be considered when conducting this assessment. Then, the DPA in turn considered the:\n  * Purpose test. It determined that the condition for specific lawful processing was not met, as it was not easy for users to assess to what extent the collection, dissemination and processing of their personal data were necessary for the intended purposes. Notably, the DPA nonetheless did not express an opinion on whether an economic interest can be regarded as a legitimate interest.\n  * Necessity test. It determined the condition of necessity of processing was not met due to absence of measures that adequately demonstrated that no inappropriate personal data were being disseminated.\n  * Balancing test. It determined that the interests pursued by the adtech vendors did not outweigh the fundamental freedoms and rights of the data subjects, and that \"the legitimate interest of participating organizations [could not] be deemed an adequate legal ground for the processing activities occurring under the OpenRTB, based on users’ preferences and choices captured under the TCF.\"\nAs such, the DPA held that the processing of personal data under the OpenRTB on the basis of preferences captured in accordance with the current version of the TCF was incompatible with the GDPR, due to an inherent breach of the principles of lawfulness and fairness.\n\nDuty of transparency towards data subjects - Article 12, 13 and 14 GDPR\nThe DPA then considered the complainants' claim that the OpenRTB ecosystem is so extensive that it is impossible for data subjects to give an informed consent to the processing of their personal data, or to object in an informed manner to the processing of their personal data on the basis of a legitimate interest. The defendants argued the TCF offers a solution to collect valid consent from users.\nThe DPA upheld the complainant's claim, and held that IAB Europe did not meet its transparency requirements under the GDPR because the manner in which information was provided under the TCF to data subjects was too generic, which is not compatible with the requirement that consent must be specific and informed in order to be valid. Further, the large number of adtech vendors that could receive the personal data of users was found to also not be compatible with the condition of a sufficiently informed consent, nor with the broader transparency duty set out in the GDPR.\nAs such, the DPA found the TCF did not comply with the obligations arising from the transparency principle, notably Articles 12, 13 and 14 GDPR.\n\nAccountability (Article 24 GDPR), data protection by design and by default (Article 25 GDPR), integrity and confidentiality (Article 5(1)(f) GDPR), as well as security of processing (Article 32 GDPR)\n1. Principle of accountability and data protection by design and by default\nThe DPA first simply restated the data controllers' obligations under Articles 24 and 25 GDPR, without explaining at this point whether IAB Europe complied with them.\n2. The outline of the security obligation\nThen, the DPA noted \"a lack of respect for the obligation to ensure the security of processing on the part of the defendant, which is part of the principle of accountability.\" It highlighted the importance of organisations meeting this obligation, and the fact that \"[t]he absence of technical and organisational measures aiming to ensure the integrity of the TC String\" was a serious offence given the very large number of TC Strings generated each day within the TCF.\nIndeed, it explained this finding by describing the fact that IAB Europe offers the TCF to make OpenRTB compliant with the GDPR, meaning that it should (as the managing organisation) take \"organisational and technical measures to ensure that participants at least comply with the TCF policies.\" However, it was theoretically possible for CMPs to falsify or modify consent signals that are meant to be validated by IAB Europe to generate a 'euconsent-v2' cookie and thus reproduce a \"false consent\" from users for all purposes and all adtech vendors - even if this would constitute a violation of the 'TCF Vendor Compliance Programme'. Additionally, the sanction regime provided for by this programme was found to be insufficiently dissuasive, as vendors could be allowed up to 4 breaches before being forced into compliance.\nAs such, the DPA found that because the company did not systematically monitor compliance with the TCF and the significant impact the aforementioned violations could have, it failed to comply with its security obligations and \"must take not only organisational but also technically effective measures to ensure and demonstrate the integrity of the preferential signal transmitted by CMPs to adtech vendors.\"\nOn international data transfers\nFinally, the DPA interestingly held that IAB Europe \"should facilitate the due diligence incumbent on the publishers and CMPs, e.g. by requiring adtech vendors to indicate clearly whether they are located outside the EEA or whether they intend to transfer personal data outside the EEA through their data processors.\" It noted that \"contrary to its obligation under the principles of accountability and of data protection by design and by default, IAB Europe did not foresee any mechanism to ensure that participating publishers and CMPs have put in place adequate mechanisms for potential international transfers of the TC String, as foreseen under Articles to 44 to 49 GDPR, both at the time of its creation and when transmitting the TC String to participating adtech vendors. The preamble of the TCF Policies merely indicates that the TCF 'is not 105 intended nor has it been designed to facilitate […] more strictly regulated processing activities, such as transferring personal data outside of the EU'.\" As such, the DPA held this failed to meet the requirements of Articles 24 and 25 GDPR.\n\nAdditional alleged breaches of the GDPR\nIn this section, the Belgian DPA in turn (quickly) assessed a number of additional potential breaches of the GDPR.\nPurpose limitation and data minimisation - Article 5(1)(b) and 5(1)(c) GDPR\nThe DPA held that because the complainants explicitly indicated that the scope of their allegations was limited to the processing operations within the TCF, and given the limited amount of data about a user that are stored in a TC String before being saved through a 'euconsent-v2' cookie, there was no violation of the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation in the context of this framework.\nStorage limitation - Article 5(1)(e) GDPR\nThe DPA held that there was insufficient evidence that the TC String and the associated storage of users' personal data were stored for an unauthorised period of time, meaning that no violation of Article 5(1)(e) GDPR could be established.\nIntegrity and confidentiality - Article 5(1)(f) GDPR\nAs explained above, the DPA held that the current version of the TCF offered insufficient safeguards to prevent the values included in a TC String from being modified in an unauthorised manner, with the result that the personal data of a data subject bundled in a bid request could be processed for the wrong purposes, in breach of the integrity principle, and/or might end up with the wrong adtech vendors or the ones rejected by the user, in breach of the confidentiality principle.\nAs such, it held that the current version of the TCF violates Article 5(1)(f) GDPR.\nProcessing of special categories of personal data - Article 9 GDPR\nThe DPA held that although its inspectors reported a lack of appropriate rules for the processing of special categories of personal data under the TCF, this observation was not be supported by any technical analysis showing that special categories of personal data were actually processed within the TCF. As such, IAB Europe did not violate Article 9 GDPR.\nExercise of data subject rights - Articles 15–22 GDPR\nThe DPA held that because the complainants limited the scope of their claims to the processing of their personal data by IAB Europe within the TCF, and the inspectors could not confirm that it was impossible for data subjects to exercise their DSARs, it was \"not in a position to establish a violation of the Articles 15-22 GDPR.\"\nRecords of processing activities - Article 30 GDPR\nThe DPA first restated that its inspectors found that IAB Europe does not keep records of its processing activities, although it provided a summary of its processing activities over the course of the DPA's investigation. It then noted this summary contained no activity relating to the TCF (with the exception of member management, including administration of the TCF), but held the records should have at least included \"access to users' consent signals, objections and preferences.\" Further, the company should have included its intention to monitor the compliance of the various CMPs and other adtech vendors in its records of processing activities.\nAs such, the DPA held that the company violated Article 30(1) GDPR, as it should have kept more detailed records of processing activities.\nData protection impact assessment - Article 35 GDPR\nThe DPA held that IAB Europe violated Article 35 GDPR by not carrying out a data protection impact assessment, which it should have according to Decision No. 01/2019 of the Belgian DPA in light of the large number of data subjects who come into contact with websites and applications implementing the TCF, as well as the growing number of organisations participating in the TCF, on the one hand, and the impact of the TCF on the large-scale processing of personal data in the context of RTB.\nDesignation of a Data Protection Officer - Article 37 GDPR\nThe DPA held that because the TCF must be regarded as a regular and systematic observation of identifiable users IAB Europe should have appointed a DPO, and that the failure to do so amounted to a violation of Article 37 GDPR.\n\nSanctions\nIn light of the above, the Belgian DPA ordered IAB Europe:\n 1. To render the TCF compliant with the principles of lawfulness, fairness and transparency (Articles 5(1)(a) and 6 GDPR) by establishing a legal basis for the processing as well as the sharing of user preferences in the context of the TCF, in the form of a TC String and euconsent-v2 cookie placed on the users' devices for this purpose. It added that \"any personal data collected so far by means of a TC String in the context of the globally scoped consents, which is no longer supported by IAB Europe, shall be deleted without undue delay by the defendant\" and that it should prohibit the use legitimate interest as a legal ground for processing by the organisations participating in TCF in its current format.\n 2. To render the TCF compliant with the transparency and information obligation (Articles 12, 13, and 14 of the GDPR), by requiring TCF-registered CMPs to take a harmonised and GDPR-compliant approach regarding the information to be provided to users through their interface. Namely, any information provided about the processing must be precise, concise and understandable in order to avoid users being surprised by subsequent processing of their personal data by parties other than the publishers or IAB Europe.\n 3. To ensure compliance of the TCF with the principles of integrity and security, as well as data protection by design and by default (under Articles 5(1)(f) and 32 GDPR, and 25 GDPR) by creating effective technical and organisational monitoring measures to facilitate the exercise of data subject rights and to fix the possibility that signals are falsified; implementing a strict vetting process for organisations participating to the TCF; and prohibiting the \"activati[on] of a default consent\"\n 4. To keep records of processing activities carried out in the framework of the TCF, and in particular relating to the 119 processing of users' preferences and consent in the form of a TC String and the placement of a cookie euconsent-v2 on their devices.\n 5. To carry out a data protection impact assessment, covering both the processing activities under the TCF and the impact of these activities on subsequent processing under the OpenRTB.\n 6. To designate a Data Protection Officer (DPO), responsible, inter alia, for ensuring the compliance of personal data processing activities in the context of the TCF, in accordance with Articles 37 to 39 of the GDPR.\nThe DPA set a deadline of 6 months (from the day an action plan is validated by the DPA) for these measures to be implemented.\nFinally, it issued a fine of €250,000 against IAB Europe.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 21/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_VGH München - 6 ZB 23.530","text":"The court ruled in favor of the defendant. The court found that the documents were relevant to the plaintiff's employment history and should be kept. The court also found that the plaintiff did not have a legitimate interest in having the documents removed. First there is a moot point: Even if the court ruled in the plaintiff's favor, it wouldn't change anything. The defendant already agreed to remove the documents. Also there is no legal basis: the laws cited by the plaintiff (§§ 112 & 113 BBG and GDPR) don't guarantee removal of documents unless proven false or irrelevant. Personnel files aim to present a complete picture of the employee's history, including disciplinary actions. Removing documents generally goes against this goal. There is only an exception for serious misconduct: only serious misconduct accusations might warrant removal to allow for future career advancement without the burden of past issues. In simpler terms, the court ruled that since the documents were already being removed, there was no need for a formal decision.","title":"VGH München - 6 ZB 23.530"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Enel Energie Muntenia SA","text":"The DPA found that the controller did not adopt sufficient security measures under Article 32 GDPR, which led to the unlawful disclosure a customers personal data to another customer. The DPA fined the controller €10,000 for this data breach.\nThe DPA further noted that the security incident should have been notified within 72 hours from the moment the controller became aware of it under Article 33 GDPR. Thus it issued a warning as the controller failed notify the DPA.\nIn addition, the DPA ordered the controller to:\n  * implement approperate technical and organisational measures, in particular to train it's employees to work GDPR-compliant;\n  * contact the complainant to request them to take steps to delete, destroy, as appropriate, personal information to which they had access;\n  * adopt internal measures to mitigate the risks to which the data subject's personal data was exposed, to prevent future unlawful disclosure or access to their personal data.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Enel Energie Muntenia SA"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-441-4364","text":"The Danish DPA found that Zoo has not complied with Article 32 (1) of the GDPR by failing to implement an appropriate level of security of the login page for annual cardholders. The DPA advised to introduce a procedure that ensures regular assessment of the effectiveness of the security measures.\nFurthermore, the DPA stated that the Zoo did not notify properly about the measures taken to deal with the breach and thus failed to comply with Article 33 (3) of the GDPR.\nThe DPA assessed that the Zoo did not comply with Article 34(1) of the GDPR by failing to carry out an adequate assessment of the risks posed to the data subjects. The communication provided by the Zoo to the annual cardholders was incomplete and inaccurate.\nIn the view of the DPA, a communication of the data breach only via a website to some of the data subjects constitutes a breach of Article 5(1a) of the GDPR.\nThe Zoo has been ordered to rectify the incomplete communication to all data subjects and to inform the data subjects of the breach in cases where there was a high risk. If the Zoo finds that it is not possible or requires a disproportionate effort to make an individual notification of the data subjects, the communication can be made by public announcement or similar measure.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-441-4364"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-431-0061 (Helsingor decision no. 4)","text":"The DPA temporarily suspended its processing ban against Helsingor municipality until 5 November 2022, and also ordered the municipality to:\n  * Change the data processing agreement with Google so that the DPA's remarks in their 14 July and 18 August decisions, are implemented. This includes, at a minimum, a clarification of where and if Google acts as a sole controller and any uncertainties that may entail that Google acts beyond their role as a processor, see Article 28(3)(a) GDPR.\n  * Document that all transfers of personal data to insecure third countries, are in line with the GDPR.\n  * Describe all data flows and identify the personal data that are shared with the vendor, and clarify when the vendor acts as a sole or joint controller. This documentation must include the whole technology stack used by the municipality (for this processing activity).\n  * Update their data protection impact assessment based on all identified risks.\n  * Consult the DPA if the DPIA shows any high risks the municipality is not able to mitigate.\n  * If any processing activities are still not in line with the GDPR before the DPA's deadline 3 November 2022, present a final plan for bringing them in line with the GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-431-0061 (Helsingor decision no. 4)"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03656","text":"The DPA rejected the controller's views as it argued that the exceptions in Article 14(5) GDPR should be interpreted and applied narrowly and it is not sufficient to “assume” that a data subject has received the information required under Article 14 GDPR, as the controller did in this case. In addition, the DPA found the controller's privacy policy to be incomplete and misleading.\nThe controller did not raise any arguments to contest the DPA's conclusions and informed the DPA that it was in the process of updating their privacy policy, internal documentation and routines.\nThe DPA held that the controller had violated Article 14 GDPR and ordered it to take measures to ensure that data subjects, including shareholders whose personal data are processed pursuant to the Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, are provided with all of the information required by Article 14 GDPR, including by amending its privacy policy as necessary. The controller was also ordered to inform the DPA about its measures taken within four weeks.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03656"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Noord-Nederland - C/18/190912/HA RK 19-19","text":"The data processing of Google is based on Article 6(1)(f). The content of the page linked to also has to be taken in account. Article 10 GDPR states that processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences or related security measures based on Article 6(1) shall be carried out in principle only under the control of official authority. When a trade-off has to be made, based on Article 17 and 21, plaintiff's right to privacy shall normally outweigh Google's economical interests. In this case, it is relevant what the CJEU has determined in CJEU - C-136/17 - GC et al v. CNIL paragraphs 46, 47, 66, 67, 68, 76, 77, 78 and 79.\nPlaintiff has been convicted for murderer committed in 2006. While the jail time has ended, the involuntary commitment had not been ended yet. Publicity which involved naming the full name of plaintiff are caused by his own actions. Plaintiff did not explain why the search results cause harm at this moment, considering the involuntary commitment is not finished yet. The search results do not point to wrong information in any way. The information, even from 2006 is still relevant.\nThe request will be rejected, because the conditions from Article 17(1) GDPR are not met. Listing of the search results shown after searching for the name of the plaintiff are required to protect the freedom of expression and information as defined in Article 11 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This means the situation as described in Article 17(3)(a) GDPR applies.","title":"Rb. Noord-Nederland - C/18/190912/HA RK 19-19"}
{"_id":"holding_CE - N° 434684","text":"The Council of State validated most of the interpretations or recommendations provided in the guidelines:\n- Individuals should be able to decline to give consent as easily as to give consent; Individuals must be able to withdraw their consent as easily as they gave it; - User consent should be given for each purpose, which implies specific information; - Individuals must be informed of the identity of the controllers depositing cookies; the list containing the identity of the controllers must be made available to them at the time consent is obtained and must be regularly updated; - Data controllers must be able to demonstrate that they have obtained valid consent to the CNIL.\nHowever, in its decision of 19 June 2020, the Council of State suppressed a paragraph in which the CNIL considered that the Internet user should not suffer major inconvenience in the event of the absence or withdrawal of consent. The CNIL considered in particular that access to a website could never be subject to the acceptance of cookies (\"cookie walls\").\nThe Council of State considered that by deducting this general prohibition from the GDPR, the CNIL had gone beyond what is legally possible with guidelines, which are an instrument of \"soft law\".","title":"CE - N° 434684"}
{"_id":"holding_LG Essen - 18 O 204/21","text":"The Regional Court of Essen rejected the data subject's claim entirely.\nRegarding the notification letters, the court concluded that the data subject has no right to access under Article 15 GDPR , because the notification letters are standardised letters sent to every policy holder and, therefore, not personal data under Article 4(1) GDPR. Moreover the court found that the controller can refuse to act on the request according to Article 12(5)(b) GDPR, because the request is excessive. The court held that the \"repetitive character\" of a request is just an example under Article 12(5) GDPR and that an access request can also be considered excessive if the request does not serve the purpose of verifying the lawfulness of the processing as stated in Recital 63. The court then established that the data subject's request does not serve this purpose but solely aims at verifying the validity of the premium increases.","title":"LG Essen - 18 O 204/21"}
{"_id":"holding_DSB (Austria) - 2020-0.191.240","text":"The DSB held that at a legal person has the constitutional right to data protection under § 1 DSG (Austrian Data Protection Act) and is entitled to lodge a complaint before the DSB if these rights are violated. The DSB further held that the procedural provisions of the DSG - which deal with the procedure before the DSB - also apply regarding data protection complaints lodged by legal persons.\nThe DSB reasoned as follows:\n  * §1 DSG has a wider scope of applicability than Article 8 GRC (the latter only protects natural persons).\n  * As Article 16(2) TFEU leaves it to member states to grant data protection rights to legal persons as well as long as this does compromise the level of protection of the GRC, nor the primacy, unity and effectiveness of Union law.\n  * The provisions of the DSG - which deal with the procedure before the DSB - must also apply on legal persons because the Austrian legislator cannot be accused of treating legal persons grossly disadvantageously differently from natural persons in the pursuit of their constitutionally guaranteed rights without comprehensible reason.\nIn conclusion, the DSB held that the company was entitled to lodge a complaint, but rejected the complaint on the merits of the case as there was no violation of data protection rights granted by § 1 DSG.","title":"DSB (Austria) - 2020-0.191.240"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00264/2020","text":"The Spanish DPA (AEPD) held that:\n  * i) the lack of sufficient information on the first layer of the cookie banner,\n  * ii) the lack of information as to the type of cookie and the time it remained active,\n  * iii) as well as the absence of a \"refuse all cookie\" option\nconstituted a breach of Article 22(2) of the Spanish Law on Services of the Information Society and Electronic Commerce (LSSI).\nThe Spanish DPA therefore imposed a warning sanction on the defendant, ASOCAPAC. The DPA also outlined that the defendant had a month to modify the cookie banner and introduce a new cookie policy.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00264/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS (Netherlands) - 202006082/1/A3","text":"The Council of State declared the appeal unfounded.\nThe District Court rightly decided that the Municipality had reason to doubt the identity of the appellant on the basis of Article 12(6) GDPR. This is apparent from the way in which the appellant's request was submitted, namely the words \"beneficiary of [appellant]', and 'Beneficiary, Authorized Agent and Representative for the legal fiction [appellant]', as well as from the fact that the appellant did not comply with the request for identification.\nContrary to what the appellant argued, the fact that the Municipality sent correspondence to his home address did not alter the fact that it could reasonably have doubts about his identity. It is true that only the appellant lives at the address in question, but this does not necessarily mean that he is also the person who made the request. Other persons could live at that address who are not registered there and who can send letters on behalf of the appellant. The residential address therefore does not automatically provide a definitive answer about the identity of the applicant.\nFurther, the fact that the municipality, as argued by the appellant, has not objected in other proceedings to the way in which he arranged his requests and has even previously used the description 'beneficiary of [appellant]', does not affect the fact that that in this case the Municipality could have reasonable doubts about his identity. The Municipality rightly stated that under the GDPR, it is important that it ascertains his identity. The aim of the GDPR is to strive for high protection of personal data.\nThe Council of State also emphasised that the nature of the data requested has no bearing on the applicability of Article 12(6) GDPR, and he Municipality did not have to take into account the sensitivity of the data requested. The appellant also has not argued that there is an objective obstacle for him to submit his application via DigiD or to identify himself at the town hall. The District Court therefore rightly considered that the information required by the Municipality was proportionate.","title":"RvS (Netherlands) - 202006082/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_CE - N° 444937","text":"With regard to the Schrems II decision:\nThe French Court outlined relevant segments in the the Schrems II CJEU decision. In this case, the CJEU held that Articles 46(1) and 46(2)(c) GDPR must be interpreted as meaning that a data subject, whose personal data is transferred to a third country, benefits from a level of protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed by the GDPR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.\nThe French Court also highlighted that the CJEU held that the Privacy Shield adequacy decision (adopted as per Article 45(3) GDPR) was invalid. It was deemed invalid as it did not provide an adequate level of protection to personal data transfers from the EU to companies in the US. This is notably because public authorities in the US are able to request access to such personal data as a result of surveillance laws: Article 702 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) or the Executive Order (EO) 12333. These law allow for bulk collection of personal data. They do not allow a data subject to enforce any rights before a tribunal.\nWith regard to national law relating to collection and processing of data:\nThe French Court outlined that Article L. 1462-1 of the public health code provides for the Health Data Hub and the collection of health data from the existing national health data system (as per Article L. 1461-1).\nArticle L. 3131-1 of the public health code stipulates that the Health Minister can prescribe an Order in the public interest in case of a public health emergency, such as a pandemic. This order must be proportionate and necessary. As such, a Ministerial Order of the 10 July 2020 prescribed measures necessary to combat covid-19, including the processing of personal data concerning health (see Article L. 3131-16 public health code)\nWith regard to the risk of transfer of data due to the contractual arrangement with Microsoft:\nThe French Court stipulated the FISA and EO allows US public authorities to have access to transfers of data to the US from the EU without such appropriate safeguards for data subject. Therefore, any transfer of data to the US would be deemed to infringe Article 44 and subsequent of the GDPR, following the recent Schrems II decision by the CJEU. This is the case unless justified within derogation pursuant to Article 49.\nThe Court highlighted that the contract with Microsoft stipulates that data must not be processed outside of the stipulated geographical zone (Netherlands). This is true unless resolution of issues must be achieved outside of this zone subject to authorisation by the Health Data Hub. However, the Minister for Solidarity and Health introduced a Order of the 9th October 2020, which stipulated that no data transfer outside of the EU would be performed. The French Court therefore outlined that this imposed on a barrier on the contractual arrangement with Microsoft which allowed for such a possibility. Therefore, the Court deemed that there was no possibility of transfer of personal data outside of the EU as a result of the contract. The claimant’s claim that there was an interference with fundamental rights, including to data protection, is not well founded.\nWith regard to the risk of other transfers of personal data:\nThe Court addressed the claimant’s concern that Microsoft, as an American company, is subject to FISA and EO. This means that it can be under the obligation to transfer data to American public authorities even if the data is stored in the EU and the contract between the Health Data Hub and Microsoft preclude such transfers. The Court held that it was necessary to consider the level of protection afforded during the transfers of data in light of the contractual stipulation, the law in the third country and the judicial system there.\nThe Court highlighted that the French DPA (CNIL) stipulated in its defense that the risk of a transfer to the US by virtue of US surveillance law could not be excluded. This would subsequently infringe Article 28 and 48 GDPR which prohibit transfers to third countries unless agreed upon by the data controller or as a result of a legal obligation provided for in EU law or a Member State’s law.\nHowever, the French Court outlined that the CJEU in Schrems II only discussed circumstances where data is transfered to the US and did not discuss circumstances where such data is processed in the EU by American corporations subject to US law. The French Court also noted that the CJEU held that derogations found under Article 49 may allow for such transfers where necessary for a public interest recognised by EU law or the law of a Member State. It also deemed that there was public interest in allowing the use of health data in the context of the Covid-19 crisis and therefore, public interest in contracting with Microsoft on the technical aspects. The Court noted that such measures must be proportionate to the risk posed by the public health emergency and necessary considering the urgency and the absence of technical alternatives. The Court highlighted that it is the French DPA which must assess any potential public interest in link with the Covid-19 pandemic.\nThe French Court also outlined that the claimants only claimed that there was a risk of a violation of the GDPR should Microsoft have to grant access to personal data to US public authorities rather than claiming a direct violation of the Regulation.\nThe Court stipulated that the Health Data Hub must ensure that the data processor, Microsoft, adopts appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the protection of the rights of data subjects (pursuant to Article 28 GDPR). In light of this Article, Microsoft must also provide all information required and allow audits to be conducted.\nThe Court therefore did not order the suspension of the Health Data Hub.","title":"CE - N° 444937"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 20/2020","text":"The HDPA found, first of all, itself competent to decide on the case as the personal data collected (a) has not been characterised as \"classified information\" (b) nor does it relate to activities concerning national security, as required by the national Data Protection Act.\nThen, the HDPA rejected the complaint as it found the processing necessary for the protection of military facilities and thus lawful according to Articles 6(1)(e) and 9(2)(g) GDPR.\nLastly, the HDPA imposed the corrective measure of Article 58(2)(d), ordering the Military Hospital to appoint a DPO.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 20/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_LG München - 31 O 16606/20","text":"The Court upheld the appeal and ordered the controller to pay € 2,500, - as non-material damages to the data subject.\nFirst, the Court considered that the controller violated Article 32(1) and Article 5(1)(f) GDPR because it failed to implement sufficient organisational measures to ensure an appropriate level of data protection. In this regard, the Court considered Article 82(4) GDPR and noted that it is irrelevant whether the security deficiencies of CodeShip could be attributed to controller. Due to the quality and sensitivity of the stored data, as well as the scope of access, it was negligent of controller to rely on CodeShip to have erased the access information, without checking this with CodeShip and/or changing the access information themselves.\nSecond, the Court found that it is also not relevant that controller immediately took all necessary measures to exclude further unlawful access to the digital document archive after the incident, since they should have done so immediately after the termination of the business relationship with CodeShip.\nThird, the Court stated that the requirement of causality between the GDPR breach and the damage, laid down in Article 82(1) GDPR, had been fulfilled. This requirement is not sufficed if damage occurred, but did not result directly from a breach of the controller (OLG Stuttgart, judgment of 31 March 2021, ref. 9 U 34/21). However, in this case, the Court noted that the damage would not have occurred if controller would have taken sufficient organisational security measures.\nLastly, the Court considered that Article 82 GDPR also covers non-material damage like the “loss of control over data” (which is mentioned as example in recital 75). In this regard, the Court considered the judgement of LG Essen, judgement of 23.9.2021 - 6 O 190/21, and held that in this case, there is not only an \"insignificant or perceived violation of personal rights\", and that identity theft is obviously sufficient for a claim for damages. Because the data subject’s personal data had not yet been misused, however, the Court considered that the amount of € 2,500, - was appropriate.","title":"LG München - 31 O 16606/20"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 48/2021","text":"The Belgian DPA reminded the defendant that, notwithstanding the fact that notary was one of the professions allowed to consult the national register for natural persons, they should, pursuant to Article 3 of the Belgian law for organising a national register for natural persons, always do so for tasks that fall within their competence and are specific to the performance of their notary assignments.\nThe register should therefore not be used for tasks that are common to any employer, such as sending mail to their employees or former employees. By consulting the national register for that purpose, the defendant processed data unlawfully, thus going against Article 6 combined with Article 5(1)(a) GDPR.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 48/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Midden-Nederland - ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2023:6043","text":"The Court held that the controller was in violation of Article 12(3) GDPR, as they had failed to respond to the data subject's access request within the one-month deadline.\nThe Court noted that, while the controller did respond with a request for more information, this response was after the one-month deadline established by Article 12(3) GDPR. Usually, a request for more information would have suspended the one-month deadline. However, in this case it was not suspended, as the response was done after the deadline had passed. The Court further held that there was no infringement of Article 15 GDPR, as the data subject did not respond to the controller's request for more information. As such, the controller was entitled to set aside the access request on 10 February 2023.\nAs a result, the Court held that the controller was liable for damages for their violation of Article 12(3) GDPR, and awarded the data subject €707 in damages. The amount awarded was calculated on the basis of domestic administrative law, as the controller (the University of Utrecht) is an administrative body.","title":"Rb. Midden-Nederland - ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2023:6043"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-014","text":"Noting that the company had not actively cooperated and had failed to implement the required measures within the prescribed period, as spelled out in the formal notice, the CNIL imposed a fine of €3,000 on the company Société nouvelle de l'annuaire français.\nMore specifically:\n  * concerning Article 16 GDPR (right to rectification), it was found that the company had failed to follow up on a data subject's request to rectify his postal address from his personal to his professional address within the prescribed period. The deadline for rectifying the personal data of the complainant had been largely exceeded as the company's director implemented the required measures in July 2021, whereas the deadline expired in September 2020;\n  * concerning Article 17 GDPR (right to erasure), it was also found that the erasure requests of several data subjects had not been processed within the prescribed period. Several requests which were supposed to have been processed had, in fact, not been followed up on, even after the formal notice period had expired. The CNIL considered that if the data controller had indeed reinitialized its database by taking only the INSEE data, this was not sufficient to ensure that the requests were taken into account;\n  * concerning Article 30 GDPR (record of processing activities), it was found that the company had failed to create and complete a record of processing activities although processing a large amount of personal data constituted the core of its activity.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-014"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Amsterdam - 22/4916","text":"The court issued its final judgment on 20 September 2023 and held that, since the access request by the data subject was drafted in general terms and had a broad scope, the defendant correctly replied with a general overview of the personal data and criminal records about him being processed. The plaintiff objected to this response and the defendant asked him to specify his request in line with Recital 63 GDPR. As the plaintiff again answered in general terms, claiming he requested access to all his personal data, the court held that the defendant was right in replying in broad terms too. When the plaintiff substantiated his request at the appeal hearing, mentioning specific data he wished to have access to, the court held that it was too late and he should have mentioned this at the time of objection or submit a new request.\nFurther, upon hearing the defendant on its search operations, the court held that the defendant did carry out a sufficiently complete research when looking for the plaintiff’s personal data in its possession.\nAs regards the provision of copies of personal data of the plaintiff under Article 15(3) GDPR, making reference to CJEU C-487/21, the court specified that a right to obtain a copy of one’s personal data does not constitute an obligation for an administrative body to provide copies of documents entailing the data subject’s personal data. The latter can choose to provide an understandable reproduction of such data as long as a copy of the documents is not indispensable for the data subject to exercise his rights under the GDPR. The court held in this respect, that the plaintiff did not make it clear in his request that the data was indispensable for him to exercise his rights, hence the defendant was not bound to provide him with a copy of his personal data.\nAs regards the plaintiff’s criminal records, the court also held that he had no right to obtain a copy thereof under the WJSG.\nIn light of the above, the court declared the appeal to be unfounded as the defendant had answered in a complete and clear manner to the plaintiff’s access request.","title":"Rb. Amsterdam - 22/4916"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10065894","text":"First, The DPA pointed out that video surveillance by natural persons can be exempt from GDPR when used for purely personal purposes under Article 2(2) GDPR. However, this exemption only applies when cameras are limited to the controller's own property and immediate surroundings.\nIn examining the footage, the DPA found that the controller's cameras captured areas beyond their immediate property, including neighbors' doors and windows. This meant the processing could not benefit from the household exemption under Article 2(2) GDPR.\nFurthermore, since the controller lacked any valid legal basis for capturing these third-party areas, the DPA found a violation of Article 6 GDPR. The processing also violated the principle of lawfulness under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, as filming neighbors' private areas without proper justification went against fundamental data protection principles.\nBased on these violations, the DPA ordered the controller to adjust the cameras' viewing angle to exclude neighbors' private areas within 90 days and imposed a fine of €400.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10065894"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Global Ports’s Services S.R.L.","text":"First, the DPA found that this processing activity lacked of legal basis. More specifically, the DPA pointed out that the controller had not proven that it had previously used other less intrusive methods to achieve the purpose of the processing. Therefore, it found a violation of Article 5(1)(a), 5(1)(c), 5(2) and 6 GDPR.\nSecondly, the DPA noted that the controller did not provide data subject with the information set by Article 14 GDPR. Therefore, it found a violation of this article in combination with Article 12 GDPR.\nFinally, the DPA pointed out that the controller had stored the data for a period of 6 months, which exceeds the period of 30 days set by Article 5(1)(e) of the national law implementing GDPR (Lege nr. 190/2018). Therefore, it found a violation of Article 5(1)(e) GDPR.\nOn these grounds, it fined the controller RON 9,947.60 (€2,000).","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Global Ports’s Services S.R.L."}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02368","text":"The DPA held that the controller lacked a legal basis as per Article 6(1)(f) GDPR for accessing and monitoring the data subject's email inbox, that they had failed to provide required information to the data subject as per Article 13 GDPR and for failure to assess the data subject's objection as per Article 21 GDPR. For this, the DPA fined the controller €9,775 and required them to improve internals controls for employee emails as per Article 24 GDPR.\n\nOn the legal basis\nFirst, the DPA assessed if the controller had a legal basis as per a national (Norwegian) regulation concerning employers' access to employees' inboxes and other electronically stored material, which allows such processing if one of two possible conditions are fulfilled. First, the DPA found that \"upholding customer relations and daily operations\" and \"suspicion of violations of work duties\", as argued by the controller, are legitimate purposes as per the regulation §2(1). However, this only allows for single accesses for a specified purpose. Automatic enabling of forwarding is considered as continuous surveillance and the processing could therefore not be based on this condition.\nContinuous surveillance is regulated by §2(2), but solely for purposes of administrating the computer network or to uncover or solve security breaches in the network. Consequently, the processing could not either be based on this condition.\nFurther, the DPA found that the conditions in Article 6(1) GDPR was not fulfilled. The only available legal ground for this type of processing is Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, where three conditions must be fulfilled: the processing must be necessary for legitimate interests, and these interests must outweigh the rights and freedoms of the data subject.\nThe DPA had already concluded that the purposes were legitimate. However, they held that the purposes could have been achieved by less privacy-invasive measures, for example by deactivating the email inbox and/or enable automatic forwarding themselves. Consequently, the DPA held that the controller lacked a valid legal basis as per Article 6(1)(f) GDPR.\n\nOn the right to object\nThe DPA found that the controller was unable to demonstrate that they had considered the data subject's objection, or that they had conducted a specific legitimate interest assessment in line with Article 21 GDPR.\n\nOn the obligation to inform data subjects\nThe DPA held that it is highly likely that the controller had violated the right to information as per Article 13 GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02368"}
{"_id":"holding_DPC (Ireland) - Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (Instagram) - IN-18-5-7","text":"In the Final Decision, the DPC identified four issues which had to be addressed (three issues the DPC intended to address and an additional issue on which the EDPB directed the DPC to make a finding).\n\nIssue 1 – Whether clicking on the “Agree to Terms” button constitutes or must be considered consent for the purposes of the GDPR and, if so, whether it is valid consent for the purposes of the GDPR\nThe DPC identified the first issue as consisting of two parts: “first, whether clicking the ‘Agree to Terms’ button actually constitutes consent for the purposes of the GDPR and, second, whether the act of clicking ‘Agree to Terms’ necessarily must be considered consent for such purposes” (34).\nOn the first point, the DPC accepted Meta IE’s argument and proposed, by way of its Draft Decision, to conclude that “as a matter of fact, Meta Ireland did not – and did not seek – to rely on consent as the legal basis for all processing” (46).\nRegarding the second point, the DPC held that Meta IE was also not legally obliged to rely on consent as the legal basis for processing of personal data in this context. The DPC emphasized that there is no hierarchy of legal bases for the processing of personal data under the GDPR, any implication otherwise would be “inherently problematic”, and “[no] one ground has normative priority over the others” (51).\nHowever, in its binding decision the EDPB instructed the DPC to remove its conclusion on finding 1 (EDPB - 203), stating as follows:\n“The EDPB agrees with the IE SA and Meta IE that there is no hierarchy between these legal bases. However, this does not mean that a controller, as Meta IE in the present case, has absolute discretion to choose the legal basis that suits better its commercial interests. The controller may only rely on one of the legal basis established under Article 6 GDPR if it is appropriate for the processing at stake\" (EDPB - 107). “[The DPC] cannot categorically conclude… that Meta IE is not legally obliged to rely on consent to carry out the personal data processing… without further investigating its processing operations, the categories of data processed, and the purposes they serve” (EDPB - 202).\nAccordingly, the DPC made no finding on the matters encompassed by their assessment of issue 1.\n\nIssue 2 – Whether Meta Ireland could rely on Article 6(1)(b) GDPR as a lawful basis for processing of personal data in the context of the Terms of Use and/or Data Policy\nThe second issue concerned whether Meta IE could rely on Article 6(1)(b) GDPR as the lawful basis for processing of personal data. In order to do so, the controller had to demonstrate that such “processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party”.\nTaking into account the complainant’s submissions, the EDPB guidelines and the framing of Article 6(1)(b), the DPC acknowledged that “consideration of the meaning of the term ‘contract’ within a data protection context is required”. However, the DPC also asserted that an assessment of the terms “necessary” and “performance” is also required, and they “do not have competence to consider substantive issues of contract law, and, accordingly [their] analysis is limited to the specific contract entered into by the named data subject and Meta Ireland in respect of the Instagram service” (87). The DPC took a broad approach in determining what is necessary for the performance of a contract based on what is “reflected in the terms of the precise contract between those parties” (95). The DPC explained that, in their view, “the core of the service offered is premised on the delivery of personalised advertising” (106) and proposed to conclude that “Meta Ireland may in principle rely on Article 6(1)(b) as a legal basis of the processing of users’ data necessary for the provision of the Instagram service, including through the provision of behavioural advertising” (116).\nWhen issuing its Binding Decision, the EDPB, emphasised \"the complexity, massive scale and intrusiveness of the behavioural advertising practice that Meta IE conducts through the Instagram service\" (EDPB - 99). With regard to Article 6(1)(b) GDPR as a lawful basis for data processing and the determination of what is necessary for the performance of a contract, the EDPB stated as follows:\n\"The GDPR makes Meta IE, as a data controller for the processing at stake, directly responsible for complying with the Regulation’s principles, including the processing of data in a lawful, fair and transparent manner, and any obligations derived therefrom. This obligation applies even where the practical application of GDPR principles… is inconvenient or runs counter to the commercial interests of Meta IE and its business model” (EDPB - 108).\n\"The EDPB agrees that SAs do not have under the GDPR a broad and general competence in contractual matters. However, the EDPB considers that the supervisory tasks that the GDPR bestows on SAs imply a limited competence to assess a contract's validity, insofar as it is relevant to the fulfilment of their tasks under the GDPR… the SAs would thus be obliged to always consider a contract valid, even in situations where it is manifestly evident it is not\" (EDPB - 112).\n\"...the concept of necessity has its own independent meaning under EU law. It must be interpreted in a manner that fully reflects the objective pursued by an EU instrument, in this case, the GDPR\" (EDPB - 119).\nTurning to the facts of the case, the EDPB outlined a number of factors which, in contradiction to the view of the DPC, support the argument that data processing for personalised advertising is not essential to the contract between Meta IE and users of Instagram. Firstly, \"Meta IE promotes... the perception that the main purpose of the Instagram service serves and for which it processes its users' data is to enable them to share content and communicate with others\" (EDPB - 120). The EDPB also takes into account Article 21(2) and (3) GDPR, \"the absolute right available to data subjects... to object to the processing of their personal data for direct marketing purposes\". Because this right exists, \"the processing cannot be necessary to perform a contract [as the] subject has the possibility to opt out from it at any time, and without providing any reason\" (EDPB - 125). The EDPB continues, outlining the inherent risk of a finding in the DPC’s decision that Meta IE can process personal data on the basis of Article 6(1)(b):\n“...there is a risk that the Draft Decision’s failure to establish Meta IE's infringement of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR, pursuant to the [DPC]'s interpretation of it, nullifies this provision and makes lawful theoretically any collection and reuse of personal data in connection with the performance of a contract with a data subject\" (EDPB - 134). \"As a result, owing to the number of users of the Instagram service, the market power, and influence of Meta IE and its economically attractive business model, the risks derived from the current findings of the Draft Decision could go beyond the Complainant and the millions of users of Instagram service in the EEA and affect the protection of the hundreds of millions of people covered by the GDPR\" (EDPB - 135).\nIn light of all of the above, the EDPB directed the following:\n“...behavioural adveritising performed by Meta in the context of the Instagram service is objectively not necessary for the performance of Meta IE's alleged contract with data users for the Instagram service and is not an essential or core element of it\" (EDPB - 136). \"Meta has inappropriately relied on Article 6(1)(b) GDPR to process the complainant's personal data in the context of the Instagram Terms of Use and therefore lacks a legal basis to process these data for the purpose of behavioural advertising. Meta IE has not relied on any other legal basis to process personal data in the context of the Instagram Terms of Use for the purpose of behavioural advertising. Meta IE has consequently infringed Article 6(1) GDPR by unlawfully processing personal data” (EDPB - 137).\nAccordingly, under instruction from the EDPB, The DPC altered “Finding 2” of its Draft Decision, finding that “Meta Ireland was not entitled to rely on Article 6(1)(b) GDPR to process the Complainant’s personal data for the purpose of behavioural advertising in the context of the Instagram Terms of Use”.\n\nIssue 3 – Whether Meta Ireland provided the requisite information on the legal basis for processing on foot of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR and whether it did so in a transparent manner\nOn the issue of transparency, Article 13(1) GDPR outlines the information the controller must provide to a data subject at the time when personal data are obtained and Article 12(1) GDPR details the manner in which this data must be provided.\nDescribing the information provided by Meta IE to Instagram users, the DPC stated:\n“Meta Ireland has not provided meaningful information as to the processing operation(s) and/or set(s) of operations that occur in the context of the Instagram service, either on the basis of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR or any other legal basis. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that it is impossible for the user to identify with any degree of specificity what processing is carried out on what data, on foot of the specified lawful bases, in order to fulfil these objectives… Indeed, it could be said that there is a significant deficit of information made available to data subjects” (188). “Taking into account the circular, disjointed nature of the information provided by Meta Ireland and the generalised, high-level overview it provided, I am not satisfied that the information was clear and concise” (190).\nThe DPC also describes the “significant link” (194) between the principle of transparency and the principle of fairness in Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, and finds that, with regards to the issue of transparency, it is appropriate to made a finding of an infringement of the principle of Article 5(1)(a) (Para 197).\nIn light of the above, the DPC found that “In relation to processing for which Meta Ireland indicated reliance upon Article 6(1)(b) GDPR, Articles 5(1)(a), 12(1) and 13(1)(c) have been infringed”.\n\nIssue 4 (Additional Issue) – Whether Meta Ireland Infringed the Article 5(1)(a) Principle of Fairness\nDuring the course of the Article 60 GDPR consultation period, the Italian DPA raised an objection to the DPC’s draft decision. The purpose of this objection was to require the amendment of the Draft Decision to include a new finding of infringement of the Article 5(1)(a) GDPR principle of fairness. The DPC decided not to follow the objection, as the “principle of fairness was not examined during the course of this inquiry and, consequently, Meta Ireland was not afforded the opportunity to be heard in response to a particularised area of wrongdoing” (200). The matter was referred to the EDPB, who determined as follows:\n\"the principle of fairness has an independent meaning and… an assessment of Meta IE’s compliance with the principle of transparency does not automatically rule out the need for an assessment of Meta IE’s compliance with the principle of fairness too\" (EDPB - 224).\n\"the concept of fairness stems from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights\" (EDPB - 225).\n“Fairness is an overarching principle which requires that personal data should not be processed in a way that is unjustifiably detrimental, unlawfully discriminatory, unexpected or misleading to the data subject… [it] underpins the entire data protection framework and seeks to address power asymmetries between the data controllers and the data subjects in order to cancel out the negative effects of such asymmetries and ensure the effective exercise of the data subjects’ rights” ( EDPB - 225, 226).\n\"The combination of factors, such as the asymmetry of the information created by Meta IE with regard to the Instagram service users, combined with the ‘take it or leave it’ situation that they are faced with… systematically disadvantages the Instagram service users, limits their control over the processing of their personal data and undermines the exercise of their rights” (EDPB - 234).\nAccordingly, the EDPB instructed the DPC to include a finding of an infringement of the principle of fairness under Article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR by Meta IE, and to adopt the \"appropriate corrective measures, by addressing, but without being limited to, the question of an administrative fine for this infringement” (EDPB - 235).\nAs directed by the EDPB, the DPC found that “Meta Ireland has infringed the principle of fairness pursuant to Article 5(1)(a) GDPR”.\n\nSummary of Envisaged Action\nThe DPC made an order pursuant to Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, requiring Meta IE to bring processing into compliance in accordance with its transparency obligations under Articles 5(1)(a), 12(1) and 12(1)(c) GDPR, within 3 months of the date of the date of notification of any final decision. The order also requires Meta IE to address the EDPB’s finding that it is not entitled to carry out data processing on the basis of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR, and to bring its processing into compliance with Article 6(1) GDPR.\nFurthermore, pursuant to Articles 58(2)(i) and 83 GDPR, and under the direction of the EDPB, the DPC imposed an administrative fine in the amount of €180 million. This fine is made up of an €70 million fine for failing to provide sufficient information on processing operations (Articles 5(1)(a) and 13(1)(c) GDPR); a €60 million fine for failing to provide this information in a concise, transparent, intelligent, and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language (Articles 5(1)(a) and 12(1) GDPR); and a €50 million fine for the unlawful processing of personal data (Article 6(1) GDPR).","title":"DPC (Ireland) - Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (Instagram) - IN-18-5-7"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - Nr. 2020123144","text":"After analysing the facts of the case, the Icelandic DPA considered that Creditinfo had complied with Article 14 of the GDPR. In particular, the Icelandic DPA noted that Creditinfo had provided sufficient evidence that a letter containing an information notice had been sent to the data subject prior to the publication of the personal data, in accordance with its operating license. The Icelandic DPA therefore concluded that Creditinfo had respected the terms of its operating license, and had not infringed Article 14 GDPR.\nWith regards to the fact that the Complainant was claiming not having received the letter, the Iceland DPA simply noted that it was not in a position to resolve the dispute regarding this factual aspect of the case but that it could however take a position on whether Creditinfo had complied with the procedure set out in its operating license (which, here, proved to be the case).","title":"Persónuvernd (Iceland) - Nr. 2020123144"}
{"_id":"holding_CNPD (Portugal) - Deliberação 2021/533","text":"The CNPD found that the National Statistical Institute, being the controller of the data processing, had not carried out the necessary Data Protection Impact Assessment for this particular processing, having only carried out an impact assessment for the general statistical activities. Therefore, Institute had not been able to assess the risks of this particular processing of data, that might include transfers of personal data to third countries without an adequate level of protection. The controller did not seek the DPA's advice either; consulting only with the Portuguese National Security Cabinet (\"Gabinete Nacional de Segurança\") about the census' cybersecurity requirements.\nThe DPA stated that even given the cybersecurity requirements of the census, additional measures could have been put in place to mitigate the risk to individual's personal data, ensuring greater control over the data by the National Institute, and limiting the processing of personal data to EU Member States; and by implication not processing the personal data in third countries. However, the choices made by the National Institute meant personal data might be processed in the United States and other countries in Cloudflare's network (for instance, South Africa, China, India, Jordan, Mexico, Russia, and Singapore).\nThe National Institute, as a controller, accepted Cloudflare's terms and conditions when using their service. The contract specifies that:\n  * personal data may transit any of the 200 servers used by Cloudflare;\n  * Standard Contractual Clauses are relied upon for the transfer of data to third countries, based on the Commission Decision 2010/87/UE of 5 February 2010 on Standard Contractual Clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries;\n  * Cloudflare is authorized to use sub-processors from outside their group, including companies from third countries;\n  * Cloudflare may be subject to requests of disclose by US government institutions that may be inconsistent with the GDPR; and those requests may forbid the notification to the data controller about these requests.\nThe DPA held that use of standard contractual clauses does not imply that the controller does not have the obligation to ensure an equivalent level of protection when data is transferred to third countries, implementing adequate safeguards that allow to maintain such level of protection, according to the CJEU Schrems II Judgment[1]. This is also related to the accountability principle from Article 5(2) GDPR.\nThe DPA remarks that, according the Schrems II Judgment, the transfer of data to the United States may result in violations of fundamental rights, given that the US legislation allows for access to the data because of national security and public interest reasons. Such inferences are not reasonable, as limitations to fundamental rights are not clearly defined; as there are no clear and precise rules on the application of such measures or minimum requirements to protect against risks of abuse; there is no requirement for a necessity test; and there are no enforceable rights for data subjects or legal remedies.\nThe Portuguese DPA found that the National Institute had not undertaken a sufficient Data Protection Impact Assessment, had not consulted the supervisory authority prior to processing, and had therefore not adopted adequate additional safeguards before using the services of a data processor who was headquartered in the United States.\nThe DPA concluded that Portuguese citizens lack any guarantees in regards to their data being collected by the National Statistical Institute, as US legislation does not offer a similar level of protection than the GDPR. The controller had neither been able to demonstrate that the data is not effectively transferred to the US, not had they implemented any supplementary adequate measures to ensure a similar level of protection, which they are obliged to do as a data controller.\nTherefore, the CNPD ordered the National Statistical Institute to suspend any processing of personal data for the census in the US or any other third country without adequate levels of protection, within 12 hours of their decision being issued.\nThe CNPD also remarked that the National Institute should obtain guarantees that compliance with GDPR is assured when contracting with processors or sub-processors.","title":"CNPD (Portugal) - Deliberação 2021/533"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202208230","text":"The DPA held that there was enough evidence to start a sanctioning procedure. Especially considering the lack of legally binding instruments between the processor and the subprocessors involved in the delivery of a package to the data subject. Considering that the subprocessor had to process personal data controlled by Carrefour, there was a breach of the GDPR.\nWith this, the Spanish DPA established that a possible fine of €90,000 could be imposed for the breach of Articles 28(2) and 28(3) of the GDPR. The data processor decided to finalize the procedure by paying the reduced fine of €72,000, which implies admitting the breach of the data protection rules.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202208230"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-432-0056","text":"Based on the documentation submitted, the DPA found that the processing activities entailed a high risk for the data subjects' rights and freedoms that could not be mitigated, and referred to Article 36(1) GDPR and Article 36(2) GDPR.\nThe DPA ordered the municipality to:\n  * Change the data processing agreement with Google so that the DPA's remarks in their 14 July and 18 August decisions to Helsingor municipality, are implemented. This includes, at a minimum, a clarification of where and if Google acts as a sole controller and any uncertainties that may entail that Google acts beyond their role as a processor, see Article 28(3)(a) GDPR.\n  * Document that all transfers of personal data to insecure third countries, are in line with the GDPR.\n  * Describe all data flows and identify the personal data that are shared with the vendor, and clarify when the vendor acts as a sole or joint controller. This documentation must include the whole technology stack used by the municipality (for this processing activity).\n  * Update their data protection impact assessment based on all identified risks.\n  * Consult the DPA if the DPIA shows any high risks the municipality is not able to mitigate.\n  * If any processing activities are still not in line with the GDPR before the DPA's deadline 3 November 2022, present a final plan for bringing them in line with the GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-432-0056"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9542096","text":"The Garante found that the defensive statements were not enough to overcome its initial findings and close the proceedings. On the other hand, since the access request was fulfilled 62 days after its submission, the DPA found a violation of Article 12(3) in relation to Article 15 GDPR. The Garante hence applied an administrative fine as per Article 83(5) GDPR. The amount of such fine was set at €2000, taking into account the negligent nature of the delay, the fact that the polyclinic cooperated with the Supervisory Authority, and the lack of “previous relevant infringements”, or “previous provisions” as per Article 58 GDPR, ascribed to Poliambulatorio Talenti.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9542096"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-020","text":"No legal basis under Article 6 GDPR\nThe CNIL found that the processing of personal data taken from LinkedIn users who had limited their visibility lacked a legal basis. The CNIL highlighted that users who had selected options 3 and 4, had expressly limited the visibility of their contact details. The mere fact that users had limited and not entirely denied access to their contact details did not provide authorisation for the controller to harvest this data as users could not reasonably expect for this processing to occur.\nNo clear data retention period adhered to under Article 5(1)(e) GDPR\nThe CNIL found that the controller's storage limitation policy entailed an automatic extension of the storage period and potentially led to an indefinite storage of personal data without a clear set storage limitation. According to the CNIL, this was not proportional and did not meet the requirements under Article 5(1)(e) GDPR.\nFailure to provide adequate transparency under Article 12 GDPR and information under Article 14 GDPR\nIn addition to the fact that the controller had only informed data subject’s four years after it had begun processing their personal data, the CNIL criticised that the controller sent the email exclusively in English.\nFailure to provide access to data under Article 15 GDPR\nThe CNIL found that the controller did not provide all available information as to the source of the data. Even if the controller could not trace the specific source of the data for each data subject, it was found to have been aware of some sources and should have disclosed these. The CNIL further criticised that these sources were not listed in the privacy policy.\nFor the above breaches of the GDPR, the CNIL issued a fine of €240,000. The CNIL ordered the company to rectify its data processing within a six-month period (before the 18 June 2025). Specifically it ordered the controller to:\n  * Stop collecting the data of LinkedIn users who had selected to limit the visibility of their contact details and to delete this data. If the controller cannot identify which users had limited their data visibility, it should inform all data subjects of the processing and the option to object to it within three months. The CNIL specified that the collected data must only be used for this purpose.\n  * Cease the automatic renewal of the storage period pending a personal data update.\n  * Inform data subjects of the processing in a language they understand.\n  * Adequately respond to access requests and include all available information on the source of the personal data collected.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-020"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Den Haag - C/09/581706 / HA RK 19-593","text":"According to the court, the exercise of the rights granted to the data subjects by the GDPR is not unlimited. In order to protect the legitimate interests of the data controller (not to have to decide continuously on repeated requests and be subjected to lengthy litigation, but to know, within a workable period, whether its decision can still be submitted to the courts or not), there are limits to the frequency with which data subjects can make use of their rights. Article 12(5) of the GDPR provides in this respect that a controller may refuse to comply with a data subject request where that request is manifestly unfounded or excessive, in particular because of its repetitive nature.\nHowever, Article 12(5) of the GDPR does not contain a clear answer as to when a request may be dismissed as repetitive, nor whether, as in the present case, this can be done after only one repeated request within two months of receiving the negative answer. In addition, it is not clear to the court how Article 12(5) relates to the right to object deriving from Article 21(1), which the data subjects can exercise \"at any time\", neither how the submission of a repeated request relates to the situation where the national law sets a period of six weeks for lodging an appeal and where such period has expired.\nThe domestic court therefore proposes to ask the following questions to the European Court of Justice:\n1) Do the words \"at any time\" in Article 21(1) of the GDPR mean that data subjects, following receipt of a negative decision in response to a request for removal, are entitled to submit a repeated request (when there is not any change in the facts or circumstances relating to the data subject's situation)?\n2) If yes, is the data controller nevertheless allowed, under Article 12(5)(b) of the GDPR, to refuse to comply with the request because of its repetitive nature?\n3) Is it relevant how much time elapsed between receipt of the controller's decision rejecting the previous request and the submission of the new (repeated) request by the data subjects? If so, how much time must have elapsed as a minimum before the data subject can submit a new (repeated) request?\n4) Does it make any difference if the national law lays down a time-limit within which the data subjects must lodge their appeal against a (negative) decision of a controller, and that time limit has expired at the time when the repeated request is lodged? Is it possible, immediately after the expiry of the time-limit, to submit a new identical request to which the controller would have to reply as to the substance and against which - according to the letter of Article 35(2) - an appeal could (still) be lodged?\n5) Does it make any difference if, when the original (rejected) request was made, the data subject was assisted by a professional legal adviser, such as a lawyer?","title":"Rb. Den Haag - C/09/581706 / HA RK 19-593"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W214 2233132-1/27E","text":"Upon hearing further submissions by the parties, the BVwG issued its final decision on the remaining part of the case on 29 November 2023.\nIn the second partial judgment the court considered the two parts of the DSB’s decision that had not already been decided, namely: (2a) the order to the controller to disclose the names of all recipients of the data subject’s personal data and (1) the declaration that the controller violated the data subject’s right to access as it failed to fully comply with his request under Article 15 GDPR.\nThe Court first of all held that, part (2a) of the DSB’s decision should be dismissed, as the controller in its later submissions sufficiently proved that it was impossible for it to identify all recipients of the data subject’s personal data and thus it could and can not comply with the order to disclose their names.\nAs regards part (1) of the DSB’s decision, the BVwG held that, even though it was indeed impossible for the controller to identify the recipients of the data subject's personal data, this was due to the fact that the controller did not take the appropriate steps to save information about the transmission of personal data to recipients, even though controllers are generally obliged to do so. This, in turn, resulted in the data subject not being able to exercise its other rights under the GDPR and the controller could not comply with its obligation under Article 19 GDPR. For this reason, the court held that the GDPR violation did not just take place in the past but was still ongoing and the data subject's request was still not complied with. Further, the court rejected the argument that the list of recipients of the controller is covered by trade secret protection. As a matter of fact, the court considered that this would lead to the impossibility to ever apply Article 15(1)(c) GDPR, and the interpretation of a law leading to its disapplication is unlawful according to the case-law of the Austrian supreme court. Also, in this specific case, the existence of trade secret protection was negated by the controller at the oral hearing.\nIn light of the above, the BVwG concluded that the controller violated the data subject’s right to access under Article 15(1)(c) GDPR as it failed to store information about the recipients of his personal data and thus was unable to provide it to the data subject.","title":"BVwG - W214 2233132-1/27E"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Den Haag - SGR 22/2863","text":"The Court ruled that the controller’s decision to deny the data subject’s request is justified.\nThe Court recognised that, under Article 7(6)(i) Dutch Access and correction rights regulation, a request for access may be partially or fully denied if it is necessary and proportionate to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Thereby, the tipster’s anonymity and the public interest in maintaining such anonymity outweighed the data subject’s interest in disclosure, as the investigation led to the benefit recovery, not the tip.\nOther claims, including harassment by anonymous tipsters and privacy violations by the controller, were deemed irrelevant to the decision.\nThe appeal was dismissed and the data subject’s arguments were rejected.","title":"Rb. Den Haag - SGR 22/2863"}
{"_id":"holding_LfD (Lower Saxony) - Fine EUR 900,000 against bank","text":"The DPA found that the analysis of large amounts of data to create customer profiles could not be based on Article 6(1)(f). It followed that processing based on a legitimate interest requires a balancing act between the interest of the controller and the fundamental rights and freedoms if the data subject. The controller had to consider the reasonable expectations of the data subjects.\nThe DPA argued that a data subject could not reasonably expect large amounts of its personal data to be analyzed by the controller to better target its advertising. Third-party data enrichment, like the use of commercial credit reporting agency data, further overrides the interest of the controller and tips the balancing test in favor of the data subject.\nThe DPA held that in addition, data enrichment from a third-party source and linking it to profiles could also not be based on legitimate interest. This could potentially link data from all areas of life to an accurate customer profile, which could also not be reasonably expected by a customer. Customer consent (see Article 6(1)(a)) is required.\nThe controller cooperated with the DPA throughout the process.\nFor the violation, the DPA fined the controller €900,000.","title":"LfD (Lower Saxony) - Fine EUR 900,000 against bank"}
{"_id":"holding_NS - 33 Cdo 347/2023","text":"The Court upheld the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, and stated that the company had the authorisation and obligation to keep the processed data on outgoing and incoming calls. Furthermore, it bore the burden of proof in disputes on the provision of services. This was especially important for the user to verify whether the billed amount corresponds to the volume of data and whether the data was provided correctly.\nOn the application of the GDPR, the Court upheld the reasoning of the Court of Appeal supported by an opinion of the Czech DPA. According to the Court, the processing of incoming call data is personal data, however, the company is entitled to process and store the data for a limited period under legal obligation (Article 6(1)(c) GDPR) and legitimate interests (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR). This is also the case on processing for the extent necessary to provide services and for billing and payments, even if it relates to a person other than the data subject.","title":"NS - 33 Cdo 347/2023"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W211 2230221-1","text":"The BVwG did not (yet) take a decision on the merit of the case but stalled the procedure because the Austrian Supreme Court (OGH) had already filed a request for preliminary ruling on the question the interpretation of Article 15(1)(c) GDPR in February 2021. Once the CJEU has passed its judgment on the matter, the BVwG will reopen the case.","title":"BVwG - W211 2230221-1"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W274 2232028-1/3E","text":"The BVwG rejected the appeal and fully upheld the decision by the DSB.\nOn the issue of storage duration of the data on payment defaults, the BVwG agreed with the DSB's reasoning and held that none of the data must be erased at the time of the decision. All the data stored could still be considered relevant for assessing the data subject's creditworthiness.\nWith regards to the non-information under Article 14 GDPR, the BVwG applied a \"narrow concept\" of lawfulness under Chapter II GDPR: The lawfulness of processing is only determined by Article 5 et seqq. GDPR. A violation of Article 13 or 14 GDPR can be fined under Article 83(5) GDPR but it does not affect the lawfulness of processing as such.","title":"BVwG - W274 2232028-1/3E"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 39/2020","text":"The litigation chamber of the BE DPA concluded that the processing took place without legal basis (Article 6.1.f not applicable), without privacy policy and without information to the individuals whose data were collected indirectly.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 39/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 51/2024","text":"Regarding the legal basis of the processing operations, the APD noted that the controller’s privacy policy did not clearly state the legal basis under Article 6 GDPR. The APD found a possible violation of Article 13(1) GDPR which requires the controller to inform the data subject of the legal basis.\nMoreover, the APD pointed out that this processing, which uses, among other things, location and IP address to assign a unique ID to a visitor, must in principle be based on consent. The APD therefore found a possible breach of Articles 5(1)(a) and 6 GDPR.\nRegarding the use by other parties of the technology, the APD indicated that the complaint is specifically directed towards the controller, and that it is up to each controller to ensure that their processing activities are in compliance with the GDPR. Therefore, the APD only examined the activities that took place under the responsibility of the controller.\nRegarding the access and erasure request, the APD considered that it appeared from the elements provided that there was an email exchange between the data subject and the controller, but as the content of this communication had not been provided, the DPA could not assess whether the controller’s response met the requirements of the GDPR.\nNonetheless, the APD added that if personal data is obtained by submitting an erasure request, it cannot be used thereafter to send out marketing emails, under the principle of purpose limitation under Article 5(1)(b) GDPR. The APD therefore found a possible violation of Article 5(1)(b) GDPR.\nFinally, the APD also noted that the controller had not appointed a representative in the European Union under Article 27 GDPR.\nThus, the APD issued a warning for (i) failing to comply with the information obligation under Article 13 GDPR, (ii) for using the contact details of the data subject to send marketing emails and thus possibly violating Article 5(1)(b) GDPR, (iii) for failing to appoint a representative in the European Union under Article 27 GDPR and (iv) for possibly violating Articles 6 and 5(1)(a) GDPR.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 51/2024"}
{"_id":"holding_AP (The Netherlands) - Boete voor gemeente Voorschoten","text":"The Dutch Data Protection Authority (DPA) has determined that the municipality unlawfully processed personal data related to waste disposal. The data in question included the chip number of waste containers or tokens, associated address details, date and time of container emptying or underground container access, location data, and type of waste. As the chip number links this data to an address, it directly or indirectly identifies residents.\nThe DPA assessed whether the municipality could rely on Article 6(1)(e) GDPR—necessity for the performance of a task in the public interest—as a legal basis. The purpose of the processing was clearly defined as reducing residual waste by regulating disposal. Moreover, the stated purpose could be achieved by the processing of personal data. After all, the address information plays a key role in limiting the amount of residual waste that a household can offer. The purpose of the processing also fits within the public task.\nThe short-term processing of personal data via the chip reader on garbage trucks was deemed necessary for verifying whether a container was provided by the municipality and had not been emptied recently. Similarly, for underground containers, checking whether a token granted access and whether disposal limits were exceeded was considered necessary. However, storing detailed records of which token or container was used, when, where, and for which type of waste was not deemed essential unless part of a diftar (differentiated waste collection) system, which the municipality of Voorschoten does not operate. Since long-term storage of waste disposal data was unnecessary for fulfilling a public interest task, the processing lacked a valid legal basis and was deemed unlawful.\nOn 24 May 2023, the waste management board informed the DPA that it would reduce the retention period for container disposal data to 14 days. Previously, data was retained for as long as a container remained in use (for overground containers) or up to five years (for underground containers).\nAdditionally, the DPA found that the municipality failed to adequately inform residents about the processing of their personal data, as required under Article 14 GDPR. While some information was provided, it did not clearly specify which personal data was processed, for what purpose, or on what legal basis. For example, letters informing residents about new underground containers with tokens did not disclose how personal data would be processed. The DPA concluded that the municipality had failed to meet GDPR transparency requirements.","title":"AP (The Netherlands) - Boete voor gemeente Voorschoten"}
{"_id":"holding_TA Luxembourg - 46578","text":"The Court upheld the Luxembourgish DPA’s decision.\n\nThe legal basis of legitimate interest\nThe Court rejected all the controller's arguments on the legal basis of legitimate interest. First, the Court held that the controller failed to provide evidence that the controller’s processing of personal data pursued the interest of the wider community in a vital Internet economy.\nSecond, the Court held that in the original procedure involving the Luxembourgish DPA, the controller failed to establish that processing personal data was necessary for interest-based advertising. The controller merely stated that personal data were necessary without carrying out a concrete analysis of necessity.\nThird, the Court observed that the DPA did not need to assess the balancing of legitimate interest because the controller failed to establish that the processing of personal data was necessary to begin with. In this regard, the Court referred to the case law of the EU Court of Justice[1] and specifically to the so-called “three-step test” for legitimate interest.\nFinally, the Court pointed out that the controller still relied on legitimate interest to some extent in order to provide targeted advertising. Therefore, the processing of personal data in the context of interest-based advertising was still unlawful. The controller also failed to specify which data processing operation relied on consent, and failed to mention its reliance on consent in any of the privacy notices on its websites.\n\nThe controller's transparency obligations\nThe Court essentially confirmed all of the DPA’s findings. With regards to recipients of personal data for the purpose of providing interest-based advertising, the Court observed that the controller did not even provide precise enough information on the categories of recipients involved.\n\nThe right to object\nThe Court rejected the controller's claim that its granular opt-out system was more respectful of the data subjects' wishes. In this regard, the Court observed that the controller merely stated this argument without providing any evidence. The Court also pointed out that the controller failed to show that the opt-out system retained the users’ advertising preferences when re-connecting to the controller’s websites.\n\nOther data subject's rights\nThe Court rejected the controller’s argument about re-identification. The Court clarified that interest-based advertising necessarily requires the identification of the users’ terminal equipment. For this reason, the Court clarified that Article 11 did not apply to the case.","title":"TA Luxembourg - 46578"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - ING Bank N.V. Amsterdam – Bucharest Branch (2)","text":"The ANSPDCP found that the controller sent (through its processor) to a contractual partner, files containing outdated information. The data were outdated because the employees of the insurance policy monitoring department did not check and process the insurance policies in accordance with the working procedure. A number of 270 data subjects were affected because the technical and organizational measures implemented by the controller before the incident were not sufficient and led to the violation of the confidentiality of personal data.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - ING Bank N.V. Amsterdam – Bucharest Branch (2)"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Rotterdam - C/10/576091/HA RK 19-701","text":"First, the Court examines the basis of the applicant's request pursuant to Article 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure which requires to state fully and truthfully the relevant facts, and to submit all the document relevant to the application. In this regard, the Court considered that the applicant did not comply with this obligation. Indeed, the Court pointed out there is no docuiment showing that the applicant submitted an inspection request of the procedural files at stake.\nThen, the Court clarified that both the ePrivacy Directive and the GDPR apply. It considered that the right of inspection of document including personal data is not absolute. However, it stated that the access right and the right of inspection have to be understood as a right to a complete overview of all personal data, in a form that enables the data subject to inspect his or her data and to check that they are correct and have been processed lawfully. Regarding the format, the Court recalled that the data subject cannot expect to be provided with the original document and that the material form depends on the concrete circumstances.\nFinally, the Court considered that in any cae, the applicant's purpose was not to verify the accuracy and lawfulness of the personal data processed but to use them to prove his innocence in the case he was involved against the State and in any proceedings to be brought against the State. Thus, the court ruled that the applicant could not invoke the right to inspection because his claim did not concern the protection of his personal data and therefore, there was an abuse of rights.\nAs a consequence, the court considered the applicant's claim as inadmissible.","title":"Rb. Rotterdam - C/10/576091/HA RK 19-701"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - Case no. 2021101926","text":"The DPA first held that the controller processed the data legally on the basis of legitimate interest pursuant to Article 6 GDPR. Although the data subject had an interest in the protection of their personal data, Google LLC's financial interests and the interest of the public to access information on the Internet outweighed it.\nMoreover, in its second analysis, the DPA also held that the data subject could no rely on their right to be forgotten according to Article 17 GDPR to remove the search results in the Google search engine. The DPA noted that, according to Article 17(3)(a) GDPR, the right to be forgotten may not apply to the extent that it conflicts with exercising the right of freedom of expression and information. In the case at hand, it was of particular significance that the concerned data subject held a public role. The DPA elaborated that public figures may enjoy a lesser degree of privacy protection than private persons due to the importance of being able to freely discuss issues that may be relevant to the public. Moreover, the DPA considered that the press coverage was only about the data subject's job and the conditions at their workplace but not about their personal conduct in private life.\nConsequently, the public's right to freedom of information was considered set aside the complainant's right to be forgotten.","title":"Persónuvernd (Iceland) - Case no. 2021101926"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2020-016","text":"The CNIL orders PERFORMECLIC to pay an administrative fine of €7300. It also issued an injunction to bring the processing into compliance with the provisions of the French Post and Electronic Communications Code and the GDPR, accompanied by a penalty payment of 1,000 euros per day of delay at the end of a two-month period following notification of the decision. Finally, the French DPA has made its decision public.\nThe CNIL based its decision on the following grievances :\n\nOn the competence of the French DPA\nAt the time of the audit, the manager of the company indicated to the CNIL that the operational activities of the company were carried out from Morocco and that, in the near future, he intended to end the company's activities in France and carry them out in their entirety from Morocco, so that the GDPR did not apply in this case.\nAs per Articles 3 GDPR and 8 of the French Data Protection Act, the CNIL retains its jurisdiction and confirms the application of the GDPR insofar as the company is established in France, and addresses its prospecting messages to the French public only.\n\nOn the failure to obtain the consent of the person concerned by a direct marketing operation by means of electronic mail\nAccording to article L. 34-5(1) of the French Post and Electronic Communications Code, \"direct prospecting by means of an automated electronic communications system, a fax machine or electronic mail using the contact details of a natural person, subscriber or user, who has not previously expressed his consent to receive direct prospecting by this means, is prohibited\". With regard to this article, the notion of consent should be understood as any expression of free, specific and informed will by which a person agrees to the use of personal data concerning him/her for the purpose of direct prospecting. Thus, the consent of individuals must be obtained before sending any commercial e-mail.\nIn this case, the absence of elements attesting the effective existence of a valid consent of the persons concerned, in relation to the number of reports received by the association SIGNAL SPAM concerning the company (163,126 reports over the period from 1 January 2019 to 11 June 2019 making it the issuer of e-mails most reported by French Internet users to SIGNAL SPAM over this period) leads the Cnil's sub commission to retain a breach of Article L. 34-5 of the French Post and Electronic Communications Code.\n\nOn the failure to ensure the adequacy, relevance and non-excessiveness of the personal data processed by the company\nThe CNIL recalls the provisions of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR, according to which personal data must be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed (data minimisation).\nIn the present case, the CNIL notes that the prospecting files contained the telephone number of the prospects. However, it emerges from the monitoring operations that this information is not used by the company, which only addresses marketing by e-mail.\nConsequently, the French DPA considers that the telephone number should not have been collected and processed by the company and should have been deleted from the databases. In these circumstances, the restricted formation considers that the company has failed to comply with the obligation provided for in Article 5(1)(c) GDPR to process only adequate, relevant personal data limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed.\n\nOn the failure to comply with the obligation to process personal data for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed\nArticle 5(1)(e) GDPR provides that personal data must be kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data are processed.\nAccording to the findings of the CNIL, it appears that the company kept prospect data for more than three years, with the contact details of approximately 5 million prospects having only opened the prospecting e-mails sent by the company, without any further action on their part, in particular without having clicked on one of the links contained in the said prospecting e-mails.\nThe CNIL finds that the provisions of Article 5(1)(e) GDPR have been breached, emphasising in particular that the starting point set by the company to calculate the retention period for prospect data cannot be the simple opening of an email, insofar as the opening of an email does not necessarily reflect the prospect's interest in the products or services of the sender of the message, as the prospect may have opened the email by mistake or automatically, in particular due to the operation of his email software. By proceeding in this way, the company has not ensured the effective interest of the subjects in the commercial prospecting messages that it sends.\n\nOn the failure to comply with the obligation to inform the data subjects\nArticle 14 GDPR requires the controller to provide the data subject with several pieces of information, such as the identity and contact details of the controller, the purposes of the processing operation, its legal basis, the categories of personal data concerned, the recipients of these data, the storage period, or the terms and conditions of the rights granted to the data subjects. In addition, this information must be provided at the latest at the time of the first communication with the individual.\nIn this case, the CNIL notes that in emails sent to prospects, information is provided by a standard mention at the bottom of the email. However, the CNIL points out that the company must provide individuals with complete information, whether it be from this first level of information given in the e-mails or by allowing them easy access to additional information, within a second level of information.\nHowever, the mention provided for at the end of e-mails sent to prospective customers does not include all the elements provided for by Article 14 GDPR. The CNIL also notes that no hypertext link refers to more complete information than that standard mention in the mail. Consequently, the CNIL retains the failure to comply with the information obligation referred to in Article 14 GDPR.\n\nOn the failure to respect the right to object of data subjects\nIn this case, the CNIL holds that the company carries out its commercial emailing activity by silos: the personal data of prospects contained in the database is replicated within nine different accounts, and each account is associated with two different domain names. Thus, when a person clicks on an unsubscribe link to exercise their right of opposition, they are unsubscribed from the account used to send the prospecting campaign in question but not from the other accounts used by the company for other campaigns.\nArticle 21(2) GDPR provides that where personal data are processed for marketing purposes, the data subject shall have the right to object at any time to the processing of personal data concerning him for such marketing purposes, including profiling insofar as it relates to such direct marketing.\nWith regard to this article, the CNIL notes that the management of marketing campaigns by silos by the company makes it ineffective for individuals to oppose the processing of their data by the company for the purposes of commercial e-mailing when this right is exercised by means of the unsubscribe link at the bottom of the e-mail messages. Indeed, when a person clicks on an unsubscribe link to exercise his or her right to object, that person is unsubscribed only from the account used to send the prospecting campaign concerned but not from the other accounts used by the company for other campaigns.\nIn order to defend itself, the company has indicated to the delegation of control that, in order to be unsubscribed from all accounts used for sending prospecting emails by the company, the person concerned must either make this request by replying by return message to the prospecting emails received, or fill in an online form available from the PERFORMECLIC.FR domain.\nIn this respect, the CNIL recalls that Article 12(2) GDPR requires the data controller to facilitate the exercise of the rights conferred on the data subject under Articles 15 to 22 GDPR, which the company has in any event failed to do by not offering the data subjects a satisfactory means of exercising their rights and by not informing them of the existence of channels enabling them to unsubscribe from all accounts and inviting them to use them to exercise their right of opposition.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2020-016"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 25/2022","text":"The DPA held that the controller processed personal data in absence of a valid contractual relationship with the data subject. In particular, the controller had full access to all crucial information (especially the decision of the insolvency court and records kept in public registries) proving that the data subject was not obliged to repay the debt in question. The controller failed to prove the lawfulness of the processing in violation of its accountability obligation. For this reason, DPA imposed a €10,000 fine for the violation Articles 5(1)(a), 5(2), and 6 GDPR.\nThe DPA also held that the controller created undue barriers to the exercise of the data subject’s rights by demanding the update of the identification information. The controller had at its disposal a variety of personal identification information such as VAT number, date of birth, and father's name. The identification of the data subject was possible even without the ID number. For this reason, the DPA fined the controller €10,000 for violating Article 12(2) GDPR.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 25/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - 2020092288","text":"In its decision from 23 November 2021, the Icelandic DPA came to conclusion that the Ministry had breached several principles of the data protection legislation. More specifically, the Icelandic DPA found that the Ministry had (1) collected a large amount of users´ personal data without having a lawful basis; (2) failed to obtain a valid consent for processing of users´ data, (3) required extensive access rights to users´ mobile devices, in violation of the principle of data minimisation and (4) failed to provide the users with adequate information on the use of their data.\nFurthermore, the Icelandic DPA stated that both the Ministry and YAY had failed to implement appropriate technical and organizational security measures to ensure the protection of the users´ personal data.\nThe Icelandic DPA imposed an administrative fine of 7,5 million ISK (approx. €50.800) on the Ministry, and a fine of 4 million ISK (approx. €27.100) on YAY ehf. for violation of Articles 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 24, 25, 28(3) and 32 GDPR.","title":"Persónuvernd (Iceland) - 2020092288"}
{"_id":"holding_APDCAT (Catalonia) - EXP202409570","text":"The DPA began their investigation on 19th November 2024.\nThe DPA highlighted the fact that the parents were informed that without consenting to the photographs of their child being taken, they could not proceed with registration, and held that the consent given would not have been “free”, as required in Article 7 GDPR. The DPA according found that the controller infringed Article 7 GDPR.\nThe DPA also noted that the absence of anonymisation software on the part of the controller was not an excuse for not offering the parents a genuine choice in consenting to the processing.\nThe DPA initially set the fine at €1,000 but pursuant to Law 39/2015, a Spanish law concerning administrative proceedings, the DPA informed the controller that it may acknowledge its responsibility for the alleged violations and/or make a voluntary payment of the proposed fine. Each of these actions reduces the imposed fine by 20%. The controller opted to reduce the fine by 40%, both acknowledging its responsibility for the violations and paying the reduced sanction amount of €600.\nThe controller was also ordered to bring their processing in line with the requirements of Article 7 GDPR.","title":"APDCAT (Catalonia) - EXP202409570"}
{"_id":"holding_AP (The Netherlands) - 7.04.2022","text":"The DPA found that the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration had registered about 244,273 individuals and 30,000 business owners in the FSV from 4 November 2013 to 27 February 2020. The Tax and Customs Administration processed personal data (including data relating to health, nationality and criminal data). The DPA has concluded that the Tax and Customs Administration had violated several principles of data processing, including transparency, purpose limitation, accuracy and storage limitation.\nFirst of all, the DPA concluded that there was no legal basis for processing of personal data. The Tax and Customs Administration could not successfully invoke the 'legal obligation' under Article 6(1)(c) GDPR as a basis for this processing since there was no obligation to process signals of (possible) fraud. This resulted in a breach of Article 5(1)(a) GDPR and Article 6(1) GDPR in conjunction with Article 8 of the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act (Wbp).\nSecondly, the DPA also found that the purposes of personal data collection in FSV were not well-defined, breaching Article 5(1)(b) GDPR in conjunction with Article 7 Wbp.\nThirdly, the FSV contained inaccurate and non-updated personal data and no reasonable steps were taken to rectify or delete such personal data. This resulted in a breach of Article 5(1)(d) GDPR in conjunction with Article 11(2) Wbp.\nFurthermore, the DPA concluded that personal data in the FSV were kept longer than the applicable retention period and hence longer than necessary, violating Article 5(1)(e) GDPR in conjunction with Article 10(1) Wbp.\nIn addition, the Tax and Customs Administration did not take sufficient technical and organizational measures with respect to access security, logging, and logging controls to ensure an adequate level of security for the personal data in the FSV. Thus, it violated Article 32(1) GDPR in conjunction with Article 13 Wbp.\nFinally, the DPA found that the Tax and Customs Administration did not properly and timely involve the DPO in the implementation of FSV's data protection assessment. With this, the Tax and Customs Administration violated Article 35(2) GDPR and Article 38(1) GDPR.\nThese violations had serious implications for those who were incorrectly listed as fraudsters. For example, those who were listed in the FSV could not qualify for payment plans or debt settlements. On top of these violations, the DPA also considered the fact that the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration had committed serious violations of the GDPR before, such as in 2018. Consequently, it imposed a fine of €3,700,000 considering all of the above. The Dutch Tax and Customs Administration does, however, have the option to object to this penalty.","title":"AP (The Netherlands) - 7.04.2022"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202209001","text":"The Spanish DPA considered that the data subject provided a photograph without date and time and, based on this, it was impossible to specify which was her private area on a location plan. Also, AEPD considered that the allegations were insufficient as they do not provide a proper \"screen print\" of what is being captured by the data controller or the specific orientation of the camera.\nAEPD highlighted that individuals can install cameras, but only on their own private property and it must be oriented towards his own private property.\nThe Spanish DPA considered that the data controller had a camera system in place that was poorly oriented and deficient in terms of information signs. It was concluded that the information signs had irregularities, since it did not have an effective address to which any person can address himself.\nThe Spanish DPA fined €600 the controller for installing security cameras that focused beyond his private property, violating Article 5(1)(c) and 13 GDPR.\nAEPD determined the removal of the cameras in question or the reorientation of the cameras, in accordance with current legislation, so that they do not record or capture images of the data subject's private space. In addition, the controller must include an informative sign in accordance with the regulations.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202209001"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Amsterdam - C/13/693399 / HA RK 20-337","text":"Was the case admissible?\nFirst, the court commented on how repeated requests under Article 35(2) of the Act Implementing the GDPR (UAVG) should be treated. In this regard, the court clarified that it was not the intention of the law that the filing of repeated requests would allow for a new deadline under which a request can be filed with a court. At the same time, the court noted that Article 21 GDPR states that data subjects have the right to object and that this right can be exercised at any time, including more than once. Therefore, the court concluded that an interested party may file multiple applications under Article 35 of the GDPR Implementation Act (UAVG) as long as it does not lead to an abuse of procedural law.\nAs to the admissibility of the application, the court held that the application was admissible. The reason for this was that in its last decision Rabobank had taken into account the new facts and circumstances that the applicant had put forward regarding the interest in a leased vehicle when rejecting the application. Since Rabobank took the new circumstances into account and did not express in its reply of 13 October 2020 that it considered this to be a repeated request which it would not comply with, the applicant had six weeks after 13 October 2020 to file an appeal. The complaint was therefore admissible.\n\nBKR Registration\nRabobank and other credit providers are required to participate in a credit reporting system pursuant to Article 4:32 of the Dutch Financial Supervision Act (Wft). In addition, under Article 4:34 of the Financial Supervision Act (Wft), the credit provider is required to assess the consumer's financial standing in order to determine whether it would be responsible to grant the credit to that person.\nThe court then looked at the legislative history of the law and found that its purpose was twofold. First, the regulation intended to protect consumers from over-indebtedness, and second, to protect lenders from borrowers who cannot repay. Further, the court considered the legal basis for credit scoring under the GDPR. The court found that under Article 3(4) of its General CKI Rules (Algemeen Reglement CKI) the BKR processes personal data for legitimate interest under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The court concluded that credit providers therefore also rely on legitimate interest. In this case, the court clarified that the legitimate interests are those of the consumer, BKR and its business customers.\nFurthermore, the court clarified that the applicant has a right to object to the processing of his personal data under Article 6(1)(e) GDPR and Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The court stated that if a data subject objects to data processing, Rabobank must comply with that request. Unless it can demonstrate compelling legitimate grounds which override the interests and rights of the data subject.\nThe court also concluded that Article 79 GDPR and Article 35 of the Dutch Act implementing the GDPR (UAVG) provide the data subject with access to effective remedies if the controller does not comply with the objection.\nThe court went on to state that if it has such a case before it. The court will assess whether the controller has made a prima facie case (made it probable) that the interest of protecting consumers from over-indebtedness and protecting credit providers outweighs the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject in the specific case.\nFurthermore, the court clarified that it would not be sufficient for Rabobank to refer in general terms to its legal obligation to participate in a credit registration system or the social importance of such a system. It would also not be sufficient for Rabobank to refer to the General Regulations of the CRI, as it is not a law. The court clarified that the General Regulations of the CRI are internal rules that only apply to the BKR and the banks. Nevertheless, the court considered the General Regulations as a good starting point and a document that gives legal certainty. However, it stated that it might be necessary to deviate from them when it comes to the objection of a data subject.\nThe court went on to state that Article 21 GDPR requires Rabobank to respond to the objection by assessing the circumstances in relation to the specific situation of the data subject. The court then assessed the applicant's situation in detail. The court indicated that the remaining debt was a result of the divorce and the foreclosure of the houses. Further, the court noted that the applicant had no irregularities in paying the mortgages and that he began paying off the remaining debt on his own initiative, even before the second house was sold and the total amount of the remaining debt was known.\nFurther, the court gave weight to the fact that the applicant and the bank had agreed to a special repayment arrangement. The applicant had fully complied with the repayment plan, after which he no longer owed any money to Rabobank.\nFurthermore, the court considered that the applicant had shown that he was in a financially stable position, taking into account how much he earned through his business and how much his current partner earned.\nFinally, the court also found it sufficiently plausible that Code 3 was an impediment to the applicant. It prevented the applicant from buying an apartment or renting an apartment more cheaply. The court also found it plausible that the code was a business obsticle that prevented the applicant from leasing a car.\nThe court held that there was no credit risk in this case. The court held that there was no need to protect the applicant from over-indebtedness, nor was there a need to protect credit providers from a customer who could not repay their loans. The court concluded that society's interest in responsible lending did not outweigh the interests of the applicant.\nThe court ruled that Rabobank must request the deletion of Code 3 and Code A from the applicant's file in the BKRs register within 48 hours of notification of the decision. If Rabobank failed to comply, it would be fined €1000 per day, counting three days from service of the decision. However, the maximum fine would be €30,000. The court also ordered Rabobank to pay the applicant's legal fees.","title":"Rb. Amsterdam - C/13/693399 / HA RK 20-337"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 20/2021","text":"After examination of the facts of the case and after examination of 79 other data subjects data which were not successfully deleted from the company's data base, the authority decided that the company failed to implement the appropriate procedural and security measures to detect the error and to secure the deletion of the users' data. In the light of these violations the authority fined the company 5.000€.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 20/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W214 2242817-1","text":"The court did not decide on the subject matter. Instead, it repealed the contested decision and referred it back to the DSB in accordance with § 28(3) VwGVG. It concluded that the reasoning of the DSB's decision had been too superficial. According to the court, the decision showed a lack of investigation since the DSB had not even presented what type of personal data had been processed.","title":"BVwG - W214 2242817-1"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202309359","text":"The AEPD found that the controller’s use of non-technical cookies without consent, the inability to reject consent in a granular manner and the impossibility of withdrawing consent violated Article 22(2) LSSI. These practices did not enable the data subject to give adequate consent and thus could not provide a legal basis for using cookies pursuant to the national law.\nThe AEPD considered this a slight infraction pursuant to Article 38(4) LSSI and imposed a €5,000 fine.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202309359"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Dante International SA (eMAG) - no 3","text":"The Romanian Authority accepted the request, consulted with the Hungarian Authority according to the procedure under Article 60 GDPR, and held the following:\nFirstly, for the account deletion request, the controller did not regularly train its employees with regard to data subject right requests. The training in place was deemed insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 24 GDPR.\nSecondly, for the erasure request, the lack of a unified channel for receiving data subject requests lead to disproportionate restrictions of data subject rights. The DPA noted that the privacy notice of the controller did not include any information regarding processing performed by third parties and the transfer of the data to third countries, in breach of Articles 13(1) (c), (e), (f), and 14(1) (c), (e),( f) GDPR.\nThirdly, regarding the rectification request, the authority held that the controller did not have an appropriate legal basis (consent) to use the old email address of a data subject for electronic communications.\nConsidering the above mentioned reasons, the DPA held that the controller:\n  * did not handle data subject rights requests in accordance with Articles 12(2) and 17(1) GDPR;\n  * failed to inform data subjects about the third parties processing, and the international data transfers in breach of Articles 13(1) (c), (e), (f), and 14(1) (c), (e),( f) GDPR; and\n  * did not rely on the appropriate legal basis for processing a data subject's old email address after a rectification request in breach of Article 6(1)(a) GDPR.\nThe DPA therefore issued a fine of a total amount of approx. €40,000 along with an order to apply coercive measures, including providing information to the data subjects on the website, anonymize some data and organize training for the employees about how to handle data subject rights requests.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Dante International SA (eMAG) - no 3"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-431-0048","text":"The DPA held that the processor acted in breach of the GDPR, and expressed criticism for the security incident.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-431-0048"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 12/2022","text":"The HDPA stated that with regards to the processing of personal data in the context of employment relations, this is permitted only for purposes directly related to the employment relationship, and insofar as it is necessary for the fulfilment of mutual obligations arising from that relationship, whether these obligations arise from the law or from a contract. Furthermore, the HDPA noted that in the case of employment relationships, the inherent power imbalance of the parties means that employees are rarely in a position to freely give valid consent for the processing of their personal data, and therefore employers should rely on a legal basis other than consent in these cases. Therefore, the HDPA held that, in this case, not only had the employee expressly objected to this processing, but that even if this consent had been given, this could not be relied on by the employer as a valid legal basis.\nThe HDPA also held that the employer had not satisfied the employee’s right to objection to the monitoring of the lessons. The HDPA explained that although the employer’s response to this objection was based on the grounds of legitimate interest in the exercise of its managerial right, the employer had not been able to establish that the actual attendance to the online courses was in fact an appropriate and necessary means for the exercise of this legitimate interest. Additionally, the HDPA found that the employment contracts analysed this case, did not mention the monitoring of lessons, nor the specific legal basis for this processing.\nTherefore, the HDPA held that the employer’s failure to previously determine a valid legal basis for this processing violated of the principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, and the principle of accountability under Article 5(2) GDPR. Additionally, the HDPA held that the employer’s failure to inform the employee of the processing and its corresponding legal basis was in breach of its legal obligations under Article 13 GDPR. As a result, the HDPA issued a fine of €2000 against the school.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 12/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W258 2247028-1","text":"The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht – BVwG) decided in favour of the controller and set the administrative act aside. It found that there is no provision in national law or the GDPR that gave the DSB the power to declare the processing unlawful.\nThe court first established that § 24 DSG, which provides the DSB with such a power, only applies to complaint proceedings and not ex officio proceedings. The court also rejected an analogous application of § 24 DSG, because it found that the legislator purposefully regulated complaint and ex officio proceedings differently so that there is no room for an analogous application. Moreover, it reasoned that in a complaint proceeding there is a data subject who may have a legal interest in the declaration in order to pursue further individual claims against the controller like a claim for damages; in ex officio proceedings no such interest exists.\nThe court further found that there is no legal basis in the GDPR either, since Article 58(2) GDPR does not include a power to declare the processing unlawful, but only the power to issue a reprimand or to fine the controller.","title":"BVwG - W258 2247028-1"}
{"_id":"holding_Hoge Raad - 20/02950","text":"The Supreme Court rejected the appeal.\nFirst, it considered the data subject’s argument that their request should have been assessed on the basis of Article 10 GDPR. The Supreme Court found that it was irrelevant to discuss whether the Court of Appeal should have done this. According to the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal already assessed whether it was strictly necessary to process the sensitive data pursuant to Article 10 GDPR. Now, the Court of Appeal decided that this was the case, to protect the right to information and freedom of expression. Hence, the Supreme Court considered that the Court of Appeal already considered the applicable standard (that would follow from Article 10 GDPR), and nevertheless decided that the data subject’s rights and interests did not outweigh Google and third parties’ interests.\nSecond, the Supreme Court considered whether it follows from Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 79 GDPR, that they should not be ordered to pay the costs of both proceedings, because this would limit their right to effective remedy. The Supreme Court noted that the assessment of such costs is left to national procedural law (Article 289 Rv. in the Netherlands). However, because the data subject did not argue why this national provision prevents them from effective legal remedy, the Supreme Court did not discuss this matter further.","title":"Hoge Raad - 20/02950"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00421/2020","text":"The DPA rejected the argument of transaction-based customer communication and held that the mail had marketing purposes because the Controller publicizes its services, although the data subject had expressly indicated his refusal to receive advertising content.\nAs a result, the DPA considered that the financial entity violated Article 21(1) LSSI.\nFurthermore, the commercial communication did not inform the recipient about his right to object to the processing of its data for marketing purposes.\nAs a consequence, the Spanish DPA imposed a fine of €5,000.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00421/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Amsterdam - KG ZA 23-440","text":"The court dismissed ING's plea for inadmissibility under national provisions.\nThe court then clarified that under national law, credit providers are mandated to process personal data and participate in the Central Credit Information System. The aim of the provision is twofold: firstly, it seeks to protect consumers from over-indebtedness and secondly, shield creditors from non-paying borrowers.\nThe court added that the rejection of a request for data deletion under Article 21 GDPR needs to be justified by a compelling legitimate interest, subject to the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. Legitimate interest must be assessed on the basis of currently known facts and circumstances of the case, including those after the CKI registration.\nThe court pointed out that the data subject had inconsistent debt repayment patterns but fully cleared his debt in 2023 (i.e. after the CKI registration). In the balance of interest, the court considered that the controller's interest in maintaining the registration outweighed the data subject's interest in their removal. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal.","title":"Rb. Amsterdam - KG ZA 23-440"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01627","text":"Personal data\nThe DPA agreed with the controller's claim that it was unlikely that number plates or faces of people would be recognisable due to the distance and the quality of the recording. The DPA highlighted, however, that it would be possible to recognise the type of car someone was driving, what type of clothes people were wearing, the colour of their hair and rough hair style. The DPA highlighted that prior knowledge about someones schedule, shopping patterns, their car or their look could identify the person being recorded, for example by friends, significant others, family or colleagues. This view was supported by the police requesting access to the recordings on several occasions concerning events in the city centre.\nAs such, the DPA held that the recordings captured personal data pursuant to Article 4(1) GDPR.\n\nLegal basis\nSince the controller did not use the recordings, they had not assessed whether there was a legal basis for the processing as per Article 6. The DPA therefore assumed that the legal basis would have been legitimate interest as per Article 6(1)(f).\nThe DPA identified two processing operations with different purposes. The first one was the live feed of the city centre, where the purpose was to provide a service to customers and local residents. The second processing operation was saving the recording and keeping it for 14 days, for the purpose of providing security to the local residents by sharing the recordings with the police if needed.\n\nBalancing of interests\nFor the first purpose, the DPA also questioned whether the recording pursued a legitimate interest, finding that it did not need to conclude as the balancing of interest was in the data subjects favour. The DPA also noted that the placement of the camera could be positioned at an angle that would not be as invasive to the privacy of the data subjects.\nFor the second purpose, the DPA held that it could not be established for certain that there was a legitimate interest for storing the recordings. The DPA referenced EDPB guidelines which state that purposes connected to protection against theft, vandalism and criminal acts may be a legitimate interest, noting however that such a purpose must be connected to a specific event and not based entirely on speculation. The DPA questioned whether a real danger for criminal acts was established, finding however that it did not need to conclude as the rights and freedoms of the data subject clearly outweighed the controller's interest.\nConsequently, the DPA held that the camera surveillance and livestreaming violated Article 6(1) and Article 5(1)(a) and fined the controller €15,000.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01627"}
{"_id":"holding_OLG Stuttgart - 2 U 63/22","text":"The Court decided to uphold the judgment of the Stuttgart Regional Court, dismissing the data subject's appeal.\nThey concluded that the advertising mail sent by Dansk Retursystem was lawful under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and there was no need for an existing customer relationship for direct advertising to be considered a legitimate interest.\nAlso, they highlighted that the data subject's claim for damages under Article 82 GDPR was unfounded, since he failed to demonstrate that he suffered any actual harm or distress beyond mere displeasure from receiving the advertisement.\nThe Court reaffirmed that the use of personal data for direct advertising in this context complied with the GDPR, as the processing was aligned with recognized legitimate interests and did not disproportionately impact the data subject's rights or freedoms.","title":"OLG Stuttgart - 2 U 63/22"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd (Island) - 2020122992","text":"The DPA held that the processing of financial data is considered personal data and falls under the authority of the DPA. The DPA is responsible for monitoring the implementation of Act No. 90/2018, on Data Protection and the Processing of Personal Data, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation) and Act No. 75/2019, on the Processing of Personal Data for Law Enforcement Purposes.\nThe controller is responsible for ensuring that the processing of personal data complies with Act No. 90/2018 and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR).\nIn the present case there are three controllers. Firstly, Creditinfo is the controller of the processing that involved the use of information registered with the company for the preparation of reports on the complainant's credit status. Secondly, the ÍL Fund is the controller of the processing involved in the transmission of information about the complainant in the Creditinfo debt ranking system. Thirdly, Netgíró is the controller of the processing that the undertaking itself carried out in assessing the applicant's creditworthiness when requesting financial assistance from the complainant.\nEventually, the DPA found that the processing of personal data about the complainant's debt status and credit assessment took place in accordance with the Icelandic national data protection law Act no. 90/2018 and Articles 5 and 6 GDPR.","title":"Persónuvernd (Island) - 2020122992"}
{"_id":"holding_LG Baden-Baden - 3 O 277/22","text":"The court held that the controller's request was admissible and justified. The court pointed out that the CJEU case law allows the application of national law enabling judges to check the existence of abuses of EU rights by the parties (see C-373/97).\nIn the present case, such parameter is the standard of \"good faith\" under § 242 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB) which, according to the court, the data subject had violated in the present case. This results from the fact that, contrary to the data subject's submissions, their primary interest when accessing the websites was the generation of claims for damages against the controller. The court rejected the data subject's statement that their main concern was to denounce data protection violations. Besides, the court held that the risk that inexperienced users came to the webpages was very low. A violation in the form of unlawful data transfers materialised only because the data subject intentionally looked for it with an aim of asking for non-material damages.\nAs a further argument to substantiate the data subject's bad faith, the court claimed that, by visiting the controller's website, the data subject implicitly consented to the data processing in accordance with Article 6(1)(a) GDPR.\nIn conclusion, the court identified an abuse of the right, as the data subject based their requests on irrelevant interests and goals that were not worthy of protection in themselves.","title":"LG Baden-Baden - 3 O 277/22"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W256 2226003-1/5E","text":"Referencing a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) (ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081), the Austrian Federal Administrative Court stated that personal data legally assessed by the competent state agency in an administrative matter is not considered as information about the data subject. Consequently, the court held that a correction of personal data in a legal notice cannot be based on Article 16 GDPR.","title":"BVwG - W256 2226003-1/5E"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9867661","text":"The Italian DPA held that the controllers violated Article 17 GDPR. In particular, a controller shall facilitate the exercise of data subject's rights in accordance with the procedural rules set forth in Article 12 GDPR. The fact that the controllers updated the content of the original publication was not considered sufficient by the supervisory authority.\nTherefore, pursuant to Article 58(2)(c) and (g) GDPR, the Italian DPA ordered the controllers to take action in order to ensure the delisting of the publications from external search engines, insofar as the data subject's name was used as a keyword for the online search.\nIn addition, the Italian DPA issued a warning against the controller pursuant to Article 58(2)(a) GDPR.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9867661"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - Decision of 2 December 2022","text":"First, the Danish DPA stated that a detailed description of the criminal offence by the controller in the sent email meant that the recipient of the information had to consider it to be true. According to Section 8 Subsection 3 of the Danish Data Protection Act, such information may only be shared if the controller had the authority to do so. This might be the case, if the disclosure is made to further personal interests that clearly exceed the reasons for maintaining confidentiality.\nSecond, the DPA assessed that the controller had a legitimate interest in passing on information about the dismissal of the data subject to its customers and in informing them that the data subject could, therefore, not enter into agreements on behalf of the company anymore.\nThird, the DPA made a concrete assessment of the seriousness of the offence pursuant to Article 83(1) GDPR when assessing which sanction should be adopted. In assessing that a fine should be imposed, the DPA emphasised that criminal offences were at stake as sensitive information. Besides that, the description of the criminal offence, which was the reason for the dismissal, was not necessary for the company to safeguard its legitimate interests. Moreover, the controller has not proven that it only informed customers with whom the data subject had been in contact.\nIn Denmark, fines according to the GDPR must be decided by the courts. The Danish DPA can recommend to impose fines on both private actors and public authorities. In connection with the notification of the case to the police, the DPA assesses the amount of the fine, and it is then up to the police and the prosecution to bring charges and conduct the criminal case court. In this case, the DPA proposed a fine of DKK 150,000 on the controller for unlawfully passing on information about criminal offences to third parties.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - Decision of 2 December 2022"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 202100165/1/A3","text":"The Division noted that not only the wording, but also the context and purpose should be considered when interpreting EU legislation (HvJ Tarola). This required a comparison of the different language versions (HvJ Consorzio).\nThe Division found that the English, German and French version of Article 17(3)(e) all had a much broader scope than the Dutch text. They contained some translation of the word 'defense,' (defence; Verteidigung; défense) while the Dutch version merely used the word 'substantiation' (onderbouwing).\nThe Division further noted that in case of these differences in translations, it must consider the objective and purpose of the legislation for a uniform interpretation (CJEU Kraaijveld). The objective is the protection of natural persons when processing personal data (Recital 1&2), however this must be balanced with other fundamental rights recognized in the Charter (Recital 4). In particular, the Division followed, Article 47 of the Charter, which included the right of defense (CJEU Otis). Thus, the German, English and French versions of Article 17(3)(e) were more consistent with the purpose of the AVG.\nThe Division held that, contrarily to what the data subject argued, Article 17(3)(e) AVG does include the defense against a legal claim. Therefore, the appeal was unfounded.","title":"RvS - 202100165/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 6/2024","text":"The DPA held that the company failed to comply with Article 5(1) GDPR as they processed the data subject's personal data illegally, due to the use of his vehicule tracking outside of working hours and for the purpose of locating the data subject for the lack of legal basis.\nThe DPA also found a breach of Article 12 and 13 GDPR as the controller gave incomplete information regarding the function of the system installed in the vehicule, as well as the fact that he was not entitled to use it outside of working hours.\nThe HDPA therefore imposed a €2,000 fine on the controller.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 6/2024"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 31/2025","text":"The DPA found several violations and imposed a fine of total amount €10,000.\nFirst, the DPA held that the controller violated Article 5, Article 12 and Article 15 GDPR for refusing to satisfy the data subject’s access request to the CCTV footage without demonstrating adverse negative effects on the rights or freedoms of the employees involved. It also found that it stored the footage for way longer than 48 hours. For this violation the DPA imposed a €3,000 fine.\nSecond, it found that the controller infringed Article 5, Article 13 and Article 24 GDPR by transmitting the personal data of the minor child to the third party without prior notification, and imposed a €3,000 fine.\nThird, it found that the controller disclosed the interim measures order of the court which contained personal data of the child to a large number of third parties, in violation of Article 5 and Article 13 GDPR, and imposed a €3,000 fine.\nLastly, it imposed a €1,000 fine for failure to cooperate with the DPA, in breach of Article 31 GDPR.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 31/2025"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Condor SA","text":"The ANSPDCP found that someone had gained unauthorised access to a document containing the personal data of current and former employees, which included, inter alia, name and surname, role, salary, bank account and personal identification number.\nThe ANSPDCP held that the controller had not implemented the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure the confidentiality of its current and former employees' personal data, and did not prove to have adequately trained its personnel regarding the protection of personal data. As a result, the ANSPDCP held that the controller had violated Articles 32(1), (2) and (4) GDPR, and issued a fine of approximately €2000 (RON 9.897,4).\nAdditionally, the as corrective measures, the ANSPDCP ordered the controller to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure compliance with GDPR, including the adequate training its personnel, and also to contact the individual who was granted unauthorised access to the personal data to make sure they delete it.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Condor SA"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Den Haag - SGR 23/6174","text":"The court found that the DPA could refrain from conducting further investigation. According to Article 57(1)(f) GDPR, the DPA must deal with complaints to the extent appropriate. The court therefore held that the DPA has discretion to determine case by case whether to take corrective measures.\nThe court found that based on the available information, the DPA could not yet determine whether there was a violation as for example it was not clear what personal data was shared during the phone call. The fact that the controller should have informed the former bankruptcy trustee that they were no longer appointed and that information should not be shared with them anymore, does not mean that there was a GDPR violation. Therefore, further investigation was required.\nHowever, the court stated it could follow the DPA’s reasoning for not further investigating the complaint based on the DPA's criteria. Therefore, the court held that the DPA could refrain from further investigating and thus dismissed the appeal.","title":"Rb. Den Haag - SGR 23/6174"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100764","text":"The Spanish DPA considered that even though the Community is authorized to display personal data in some cases for the management of the community, the notice board must not be placed in a public area of transit easily accessible by any person.\nThe AEPD highlighted that the data subject had a previous complaint against the Community under proceeding A/00001/2018, concluded with a warning to the Community and an order to remove the (other) document displayed.\nAEPD concluded that, based on the evidence, it occurred a personal data security breach, categorized as a breach of confidentiality as the data subject’s personal data was improperly exposed by the Community to third parties, as they appeared in an Decree of Execution of Judicial Titles. Specifically, the information was displayed on a bulletin board in plain view of any person who accesses the building and not only the neighbors.\nFor this reason, the Community was fined €1,500 for unduly exposure of personal data to third parties on a public bulletin board, in violation of Article 5(1)(f) and Article 32 GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100764"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 103/2021","text":"In its decision, the Belgian DPA first stated that the withdrawal of a complaint does not as such put an end to any potential violation of the GDPR, and therefore does not deprive the DPA from its competences to assess whether the reported facts constitute an infringement. The Belgian DPA noted in this respect that the control it exercises does not aim so much at settling disputes between parties, but rather at ensuring compliance with the data protection rules.\nIn the present case, however, the Belgian DPA noted that the potential infringements of Article 17 GDPR by the search engine provider were inextricably linked to the willingness of the Complainant to exercise his right to erasure. Because the Complainant had informed the Belgian DPA of the fact that he longer wanted to exercise his right to erasure, the Belgian DPA thus concluded that the case had become moot. The Belgian DPA therefore closed the case without taking any further action.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 103/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_UODO (Poland) - ZSZZS.440.768.2018","text":"Following an ex officio administrative proceedings, the President of the UODO has established that the school is using a biometric reader at the entrance to the school canteen that identifies the children in order to verify the payment of the meal fee. The UODO highlighted that it is special categories of personal data and that extra protection has been set out for children.\nIn this case the UODO found that the consent given by the parents was not valid in particular because of the imbalance of the parties, hence the processing of biometric data did not have a valid legal basis. It also stressed that there it promotes unequal treatment among the students. The identification of the students could have been achieved through less intrusive means.\nFor the mentioned reasons, the UODO ordered the primary school to delete the biometric data concerned, to cease the collection of this data in the first place and it imposed the fine of PLN 20,000.","title":"UODO (Poland) - ZSZZS.440.768.2018"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Kaufland Romania SCS","text":"The Romanian DPA decided that a controller should take all the necessary technical and organisational measures when answering an access request to make sure the personal data and rights of others are not affected. The DPA suggested that, in cases like these, in order to provide the claimant with the personal data in their access request, this could be solved by blurring the image of other individuals appearing in the footage.\nTherefore, the Romanian DPA held that Kaufland did not fulfill their obligation to grant the data in the claimant's access request in breach of Article 15(3) GDPR, and imposed a fine of approximately €3000 in local currency on the supermarket chain.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Kaufland Romania SCS"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00446/2021","text":"First, the AEPD recalled that, in accordance with Article 5(1)(c) GDPR, private surveillance cameras should be oriented towards private space, and not intimidate adjacent neighbours nor control the local transit without justification. Unless permitted by specific legal provisions, private individuals are not allowed to capture images of public space. In the case at hand, the AEPD found that the cameras used by the controller aimed at recording the controller’s property, within the limits of the legal data protection provisions. In its analysis, the AEPD held that the first camera used by the controller also captured the surroundings, which was done in proportionate manner and thus was not illegal. The second and third cameras captured a very small portion of the community yard. Finally, the fourth camera located on the controller’s rooftop did not capture direct images of the data subject’s property. The AEPD concluded that the images captured by the surveillance system were not disproportionate or excessive, and did not constitute of a breach of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR.\nSecond, the AEPD recalled that, compliant with Article 13(1) and (2) GDPR, and Article 22(4) of the Law on the Protection of Personal Data and Guarantee of Digital Rights (Ley Orgánica 3/2018 de Protección de Datos Personales y Garantía de los Derechos Digitales - LOPDGDD), the data controller should display a sufficient visible sign informing data subjects about the video surveillance of the area. In the case at hand, the AEPD held that the controller did not install a sign informing about the video surveillance system. Instead of a fine, the AEPD issued a reprimand on the controller.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00446/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-008","text":"The CNIL found that the controller had violated Articles 5(1)(e), 13, 17 and 32 GDPR by failing to comply with the obligation to determine and implement data retention periods, failing to inform web visitors about processing activities, failing to comply with the request for erasure of data, and failing to ensure appropriate security measures regarding authentication on the website and on the customer relationship management software used by the company's employees.\nThe CNIL also found that the controller had violated national provisions concerning cookies and unsolicited commercial communications.\nWith regards to Article 5(1)(e), the DPA found that the company did not have a retention policy in place for the deletion of data. The company had data from accounts as old as five years without any activity.\nWith regards to Article 13, the controller did not offer on their website information such as the contact details of the data protection officer, the retention periods, the legal bases for processing, and certain rights from which individuals benefit under the GDPR.\nWith regards to Article 17, the company did not delete the data when there were requests from users to delete their account, but only deactivated the accounts, preventing the person from connecting to the account and ending unsolicited commercial communications.\nWith regards to Article 32, the DPA found that there was not a sufficient level of data security to meet requirements concerning the robustness of passwords, both for users and employees.\nWith regards to cookies, the DPA found that several cookies that did not fall within the scope of the exceptions (necessary cookies) were placed on the user's terminal as soon as they arrived on the home page of the site, and before any action on their part.\nAdditionally, the company was sending unsolicited commercial communications to users who created an account for commercial purposes and without obtaining their consent.\nTherefore, the CNIL fined Brico Privé €300,000 for violating Articles 5(1)(e), 13, 17 and 32 GDPR and €200,000 for violating Article 82 of the loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 modifiée relative à l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés and Article 34(5) of the Code des postes et des communications électroniques (CPCE) – the national provisions concerning cookies and unsolicited commercial communications.\nThe CNIL also ordered the controller to bring its processing operations into compliance with the obligations resulting from Article 5(1)(e) GDPR and Article 34(5) of the CPCE, and in particular:\n  * to cease to retain the personal data of former customers at the end of a set period of inactivity and proceed with the purging of such data retained by the company,\n  * to provide evidence of an intermediate archive procedure for customers personal data, established after sorting out the relevant data to be stored and deleting irrelevant data, as well as the starting point of such storage (e.g. for invoices stored for accounting purposes),\n  * to cease unsolicited commercial communications to users who have not given their consent.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-008"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9746047","text":"The Italian DPA noted that the use of video surveillance systems may result in the processing of personal data depending on the positioning of the cameras and the quality of the images captured. Furthermore, the Italian DPA stated that processing of personal data by video surveillance cameras must be carried out in compliance with the general principles contained in Article 5 GDPR, in particular with the principle of transparency. In the case of video surveillance cameras, this presupposes that \"the interested parties must always be informed that they are about to enter a video surveillance area\", and therefore the data controller must place appropriate information signs which convey this information to data subjects.\nThe Italian DPA held that the processing of personal data carried out by the club in this case was unlawful since it was not carried out in accordance with the principles of \"lawfulness, fairness and transparency\" and \"data minimisation\", in violation of Articles 5(1)(a) and (c) GDPR, as well as in breach of the adequate information requirements under Article 13 GDPR. Based on these infringements, the Italian DPA imposed a €2000 fine on Ruian club.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9746047"}
{"_id":"holding_CNPD (Luxembourg) - 10FR/2023","text":"The DPA noted that pursuant to the entry into force of the GDPR, public bodies were obliged to designate a DPO no later than 25 May 2018. Meanwhile, on the date the investigation was opened, and after consulting the register of DPOs, no DPO had been identified for the controller. The controller appointed a DPO only on 10 March 2023, namely after the opening of the investigation. Thus, the controller violated Article 37(1)(a) GDPR. Moreover, the DPA acknowledged that when the investigation began, the controller had not communicated to the DPA the contact details of the DPO, breaching Article 37(7) GDPR.\nObserving Article 48 of the National Data Protection Law, the DPA may impose administrative fines as provided in Article 83 GDPR, except against the State or municipalities. Hence, the DPA found it appropriate to issue a reprimand to the controller under Article 58(2)(b) GDPR. In light of this, the DPA recognised that during the proceedings, the controller took steps to remedy the shortcomings identified by the head of the investigation.","title":"CNPD (Luxembourg) - 10FR/2023"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Valoris Center S.R.L.","text":"The DPA held that Valoris did not fulfill its obligations laid down in Article 29, Article 32(1)(b), and Article 32(4) GDPR. Even if the employee of Valoris was not allowed to share the personal data with the customer, this data breach could only occur because of Valoris negligence. In particular, the processor had not taken adequate measures to ensure that any natural person acting under its authority could have limited access to the personal data. Hence, the security of processing was not guaranteed, ultimately leading to a personal data breach.\nThe DPA considered the different aspects of the case, such as the amount of data subjects involved, the categories of personal data, and decided to impose a fine of 9898 Leu (the equivalent of €2,000) on Valoris.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Valoris Center S.R.L."}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00198/2020","text":"Without prejudice to the results of the final investigations corresponding to the sanction procedure, the AEPD understood that the defendant could have breached the lawfulness of processing principle as per article 6(1) GDPR: on the basis of the available evidences, and although the defendant admitted its mistake and declared that new measures in order to avoid such situations have been taken, it did not prove the lawfulness of the data processing. Consequently, after considering some aggravating circumstances [(i) there is a negligence by the defendant, (ii) basic personal data have been affected, (iii) there has been a continuous breach, and (iv) there is a clear connection between the busines activity of the defendant and the processing of personal data related to clients and third parties], the AEPD understood that, in case the sanction procedure resulted in a successful decision, this infringement would be fined with 75,000 € to the defendant. In this sense, the AEPD offered the defendant the possibility to settle the issue before the decision takes place by agreeing to a voluntary payment of part of the fine with two possible discounts: (i) acknowledging of its liability (60,000 €) and early voluntary payment (45,000 €). The defendant agreed to both concepts, so it paid 45,000 € and the sanction procedure was closed by the AEPD.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00198/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 202000948/1/A3","text":"Recital 64 of the GDPR states that the data controller should take all reasonable steps to verify the identity of a data subject requesting access. If there is reason to doubt the identity, additional information may be requested, as follows from Article 12(6) of the GDPR.\nIn this case, the Council of State as of the opinion that there were other possibilities for establishing identity, which raised a lower threshold. The presentation of a copy of a passport, for example, is in principle considered a reasonable measure to verify identity.\nThe fact that it is possible to falsify the copy of a passport and that it is impossible to check whether the document that has been scanned is authentic, as argued by the Council, does not make this any different. The Council itself indicated that it did not suspect that the copy had been falsified or that there might be another person behind the request. Therefore there was no reason to ask for additional information or to impose additional requirements.","title":"RvS - 202000948/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_CE - 451423","text":"With regard to the application of the \"one-stop shop\" mechanism and the CNIL's jurisdiction:\nThe Conseil ruled that the application and enforcement of the ePrivacy directive was the responsibility of national DPAs according to Article 15a of the directive. The \"one-stop shop\" mechanism did not apply in this case, even when there was a form of a cross-border processing. The Conseil also stated that the absence of a 'one-stop shop' mechanism did not imply any infringement of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, because the DPA only ruled on breaches of national law transposing EU law in the contested decision, and not on GDPR related violations.\nThe Conseil also assessed the compatibility of Article 3 of the French Data protection Act with the ePrivacy Directive. The Conseil determined that Directive 2002/58/EC did not prevent the French DPA to apply the French data protection Act (including Article 82). The Directive would therefore also not prevent the French DPA from penalising the controller for supposed violations of Article 82 of the French data protection Act. Therefore, the Conseil established that the French DPA could enforce the French data protection act against any person or legal entity responsible for the processing of data who had an establishment in France, irrespective of the location of the principal establishment of the responsible entity. This enforcement by the DPA would also not constitute violations of articles 49 (Freedom of establishment) or 56 (Freedom to provide services) of the TFEU.\nWith regard to the sanction imposed by the CNIL:\nThe Conseil deemed that the applicant was sufficiently informed regarding the scope of the DPA's investigations, the facts and the legal grounds on which the sanction was based. Moreover, the Conseil considered that the applicant was given sufficient time to present its defence. The Conseil also ruled that the involvement of the French DPA, while the Luxembourg DPA was the lead supervisory authority, was not enough to constitute a breach of the equality of arms principle. Amazon had argued that the involvement of the French DPA in the procedure had enabled the French DPA to gain access to privileged and confidential information and had used this information as a basis for its own decision. The Conseil determined that Amazon did not provide enough proof for this argument and stated that Amazon was not able to prove that was the procedure contrary to Article 15a(4) of Directive 2002/58/EC.\nOn a possible violation of Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights:\nThe Conseil explained, based on the CJEU's case law (Aklagaren v Akerberg Fransson C-617/10, Powszechny Zaklad Ubezpieczen na Zycie SA of C-617/17 and bpost SA v Belgian Competition Authority C-117/20), that the principle invoked by the applicant, that the same person may not be the subject of several proceeding in respect of the same facts, was not violated by the French DPA. The Conseil stated that the principle could only be enforced when criminal proceedings had been definitively terminated. This was in particular the case when a criminal penalty had become final. The Conseil held that Amazon was not found to be the subject of a final sanction issued by the Luxembourg DPA for the facts that had resulted in the €35,000,000 fine in the contested decision. The Conseil rejected the applicant's claim for a reference for a preliminary ruling on the matter.\nRegarding the application of French Data Protection Act by the French DPA, Amazon had argued that the legal framework regarding cookies was not stable and unclear at the time when proceedings against Amazon were started. The Conseil concluded that it had published guidelines detailing obligations for entities under the applicable law, and considered that the fact that other national supervisory authorities had taken divergent positions in interpreting the conditions and procedures applicable to the collection of user consent had no bearing on the application of the French Data Protection Act by the French DPA.\nOn the proportionality of the sanction imposed:\nTaking into account the elements assessed by the French DPA to calculate the imposed fine, the Conseil ruled that the DPA had not imposed a disproportionate penalty on the controller.\nConsequently, the Conseil rejected the entirety of controller's claims.","title":"CE - 451423"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant - 10072897 AZ VERZ 22-61","text":"The Court held that the summary of the dismissal was not legally valid, following the requirements under article 7:677(1) of the Dutch Civil Code (BW). The provision states that there must be an ‘urgent reason’, the dismissal must be without delay, and the reason must be communicated to the employee in a timely and sufficiently clear manner. The e-mail sent to the data subject listed “refusal to work” and \"insubordination” as the ‘urgent reasons’.\nThe Court found that the reason was not sufficiently clear, as the email had no explanation on the nature and seriousness of the behaviour which underlay the ‘urgent reasons’ stated in the e-mail. The e-mail correspondence also did not sufficiently prove that the data subject refused to perform his assigned activities. Hence, the alleged refusal to work did not constitute an urgent reason for the dismissal granted.\nThe Court also found that there was no unruly or disobedient behaviour, as there was no reasonable instruction that the data subject had to comply pursuant to the definition of reasonable orders under article 7:678(2)(j) BW. It held that Art. 8 ECHR is applicable for the underlying employer-employee relationship, where the state did not sufficiently protect the fundamental right.\nThe court held that since the data subject was only observed during working hours, and there were no recordings that were stored or used, there was an absence of processing of data within the meaning of Article 4(2) GDPR, hence the lawfulness of the observation was tested directly against Article 8 ECHR. The requirement by the controller to leave the data subject’s camera on is contrary to his right to respectful private life without any justification under Article 8 ECHR. Hence, there was no refusal to comply with a reasonable order/instruction by the data subject, therefore no urgent reason for instant dismissal either.\nThe Court awarded the data subject an approximation of €75,000 in compensation for reasons including wages, vacation allowance and transit compensation.","title":"Rb. Zeeland-West-Brabant - 10072897 AZ VERZ 22-61"}
{"_id":"holding_DPC (Ireland) - WhatsApp Ireland Limited - IN-18-12-2","text":"First, it found WhatsApp denied non-users their right to exercise control over their personal data by failing to provide them with the information prescribed by Article 14 GDPR.\nSecond, it held WhatsApp failed to provide users with sufficiently meaningful information regarding nearly every category of information to be provided under Article 13 GDPR, making it impossible for them to adequately consider and exercise their data rights.\nThird, it included an infringement of the key principle of transparency under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR in its final decision following an objection to its original decision by the Italian SA and a decision by the EDPB.\n\nWhatsApp’s transparency obligations in the context of non-users under Articles 14 and 12(1) GDPR\nIn its assessment of WhatsApp’s processing of non-user personal data, the DPC first analysed how the ‘Contact Feature’ operates in practice. It found that the data it generates, a table of lossy hashes together with the associated users’ mobile phone numbers, is personal data because non-users are identifiable. It held WhatsApp processed this personal data as a controller due to the degree of control it has over the purposes and means of that processing.\nHaving concluded WhatsApp processes non-user personal data as a controller, the DPC evaluated its compliance with the transparency obligations set out in Articles 14 and 12(1) GDPR.\nWhatsApp argued that it took “appropriate measures” to inform non-users of the “very limited ways” in which it processed their personal data. This was supposedly done by stating users provide the company with all their contacts’ phone numbers in their Privacy Policy.\nThe DPC rejected this argument, pointing out the lack of a discoverable and accessible “public notice” that would provide non-users of WhatsApp services with the information they are entitled to under Article 14. For example, they should be provided with details about the “circumstances in which any non-user personal data is shared with any of the Facebook Companies”. It emphasised that the burden of preparing such information is outweighed by “the role and utility of the right to be informed”.\n€75,000,000 of the total fine are attributable to the infringement of Article 14 GDPR.\n\nWhatsApp’s transparency obligations in the context of users under Articles 13 and 12(1) GDPR\nThe DPC first considered WhatsApp’s submissions of a general nature, and divided them into four categories. Then, it in turn considered how WhatsApp conveyed to users the information required by the sub-clauses of Articles 13(1) and 13(2) GDPR, asking two questions as part of every assessment:\n-“What information has been provided?”\n-“How has the information been provided?\n\nSubmissions of a general nature\n\nSubmissions concerning WhatsApp’s willingness to amend its Privacy Policy and related material.\nThe company contended any changes it made to its policies in response to the Preliminary Draft it was provided should be taken into consideration when the DPC determined whether a breach of the GDPR occurred. The DPC rejected this.\n\nSubmissions concerning Legal Certainty\nWhatsApp argued official guidance about transparency requirements was lacking and that its policies aligned with those of industry peers. It qualified the standard to which the DPC held them in the preliminary draft as “alternative and even higher” than what is required by the GDPR. The DPC rejected both these points, citing the Article 29 Working Party’s Transparency Guidelines to support their original assessment.\n\nSubmissions concerning Inconsistency\nWhatsApp suggested there were inconsistencies in the DPC’s interpretation of the Transparency Guidelines, notably about the requirement of a “concise approach” to providing information about the company’s reliance on legitimate interests. The DPC rejected this, explaining its view that there was an “over-supply of very high level, generalised information at the expense of a more concise and meaningful delivery of the essential information” in the Privacy Policies.\n\nSubmissions concerning WhatsApp’s pre-GDPR engagement with the Commission\nWhatsApp defended its position “in a limited number of respects” by pointing out that the DPC did not take issue with its policies at the time of its pre-GDPR engagement. The DPC rejected this, maintaining that its function is not to approve or review policy documents for individual data controllers\n\nArticles 13(1) and 13(2) GDPR\n\nArticle 13(1)(a) - the identity and contact details of the controller\nThe DPC held this information was provided in a clear and predictable way.\n\nArticle 13(1)(b) – the contact details of the data protection officer\nThe DPC held this information was provided in a clear and predictable way.\n\nArticle 13(1)(c) – the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for processing\nThe DPC stated that data subjects must be provided with meaningful information such that they know (i) which of his/her personal data are being processed, (ii) for what processing operation(s), (iii) for what purpose(s), and (iv) in reliance on which legal basis. Such information should be presented in a way that clearly links each of these elements. This “Proposed Approach” represents the minimum information required to adequately give effect to the rights of the data subject.\nIt analysed whether WhatsApp achieved this in regard to the individual legal bases it identified in its Privacy Policy and found the company did not.\n\nArticle 13(1)(d) – where applicable, the Legitimate Interests being pursued\nThe DPC originally held this information was provided in a clear and meaningful way, but amended its finding to comply with the EDPB’s binding decision.\n\nArticle 13(1)(e) – the Recipients or Categories of Recipients\nThe DPC held “the information provided does not enable the user to understand what categories of personal data will be sent to which category of recipient, [nor] why such transfers are being carried out and, therefore, [their] consequences”.\nIt criticised the excessive links between different WhatsApp documents and “scattered” manner relevant information is spread throughout them, and stated it should be presented in a clear and concise format instead.\n\nArticle 13(1)(f) - Transfers of personal data to a third country\nThe DPC held controllers are required to provide information such that data subjects are informed either (i) that transfers are subject to an adequacy decision; or (ii) that transfers are not subject to an adequacy decision. The link to “a generic European Commission webpage” WhatsApp provided did not meet this standard. Instead, the DPC stated the “specific set of standard contractual clauses or specific adequacy decision” should be directly accessible.\n\nArticle 13(2)(a) – Retention Criteria/Retention Periods\nThe DPC held WhatsApp failed to provide meaningful information (i) in relation to the criteria that will be used to determine if, and for how long, a user’s personal data will be retained following the deletion of their account; (ii) concerning the fact that certain information will be retained, even after deletion; and (iii) to explain how such retained records are “disassociated from personal identifiers”.\n\nArticle 13(2)(b) - the existence of the data subject rights\nThe DPC held this information was provided in a clear and concise way.\n\nArticle 13(2)(c) – the existence of the right to withdraw consent\nThe DPC held whilst WhatsApp’s Legal Basis Notice referenced the right to withdraw consent, the required extent of information was not included. Further, users were not informed about how to exercise this right.\nIt again criticised the “piecemeal approach to the provision of the required information”, which made any effort to provide information about this right pointless.\n\nArticle 13(2)(d) – the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority\nThe DPC held this information was provided in a clear and concise way, albeit in a confusing place.\n\nArticle 13(2)(e) - whether the provision of personal data is a statutory or contractual requirement, or a requirement necessary to enter into a contract, as well as whether the data subject is obliged to provide the personal data and of the possible consequences of failure to provide such data\nThe DPC originally proposed no finding under this heading, but amended its finding to comply with the EDPB’s binding decision.\n\nArticle 13(2)(f) – the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling\nThe DPC proposed no finding under this heading because WhatsApp does not engage in such activities.\n\nWhatsApp’s transparency obligations in the context of its relationship with other Facebook Companies and any sharing of user data in the context of that relationship\nThe DPC specifically assessed the extent to which WhatsApp explained its relationship with the Facebook Companies and any consequent sharing of data.\nIt again criticised the manner in which the information is spread out \"across a wide range of texts\", and how a significant amount of it is so high level as to be meaningless. It pointed out how the Facebook FAQ is only linked to WhatsApp's Privacy Policy in one place. The information being provided is characterised as \"unnecessarily confusing and ill-defined\".\nAs such, the DPC held that WhatsApp failed to comply with its transparency obligations per Articles 13(1)(c), 13(1)(e) and 12(1) in relation to how the company works with other Facebook Companies. It notably added that \"unless WhatsApp has a concrete plan in place, that includes a definitive and imminent commencement date, to commence the sharing of personal data on a controller-to-controller basis with the Facebook Companies for safety and security purposes, the misleading elements of the Legal Basis Notice and Facebook FAQ should be deleted to reflect the true position\".\nWhilst the DPC originally found WhatsApp complied with Article 13(1)(d), it changed this assessment following the EDPB's binding decision.\n\nWhatsApp's compliance with the Principle of Transparency per Article 5(1)(a)\nThe DPC did not include an assessment on this issue in its original draft, but found a violation of Article 5(1)(a) following the EDPB's binding decision.\n\nExercise of Corrective Powers\nThe DPC exercised the following corrective powers:\n  * A reprimand pursuant to Article 58(2)(b).\n  * An order to bring processing operations into compliance, pursuant to Article 58(2)(d) within 3 months.\n  * An administrative fine, pursuant to Articles 58(2)(i) and 83, addressed to WhatsApp, in the amount of €225,000,000.\nThe total fine reflected these individual infringements.\ni. In respect of the infringement of Article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR, a fine of €90,000,000\nii. In respect of the infringement of Article 12 of the GDPR, a fine of €30,000,000\niii. In respect of the infringement of Article 13 of the GDPR, a fine of €30,000,000\niv. In respect of the infringement of Article 14 of the GDPR, a fine of €75,000,000\nIt arrived to these figures after first taking a number of submissions by WhatsApp into consideration, then assessing the Article 83(2) criteria, and finally adopting the EDPB’s binding decision.\n\nSubmissions\n\n'New and Subjective Views' Submissions\nWhatsApp argued the DPC’s assessment turned on “new and subjective interpretations” of relevant GDPR articles, and that “unprecedented fines” should not be imposed where it was not aware of such a higher standard. The DPC rejected expecting this much, and gave a concrete example of how the company did not meet the standard it claimed to by citing the Transparency Guidelines’ advice on the use of “language qualifiers such as ‘may’, ‘might’, [etc]”.\n\n'Nuanced Nature of Assessment' Submissions\nWhatsApp argued that the “nature” of assessing transparency requirements is “subjective and nuanced” and that this made the DPC approach to this investigation inappropriate, pointing to the “material differences” between the views of the original Investigator and Commissioner as evidence. The DPC rejected this, arguing they were the mere “result of a divergence in approach to the inquiry itself”.\n\n'Binary Approach' Submissions\nWhatsApp argued that the DPC should not have found “either full compliance or complete non-compliance with each provision”. In response, the DPC repeated much of its earlier justifications for the findings it made to illustrate that it only assessed whether “all” the required information under every article had been provided.\n\n'Careful and Good Faith Efforts' Submissions\nWhatsApp, amongst other things, argued it considered that it met the required transparency standard because “its approach [to transparency] is aligned with the approach adopted by many industry peers”. The DPC rejected this, stating that “while an industry-wide failure (if this is, in fact, the case) to achieve compliance with the transparency requirements is a poor reflection on that industry, it is not, however, evidence of a position whereby data controllers in this particular sector are unable to identify what is required of them, in terms of transparency”.\n\n'Willingness to Change' Submissions\nWhatsApp argued that because it actively ‘volunteered’ to change the information it provides in response to the preliminary draft decisions it received, the use of corrective powers is inappropriate. The DPC rejected this, highlighting that the company’s express disagreement with the DPC’s points at previous points during the investigation “creates certain limitations, in terms of the weight [it] might attribute to WhatsApp’s willingness to change”.\n\n'Theoretical Risk' Submissions\nWhatsApp argued the DPC could not demonstrate that its approach to transparency “has in fact had any negative impact on data subject rights”. The DPC reminded the company it has no duty to demonstrate “evidence” of damage to data subjects.\n\nArticle 83(2) criteria\nThe DPC considered each of the Article 83(2) criteria (subsection a-k) to assess the nature, gravity and duration of the infringements as well as the duration of the infringements. The purpose of this assessment was to determine the sums to be fined in order for them to be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” as required by Article 83(1) GDPR.\nIt held a fine is warranted where:\n  * All four infringements are very serious in nature and severe in gravity. This was the case as WhatsApp only provided \"41% of the prescribed information to users and none to non-users\"\n  * The number of affected users was very large. The exact figure of users was redacted in the report, but this was the case. The number of affected non-users was described as \"unquantifiable\" but likely to be extremely high.\n  * Users are not able to meaningfully consider and exercise their data subject rights. The DPC held there was a very serious information deficit that led to this.\nFurther, it took consideration of the limited nature and scope of the processing in question, but stated it could not give it significant weight as a mitigating factor because of the seriousness of the infringements. It characterised all of them as negligent and the Article 14 GDPR one demonstrating \"a high degree of negligence\", which was taken into account as an aggravating factor.\nThe only mitigating factors it recognised as valid were the limited categories of personal data processed by WhatsApp and the company's willingness to amend its Privacy Policy and related material.\n\nEDPB’s binding decision\nSee decision here for commentary.\n\nAppeal\nThe decision by the EDPB underlying this case has since been appealed by WhatsApp, which brought an action to the CJEU on 1 November 2021.","title":"DPC (Ireland) - WhatsApp Ireland Limited - IN-18-12-2"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W211 2225136-1","text":"The BVwG held, that KSV 1870 Information GmbH is allowed to store the data on the data subject's insolvency, even though that data is no longer available in the official insolvency register. Both the amount of a debt and the time that has passed since its incurrence and its payment are relevant to assess an indivuidual's creditworthiness.\nNeither EU law nor the national Austrian law contain provisions on the allowed storage period of creditworthiness data (such as information on insolvencies). The storage period can therefore be established by assessing existing legal provisions that deal with creditor protection or requirements for an appropriate credit assessment.\nUnder REGULATION (EU) No 575/2013 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 banking institutions have to estimate the probability of default of payment by using long-term averages of the annual default rate, based on a historical observation period of at least five years. In light of these obligations and the fact that banking institutions are among KSV 1870 Information GmbH's customers, the BVwG rejected the data subject's erasure request. The debts have only been fulfilled some two years ago (in 2018) - i.e. nowhere near the five-year period taken into account by the BVwG.","title":"BVwG - W211 2225136-1"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W258 2217446-1","text":"Overturned and upheld decisions\nConcerning the appeal against decisions 1, 3, 4 and 5 (see above: \"Decisions by the Austrian Data Protection Authority\"), the BVwG had already issued its decsion on 20.08.2020 (GZ 2217446-1/15E):\n  * decisions 1, 4 and 5 were upheld and\n  * decision 3 was overturned.\nOn 23.10.2020, the Austrian Postal Service informed the BVwG that it had deleted any data on \"marketing information and classifications\", including those on the \"affinity for a political party\" from its database.\nOn 26.11.2020, the BVwG issued its decision on the appeal against decisions 2 and 6:\n  * decision 2 was partially overturned and partially upheld: The order to erase the data on the \"affinity for a political party\" was overturned, because the Austrian Postal Service had already deleted this data. The ban of further processing of such data was upheld.\n  * decision 6 was overturned.\n\nData on the \"affinity for a political party\" as personal data?\nThe BVwG held that data on the \"affinity for a political party\" qualify as personal data under Article 4(1) GDPR. This affinity is a calculated probability of a person's interest fo advertisement by a certain political party for the purpose of limiting the sending of advertisement of political parties that the recipient is not interested in. It is i.a. based on regional election results, socio-demographic information and opinion polls. As it is assigned to a specific identifiable natural person, it qualifies as personal data under Article 4(1) GDPR.\nThe argument, that these data could not be rectified under Article 16 GDPR was waived as incorrect (and could not change the qualification as personal data anyhow). Assessments of a presumed affinity can indeed be rectified - e.g. in cases of incorrect socio-demographic information by using correct socio-demographic information.\nGiven the primacy of the GDPR as EU law, the differentiations between \"marketing information and classifications\" and other data in the national law (§ 151 GewO) could also not change the qualification of data on the \"affinity for a political party\" as personal data\n\nData on the \"affinity for a political party\" as special categories of personal data?\nData on the \"affinity for a political party\" also qualify as special categories of personal data, namely data on political opinions. The purpose of Article 9 GDPR is to protect data subject from discrimination based on their (presumed) political opinions. Even though the \"affinity for a political party\" only expresses a probability, it allows for discrimination based on the fact that they are considered to be especially interested in one or more particular political parties.\n\nLawfulness of processing\nThe BVwG held that the processing of data on the \"affinity for a political party\" could not be based on Article 9(2)(g) GDPR in connection with § 151(6) GewO in lack of a substantial public interest. The processing of personal data by address publishers under Article 151 GewO might facilitate the business of address publishers but it is not of vital interest for the economy. The general public would not be seriously affected without such a regulation. Processing of data under Article 151 GewO is therefore not in the substantial public interest.\nOther legal bases under Article 9(2) GDPR could also not justify the processing of of data on the \"affinity for a political party\". Hence it needs to be based on the data subject's explicit consent under Article 9(2)(a) GDPR. As the Austrian Postal Service did not collect such consent, the processing was unlawful.\n\nBan of processing\nThe BVwG upheld the DSB's ban of processing but corrected it so that it only concerned the processing of data on the \"affinity for a political party\".","title":"BVwG - W258 2217446-1"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9938413","text":"The DPA held that the processing of personal data by the data controller fell under Article 10 GDPR, which states that processing of data relating to criminal convictions and offences must take place only under the control of public authority or if the processing is authorised by Union or Member State law providing appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subjects. However, it found that the disclosure on the controller’s website of the data was carried out in the absence of a legitimate legal basis, in accordance with the combined provisions of Article 10 GDPR and Article 2-octies of the Italian Privacy Code. Because there is no law authorising the processing of judicial data as done in the present case.\nAdditionally, the DPA held that the processing did not comply with the principles set out in Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, Article 5(1)(c) GDPR and Article 5(1)(f) GDPR either. According to the Articles, personal data needs to be processed in accordance with the principles of lawfulness, fairness and transparency, the principle of data minimisation and the principle of integrity and confidentiality.\nThus, the DPA found that the disclosure, in the absence of lawfulness requirements, of such data by the Italian Bar Association in question, in its capacity as data controller, constituted an administrative offence under Article 166(2) of the Italian Privacy Code, read in conjunction with Article 83(5) GDPR.\nThe DPA fined the data controller €20,000 pursuant to Article 58(2)(i) GDPR and Article 83 GDPR.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9938413"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100897","text":"In the first place, the DPA stated that the publication of data subjects' first and last names on a website was considered processing of personal data. These data allowed the identification of the data subjects since the list contained names of persons who fulfil the requirements to enroll in a specific category, and more elements allowing the identification by a broader audience.\nRegarding the claim of the public character of the data, since it had been published on the SERGAS website, the DPA considered that a website is not a publicly accessible source. In addition, in case that the data was made available by a public entity for a specific purpose, the list made by the controller must rely on its own legal basis. When it comes to the concept of publicly accessible sources, the GDPR regulates it in the context of the right to information when the data was not collected from the data subject. In any case, data contained in a publicly accessible source must have a legal basis for further processing.\nOn the legitimate interest, the DPA noted that Article 29 Working Party Opinion 6/2014states that is necessary to take into account not only the data subject’s fundamental rights and freedoms but also their interests and that “legitimate” involves the need for processing and the use of the least invasive method to achieve the same end. For instance, the controller could have informed only the participants about the results but opted to inform the public in general.\nIn the context of data impact assessments, the DPA highlighted which elements to include, such as the bargaining position of the parties (especially the controller’s), if there is a reasonable expectation of further processing, the way that the controller processes the data (including if there is profiling or not) and the need for a balancing exercise between the data subject’s rights and interests and the controller’s legitimate interest whose results must show a prevalence of the latter, being the only case to rely on Article 6(1)(f) GDPR.\nIn the present case, the Spanish DPA did not observe a prevalence of the controller’s interest over the data subject’s rights for the following reasons. The processing was not necessary for the initial collection purposes, the data subjects were not informed about the publication of results on the website, sensitive data was included in the list, the storage limitation principle was violated (the publication lasted for more than three months), there was an incomplete impact assessment, there was no inclusion of information regarding the right to object which is mandatory when relying on legitimate interest as legal basis for the processing (Article 21(1) GDPR).\nFinally, the DPA fined the controller €12,000 for a violation of Article 6(1) GDPR due to the lack of a valid legal basis for processing.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100897"}
{"_id":"holding_NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH/2020/2729/15","text":"The DPA concluded that the video surveillance system introduced by the company was unreasonable and that it failed to provide sufficient information about collection of personal data from its employees. The company was fined 700.000 HUF and instructed to change the angle of view of the camera so that it doesn't monitor workers' activities.","title":"NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH/2020/2729/15"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Energy Suite Limited","text":"The ICO found that Energy Suite had contravened Regulation 21 of Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 by calling numbers that were registered on the TPS. On the balance of probabilities, it found out that at least 1246 calls made by Energy Suite got connected. The ICO referred to another complaint made outside the investigation period to conclude that Energy Suite's compliance with Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 has been lax.\nThe ICO concluded that \"unsolicited direct marketing calls were made to subscribers who had registered with the TPS at least 28 days prior to receiving the calls, and who for the purposes of regulation 21(4) had not notified Energy Suite that they did not object to receiving such calls.\" This contravention was considered to be serious due to multiple violations as Energy Suite made some 15,000 calls in total, many of which did not connect. Consequently, the ICO concluded that Energy Suite had been negligent and the \"condition (b) from section 55A (1) DPA is met\".\nThe ICO considered the aggravating factors of Energy Suite's action being for financial gain, claiming ignorance of the law, inadequacy in record keeping, continued non-compliance etc. At the same time, the ICO also considered the mitigating factors of Energy Suite being a small company, its cooperation with the investigation, and the number of calls being comparatively low.\nThus, the ICO issued a monetary penalty of £2000 (two thousand pounds) against Energy Suite,","title":"ICO (UK) - Energy Suite Limited"}
{"_id":"holding_CE - 449212","text":"The Conseil d’État rejected the request made by Google and ruled that the French DPA was territorially competent on this matter even though it is not the lead supervisory authority.\nThe court stated that Article 82 of the Law Informatique et Libertés was a transposition of article 5(3) of the Directive 2002/58/CE into French Law when dealing with cookies and that the CNIL is charged with enforcing this Directive. As such, the one-stop shop mechanism provided for in Article 56 GDPR does not apply in the present case.","title":"CE - 449212"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 65/2022","text":"Issuing its decision, the DPA acknowledged the two arguments put forward by the controller. In response to both of these claims, the authority held that “the controller is not released from its obligation to inform the data subject merely because the data in question does not exist in a file kept by [them]”. Therefore, as the company did not respond to the data subject’s request in any way, they had violated Article 12 and 15 GDPR. The decision also found that the investigation, and the controller’s comments, demonstrated that the company does not appear to have any methods in place to deal with these sorts of requests.\nRegarding the exercise of corrective powers, the DPA observed that the effects of the infringement were de minimis, that the company did not derive any benefit from it, and that there are have been no prior infringements by the controller. Therefore, in accordance with Article 58 GDPR, the DPA issued a reprimand to the controller, and imposed an order instructing the company to establish, within two months from the receipt of this notice, procedures to ensure that the rights of data subjects are duly satisfied and to inform the Authority accordingly.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 65/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-431-0031","text":"First, the DPA assessed whether the controller had legal basis for the processing of personal data. The DPA held that the Party had a legitimate interest in using the personal data for campaigning purposes, and that the use of such publicly available information was not particularly invasive to the data subjects' privacy. The controller, therefore, had legal basis for the processing, namely Article 6(1)(f) GDPR.\nThe DPA then assessed whether the Party had acted in accordance with the information obligations in Article 14 GDPR. First, the DPA stated that, contrary to the opinion of the controller, the exception laid down in Article 14(5)(c) GDPR was not applicable \"since the processing of information in connection with the sending of letters on the party's main issues is not expressly provided for by law\". Second the DPA held that the information could not be considered \"given to the data subject\" when the data subject would have to find the information on the website by themself.\nHence, the DPA reprimanded the controller for violating Article 14 GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-431-0031"}
{"_id":"holding_CPDP (Bulgaria) - PSPN-01-243.2021","text":"The CPDP issued warnings to both controllers. It found that controller 1 violated Article 5(1)(a), (b) and (d) as well as 5(2) GDPR. Controller 2 violated Article 5(1)(a) GDPR.\nThe CPDP considered both the journalist and the doctor from the data subject’s same clinic controllers. The journalist, Controller 1, was a controller by nature of publishing the data on their profile. The doctor, Controller 2, was a controller because they distributed the data to Controller 1 with knowledge that they were a journalist intending to investigate and broadcast information about the data subject.\nGiven that the infringement was brought to an end and the unlawful data was only briefly posted online, the CPDP thought it proportionate to issue a formal nonmonetary warning to both controllers.\n\nController 1\nThe CPDP found that Controller 1’s post violated Article 5(1)(a), (c) and (d) GDPR.\nController 1 infringed the accuracy principle pursuant to Article 5(1)(d) GDPR. Regardless of whether or not the processing occurred for ‘journalistic purposes,’ the CPDP noted that accuracy obligations still applied. This reasoning related to the data subject’s diploma: While the CPDP considered that the diploma did not contain personal data because it only had an outdated photograph of the data subject from 1996, it determined that the image not being up to date implicated the accuracy principle.\nThe CPDP also considered that the post violated data minimisation obligations pursuant to Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. Information about the data subject’s previous convictions had already been deleted due to rehabilitation purposes. Thus, for the purposes of his medical practice, the CPDP said that the data subject should be considered unconvicted. As a result, Article 10 GDPR was also implicated. The inclusion of the data subject’s date and place of birth, PIN, address and kin connection data were also excessive. On the other hand, the processing of the data subject’s name and complete educational degree is not unlawful because it can be found in the register of the Bulgarian Medical Association.\n\nController 2\nThe CPDP concluded that Controller 2 violated Article 5(1)(a) GDPR's transparency and fairness principles. The CDPD considered it clear that Controller 2 had processed information related to the data subject’s convictions within the meaning of Article 10 GDPR. It then transmitted this information to Controller 1 knowing that they were a journalist investigating this issue. The CPDP also noted that Controller 2 had misled the DPA through their written submissions, which incorrectly claimed no part in transmitting the data to Controller 1.","title":"CPDP (Bulgaria) - PSPN-01-243.2021"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9949453","text":"On the basis of the information provided, the DPA found a systematic lack of compliance with GDPR provisions by the controller.\nThe DPA began by explaining that pursuant to Article 4 GDPR a phone number randomly dialled and called for telemarketing purposes can be considered personal data. Hence, the GDPR and the Italian Privacy Code apply. In light of this, the controller's acquisition of the personal data by word-of-mouth could not be considered valid since the person who provided the data was not entitled to give any valid consent on behalf of the data subject to whom the promotional communication was addressed. Thus, DPA assessed that the controller violated Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, Article 6 GDPR, Article 7 GDPR, Article 13 GDPR and Article 130 of the Italian Privacy Code also for not providing any information concerning the data processing to the data subjects.\nIn relation to this, the DPA stated that the controller violated Article 5(1) GDPR, Article 5(2) GDPR, Article 6(1)(a) GDPR and Article 7 GDPR for having utilised personal data acquired from third parties without having verified the existence of the requirements for lawful processing, so the acquisition of the free, specific, documented and informed consent of the persons concerned.\nThe DPA also found a breach of Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, Article 6(1)(a) GDPR, as well as Article 7 GDPR and Article 12(1) GDPR for not having published on its website a transparent information notice regarding the data processing operations conducted, as telemarketing activities were not clearly indicated.\nIt further established a violation of Article 12 GDPR, Article 15 GDPR and Article 21 GDPR as the controller failed to comply with the access requests made by certain data subjects. In some cases, the controller did not provide a full reply to the requests since it limited its answer to explain that the numbers were dialled randomly and that it would remedy the mistake by creating a 'no-go list' of numbers, although such list was never provided to the DPA. In addition, the controller failed to consider the objection requests made by some data subjects.\nMoreover, the DPA also stated that the controller breached Article 130(3) of the Italian Privacy Code for having conducted telemarketing activities without having consulted the RPO.\nLastly, the DPA found a violation of Article 5(2) GDPR, Article 24(1) GDPR, Article 24(2) GDPR and Article 25 GDPR for failing to take adequate measures against any third parties that would unlawfully use the Scionti name, although the DPA also alleged that the promotional activity of third parties, allegedly external to the controller, could have been advantageous for the latter.\nConsequently, the controller was ordered to stop processing personal data for marketing activities without proper consent, was instructed to promptly delete unlawfully obtained personal data, and was mandated to adopt stringent procedures and measures to ensure GDPR compliance in future promotional activities. Additionally, an administrative fine of €70,000 was imposed on the controller, taking into account the seriousness of the violations, inadequate cooperation, and the need for an effective deterrent.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9949453"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - S.C. Marsorom S.R.L.","text":"The ANSPDCP held that the controller failed to take appropriate measures and breached the storage limitation principle enshrined in Article 5(1)(e) GDPR, and also failed to fulfill its obligation under Articles 25 and 32 GDPR.\nConsequently, the DPA issued a €3000 fine and recommended the website operator to establish a shorter storage period for the personal data associated with the accounts of its customers.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - S.C. Marsorom S.R.L."}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Rotterdam - C/10/583910/KG ZA 19-1062","text":"The Court went through this balancing exercise and first invoked Recital 1 GDPR and Recital 4 GDPR and the definition of processing under Article 4(2) GDPR.\nThen, it noted that according to Article 9 GDPR and Recital 35 GDPR genetic data must be protected as sensitive data. The man’s consent to processing was only referred to the purposes of the research he participated in. Further, none of the requirements in Article 9(2) GDPR is fulfilled.\nThe Court concluded that in this case the interest of the EUMCR must outweigh the plaintiff’s interest and the EUMCR must not provide her the DNA material.\nThe Court rejected the plaintiff's claim.","title":"Rb. Rotterdam - C/10/583910/KG ZA 19-1062"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00032/2020","text":"The AEPD concluded that Iberia had infringed Article 22(2) of the Spanish law on cookies (LSSI), as transposed from the e-Privacy Directive. The DPA considered that the airline should have allowed users to reject cookies in the second layer at once, instead of granularly, and that it should not had installed cookies without allowing users to exercise their choice.\nThe airline should have also informed users about third party cookies and the storage period, as well as more clear information about the purpose of cookies.\nFor this, the Spanish DPA fined Iberia €30,000.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00032/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202212247","text":"The DPA conducted a step-by-step analysis of the alleged GDPR violation.\n1. Biometric Data Processing\nThe DPA considers that in the case at hand, automated technical instruments are used which allow the permanent and univocal identification, stemming from the biological identity of each employee.\nThe DPA held that each singular scan of an employee's face is compared to the database containing all scans of employee´s faces and not just the individual´s registered biometric data. This entails that a processing operation takes place.\nIn relation to whether or not the data was biometric data and whether or not there has been processing of such data, the DPA held that the data processed is linked to the identification of the data subject in each access log and thus is biometric data.\n2. Obligations under Article 25 GDPR\nThe DPA determined that the purpose of processing is the registration of employees for the working day, access and exit throughout the workday. Against this background, the DPA considered that the controller is obliged to respect the principles of privacy by design and privacy by default as per Article 25 GDPR.\n3. Processing of Biometric data: legitimization\nAs per Article 9 GDPR, the processing of biometric data is in principle prohibited. The DPA considered that the “labour exception” to this general prohibition under Article 9(2)(b) GDPR, may apply to the case at hand. The ground for processing under Article 9(2)(b) GDPR can only be successful if there is a provision of national law that requires the data processing. However, the DPA concluded that no such provision existed in Spanish law, rendering the ground for processing under Article 9(2)(b) GDPR inapplicable to the case at hand.\nThe DPA considered that, even if that was not the case, the “necessity” element was not fulfilled. In fact, the intended purposes could have been achieved through other means. This was further confirmed by the fact that the system had since been discontinued by the controller, in favor of an ID-card system.\nThus, the DPA found that no lawful ground for the processing of biometric data under Article 9(2) GDPR was applicable.\n4. DPIA and Violation of Article 35 GDPR\nAs biometric data is sensitive data, it shall be processed only when no risks to the rights and freedoms of individuals are present. Therefore, as put forward in Article 35 GDPR, any processing considered high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, must be legitimised through a data protection impact assessment, describing the processing in detail.\nThe DPA acknowledged that the processing of biometric data for labor control began in 2016. It has been acknowledge by the controller that they were not aware of whether a DPIA was ever carried out or not.\nConsidering that the controller did not provide a DPIA of the processing of biometric data, the DPA found that the controller violated Article 35 GDPR.\n5. Violation of Article 15 GDPR\nAs the controller did not effectively reply to the email of the data subject requesting access to their personal data, the DPA found a violation of Article 12 and 15 GDPR.\n6. Fine\nIn light of the aforementioned violations, the DPA deemed it appropriate to impose a twofold fine to the controller:\n  * €200,000 for the violation of Article 35 GDPR;\n  * €20,000 for the violation of Article 15 GDPR.\nThus, the overall amount of the fine was €220,000.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202212247"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00098/2019","text":"The AEPD ruled that the form used to allow underage children travelling did not provide the mandatory information, as required by Article 13 GDPR.\nAs a consequence, the AEPD issued a reprimand to the Directorate-General of the Spanish Civil Guard for the violation of Article 13 GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00098/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - fine to Enel Energie Muntenia SA","text":"The ANSPDCP found that Enel Energie Muntenia SA transmitted a client's personal data to the e-mail address of another client. The DPA decided that the controller did not have adequate technical and organizational measures in place to ensure a level of security that corresponds to the risk of the processing.\nThus, the controller violated the security of processing as required by Article 32 GDPR and the DPA imposed the fine of 14,423.7 lei (approx. EUR. 3,000) and ordered the controller to take the necessary measures within 30 days.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - fine to Enel Energie Muntenia SA"}
{"_id":"holding_UODO (Poland) - DKN.5131.3.2021","text":"The Polish DPA imposed an administrative fine of approximately € 35,387 EUR (PLN 160,000) on the insurer, Sopockie Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń ERGO Hestia S.A, for failure to report the breach of personal data protection. In addition, the insurer was fined for not notifying data subjects about the breach, which was also required by the supervisory authority.\nThe DPA explained that a breach of data confidentiality in connection with a breach of personal data protection - through the sharing of documents with unauthorized recipient which contained: the calculation of an insurance premium, PESEL number, information about the proposed period of insurance, the subject of insurance (house), the sum insured, as well as the name, town and postal code of the data subject - amounts to a high risk of infringement of the rights or freedoms of natural persons.\nHigh risk of harm to the rights or freedoms of natural persons exists where the breach is likely to lead to physical harm or damage to the property or non-property of the individuals whose data has been breached. Examples of such damage includes discrimination, identity theft or falsification, financial loss and damage to reputation. According to the DPA, there is no doubt that the cited examples of damage, given the scope of the data covered by this data protection breach, may occur in the present case. Such a data breach must consequently be reported.","title":"UODO (Poland) - DKN.5131.3.2021"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-025","text":"Firstly, the controller based its processing on consent under Article 6(1)(a) GDPR. The DPA reiterated that it is necessary to ensure that data subjects have given their unambiguous, specific, free and informed consent.\nRegarding the one-button form, the CNIL considered that the form did not allow data subjects to make a valid choice reflecting their preferences regarding the transmission of data for commercial purposes. The CNIL emphasized on the fact that the “I VALIDATE” button had a size and colour that made it stand out from the other information provided, whereas the hyperlink which enabled the data subject to take part in the game without agreeing to the transmission of their data was presented in the body of the text and in much smaller characters.\nRegarding the two-button form, the CNIL noted that there was no mention of the consequences of clicking on the “I REFUSE” button and that as designed, the form did not make it possible to obtain unambiguous and free consent from the user under Article 4(11) GDPR.\nRegarding the new form, the CNIL considered that although the two buttons were identical in size, font and colour, the “NEXT STEP” button suggested that there was a sequence between these two buttons. Therefore, the choices in design did not compensate for the risk that the data subject may consent without measuring the consequences.\nThus, the CNIL considered that the forms did not sufficiently inform the data subjects that they were consenting to the transmission of their data for commercial prospecting purposes and that the controller did not have valid consent within the meaning of Article 6(1)(a) GDPR and Article 4(11) GDPR.\nSecondly, the CNIL discovered that the phone number and postal address of data subjects who refused to have their data transmitted to the controller’s partners were nonetheless transmitted for another purpose (the performance of technical and qualification operations) and on another legal basis (legitimate interest). The CNIL considered that in order to transmit this data to its partners, and insofar as it had chosen the legal basis of consent for this processing, the controller should have obtained the consent of the data subjects, therefore breaching Article 6 GDPR, as well as Article 5(1)(b) GDPR.\nThirdly, Article 30 GDPR stipulates that the controller must keep a register of processing activities. The CNIL noted that the controller shared a register of processing activities with another company but did not specify which one of the companies was acting as the controller for each processing. The DPA concluded that given the amount of data processed in its activity, the controller should have ensured that its register was exhaustive, accurate and up to date. Therefore, the controller failed to comply with Article 30 GDPR but did update its register during the sanctioning procedure.\nFourthly, Article 32(1) GDPR provides that the controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in order to guarantee a level of security appropriate to the risk. The CNIL considered that despite the use of a single administration account to access the database, the controller required a connection to a VPN using individual authentication keys which allowed access and actions carried out within the database to be attributed, given the small number of people accessing the administration account. Therefore, the DPA established that there was no infringement of Article 32 GDPR.\nThe CNIL imposed a €75,000 fine for the infringements to Article 6 GDPR and Article 30 GDPR.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-025"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-421-0028","text":"Despite the procedures, guidelines and templates created and implemented by the controller, the Datatilsynet ruled that Udbetaling Danmark infringed both Articles 12(3) and 15 GDPR.\nThe authority stressed out that the controller did not provide the data subject with the necessary information pursuant to Article 15(1)(h) GDPR. Indeed, the controller did not provide the data subject with the specific information on whether automatic decisions have been made against the data subject. The authority issued that the controller should from now on answer clearly to the data subject if he/she has been subject to automated decision making. For example, the authority recommend that the controller could state in each response whether or not automatic decisions have been made vis-à-vis the data subject.\nIn addition, the authority pointed out that the controller answered to 2 subject access requests with undue delay. Although the controller claimed that they needed time to confirm the data subject identification, the authority ruled that the one-month deadline was not respected and thus that, Article 12(3) GDPR was infringed.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-421-0028"}
{"_id":"holding_UODO (Poland) - DKN.5131.22.2021","text":"The DPA found that the controller breached Article 5(1)(f), Article 24(1), Article 25(1), Article 32(1)(b) and (d), and Article 32(2) GDPR due to a lack of a reliably conducted risk analysis, combined with the lack of regular testing, measuring and evaluation of the effectiveness of the implemented technical and organisational measures to ensure the security of processing.\nFirst, regarding the risk analysis, the DPA stated that, for the risk analysis, the controller should take into account the characteristics of the processes involved, assets, vulnerabilities, threats and existing safeguards as part of the processing of personal data taking place. The data controller determined that the loss of a USB-Stick was a \"medium risk\", which meant that \"training for personnel on potential threats\" was deemed a sufficient measure to reduce the risk to a \"low level\" risk. The DPA stated that such measures can not be regarded as sufficient. Nor do they suffice the requirement to put in place appropriate technical measures, since the controller obliged the users, like the probation officer that lost the USB-Stick, to implement technical safeguards on their own. Now, the user might not have enough technical knowledge to know how to implement such safeguards. Hence, ultimately, the lack of guidance resulted in the possibility for unauthorised persons to access the personal data processed on that medium.\nSecond, the DPA considered that the implementation ad hoc tests by the DPO, do not suffice the requirement of regular testing, since they are not \"aimed at verifying the effectiveness of the implemented security measures. New risks may arise during the the implementation of individual processing activities. Hence, it is of utmost importance that such testing is carried out regularly, so that the results of these tests can be evaluated carefully.\nIt follows from the Polish DPA decision that by losing the memory stick, the President of the District Court committed a breach of, inter alia, the principle of confidentiality and integrity, as laid down in Article 5. Hence, the Polish DPA set an administrative fine of PLN 10,000, considering as a mitigating circumstance the good cooperation of the President of the District Court with the supervisory authority, undertaken and conducted in order to remove the violation and mitigate its possible negative effects.","title":"UODO (Poland) - DKN.5131.22.2021"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00071/2020","text":"After obtaining the corresponding evidences, the AEPD understood that, as long as the not-erased-URLs are related to professional and not personal information of the claimant (and that CJEU judgement 13/05/14 clarified that the right to be forgotten can be declined due to the role of the claimant in the public life), they are excluded from the data protection regulation as per Articles 1 and 2 of the GPDR. In this sense, the AEPD decided to dismiss the claim from the Spanish citizen.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - TD/00071/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_VG Berlin - 2 K 98/20","text":"In three steps, the court held that the information concerning former members of the Bundestag is protected insofar as they are still alive.\nThe court first established that the information concerning still living former members of the Bundestag constituted personal data. In accordance with Article 4(1) GDPR, an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified directly or indirectly, in particular by means of an association with an identifier such as a name. What is required is the possibility of establishing the identity of the data subject. In the context of determining whether a natural person is identifiable, account must be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used by the controller or by any other person to identify the natural person, directly or indirectly (Recital 26 GDPR). In this light, the court held that the requested information constitutes personal data. The possibility that the living individuals concerned will be identified is not negligible. This applies irrespective of the fact that the plaintiff is only requesting information on the number of applications that have been decided, without naming names, and that the year of the decision does not necessarily correspond to the year of leaving the Bundestag. The group of persons potentially affected is limited which makes them identifiable.\nSecond, the court held that the still living MPs' interest in secrecy outweighs the plaintiff's interest in information. According to Article 9(1) GDPR, the transmission of special categories of personal data, such as health data, is prohibited unless one of the conditions of Article 9(2) GDPR, such as explicit consent, is met. According to Article 4(15) GDPR, health data are personal data relating to the physical or mental health of a natural person from which information about his or her state of health emerges. Consequently, the information sought by the plaintiff concerns specially protected personal data as the data as to whether the Bundestag administration has given a positive or negative decision on an application pursuant to \"old-age compensation due to health problems\" contains an assessment by the Bundestag administration of the physical and/or mental state of health of the applicant. Furthermore, access to information was also precluded by § 5.2(1) of the German Freedom of Information Act. According to this provision, the applicant's interest in information does not prevail in the case of information from documents insofar as they are connected with a mandate of the third party (in this case, the Member of Parliament).\nThird, the court held that there are no grounds for exclusion for the information concerning deceased persons due to two reasons. Firstly, because natural persons within the meaning of Article 4(1) GDPR are only living persons (Recital 27 GDPR) the data concerning already deceased persons does not constitute personal data under the GDPR. Secondly, contrary to the arguments of the Bundestag, the post-mortem right of personality also does not prevent the disclosure of the concerned information. The deceased are not protected by the general right of personality under Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Basic Law as only living individuals are the bearers of this fundamental right. The protection of the post-mortem right of personality, also resulting from Article 1 (1) of the Basic Law, is an altogether separate right to the general right of personality. The post-mortem right of personality protects, on the one hand, a general right to respect, as well as, on the other hand, a right of the deceased to not be degraded or humiliated. Nevertheless, in the interpretation of the court, this right only protects against gross distortion, but not against mere questioning. In the present case, the disclosure would neither be connected with a degrading nor would it entail a gross distortion of the image of their life.","title":"VG Berlin - 2 K 98/20"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 34/2020","text":"The Dispute Chamber of the GBA found that the use of personal data obtained via the data-bank of vehicles by customers of NV Informex, in particular insurance companies, for the purpose of creating personalized price offers constitutes direct marketing and violates Articles 5 and 6 of the GDPR and Article 25 of the Royal Decree of 8th of July 2013. The Federal Public Service Mobility and Transportation was ordered to bring this personal data processing in compliance with GDPR within 6 months.\nThe Dispute Chamber also issued a reprimand against the Federal Public Service Mobility and Transportation for violating Articles 12, 13, 14 of GDPR and ordered to bring the relevant information provisions in compliance with GDPR within 3 months.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 34/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 21/3636","text":"The Court upheld the claim. Regarding the first registration (on alleged domestic violence), the Court considered that, in 2019, the police had decided not to further investigate the allegations of domestic violence brought forward by the data subject's ex-wife. Hence, the Court stated that the report needed to be rectified in the sense that it must speak of \"alleged\" domestic violence. Moreover, the Court found that it must clearly follow from the report that the temporary ban to enter his previous home was instated by the judge in the divorce procedure and had nothing to do with the alleged domestic violence. Regarding the second registration, the Court found that the report did not accurately display that the new address his ex-wife had moved into with their son, and that he was not provided this information. The Court concluded that the personal data held by the Police was inaccurate, and ordered the police to grant the data subject's right to rectification and correct it.","title":"Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 21/3636"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W252 2246581-1/6E","text":"The court upheld the controller's appeal.\nFirst, the court noted that, according to Article 15(1)(h) GDPR, in case of automated decision-making the controller shall provide the data subject with an explanation about the logic behind the processing. However, this 'logic' shall not be understood as the algorithm or mathematical formula underlying the automated decision. Rather, the controller shall provide the following pieces of information: a) categories of personal data and why they are relevant to the creation of the profile; b) how the profile is created by automated means, with specific regard to the statistical method used; c) why the profile is relevant for the decision; d) how the profile is actually used in the context of the decision.\nIn the case at issue, the court held that the information provided by the controller was sufficient, as the controller disclosed all the elementes listed above in a comprehensive manner. Data used and their function in the weighting was clearly stated by the controller, alongside with the meaning of the results (the profile) and the statistical nature of the processing. The data subject could thus understand the processing of their personal data. The court stressed that a more accurate description of how the concrete weighting of the parameters took place would have amounted to the disclosure of the mathematical formula (i.e. the algorithm) governing profiling, which is not covered by the GDPR.","title":"BVwG - W252 2246581-1/6E"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Gelderland - C/05/400739 / KG ZA 22-54","text":"The Court decided that the registration was unlawful and ordered the controller to remove the special code “9 Dispute” from the registration pursuant to Article 17(1)(d) GDPR.\nFirst, it considered that the data subject did not explain what the legal basis was to have the actual registrations removed (rather than only the special codes that are linked to the registrations), or why this should follow from the circumstances of the case. Hence, it rejected the claim to have the actual registrations removed.\nSecond, it considered that the claim to have the special codes (linked to the registrations) erased and to keep having these codes erased. The Court also rejected this claim since it could not assess any potential future registrations in advance. The Court stipulated that every registration must be assessed on the merits of that specific case.\nThird, the Court assessed the lawfulness of the registration of special code “9 Dispute”, and whether it should be erased pursuant to Article 17(1)(d) GDPR. The Court stipulated the controller has the duty to prove adherence to the principle of lawfulness and transparency pursuant to Article 5(1)(a) GDPR. Moreover, it considered that the BKR added this code on its own behalf (and not on the behalf of credit providers), that BKR did not inform the data subject of this registration pursuant to Article 14 GDPR, and that this special code is not mentioned on their webpage which provides explanation on the different special codes. The Court concluded that the controller violated its duty to be transparent and to inform data subjects pursuant to Article 5 in combination with Article 14 GDPR.","title":"Rb. Gelderland - C/05/400739 / KG ZA 22-54"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00274/2019","text":"Thus, the AEPD understood that the defendant has infringed the integrity and confidentiality principle included at Article 5(1)(f) GDPR. Consequently, after considering some circumstances [(i) the local scope of the processing activity made by the defendant, (ii) the number of persons affected by the processing activity, (iii) there is no evidence that the defendant has adopted any measures in order to prevent such issues to happen again in the future, (iv) there is no evidence of wilful misconduct by the defendant, even being this issue a very serious breach of the law, (v) the link between the activity of the defendant and the processing of personal data, and (vi) the defendant has not the consideration of big company, despite it represents a big number of public workers throughout the country], the AEPD decided to impose a fine of 3,000 € to the defendant.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00274/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00317/2019","text":"Thus, the AEPD understood that the right of access has been duly fulfilled, and so it decided not to impose any fine nor warning to the defendant.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - TD/00317/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202303454","text":"According to the DPA, the processing did not meet the requirements under Spanish data protection law (Organic Law on Protection of Personal Data and Guarantee of Digital Rights or LOPDGDD). Article 20 LOPDGDD has specific requirements for data processing for credit information purposes. The DPA stated that the inclusion of the data subject’s debt in the ASNEF database was unlawful; the data subject’s debt was exonerated, and therefore the requirement of enforceability did not apply. The DPA also considered the fact that the controller was aware of this exoneration from the data subject’s data erasure requests.\nFurthermore, the DPA considered this a violation of Article 5(1) GDPR and 6(1) GDPR. There is a potential presumption of lawfulness if the processing meets the conditions of Article 20 LOPDGDD. However, the processing was not lawful under the LOPDGDD, and the controller could also not rely on any of the legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR.\nFinally, the DPA dismissed the controller’s arguments. Under national bankruptcy law, the creditor is responsible for notifying credit information systems if previously reported debts have been exonerated. The contract between the data subject’s bank and the controller explicitly states that the buyer (the controller) is aware of this. The debtor is also allowed to carry out a request to update the information, however, it is not an obligation.\nThe DPA fined the controller €200,000. The DPA considered this a serious violation of the data subject’s rights, due to the lack of lawfulness and that it affected the data subject’s financial solvency.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202303454"}
{"_id":"holding_DPC (Ireland) - TikTok","text":"The DPC found that TikTok had infringed Article 46(1) GDPR in respect of the transfers of the personal data of EEA users via remote access to China. The DPC held that TikTok had failed to verify, guarantee and demonstrate that the supplementary measures and standard contractual clauses (SCCs) relied upon were effective to ensure that the personal data of EEA users were afforded a level of protection essentially equivalent to that in the EU.\nThe DPC also found that TikTok had infringed Article 13(1)(f) GDPR, the obligation on controllers to inform data subjects of their intention to transfer their personal data to a third country at the point of data collection in respect of their October 2021 privacy policy. The DPC held that TikTok failed to both name the third country in question (China), and to specify the manner in which this processing occurred (i.e. by remote access).\nFor these infringements, the DPC levied a fine of €530 million. This figure was comprised of a €485 million euro fine of their infringement of Article 46(1) and a €45 million euro fine for having infringed Article 13(1)(f). TikTok were also ordered to bring their processing into compliance within six months and ordered to suspend transfers to China if they fail to do so within that timeframe.","title":"DPC (Ireland) - TikTok"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100300","text":"The AEPD, however, dissented and stated that what the data subject asked for was not included within the framework of data protection.\nTherefore, Article 16 GDPR cannot be applied. Article 16 refers to inaccurate personal data, not to the rectification of processes within the workplace.\nThe AEPD stated that it is not within their functions to rectify parameters that may affect the economic outcome or performance of individuals, regardless the data subjects consider the formula is accurate, since they affect various individuals and are therefore not considered personal data.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100300"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 154/2023","text":"The Belgian DPA found that the camera surveillance was in violation of the principle of data minimisation (Article 5(1)(c) GDPR) and CLA No. 68.\nIn this decisions, many references are made to CLA 68 on camera surveillance in the workplace. This is an important collective labour agreement for Belgian companies in the private sector as it lists the five purposes for which camera surveillance is permitted in the workplace:\n  * Safety and health;\n  * Protection of property;\n  * Monitoring the production process (machines only);\n  * Monitoring the production process (employees);\n  * Monitoring employee performance.\nThe CLA states that for the last two purposes, camera surveillance cannot be continuous. As such, the controller's use of continuous surveillance was in violation of CLA No. 68.\nMoreover, the purpose of the cameras communicated to the employees was security, not the evaluation of employees' performance. Consequently, the continuous monitoring of employees was not necessary for the purpose of maintaining security in the shops, and as such, was a violation of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR.\nThe Belgian DPA acknowledged that the surveillance was also a violation of Article 8 ECHR (right to private life), and referred to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case of Antović and Mirković v. Montenegro. This case also concerned CCTV surveillance in the workplace. Here the European Court of Human Rights held that covert video surveillance of employees at their workplace was a considerable intrusion into their private life, and thus was a violation of Article 8 ECHR.\nAs a result, the Belgian DPA issued a warning to the shop owner and recommended that they should take steps to adequately inform employees about the purposes of camera surveillance.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 154/2023"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2022-441-12449","text":"The DPA held that in systems with confidential information about a large number of users, higher requirements must be placed on the controller to prevent unauthorised access to the data. In particular, the controller must store passwords in irreversible encrypted form at all times and in a way that ensures that they are not immediately readable and that it is not possible to recreate the password in a readable format. The DPA also emphasised that storing passwords in plain text poses a high risk to data subjects because they can be misused internally and because shopping platforms are known to be a common target of cyberattacks. Therefore, storing passwords in a readable format in a log file violates Article 32(1) GDPR. Consequently, the DPA reprimanded the Salling Group for the violation and ordered it to notify affected data subjects about the breach by 1 August 2022.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2022-441-12449"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202202898","text":"The DPA determined that the controller had violated Article 6(1) GDPR because of a lack of a legal basis for processing. The DPA determined that this was a fraudulent contract because of a missing signature from the data subject. The processing by the controller was carried out without a legitimate reason.\nThe DPA originally fined the controller €30,000. That amount was reduced to €24,000 due to a voluntary payment by the controller.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202202898"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-015","text":"Following the meeting, the French DPA first found that the company had electronic commercial canvassing operations carried out on its behalf by service providers and was unable to provide proof of validly expressed consent by prospective customers to be ‘cold’ called. The data from these prospects came from the service providers, but the prospective costumers did not validly consent to receive 'cold' calls from the company, as they were not informed of the identity of the canvasser on whose behalf the consent was collected when ticking the box to consent to receive commercial canvassing by electronic means. Additionally, when the company did not collect consent directly from the prospective customers, it was the company's responsibility to obtain such consent before carrying out any canvassing activity. And pursuant to Article 7(1) GDPR, the company must be able to prove that it had such consent. Thus, the company failed to comply with its obligations arising from Article L. 34-5 of the French CPCE and Article 7(1) GDPR, as clarified by Article 4(11) GDPR.\nSecondly, the DPA found no breach of Article 13 GDPR as the company's privacy policy was amended and clarified the data retention period. And even if there was no mention of the right to lodge a complaint with the French DPA in the company's privacy policy, this could be understood by the compilation of several documents, accessible from the website.\nMoreover, regarding the information provided to prospective customers during ‘cold’ calls, the DPA established a breach of Article 14 GDPR since when the company collected a telephone number from a third party for ‘cold’ calls, it should have informed the person of the purpose of the data processing or the existence of various rights, while the costumers were not always made aware of this.\nFourthly, based on the complaints lodged by three complainants, the DPA considered that the company had failed to comply with its obligations under Article 12 GDPR. The DPA noted that the requests made by the complainants were clear and addressed directly to the company's DPO. However, the company failed to provide the data subjects with information on the measures taken in response to their requests within a maximum period of one month under Article 12(3) GDPR, confirming a breach of Article 12 GDPR. Taking this last consideration, the DPA noted that it was clear from the information gathered that the complainants' requests had been received by the company, meaning that it failed to fulfil its obligations to process the requests, failing to comply with Article 15 GDPR.\nAdditionally, the DPA addressed the company’s contract with its processor. During the inspections, the DPA found that all the relevant information under Article 28 GDPR was present. However, the document was amended without communicating this to the DPA, and not all the information required under Article 28(3) GDPR was included. The DPA noted that the new documents now contain all the necessary information. Nonetheless, it considered that the past processing operations still failed to comply with Article 28(3) GDPR.\nThe DPA also found safety obligations issues and a breach of Article 32 GDPR as it noted that the company should have implemented a robust authentication policy as a basic security measure to keep passwords secure and comply with the Articles' obligations. Meanwhile the MD4 algorithm used by the company to store employee passwords at the time of the inspections was obsolete and insufficiently robust to ensure the confidentiality of passwords. According to the DPA, it had been known for years that the MD4 algorithm is subject to vulnerability and is immediately exploitable by attackers.\nLastly, the DPA addressed the company’s failure to comply with the obligation to notify the DPA of a personal data breach. Indeed, on 5 February 2020, the company was informed by subscribers of a data breach as subscribers accessing their account were able to view information relating to other subscribers, such as their postal address and telephone number. The DPA noted that 10,154 people were affected by the breach, not a negligible number, and since the breach was likely to infringe on subscribers' right to privacy, the company should have notified the DPA of the personal data breach. Thus, there had been a breach of Article 33 GDPR.\nDue to the numerous breaches committed, some structural and certainly serious while others less severe and taking into consideration as mitigating factors the measures taken by the company, which has brought itself into compliance on certain points, the French DPA fined the company €600,000, on the basis of Article 83 GDPR.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2023-015"}
{"_id":"holding_Gerechtshof Amsterdam - 200.258.736/01","text":"Court of Appeal is of the opinion that the documents as such could not be qualified as personal data within the meaning of the Wbp and the AVG: the requested data mainly relate to information regarding persons working at ABN AMRO, the question as to which persons had access to certain data and the question as to why, when and by whom the acts referred to by [Appellant 1] were performed. He also requested a large number of reports of telephone conversations and e-mail correspondence. On the basis of the CJEU case-law in Y vs MS and the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that such data can be regarded as personal data, since these (internal) documents relating to certain acts of ABN AMRO are not in themselves data about [Appellant 1], and these documents as such cannot be checked or corrected by [Appellant 1]. Therefore, ABN AMRO cannot be obliged to grant access to or a copy of these documents by invoking the Wbp and the AVG.","title":"Gerechtshof Amsterdam - 200.258.736/01"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-31-4326","text":"The DPA reprimanded Jo:ga for failing to process the members´ personal data in accordance with Article 32(1) GDPR. The DPA found in particular that the company had not implemented appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, namely by allowing an unlimited number of failed login attempts, and by using its members' dates of birth as a permanent password.\nThe DPA emphasized that known or easily accessible information such as a date of birth should only be used as an initial password, and should not be imposed as a permanent password. The DPA also stressed that the lack of sufficient security measures makes it possible for unauthorised persons to gain access to members´ personal information, e.g., by using a brute-force attack or acquiring members´ data.\nThe DPA ordered the company to bring the processing of its members´ personal data in line with the requirements set out in the Article 32(1) GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-31-4326"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - 2020112830","text":"The Icelandic DPA dismissed the student’s claim regarding the alleged forced consent to the online monitoring of the exam and the disregard for their objection, confirming that the student had indeed been given the option of taking the examination in person at the campus. Furthermore, it explained that in any case, consent could not be a valid legal basis for this processing, since it could not be freely given in this context due to the nature of the relationship between the University and the student. However, it confirmed the university’s position with regard to its legitimate interest in monitoring the examination, and hence held that the processing was lawful under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR.\nRegarding the student’s claim related to the potential exposure of their spouse’s medical data within the recordings, the DPA held that the complaint did not include a power of attorney from the student's spouse, and therefore only claims related to the student’s own personal data would be considered. Additionally, the DPA noted that in any case, due to the fact that audio recordings only took place during the roll call at the beginning of the Zoom session, and not throughout the examination itself, it was unlikely that their spouse’s medical data were captured in the recordings.\nAs to the security of the personal data, the DPA held that the university had implemented appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk in the processing under Article 32 GDPR. The DPA took into account, inter alia, that a GDPR compliant processing agreement existed for the hosting of Zoom calls (which included restricted access to system administrators with strong passwords), that meeting data streams were encrypted, that the option for other attendees to record sessions was disabled, that recordings were deleted after 30 days, and that access to these recordings were only available to the heads of departments on the grounds of a reasonable suspicion that cheating occurred in an examination.\nHowever, the DPA found that the university had not fulfilled its responsibility to properly inform the students subjected to the online monitoring as to the legal basis, purposes, security measures, and the student's data protection rights related to this processing. Therefore, the DPA held that this processing was unlawful under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR since it was not carried out in a transparent form, without providing the students the information required under Article 13 GDPR. Therefore, it issued a reprimand against the university on this point, and ordered them to adequately comply with this obligation in the future.","title":"Persónuvernd (Iceland) - 2020112830"}
{"_id":"holding_CE - 464445","text":"The Conseil d'État rejected the Data Subject's request, upholding the CNIL’s decision to close the complaint.\nThe Court found that the CNIL correctly applied GDPR regulations, specifically Article 55 and Article 56, which dictate that in cross-border data processing situations, the Lead Supervisory Authority is generally that of the main establishment of the controller, unless the data processing is confined to a single member state and significantly affects individuals only in that state.\nIn this case, the CNIL determined that the relevant data processing was indeed cross-border, handled by a central office in France, but the complaint was specific to the Data Subject employment in Ireland, making the Irish Data Protection Authority solely competent to address it.","title":"CE - 464445"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - NTT Data Romania SA","text":"The DPA investigated the breach and found that the controller failed to implement appropriate securit measure, and to monitor their effectiveness. The DPA also found that the controller failed to report the breach within 72 hours.\nThe DPA fined the controller RON 124,432.50 (€25,000) for violating Article 32(1)(b), (d) and (2) GDPR, as well as Article 33(1) GDPR","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - NTT Data Romania SA"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 22/2125","text":"The District Court of Rotterdam held that searching a general system was not sufficient. The Court found that the controller's view that there were too many systems was not supported by evidence, unsubstantiated, and insufficient reasoning to suffice with the limited search it conducted and that the controller's general reference to grounds for exemption in the GDPR was insufficient. The controller had therefore not complied with the data subject's request.\nFurthermore, the Court held that the controller should have specified purposes, recipients and sources per Article 15(1). The mere listing of the personal data found, followed with a general explanation of how the Tax Administration handles personal data was not enough. The Court held that this did not allow the data subject to verify the lawfulness of processing under Article 15 GDPR.\nThe Court declared the appeal well-founded, annulled the contested decision and ordered the controller to make a new decision, taking this judgement into account.","title":"Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 22/2125"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 202001651/1/A3","text":"On the first point, the Council ruled that the appellant had already had direct access to his data via the YouForce personnel file, which means his request should not have been considered as access request.\nOn the second point, the Council established that the appellant did not object to the performance reports and assessments as such. He also did not object to having these reports digitalized, provided that the storage would take place on the premises of the municipality, for example on the computer of his supervisor. However, appellant did not want the reports to be stored by third parties, such as Servicepunt71 and RAET B.V. It was not made clear during the hearing which legal basis applied to this personal data processing by the municipality, but the Council considered the circumstances and came to the conclusion that the interest of the municipality for centralizing and streamlining HR administration while giving employees access to the information outweighs the interest of the appellant to have his data stored inside of the municipality. The Council took into account that the municipality had all contracts in place to ensure that Service71 complies with the GDPR and RAET B.V. was a reliable data processor. The appellant also did not clarify why the processing of his health data must be seen as illegal under Article 9(2)(b) of the GDPR, so this argument was skipped by the Council.\nOn the third point, the municipality explained that the company Mindtree was engaged by RAET B.V. for monitoring and technical management of the HRM tool, including the disk capacity monitoring, backup processes and system availability checks. No personal data of employees of the municipality of Leiden in general and personal data of the appellant in particular were processed by Mindtree. The appellant did not challenge these statements. The Council agreed with the Court in that there was no reason to assess the lawfulness of the personal data processing by Mindtree.","title":"RvS - 202001651/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00182/2020","text":"Thus, the AEPD understood that the defendant has infringed the lawfulness principle included at Article 6 GDPR, as it did not have the corresponding legal basis to process the personal data of the claimant when it charged him five invoices. Consequently, after considering some circumstances [(i) there is a wilful misconduct by the defendant, (ii) basic personal data have been affected, (iii) the duration of the infraction by the defendant, and (iv) the evident connection between the main activity of the defendant ant the processing of personal data], the AEPD decided to impose a fine of € 75000 to the defendant.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00182/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_Gerechtshof Amsterdam - 200.251.466/01","text":"The Amsterdam Court of Appeal considered that a request under Article 21 GDPR can be made at any time and several times. It also found that a provisional measure can be granted under Article 21 GDPR if an urgent action is needed.\nHowever, in the present case, the Court stated that the applicant did not prove the urgent interest for the interim measures. Thus, the measures could not be granted and the dedicated claim was rejected as inadmissible.\nThe Court found that the applicant should have submitted a new request under Article 21 GDPR.","title":"Gerechtshof Amsterdam - 200.251.466/01"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W298 2274626-1/8E","text":"The BVwG held that the data subject had not given his clear consent to the reCatpcha data processing.\nEven though the controller had not listed Article 6(1)(f) GDPR as a legal basis for processing, the court analysed whether this could legitimize the data processing. The Google reCaptca service was held to be unnecessary and therefore the controller could not rely on a legitimate interest.\nTherefore, none of the legal bases under Article 6(1) GDPR applied and the data processing violated the data subject’s right to privacy under §1(1) of the Austrian Data Protection Act. The BVwG therefore upheld the decision of the DPA.","title":"BVwG - W298 2274626-1/8E"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Amsterdam - C/13/692003/HA RK 20-302","text":"The Court found that Uber's contract termination procedure does not constitute automated decision making under Article 22 GDPR. In view of this explanation from Uber, the court assumed that the decision to temporarily block access to the Driver app after a fraud signal was taken automatically, without human intervention. However, this temporary blocking had no long-term or permanent effect, so that the automated decision had no legal consequences or significantly affected the driver.\nSubsequently, the Court concluded that the argument of the applicants that they were not informed in advance by Uber about the possible consequences of fraudulent acts is not supported by the facts. After all, it is not disputed between the parties that different conditions apply to the contractual relationship between Uber and the drivers, including 'Community Guidelines', 'Driver Terms' and 'Services Agreements'.\nThe Court concluded that for two of the applicants it must have been sufficiently clear from the messages from Uber they received and the explanation that Uber provided to them which fraudulent actions led to the deactivation of their accounts. According to the Court, there is therefore no violation of transparency obligations.\nHowever, two other applicants were in a different position. According to the Court, Uber has not clarified which specific fraudulent actions resulted in their accounts being deactivated. In the Court's view, the decision to deactivate their accounts was insufficiently transparent and verifiable. As a result, Uber must provide them with access to their personal data pursuant to Article 15 of the GDPR insofar as they were the basis for the decision to deactivate their accounts, in such a way that they can are able to verify the correctness and lawfulness of the processing of their personal data.","title":"Rb. Amsterdam - C/13/692003/HA RK 20-302"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-442-8862","text":"First, the DPA noted that the controller is obliged to take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure an appropriate level of security relating to its processing. Now, the DPA found during its investigation that the controller, before both updates, did not qualify and perform any tests to identify how the update on the platform would affect the integrated database. In this regard, the DPA emphasised that even minor changes in integrated systems can lead to significant risks of data subjects, the sensitive nature of the personal data and the fact that there were two breaches. Lastly, as explained, the controller did not inform the Authority. Considering all of the foregoing, the DPA concluded that the controller violated Article 32(1) GDPR.\nSecond, the DPA considered that the breach of health data poses a high risk to the rights of the citizens concerned. Moreover, it noted that the controller notified the data subjects affected by the data breach via a health professional notification. However, the DPA found that this notification satisfied the requirements of Article 34(2) and Article 33(3) GDPR.\nThe DPA expressed serious criticism to the controller for violating Article 32(1) GDPR. Moreover, it issued a warning pursuant to Article 58(2)(a) and ordered the controller to bring its processing operations into compliance with the GDPR, pursuant to Article 58(2)(d) GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-442-8862"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 130/2021","text":"The Belgian DPA found that the Authority had obtained the personal data of the Complainant for a specific purpose, namely to investigate and impose a fine for illegal dumping in the context of the GAS procedure.\nThe Belgian DPA stressed that the Authority did not need to reveal the identity of the Complainant to the four suspects to be able to investigate the illegal dumping and impose a fine. In other words, the four suspects were not part of the category of recipients to whom the personal data should have been disclosed for the purpose of the processing to be achieved. As a consequence, the Belgian DPA found that there had been a breach of the principle of purpose limitation pursuant to Article 5(1)(b) GDPR, since the disclosure of the Complainant's personal data by the Authority to the four suspects was not in accordance with the intended purpose for which the data were initially provided by the Complainant. Furthermore, the Belgian DPA found that the disclosure was made without the prior consent consent of the Complainant. As a consequence, such processing had no valid legal basis pursuant to Article 6(1)(a) GDPR. The Belgian DPA therefore also found a breach of Article 6 GDPR.\nDespite the existence of these breaches, the Belgian DPA noted that, in the course of the proceedings, the Authority had explicitly acknowledged having committed a serious error, and had stated that it understood the importance of handling confidential data with care. The Authority also timely reported this incident to the Belgian DPA, and presented concrete measures to avoid such incidents in the future. For these reasons, the Belgian DPA decided to issue a warning, but did not impose any fine on the Authority.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 130/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_TADM - 46401","text":"Involvement of the group's DPO\nThe court held that in order for the DPO to comply with its obligation to inform and advise the controller under Article 39(1) GDPR, it is necessary and imperative for the DPO to be involved in questions and projects involving issues relating to the protection of personal data at the earliest possible stage. The court found that the handling of the requests and complaints by data subjects was done by a local contact point without intervention of the group's DPO. The group's DPO was only involved when a data subject was not satisfied with the handling by the local contact point. Although the controller referred to regular communications via telephone, video conferences and e-mails between the local contact point and the group's DPO, it did not provide any documentation of these communications. It was also not demonstrated that the group's DPO had preliminary been consulted about putting into place the GDPR Board.\nThe court dismissed the controller's argument that the DPA did not take into account that the controller appointed its own DPO during the investigation. The DPA only considered the facts as they existed on the day it started its investigation. The court agreed with the DPA that any changes made by the controller during the investigation would not eliminate an established breach and would not relieve the controller from their responsibility.\nThe court also dismissed the controller's argument that the CNIL came to a different conclusion during its investigation of the parent company of the group and the other entities located in France. The court held that the CNIL's finding had no relevance as it did not concern the activities in Luxembourg and both the court and DPA are not bounded by decisions from administrative authorities or courts in other countries.\nThus, the court found that the DPO was not directly involved in all data protection-related matters. Therefore, the controller violated Article 38(1) GDPR and Article 39 GDPR.\nAvailable resources for the DPO\nThe court held that the controller did not present any information about formalising the working time devoted to data protection of the local contact point. The court also noted that the local contact point was the only lawyer in the controller's company in Luxembourg. The court held that the DPO had to be involved in all personal data protection related matters, general consultation was not sufficient. The court then took into account the volume of activities of the controller in Luxembourg (70 sites, between 1600 and 2100 employees and 25000 consumers per day), which would have justified at least one full time person being devoted to data protection. The court thus found that the controller violated Article 38(2) GDPR by not providing sufficient resources to its DPO.\nImposed fine\nConcerning the proportionality of the fine, the court took into account Article 83 GDPR and the seriousness of the violation. The court found that the fine was proportionate as the violations that were found were serious, involved potentially a large number of people and lasted at least from 25 May 2018 to 1 October 2020.\nThus, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the DPA's decision that the controller violated Article 38(1) and (2) and Article 39 GDPR.","title":"TADM - 46401"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 04/2023","text":"The DPA confirmed that the data subject correctly exercised his right to erasure. It also reiterated that the controller had explicitly stated that it had been unable to delete the e-mail address of the data subject from its address list. Thus, the DPA determined that the controller did not fulfil the principle of accountability under Article 5(2) GDPR, because it did not show that it could comply with the data subject's erasure request and was also unable to show that it facilitated the exercise of data subject's rights in Articles 15 - 22 GDPR, in this case, the right of erasure.\nThe DPA held that a by not granting the request to erasure, the controller had violated Articles 5(2) GDPR, 12(2) GDPR and 17(1) GDPR.\nThe DPA also determined that the controller's action of asking the data subject for additional e-mail addresses violated Article 5(1)(c) GDPR, the principle of data minimization. A controller had to be able to erase personal data from its database without asking additional e-mail addresses of data subjects. However, the DPA also confirmed that the controller's practice of sending mails using the 'BCC' feature was in line with the data minimisation principle, because this made it possible to e-mail different recipients without disclosing the identities of all recipients in the e-mail.\nThe DPA ordered the controller to comply with the erasure request pursuant of Article 58(2)(c) GDPR.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 04/2023"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 1150/161/2021","text":"The Finnish DPA found that the firm had violated Articles 33(1) GDPR (notification of data breaches to the DPA) and Article 34(1) GDPR (communication of data breaches to data subjects) for having failed to report in due time the data breaches to the Finnish DPA and to the data subjects, respectively.\nFurthermore, the Finnish DPA found that Article 5(1)(f) GDPR had been violated because the Firm had failed to implement appropriate security measures to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the personal data. The Finnish DPA also considered that the Firm had violated its security obligations under Articles 24(1), 25(1), 32(1) and 32(2) GDPR. Finally, the Finnish DPA considered that the firm had failed to respect the principle of accountability enshrined in Article 5(2) GDPR, as it could not demonstrate compliance with the core principles of the GDPR.\nThe Sanctions Board of the Finnish DPA decided to impose a fine of €145,600 for infringement of Article 33(1) GDPR, a fine of €145,600 for infringement of Article 34(1) GDPR, and a fine of €316,800 for infringement of Article 5(1)(f) GDPR. In total, the administrative fine thus amounted to €608,000, representing around 4.2% of the Firm's turnover for the year 2020.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 1150/161/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9771545","text":"The Italian DPA held that the controller violated the principle of fairness and in particular the principle of storage limitation by keeping the data subject's account active after inhibiting her access to it (Article 5(1)(a)(e) GDPR). The DPA specified that, according to its own case law, work emails of employees must be deactivated at the end of the employment relationship. The DPA further clarified that the data rights of workers must be protected in the employment relationship regardless of the legal nature of the relationship itself. The data subject's position as an independent contractor thus did not change this.\nThe DPA also held that Article 13 GDPR was violated, as the controller failed to provide the data subject with the required information on the processing of her personal data. Finally, the DPA held that the company violated Articles 12(3) and 15 GDPR by failing to respond to the data subject's access request.\nThe DPA orders the controller to adopt suitable organisational technological measures to allow the data subject to access the email account and to deactivate it within 7 days. Additionally, to adopt an automated system to provide relevant third parties with an alternative (email) address and suitable measures to prevent the display of incoming messages within 10 days. The DPA further orders the controller to adopt measures to ensure requests from data subjects to exercise their rights are handled in a suitable and timely manner. The DPA prohibits the controller to further process personal data on the email account, without prejudice to the preservation necessary for the ongoing procedures regarding the breach of confidentiality. The DPA imposed a fine of €50.000 on the controller.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9771545"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202103886","text":"The DPA found that the controller's consent banner violated Article 22.2 of the Spanish Law on Services of the Information Society and Electronic Commerce (Ley 34/2002, de 11 de julio, de servicios de la sociedad de la información y de comercio electrónico - LSSI) which requires service providers to obtain consent before installing non-essential cookies. The use of pre-ticked boxes is not a valid basis for consent, and the impossibility to reject cookies miscategorized as essential is not legal either.\nFor these violations, the DPA ultimately fined the controller €18,000; an inital €30,000 fine was reduced by 40% because the controller voluntarily acknowledged responsibility for the infractions and agreed to pay the fine before final resolution of the sanctioning procedure.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202103886"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 202002834/1/A3","text":"The appeal is unfounded.\nThe Council of State ruled that the appellant did not make it plausible that the Minister did not provide all the documents covered by her request. Also, in view of Article 15(1) of the GDPR, the appellant has no right to personal data of third parties. This includes information by which a third party can be directly or indirectly identified. The Minister has therefore rightly omitted/deleted the litigated passages.","title":"RvS - 202002834/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 25/2020","text":"The Litigation Chamber stated the \"invite a friend\" functionality made the provider a controller within the meaning of the GDPR, and such processing of personal data did not fall within the scope of the \"household exemption\". Therefore, the GDPR applied in full.\nOnly the data subject whose personal data are processed can validly consent to the processing of this data. The collection of contact details can take place only on a compare and forget basis: all data of non users of the platform should be deleted. That was not the case here.\nNo consent is required for an e-mail invitation to the user's non-member contacts under the following conditions (already stated by the Article 29 WP):\n  * no pressure should be applied to the transmitter or receiver;\n  * the provider is not allowed to choose the addressees of the message;\n  * the identity of the user sending the message must be clearly indicated;\n  * the user sending the message must be aware of the full content of the message to be sent on his behalf.\nThe social media provider claimed that others social media providers were following the same practices. However, the litigation chamber considered that was not a proper argument.\nAs conclusion, the litigation chamber imposed a fine of EUR 50,000 for processing personal data of non-members of the website without an appropriate legal basis, as well as personal data of members.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 25/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9932951","text":"The DPA assessed that the failure to reply to the request of the complainant by the data controller could be considered excusable since the complainant made an unclear request, as it referred to compensation for damages and to a streaming reproduction that the data controller never carried out.\nHowever, it also found that the data controller breached Article 136 of the Italian Privacy Code, Article 137(3) of the Italian Privacy Code, Article 139 of the Italian Privacy Code and Article 6 of the Deontological Rules, and to the general principles of lawfulness and fairness in the processing of personal data set out in Article 5(1)(a) GDPR.\nThe DPA stated that a will is not a public document to which anyone with an interest may have access, even if such data was public and acquired lawfully. Moreover, the fact that the complainant's data were essential for the validity of the holographic will did not make them essential for the right to report, which could have been pursued without providing all the complainant’s personal data. In fact, the data disseminated were more than those necessary for proper information as it exposed the data subject well beyond the circle of her acquaintances, as by publishing it, the online newspaper made the data available on the Internet to an indeterminate number of people. Since the complainant was not a public figure, the reproduction had to be subject to the requirements of fairness, relevance, non-excessiveness and necessity in relation to the public interest concerned.\nThus, the DPA prohibited the data controller from further processing the complainant’s first and last name, date of birth and address of residence, and it fined the data controller €10,000 under Article 58(2)(i) GDPR and Article 83 GDPR.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9932951"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02042","text":"1. The DPA held that Innovation Norway did not have a legal basis as per Article 6(1)(f) GDPR to conduct the credit ratings in question.\n 2. They also held that Innovation Norway hadn't followed up on their own internal policies and procedures and these were insufficient.\n 3. They also held that Innovation Norway breached their duty to notify the DPA three of the (first) personal data breaches (unlawful credit ratings), however they upheld it at the fourth.\nFor these breaches, the DPA fined Innovation Norway NOK 1,000,000.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02042"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO - FS50908339","text":"The ICO confirmed that the information requested (names of the examiners and date of the thesis' assessment) can be considered personal data related to the President Tsai Ing-wen.\nThen, the DPA evaluated if the disclosure of this information would have been lawful, fair and transparent, according to the Art. 5(1)(a) of the GDPR.\nWith regards to the lawfulness of the request, one of the legal bases listed in Article 6(1) of the GDPR must apply to the processing. In this case, the Supervisory Authority specified that the 'legitimate interest' (art. 6(1)(f)) would underlie as the most appropriate basis.\nTherefore, the ICO proceeded to assess the three-part test (legitimate interest, necessity and balancing tests) to see what would be the outcome.\nAs mention above, the data subject was interested in the legitimacy of President Tsai’s 1984 thesis (legitimate intest test) and, in his view, disclosing the names of the examiners who assessed the thesis, and the date when they ‘signed it off’, would have been necessary to support that the thesis was a valid piece of work (necessary test).\nHowever, The Authority clarified that the fact that the thesis was officially listed in the publicly searchable University library provided the confirmation of a qualification of the President Tsai Ing-wen, thus the disclosure of the requested information would not be necessary for this purpose.\nFurthermore, moving to the balancing test, the ICO interpreted this to mean that neither President Tsai nor the examiners would have expected their personal data to be released so many years before the introduction of the FOIA. Whilst President Tsai might reasonably expect this now, in particular in order to end the 'ongoing public controversy' on this topic, the Commissioner considered that disclosure remains beyond the examiners’ expectations. It is therefore possible that disclosing this information would cause them distress.\nTaking into account this evaluation, the Authority rejected the request of the data subject and confirmed the choice of the University of London to withhold these pieces of information, in the light of the insufficient legitimate interest of the individual to take priority over the data subjects’ fundamental rights and freedoms.","title":"ICO - FS50908339"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03823-45","text":"The DPA highlighted that regardless of whether the appointment of a DPO is mandated in accordance with Article 37(1) GDPR, the requirements for the role in Articles 38 & 39 GDPR apply if a DPO is appointed by the controller. Accordingly, the DPA found that the presence of absence of such mandate could not influence the levying of sanctions.\nThe DPA was critical of the absence of documented reasoning for the termination of the DPO on the basis that one is not required under Article 37(1) GDPR. On this point, the DPA found a violation of Article 24 had occurred, with such documentation being necessary to demonstrate compliance with the GDPR, as required by Article 24. The DPA also noted that the actual processing activities of the controller were much broader than that claimed by them in the course of the investigation, and that when assessing the scope of processing activities, controller must also have regard to the activities that entity performs as a data processor.\nIn respect of the absence of published contact details of the DPO, the DPA found that the controller had violated Article 37(7).\nThe DPA found that there was a lack of evidence to conclude that the controller failed to involve the DPO in all matters in relation to data protection, in violation of Article 38(1) GDPR. It was held, however, that there existed a lack of policies detailing how the DPO should be involved, in violation of Article 24 GDPR.\nThe DPA found that the controller infringed Article 38(2) GDPR in failing to provide the DPO with the resources necessary to perform the tasks outlined in Article 39 GDPR.\nIn spite of the revelations of the investigation, the DPA found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the DPO was independent in the exercise of their function.\nOverall, the DPA found that the controller infringed Articles 24(1) & (2) GDPR in not having implemented sufficient organisational measures to ensure and demonstrate compliance. The DPA concluded this for a number of reasons. Firstly, the PDA foundt hat there was insufficient documentation to establish that the DPO was being involved in data protection issues in a timely manner. Secondly, the DPA found that there existed no process for establishing a line of contact between the DPO and the highest level of management. Thirdly, the controller was found to have failed to document and establish the independence of the role of the DPO, particularly ensuring the distinction between the role of associate lawyer and the DPO function. Fourthly, the DPA concluded that the controller lacked appropriate documentation to ensure general GDPR compliance. This conclusion was reached based on the inadequate documentation to standardise procedures in the areas of internal data sharing and governance, ownership of business systems, and a general lack of certainty as the role played by the controller in respect of certain data, i.e. whether they were a controller or processor.\nThe DPA ordered the controller to carry out a detailed assessment as to whether they are required to appoint a DPO in accordance with Article 37(1), to update their ROPA and ensure it accurately depicts the organisation’s processing activities, and if found to be required to appoint a DPO, to implement appropriate procedures and policies for ensuring the position’s independence, reporting line to highest levels of management, establish a separate DPO email address, and document the DPO’s shareholding in the organisation.\nThe DPA also imposed a fine of NOK 4,000,000 (€351,477.64) on the controller.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03823-45"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202307696","text":"Controller responsibility\nWith reference to Article 8 GDPR, the AEPD points out that the processor carries out their function on the instructions of the controller and that therefore violations of the GDPR are attributable to the controller. As Articles 5(2), 24, 28 and 32 GDPR set out, compliance monitoring of the processing is attributable to the controller regardless of the involvement of a processor. The AEPD established that the processor was acting on the instructions of the controller in sending the advertisements.\nGravity of the violation and setting the fine\nThe AEPD held that the controller did not adopt the required diligence as it did not prevent the processing after the request had been made.\nTherefore, on the 12 April 2024, the controller was fined €50,000 under Article 83(5)(a) GDPR for violating Article 6(1) GDPR. In setting the fine, the AEPD purported that the violation of Article 6(1) GDPR is of sufficient gravity to warrant the fine of €50,000 in light of the controller’s annual turnover.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202307696"}
{"_id":"holding_BlnBDI (Berlin) - 631.457.4 521.14765.10","text":"First, the DPA determined that there was no legal basis for the processing of the data subject's e-mail address, in violation of Article 6 GDPR.\nSecond, the DPA determined that the controller did not respond to the data subject's requests for erasure within one month, which resulted in violations of Articles 12(3) and 17 GDPR. The fact that the data subject did not address her request for erasure to the controller's DPO but to its customer service did not justify the controller's failure to reply in time. Nevertheless, there was no obligation in the GDPR for data subjects to submit their requests electronically, nor was there an obligation to send requests only to a specific e-mail address, pursuant to Article 15(3) GDPR.\nThe DPA reprimanded the controller pursuant to Article 58(2)(b) GDPR.","title":"BlnBDI (Berlin) - 631.457.4 521.14765.10"}
{"_id":"holding_EDPS - 2019-0878","text":"The EDPS held that there had been violations by the CJEU, on its own webpages of several provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.\n- Article 37 (accessing and storage of information on a terminal device), on the basis that the CJEU did not inform the user about the potential for YouTube cookies to be set if they accepted, nor did they provide a mechanism to refuse all cookies on the website.\n- Article 7 (conditions for consent), \"as the CJEU did not provide its website users with a way to withdraw their consent regarding the use of cookies as easily as giving it - such as a ‘reject’ button displayed in the same place and in the same manner as the ‘accept’ button. Instead, in order to reject cookies, users had to click on the button ‘more information’ and go almost to the bottom of the page to withdraw their consent.\"\nIt held that there were partial violations of\n- Article 14 (transparency), in relation to the CJEU's website's own YouTube cookies. In relation to the third party websites, Fashion ID applied, as the CJEU had no obligation to inform users of cookies laid by a website linked to by that website, regardless of whether it was a service the CJEU were using to deliver material or the branding on the site.\nThe CJEU rectified all breaches following the complaint, in co-operation with the EDPS. As a result, the EDPS did not use any of its corrective powers. The EDPS also used the complaint to deploy its Website Evidence Collector (WEC).\nIn relation to linked pages of third party services that the CJEU used to host branded conference videos, which laid Google and DoubleClick cookies without information or a possibility to reject, these were in breach of the law but did not fall within EDPS jurisdiction, and the CJEU had no obligation to provide information on cookies on pages it linked to (Fashion ID applied). This case clarified and confirmed that a withdraw button is needed to be placed as clearly as an accept button in order for consent to be valid to cookies and similar technologies. The EDPS took no formal action as the CJEU engaged rapidly with the organisation and rectified all breaches following the complaint.","title":"EDPS - 2019-0878"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 80/2021","text":"The DPA issued a reprimand against the company and ordered it to:\n  * comply with the right to object within a month after the notification of the decision;\n  * stop the processing of personal data for direct marketing purposes;\n  * erase all the data of the complainant (except if another legal basis could justify the processing for another purpose)\n  * notify all the recipients in accordance with Article 19 GDPR.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 80/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00177/2021","text":"The AEPD determined that the collection of data for entering a real state contract entails processing of personal data. Therefore, the controller had the obligation to provide the information required by Article 13 GDPR. However, the controller had not provided the data subject such information. The controller only mentioned the former Data Protection Act from 1999, and did not inform about the rights that the data subject is entitled to under the GDPR.\nHence, the AEPD fined the controller €2000, reduced to €1200 because of an early payment and recognition of responsibility, for a violation of Article 13 GDPR. In order to determine the amount of the fine, the DPA took into account, the absence of previous sanctions on the controller, the lack of benefit obtained by the controller and the small size of the controller.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00177/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 29-11-2021","text":"The DPA held that the collection and processing of personal data, including an ID card copy, by the controller is lawful under Article 6(1)(c) GDPR when performed to fulfill legal obligations prescribed by ZSPNIFT.\nThe DPA stated that state that the controller had a justified reason based on the ZSPNIFT for which it is obliged to unequivocally establish the identity of the client by collecting a copy of the applicant's identity card, as well as a certain amount of personal data.\nFurthermore, the DPA held that personal data must be processed lawfully under one of the legal bases set out in Article 6 of the GDPR, and the principles of lawfulness, fairness, and transparency require the data subject to be informed about the processing procedure and its purposes. In this case, the DPA found that the controller fulfilled its obligation under Article 13 of the GDPR by informing the data subject about the processing of his personal data, as evidenced by the correspondence and the document detailing the information on the processing.\nIn this administrative procedure, it was determined that the conditions for fair and lawful processing of personal data, as per Articles 5 and 6 of the GDPR, were met. The data controller demonstrated a lawful legal basis for processing the data subject's personal data, including the collection of a copy of his ID card. As a result, the data subjects's personal data was processed in a fair, lawful, and transparent manner in accordance with GDPR requirements.","title":"AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 29-11-2021"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202201721","text":"The DPA seemed to infer that identifying a client at a bank for just the sake of providing them with a bank service involves a processing operation which must be carried out in compliance with Article 32 GDPR. The Spanish DPA considered the bank to have failed in adopting appropriate security measures by not verifying the data subject's identity in a reliable manner. As highlighted by AEPD, it was negligence that would have been overcome if available protocols would have been correctly followed. For example, correctly comparing and verifying both the photograph and the signature of the document that was presented in the request.\nBy not using appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, the controller violated Article 6 and Article 32 GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202201721"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/02504","text":"The DPA found that the controller lacked a legal basis as per Article 6(1) GDPR, and informs in their decision that the relevant legal basis as per the GDPR, is Article 6(1)(f). The DPA found that the controller had also breached Article 5(2) GDPR, cf. Article 24.\nFor this, the DPA intends to fine the controller NOK 50,000 (€5,000), for conducting a credit rating without a legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR and for not adhering to the accountability principle as per Article 5(2) GDPR, cf. Article 24. The DPA also requires that the company implement internal controls of their credit rating process. The controller has four weeks to fulfill the penalties, unless they appeal.\nThe controller has three weeks to appeal the decision, otherwise it will take full effect.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/02504"}
{"_id":"holding_VG München - M 3 E 22.667","text":"The court rejected the application for interim relief in its entirety.\nThe court held that the application regarding the mask exemption certificates was already inadmissible when the data subjects filed the complaint, because, according to the uncontested statement of the controller, it transmitted all of the certificates to the prosecutor's office and did not store any certificates anymore. The court further reasoned that, because the duty to wear a mask in school was dropped on 2 April 2022, there were no indications suggesting that the data subjects will have to show further certificates in the near term.\nRegarding the collection of test certificates, the court also found the application to be inadmissible. The court established that on 30 April 2022, four days before the decision was rendered, the relevant provisions of the 16. BayIfSMV have expired so that there is no duty to show test certificates anymore to participate in classes. The court also found no indications the school will collect test certificates of the data subjects again in the near term, because a reintroduction of the duty was not foreseeable at this time.\nRegarding the storing of test certificates, the court concluded that the application was admissible but unfounded. The court did not decide on the disputed question whether a data subject has a right to an injunction under the regime of the GDPR [editorial note: see Comment section], because it found that the data subject's request can be construed as a request for deletion under Article 17 GDPR. However, the court concluded that the application against the storing of the test certificates was unfounded, because the controller processed the data in accordance with the Ordinance and the Ordinance in conjunction with Article 6(1)(c) and (e), (2), (3) GDPR constituted a valid legal basis for the processing. In this regard, the court referred to the decision by the Higher Administrative Court of Bavaria (Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof - BayVGH) from 04 November 2021 (25 NE 21.2634) in which the BayVGH established that the provisions in question were not invalid under the constitutional right to informational self-determination or under Article 9 GDPR.\nRegarding the storing of test certificates after the expiration of the relevant provisions on 30 April 2022, the court found that the law does not determine whether the test certificates collected before must be immediately deleted or whether they can be stored for the 14 days period beyond 30 April 2022. The court reasoned that the purpose of the 14 day period is that that the school can monitor compliance with the access restriction to classes and investigate any cases where the validity of the certificate is doubtful. Therefore, the court did not see why the certificates collected shortly before the 30 April 2022 should immediately be deleted on that day. Moreover, the court held that interim relief can only be granted in the form of restriction of processing as Article 18(1)(d) GDPR established only a right to restriction as long as the lawfulness of the processing can not be finally assessed.","title":"VG München - M 3 E 22.667"}
{"_id":"holding_DPC (Ireland) - IN-21-2-5","text":"Following these initial steps (commencement letter, inquiry issues paper, draft decision, other relevant materials, submissions made by VIEC) the DPC issued its final decision. This decision identified three issues for determination, and proceeded to analyse these issues in turn. Firstly, an assessment of the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons of natural persons associated with the processing in question, having regard to VIEC’s own assessment of the risks. Secondly, whether the measures implemented by VIEC prior to the breach were appropriate to ensure ongoing confidentiality, particularly concerning special category data. Thirdly, whether these measures were appropriate in light of any obligations to implement a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of its technical and organisational measures in respect of the security of the system.\nWith regard to the first question (assessment of the risks), the DPC observed the high number of data subjects involved and the sensitive nature of the data processed, and thus determined that the processing of data by VIEC is to be considered high risk. In addition, there were no specific references to the data protection in the company’s 'risk management policy'. According to the DPC, the VIEC’s use of its email system, and in particular the storing of biometric data and the lack of appropriate technical measures, created the risk of unauthorised access and disclosure. This constituted a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons in terms of both likelihood and severity.\nOn the second issue, (measures implemented by VIEC to address the risks) the DPC made a number of observations. With regard to data governance, VIEC's data protection policy appeared to be outdated since it referred to the Data Protection Acts of 1988 and 2003 and did not make reference to the GDPR or the Data Protection Act 2018. Similarly, the Employee Data Policy did not refer to the GDPR. This would suggest that these policies were not reviewed or updated prior or after the GDPR’s entry into force. Furthermore, there was no evidence that VIEC had provided phishing training to its employees prior to the data breach taking place. Moreover, in terms of technical measures, the majority of user passwords were not set to expire and VIEC did not implement multi-factor authentication for users logging into accounts. There was also no journaling in place for emails at the time of the breach, and the controller was therefore unable to search for the original phishing email. Furthermore, with reference to VIEC’s submissions above regarding the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, the DPC noted that, while the pandemic brought additional challenges, the shortcomings in the controllers processing of data and data security have existed since the implementation of the GDPR.\nAddressing the third and final question (processes to test, assess and evaluate the effectiveness of measures) the DPC observed an overall lack of any technical measures to ensure ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability, or resilience. In terms of organisational measures, VIEC had developed policies to avoid and minimise risk. The company was therefore clearly aware that the use of its email system for the storage and transfer of personal and special category data may present risks to the integrity of the data. However, no follow up action was taken to ensure that these policies were being followed or were effective. Overall, the lack of appropriate testing of technical and organisational measures, led the DPC to conclude that they did not meet the standard required by Articles 5(1)(f) and Article 32 GDPR.\nThe DPC concluded that the processing by VIEC failed to ensure that the personal data was processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage. The processing by the author of the phishing attack was unauthorised and unlawful. The processing by VIEC itself of personal and special category data on its email system prior to the phishing attack, without adequate security measures, placed such data at risk of being unlawfully accessed.\nThe DPC further added that the adequate technical and organisational measures that may have been employed by VIEC could have included, among others, appropriate encryption of personal data being transferred over external networks, and provision of suitable phishing training. Regular testing of the measures employed would also go some way to ensuring the security of processing.\nTherefore, the DPC held that VIEC infringed Articles 5(1)(f) and 32(1) GDPR, and made an order pursuant to Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, obliging VIEC to bring its processing operations into compliance with the GDPR; and also issued a reprimand upon the controller pursuant to Article 58(2)(b) GDPR. In accordance with article 83 GDPR, and taking into account the factors outlined in Article 58(2)(i) GDPR, the DPC also imposed an administrative fine of €100,000.","title":"DPC (Ireland) - IN-21-2-5"}
{"_id":"holding_IP - 07121-1/2020/2281","text":"The Slovenian DPA advised that each controller of personal data must have a legal basis for such processing.","title":"IP - 07121-1/2020/2281"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 05/2021","text":"One of the first arguments of the defendant is that it couldn't have known the identity of the third party as they are forbidden from collecting identification data for commercial purposes (article 127 WEC) when migrating from a prepaid to a postpaid abonnement.\nHowever, the Dispute Chamber states that according to article 122 WEC, that this is possible when sending invoices or to protect the private life of the clients. The defendant had to check the identity of the third party, it is a legitimate purpose to prevent identity fraud with phone numbers as the impact on a data subject can be drastic.Not checking this is marked as grave negligence.\nThe defendant states that the impact on the personal life of the complaint is minimal which the Dispute Chamber dismisses as conversations are very personal and it is easy to access WhatsApp because only a phone number is required. SMS is also used for very personal things such as reminder of meetings (e.g. hospital, special categories of data) or it can be used to impersonate someone. The possession of a phone number creates a significant risk to the personal life of the data subject.\nThe Dispute Chamber states that defendant failed to respect the data breach notification deadline under Article 33(1) as this data breach poses a high risk to the data subject.\nTo determine the risks, the Dispute Chamber used the Guidance of WP29 250rev.01[1]. Possible damages for the usage of a phone number are discrimination, identity theft- and fraud, financial loss and reputation damage.The fact that it concerns one person and for a very short time are irrelevant as the risk is very high.\nThe controller must always implement the necessary technical and organisational measures to be in compliance with the GDPR and be able to demonstrate said compliance (Article 5(2) and Article 24 GDPR). It is one of the corner stones of the GDPR.\nThe defendant, as such, failed to take proactive measures: there was no verification of the identity of the third party and the data breach was not notified nor was it justified why this data breach was not necessary nor were there any logs on the data breach which is a breach of Article 33(5).\nAnd even if a data breach poses no risks, it must still be logged internally.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 05/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 19/3036","text":"In the court's opinion, the controller was free to decide to process the personal data within the organization, or to outsource the processing to an external organization as processor, in this case DEX Online Services. In that context, Dex Online Services could rely on the basis of the controller, whereby he remained responsible for the processing that it had outsourced to Dex Online Services. Contrary to the plaintiff's submission, DEX Online Services as processor is not under any obligation to ensure that the controller, meets the obligations referred to in Article 6 GDPR.\nIn the court's opinion, the DPA was able to take the position that the accountability duty of the controller with regard to compliance with Article 5 (1) GDPR has been fulfilled . As the DPA explained at the hearing, this was substantiated in this case by submitting the signed processing agreement between the controller and DEX Online Services.\nThe court concluded that the respondent has rightly taken the position that there is no obvious violation of the GDPR and that there is no reason to further investigate the plaintiff's complaint.","title":"Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 19/3036"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100639","text":"The AEPD held that according to Article 22 of the Spanish Data Protection Act (Ley Orgánica de Protección de Datos Personales y Garantía de los Derechos Digitales – LOPDGDD), security cameras can be installed in order to preserve the safety of persons and property, as well as the security of premises, but that recording of public streets is only permitted to the extent that it is essential for these purposes. Additionally, the AEPD held that any recording of private premises cannot take place without consent.\nMorever, the AEPD held that when installing video cameras, the information requirements under Articles 12 and 13 GDPR must be fulfilled by placing a sign in a sufficiently visible place which announces that the video processing of personal data is taking place, the identity of the data controller, and the possibility for data subjects to exercise the rights provided for in Articles 15 to 22 GDPR.\nSince the individual did not submit any defense in order to justify why the cameras were pointed towards the street and adjacent private areas, the AEPD issued a fine of €1500 against the individual (€1000 for a violation of the data minimisation principle under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR, and €500 for a violation of the information requirements under Article 13 GDPR). Additionally, the AEPD ordered the individual to either take down the cameras, or to redirect them facing his property and place a sign containing the aforementioned information requirements.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202100639"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Global One 2015","text":"The Information Commissioner's Office held that Global One infringed Articles 22 and 23 PECR.\nGlobal One relied on consent obtained by another organisation (Y) to send these text messages. However, the ICO's view is that third parties cannot rely on consent provided to an organization when the consenting individuals did not know how their data would be used by third parties. Organisations can generally only send marketing messages to individuals who specifically consented to receiving them. Indirect consent collected by a third party is only authorised where it is freely given, specific and informed (Article 4(11) GDPR).\nAs there is no evidence of individuals consenting to third party marketing, the ICO concluded that Global One did not have the necessary valid consent to send marketing messages. Therefore, Global One breached Article 22 PECR.\nThe ICO also held that Global One breached Article 23(b) PECR as it did not provide a valid contact point for recipients of marketing to send a request to refuse marketing. There was also no procedure in place for handling such requests from individuals.\nThe ICO therefore decided to imposed a fine of €11600 on Global One for breaching Articles 22 and 23 PECR. The ICO concluded that the contravention was serious and negligent. The fine can be reduced by 20% if paid within a month.","title":"ICO (UK) - Global One 2015"}
{"_id":"holding_IMY (Sweden) - DI-2021-3422","text":"Indecap had stated that the file was attached to the email as a result of a mistake made by an an individual employee. However, as the data controller, Indecap is responsible for all the processing of personal data that takes place under its management or on its behalf. Thus, the Swedish DPA chose to fine Indecap and not the employee.\nIndecap is a securities company, meaning that the nature of its work imposed high protection standards as it processed, among other things, financial information and national security numbers. These high standards are also reflected in national law. Chapter 1, section 11, first paragraph of the Securities Market Act (2007:528) states that a person who is or has been affiliated with a securities company may not unauthorisedly disclose or use what he or she has learned in his or her employment or during the assignment about someone else's business or personal circumstances. It was clear that the processing in question therefore entailed high risk.\nIn accordance with Article 32 of the GDPR, Indecap has an obligation to protect the personal data that the company processes by taking appropriate technical and organisational measures. The personal data processing took place within the framework of Indecap's core business, for which the company should have had a good ability to ensure an appropriate level of security. According to Indecap's own information, the reason for the erroneously attatched file was that it had been named a similar name to another file that contained general information about the funds' performance. This suggests that Indecap did not had sufficiently clear instructions to prevent documents containing customer data from being mixed with other public documents. Moreover, the breach involved a large number of data subjects (approximately 52,000 persons).\nFor these reasons, the Swedish DPA held Indecap to have breached Article 32(1) GDPR and fined them around €43,700.","title":"IMY (Sweden) - DI-2021-3422"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 162/2024","text":"The DPA considered that the controller failed to inform and facilitate the data subject’s erasure request in accordance with Article 12(2) GDPR and Article 12(3) GDPR in relation to Article 17 GDPR. The DPA noticed that the controller should have erased the personal data following the erasure request and informed the data subject of any measure taken.\nFurthermore, the DPA pointed out that the controller may have breached Article 5 GDPR and Article 24 GDPR, stressing its obligation to implement technical and organizational measures to ensure compliance with the GDPR. The DPA took into consideration the time taken by the controller to answer the erasure request and the failure of the controller in deleting the article concerned. According to the DPA, those two factors highlighted the possibility of technical and organizational deficiencies in right’s requests management.\nThe DPA warned the controller and stressed that the aim of the warning is to prevent such a breach from happening again.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 162/2024"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9756853","text":"The Garante stated that Arte del Vivere, as a data controller, proved to be completely unable to guarantee compliance with GDPR and the data subject’s deletion request. The Garante also noted that the company showed a total lack of control over the role of the data processor, including a failure to provide documentation in this regard. Additionally, the Garante stated that the company, as the controller, should have adequate measures to intervene in order to handle the data processed, and was directly responsible for the non-deletion of the complainant's data, regardless of the individual responsibilities delegated for processing purposes. Therefore, the Garante held that these organisational deficiencies led to the failure to grant the data subject his right to the deletion of his personal data, in violation of Articles 12 and 17 GDPR. Based on these violations, the Garante issued a fine of €5000 against Arte del Vivere.\nThe amount of the fine was based on the following aggravating factors: the seriousness of the violation, given that almost 2000 data subjects' personal data were published without an update since 2014, many of which might have been added without a specific request from these data subjects, as was the case with the complainant; the controller’s negligence and failure to carry out its obligations and grant the data subject’s rights under GDPR, which it seems to have ignored until the intervention of the Garante; the fact that the controller displayed an omissive conduct when the Garante made its initial requests for information, making it necessary to employ the Financial Police in order to address the Garante’s notification, which resulted in increased costs within the procedure, and the impossibility of carrying out a thorough investigation in the preliminary phase.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9756853"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03126","text":"Pursuant to Article 58(2)(i) GDPR and Article 83(4)(a) GDPR, the DPA imposed an administrative fine of €220,337 (NOK 2 500 000) against Argon Medical Devices, Inc. for violating Article 33(1) GDPR by failing to notify a personal data breach without undue delay.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03126"}
{"_id":"holding_IMY (Sweden) - DI-2019-11737","text":"The IMY (Swedish DPA), after highlighting the fact that Bonnier set up the framework for the accessing of the personal data by the affiliate countries, held that Bonnier News AB was a joint controller in respect of the processing activities. This included the initial collection of the data, the storage of that data in the databases, the profiling of the data subjects and the use of the data for the purposes of customised advertisements and direct marketing.\nThe IMY further reasoned that as the behavioral data base distinguished users based on cookie identifiers, and the users can be individually identified from them, the behavioral data base constituted personal data.\nThe IMY then considered the validity of the controller’s reliance on legitimate interest as a lawful basis for the profiling of user data. It was found that the interest being pursued was legitimate, and the processing in question necessary for the pursuit of the interest.\nThe IMY then turned to assess the balancing of interests. In respect of the making available of completed behavior profiles, it was noted that the overall benefit of the processing was for the controller to generate revenue from advertisements. The IMY disagreed with the controller’s assertion that the processing would be consistent with the reasonable expectations of the data subject, finding that the profiling was extensive in nature and not something which could be reasonably expected without consenting. The IMY thus found that the privacy interests of the data subjects outweighed the interest being pursued by the controller and as such, the controller infringed Article 6(1) GDPR.\nWith respect to the processing of simple behavioral profiles, allowing for the mapping of individuals through observation and the use of cookies, the IMY again held that the data subject’s interest in privacy outweighs the interests of the controller. The IMY reasoned that the monitoring of data subject behavior to provide targeted advertisements could give the data subject’s the feeling that they are being monitored.\nThe IMY thus found that the controller had processed personal data for profiling based on behavioral data for the purposes of enabling targeted advertisements without a lawful basis, infringing Article 6(1) GDPR.\nThe IMY issued a fine of SEK 13,000,000 (€1,157,483.21).","title":"IMY (Sweden) - DI-2019-11737"}
{"_id":"holding_OLG Köln - 15 U 60/23","text":"On whether Google Ireland Limited is a controller\nThe court disagreed with the first instance court and held that Google Ireland Limited is the controller. The court held that it is irrelevant whether the controller only offers access to the search engine and took into account the CJEU judgement in C-131/12 - Google Spain and C-231/22 - Belgian State and held that the mere display of information containing personal data constitutes the processing of such data. The fact that the company itself does not decide which and how search results are displayed is therefore irrelevant according to the court. By offering German internet users access to the search engine, it provided users with the search results prepared by its parent company Google LLC and thus carried out data processing within the meaning of Article 4(2) GDPR.\nThe court further noted that naming Google LLC the controller in the privacy policy did not release Google Ireland Limited from its own responsibility in connection with data protection.\nOn the unlawful processing\nThe court took into account the CJEU’s judgement in C-460/20 - TU, RE v Google and held that the operator of a search engine is obliged to grand a request for erasure if the data subject can provide sufficient evidence that the information contained in the search results is manifestly inaccurate or at least part of it.\nThe court found that the data subject provided enough evidence that showed that the article provided inaccurate claims about the data subject. When weighing up the data subject’s interests, the court took into account the fact that the false allegation constituted criticism of the data subject and was therefore not value-neutral.\nTherefore, the court held that the data subject’s personal data was processed unlawfully under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR and that the processing was also not necessary for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information under Article 17(3)(a) GDPR. The court therefore ordered the controller to delete the search results that linked to the article in question.\nOn the claim for injunctive relief\nThe court held that Article 17(1) GDPR grants the data subject a right to injunctive relief in addition to the right to erasure. The court imposed a fine of up to € 250,000 for each violation if the controller violates the injunctive order.","title":"OLG Köln - 15 U 60/23"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2025-001","text":"The DPA considered that SOLOCAL acted as a controller in carrying out direct marketing on behalf of its customers and in transferring the data for companies to carry out the direct marketing themselves. The DPA considered SOLOCAL potentially as a joint controller with its partners.\nFirst, the way in which consent was collected in the online forms did not comply with consent requirements under the GDPR or national law (Postal and Electronic Communications Code or CPCE[1]). The DPA found that the design of the forms did not allow the user to give free and unambiguous consent. The forms gave a significant prominence to the buttons allowing processing for direct marketing purposes compared to the option of not consenting to direct marketing. According to the DPA, the user’s expression of wishes must relate precisely with the processing and cannot be inferred. This was supported by CJEU case law such as Planet49. Any inappropriate influence preventing the data subject from exercising their will render the consent invalid. Therefore the controller could not rely on consent as a legal basis (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR), given that the conditions for consent under Article 4(11) GDPR or Article 7 GDPR were not met.\nThe DPA also dismissed the controller’s argument on foreseeability. The DPA stated that rules relating to direct marketing and consent were available years before the investigation took place. This was especially the case considering the case law, guidelines and legal provisions it had cited to support its arguments on consent above.\nThe DPA did not consider the controller’s contractual measures as sufficient. The contractual framework was broad and placed a significant responsibility on the collectors of the data. The controller had the proactive obligation to carry out regular checks and to implement necessary consequences for the lack of validity. Furthermore, the controller had also failed to demonstrate that the data subject gave consent to process their data for direct marketing purposes under Article 7(1) GDPR and Article L. 34(5) CPCE. This was especially serious for one of the data brokers, because the controller was unable to receive information despite several requests.\nFinally, the DPA considered the legal basis to transfer the data unlawful. Under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, the interests and fundamental rights of the data subject may prevail over those of the controller taking into account the reasonable expectations of the data subject. Here, the DPA stated that the controller could not rely on legitimate interests in this case, considering the fact that the data subjects were not informed and therefore could not have reasonably expected such processing.\nThe DPA fined the controller €900,000, and ordered it to cease direct marketing activities in absence of valid consent. The severity and high number of people concerned were considered aggravating factors.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2025-001"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W256 2240235-1","text":"The BVwG did not issue a decision on the merits of the case but remitted it to the DSB, ordering it to establish the facts of the case properly. It held that the DSB failed to assess which personal data of the data subject had actually been shared with the attorney. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the DSB had also failed to establish when and how the respective data were shared with the attorney. In particular, the BVwG criticized that the DSB merely invited the parties to exchange submissions but took no further steps to objectively establish the facts of the case. Lastly, the BVwG held that the DSB failed to take into account Article 6(1)(e) and Article 9(2)(f) GDPR in their legal assessment but merely held that § 1 DSG had not been violated. The DSB will now have to follow the BVwG's orders, establish the facts of the case and assess it under Article 6 and 9 GDPR.","title":"BVwG - W256 2240235-1"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Briza Land SRL","text":"The Romanian DPA initiated an investigation, and found that the real estate agency had indeed not responded to the request and failed to grant the information requested by the data subject, in violation of Article 15 GDPR. Therefore, the DPA issued a fine of approximately €2000 (9892.6 lei in local currency) against the controller.\nThe DPA also issued a corrective measure against the agency, ordering it to communicate to the data subjected all the information they had requested regarding the processing of their personal data, and to do so in 5 working days from the communication of the decision.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Briza Land SRL"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/03500","text":"The DPA found that the Parliament, despite having identified several risks, lacked sufficient technical and organizational measures, including two-factor authentication, thus breaching Article 32(1)(b) GDPR and Article 32(1)(d), cf. Article 5(1)(f) GDPR.\nFor this, the DPA fined the Parliament about €196,400 (NOK 2 million).","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/03500"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 11/2024","text":"The Belgian DPA stressed that the controller, in its capacity, must comply with a request made by a data subject pursuant to Articles 15 to 22 GDPR, in compliance with the conditions set out in Article 12 GDPR, and to provide the data subject with information on the measures taken, as soon as possible and in any event within one month of receipt of the request.\nFurthermore, the DPA noted that pursuant to Article 5(2) GDPR and Article 24 GDPR, the controller should be able to demonstrate its compliance with the data protection principles.\nIn light of the facts of the case, considering that the complainant clearly exercised their right to access under Article 15 GDPR, that on 14 June 2023, the data subject complained to have not received any answer and that the controller only replied on 7 August 2023, the controller exceeded the deadline established in Article 12(3) and (4) GDPR.\nTherefore, the Belgian DPA found the controller to have breached Article 15 GDPR in conjunction with Article 12(3) and (4) GDPR, and it mandated the controller to comply with the data subject's access request within 30 days from the notification of the decision. Additionally, the controller was ordered to inform the DPA about the actions taken in response to the decision within the same timeframe.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 11/2024"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00347/2020","text":"The AEPD concluded that, even if it was justified by the nature of the proceeding and related procedural issues, and by the Transparency Act, to publish data related to the grants, it should be done following the data protection principles. Therefore, the minimization principle applied, so data such as the personal ID should not be published, as it does not add any necessary information to the grant procedure.\nAdditionally, the data should not have been accessible to all the workers and parties with access to the platform, but only to the ones that were involved and needed to access the data.\nThe DPA took into account the will of the Council to change their bylaw if necessary, and the lack of bad faith.\nTherefore, the AEPD concluded that the Council had violated Article 5(1)(f) for breaching the confidentiality principle, and issued a warning against it.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00347/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00415/2020","text":"Based on the facts presented, the AEPD held that the actions of the defendant infringed the following principles of processing pf personal data:\n  * Article 5(1)(d) GDPR – Accuracy principle, as it was proven that in Vodafone’s systems, the products contracted by the complainant were in the name of a third party.\n  * Article 5(1)(f) GDPR – Confidentiality principle, as Vodafone responded to the complaint with the response that was intended for another individual not for the complainant, meaning that Vodafone does not have appropriate security measures in place to protect the confidentiality personal data.\nThe AEPD held that this offense is considered ‘grave’ in accordance with Article 72(1)(a) LOPDGDD and falls under the criteria defined in article 83(5)(a) GDPR where a company can be fined up to €2 million, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher.\nThe AEPD imposed a fine of €60000 for the violating Article 5(1)(d) GDPR and €30000 for violating Article 5(1)(f) GDPR.\nIn imposing the fine, the AEPD factored in that the infringement was considered negligent not intentional but significant and that the records affected corresponded to complainant ’s basic personal data such as name and address.\nVodafone España, S.A.U. acknowledged its responsibility in accordance with Article 85 (1) LPACAP which resulted in a 20% reduction of the penalty. Furthermore, it carried out the voluntary payment of the proposed fine before the resolution, so it benefited from an additional reduction of 20% (Article 85 (2) LPACAP). Therefore, Vodafone España, S.A.U benefited by the two 20% reductions and paid € 54000 instead of the initial € 90000.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00415/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Warning issued to Bucharest Municipality (District 4)","text":"The ANSPDCP found that the staff of the General Directorate of 4th District Local Police were hierarchically obliged to wear audio-video surveillance devices (\"BADGE\" type) during their working hours, without any legal provisions in force to govern the use of portable audio-video surveillance systems in the activity of local police officers. Therefore, the personal data (image and voice) were processed without a legal basis by using audio-video surveillance devices (\"BADGE\" type). The Romanian DPA issued the warning because the controller processed the personal data (image, voice) without fulfilling the legality conditions provided in Article 6(1) GDPR. In addition, the ANSPDCP applied a corrective measure through a remediation plan according to which the controller must ensure the compliance of the processing operations, performed by using the \"BADGE\" surveillance portable device, with the provisions of Article 5 and Article 6 GDPR.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Warning issued to Bucharest Municipality (District 4)"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd - 2020010677","text":"The DPA considered that either Article 6(1)(c) - the processing is necessary for complying with a legal obligation - or Article 6(1)(e) - the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest - could apply to this case. However, it ultimately concluded that neither could apply, because the processing was the result of a mistake. Furthermore, the DPA concluded that the processing was also unlawful because it failed to meet the requirements of Article 5(1)(e) - data subjects shall not be identifiable for longer than is necessary - and Article 5(1)(f) - data shall processed so as to ensure appropriate security for it. It stated that it was not going to answer the question of whether or not the Association had a responsibility to report the breach, despite both parties to the complaint agreeing that a breach had taken place.","title":"Persónuvernd - 2020010677"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 37/2020","text":"The HDPA found that the politician acts as data controller for this communication and that he did not obtain the recipient's consent. However, the politician provided and satisfied the rights of access and objection.\nThe HDPA upheld the complaint and imposed the proportionate fine of EUR 1000.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 37/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W252 2239742-1/11Z","text":"The BVwG did not (yet) take a decision on the merit of the case but stalled the procedure it filed a request for preliminary ruling on the question the interpretation of Article 15(3) GDPR in August 2021. See decision BVwG - W211 2222613-2/12E.\nOnce the CJEU has passed its judgment on the matter, the BVwG will resume the case.","title":"BVwG - W252 2239742-1/11Z"}
{"_id":"holding_VG Cottbus - VG 4 K 1191/19","text":"The Administrative Court of Cottbus (VG Cottbus) held that the installation of a water meter with a radio module may already be considered data processing (Article 4(2) GDPR). Although the installation does not yet directly process data in the sense of storage, a necessary preparation, which is undoubtedly only aimed at enabling data processing, is also subject to Article 4(2) GDPR.\nIn the present case, the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller Article 6(1)(e) GDPR. The municipal water supplier's by-laws explicitly state that it collects data on consumption via measuring equipment and that this is done using a water meter and its readout.\nArticle 12(5) GDPR in conjunction with Article 18(1)(d) GDPR does not prevent the charging of an administrative fee for the deactivation of the radio module of the water meter if the interests of the controller outweigh those of the data subject and the customer only objects in principle to the collection of data and does not invoke any grounds under Article Article 21(1) GDPR arising from their particular situation. The mere concern for one's own data protection and fear of \"forced digitisation\" are only general or principled interests, but not particular or individual, so that Article 21(1) GDPR does not apply.","title":"VG Cottbus - VG 4 K 1191/19"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - Case no. 2021020294","text":"The DPA rejected the data subject's complaint.\nFirst, it assessed based on what legal basis the school administer had processed the personal data. It noted that Article 6(1)(c) GDPR allows the processing of personal data if it is necessary to fulfil a legal obligation. Based on a national law, it was the role of the school administrator to manage the day-to-day operation and work of the school. Moreover, the DPA considered that to receive e-mails and messages from their subordinates, including regarding their well-being at work and communication with other staff, regardless of who initiates such disclosure, falls within the work cycle of a school administrator. Therefore, the DPA held that the controller had processed the personal data on a valid legal basis.\nSecond, the DPA considered whether the controller upheld the Article 5(1) GDPR principles \"fairness and transparency\" and whether the data subject was adequately informed pursuant to Article 14 GDPR. The DPA argued that if processing of personal data was based on the nature of the working relationship between the supervisor and subordinates, as outlined above, the personal data would not be considered to be obtained from a third party. However, Article 14 GDPR would only apply if personal data had been collected from a third party. Consequently, the information obligations of controllers pursuant to Article 14 GDPR would not have to be upheld in order to meet Article 5(1) GDPR's requirements for fairness and transparency.\nLastly, the DPA held that the controller was also under a legal obligation to share the concerned personal data with the Minister of Education and Culture, as the school falls under the supervision of the Minister. Consequently, there was a legal obligation to hand over documents after a relevant request. Here as well, the personal data was processed lawfully pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) GDPR.","title":"Persónuvernd (Iceland) - Case no. 2021020294"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Birthlink","text":"First, the DPA established that the manual records formed part of a ‘filing system’ as defined by Article 4(6) UK GDPR.\nSecond, the DPA held that Birthlink violated Article 5(1)(f) UK GDPR, the principle of integrity and confidentiality and Article 32(1) and Article 32(2) UK GDPR, security of processing, for failing to ensure appropriate security and organisational measures to the processing of the personal data. In particular, it failed to implement a data retention policy, a data destruction policy, any sufficient internal approval process for the destruction of the files and any data protection training for members of staff.\nThird, the DPA found that it violated the principle of accountability, pursuant to Article 5(2) UK GDPR. In the absence of appropriate policies, procedures and staff training, Birthlink was not able to demonstrate compliance with its obligations under Article 5(1)(f) UK GDPR.\nThird, it held that Birthlink breached Article 33 UK GDPR by failing to notify the DPA within 72 hours of the personal data breach.\nLastly, the DPA imposed a fine of GBP 18,000 (€20,707). For the calculation of the fine it took into account the irreplaceable nature and sensitivity of the destroyed data, the seriousness of the infringement and high risk to affected individuals' rights.","title":"ICO (UK) - Birthlink"}
{"_id":"holding_CNPD (Portugal) - Deliberação 2022/140","text":"The DPA found that the controller had violated the integrity and confidentiality principle from Article 5(1)(f) GDPR by not defining organisational measures for safeguarding information, policies or guidelines for the secure management of information. Nor did the controller determine a procedure, together with the Eastern European Immigrants' Association, that would regulate access and handling of the processed data. The exception regarding the non-existence of these policies and/or guidelines was an e-mail from the IT Division on the security of computer access passwords, email and internet. Article 5(1)(f) GDPR was also breached by allowing people outside the controller's services to access computer equipment used for processing personal data without a specific access profile, as well as by granting them access to information of refugees supported through the Helpline. The principle was further breached by the controller for its use of Excel files for the management and storage of information relating to a group of vulnerable parties (refugees). These Excel files did not have any audit records. Therefore, these files did not allow anyone to know who accessed them, when the files were accessed and what operations were carried out. The fact that the excel files were password protected did not mitigate this fact.\nThe DPA also found that the data storage periods had not been defined, nor were the criteria for establishing storage periods. This constituted a violation of the storage limitation principle ((Article 5(1)(e) GDPR)). Also, no information was provided to the data subjects about the identity of the controller, the purposes of the processing, the recipients or categories of recipients, the rights of the data subjects, or the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority. The DPA noted that, at least, the entities that were involved in this procedure were known to the controller, so they could have been mentioned to the data subjects, together with their data subject rights. Lastly, the DPA highlighted that the only reference made to data protection legislation was obsolete. Hence, the DPA concluded that the controller also violated Article 13 GDPR. The DPA also found that the controller had not appointed a DPO which resulted in a violation of Article 37 GDPR. A DPO was only appointed after the start of this procedure, on 22 September 2022.\nThe DPA also found that no data protection impact assessment (DPIA) had been carried out in order to analyse the processing of personal data in this context, which was required when processing data of vulnerable data subjects, according to the EDPB Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (p. 12). However, the DPA did not specify that Article 25 GDPR had been breached.\nThe DPA acknowledged that this was an emergency situation and that this could mitigate the degree of gravity of the infringement with regard to some elements, such as parts of the information obligation (Articles 13(1) and 13(2) GDPR), as well as the storage limitation obligations. However, the DPA also remarked that some other violations constituted proof of structural incompliance and were therefore of more gravity. Also, according to the DPA, the Helpline project had been discussed within the Setúbal Local Council for Social Action (CLASS), and therefore important matters such as the fundamental right to privacy and data protection from vulnerable people such as refugees should have also been discussed, despite the urgency.\nFor the above violations, the CNPD imposed a fine of €120,000 for the violation of Article 5(1)(f) GDPR and a fine of €100,000 for the violation of Article 37 GDPR. The DPA issued a reprimand for the violations of Article 5(1)(e) GDPR and Article 13 GDPR. This resulted in a total fine of €220,000. The two fines were nonetheless accumulated together, following Portuguese legal principles, which resulted in a fine of €170.000.","title":"CNPD (Portugal) - Deliberação 2022/140"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00415/2019","text":"The Spanish data protection authority ('AEPD') concluded that Xfera Móviles carried out the processing of the claimant's personal data without his/her consent, in violation of Article 6 of the GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00415/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/03293 (decision 2)","text":"The DPA held that controller must sort out and document the responsibilities related to their role as controller, as well as review and update the internal control system for managing privacy and personal data protection in the organisation.\nThe controller must comply with the order within six months. If they fail to do so (with the deadline set to 9 April 2023), the DPA will consider a daily penalty until the order has been complied with in full.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/03293 (decision 2)"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-431-0061 (Helsingor decision no. 2)","text":"The Danish DPA held that the Municipality violated Articles 5(2), 24, 35(1) and 44 GDPR.\nFailure to be able to demonstrate that data is processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner\nThe DPA found that the Municipality of Helsingor (i) in its risk assessment did not include the risk scenarios that may arise as a result of the data processor design and the system choices, (ii) did not carry out sufficient testing of the scope and operation of the selected hardware and software used, and (iii) was not able to document how the municipality controlled Google's access to the personal data. Consequently, the DPA held that the Municipality did not demonstrate that personal data were processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner pursuant to Article 5(2) GDPR in conjunction with Article 5(1)(a) GDPR.\nFailure to demonstrate that processing is performed in accordance with the GDPR\nThe DPA noted that the Municipality expressed doubts as to whether Google would always comply with its contractual obligation to not use data collected in core services for marketing purposes. The DPA pointed out that under Article 28(1) GDPR, the controller may only use such processors that provide sufficient guarantees for implementing appropriate technical and organisational measures to comply with the GDPR. Hence, given the Municipality’s own assessment of the risk entailed in engaging with Google as a processor, the Municipality was held to violate Article 24 GDPR in conjunction with Article 28(1) GDPR. The DPA placed particular emphasis on the Municipality’s failure to put in place technical or organisational measures to mitigate the high risk posed to the data subjects.\nFailure to carry out a data protection impact assessment\nThe DPA stated that any processing that is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, even if the probability of that risk realizing is low, triggers the obligation to carry out a data protection impact assessment under Article 35(1) GDPR. Since the Municipality itself admitted that it could not be excluded that the processor would act in violation of their agreement, the DPA held that by not conducting an impact assessment, the Municipality violated Article 35(1) GDPR.\nData transfers to third countries\nFirst, the DPA did not take a position on the extent to which the Municipality transferred personal data to other third countries than the United States. Nevertheless, it recommended that the Municipality ensures that any such transfers are in accordance with the GDPR.\nSecond, the DPA considered the transfers to the United States. The Municipality, in its capacity as the controller, instructed its processor (Google Ireland) to transfer personal data to a sub-processor (Google LLC) in the United States. The transfer was based on standard data protection clauses pursuant to Article 46(2)(c) GDPR. In C-311/18, Schrems II, the CJEU clarified that the use of SCCs does not always constitute \"an adequate means of ensuring the effective protection of the personal data transferred to the third country in question in practice. That is the case, in particular, where the law of that third country allows its public authorities to interfere with the rights of data subjects in relation to that data.\" The DPA found that the personal data of Danish citizens transferred to Google LLC could be obtained by US law enforcement authorities. Consequently, the Municipality of Helsingor was obliged to ensure that additional measures were put in place to comply with Chapter V of the GDPR, such as encryption of the personal data. The Municipality claimed that the data were encrypted. However, the DPA did not consider the encryption in this case to be effective, as the Municipality itself admitted that Google LLC may have access to the information in plain text.\nConsequently, the DPA found that the transfer of personal data that the Municipality of Helsingor has instructed Google Cloud EMEA Limited to carry out did not take place in accordance with Article 44 GDPR in conjunction with Article 46(2)(c) GDPR.\nCorrective measures\nAs a consequence, the DPA issued a reprimand against the Municipality and banned the processing of personal data using Google Chromebooks and Workspace for Education (previously G Suite for Education) until brought in line with the GDPR. Furthermore, until the Municipality of Helsingor complies with the GDPR, the DPA suspended transfers of data to the United States that were carried out by Google Cloud EMEA Limited as data processor for the Municipality.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-431-0061 (Helsingor decision no. 2)"}
{"_id":"holding_Court of Appeal of Brussels - 2020/AR/1160 (First Interim Decision)","text":"The Court of Appeal decided the following: Article 66 GDPR gives the possibility for a procedure of urgency and from this article (and Article 66 and Article 62 GDPR), the European lawmaker did not intend to make decision of a DPA provisionally enforceable.\nThe Court continues to explain that decisions are provisionally enforceable during an appeal when the appealing courts entirely reviews the case (rules regarding independency and impartiality of judges are the same). The DPA however, is a body created by an administrative body of the government and its judges are appoint by vote of the Chamber of Representatives and thus the same rules regarding judges do not apply.\nThe Court of Appeal does not entirely review the administrative decision, but only its merits regarding applicable law and good governance. In cases of urgency and when requested, the provisional enforceable aspect of the decision can be suspended.\nThe appeal against an administrative decision can only be effective if there is no pressure o the appealing party to immediately pay a fine or to align itself with the appealed decision.\nThe Court of Appeal states that the DPA failed to adequately motivate its decision and thus the provisionally enforceability cannot be granted automatically. When the DPA sends a document to a defending party, principles of good governance must allow for a reply by the party and the DPA must take the reply into consideration in its decision. The name of the 'document' of the reply does not matter, as the procedure for administrative bodies are not as stringent as those for courts.\nIf the DPA only considers the 'formal conclusion' when motivating its decision (and not the aforementioned 'document'), the duty of motivation is breached. If the DPA would be able to 'chose' to which arguments to reply, the principles of the rule of law would also be breached. Interpreting this any differently would mean the DPA would be able to ignore the remarks in the document, which is not a sign of good governance.\nThe Court of Appeal suspends the provisional enforceability of the decision. Any actions already taken must be reverted.","title":"Court of Appeal of Brussels - 2020/AR/1160 (First Interim Decision)"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 18/02140","text":"The DPA first instructed Bergen municipality to enable two-factor authentication in their systems, cf. Article 5(1)(f) GDPR, cf. Article 32(1)(b). Second, the DPA fined the municipality about €158,315 (NOK 1,600,000) for the lack of sufficient technical and organisational measures required by Article 5(1)(f) and Article 32(1)(a) and Article 32(1)(b).","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 18/02140"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd (Iceland) - 2021102040","text":"The Icelandic DPA rejected the complaint. The DPA noted that pursuant to Article 6 GDPR, personal data may be processed if it is necessary for the legitimate interests of the controller or a third party, unless the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject that require the protection of personal data are outweighed.\nBased on this provision, the DPA agreed with the controller that if they had to look up the phone numbers of every single person in the national register sample for every survey, it would entail a lot of time-consuming work and could have a negative effect on the quality of research. In addition, Gallup uses the phone number database to keep track of those individuals who have declared to the company's staff that they no longer wish to be invited to participate in the company's research. The DPA therefore held that the controller may therefore have a legitimate interest in saving data subjects' phone numbers in the company's internal database, and the processing may be necessary for those purposes.\nThe DPA pointed out that there is an obligation to provide data subjects with information pursuant to Article 14 GDPR. Nevertheless, according to Article 14(b)(5) GDPR, the obligation does not apply to the extent that its costs would be excessive. In the opinion of the DPA, this exception applies to the controller's processing. All persons who agree to participate in a survey by the controller are informed at the beginning of the call that information on the processing of personal information can be found in the controller's privacy policy on its website.\nPursuant to Article 21 GDPR, data subjects may object to the processing of their data when this is done on the legal basis of legitimate interest. If a data subject raises objections, the controller suppresses their phone number in their database to avoid contacting them again.\nConsidering everything mentioned above, the DPA held that the controller did not violate the GDPR with its processing.","title":"Persónuvernd (Iceland) - 2021102040"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202313830","text":"First, it is relevant to clarify the position of Silvarnergía in this complaint. The contract between Silvanergía and BEC established the former as a processor. However, the contract was not signed. Therefore, the DPA treated Silvernergía as a controller, in accordance with Article 4(7).\nThe DPA deemed the processing of the data subject’s personal data by the controller unlawful for three reasons. First, the controller's calls to the data subject (BEC' clients) for customer attraction did not rely on the legal basis of Article 6(1). Second, the DPA found that BEC did not have a contract with the controller for processing the data subject’s personal data. Consequently, the processing of the data subject’s personal data by the controller violated Article 28(3). Third, the DPA pointed out that the data subject has not even given their consent to the controller for processing their personal data.\nTherefore, the DPA imposed a fine, according to Article 83(5)(a) in conjunction with Article 71 Organic Law on Protection of Personal Data and Guarantee of Digital Rights 3/2018 (LOPDGDD). Among other criteria, the fine amount was determined based on the controller's grave negligence and the type of data involved in the infringement. Under Article 83(2)(b), such a negligence was attributed to the controller’s use of personal data without directly obtaining it from the data subject, as well as the processing of that personal data without informing the data subject. Further, under Article 83(2)(g), the controller processed data that could uniquely identify the data subject, such as their ID number, Universal Supply Point Code number, and digits of their bank accounts.\nThe fine was initially set at €5,000, but pursuant to Law 39/2015, a Spanish law concerning administrative proceedings, the DPA informed the controller that it may make a voluntary payment of the proposed fine and waive their right to appeal. This action reduces the imposed fine by 20%. The fine can be reduced by a further 20% if the controller acknowledges its liability. The controller opted for both and reduced the fine by 40%, paying the reduced sanction amount of €3,000, based on Article 85(3) Law 39/2015.\nLastly, in addition to the administrative fine, the DPA imposed on the controller to cease processing its clients' personal data.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202313830"}
{"_id":"holding_LAG Schleswig-Holstein - 6 Ta 49/22","text":"The court upheld the original decision. The controller infringed the GDPR by filming the data subject and publishing the clip because the data subject had not given written consent and was not informed about the purpose of the data processing or their right to withdraw consent. The data subject is entitled for maximum damages of up to €2,000, but not €6,000 as requested.\nThe data subject does not have to prove that damage within the meaning of Article 82(1) GDPR has occurred, as a breach of the GDPR itself constitutes non-material damage. Recital 146, sentences 1 and 6 GDPR support this interpretation, as the claims for damages serve to support the objectives of the Regulation and in particular to provide effective protection of individuals’ rights.\nThe court confirmed that damages in this case can amount to a maximum of €2,000. The controller did not film the data subject in intimate situations or discriminate them and the data subject gave verbal consent to be filmed. Furthermore, the controller reduced the harm by taking the video down immediately after the data subject requested it. However, on the other hand, the controller was not only using photographs, but moving images for a commercial purpose.\nThe court found that damages of €6,000 would not be justified in these circumstances. In similar cases, even lower amounts than €2,000 were awarded, or the cases were more severe because the controller’s actions were discriminating.","title":"LAG Schleswig-Holstein - 6 Ta 49/22"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 71/2022","text":"The DPA rejected the argument of the controller that sending an email with promotional content was necessary for the performance of the contract under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR. It found that the purpose of informing the ticket holders about the contractual conditions and safety precautions could also have been achieved by publishing the information on the controller's website. It further found that the email constituted direct marketing according to Article 21(2) GDPR and by not providing the possibility to opt-out of receiving similar emails in the future the controller violated Article 12(2) and 21(2), (4) GDPR. Consequently, the DPA held that the controller violated Article 5(1)(a), (c), (2), 6(1), 12(2) and 21(2), (4) GDPR and, therefore, issued a fine of €10,000 against the controller.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 71/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_EDPS - 2021-0518","text":"The EDPS found infringements with regards to purpose limitation, transfers to a third country and further, unathorised disclosure of personal data.\nPurpose limitation: The EDPS found that it was not sufficiently defined in the International License Agreement (ILA) which types of personal data are to be processed for which purposes. Instead, there was only a list of purposes stating that Microsoft uses these data for:\n  * troubleshooting\n  * billing\n  * remunerating Microsoft staff, internal reporting and business modelling,\n  * financial reporting following the use of the system for own reasons (analytics)\n  * to improve the service\n  * security risk management\n  * protection of intellectual property\n\nThese stated purposes were considered to be too vague and general pursuant to the Art 29 WP. The Commission and Microsoft could not demonstrate that all these data were necessary and that a less intrusive collection of data would be insufficient to achieve the purposes cited. In addition, some of these purposes were actually not in the interest of the Commission but for purposes of individual to Microsoft (like remuneration of their personnel). In this case, the processor acts as controller; thus, these purposes and the data used for this purposes should have been precisely defined. Also, if data were used for purposes other than for which they were collected, the compatibility of these new purposes with the original ones should have been assessed.\nAs a processor, Microsoft should have processed the personal data on documented instructions by the Commission. This was not ensured as the Commission did not issue sufficiently clear documented instructions to Microsoft. For example, though the Commission gave instructions for analytics and improvement of the service, these instructions were not sufficiently detailed and precise and did not exclusively concern uses of data for the purposes of the controller. Some instructions were given orally, but this was not enabled by the ILA and the oral instructions were not documented.\nThe Commission did not assess whether it is necessary and proportionate to transmit data to Microsoft Ireland and its sub-processors. Further details of this infringement are given under the part on further unauthorised disclosure or personal data.\nTransfer to third countries: The Commission transferred personal data to Microsoft, a company established in the US. This raises questions about adequacy for such transfers to a third country.\nAfter the reference date, the Commission adopted the Transatlantic Data Privacy Framework (TDPF), which is an adequacy decision in respect of recipients in the US who register under this framework. The EDPS found that even when the software and data storage is property of Microsoft, it is directly transferred to these subcontractors and cannot therefore be covered by the TDPF to Microsoft US and onward transfer from Microsoft US to other subcontractors under SCCs. The EDPS found that in was not clearly specified in the ILA what types of personal data can be transferred to which recipients in which third country. The Commission also did not appraise the transfers and therefore could not determine whether any supplementary measures are necessary.\nIn addition, the Commission should have performed a data transfer impact assessment and (as there are no SCCs applicable by EUIs as exporters) should have submitted the DPAs with these processors or subprocessors in third countries to the EDPS for approval. Because it failed to do this, the Commission did not implement effective supplementary measures for these transfers.\nAnother issue was that the “EU storage guarantee” offered by Microsoft did not cover all types of data. Some data may be accessible to recipients in third countries. The “EU Data Boundary” also has numerous exceptions and exclusions which cover customer data, service generated data, diagnostic data and professional services data.\nFurther unauthorised disclosure or personal data: A specific reference was made to Article 9, which concerns transmission of personal data by EU institutions to recipients established in the EU. According to the EDPS, this article is also applicable to transmission of personal data to processors of EUIs. Therefore all transmission of personal data should be in the public interest and if the data subject’s legitimate interests may be prejudiced, the controller has to weigh the competing interests and establish that it is proportionate to transmit the personal data. The purpose of management and functioning of the Commission, use of products the staff is familiar with etc. was not found to be the purpose of processing of the personal data by MS. As long as the purposes are not specified, specific and explicit, it is not possible to do this balancing.\nIn addition, the EDPS found that the Commission did not ensure that transfers take place “solely to allow tasks within the competence of the controller to be carried out”.\nThe EDPS determined that organisational and contractual measures to restrict/prevent access of third country authorities were not sufficient, and that further technical measures are thus necessary. The EDPS also found that the organisational measures applied are only limiting transfers but does not ensure that transfers are protected. Further, the encryption is only found to be an adequate measure if the controller is in control of the encryption key. In this case, customers control the keys, but Microsoft has access to the encryption key, and thus, even when law does not oblige it to decrypt the data on an authority request, it may do it voluntarily. Also, the ILA does not detail encryption of data other than “customer data”, i.e. diagnostic data, service generated data or professional services data.\nThe contract also enabled the processor not to notify the Commission about a request of disclosure also when EU or Member State law did not prohibit this notification and enabled recipients in third countries not to notify requests for disclosure also when the law prohibiting it did not constitute a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society respecting the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter.","title":"EDPS - 2021-0518"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-31-3354","text":"In building its argumentation, the DPA also relied on Recital 32 GDPR, as well as paragraph 62 of the CJEU Planet49 case (C-673/17) which states that:\n“Active consent is thus now explicitly provided for in Regulation 2016/679. In this respect, it should be noted that, pursuant to recital 32 in the preamble to that regulation, consent may be given, inter alia: by ticking a box when visiting a website. That recital, on the other hand, expressly excludes that silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity may constitute consent.\"\nThe DPA emphasised that consent presupposes voluntariness, which was clearly not present since it was not possible to refrain from giving consent to the processing in question.\nFurthermore, website visitors were not free to choose in a granular fashion between different processing purposes, such as statistics or marketing (the DPA referred to this as the \"requirement of granularity\").\nFinally, the Datatilsynet reiterated that \"consent must be an expression of an unequivocal expression of will on the part of the data subject.\" As confirmed by the Planet49 case, this requires active action and not merely inactivity.\n\nIn relation to controller's new consent solution, the DPA has become aware that the solution contains the following wording:\n“Subsequent processing takes place on the basis of your consent and in special cases on the basis of legitimate interest.”\nThe DPA's \"immediate opinion\" is that a wording such as the above is not transparent and easy to understand for a website visitor. Instead, the text of consent should only include the processing(s) covered by the consent. The data controller should therefore be aware of the basis for the processing of personal data that is relevant in the design of the consent text.\nThe Datatilsynet also notes that a website visitor by clicking on \"cookie settings\" in the new consent solution is presented with the opportunity to object to the website's legitimate interests in relation to statistics and marketing.\nIt is the Data Inspectorate's assessment that such a setup makes it unclear to the website visitor which processing basis(s) actually form the basis for the website's processing of personal data in relation to statistics and marketing. The DPA therefore encourages the controller to reconsider the design of its new consent mechanism.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-31-3354"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01896","text":"No, Gveik AS did not have legal grounds for processing the personal data of the complainant for credit scorings, as per Article 6(1)(f). For this offense, the company was fined NOK 75,000.\nThey also didn't have sufficient internal controls for the use of credit scoring in their business, as per Article 24. For this offense, the company is required to establish corresponding internal controls and submit a written confirmation and actual documentation of the internal controls, to the DPA.\nThe DPA also noted that Gveik AS likely didn't have sufficient technical and organizational security measures, but didn't find strong enough evidence to add further penalties for this.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01896"}
{"_id":"holding_Dublin Circuit Civil Court - 2023 IECC 11","text":"The court found that the data subject’s relationship with her family members had been damaged due to the data breach. The court reiterated that a breach of the GDPR does not automatically warrant damages. The court highlighted that in this case, the data subject had been retraumatised through the actions of the controller.\nThe court classified the data breach as serious in nature and awarded the data subject with damages in the sum of €7,500. In setting this number, the court highlighted the controller’s role in handling sensitive data and the high level trust required.","title":"Dublin Circuit Civil Court - 2023 IECC 11"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202103039","text":"The DPA noted that when a controller obtains personal data, it must provide the data subject with all information regarding their processing activities pursuant to Article 13 GDPR. In the present case, the controller omitted this obligation. The DPA therefore held that the controller violated Article 13 GDPR by neither informing the data subject nor including any clause about the processing of personal data in the contract.\nThe DPA found that since the main activity of the controller was direcltly linked to the processing of personal data, the controller was required to have a higher level of rigorousness, professionalism and, consequently, responsibility regarding the processing.\nBecause of this aggravating circumstance, the DPA imposed a fine of €5.000. The DPA further ordered the controller to bring its operations into compliance with Article 13 GDPR and thus making sure to inform its clients about the processing of their data.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202103039"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Softehnica S.R.L","text":"The DPA considered that the ransomware attacked happened due to the lack of technical and organisational measures. Moreover, the controller did not implement regular testing, evaluation and assessment of the effectiveness of technical and organisational measures already in place. This entailed that both the security of data processing, including the ability to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, availability and continuous resilience of the processing systems and services could not be assured.\nAs a consequence of this failures, name, surname, home address, e-mail address and contact details of data subjects were disclosed unlawfully, in breach of Article 32(2) and 32 (3) GDPR.\nThe DPA deemed it appropriate to impose a fine of RON 24,866 (€5,000) to the controller.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Softehnica S.R.L"}
{"_id":"holding_Datainspektionen - DI-2020-4534","text":"The DPA held that Uppsalahem AB had processed personal data in breach of Article 6 (1) (f) GDPR by conducting camera surveillance of common areas in an apartment building.","title":"Datainspektionen - DI-2020-4534"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03177","text":"The Norwegian DPA fined the controller €29,880 for lack of sufficient technical and organisational measures under Article 32(1)(b) GDPR and Article 5 GDPR, and for having published personal data on their website without lawful grounds under Article 6 GDPR and Article 5 GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03177"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 3116/163/20","text":"The DPA considered whether data subjects were informed in the survery of the purpose and legal basis of the processing of personal data, and the voluntariness of responding to the inquiry. This decision was based on Article 5(1)(a) GDPR (principle of lawfulness, fairness, and transparency); Article 12(1) GDPR (controller's responsibility to communicate in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form using clear and plain language); and Article 13 GDPR (detailing the information to be provided to the data subject).\nThe DPA evaluated the inquiry form used by the controller and found that it was unclear whether returning was voluntary or mandatory. Furthermore, neither the form nor the accompanying information sheet sufficiently clarified how the data would be used. No information was provided to explain that the collection of the personal data was needed to identify how many children required day care, and the information did not clarify whether day care could be denied based on the answers provided. In its response to the investigation, the controller had stated that the information was required in order to process refunds if children were not attending day care. However, it was not clear whether the personal data would be processed to determine the arrangement of child care at home, the processing of payment refunds, or both.\nTaking into account the above-mentioned points, the DPA found that the purpose of personal data processing had not been sufficiently communicated, and that the controller had therefore infringed their transparency obligations under Articles 5(1)(a), 12, and 13 GDPR. Accordingly, the controller was reprimanded pursuant to Article 58(2)(b) GDPR.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 3116/163/20"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00111/2021","text":"The Spanish DPA held that Vodafone Spain unlawfully processed the complainant's personal data, as the company had no lawful basis to send them invoices belonging to one of its customers. It found this to constitute a severe and negligent violation (Article 83(2)(a) and (b) GDPR) of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32 GDPR, as the complainant's data was neither processed with integrity and confidentiality nor appropriately safeguarded.\nIt originally imposed a fine of €30,000 for the violation of Article 5(1)(f) GDPR and €20,000 for the violation of Article 32 GDPR, but this was reduced to a total fine amounting to €40,000 because Vodafone Spain made use of a reduction procedure proposed by the DPA.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00111/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_VwGH - Ra 2023/04/0259","text":"The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the argument that there was a lack of case law from the Supreme Administrative Court on Article 57(1)(f) GDPR and referred to its decision in the case 2023/04/0254. In this case, the Supreme Administrative Court held that in proceedings concerning a data protection complaint, the DPA must observe the principle of material truth arising from §37 and §39(2) of the Austrian data protection law (\"AVG\") on a case-by-case basis in order to guarantee effective legal protection to a data subject who considers that their rights under the GDPR have been violated and to ensure compliance with the GDPR. The Supreme Administrative Court then held, unlike the DPA's view, that the DPA should not only investigate a case to the extent appropriate, but find out the material truth of the case.\nHowever, the Supreme Administrative Court held that a referral back is only used in the event of serious gaps in the investigation. Referral of the case back to the administrative authority to carry out necessary investigations can therefore be considered if the administrative authority failed to carry out all necessary investigative activities or if it took completely unsuitable investigative steps to determine the relevant facts. The Supreme Administrative Court held that this also applies if there are concrete indications that the administrative authority, such as the DPA, omitted (difficult) investigations so that these could then be carried out by the administrative court.\nThe court then took into account the investigation of the DPA in the present case and held that there were no serious investigative gaps. Therefore, the court held that the additional investigative steps deemed necessary by the Federal Administrative Court could have been carried out by themselves without difficulty - within the framework of an oral hearing before the court.\nThe argumentation of the Federal Administrative Court that it would be necessary to question the third party to whom the data subject's personal data was forwarded in order to clarify the essential question of fact, combined with the statement that the DPA had to carry out a comprehensive investigation regarding this, did not justify a referral back according to the Supreme Administrative Court.\nAccording to the Supreme Administrative Court, the argument that the referral back would save costs did also not support the Federal Administrative Court's decision. The Supreme Administrative Court repeated its prior statement that when supplementary investigations are to be carried out, the interest of speed takes priority. It was therefore irrelevant whether the completion of the proceedings conducted by the administrative authority would cost more as the opening of a new appeal against in this case the DPA at the Federal Administrative Court would lead to an overall extension of the proceedings.\nThe Supreme Administrative Court thus held that the decision by the Federal Administrative Court should be annulled.","title":"VwGH - Ra 2023/04/0259"}
{"_id":"holding_CE - N° 430810","text":"The Conseil d'Etat confirmed the decision of the CNIL in all points and considered that the CNIL was competent to deal with the case since Google did not have a main establishment in the EU at the time of the decision of the CNIL. The Conseil d'Etat also confirmed that Google's privacy policy was not sufficiently transparent since the information was disseminated throughout several documents and was not easily accessible. The Conseil d'Etat also confirmed that the consent obtained by Google was not valid since it was not sufficiently informed and specific (the users had to accept all processing operations without the possibility to refuse specific processing operations in the first layer of information). Finally, the Conseil d'Etat confirmed that the fine was not disproportionate considering inter alia the seriousness of the violation, the financial capacity of Google, the impact of people and the duration of the violation.","title":"CE - N° 430810"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W292 2267784-1","text":"The BVwG first of all assessed whether the pronouncement of the DSB constituted a decision within the meaning of section 58 et seqq. of the Austrian General Law on Administrative Procedures (Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, AVG). In this, the court took into account objective criteria and giving importance to the form and content of the decision. Further, it considered that attention should be given to the language used and whether this undoubtedly had a normative character, making reference to Austrian case law.\nThe BVwG held, with respect to the letters of the DSB of 11 and 13 January 2023, that they lacked the formal and content-related requirements to be considered a decision, instead, they merely constituted communications of the DSB to the data subject. If the court were to consider the DSB’s communications as decisions, this would mean that the BVwG would have to decide on the legality of a decision by the Irish DPC. In this context the BVwG referred to its case-law in asylum law matters, whereby the decisions of national authorities cannot be reviewed by the courts of another state as this would go against the principle of national sovereignty of international law. The BVwG held that this principle is transferable to data protection cases. Hence, the BVwG concluded that it cannot review the legitimacy of a decision by a lead supervisory authority in accordance with Article 60(7).\nFurther, the BVwG considered that it would violate the constitution and higher administrative case-law by carrying out a task that is not within its competences provided for by law.\nThe court specified that the DPC's decision constitutes a decision in accordance with Article 60(7) for which the DPC and not the DSB is the competent authority.\nFor these reasons, the court dismissed the appeal.","title":"BVwG - W292 2267784-1"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 19/5030","text":"The Court considered that it was not obvious that the complainant’s wish to access his data was contrary to the purpose of the GDPR. The fact that these data could be used in another procedure also did not not lead the Court to believe that there was an abuse of rights. The Court also pointed to the case law, from which it follows that the access request where another procedure is concerned only constitutes an abuse of rights in special circumstances. For example, if rights or powers have been used so manifestly without reasonable purpose or for a purpose other than that for which they were granted. The Court saw no reason to rule that there had been an abuse of rights by the complainant.\nWhen deciding whether the Directorate was a controller or a processor, the Court considered the following. The Directorate failed to provide the documents (required following Article 28(3) GDPR) to demonstrate that the purposes and means of processing were determined by the DT&V and that the Directorate had no factual influence over the key elements of the personal data processing. Considering that the term “controller” must be interpreted broadly, the Court ruled that the Directorate was wrong in assuming that it was a data processor.\nThe Court declared the appeal against the Directorate’s decision well founded.","title":"Rb. Rotterdam - ROT 19/5030"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-431-0061 (Helsingor decision no. 3)","text":"The DPA assessed that the municipality had not identified and managed all relevant risks, including those related to the contract with the vendor (Google) and other publicly known risk issues pertaining to the procured technology (here, they specifically refer to the Dutch government's DPIA for Google Workspace, the DPIA conducted on behalf of Groningen and Amsterdam universities in March 2021, as well as the updated one of August 2021). The DPA further noted that the municipality also had not sufficiently reduced risks they have identified themselves.\nNext, and after assessing the municipality's own documentation, the DPA believes that Google, in several areas, acts as a stand-alone controller that uses personal data for their own purposes. Here, the DPA refers to Google's direct responses to the municipality and, in particular, Google's description and reference to the Google Cloud Privacy Notice (as per 20 April 2022). In this document, Google describes their role as a controller and use of for example \"Service Data\" for its own purposes.\nFinally, the DPA found that the documentation from the municipality did not fulfill the requirements for a DPIA. For example, the municipality had not assessed relevant risks, not even for the the processing activities they had initially described, and, further, they had only partially described necessary security measures. In addition, the municipality did not disclose whether they had asked their data protection officer for input as per Article 35(2) and Article 39(1)(c).\nIn conclusion, after reviewing the new documentation submitted in the case, the DPA held that the municipality's processing by using Google Chromebooks and Workspace for Education is still not in line with the GDPR. Further, the DPA held that the new documentation is not in line with Article 35(1) and 35(7), as well as Article 36(1).\nThus, the DPA upheld the 14 July 2022 decision, but amended it to inform the municipality of a ban against processing personal data by using Google Chromebooks and Workspace for Education.\nThe ban is effective immediately and lasts until the municipality has brought the processing in line with the GDPR as outlined in the 14 July 2022 decision, as well as in line with Article 35(1), 35(7), and Article 36(1). For processing where a prior consultation is required under Article 36(1), the ban is effective until the DPA has provided such consultation as per Article 36(2) or the DPA otherwise permits the processing until such consultation is ready.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2020-431-0061 (Helsingor decision no. 3)"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 4680/182/18","text":"On the basis of the information provided by the controller, the DPA emphasised that Section 6(1)(1) of the Finnish Data Protection Act, which is based on Article 9(2)(g) GDPR, applies only to the processing of the personal data of insured parties and claimants. The DPA considered that the insurance contract has not yet been concluded at the insurance application stage, and the provisions of the Finnish Data Protection Act cannot be extended to a data subject applying for insurance. Therefore, Section 6(1)(1) of the Finnish Data Protection Act cannot be applied to the processing of health data of insurance applicants and to requesting their health data from health care units.\nThe DPA stated that the consent requested by the controller concerned an unspecified set of health data stored in the patient information systems of various health care units. The data subjects could not control whether their personal data was processed or not or for what purposes it was processed. Thus, the consent requested by the controller was not sufficient to fulfil the requirements for the processing of special categories of personal data according to Article 9(2)(a) GDPR.\nOn the basis of the information gathered, the DPA held that the controller had violated Article 9 GDPR. As a result, and in accordance with Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, the DPA ordered the controller to bring its processing operations into compliance with the provisions of Article 9 GDPR.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 4680/182/18"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Amsterdam - AMS 20/3251","text":"First, the Court considered whether the measure was necessary by assessing the proportionality and subsidiarity of the measure. It held that the requirement of proportionality was met since the cameras do not allow the processing of biometrical data, and clear images of filmed people are justified by the fact that, in cases of damage, it needs to be clear against whom the charges are to be made. The requirement of subsidiarity was also met since the objective of the surveillance could be achieved in a less intrusive manner.\nSecond, the Court conducted a balancing test of the interests of both parties. It considered that it is guaranteed that the data subject (and persons visiting her) will not be filmed more than necessary. Moreover, the Court noted that the controller had drawn up privacy regulations and had taken measures to limit the undesirable consequences of camera surveillance as much as possible: images would be deleted - in any case - after four weeks: the video recorder is password-protected; the recorder is placed a locked room; only a limited number of members of the Board of the VvE are allowed to check the images; and log files of the actions performed in kept a logbook. Lastly, the Court considered that people that pass by the camera, are informed about the camera surveillance (via a sign).\nTherefore, the Court concluded, with regard to the balancing test, that the interest of the controller in securing the communal property and that of the residents, and in being able to make a substantiated report if necessary, outweighed the data subject’s interest of the protection of her privacy.","title":"Rb. Amsterdam - AMS 20/3251"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9853406","text":"Issuing its decision, the Italian DPA sought to emphasise, from the outset, the fundamental importance of the “civic right/duty” of voting and engaging in democratic process, at such a delicate time for a country’s public institutions and political life; the election of a new Parliament. Such a fundamental and impactful right should be considered carefully and presented in a manner that is very different from that used in the case at hand – especially regarding activities carried out by a multinational business entity.\nFollowing this, the Italian DPA conducted an analysis of the substantive issues raised, in order to verify at least whether there is a prima facie case of unlawfulness in the processing under way and whether or not there is a real danger to the rights and freedoms of Italian citizens – also with a view to putting in place safeguards provided for by the legal system.\nFirstly, with regard to the lawfulness of processing, there was no clear indication of the legal basis for the processing of data through the EDI function. Based on the information provided to the DPA, which they note contained very little information and was not provided in a timely manner, the processing operations do not appear to be grounded in consent (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR). The purpose appears to relate to the pursuit of a public interest or, at the very last, of an interest for the public good (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR). However, Meta is a private company which is not established in the Italian Republic, it clearly pursues commercial objectives and its main business consists in providing a social media platform the operation of which is financed by the sale of advertising space, preferably linked to profiling of users. Therefore, the supposed objective of protecting a primary public interest such as the holding of democratic elections and the free exercise of the right to vote appears to fall outside of the scope defined by Meta’s business objectives. Additionally, it cannot be understood how purposes related to the public interest from a very high-level perspective may fall within the terms of a contractual relationship that has been or is about to be established between Meta and its users (Article 6(1)(b) GDPR). Additionally, there appears to be a major inconsistency between Meta’s alleged philanthropic and social purpose and the collection of data from Italian citizens in a specific electoral context; data which thereafter becomes part of Meta’s business activities according to unspecified mechanisms and terms. Finally, there appears to be no agreement or formal mandate by which the Ministry of the Interior entrusted Meta with the task of informing citizens of the voting operations. In light of the above, these elements allow the identification of a prima facie case of unlawfulness of the processing of personal data of Italian citizens.\nWith regard to the processing activities by fact-checkers, the information provided to the Italian DPA by these entities during its investigation further compounded the concerns raised by the DPA; in particular, that the processing activities are not underpinned by consent and fall outside of specific control by data subjects. The DPA expressed that Meta’s use of fact-checkers should be further investigated.\nAdditionally, regarding the processing of special category data, the DPA found, despite Meta’s assertions that it does not process such data through these features, enough evidence to conclude that there was a prima facie case of unlawfulness with regard to a possible infringement of Article 9 GDPR. In doing so, the DPA points to the lack of means to determine the EDI function is only communicated to citizens over 18, the lack of anonymity of the data processed, and the likelihood of the data revealing a subject’s political orientation, which is specifically identified as special category data under Article 9 GDPR.\nFurthermore, the DPA stated “one cannot but find that” Meta’s processing in this regard is both excessive and unnecessary, establishing an infringement of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR principle of data minimisation. With regard to the storage limitation principle, Meta’s admission that data is aggregated within 90 days shows evidence of further processing to pursue an undefined purpose, a violation of Articles 5(1)(e) and 13(2)(a) GDPR.\nIn light of all of the above, the Italian DPA held that, while the DPC is the lead supervisory authority under Article 56(1) GDPR, it is necessary to undertake urgent corrective measures regarding Meta’s processing activities in relation to Italian elections, in order to protect the rights and freedoms of Italian citizens. The Italian DPA had submitted, to the DPC, an explicit request to consider taking urgent corrective measures, but received no substantive feedback. Furthermore, given the nature of the data involved, the gravity of the infringements, the envisaged retention of data, and the number of users potentially effected, the Italian DPA considered that a reasoned derogation from the cooperation mechanism under Article 60 GDPR should apply, and implemented the urgency procedure provided for in Article 66(1) GPDR.\nThe DPA made an order finding that the processing is likely to infringe the legislation in force (pursuant to Articles 57(1)(a) and 66(1) GDPR); issued a warning to Meta, valid for 3 months, to the effect that any processing of personal data under the terms described would be in breach of the provisions described above (Article 58(2)(a) and 66(1) GDPR); and stating they reserve the right to initiate the relevant procedures with a view to adopting final measures (Article 66(2) GDPR).","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9853406"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00257/2020","text":"The Spanish DPA recalled that the public administrations act as controllers for the processing of personal data and on some occasions as processors. As a result, they are subject to the GDPR and must fulfill all its obligations, including the obligation to appoint a data protection officer (Article 37 GDPR). This obligation had to be fulfilled starting from 28.05.2018, the date of entry into force of the GDPR.\nThe Spanish DPA issued a reprimand against Ayuntamiento de Arroyomolinos for violating Article 37 GDPR. The reprimand was issued by virtue of the power conferred by Article 58(2)(b) GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00257/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202407160","text":"The DPA found that the controller had infringed Article 32 GDPR in failure to implement appropriate technical and organisational security measures in respect of the collection and dissemination of the footage.\nThe DPA found that the fact that the recording of the footage taken on the staff member’s mobile phone evidenced that CCTV footage could be accessed by staff members with no responsibility for the security of the store. The DPA also noted that the CCTV system allowed for the recording of footage by a secondary device and was critical of the use of WhatsApp as a means to transfer the footage. Finally, the DPA highlighted that the footage in question included the personal data of not only the data subject, but of other customers in the store with no effort made to deidentify those data subjects before disseminating the footage.\nIn determining the appropriate sanction to be imposed, the DPA was influenced by the stark lack of diligence in the protection of personal data undergoing processing by the controller, as well as its high turnover. The DPA initially set the fine at €20,000. However, pursuant to Law 39/2015, a Spanish law concerning administrative proceedings, the DPA informed the controller that it may acknowledge its responsibility for the alleged violations and/or make a voluntary payment of the proposed fine. Each of these actions reduces the imposed fine by 20%. The controller opted to reduce the fine by 40%, both acknowledging its responsibility for the violations and paying the reduced sanction amount of €12,000.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202407160"}
{"_id":"holding_APDCAT (Catalonia) - CNS 14/2022","text":"The APDCAT answered, advising the controller that the disclosure of a securty guard's identifying data would be lawful processing.\nThe basis for lawfulness of processing would be Article 6(1)(c) GDPR, necessecity for compliance with a legal obligation. The Spanish national law on transparency, access to public information and good governance (LTC) obligated the controller to disclose information in its possession as a result of the public service it provided, which included the identification data of its security personnel.\nThe LTC also required the controller to notify any parties affected by the disclosure, in this case any security guard whose data was being disclosed, which the APDCAT said would allow a security guard to exercise the right of opposition provided for in Article 21 GDPR.\nAnother Spanish national law, law 5/2014, of 4 April, on Private Security, limited the data that could be disclosed to the professional ID number of the security guard in question.","title":"APDCAT (Catalonia) - CNS 14/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00190/2020","text":"The AEPD determined that this behaviour infringed Article 5(1)(f) GDPR, because it discloses personal data without the consent of the data subject. The Spanish law regulating private ownership of housing allows in its Article 19(3) Home Owners' Associations to publish of (personal) data in certain cases: for notification purposes, when other means have not resulted, for calling for meetings and for the publication of meetings memorandum. However, they are not allowed to publish personal data for mere informative purposes that are not supported by a legal ground.\nThe AEPD warned the Home Owners' Association and gave them a month to rectify the level of security of the data.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00190/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-442-13805","text":"The DPA held that the Customs and Tax Administration had not processed personal data in line with Article 34(1) GDPR. They expressed serious criticism of the way the CTA had dealt with the personal data breach, in particular i) that the CTA first, incorrectly, reported to the DPA that they had notified the affected data subject shortly after, and ii) that they blamed their late response on \"extraordinary circumstances\" due to vacation period, which the DPA does not agree is a valid excuse.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-442-13805"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 4431/161/21","text":"On the basis of the information provided by the controller, the DPA considered that Section 82 of the Finnish Motor Liability Insurance Act does not give the controller the right to directly access all patient records, but that the information requested must be necessary for the settlement of the claim. As a general rule, insurance companies may not request all information about customers' healthcare appointments, but this information must be limited and specified on a case-by-case basis.\nThe DPA emphasised that, in addition to the necessity requirement under the Finnish Motor Liability Insurance Act, the controller must also comply with the data minimisation principle as well as data protection by design and default when receiving personal data. Accordingly, the controller should have reasonably limited the information requested, erased unnecessary information disclosed to it and ensured that it processed only personal data necessary for the purposes of the processing.\nThe DPA found that the processing of all information about the patients' healthcare appointments also failed to meet the fairness requirements for the processing of personal data, as the data subjects have a justified reason to expect that the insurance companies will only process the information necessary to settle the claim.\nThe DPA also noted that although it is the healthcare provider's responsibility to sort the information to be disclosed, insurance companies must still review all the information they receive and erase any unnecessary personal data. However, billing issues between healthcare providers and insurance companies must be resolved by means other than the systematic and large-scale collection of patient information.\nOn the basis of the information gathered, the DPA held that the controller had violated Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, Article 5(1)(c) GDPR and Article 25(2) GDPR. As a result, the DPA issued a reprimand to the controller in accordance with Article 58(2)(b) GDPR. Pursuant to Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, the DPA also ordered the controller to comply with the principles of fairness and data minimisation as well as data protection by design and default when processing the patient information.\nIn addition to the reprimand and the order, the Sanctions Board of the DPA imposed an administrative fine of €52,000 on the controller pursuant to Article 83 GDPR. The Board considered that the controller's practice was intentional, and that it had not taken action to mitigate the damage suffered by data subjects.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 4431/161/21"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Oost-Brabant - ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2023:7274","text":"The Court held that the Municipality was entitled to reject the data subject's erasure request (Article 17 GDPR) and their Article 22 GDPR claim.\nIn relation to Article 17 GDPR, the Court held that the Municipality had a legitimate aim in retaining the data and assessing whether the data subject could be rightly classified as a taxable person. Moreover, the Municipality was legally obligated to retain the data under national administrative law (Article 17(3)(b) GDPR).\nOn the issue of Article 22 GDPR, the Court held that the Municipality had adequately demonstrated that all automated tax calculations were subject to sufficient human intervention, and thus did not fall under the scope of Article 22 GDPR. Consequently, they were entitled to reject the data subject's Article 22 GDPR claim.","title":"Rb. Oost-Brabant - ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2023:7274"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/502323 / HA RK 20-122","text":"The initial request of the applicant was indeed very broadly formulated. However, the applicant has subsequently explained that he was looking for specific emails between NWO-I and his former employer. Moreover, the applicant was able to demonstrate an email chain where he was mentioned.\nThe Court noted that the right of access does not extend to (parts of) internal notes that contain the personal thoughts of employees of the data controller and that are exclusively intended for internal consideration. However, this exception does not apply in this case because the personal data were shared with third parties outside of NMO-I.\nNMO-I must provide the applicant with the complete overview of all personal data it processed via emails with third parties concerning the applicant and his former employer. NMO-I must also provide copies of underlying documents, but it can edit out the names of the senders and recipients.","title":"Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/502323 / HA RK 20-122"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 35/2023","text":"The HDPA fined the controller €10,000 for unauthorised disclosure of personal data by bank to the data subject's wife under Article 5 (1) (a) GDPR and Article 5 (1) (f) GDPR. An additional €50,000 was added for the violation of the obligation to notify the breach to the supervisory authority under Article 33 GDPR.\nFirst, the Hellenic Data Protection Authority established the violation of Article 5(1)(a) and (f) GDPR, committed through the unlawful transfer of the complainant's personal data. The transfer of data from the controller to the complainant's wife was unlawful, in violation of the principle of legality and transparency of processing and in violation of the principle of data confidentiality. This unauthorised processing (disclosure by transmission) constitutes a personal data breach, according to the definition of Article 4(12) GDPR, even if it is attributed to an error of an employee of the Bank\nSecond, the Hellenic DPA considered the violation of the obligation to notify the breach to the supervisory authority, in accordance with Article 33 GDPR. Under Article 33, the controller should have reported the breach within 72 hours to the Supervisory Authority.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 35/2023"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2018-32-0232","text":"The Danish DPA found that the new subscription for the purpose of handling deletion requests is not necessary under Articles 5(1)(c) (data minimisation principle) and 6(1)(e) GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2018-32-0232"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-014","text":"1) Data retention proportionate to the purpose of processing under Article 5(1)(e) GDPR\nThe CNIL clarifies that while the controller must comply with judicial requests for data, the controller would not face any criminal sanctions if it had deleted data as it was no longer necessary to process it for the controller’s specified purposes. Thus the CNIL did not accept the controller’s argument for warranting the six year storage policy.\nAs the data is collected for a specific purpose which is the management of the commercial relationship, the CNIL states that as soon as the purpose changes, the controller must take action in differentiating the data. The practice of categorically compiling all customer data into an active database without any differentiation or archiving policy therefore constituted a violation of Article 5(1)(e) GDPR. In relation to the managing of commercial relationships, the CNIL recommended a maximum storage period of three years after the commercial relationship has ended.\n2) Processing limited to necessary data under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR\nThe CNIL stated that the categorical recording of telephone calls was excessive and that a sample would be sufficient for quality control and training purposes.\n3) Prior consent to the processing of special category data under Article 9 GDPR\nThe CNIL points out that the mere act of recording the conversations, storing some and deleting others at the end of the day falls under the definition of processing under Article 4(2) GDPR, therefore rejecting the controller’s argument. Contrary to the provisions of Article 4(11) GDPR, the CNIL notes that the company does not provide any specific information to the data subjects with regard to the collection and processing of data collected from the form on the website and does not explicitly collect their consent for the processing of such data. Similarly, in the context of chat or text consultations, no information on the processing of such data is provided or consent as required under Article 9(2)(a) GDPR.\nThe CNIL therefore concludes a violation of Article 9 GDPR as the mere willingness to enter information into a form or share personal information through the chat options does not equate to the fully informed consent to the processing of this sensitive data.\n3) Processing for marketing purposes under Article L.34-5 of the Post and Electronic Communications Code (Article L34-5 Code des postes et des communications électroniques)\nThe CNIL stated that the improvements made to the form still do not meet the required standard of allowing the data subject to easily access a clear description of the marketing purposes and partners as required by the French provision.\n4) Conclusion and setting the fine\nThe CNIL concluded that the controller had violated Article 5(1)(e) & (c) GDPR, Article 9 GDPR and Article 34-5 of the French domestic provision (Article L34-5 Code des postes et des communications électroniques). With reference to the controller’s annual turnover, a €200,000 fine was set for the breaches of the GDPR through Articles 5(1)(e) & (c) and Article 9 GDPR and a €50,000 fine for the breach of Article L.34-5 of the French Post and Electronic Communications Code.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-014"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-812-0035","text":"The DPA found that different legal grounds are relevant in this case, such as Article 15 GDPR, sections 15 and 19 of the Danish Law Enforcement Act and provision of the Public Administration Act.\nThe DPA is not competent to decide which legal ground will have the best results for the complainant as it is a matter of administrative law.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2019-812-0035"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/542054 / KG ZA 22-341","text":"The District Court of Midden-Nederland (Rechtbank Midden-Nederland - Rb. Midden-Nederland) heard the case. The Court stated that the data subject's did not consent to the disclosure of their personal data and this does not fit with the purpose for which the data was initially processed. It must therefore be tested against Article 6(1)(f) and (4) GDPR.\nThe Court noted that (1) there must be legitimate interest, (2) the disclosure must be necessary and (3) it had to balance the interests of both parties: the right to protection of personal data and the safety of the research group and the right to information and effective legal protection of the parents.\nInitially, the Court found that the parents had a legitimate interest to access the personal data of, at least, the representative of the paranormal group. Then they could learn more about what exactly happened at the graves of their children and get answers to the questions they still had. The Court also held that the condition of necessity had been met.\nHowever, the Court held that the safety aspect weighed heavily. The mayor had also received threats, after which a conviction followed. Although the interests of the parents were important, they did not outweigh the interests of the data subjects.\nMoreover, the alternatives to get answers have not yet been exhausted by the parents. They even turned down previous proposals from the municipality. The data subjects did not want a personal conversation with the parents, and such a conversation cannot be forced.\nLastly, the Court stated that it's doubtful whether the data subjects acted unlawfully towards the parents. Therefore, it was not proportional to take an irreversible decision like the provision of personal data.\nUltimately, the Court held that the municipality was not obliged to provide the name and address details of the data subjects and denied the parents' request.","title":"Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/542054 / KG ZA 22-341"}
{"_id":"holding_Personvernnemnda (Norway) - 2021-03","text":"Personvernnemnda decided that the amount of the fine was correctly assessed by the DPA. However, they reduced it from NOK 400,000 (approx. €38,300) to NOK 250,000 (approx. €23,950) because of the long time it took the DPA to process the case. It took almost 16 months for the DPA to send the notices of orders and fines after all facts of the case were essentially clarified. According to the Personvernnemnda this processing time could generally be justified by the fact that the authortiy has limited resources. However, this did not apply here as the case was neither factually nor legally particularly complex. Personvernnemnda also noted that the fact that the DPA apologised for the long processing time was not sufficient compensation.","title":"Personvernnemnda (Norway) - 2021-03"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00603/2021","text":"The AEPD held that by processing personal data without the data subject’s clear, affirmative, informed and free consent, or any other valid legal basis, the online store had violated Article 6(1) GDPR.\nThe AEPD also held that the online store had violated its obligation under Article 13 GDPR to provide data subjects information related to the processing of their personal data when collected from them, in particular by not having a privacy policy and not disclosing any details as to who the controller of that personal data would be.\nLastly, the AEPD held that the online store’s use of non-essential cookies without having a cookie banner violated Article 22.2 of the Spanish Law of Information Society Services (LSSI), which establishes that clear and complete information on the use of cookies and the purposes of the data processing must be provided to data subjects, as well as the possibility to reject non-essential cookies.\nTaking into account that the online store was owned by a private individual, the AEPD issued a fine of €1000 for the each of the three aforementioned violations, for a total fine of €3000. Due to the fact that the individual voluntarily paid the fine and expressly accepted their responsibility, the fine was reduced to €1800.\nThe AEPD also ordered the owner of the store to incorporate an adequate privacy policy and cookie banner in order to comply with GDPR and national data protection provisions.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00603/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 3831/161/21","text":"The DPA stated that tying the storage period of purchase data to the duration of the customer relationship had resulted in the data being stored in a form that enables identification of the data subject for potentially very long periods, even decades. A storage period based on the duration of the customer relationship could therefore lead to very long storage of the purchase data, even for the lifetime of the data subject.\nMoreover, according to the DPA, some of the purchase data could be used to infer detailed information about the person's life situation, lifestyle and movements. Purchase data may also indirectly reveal personal data belonging to the special categories of personal data within the meaning of Article 9 GDPR. For example, customers had the opportunity to collect loyalty points by using certain healthcare services. The risk associated with the processing of such data increases the more extensive data is collected and the longer it is stored.\nHence, the DPA considered that the controller should have defined the storage period for purchase data on a purpose-specific basis and assessed it separately from the storage period of other personal data needed to manage the customer relationship. The controller should have determined the storage period for purchase data already before engaging in any personal data processing activities since data subjects must be informed of the storage period when collecting personal data in accordance with Article 13(2)(a) GDPR.\nOn the basis of the information gathered, the DPA held that the controller violated Article 5(1)(e) GDPR, Article 25(1) GDPR and Article 25(2) GDPR, as the storage period of purchase data tied to the duration of the customer relationship was not necessary for the purposes for which the controller processed the personal data. Furthermore, the DPA stressed that in compliance with data protection by default, the controller should have ensured that a data subject would have the opportunity to influence the level of collection of their personal data from the beginning, for example, by choosing in the registration form the level of data collection they want.\nAs a result, the DPA issued a reprimand to the controller in accordance with Article 58(2)(b) GDPR. Pursuant to Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, the DPA also ordered the controller to define a storage period for purchase data according to the purpose of use and to erase or anonymise purchase data older than the defined storage period.\nIn addition to the reprimand and the order, the Sanctions Board of the DPA assessed the necessity of imposing an administrative fine pursuant to Article 83 GDPR. The Board concluded that several factors would have justified the imposition of a fine. The infringement concerned 3.49 million data subjects, and the amount of data collected for each data subject had been significant. However, the Sanctions Board considered that tying the storage period of purchase data to the duration of the customer relationship had not yet led to such long storage periods to the extent that an administrative fine should be imposed.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 3831/161/21"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202309454","text":"The DPA found that the combination of a clause in a subscription contract and verbal consent did not meet the standards under Article 7(1) GDPR. Freedom of consent could not be demonstrated through the contracts signed by data subjects. It lacked a specific, clearly separated clause dedicated to the use of images. The acceptance of image processing was not distinguishable from acceptance of general and specific contractual terms. Furthermore, the administrative file contained no evidence to demonstrate that such verbal consent had been effectively requested and obtained. The DPA held that the controller thereby violated Article 7(1) GDPR.\nFurthermore, the DPA found that the controller breached the principle of storage limitation. The company's internal records indicated that images and videos were retained indefinitely. They did not give a specific storage period nor assessed the necessity based on the original purpose. They thereby failed to establish and observe a defined data retention period. Therefore, the DPA also found a breach of Article 5(1)(e) GDPR\nFinally, the DPA was critical of the arrangement between the fitness franchise and its local gym operator. They claimed to function as joint controllers, but this was not the case in actuality. According to EDPB Guidelines 07/2020, joint controllership must be based on a factual analysis of actual influence over the processing purposes and means. In practice, the fitness franchise exclusively determined the way in which personal data was processed. The local gym carried out instructions without real decision-making power. Since the local gym did not share control over the data processing operations, it should have been qualified as a processor rather than a joint controller. Accordingly, the DPA ruled that the fitness franchise violated Article 28(3) GDPR\nConsequently, the DPA imposed a fine of €36,000 on the controller. Following recognition of responsibility and prompt payment, this amount was reduced to €21,600. The controller was also ordered to implement corrective measures. They needed to ensure that the recording and publication of images and videos of data subjects is carried out with a correct legal basis. Second, comply with data retention periods, and to formalise a compliant processor agreement.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202309454"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 2245/163/2019","text":"The DPA noted that it is not necessary to provide a phone number to receive a receipt, since, even in case of a technical failure, one can contact the customer support to receive a receipt. However, customers knew not about this possibility because the payment machines, in case of a technical default, did not inform the customer that they could do so. Moreover, the DPA considered that, according to Article 25(2), the controller had to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that, even in case of a technical failure, it would not collect more data than necessary. Since the controller neglected to implement those measures, the DPA found that the controller violated Article 5(1)(c) and Article 25 GDPR.\nIn accordance with Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, the DPA ordered the controller to bring its processing operations into compliance with the GDPR. Hence, the controller has to implement such measures that, in case of a technical failure in a payment machine, the customer will not have the impression that they would need to provide their phone number in order to receive a receipt.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 2245/163/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 13/2019","text":"The data protection authority ruled in favour of the plaintiff and summoned the data controller to comply with Art. 12, 15 and 17 GDPR by answering the data subject’s requests. Furthermore, the DPA reminds that an infringement to Art. 12, 15 and 17 GDPR are to be considered particularly grave with regard to the nature of the data processing involving special categories of personal data.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 13/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 11/2024","text":"The Hellenic DPA (HDPA) noted that a search engine provider that receives a deletion request based on the particular situation of the data subject must delete the personal data in accordance with Article 17(1)(c) GDPR unless it is able to demonstrate that there are \"compelling and legitimate reasons\" overriding the interests, rights, and freedoms of the data subject for the inclusion of the specific search result, pursuant to Article 21(1) GDPR. Additionally, the HDPA considered that the information in question was outdated, as it was older than fifteen years and concerned issues that were no longer of interest to the readers. Based on this data, the conditions for removing the mentioned links from Google search results under the complainant's full name are met, and, therefore, the examination of additional criteria for their deletion was unnecessary.\nFor these reasons, the HDPA partially accepted the application and ordered the controller to immediately proceed with the deletion of two links (13-14) that appeared as search results with the complainant's first and last name in the Google search engine and postpone the hearing and decision regarding the other seven links (1-6, 11) until the data subject provides:\n(i) evidence showing the date of cessation of her business activity and\n(ii) the convictions and records relating to her, including any decision of the Supreme Court on an appeal.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 11/2024"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-004","text":"Preliminarily, regarding the cooperation mechanism, the CNIL considered that although the commercial canvassing operations were carried out exclusively from France, targeting French nationals, the controller transmitted recordings of canvassing calls to Belgium in order to promote its stores there. The CNIL added that the controller’s customer database contained all the customer data for HUBSIDE.STORE in Europe. Therefore, the CNIL found that the controller carried out cross-border processing and communicated the relevant information to the supervisory authorities concerned under Article 60(3) GDPR. None of the authorities raised any relevant and reasoned objection to the draft decision sent. Thus, under Article 60(6) GDPR they were deemed to have approved it.\nFirstly, regarding the obligation to obtain consent from data subjects for commercial prospecting by electronic means (SMS), French national law, in particular Article L. 34-5 of the Postal and Electronic Communications Code (“CPCE”) establishes that consent is necessary for commercial prospecting by electronic means. Read in conjunction with Article 4(11) GDPR, an organization carrying out commercial canvassing by electronic means must collect the unambiguous, specific, free and informed consent of the data subject.\nThe CNIL added that that the forms used by the data suppliers did not allow data subjects to express a valid choice reflecting their preferences regarding the transmission of data for commercial prospecting purposes. The DPA found that the “VALIDATE”, “I VALIDATE” or “I ANSWER QUESTIONS TO APPLY’ button was highlighted by their size and color, which made it stand out from other information provided. The CNIL pointed out that the text used suggested the conclusion of the data subject’s journey rather than the transmission of data to partners. The location of the button also gave the impression that it must be clicked to complete the registration and take part in the competition.\nOn the other hand, the hypertext link which enabled data subjects to take part in the game without agreeing to the transmission of their data to partners was presented in the body of the text and in characters of a much smaller size. Therefore, it did not appear intuitive that it was possible to take part in the competition without clicking on one of the aforementioned buttons. Thus, the CNIL considered that the consent obtained was not unambiguous and free, violating Article L.34-5 CPCE and Article 4 GDPR.\nSecondly, regarding the legal basis for the telephone canvassing, the CNIL considered legitimate interest and consent. On legitimate interest, the CNIL indicated that non-electronic commercial canvassing may be carried out in the basis of the controller’s legitimate interest if the processing does not infringe the rights and interests of the data subject. The controller must also take into account their reasonable expectations.\nIn the present case, the controller considered that the competition forms used did not enable the data subject to reasonably expect to receive commercial prospecting offers. The CNIL held that as the controller did not appear on the nominative list of partners to which the hyperlink in the form sent to, this exceeded the reasonable expectations of the data subjects. Therefore, the controller could not rely on legitimate interest.\nOn consent, the CNIL found that the forms implemented by the data suppliers did not enable valid consent to be obtained. Therefore, the CNIL considered that the controller did not obtain valid consent, and that there was no legal basis to the commercial canvassing operations by telephone.\nThirdly, regarding transparent information, the CNIL considered that in the present case, Article 14 GDPR applied to the controller as the data has not been collected by the controller itself. The CNIL held that the controller did not provide all the information required by Article 14 GDPR and did not offer the possibility to the data subject to obtain more complete information. Thus, the CNIL concluded that there was a breach of Article 14 GDPR.\nFinally, regarding the security of processing, the CNIL indicated that under Article 32 GDPR, the controller must implement appropriate measures to ensure the confidentiality of data and prevent it from being processed unlawfully. The CNIL noted that the controller kept its customers’ personal data after the end of the contractual relationship without any intermediate archiving measures. However, the DPA decided that nothing established that persons would have access to said data without having a need to know. Therefore, the CNIL indicated that there was no breach of Article 32 GDPR.\nThe CNIL imposed a total fine of €525,000 on the controller: €200,000 for the infringement of Article L. 34-5 CPCE and €325,000 for the violation of Articles 6 and 14 GDPR.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-004"}
{"_id":"holding_UODO (Poland) - DKN.5130.2215.2020","text":"The DPA imposed administratives fine of PLN 4,911,732 (roughly €1,000,000) on Fortum and of PLN 250,135 (roughly €53,000) on PIKA.\nThe DPA noted that under EN ISO/IEC 27002:2017-06, it is recommended to avoid using personal or other sensitive data as test data. If personal data are used during testing, it is recommended to protect all sensitive details and context by deleting or modifying them. The standard mentioned above accepts that actual data may be used for testing purposes, but such data should be subject to special protection. First of all, when real data is used for testing purposes, the same access control procedures should be applied in the tested applications as those used in production systems.\nThe DPA held that PIKA had acted contrary to the agreement on entrusting personal data processing, which required, among other things, to implement data pseudonymisation. In defining the security measures that it would apply to protect personal data, PIKA omitted, in particular, the obligation arising from the GDPR to take into account the state of technical knowledge when defining them. The DPA cited the legal doctrine indicating that the need to consider the state of the art may be understood as the need to apply measures that reflect current security standards. This requirement may be read as the need to apply solutions currently considered adequate while not applying outdated solutions commonly assessed as not ensuring security.\nThe DPA emphasised that using a processor did not exempt Fortum from these obligations. As a controller, the obligations in this regard remained primarily with Fortum itself. When analysing the actions, or rather the lack of actions by Fortum in this respect, the DPA concluded that it was more important for the controller to increase the capacity of the system as soon as possible than to ensure an adequate level of security of personal data processed using this system. It should be emphasised that Fortum indicated in the course of the proceedings that in the past practice of the Processor introducing changes to Fortum's systems, such changes were introduced according to a pre-agreed work plan, tested by Fortum on a test environment and only then implemented in production. Consequently, in the opinion of the DPA, both Fortum and PIKA failed to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the security of the processing of personal data located in the IT system subject to modification, which constitutes a breach of Article 32(1) GDPR and Article 32(2) GDPR.\nBoth Fortum and PIKA failed to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the security of the processing of personal data, which led to Fortum breaching their confidentiality in connection with the occurrence of a personal data breach, i.e. a breach of the principles of confidentiality and integrity referred to in Article 5(1)(f) GDPR.\nAccording to Article 28(1) GDPR, where the processing is to be carried out on behalf of the controller, the controller shall only use the services of such processors that provide sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures so that the processing meets the requirements of the GDPR and protects the rights of the data subjects. In the case in question, Fortum indicated that it had not verified PIKA prior to entering the data processing outsourcing agreement. Fortum has been cooperating with PIKA for many years, and no security incidents have occurred so far. Additionally, as Fortum pointed out, PIKA is a market leader in terms of the services provided and represents a high standard of archiving and digitalisation. Given the above, Fortum considered it sufficient to sign an agreement on entrustment of personal data processing together with arrangements indicated in the appendix to the agreement.\nBefore initiating the administrative proceedings in question, Fortum also did not exercise the right of control referred to in Article 28(3)(h) GDPR concerning PIKA's provision of the measures required under Article 32 GDPR. Only after a personal data security breach had been identified and the administrative proceedings in question had been initiated, Fortum send a Processor Questionnaire to PIKA as the first element of the processor verification process.\nThe DPA pointed out that, since the processing was to be carried out on behalf of the controller, following the wording of Article 28(1) GDPR, the controller could only use the services of such processors that provide sufficient guarantees regarding the implementation of appropriate technical and organisational measures. Long-term cooperation of the parties, not supported by periodic, systematic audits or inspections, does not guarantee that the processor will adequately perform the tasks required by law and arising from the concluded entrustment agreement. A positively assessed cooperation in the past may only be a starting point when verifying whether the processor provides sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures so that the processing fulfils the requirements of GDPR and protects the rights of the data subjects. Indeed, the requirement set out in Article 28(1) GDPR applies to any data controller that, in the course of its business, uses the resources or services of a processor when processing personal data. The mere signing of a personal data processing outsourcing agreement without an appropriate assessment of the processor cannot be considered the fulfilment of the obligation to carry out a verification procedure of the processor concerning its compliance with the requirements of GDPR. Long-term cooperation and use of the services of a given processor before 25 May 2018, i.e. before the application of GDPR, also does not exempt from the obligation to carry out such an assessment.\nAccording to the DPA, Fortum did not carry out such verification in the case at hand. It only contented itself with a positive assessment of the processor as a result of previous cooperation, during which, as it explained, there were no security incidents. However, the consequence of failing to carry out this assessment is that Fortum has breached the requirement set out in Article 28(1) GDPR. Given the above findings, the DPA concluded that in the case at hand, the conditions justified the imposition of administrative pecuniary penalties on both the controller and the processor.","title":"UODO (Poland) - DKN.5130.2215.2020"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - 23.08.2023","text":"The Romanian DPA found a violation of Articles 5,6, and 9 GDPR, Article 17 GDPR and Article 32(2)(b) GDPR.\nFirstly, posting the videos and nickname was a violation of Articles 5, 6 and 9 GDPR, as the controller had no lawful basis to process the data under Article 6 GDPR, and violated the principles of processing under Article 5 GDPR (lawfulness, fairness, transparency). Moreover, there was a violation of Article 9 as the data revealed the data subject’s ethnic origin. Article 9 GDPR prohibits the processing of ‘special categories’ of personal data, unless certain exceptions apply. Data revealing ethnic origin falls within the scope of Article 9 GDPR, and in this case the exceptions did not apply, so the processing was unlawful.\nSecondly, the controller did not comply with the complainant's request to delete the data, which constituted a breach of Article 17 GDPR.\nThirdly, the Romanian DPA found that the controller did not adopt sufficient appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the confidentiality of the personal data processed through the audio-video surveillance system, as required by Article 32 GDPR. The lack of appropriate internal measures led to an employee of the controller accessing and posting the data subject’s personal data on social media, which amounted to an infringement of Article 32(2)(b) GDPR.\nAs a result, the controller was fined a total of 49,322 RON, equivalent to €10,000.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - 23.08.2023"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Midden-Nederland - UTR 20/2315","text":"The court does not agree with the restrictive interpretation of legitimate interest by the Dutch DPA. Any interest can be a legitimate interest as long as it is not against the law (negative test). The Dutch DPA should have performed a balancing test in order to balance the interests pursued by VoetbalTV against the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subjects. Because the DPA did not perform such a balancing test, the court annulled the decision and the imposed fine.\nThe court annulled the decision and decided to judge the case itself (Article 8:72a Dutch General Administrative Law Act). Then the court decided to not take a new decision in order to replace the annulled decision, noting that the fine is now completely off the table.","title":"Rb. Midden-Nederland - UTR 20/2315"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 03/2024","text":"The Belgian DPA reiterated that in line with Article 17 GDPR and Article 12 GDPR, a controller is obliged to erase the personal data of a data subject upon request without delay. Furthermore, under Article 12(3) GDPR, the controller should inform the data subject as soon as possible, but at least within a month, about the action taken on his request.\nThe DPA established based on the facts of the case as provided by the data subject that he had exercised his deletion request several times but was still contacted afterwards. Moreover, even if the controller did respond after the data subject's second request confirming that the personal data had been deleted, the data subject still received messages from the controller.\nTherefore, the DPA held that the controller infringed Article 12(3) GDPR, Article 12(4) GDPR and Article 17(1) GDPR and ordered the controller to deal with the data subject's request within 30 days after the decision.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 03/2024"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9856345","text":"First, the DPA determined that the controller received lists of personal data from the company XX. This fact alone constituted a violation, since the controller should have obtained new consent for its promotional activities. Also, the fact that the controller asked for a single consent for 4 different purposes itself (marketing and profiling by both the controller and a potential third party) was in violation with the requirement for free and specific consent. Additionally, the DPA noted that the controller had taken insufficient steps to verify compliance with the GDPR, since it had not checked if the third party from which it received its calling list was acting in a GDPR complaint manner. Therefore, the controller violated Articles 5(2), 24, 6 and 7 GDPR, as well as Article 130 of the code.\nSecond, the DPA determined that the controller was liable for the fact that no sample checks were carried out with respect to the contact details on the lists provided by company XX, despite the fact that the controller had entrusted another third party to do this for the controller. Pursuant to Article 5(2) GDPR, it was the controller's responsibility to make sure that measures were adopted to ensure GDPR compliance, which was not the case here, since people who had objected to marketing were still contacted. This resulted in a violation of Articles 5(2), 24(1), 24(2) and 25(1) GDPR.\nThird, the DPA determined that the controller did not provide an easy way to object to the marketing campaign. The DPA confirmed that the data subject would have to contact both the controller, and Company XX to be excluded from the processing. The data subject would have to object to the controller against the processing for the marketing campaign, which would last for around 3 months. However, to prevent from being targeted again, the data subject would also have to object to the transfer of data between the controller and company XX. This resulted in a violation of Articles 12(2), 12(3) and 21(2) GDPR.\nFourth, the DPA held that there was a discrepancy between the processing being conducted by the controller and the information provided on its website and in its mobile application. The controller admitted that it was not sharing data with third parties and was not individually profiling data subjects. This resulted in a mismatch between the information provided by the controller and reality. It was likely to result in reasonable doubts as to what processing was actually carried out by the controller. This resulted in a violation of of Articles 12 and 5(1)(a) GDPR.\nLastly, the DPA held that the controller failed to obtain free and specific consent for various processing activities, but in particular failed to obtain consent for marketing and profiling purposes. This resulted in violations of Articles 6, 7 and 12(1) GDPR, as well as Article 130 of the code.\nAfter considering several aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Italian DPA fined the controller €4,900,000 pursuant to Article 58(2)(i) GDPR. The controller was also ordered to make its several processing operations GDPR-compliant.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9856345"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Sanction against Tensa Art Design SA","text":"The DPA held that the controller's conduct was a violation of the GDPR. Pursuant to Article 21 GDPR - the right to object - data subjects have the right to object to processing which is done based either the legal basis of Article 6(1)(e) GDPR - public interest - or the legal basis of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR - legitimate interest. Moreover, Article 21(3) GDPR specifically grants data subjects the right to object to processing for direct marketing purposes.\nConsidering the facts above, the DPA decided that the controller violated Article 21(3) GDPR by not respecting the data subject's objection. Based on its powers pursuant to Article 58(2)(i) GDPR, the DPA fined the controller €1,000 (RON 4,927.3). Moreover, based on Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, the DPA ordered the controller to take corrective measures to ensure that its processing of personal data respected the rights of data subject vested in them by the GDPR.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Sanction against Tensa Art Design SA"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Tuckers Solicitors LLP","text":"The ICO held that “primary culpability for this incident rests with the attacker”. However, Tuckers violated Article 5(1)(f) GDPR as its “technical and organisational measures areas were, over the relevant period, inadequate”. The same was based on the reading of Article 32 GDPR which mandates “a controller when implementing appropriate security measures to consider \"the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons\". The failure to comply with the same was evident from the following:\nAlthough Tucker’s GDPR and Data Protection Policy required two-factor authentication where available, it was not using the same for remote access. The ICO held that multi-factor authentication was a low-cost measure that “could have substantially supported Tuckers in preventing access to its network”. Accordingly, Tuckers failed to meet the requirements of Article 32(1)(b) GDPR.\nTuckers installed the patch after months of its release, during which the attacker could have exploited the vulnerability.\nConsidering the “highly sensitive nature of the personal data”, Tuckers “should not have been processing personal data on an infrastructure containing known critical vulnerabilities without appropriately addressing the risk”.\nTuckers did not encrypt the personal data, and accordingly “did not ensure appropriate security, including protection against unauthorised and unlawful processing of its personal data, as required by Article 5(1)(f) GDPR”. Although the encryption would not have prevented the ransomware attack, it could have mitigated the damage.\nFor determining the penalty amount, the ICO took note of the fact that “personal data included within the bundles included special category data, and related to individuals that were particularly vulnerable, including children and individuals involved in significant crimes”. As per the ICO, “this type of personal data required particularly high levels of security to be applied to it”; and its breach made the infringement more severe. It also determined that Tuckers’ security practices were negligent. The fact that Tuckers informed the data subjects as per Article 34 GDPR and commissioned a third-party investigator was also considered by the ICO.\nTuckers' failure to follow the mandated security standards was considered to be an aggravating factor. Its subsequent actions of taking remedial steps including changes in the way it handles personal data were considered as mitigating factors.\nThe ICO used the Five-Step Process mandated in the Regulatory Action Policy (RAP) and fined Tuckers a total of €116,784.27 (GBP 98,000).","title":"ICO (UK) - Tuckers Solicitors LLP"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Brazier Consulting Services Ltd","text":"The ICO found that BCS violated Regulation 21A of the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations, implementing the e-Privacy Directive in the UK, which requires organisations to obtain consent from individuals in order to make calls related to claims management services.\nBetween 1 February 2019 and 31 July 2019, BCS used a public electronic communications service for the purpose of making 11,489,873 unsolicited calls for direct marketing purposes to individuals in relation to claims management services. These calls were made to who had not given their prior consent to BCS to receive such calls.\nThe ICO issued a fine of £200,000 for this violation.\nThe ICO considered that the conditions for the imposition of a monetary penalty section 55A of the UK Data Protection Act are met, namely: the convention was sufficiently serious (since there were because multiple breaches over a six month period) as well as negligent (since BCS knew or ought reasonably to have known that there was a risk that these contraventions would occur)\nWith regards to the amount of the fine, the ICO stated that the fact that BCS did not fully cooperate during the investigation, and was not completely open and transparent regarding information provided, was an aggravating feature. It did not identify any mitigating features.\nThe ICO also issued BCS with an Enforcement Notice compelling them to stop their illegal marketing activity and informing them that failure to do is a criminal offence.","title":"ICO (UK) - Brazier Consulting Services Ltd"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Overijssel - 9965129 \\ CV EXPL 22-2279","text":"The District Court of Overijssel (Rechtbank Overijssel - Rb. Overijssel) concluded that both claims were partly justified.\nThe controller’s claim was not fully justified, as the controller did not dispute that the laptop contained personal data of the data subject. The fact that the data subject was not allowed to put these data on the laptop was irrelevant. It was still personal data within the meaning of the GDPR and therefore protected by this Regulation.\nThe data subject’s counterclaim was not fully justified, as granting her access to the laptop would give her access to the controller’s digital work-environment. This contained personal data for which the controller was responsible (other employees, clients).\nThe Court held that the solution must be found in the middle. The Court proposed that laptop would be taken to the controller. Someone other than the data subject or the controller could then erase the data subject's personal data from the laptop. The data subject may be present during this process.","title":"Rb. Overijssel - 9965129 \\ CV EXPL 22-2279"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd - 2020010610","text":"The Persónuvernd held that the publishing of the complainant's information constituted an unlawful processing of personal data in breach of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR.\nIn its reasoning, the DPA first examined whether the publishing of the complainant's address constituted processing of personal data. Despite the DPA not having explicitly mentioned Recital 18 GPDR, it did state that the processing did not only cover personal information intended for personal use. A main reason for the household exemption not applying was that the Facebook page was not closed, but open to be accessible to anyone who had the URL of the post in question.\nThe DPA then examined the defendant's potential exercise of his freedom of expression based on Article 10 ECHR and its relation to Article 8 ECHR. The Persónuvernd first noted that expressing one's views and beliefs, as well as value judgements based on facts, do not constitute personal data and the DPA would not be competent to assess whether an individual has violated the Icelandic Constitution which protects the aforementioned ECHR rights and freedoms. However, the Persónuvernd then noted that the photos and screenshots posted on Facebook constituted information which can be objectively verifiable, for example by consulting the national registry. The DPA reasoned that this information went beyond merely expressing one's views and value judgements, and constituted personal data processing which the DPA was competent to examine.\nAs there was no valid legal basis for the personal data processing, the Persónuvernd held that the publishing of the complainant's information in the form of Facebook posts occurred in breach of Article 6 GDPR. More specifically, the DPA stated that the only potential legal ground for processing would have been Article 6(1)(f), but that the interests of the complainant outweighed the interests of the defendant. The DPA therefore ordered that the electronic summary of payments be removed from the Facebook page.","title":"Persónuvernd - 2020010610"}
{"_id":"holding_FG Berlin-Brandenburg - 16 K 2059/21","text":"The Finance Court Berlin-Brandenburg fully rejected the data subject's claim.\nFirst, regarding the data subject's right to access pursuant to Article 15(1) GDPR, the court held that the data subject was not entitled to the requested unlimited and unspecified data disclosure. It stated that this right against controllers who process large amounts of data only exists if the request is sufficiently specified. The court rejected the data subject's view which mainly referred to the wording of the provision. Instead, it made a systematic argument. The court used Recital 63(7) GDPR and a comparison with Article 14(5)(b) GDPR according to which the fulfilment of information obligations vis-à-vis a person affected by a data collection from third parties can be omitted if the provision of this information proves to be impossible or would require a disproportionate effort. Here, the court emphasised that some scholars even apply Article 14(5)(b) GDPR analogously to Article 15(1) GDPR even though it did not create an analogy itself. In particular, the court argued that, if Article 15(1) GDPR had to be interpreted widely, the exercise of comprehensive rights by a comparatively small group of data subjects (taxpayers) may have the consequence that the level of data protection for a larger group of data subjects (also taxpayers) falls short of the intended level of the Union legislator due to the inevitably limited resources of the tax authorities.\nFurther, the court held that the request was excessive pursuant to Article 12(5) GDPR, regardless whether Article 15(1) GDPR was to be interpreted narrowly or widely. It found the excessiveness both in the temporal sense because it concerned data aggregation over 50 years, and in the substantive-material sense. The court interpreted the granting of specific information as something qualitatively different (aliud) in relation to the unspecified and unlimited request for the provision of a copy of the data. Therefore, it rejected the entire claim instead of granting it with regard to specific information.\nSecond, regarding the data subject's right to a copy pursuant to Article 15(3) GDPR, the court held that he was not entitled to be provided with copies of personal data in the form of (electronic) duplicates of entire files. It argued that Article 15(1) and 15(3) GDPR do not contain two independent rights but a single right. Therefore, according to the court, Article 15(3) GDPR only contains a right to the catalogue information pursuant to Article 15(1)(a)-(h) GDPR. The court confirmed that the request was also excessive in this regard.\nThird, the court rejected the data subject's right to deletion and to object (Articles 17(1)(d) and 21(1) GDPR). It held that there had been no unlawful processing of personal data because it was based on Article 6(1)(e) GDPR, § 29b(1) German Tax Code (Abgabenordnung - AO). Moreover, the right to deletion was precluded by § 29b(1) AO.","title":"FG Berlin-Brandenburg - 16 K 2059/21"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Royal Mail Group Limited","text":"The ICO determined as follows:\nRoyal Mail contravened Regulation 22 PECR as 213,191 unsolicited marketing emails were received by subscribers.\nRoyal Mail accepted that it did not have the consent for sending the unsolicited marketing emails as it did not have the consent of those persons, or those persons had used services of Royal Mail as a guest, and were never given an opportunity to provide their consent.\nFor 123,466 persons who had used Royal Mail’s services as a guest, Royal Mail cannot rely on “the soft opt-in as it cannot be said that individuals were given “a simple means of refusing […] the use of [their] contact details for the purposes of such direct marketing, at the time that the details were initially collected”.”\nThe contravention was considered to be serious as the emails “contained direct marketing material for which subscribers had not provided valid consent”.\nRoyal Mail did not deliberately contravene PECR. However, its actions were considered to be negligent as “storing all consented and non-consented email addresses on the same system from which direct marketing emails were sent, and given the risk of human error which could (and indeed did) occur, it is reasonable to think that Royal Mail ought to have been aware of the risk that direct marketing emails could be sent to customers who had opted out of marketing communications.”\nSince the incident, Royal Mail took steps to remove the risk of human error. However, Royal Mail ought to have taken have these steps before in order to prevent the incident. Accordingly, “Royal Mail failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the contraventions.”\nThe ICO considered the following aggravating factors:\nSix responses/complaints from persons who had received unsolicited marketing emails demonstrate a level of annoyance.\nThe ICO in 2018 had taken action against Royal Mail for contravening Regulation 22 PECR, and Royal Mail had got clear advice for compliance with PECR.\nThe ICO considered the following mitigating factors:\nRoyal Mail undertook to conduct a full internal Data Protection audit of its direct marketing practices.\nThis was an isolated accident resulting due to human error.\nRoyal Mail itself reported the incident, despite there being no legal requirement for the same.\nThe ICO said, “The sending of unsolicited direct marketing messages is a matter of significant public concern. A monetary penalty in this case should act as a general encouragement towards compliance with the law, or at least as a deterrent against non-compliance, on the part of all persons running businesses currently engaging in these practices. The issuing of a monetary penalty will reinforce the need for businesses to ensure that they are only messaging those who specifically consent to receive direct marketing.” Thus, the ICO issued a €23,850 (GBP 20,000) fine against Royal Mail for sending unsolicited direct marketing emails in violation of provision 22 of the UK Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003.","title":"ICO (UK) - Royal Mail Group Limited"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00475/2021","text":"According to the AEPD, the controller did not provide all the information required by Article 13 GDPR, since information about the right to portability and to restrict the processing was missing, as well as information about the right to lodge a complaint with the supervisory authority. In this regard, AEPD issued a reprimand to the controller and ordered them to include such information.\nThe AEPD found no evidence whatsoever of a violation of Article 6 GDPR, nor of Article 8 GDPR. There was also no violation of Article 9 GDPR, since the exception for explicit consent from Article 9(2)(a) GDPR applied.\nWith regard to international transfers of data, the AEPD concluded that there was no evidence of a violation, since the complainant did not point to any specific risks, and the controller manifested that they were working on new Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs).\nThe AEPD also disregarded all the other allegations, finding no violations whatsoever, except in relation to cookies. Regarding cookies, the AEPD found that the website placed unnecessary own and third-party cookies before asking for consent. Additionally, the information offered in the banner was insufficient, and the cookies policy did not identify the cookies the web used. According to the AEPD, such facts constituted a violation of Article 22(2) LSSI, (the Spanish law implementing the e-Privacy Directive), and fined the controller €20,000, that were reduced to €16,000 because of an early payment.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00475/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Colour Car Sales Limited","text":"The UK DPA first outlined the definition of consent as defined by Article 4(11) of the GDPR. It also outlined the rules under Regulation 22 PECR which address consent.\nAnalysing the application form, the ICO considered that there was no specific reference to direct marketing nor purposes of contact from third parties. Additionally, the UK DPA found that there was no method for the individual to send an application without consenting to being contacted, nor any option for them to select who may contact them.\nThe ICO therefore found CCSL in contravention of Regulation 22 of PECR for instigating unsolicited direct marketing messages. Individuals did not have the option other than agreeing to receiving direct marketing. Consent was therefore not freely given. Similarly, it was not specific as individuals could not select which party they agreed to receive marketing from. Finally, it was not informed (the information provided was too vague).\nThe ICO found that the \"soft opt-in\", where organisations can send marketing messages by text and e-mail to individuals whose details had been obtained in the course or negotiation of a sale and in respect of similar products and services, was also not available to CCSL. This is because individuals were not given the opportunity to refuse or opt-out in the first place.\nThe ICO took into account the seriousness and the deliberate or negligent nature of the infraction, as well as the lack of cooperation by CCSL. It therefore imposed a fine of approximately €198,000 on CCSL.","title":"ICO (UK) - Colour Car Sales Limited"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W214 2224204-1","text":"The Austrian Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht – BVwG) rejected the complaint and upheld the DPA’s decision entirely.\nThe court held that the controller was processing personal data according to Article 4(1) GDPR because, at least, in (small) private homes measuring the water consumption can give insights into the beaviour of the residents. The court also corrected the view of the DSB which was of the opinion that the controller is not obliged to erase data of its own accord but only if the data subject requested it to do so. It clarified that according to the explicit wording of Article 17(1) GDPR erasing the data of its own accord is an obligation of the controller and a request by the data subject is not necessary. However, it found that Articles 17(1)(c),(d) GDPR and 21(1) GDPR were not violated because the processing was lawful under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR since measuring the water consumption was necessary to fairly distribute the costs among all users, to check whether the data subject exceeds the water supply needed for a single-family home, to ensure daily reliability of the distribution system and to detect damages to it. The court further held that the controller did not violate Article 18 GDPR because the data subject did not show that the data was inaccurate (Article 18(1)(a) GDPR) and the data subject did not oppose the erasure of the data but rather tried to achieve it with its complaint (Article 18(1)(b) GDPR). Moreover, since the controller did not violate Article 21 GDPR, the court found that the requirements of Article 18(1)(d) were also not met, and a violation of Article 18(1)(c) GDPR was not indicated by the data subject's submissions. Lastly, the court did not find a violation of Article 22(1) GDPR. It clarified that Article 22(1) GDPR does not require a request of the data subject – contrary to the DPA’s opinion – because it constitutes a prohibition, although it is systematically listed in Chapter 3 of the GDPR. However, the court found that there was no decision solely based on automated processing as required by Article 21(1) GDPR because the decision to cut off the supply if the data subject exceeds the daily limit was taken by the controller as a kind of \"fundamental decision\" before the respective system was installed and was not taken again each time when the supply was actually cut off by the automatic system or the employee (the automatic system or the employee just being the means to enforce the \"fundamental decision\" of the controller). Furthermore, the court reasoned that there was no automated decision making because, even if the decision was taken each time again, the controller switched from an automated system to a system where the accuracy of the counter is checked by an employee, who is also responsible for shutting off the water supply manually, and therefore the decision was not solely based on automated processing.","title":"BVwG - W214 2224204-1"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202209596","text":"This incident was deemed a personal data breach under Article 5(1)(f) GDPR, as defined by Article 4(12) GDPR. Consequently, the Spanish DPA imposed a fine of €2,000, calculated based on Blu Management Spain's annual turnover. On February 29, 2024, the controller acknowledged responsibility and opted to take advantage of a 20% reduction by voluntarily paying the fine within the established timeframe and admitting responsibility, resulting in a reduced penalty of €1,200.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202209596"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - fine against AG-BROKER ASIGURARE S.R.L","text":"The DPA found that the controller had not implemented security measures on secure access to network storage equipment. This increased the risk of access to the personal data of its customers. The DPA then fined the controller for not implementing appropriate technical and organisational measures in line with the risk of processing, as stated in Article 32(1)(b) and 32(2) GDPR.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - fine against AG-BROKER ASIGURARE S.R.L"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/531572 / KG ZA 21-672","text":"The interim relief judge rejected Brein's request because Ziggo does not (yet) have a permit as listed in Article 33(4)(c) Implementation Act, to process the IP addresses.\nFirst, the Court noted that the IP-addresses are personal data for both Ziggo and Brein, referring to CJEU-cases Breyer and Mircom, since Brein has the legal means to force Ziggo to hand over name and address details related to a specific IP-address. Secondly, the Court considered that the IP addresses are personal relating to criminal offences, Article 10 GDPR, because copyright infringement is a criminal offence according to Article 31-33 Dutch Copyright Act. Even though there is barely any prosecution on the basis of these offences, the Dutch DPA has previously held that processing of personal data of persons against whom there is a more or less well-founded suspicion of acts that infringe a copyright, must be regarded as the processing of personal data regarding criminal offences.\nThird, the Court marginally assessed the DPIA that Brein had to conduct pursuant to Article 35(3)(b) GDPR, and acknowledged Brein's conclusion that the processing of the IP addresses was not likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms to the affected data subjects. The Court considered that there were some risks, but that the risks were not high enough. Hence, the Court found that the DPA did not have to be consulted before processing, pursuant to Article 36 GDPR.\nFourth, the Court noted that, pursuant to Article 10 GDPR and Article 31 Implementation Act, the IP addresses could only be processed if one of the exceptions listed in Articles 32 and 33 Implementation Act. Although Brein can rely on the exception laid down in Article 33(2)(b) Implementation Act, since the offences have been committed against their interests as a foundation, Ziggo can only process the personal data if they have a permit as listed in Article 33(4)(c) Implementation Act. The Court noted that, since Ziggo did not have such a permit, they did not have a legal basis to rely on. Moreover, the Court stated that Brein also needs a legal basis pursuant to Article 6 GDPR, and considered that Brein can rely on Article 6(1)(f) because their legitimate interests overrule the interests of the alleged copyright infringers. Referring to previous case law, the Court also concluded that Ziggo had a legitimate interest.\nFifth, the Court stated that the processing of the IP addresses does not violate the principle of purpose limitation, as laid down in Article 5(1)(b) GDPR. Processing the name and address details for Brein's legitimate interest, is further processing, since it was initially only collected for providing internet access. The Court, however, considered that the requirements set out in Article 6(4) GDPR were met because the processing was based on a provision of Dutch law, which constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard one of the objectives of Article 23(1) GDPR.\nFinally, the Court assessed whether Ziggo would have to send the warning letters, if it were to have a permit as previously mentioned. It concluded, after a long assessment, that Ziggo would act unlawfully if it were not to forward the letters, after having such a permit.","title":"Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/531572 / KG ZA 21-672"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202211953","text":"Upon reviewing the data subject's complaint, the AEPD confirmed the following:\n1. The purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended and the legal basis for the processing have ambiguous wording, or lack of required clarity.\n2. The legitimate interests of third parties to whom the controller is referred to in the information banner on the main page are unclear and it is necessary to access the information individually different privacy policies of each of the more than 1,000 companies that appear in the providers list.\n3. No reference is made to the controller's intention to transfer personal data to a third country or international organization outside the European Union, all this despite the fact that some of the companies that appear in the providers list are located outside the EU.\n4. In terms of dark patterns, the AEPD confirmed that the dark pattern of overloading and skipping is observed when accessing the providers list. Once there, the users find a list of about 130 companies, of which, more than half have the default marked “Accept data processing for legitimate interest” box, which requires, in the case of objection to the processing marking one by one throughout the entire list, without the option of being able to object by indicating it only once or a number of times that is reasonable and does not generate fatigue in the affected person.\n5. In regards to cookies, those that are not technical or necessary are deployed before obtaining consent from users.\n6. The cookie management panel shows that the groups of Cookies are divided into two options, accept the cookies by “Consent” that are pre-marked in the “not accepted” option and accept the cookies by “Legitimate Interest” which pre-marked in the “accepted” option. However, if all the options marked “accepted” are unchecked, the website still continues to use the same cookies detected when entering on the web without having given consent.\n7. There is no information about cookies in the second layer or link that enable the user to be redirected to the “Cookie Policy” of the website. The information about cookies appears dispersed in each of the options of the cookie management panel.\nThe DPA resolved to impose a fine of 2000 euro for infringement of Article 13 GDPR and required compliance with this article within one month. This infringement was considered as medium. It also Imposed a fine of 5000 euro for infringement of Article 5 (1)(a) as well as one month to bring its processing into compliance. This infringement was considered very gave","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202211953"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 76/2025","text":"Regarding the first controller:\nThe DPA considered that the first controller did not demonstrate that its legitimate interest in carrying out direct marketing prevails over the rights and interests of data subjects. For this reason, the processing could not be based on the controller's interest and lacked a legal basis under the GDPR.\nThe DPA specified that their balancing depends on the circumstances of the concrete case, and recital 47 of the GDPR provides that the reasonable expectations of the persons concerned must be taken into account. These expectations relate in particular to processing operations, data, purposes and the persons responsible for further processing. They are influenced by the relationship between the controller and the data subjects.\nThe DPA then pointed out that it is not sufficient for the controller to rely on the declarations of the data seller and the existence of a contractual clause to consider that the data has been lawfully collected and can be reused (as the first controller did in this case). The data controller must instead ensure how they were collected, by whom, on what legal basis, and for what purpose.\nFurthermore, the DPA points out that consent given at the time of collection would in no way have implied an authorization to reuse the data: such consent must be free, specific, informed and unambiguous.\nThe second controller\nThe second controller claimed that it was not a controller of the subject's personal data. In this regard, it pointed out that it merely acted as an intermediary and did not open or modify the file containing the data.\nThe DPA rejected the argument. In this regard, the DPA pointed out that by purchasing and re-selling personal data, the second controller determined the means and purposes of the processing (respectively, by deciding to provide its customers with personal data, and by deciding how to transmit them).\nFor this reason, the second controller needed to demonstrate the existence of a legal basis for the processing.\nThe DPA held that it failed to do so. In the DPA's view, the rights and interests of the data subject prevailed over the interest of its customers in receiving the data. In this regard, the DPA stressed that the second controller (like the first) failed to ensure that the circumstances of the initial collection of the data, permitted its re-use. So, the second controller processed personal data unlawfully.\nFinally, the DPA held that as a data controller, the second controller was under an obligation to reply to the data subject's access request. By failing to do so, the second controller breached Article 15 GDPR.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 76/2025"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202200399","text":"First, the DPA confirmed that the personal data of the data subject had been unlawfully disclosed to a third party from the database of the controller. Therefore, the controller violated Article 5(1)(f) GDPR. The DPA considered several aggravating factors, such as the fact that in some cases the leaked data concerned minor children.\nSecond, the DPA held that the controller failed to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure an adequate level of security, breaching Article 32 GDPR. The risk analysis that the controller provided was the output of the ‘GESTIONA EIDP’ tool of the DPA itself. With this tool, data subjects, controllers and DPOs are informed about basic aspects that must be taken into account for adequate data protection, prior to carrying out adequate risk management. The DPA held that this tool only provided guidance for basic elements about risk analysis for processing operations and impact assessments. In this case, there was no link between the measures that were implemented by the controller and the risk analysis. Therefore, it could not be held the measures were deployed to mitigate a certain level of risk. The DPA considered again, among other factors, the fact that part of the leaked data was of minor children and considered this an aggravating factor.\nFinally, the DPA found that a violation of Article 33 GDPR. The DPA stated that the controller knew it had suffered a data breach on 28 October 2021 and only informed the DPA on 11 November 2021. The controller had therefore notified the DPA almost two weeks after the data breach. Again, the DPA considered, among other factors, the fact that the leaked data was of minor children and considered this an aggravating factor.\nThe DPA fined the controller €52,000 for all the violations combined. This was reduced to €31,200 because the controller had already paid part of the fine voluntarily.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202200399"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01893","text":"First, the DPA stated that, although the SPK could rely on both Article 6(1)(c) and Article 6(1)(e) GDPR, the processing must have been necessary. The same necessity requirement follows from Article 9(2)(b) GDPR, since SPK processed health data. Because SPK processed unnecessary income information that was obtained from the Tax Authority, the necessity requirement was not met, in violation of Article 6(1) and Article 9(2) GDPR. In addition, the DPA found that the Public Service Pension Fund (SPK) had obtained excess personal data not needed for the purpose of calculating correct disability pension disbursements, in breach of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. Lastly, SPK lacked sufficient routines for assessing what personal data was needed and for deleting superfluous data, in breach of Article 5(1)(e) GDPR.\nAlthough the DPA found that the violations were not found intentional, but negligent, and SPK took measures to limit the damage, SPK violated basic principles of the GDPR, special categories of personal data were involved, and a large number of persons was affected. Hence, the DPA concluded that SPK needed to be fined, and considered the fine of € 99,940 (NOK 1 million) to be sufficient.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01893"}
{"_id":"holding_NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-1743/2021","text":"The Hungarian DPA noted that both recording the conversation for purely personal use or sharing information about the meeting with other interested parents could have fallen under the household exemption of the GDPR under Article 2(2)(c). However, NAIH held that the sharing of such recording excluded the exemption and was also contrary to the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation under Articles 5(1)(b) and 5(1)(c) GDPR. Moreover, the DPA held that the defendant had no legal ground for the processing of the data, including special categories of data, under Article 6(1) and Article 9 GDPR.Subsequently, NAIH decided to reprimand the controller under Article 58(2)(b) and impose a ban on any further processing under Article 58(2)(f). The DPA also ordered the controller to inform those with whom the data was shared to erase it without undue delay under Article 58(2)(g). However, NAIH did not find it necessary to impose an administrative fine under Article 83(2), taking into account that the controller is a natural person who had accepted that their conduct had been unlawful.","title":"NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-1743/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_EWHC (QB) - Damavand Media Ltd v DMA Media Ltd","text":"The High Court dismissed the argument of the complainant alleging that he was not subject to the editorial guidelines. It found that the contract was to be read holistically, and by doing so it became clear that the contract indeed created an obligation for Mr. Farhadbahman to adhere to the editorial guidelines through other obligations which were expressly agreed upon in the terms of the contract, such as an undertaking to promote the interests of IITV.\nIn considering the arguments of both parties relating to the reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to the employment contract, the court noted that in order to uphold the claimant’s argument, it has to be satisfied that the claimant expected his employment contract with the defendant to be confidential and that such expectation is reasonable. The court further noted that employment contracts are not routinely or intrinsically a private matter and therefore this case is to be considered on its own merits.\nThe court went ahead to look at various factors such as the contractual terms and the correspondence between the claimant and the defendant reflecting the claimant’s reaction or attitude toward the leaking of his particulars at the time. Noting that the onus is on the claimant “to discharge the burden of showing on the facts and evidence that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the existence of his contract” the court found that “[t]he difficulty he faces in making out a claim for misuse of private information is the lack of contemporaneous evidence that he actively made clear to IITV he expected his contract to be kept private, or that IITV ought in all the circumstances to have inferred as much.” The court dismissed the claimant’s argument as he was not able to discharge his burden of proof. It is therefore clear that an expectation of privacy arising from contract (more specifically an employment contract) has to be expressly agreed upon between the contracting parties and if not, it should at the very least be made clear at some stage thereafter through written correspondence between the parties reflecting an unequivocal understanding of such privacy expectation by either or both parties.","title":"EWHC (QB) - Damavand Media Ltd v DMA Media Ltd"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202315744","text":"The AEPD dismissed the appeal by the data subject. It found that the data controller had responded to the erasure request and was not able to fully address the request due to technical problems with Meta.\nThe AEPD considered that the controller had put forth considerable effort to comply with the erasure request, as evidenced by the partial deletion achieved.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202315744"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9751137","text":"Regarding the alleged failure to delete the data subject’s company email account, the Garante noted, first of all, that the company did not have access to the communications contained in its mailbox following the termination of the employment relationship, since they had been deleted by the complainant upon his dismissal. The Garante also took into consideration the fact that the email account only remained partially active with an automated redirection message for a month and a half, before it was permanently deactivated. Therefore, the Garante did not find any GDPR violations regarding this element of the claim.\nWith regards to the processing of data contained in the complainant’s company laptop, the Garante once again highlighted the absence of regulations or information provided to employees regarding the company’s handling, possible controls and interventions on these computers, as well as on other tools provided to its workers as part of their employment relationship. The Garante established that it was of no relevance that the task of drafting these regulations was the responsibility of the complainant during his tenure, because any liability deriving from non-compliance with data protection legal obligations by the employee ultimately falls on the company, since the role of data controller is attributed to the company itself and not the employee (without prejudice to the possible civil liability that the employee might have towards the company in this sense).\nMoreover, the Garante held that the obligation to provide the information regarding the collection of personal data referred to in Article 13 GDPR, falls on the data controller, who once again, in the context of a work relationship, is the employer. Additionally, the Garante noted the protection of privacy also extends to the workplace, since the boundary between the working/professional sphere, and the strictly private sphere, cannot always be clearly drawn. On this point, the Garante cited European Court of Human Rights case law which considers that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects private life without making a distinction between the private and professional spheres.\nBased on these considerations, the Garante held that processing of personal data contained in the company computer assigned to the complainant in the absence of internal regulations and information on the handling of employee IT tools, violated the principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, as well as the data subject’s right to information under Articles 12 and 13 GDPR, and issued a fine of €10,000 against the company.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9751137"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00483/2020","text":"The AEPD considered that there was an infringement of Article 5(1)(f), as there was a leak of personal data without the consent of the data subject. Additionally, they considered that there was an infringement of Article 32(1), as they concluded that the audit company did not have the appropriate technical and organisational measures in place to ensure an adequate level of protection.\nFor this, the AEPD fined Asesoria Alpi Clua:\n  * for the infringement of Article 5(1)(f), €2,000.\n  * for the infringement of Article 32(1), €1,000.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00483/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00057/2020","text":"Without prejudice to the results of the final investigations corresponding to the sanction procedure, the AEPD understood that the defendant could have breached its information duties in relation to cookies as per Article 22(2) of the LSSI (digital services providers may use data storage and retrieval devices on computers terminals of the recipients, provided that such recipients have given their consent after they have been provided with clear and complete information on their use and, in particular, on the purposes of data processing according to the data protection laws): on the basis of the available evidences, the three websites still load not necessary cookies (even Facebook ones) without informing nor obtaining any consent from the user, and the basic layer is too much vague (\"…in order to improve your browsing experience…\") and does not follow the recommendations by the AEPD; besides, the second layer of the three websites provide generic information on the concept of cookies, but not specific information on which cookies and how long will they be installed at the user's device (in one of them, it even specify that the way to reject cookies \"will change depending on your browser\", but it does not include any link nor explanation on how), and they do not offer any way to reject all the cookies. Consequently, after considering some aggravating circumstances [(i) there is a negligence/intentionality by the defendant, (ii) the period of time in which the breach has been happening, and (iii) the acceptance by the defendant of the cookies guide of the AEPD], the AEPD understood that, in case the sanction procedure resulted in a successful decision, this infringement would be fined with 10,000 € to the defendant. In this sense, the AEPD offered the defendant the possibility to settle the issue before the decision takes place by agreeing to a voluntary payment of part of the fine with two possible discounts: (i) acknowledging of its liability (8,000 €) and early voluntary payment (6,000 €). The defendant agreed to both concepts, so it paid 6,000 € and the sanction procedure was closed by the AEPD.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00057/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AP (The Netherlands) - 10.12.2020 (Booking.com)","text":"The AP concluded that Booking violated the breach reporting obligation under Article 33(1) of the GDPR. According to the Fine Policy of the AP, the basis fine for this violation is €525,000. The AP took into account the measures taken by Booking to minimize the consequences of the breach and reduced the fine to €475,000.","title":"AP (The Netherlands) - 10.12.2020 (Booking.com)"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO - Enforcement Notice against Experian","text":"The ICO found three main categories of failures on Experian's approach to data protection compliance:\n1. Transparency and fairness\nThe privacy notice and the Consumer information portal ('CIP') drafted by Experian were insufficiently clear in explaining how data is collected, processed and sold, in particular in relation to the credit data used in connection with the direct marketing purposes.\nAlso, the CIP did not specify all the rights available to the data subjects (in particular rectification and restriction under art.16 of the GDPR) and did not set up a proper retention period for the data used.\nThe Commissioner acknowledged the CIP still fails to set out clearly in one place and at the forefront:\n- the attributes that may be processed about an individual;\n- the 'invisible' tracing activity undertook for marketing;\n- the explanation of the drawbacks or outcomes that individuals may find undesirable.\n\nWith reference to the credit reference data, The Authority highlighted that was not appropriate to use them for direct marketing purposes without the active engagement of the individuals concerned. Such consent needs to be either obtained by Experian directly from the individual, or by the lender on the Experian’s behalf, clearly and separately from the collection of data to be shared for credit referring purposes.\n2. Art. 14 of GDPR\nThe ICO found that, where Experian acquires the personal data of a data subject from a third party, Experian does not provide Art. 14 privacy information to the data subject directly, relying on the privacy policy of the third parties, which in many cases provides links to the policies of Experian.\nExperian suggested that any direct notification exercise will be extremely costly and disproportionate. However, the Commissioner’s views are that the question for the proportionality must be considered in the light of the extensive processing carried out by Experian. Moreover, the ICO pointed out that the processing activities are a matter of choice of Experian, and it follows from Experian's business model. The fact that there are large numbers of data subjects cannot in itself be a determinative factor against the proportionality of the notification.\nThe cost could be seen as high because it is the cost of an accumulation of many years during which there has been a failure to give notifications.\n3. Lawful processing\nThe Commissioner considered that it is unlikely that Experian would be able to apply its legitimate interests for intrusive profiling for direct marketing purposes. The Legitimate Interest Assessment put in place could not be considered to be properly balanced.\nAlso, the Commissioner was not satisfied that the privacy information and data capture mechanism of Experian’s suppliers with regards to the transparency and lawful obligations of the GDPR. It seemed that an individual could be confused about which marketing activities they had, or had not, consented to, and how much control they had over the onwards processing of their data.\nTherefore, the Commissioner is requiring Experian to take specified steps to comply with the GDPR. In particular, within 3 months:\n- revise the CIP to set out a clear summary of the direct marketing activities that Experian undertakes; place information that is likely to surprise the individuals, in a clearer and more concise language; - cease using credit reference data for any direct marketing activities other than those requested by the individuals. - delete any data supplied by third parties on the basis of the consent which is now being processed on the basis of the Experian's legitimate interests.\nAlso, within 9 months, Experian must:\n- directly provide all data subjects with an 'Art. 14 privacy notice', potentially sent by mail or other similar means; - review the compliance with the GDPR of the privacy notice of its suppliers to provide the same standard of transparency as the CIP; and their data capture mechanisms in order to have a valid 'consent' to the disclosure and further processing of the data carried out by Experian.","title":"ICO - Enforcement Notice against Experian"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-002","text":"Firstly, regarding the retention periods, the CNIL considered that a retention period of ten years from the date of acceptance of the order was justified by its legal obligations resulting from French law, in particular Articles L.213-1, D.213-1 and D.213-2 Consumer Code, for contracts worth more than €120. Therefore, the CNIL considered that for contracts that were less than €120, the 10 year retention period was excessive and therefore breaches Article 5(1)(e) GDPR.\nAdditionally, while the CNIL agreed that a 5 year retention period commencing from the date of last connection to the user account was justified for legal proceedings and anti-fraud purposes, more than 2 million user accounts of between 5 and 10 years old had been retained, as well as more than 700,000 accounts more than 10 years old. The retention of data beyond what was necessary for the announced purpose constituted a breach of Article 5(1)(e) GDPR.\nSecondly, the CNIL indicated that the controller breached Article 13 GDPR by failing to include the right to lodge a complaint to the CNIL, together with inaccurate data retention period information, in the privacy policy. The CNIL noted that this information helps users to control the processing of their data, and thereby ensures fair and transparent processing.\nThirdly, the CNIL found that the controller had breached Article 28(3) GDPR where it had tried to retroactively amend one of its data processor agreements to include all requirements of this Article. The CNIL held that the retroactive nature of the amendment cannot cover the breach for the past.\nFinally, the CNIL considered that the controller breached Article 32 GDPR in several ways. Firstly, users were not required to provide strong passwords when creating an account, accounts were not locked after a certain number of failed access attempts, and part of a reference code used instead of an account (if the user did not wish to create one) was made publicly available by forming part of the ad reference number. The CNIL found that the above measures, given the current state of the art, were not sufficient to guarantee the security and confidentiality of the data being processed. Secondly, the controller failed to intermediately archive inactive customer data (kept for 10 years) and inactive user account data (kept for 5 years). The CNIL found that the mixing of inactive data in an active database, which the controller explained was for daily anti-fraud checks, did not ensure adequate data security. A large number of employees could access the data, and some of the retained data was not needed for anti-fraud checks (such as advertising details and billing addresses).\nFor breaching Articles 5(1)(e), 13, 28 and 32 GDPR the CNIL imposed a €100,000 to the controller.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2024-002"}
{"_id":"holding_DSB (Austria) - 2021-0.568.642","text":"The Austrian DPA assessed the documents the respondent provided, and held that the processing of the complainant's address data was lawful because (i) the respondent had a valid trade licence \"for the exercise of the trade of address publishers and direct marketing companies\", (ii) only obtained the relevant data for advertising purposes, (iii) processed the data in line with the principle of proportionality per §151(3) Trade Regulation Act 1994.","title":"DSB (Austria) - 2021-0.568.642"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9870832","text":"The Italian DPA held that the controller did not comply with its obligation to provide data subjects with a privacy policy pursuant to Article 13 GDPR.\nMoreover, the collection of personal data and their use in the training of ChatGPT algorithms were undertaken in lack of a proper legal basis,in violation of Article 5 and 6 GDPR.\nConcerning specifically data of people other than the users, namely those data subjects whose data were collected on the internet, the DPA found that the algorithms behind the functioning of ChatGPT did not guarantee the principle of accuracy as enshrined in Article 5(1)(d).\nFinally, the DPA also considered that the lack of any mechanism to check the age of the users entailed a violation of Article 8 GDPR.\nIn light of the above and in the context of an urgency procedure, the DPA imposed on OpenAI a temporary limitation of processing pursuant to Article 58(2)(f) GDPR. Such limitation concerns all processing operations involving data subjects on the Italian territory.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9870832"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00476/2021","text":"The AEPD pointed out that the fact that the claimant’s sister knew her brother’s name, surname, ID number, telephone number and address could not lead to the presumption that she was authorised to represent him in order to make changes to the contract with the electricity company. The AEPD noted that in this case, the family relationship between the brother and sister allows her to easily know this data, and that this data could also be accessible to other third parties without the data subject’s knowledge. The AEPD stated that the mere fact that someone might have knowledge of this data should not imply that they can act on behalf of the data subject to modify the contract with the electrical company.\nBased on these considerations, the AEPD held that the electrical company had violated Article 32 GDPR by failing to having an adequate security protocol in place to verify if someone was actually authorised to act on the data subject’s behalf. The AEPD also held that by not having an adequate security protocol in place, the company had modified the power supply contract without the data subject’s consent, in violation of Article 6 GDPR.\nIn light of the aforementioned violations, the AEPD imposed a fine of €150,000 against the electrical company (€50,000 for the violation of Article 32 GDPR and €100,000 for the violation of Article 6 GDPR).","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00476/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202315637","text":"The DPA firstly determined that LaLiga was the data controller, rejecting the contention by the controller that each club should be considered controllers in their own respect. In doing so, the DPA focused on the provision by the controller of the access system which complied with their regulation, and the speed with which it was made available to clubs who requested it.\nThe DPA found that the controller infringed Article 35 by not conducting a DPIA prior to the commencement of the processing. The DPA stressed both the high-risk nature of the processing in question, i.e. biometric processing, as well as the large scale.\nThe DPA imposed a fine of €1,000,000 for the infringement of Article 35(1). The also ordered the suspension of the biometric processing until a DPIA had been appropriately carried out, assessing the necessity and proportionality of the processing.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202315637"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - 24.04.2023","text":"The DPA held that the controller's conduct was a violation of the GDPR. Pursuant to Article 21 GDPR data subjects have the right to object to processing which is done based either on the legal basis of Article 6(1)(e) GDPR (public interest) or Article 6(1)(f) GDPR (legitimate interest). Moreover, Article 21(2) GDPR specifically grants data subjects the right to object to processing for direct marketing purposes.\nDuring the investigation, the DPA found that the controller did not present evidence from which it could be concluded that it reacted to the request of the data subject in accordance with Article 12(3) GDPR and Article 21 GDPR and did not provide the data subject with an answer, within the month of the request, regarding the measures adopted following the exercise of the right to objection.\nThe DPA decided that the controller violated Article 12(3) and Article 21 GDPR by not respecting the data subject's objection. Based on its powers pursuant to Article 58(2)(i) GDPR, the DPA fined the controller €1,000 (RON 4,947.9). Moreover, based on Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, the DPA ordered the controller to take the necessary measures to modify the existing procedures at the company level and communicate them to the employees, in order to ensure that its processing of personal data respect the rights of data subjects under the GDPR.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - 24.04.2023"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202205208","text":"The DPA first dismissed the arguments on competence and sanctioning procedure. In terms of competence, the DPA affirmed that the case fell under its competence despite the national data retention law. Under this law, the Secretariat of State for Telecommunications and Digital Infrastructure (SETID) is competent for the failure to maintain a prepaid phone line logbook. However, Article 8 specifies that the quality of data falls under the scope of Spanish data protection law, and that the DPA is the authority responsible for ensuring compliance with data protection requirements. According to the DPA, data accuracy (Article 5(1)(d) GDPR) is directly related to the quality of data.\nThe DPA cited Supreme Court case law[3] to support the broadening of the case; here, the Court acknowledges the possibility of setting fines for violations found during the DPA’s investigations. This means that the DPA is not strictly bound by the facts of the complaint. By limiting the procedure to the facts of the case, the DPA would fail to fulfill its duty.\nThe DPA later held the controller responsible for the lack of data accuracy. Under the GDPR, the controller is liable for actions by the processor that violate the GDPR, unless the processor acts as a controller. Furthermore, the principle of accountability (Article 5(2) GDPR) places a proactive obligation on the controller to demonstrate compliance with data protection principles under Article 5(1) GDPR. The DPA analysed the contract between the controller and distributors of its products (processors) and concluded that YOIGO is a controller in accordance with CJEU case law[4] and EDPB Guidelines[5].\nThe DPA noted that the controller had no measures in place to detect errors or inaccuracies in its data, including measures to ensure that ID numbers correspond to existing IDs. Therefore, the fine imposed on the controller was based on data inaccuracy and the absence of technical and organisational measures.\nFinally, the DPA stated that the controller could not be held accountable for the content of the calls with the data subject. However, due to the lack of data accuracy, the DPA was not able to investigate the potential violation of advertising calls without a legitimate basis.\nThe DPA found a violation of Article 5(1)(d) GDPR, based on the inaccurate information given by the controller during its investigation. The DPA imposed a fine of €70,000, taking into account the fact that the data inaccuracy was an obstacle during its investigations, and the fact that the violation occurred within a framework of data processing activities that the controller carries out on a regular basis.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202205208"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W292 2248672-1","text":"Complaint based on the principles of lawfulness, fairness and transparency\nThe court dismissed the controller’s argument that a violation of Article 5(1)(a) GDPR could not be made the subject of a complaint under Section 24 of the Austrian data protection law (\"DSG\") and Article 77 GDPR. The court took into account the CJEU judgement (C-33/22), which states clearly that a complaint under Article 77(1) GDPR does not need to be based on a violation of rights, but on a violation of data processing in the GDPR.\nAutomated decision-making\nOn whether assessing the data subject’s creditworthiness falls under automated decision-making under Article 22 GDPR, the court took into account the CJEU judgement C-634/21 OQ / Land Hessen. The CJEU held that “the automated establishment, by a credit information agency, of a probability value based on personal data relating to a person and concerning his or her ability to meet payment commitments in the future constitutes ‘automated individual decision-making’ [under Article 22(1) GDPR], where a third party, to which that probability value is transmitted, draws strongly on that probability value to establish, implement or terminate a contractual relationship with that person.” (See para 73).\nThe court therefore dismissed the controller’s argument that it did not carry out automated decision-making under Article 22 GDPR, as the probability value that the controller provided to the energy supplier was the decisive criterion in refusing to conclude a contract with the data subject. Moreover, the court held that the fact that the decision led to the data subject being able to conclude a energy supply contract was a decision that “produces legal effects concerning a data subject or similarly significantly affects a data subject” within the meaning of Article 22(1) GDPR.\nThe court dismissed the controller’s argument that it only calculated the credit score and that any further decision is made by their contractual partners, and the controller could therefore not anticipate whether a decision is solely based on the credit score they provided. The court again took into account the CJEU judgement C-634/21 OQ / Land Hessen, which explicitly stated that such a restrictive interpretation would risks a circumvention of Article 22 GDPR. If the calculation of the credit score is only seen as a preparatory act and not a decision, it would create a gap in legal protection.\nTherefore, the court held that the controller's creation of a credit score was automated decision-making under Article 22 GDPR. Moreover, the court held that no exceptions under Article 22(2) GDPR applied to the controller and thus, the controller's automated processing was unlawful. The court agreed with the DPA that the controller also violated the principles of “lawfulness” and “fairness” under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR.\nThe court further elaborated that the controller violated its information obligations under Article 13(2)(f) GDPR and Article 14(2)(g) GDPR, because it did not provide information to the data subject about the logic involved or the scope and intended effects of such processing for the data subject.\nAccess request\nThe court agreed with the findings of the DPA that the controller did not comply with the data subject’s access request under Article 15(1)(h) GDPR. The court again took into account the CJEU judgement C-634/21 OQ / Land Hessen, which held that the data subject has a right of access to the “meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject” (para 56). The court found that the data subject could not verify the lawfulness of the data processing with the information given by the controller as it did not include the specific information on the calculation of the credit score attributed to it. The court held that the information provided must be so comprehensive that the data subject can understand the reasons for the scoring value of the credit score. This court held that the term “logic involved” means the principle on which such a calculation is based and not the specific calculation formula.\nThe court dismissed the controller’s argument that this information was a trade secret. Although under Section 4(6) DSG, the right to information is generally excluded if it would jeopardize a business or trade secret, the court held that this was not an absolute right to refusal of information. The controller must carefully weigh up in each individual case the extent to which specific part of information would affect a business or trade secret. The data subject can still be provided with further information on how this credit score was calculated without disclosing business secrets, such as the specific calculation formula. The court agreed with the DPA that providing information on the calculation of the credit score would not result in a competitive disadvantage for the controller compared to market competitors, especially since all of them are subject to the GDPR.\nTherefore, the court held that the controller violated Article 15(1)(h) GDPR by not providing the data subject with sufficient information. The court thus agreed with the DPA in ordering the controller to provide the data subject with the relevant information within a deadline of eight weeks.\nThe court thus dismissed the controller's appeal.","title":"BVwG - W292 2248672-1"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 17/01281","text":"The Norwegian Privacy Appeals Board (Personvernrådet) held that the missionary organization had legal grounds under Article (6)(1)(f) to process the personal data in question.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 17/01281"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - LTH Holdings Limited","text":"The ICO found that LTH contravened Regulation 21 of PECR, which establishes that if a company wants to make calls to an individual who has a telephone number which is registered with the Telephone Preference Service Ltd (\"TPS\"), then that individual must have given their consent to that company to receive such calls. It stated that LTH used a public telecommunications service for the purposes of making 1,414,519 unsolicited direct marketing calls to subscribers who had registered with the TPS at least 28 days prior to receiving the calls, and had not given their prior consent to LTH to receive calls.\nThe ICO highlighted that consent, as defined by Article 4(11) GDPR, must be \"freely given\", meaning an organisation must be able to demonstrate how consent can be said to have been given freely. LTH were unable to do this; for all of LTH's third-party data providers, the data of individuals who purchased a product from one of their sites was passed to LTH for use in further direct marketing campaigns, without those individuals being given a genuine choice about whether to consent to such marketing from LTH. Generally, the applicable 'consent' mechanisms gave users no option but to agree to electronic marketing from third parties.\nConsent was also not valid as it was not 'specific' since individuals were not able to select the method by which they might wish to receive direct marketing, nor from whom they may consent to receive it. It was also not 'informed'. The ICO emphasized that consent will not be informed if individuals are asked to agree to receive marketing from \"similar organisations\", \"partners\", \"selected third parties\" or other similar generic description. Rather, information should be clear and easy to understand.\nThe ICO concluded that a penalty in the sum of £145,000 was reasonable and proportionate. In particular, it considered the following aggravating features:\n  * LTH's primary audience appears to be older people;\n  * LTH adopted aggressive, coercive, and persuasive methods in its direct marketing;\n  * the current owner of the business is now disqualified from acting as a director;\n  * despite providing superficial responses to the ICO's various correspondence, LTH failed to co-operate with the ICO's investigation, because: it tended to refer the ICO to the third party data providers for information, rather than taking steps to obtain it itself (particularly notable given that it was information which a company would reasonably be expected to be in possession of when engaging in direct marketing campaigns); an LTH failed to provide accurate call figures when asked to do so.","title":"ICO (UK) - LTH Holdings Limited"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01813","text":"The DPA fined the hospital €76,870 (NOK 750,000) for breaching the requirements of internal control, security and safety for the processing of personal data under Article 32 GDPR, Article 24, Article 5(1)(f) and Article 5(2), as well as § 26(1) of the Personal Data Act and §§ 22 and 23 of the Health Records Act (pasientjournalloven) .\nThe DPA also pointed out that the highest-level management position, on behalf of the hospital, is accountable for the (negligent) violation.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/01813"}
{"_id":"holding_IMY (Sweden) - DI-2019-4062","text":"After conducting their investigation, the IMY held that Klarna had violated various GDPR provisions related to information on the purpose and legal basis for the processing of personal data, the recipients of various categories of personal data, international data transfers, retention periods, data subject rights and automated decision-making, including profiling. As a common thread, the IMY held that each one of these breaches also entailed a violation of Articles 12(1) GDPR, 5(1)(a) GDPR and 5(2) GDPR.\nRegarding the information provided by Klarna on the purpose and legal basis for the processing of personal data related to the \"My Finance\" and \"My Economy\" services, the IMY held that this information was not concise, clear and easily accessible, and did not meet the requirements of Article 13(1)(c) GDPR.\nWith regards to the recipients, the IMY held that Klarna provided incomplete and misleading information on who were the recipients of different categories of personal data when such data were shared with Swedish and foreign credit reference agencies, in violation of Article 13(1)(e) GDPR.\nSpecifically on the topic of international data transfers, the IMY noted that a mere statement that personal data will be transferred to third countries, without naming these countries, was not adequate information for data subjects in this sense. Moreover, the IMY held that Klarna not only failed to provide information about the countries outside the EU/EEA to which personal data was transferred, but also as to where and how data subjects could access documents regarding the safeguards applicable to the data transfers where no adequacy decision exists between the EU and these countries, in breach of Article 13(1)(f) GDPR.\nFurthermore, the IMY also held that Klarna provided incomplete information about the periods for which personal data would be retained and the criteria used to determine those periods, in violation of Article 13(2)(a) GDPR.\nRegarding data subject rights, the IMY held that Klarna did not provide them with adequate information related to the right to erasure of personal data under Article 17 GDPR, restriction of processing concerning the data subject under Article 18 GDPR, the right to object under Article 20 GDPR as well as the right to data portability under Article 21 GDPR, in violation of Article 13(2)(b) GDPR.\nAs to automated decision-making, including profiling under Articles 22(1) and (4) GDPR, the IMY noted that it was not clear whether Klarna used its own internal scoring model based on, among other things, both internal and external financial information, or what types of data are included in the financial information, such as information on liabilities with other creditors. The IMY also observed that no information was provided regarding the logic behind these processes, their significance, the types of personal data that played a decisive role when subject to a negative decision, or the foreseeable consequences for data subjects, in breach of Articles 13(2)(f) and 14(2)(g) GDPR.\nIn order to determine their administrative fine, the IMY took into account that Klarna is a multinational company that processes many different categories of personal data on a large number of data subjects, including privacy-sensitive data such as financial data and creditworthiness, and that these breaches were ongoing for a long period of time. Based on these considerations, the IMY issued a fine of approximately €730,000 (SEK 7,500,000) against Klarna Bank AB.","title":"IMY (Sweden) - DI-2019-4062"}
{"_id":"holding_IP (Slovenia) - 0611-10/2021/11","text":"The Slovenian DPA (IP) held that a bar owner does not have a legitimate interest in monitoring the various server rooms and outdoor terrace of the bar with video surveillance, but does have a have a legitimate interest in monitoring the bar counter (where bottles of higher value and the cash register are contained) and the bar entrance. Accordingly, the DPA gave the bar fifteen days to adjust the viewing angles of its surveillance cameras to record only the counter and entrance.\nThe DPA explained that video surveillance is the processing of personal data (Article 4(2) GDPR) and the operator of video surveillance is responsible for complying with the principles set out in Article 5 GDPR, including data minimization, purpose limitation and storage limitation. In assessing the adequacy of procedures and measures to ensure an adequate level of security of personal data, the bar must also comply with Article 32 GDPR, which provides that controllers and processors shall ensure a level of data security appropriate to risks to the rights and freedoms of individuals by, for example, endeavoring to maintain the confidentiality of data subjects.\nAccording to national law (ZVOP-1), video surveillance of a business premises may be carried out for the safety of people or property, to ensure control of entry into or exit from or from business or business premises, or if, due to the nature of the work, there is a possibility of endangering employees. Thus, the bar has a legitimate interest, as recognized in Article6(1)(f) GDPR, in processing data limited to those purposes. In contrast, there is no provision allowing for the general surveillance of employee workplaces, such as server rooms, if the protection of people in these workplaces can be achieved by milder means. The interest of the bar manager in securing the bar rooms also does not outweigh the interests and freedoms of bar guests. The IP thus concluded that there is no legitimate interest, based in a need for data processing, for video surveillance of spaces where guests are located and where employees work.","title":"IP (Slovenia) - 0611-10/2021/11"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9677521","text":"The Italian DPA (Garante) held that Dr. Marini had violated the basic principles of processing in Article 5 GDPR by collecting information on infectious diseases from patients regardless of the type of intervention to be carried out to provide care. In this way, Dr. Marini processed personal data about HIV infection status in a way that is not relevant to the purpose for which it can be processed. Information about infection history can only be collected in order to know the patient's clinical history and to identify the most appropriate therapy. Further, information about HIV infection can only be collected if it is deemed necessary by the treating physician for the type of health intervention.\nUsing HIV infection information to refuse treatment, is not, however, a legitimate and necessary basis for processing such data. The DPA explained that Dr. Marini failed to process the complainant’s health data with the concrete purpose of evaluating the best therapy for the patient, offering him the required service, and possibly also taking additional measures against the risk of contagion.\nTherefore, and pursuant to Article 83 GDPR, the DPA issued the dentist with an administrative fine of € 20,000.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9677521"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 170/2022","text":"Despite the findings by the investigation service, the DPA closed the proceedings regarding some findings, while for other findings the DPA stated that it would continue to investigate.\nFor findings 1 (concerning advertising profiling only) and findings 2, 3 and 4, the DPA closed the proceedings because it had reached a settlement with the same controller regarding the use of cookies. According to the DPA, the subject matter of the current complaint with regard to cookies was also covered by the settlement. Because of this settlement, the DPA stated that it would not take action regarding findings 1 (concerning advertising profiling only) and findings 2, 3 and 4. The DPA closed the proceedings with regard to these findings pursuant of Article 100(1)(1) WOG. For findings 1 (with regards to the processing of registration data), 5 and 6, the DPA stated that it would continue to examine the substance of the complaint.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 170/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2018-7320-0166","text":"The Datatilsynet noted that data controllers must carry out a concrete assessment on whether there is a reasonable doubt about the identity of a data subject. Pandora’s general practice to ask for identification without providing any exceptions did not comply with Articles 5(1)(c) and 12(6) GDPR. It ordered Pandora to carry out this assessment. Finally, it stressed that this is the first case where the Datatilsynet has taken a decision as the leading supervisory authority under the \"one-stop shop mechanism\" in connection with cross-border processing of personal data.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2018-7320-0166"}
{"_id":"holding_IP - 07121-1/2020/1677","text":"The DPA advised that if a company is to introduce measures regarding temperature checks, these measures must be necessary and justified. On the topic of video cameras, the DPA said that the use of biometric measures for the purpose of recording working time is generally not allowed, as it is an invasive way of processing personal data, and there are milder and equally effective measures for recording working time.","title":"IP - 07121-1/2020/1677"}
{"_id":"holding_EWCA - Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing LLP","text":"The Court of Appeal held that 'privilege' in the LLP exception is limited to legal professional privilege. It falls to the data controller to show that the supply of a copy of the information in permanent form would involve disproportionate effort. The High Court judge was wrong not to exercise its discretion under section 7(9) DPA 1998 to order the data controller to comply with the request.\nOn Issue 1 - Extent of the Legal Professional Privilege Exception:\nThe purpose of Directive 95/46/EC (the Directive) was to regulate the activities of data controllers on a territorial basis. Therefore, the words \"legal proceedings\" in sched. 7 para. 10 DPA 1998 refer to legal proceedings in any part of the UK. If Parliament had intended to legislate for events which occur outside the territory of the UK, it would have introduced provisions specifying which parts of the world were relevant for this purpose and under which conditions the privilege applied. The LPP exception is expressly limited to legal professional privilege. Documents not disclosable to a beneficiary of a trust under trust law principles are not within the LPP exception. Insofar as the exception was interpreted purposively as also including documents covered by the trustees' right of non-disclosure, the Directive would have to name appropriate objectives which could support an interpretation along these lines. However, the DPA does not contain such exceptions.\nThe court concluded at para. 45 that the LPP exception “relieves the data controller from complying with a SAR only if there is relevant privilege according to the law of any part of the UK.” Since the data in question is not covered by the LPP under English law and no other exemption under the DPA 1998 applies, the SAR must be granted.\nOn Issue 2 - Whether compliance with the request would involve disproportionate effort:\nThe public interest reasons set out in the Directive for giving people control over the data held about them require that SARs should be enforced so far as possible. Under section 8(2) DPA 1998 the data controller is obliged to supply copies of information constituting personal information to the data subject, \"unless …the supply of such a copy is not possible or would involve disproportionate effort.\" The effort, the data controller undertakes must be weighed in a proportionality exercise against the potential benefits that the provision of the information could bring to the data subject. That includes the possibility that there may be limits to a search in certain circumstances, see Ezsias v Welsh Ministers [2007] EWHC B15 (QB).\nThe court held at para. 75 ff, that “It falls to the data controller to show that the supply of a copy of the information in permanent form would involve disproportionate effort”. However, “disproportionate effort must involve more than an assertion that it is too difficult to search through voluminous papers”. The data controller “must produce evidence to show what it has done to identify the material and to work out a plan of action.”\nOn Issue 3 - Whether the request can be declined because the data subject intended to use the information against the data controller:\nThe purpose of the Directive is to protect fundamental rights conferred by EU law. The court found that nothing in Directive or the DPA 1998 limits the purpose for which data subjects may request their data or allows data controllers not to provide data based solely on the on the basis of the purpose of the data subject. Also, Parliament has not expressly required data subjects to show that they have no other purpose. The court distinguished Dunn v Durham County Council [2003] 1 WLR 2305, Lin & Anor v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2015] EWHC 2484 and Kololo v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2015] 1 WLR 3702. Durant v Financial Services Authority [2004] FSR 573 at para. 27 also does not establish a “no other purpose rule” and should only be interpreted to mean that “a person could not claim that something was personal data because it would assist him in obtaining discovery or in litigation or complaints against third parties.” (para. 111)\nThe court found that the trial judge had wrongly refused to enforce the request just because the appellants intended to use the information obtained in other proceedings. The section 7(9) DPA 1998 discretion must be applied with a view to fulfilling the purposes of the DPA.","title":"EWCA - Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing LLP"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Materiale Constructii Online SRL","text":"Following the complaint, the DPA started an investigation. However, the controller did not provide the information requested by the DPA.\nTherefore, the controller was sanctioned with a €2,000 fine for violating Article 58(1) GDPR and Article 83(5) GDPR.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Materiale Constructii Online SRL"}
{"_id":"holding_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 04-05-2023","text":"Following the investigation, the key findings are:\n(1) The controller did not clearly and accurately inform the data subjects about the processing and regarding the legal basis as required by Article 13(1) GDPR. This resulted in the non-transparent processing of the data subjects' personal data of which there were (at least) 132,652 at the time of the monitoring. The controller did not take measures to comply with its transparency obligation.\n(2) Contrary to the provisions of Article 28(3) GDPR, the controller did not have a processing agreement with the processor regarding the processing which concerned 83,896 data subjects. According to the DPA, the absence of such agreement implied a lack of security. Indeed, no rules were established regarding the technical and organizational measures in place.was important.\n(3) The controller did not take appropriate technical and organizational measures when processing personal data, as requested by Article 32(1)(b) and (d) GDPR. This implied a risk for the security of the personal data of all data subjects concerned (at least 132,652). The DPA recalled that these data were of a financial nature and thus quite sensitive. The DPA determined that the violation has been ongoing since at least 2019 and has not yet been remedied.\nThe DPA issued a fine of €2,265,000 for these three violations.","title":"AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 04-05-2023"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - Gyldendal A/S","text":"The DPA held that the controller violated the principles of storage limitation and accountability by keeping the personal data of a large number of data subjects for longer than necessary. Therefore, it reported the controller to the police and recommended a fine of €134,427 (DKK 1,000,000).","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - Gyldendal A/S"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 201905709/1/A3","text":"The mother’s appeal to the Council of State was declared well-founded.\nAccording to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State, • Article 15(1) GDPR only gives a data subject the right to obtain information about the personal data concerning him/her, and therefore does not provide a basis for providing personal data to third parties • Article 15(4) and recital 63 GDPR indicate that the right to obtain a copy must be without prejudice to the rights and freedoms of others.\nThe files covered by the request include documents in which only personal data of the mother are included as well as documents containing both personal data of the mother and the father.\nAs far as his own personal data are concerned, the father can be regarded as a data subject as referred to in Article 15(1) GDPR. But with regard to the mother’s personal data, the mother is the “data subject”. The personal data of the mother cannot therefore be provided to the father on the basis of Article 15 GDPR. To that extent, the decision of the Minister for Legal Protection was taken in breach of Article 15 GDPR, and the Court wrongly failed to recognize it.\nThe Minister’s view that there is “no undue serious infringement”' of the mother’s rights and freedoms is too light, since Article 15(4) GDPR requires in this case that her rights and freedoms are not infringed.","title":"RvS - 201905709/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_IMY (Sweden) - DI-2022-2351/2372/2373/2374/2375","text":"The DPA held that the data subject had exercised their right to object to the processing in accordance with the GDPR. Pursuant to Article 17(1)(c) GDPR, the burden of proof for the existence of overriding legitimate grounds for the continued processing is on the controller and not the data subject. The DPA highlighted that by denying the requests due to Google's alleged inability to access the contents of the relevant web pages, Google was placing the burden of proof on the data subjects. By this logic, the data subjects would have had to gather additional information from the relevant web pages themselves in order for Google to act on the requests. As a result, the data subjects would in practice be forced to pay to be able to exercise their rights.\nAgainst this background, the Swedish DPA reprimanded Google for violating Articles 12, 17 and 21 GDPR.","title":"IMY (Sweden) - DI-2022-2351/2372/2373/2374/2375"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202414144","text":"The DPA found a breach of the national ePrivacy implementation law (LSSI)[2]. Article 22.2 LSSI on the installation of cookies before the user's consent. The exemptions under this Article apply to cookies with technical functions. However, non-technical cookies were used without the user's prior consent. Furthermore, it was impossible to reject them, as they do not disappear after revoking or rejecting all consents.\nThe DPA decided this infraction was minor based on Article 38(4)(g) LSSI. According to the criteria of Article 40 LSSI, the sanction was evaluated based on the existence of intent demonstrated by the controller's lack of due diligence.\nThe fine was initially set at €,5000 but pursuant to Law 39/2015, a Spanish law concerning administrative proceedings, the DPA informed the controller that it may make a voluntary payment of the proposed fine and waive their right to appeal. This action reduces the imposed fine by 20%. The fine can be reduced by a further 20% if the controller acknowledges its liability. The controller opted for both and reduced the fine by 40%, paying the reduced sanction amount of €3,000.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202414144"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - 19.04.2023","text":"The Romanian DPA found that the data controller could not rely on any legal basis for the processing at stake. It therefore violated the provisions of Article 5(1)(a) and (b) in conjunction with Article 6 GDPR.\nAs such, the data controller was fined 14,776.50 RON (the equivalent of €3,000).\nThe Romanian DPA also ordered to anonymize the data published on the controller's website.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - 19.04.2023"}
{"_id":"holding_AP (The Netherlands) - Clearview","text":"The processing of biometric data\nThe DPA found that the data processed by the controller fall into the definition of biometric data under Article 4(14) GDPR.\nFirst of all, the DPA pointed out that the mere fact that individuals are shown recognizably in photos is not enough to consider these photos biometric data. On the contrary, this is the case when they are processed through a specific technical means allowing the unique identification or authentication of a natural person.\nSecondly, the DPA noted that the controller uses an algorithm to convert the collected photos and the uploaded photos into vectors and stores the pictures and the corresponding vectors into a database. Therefore, the controller is using technical means.\nThirdly, the DPA held that the purpose of these technical means is allowing the unique identification of natural persons. Indeed, the search function compares the vectors of the uploaded pictures with the other pictures in the database and show in which other photos the data subject is being shown. It is also possible to obtain the URLs and metadata related to these images.\nThe territorial scope of the GDPR\nFirstly, the DPA noted that the controller is not established in the EU, but only in the USA. The controller claims that it is not subject to the GDPR and, therefore, does not reply to access requests under Article 15 GDPR.\nSecondly, the DPA pointed out that Article 3 GDPR does not limit the territorial scope of the GDPR to the territory of the EU. More specifically, according to Article 3(2)(b) GDPR, the GDPR applies to a controller that is not established in the EU but monitors the behaviour of data subjects in the Union.\nThirdly, the DPA verified that the controller processes personal data regarding Dutch data subjects. This results from the fact that the controller scraped Dutch websites and did not implement a filter images of Dutch data subjects.\nFourthly, the DPA noted that the controller’s privacy policy of 29 January 2020 informed EEA data subjects that they could file a complaint with the competent DPA.\nFifthly, the DPA pointed out that the other EU DPAs have already fined the controller as they believed it had been processing personal data of EU data subjects.\nAs for the monitoring requirement, the DPA noted that the algorithm is able to match pictures even if the data subject’s appearance changed over time. This means that the user of the service is able to follow the behaviour of the individuals shown in the images over the course of time. Therefore, especially since the clients of the controller are law enforcement authorities, the service can be used to monitor data subjects’ behaviours under Article 3(2)(b) GDPR.\nOn these ground, the DPA held that the processing of personal data by the controller for the purposes of providing this service falls under the territorial scope of the GDPR.\nClearview is the controller\nThe DPA noted that Clearview processes personal data in the context of setting up, maintaining and enriching the database and for training the facial recognition algorithm. On the contrary, the users of the service are not involved in these activities and they do not give instructions on how the database should be composed.\nTherefore, the DPA held that Clearview determines the purposes and means of this processing and is to be regarded as controller under Article 4(7) GDPR.\nLegal basis\nThe DPA noted that the controller claims it can carry out this processing according to Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. Therefore, the DPA analysed only if this legal basis could be used for the processing at hand. As a side note, the DPA however specified that other legal bases would not be applicable in this case.\nThe DPA recalled that to verify if a controller can rely on the legal basis provided for by Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, a three-step test must be conducted.\nAs for the first step, the controller (or a third party) must have a legitimate interest, i.e. an interest which is lawful, sufficiently clearly articulated and represent a real and present interest (see C-708/18, Asociaţia de Proprietari bloc M5A-ScaraA, para. 44).\nIn the case at hand, the DPA considered that this interest could be:\n  * An interest of the controller itself to offer access to the platform against a payment. However, the DPA noted that, although the freedom to conduct a business comprises the freedom to perform economic or commercial activities, such freedom does not extend so far as to cover activities that almost fully coincide with infringing the fundamental rights of others. Therefore, this interest cannot be regarded as legitimate interest.\n  * An interest of the third parties using the service to fight crime. On these points, the DPA noted that Article 6(1) GDPR excludes that public authorities can rely on legitimate interest within the context of exercising their duties. Therefore, also this interest cannot be regarded as legitimate interest.\n\nEven though this test already fails as for the first conditions, the DPA decided to however go through the other two steps. As for the second step, the processing must be necessary to pursue the interest. The DPA found that this processing is not limited to what is strictly necessary, since the controller continuously collects an enormous quantity of data, even if it is not at all certain yet that the personal data in question are relevant for the searches.\nAs for the final step, the controller must operate a balancing of interests. The DPA noted that the controller failed to provide information about this balancing. Moreover, it recalled that this processing falls into the scope of Article 9 GDPR data, also involves children’s pictures and it is a large scale processing. Therefore, the interests and fundamental rights of data subjects are seriously infringed.\nMoreover, since the data subject and the controller do not have any relationship, data subject cannot be considered to have any “reasonable expectation” (see Recital 47 GDPR) for their personal data to be processed in this way.\nFinally, the controller does not put in place any safeguards to delete photos and data associated with them from the database once those photos are no longer published on the public internet.\nTherefore, also this final step fails. More generally, the controller cannot rely on the legal basis provided for by Article 6(1)(f) GDPR for this processing.\nOn these grounds, the DPA found a violation of Article 5(1)(a) and 6(1) GDPR.\nThe processing of biometric data\nThe DPA noted that the processing at hand involves biometric data and is, therefore, forbidden according to Article 9(1) GDPR. The DPA pointed out that the only exception could be the one provided for by Article 9(2)(e) GDPR.\nHowever, the DPA held that the mere circumstance that these personal data are found online does not mean that data subjects had the intention of making all those data accessible to the general public, explicitly and by clear affirmative action.\nTherefore, the controller violated Article 9(1) GDPR.\nTransparency obligations\nThe DPA held that the controller violated Article 12(1) and 14 GDPR since it failed to provide data subjects with the information set by Article 14 GDPR. According to the DPA, placing that information on the controller’s website is not enough. On the contrary, the controller should also take active steps to provide the data subject with the information in question.\nRight of access\nThe DPA noted that the controller explicitly stated that it does not respond to access requests made by EEA data subjects. Moreover, in the case of the complainants, the controller did not reply to their access request. Therefore, the DPA found a violation of Article 12(3) GDPR read in conjunction with Article 15 GDPR.\nRepresentative in the EU\nAccording to Article 27(1) GDPR, if a controller is not established in the EU, it shall designate in writing a representative in the Union. However, the controller did not do so. Therefore, the DPA found a violation of Article 27 GDPR.\nSanctions and corrective measures\nOn these grounds, the DPA issued a fine of €30,500,000.\nMoreover, it ordered the controller:\n 1. to stop processing personal data of Dutch data subjects and to remove the personal data that Clearview unlawfully obtained;\n 2. to provide data subjects with the information as referred to in Article 14 GDPR in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form;\n 3. to answer data subjects’ requests;\n 4. to designate a representative in the EU\n\nFinally, it ordered the controller to comply in three months, otherwise a penalty for non-compliance of €250,000 per month for each of the previous corrective measures is established.","title":"AP (The Netherlands) - Clearview"}
{"_id":"holding_BVwG - W176 2245370-1","text":"The Federal Administrative Court of Austria (Bundesverwaltungsgericht - BVwG) agreed with the position of the DSB. In particular, it confirmed the balancing of interests performed by the DSB. Furthermore, it held that the controller was obliged to delete the published request for deletion under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR and that the controller could not invoke Article 17(3) GDPR, because non of its requirements were met in the case at hand.","title":"BVwG - W176 2245370-1"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/530061 / KG ZA 21-617","text":"The Court notes that it cannot establish that the user of the IP-address made the copyright infringement. In the hypothetical situation that an infringement would be established, the Court held that Ziggo would still need a permit from the DPA pursuant to Article 33(4)(c) UAVG. First, to connect the IP-address and NAW-data in order to send a warning and second, for the provision of NAW-data to BREIN. BREIN's argument that no personal data is processed by Ziggo on behalf of BREIN was disregarded by the Court, as Ziggo would use the IP-address provided by BREIN to connect the IP-address and NAW-data on behalf of BREIN.\nFurthermore, the Court held that Ziggo would need a DPIA (Article 35 GDPR). The Court also dismissed BREIN's argument that this is not obligated because it only constitutes an IP-address and not the processing of large amounts of criminal data. The Court stated that the (possibly large) amount of personal data cannot be established yet. Moreover, BREIN itself demanded processing of personal data for all future infringements on the copyright of its members through an open directory.\nThe Court in preliminary relief dismisses BREIN's claims.","title":"Rb. Midden-Nederland - C/16/530061 / KG ZA 21-617"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9815931","text":"Based on the facts and the statements of the controller, the DPA found no objective element's that would allow for a sanction.\nHowever, due to its failure to respond to the multiple requests of the DPA, the controller breached Article 157 (request for information and production of documents) in relation to Article 166(2) of the Code. Therefore, the DPA held that a fine was necessary.\nThe DPA held that, with reference to Recital 148 GDPR, the infringement could not be regarded as 'minor'. Having regard to the nature, seriousness and duration of the infringement, as well as the degree of responsibility and the way the DPA became aware of the infringement, the DPA fined the controller €2,000 for the aforementioned violations.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9815931"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00003/2021","text":"The AEPD upheld the complaint.\nFirst, the AEPD concluded that the controller violated Article 12(2) and Article 12(3) GDPR. The DPA stipulated that the entitlement verification process must take place only when there are reasonable doubts regarding the identity of the person who made the request, and that this verification request must be necessary and appropriate. The controller did not prove the existence of reasonable doubts that justified the request of additional information to verify the data subject's identity. Instead, it was their standard procedure to ask for an ID. The AEPD stressed that it is clear from the case at hand that there are no doubts about the identity of the applicant, since the request for access to personal data was made from the same e-mail address used by the data subject when he registered an account, and uploaded his CV, on their web portal. Additionally, the controller only actually complied with the access request after the DPA had started to investigate the complaint.\nSecond, the AEPD concluded that the controller violated Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. It stated that the controller's procedure to comply with the rights of data subjects goes beyond of what is laid down in the GDPR. Hence, this results in inappropriate personal data processing activities that are not relevant and not necessary for the purpose of the case, and is contrary to what Article 25 GDPR states regarding the context, risk and purposes of the processing activities.\nThird, the AEPD considered the seriousness of the case and decided to impose a fine for both violations. Regarding the fine for the violation of Article 12 GDPR, the DPA stated that the nature of the infringement affected the data subject to \"exercise real control\" over her personal data. Moreover, this violation was the result of a lack of an adequate procedure in place to deal with such requests. The DPA concluded that a fine of €50,000 was sufficient. Regarding the fine for the violation of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR, the DPA stated that nature of the violation was very serious, due to the fundamental aspect of the data minimisation principle, as well as the number of affected data subjects. Moreover, it considered the fact that the violation occurred because of the controller's negligence, and the absence of an adequate procedure to comply with the data protection principles. The DPA concluded that a fine of €250,000 was sufficient.\nTherefore, the DPA imposed a fine of €300,000 on the controller pursuant to Article 58(2) GDPR. Moreover, it ordered the controller to bring its processing operations into compliance pursuant to Article 58(2)(d) GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00003/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_Commissioner (Cyprus) - 17.05.23","text":"The DPA upheld the administrative fine of €3,000 for its violation of Articles 5(1)(c) and 6 GDPR and Article 29(1) of Law 125(I)/2018, as there was no differentiation of the burdening and reducing factors compared to the first decision to justify a reduction of the fine.","title":"Commissioner (Cyprus) - 17.05.23"}
{"_id":"holding_Cass.Civ. - 24797/2024","text":"First, the court pointed out that the recording occurred in 2016, i.e. a time when the GDPR was not yet in force. The court recalled that Article 24(f) of the then-applicable Italian Data Protection Code stated that the data subject's consent was not needed when the processing was necessary \"to assert or defend a legal claim, provided that the data are processed exclusively for such purposes and for no longer than is necessary for the pursuit of those purposes\".\nOn this point, the court noted that, according to national case law, this rule applies not only during the trial on itself, but also regarding all the preliminary activities that are necessary to gather evidence for the trial.\nTherefore, in the case at hand, it is not relevant that the recording was made by a person that is different from the one that is using it in the labour trial. According to the court, what is relevant is the fact that the purpose for which the recording was used is defending a right during a trial.\nMoreover, the court held that, when such a piece of evidence is presented in a trial, it is for the judge of that trial to decide whether to use and how to disclose that recording, after balancing the right to the protection of personal data with the right of defence.\nIn addition, the court pointed out that the same conclusion can be drawn in a case where the GDPR would apply. Indeed, the court noted that Article 17(3)(e) GDPR sets an exception to the right to erasure \"for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims\", and so does Article 21(1) GDPR.\nTherefore, from the wording of the GDPR the court drew the principle that the right to data protection can be balanced with other fundamental rights and the latter can be considered to outweigh the former. In the case at hand, the court underlined that this is especially true since Article 36 of the Italian Constitution (Costituzione della Repubblica italiana) grants a high protection to the rights of employees.\nFinally, the court highlighted that also the CJEU considers that, when personal data is used in a trial, it is for the national judge to balance the rights of the parties and decide whether personal data should be used in the trial (see C-268/21, Norra Stockholm Bygg, para. 58).\nOn these grounds, the court annulled the appealed judgement. Therefore, the decision of the DPA stands and is valid.","title":"Cass.Civ. - 24797/2024"}
{"_id":"holding_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 04-07-2022","text":"The Croatian DPA noted that video surveillance constitutes processing of personal data and, as such, requires a legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR.\nIn this case, the controller had no legal basis to monitor the public space next to the residential building. This was confirmed by Article 26 of the Croatian Act on the Implemendation of the General Data Protection Regulation which only allows video surveillance for a purpose that is necessary and justified for the protection of persons and property. It further noted that Article 32(1) of the Act on the Implemendation of the General Data Protection Regulation prohibits private parties from monitoring public space.\nThe DPA found a violation of Article 6(1) GDPR and ordered the controller, pursuant to Article 58(2)(d) GDPR, to adjust the location of the cameras within 15 days so that they do not monitor public space and to provide footage confirming that the infringement was rectified.","title":"AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 04-07-2022"}
{"_id":"holding_AKI (Estonia) - 2.1.-3/19/3971","text":"The AKI found that the data subject’s rights should not adversely affect the rights and freedom of the others, pursuant to Article 15(4) GDPR. Also, it found that the national law - Money Laundering and Terrorist Financial Prevention Act - could restrict the data subject’s rights. As a consequence, the controller’s answer was lawful and proportionate.","title":"AKI (Estonia) - 2.1.-3/19/3971"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - 12.01.2023","text":"The DPA held that the controller did not implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in order to ensure a level of security corresponding to the processing risk generated in particular by the destruction, loss, modification, unauthorised disclosure or unauthorised access to personal data. Hence, the controller violated Articles 32(1)(b) and 32(2) GDPR.\nPursuant to its Article 58(2) GDPR statutory powers, the DPA ordered the controller to implement corrective measures and to review and update the technical and organisational measures implemented as a result of the risk assessment, including the work procedures related to the protection of personal data, as well as to carry out a training for all individuals authorised to process personal data.\nThe DPA fined the controller 9,828.00 lei (ca. €2000) for its violation.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - 12.01.2023"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd (Island) - Case no. 2021101963","text":"In its decision, the DPA noted that it is necessary to assess the legality of the continued processing of the data subject's personal data by weighing the legitimate interests of third parties against the interests and fundamental rights of the data subject. In the case at hand, the financial interests of Google LLC related to its search engine as well as the public interest in being able to access the concerned information were weighed against the data subject's interest in privacy and data protection.\nFor such an assessment, the DPA noted that it is particularly relevant if the concerned data subject is a public figure or if they hold a public position. Should that be the case, this may result in the data subject not enjoying the same privacy protection as private persons due to the importance of the freedom to discuss public matters openly. Although the data subject held a public position at the time when the news article was published, the data subject was not involved with projects of public importance at the time when the complaint was filed.\nDue to the amount of time that has passed since the events covered in the news article took place and due the fact that the data subject no longer retained a public decision, the DPA held that the data subject's interest in privacy superseded the public's interest in the information and Google LLC's financial interests. The DPA concluded that the controller should have removed the search result based on the data subject's right to be forgotten and ordered it to do so.","title":"Persónuvernd (Island) - Case no. 2021101963"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202414976","text":"The DPA were critical of the controller for firstly allowing the box containing the documents to be erroneously identified as something which could be disposed of in such a manner, and secondly, that no procedure existed whereby the person who disposed of them could be identified.\nThe DPA also noted that the fact that the negligent action was committed by an employee or third party did not absolve the club of responsibility for the incident. Accordingly, the DPA found that the club had violated Article 5(1)(f) GDPR, requiring the controller to implement appropriate technical and organizational security measures to ensure the security of processing.\nThe DPA initially set the fine at €1,000 but pursuant to Law 39/2015, a Spanish law concerning administrative proceedings, the DPA informed the controller that it may acknowledge its responsibility for the alleged violations and/or make a voluntary payment of the proposed fine. Each of these actions reduces the imposed fine by 20%. The controller opted to reduce the fine by 40%, both acknowledging its responsibility for the violations and paying the reduced sanction amount of €600.\nThe controller was also ordered to communicate to the DPA the adoption of technical and organizational measures to ensure the confidentiality of personal data undergoing processing, as well as a retention period and disposal method for such personal data.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202414976"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9524194","text":"The Italian DPA imposed an immediate limitation on the processing performed by TikTok with regard to the data of users whose age could not be established with certainty.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9524194"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10095836","text":"The DPA considered the violation committed by the controller to be of a high level of severity, given the particularly sensitive nature of the personal data involved (images of the face following an aesthetic procedure) and the processing carried out (unauthorized sharing).\nIn light of these circumstances and in application of the principles of effectiveness, proportionality, and deterrence, the DPA imposed a financial penalty of €20,000 for violations of Articles 5 and 9 GDPR, as well as Article 2-septies, paragraph 8, of the Privacy Code.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10095836"}
{"_id":"holding_RKHKm - 4-23-742","text":"The Supreme Court clarified that in Estonia, due to the unique structure of their legal system, fines for GDPR violations are imposed through misdemeanour procedures by a supervisory authority. The same is confirmed by the derogation for Estonia in recital 151 GDPR. This approach must have the same effect as fines imposed directly under the GDPR, ensuring that data breaches are effectively sanctioned even after the regulation comes into effect. As a result, the Supreme Court identified a contradiction between national law and EU law.\n§14 of the Penal Code requires an identification of a responsible natural person in order to assign liability to a legal person. On the other hand, under the GDPR, legal persons can be fined for certain type of data breaches without needing to identify the specific individual responsible for the violation. Same was confirmed by the CJEU decision in the Deutche Wohnen case in which the Court stated that the GDPR does not differentiate between natural and legal persons when determining liability for data breaches.\nMoreover, the Supreme Court noted that national courts must ensure that EU law takes precedence over conflicting national laws. They must ignore any national provision that conflict with directly applicable EU law to ensure its full effect, regardless if the national law provides a higher standard of protection.\nHowever, in the meantime, the Penal Code has been amended in a way that it provides broader grounds for liability attributable to the controller. More specifically, based on current version of Penal Code § 14(1)(2) it is not necessary to identify the natural person who committed the alleged act within the framework of the activities of the legal person and on behalf of the legal person in order to attribute liability for the violation of the requirements of the GDPR to the legal person.\nAt this moment, the Supreme Court cannot definitively determine whether the principles of foreseeability, definiteness, and non-retroactivity of law are met for retroactively applying liability guidelines to legal persons before 1 November 2023, the day the Penal Code was amended. If a court in a pending misdemeanour proceeding questions whether these general principles and the specific derogation for Estonia might justify not applying the GDPR, it can seek a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.\nNevertheless, the Supreme Court took into account the controller’s argument and assessed that pursuant to § 29(1)(5) of the VTMS, misdemeanour proceedings must be terminated upon expiry of the limitation period. In misdemeanour proceedings, the statute of limitations is an absolute obstacle to the proceedings, which does not allow further proceedings. Since two years have passed since the misdemeanour was completed on 11 February 2024, and the statute of limitations has not been suspended, the misdemeanour proceedings against the controller must be terminated.\nThe Supreme Court, therefore, annulled the decision of the first instance court and terminated the misdemeanour proceedings. This termination is based on § 29(1)(5) of the VTMS which states that proceedings must be terminated if the statute of limitations for the misdemeanour has expired.","title":"RKHKm - 4-23-742"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202405048","text":"The DPA first dismissed the arguments of the controller. According to the DPA, the controller could have stated the requirement of providing the documents early (such as in the application site, or in the e-mails sent to the candidates). In terms of discrimination and legal obligations, the DPA also stated that the law did not foresee an employer requesting this information at the interview stage. Rather, this is carried out at a later stage when the candidates have been selected.\nThe DPA considered this a violation of the principle of data minimisation (Article 5(1)(c) GDPR). The hiring process of the controller meant that it had to process the data of all candidates it was going to interview. Furthermore, the fact that the controller later changed the process shows that a less invasive way of hiring candidates was possible, and that the previous process did not respect the principle of data minimisation.\nThe DPA highlighted the sensitive nature of personal data related to criminal convictions. Specific requirements for processing are set in Article 10 GDPR. The DPA stated that a person’s criminal record constituted personal data related to criminal convictions, including cases where there is an absence of criminal convictions. While it is generally not permitted to request criminal records during the hiring process, it is allowed in certain professions authorised by law and with specific guarantees. The DPA stated that EU law allowed the controller to request candidates’ criminal records. However, the wording of the law limited this to “selected persons”, meaning it is not necessary to do so during the interview phase. As a general rule, according to the DPA, the privacy of the employee always prevails. This is because requesting this information can be a discriminatory practice carried out by companies.\nFinally, the DPA considered it unnecessary for the controller to know about the candidates’ civil status and number of children; the controller relied on a resolution by the Spanish Tax Agency, however, the DPA clarified that this was unrelated to the hiring process and therefore not applicable.\nThe DPA fined the controller €100,000: €75,000 for requesting data related to criminal convictions without a contractual relationship, and €25,000 for requesting data related to civil status without a contractual relationship. The DPA considered this a serious violation, as the controller was aware of the legal framework related to requesting these documents. Furthermore, as a company that regularly and systematically processes personal data, the DPA considered that the controller had the responsibility to more rigorously guarantee the protection of personal data principles according to national case law.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202405048"}
{"_id":"holding_OGH - 6Ob127/20z","text":"The OGH overturned the decision of the OLG and restored the decision of the first instance court. It held that\n  * a lawsuit under Article 79 GDPR regarding the alleged violation of Article 15 GDPR is indeed feasible. Article 79 GDPR is not limited to certain data subject rights such as erasure under Article 17 GDPR. This is in line with the OGH's previous case-law.\n  * \"marketing classifications\" under § 151(6) GewO qualify as personal data. The term \"information\" in Article 4(1) GDPR is not limited to statements about verifiable characteristics or factual circumstances with regard to the data subject but also includes evaluations and assessments him or her. Hence, also a statistic probability that is assigned to a certain data subject qualifies as personal data. This is in line with case-law by the Austrian Administrative Court (W 258 2217446-1 on the presumed \"affinity for a political party\").\n  * the data subject does not have a legal interest in a declaratory judgment that the controller is under the legal obligation to provide access under Article 15 GDPR in the case of further access requests by the data subject. The controller had already fulfilled the data subject's access request and declared to comply with the data subject's objection under Article 21 GDPR by refraining from any further processing of his or her data. Therefore, further access request are not to be expected and the data subject has no legal interest in the requested declaratory judgment.","title":"OGH - 6Ob127/20z"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9780409","text":"First, the website consisted in a telephone directory. However, its data processing had no legal basis since the current regulatory framework did not allow the creation of generic telephone directories that are not extracted from the DBU (Data Base Unico), the single electronic archive that collects the telephone numbers and customer data of all the national telephony Operators disseminated through public directories. Moreover, it was recalled that for the inclusion of personal data in such lists, the express, free, specific, informed and documented written consent of the contractors is required. As the website did not conform to these criteria, the DPA held that there was a breach of Article 5(1)(a), Article 5(1)(d), Article 5(2), Article 6 GDPR and 129 of the Code.\nThe data controller also breached Article 12(2), Article 15 GDPR, Article 16 GDPR and Article 17 GDPR since it proved impossible for the data subject to know the origin of the data and the methods and purposes of the processing, as well as to request the rectification of inaccurate data or their erasure.\nA breach of Article 24 GDPR was also found because there was a total lack of adequate technical and organisational measures to ensure that the processing was carried out in accordance with the rules on personal data protection. Moreover, the provision of a contact form that proved ineffective in receiving requests for cancellation also constituted a breach of Article 25 GDPR, since the technical measure adopted was not capable of protecting the rights of the data subjects. Article 12(1) and Article 13 GDPR were also breached due to the lack of an adequate privacy policy on the website. Finally, the data controller breached Article 31 GDPR and 157 of the Code for not having adequately cooperated with the supervisory authority.\nIt is also worth noting that anyone could enter a person’s personal details (names, address, social networks) on the website with no ways to trace the origin of the person who entered the data into the website, this therefore created a high risk of confidentiality. Moreover, the conduct had a generalized scope and extended to a large number of data subjects (357,046).\nThus, in light of these different infringement and pursuant to Article 58(2)(f), the Italian DPA imposed a prohibition on the data controller to collect, further store and publish personal data and imposed a fine of 50, 000€ to the data controller pursuant to Article 58(2)(i) and Article 83(5). As set forth in Article 166(8) of the Code, the controller had the right to settle the dispute, with the fulfillment of the prescriptions issued and the payment, within the term of thirty days, of an amount equal to half of the fine imposed.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9780409"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00670/2022","text":"The AEPD held that the controller breached the data processing principle of integrity and confidentiality (Article 5(1)(f) GDPR) and the security of processing (Article 32 GDPR) and fined it €55,000.\nFirst, the AEPD determined that the initial delivery company was incorporated by GEOPOST, which should be considered as the controller for the procedure.\nThe AEPD considered that the confidentiality of the data subject's information was not guaranteed in accordance with Article 5(1)(f) GDPR. In fact, it was posted such that any neighbour or visitor could see extensive personal data. With regard to Article 32 GDPR, the AEPD noted that the provision is infringed both if the controller fails to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the security of personal data and if these measures are established but not observed. In this case, even though there were acceptable security practices in place, a personal data confidentiality breach still occurred; thus, the AEPD found, Article 32 GDPR was infringed. The policies were insufficient to defend the infraction and also could not be considered as mitigating measures for the sanction.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00670/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-85-3/2022","text":"Personal data\nThe NAIH first established that the software processed personal data since the data subject was indeed identifiable within this processing, due to the fact that the customer service calls are assigned a unique internal identification number that can be linked to the both the caller and the customer service employee. According to the NAIH, this processing was analogous to case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union C-582/14, which established that dynamic IP addresses are also personal data.\nThe NAIH also stated that the use of AI to identify emotional states should be considered processing of a sensitive nature, and could fall under the special category of personal data within the meaning of Article 9(1) GDPR in certain cases. However, the NAIH held that in this specific case Article 9(1) GDPR did not apply to the processing, since the voice analysis did not produce data that in itself could uniquely identify a data subject (and therefore could not be considered biometric data), and due to the fact that no meaningful inference as to the physical or mental state of health of the data subject could be drawn from the result of the processing.\n\nAutomated decision-making and profiling\nThe NAIH held that automated decision-making was carried out in this case, since it is not a prerequisite that the software makes the decision itself, and that it is sufficient if the processing is intended to produce an outcome that influences the decision-makers. The NAIH also established that profiling also took place according to the definition in Article 4(4) GDPR, since the prioritisation of dissatisfied customers based on keywords and emotions implies the evaluation of personal aspects cited in this provision.\nBased on these assessments, and the fact that this is a novel technology, the NAIH noted that the processing created increased risks to fundamental rights, which also imply increased responsibilities on the controller. Therefore, the NAIH held that before rolling out the automated voice analysis using emotional AI, the Bank should have assessed whether the processing was feasible under the current technical and social circumstances, and taken into consideration appropriate safeguards to comply with data protection laws and the principle of data protection by design. Based on these considerations, the NAIH held that the Bank’s failure to carry out these obligations constituted a violation of Articles 24(1) GDPR, 25(1) and 25(2) GDPR.\n\nLack of proper information and right to object\nThe NAIH noted that no information was given to the data subjects regarding the voice analysis, in particular about the specific types of data processed, as well as how their emotional reactions were processed and assessed. According to the NAIH, this constituted a breach of Articles 12(1), 13, 5(1) and 5(2) GDPR.\nFurthermore, according to its previous assessments regarding automated decision-making and profiling, the NAIH held that absence of information given to data subjects regarding their right to object lead to a breach of Article 21 GDPR. Additionally, the NAIH also considered that processing for customer retention purposes constituted a marketing purpose similar to customer acquisition, and that therefore the Bank violated data subjects’ right to object under Article 21(2) GDPR as well.\n\nBalancing of interests and lawfulness of processing\nThe NAIH held that the Bank had provided no concrete evidence that it had carried out an adequate balance of interests between its claimed legitimate interest to carry out the processing, and the rights of the data subjects involved.\nThe NAIH noted that according to the technical documentation provided by the Bank, the effectiveness of the emotion analysis software is actually relatively low, and that the Bank had failed to prove that, in its current form, its use was suitable to achieve its proposed objectives in a way that was proportionate to the effect on data subjects’ rights. The NAIH also noted that the Bank had not demonstrated that any alternatives to this processing were considered.\nThe NAIH also cited the European Data Protection Board and European Data Protection Supervisor’s Joint Opinion 5/2021 on the Artificial Intelligence Act, which states that “the use of AI to infer emotions of a natural person is highly undesirable and should be prohibited, except for certain well-specified use-cases, namely for health or research purposes.” Based on these criteria, the NAIH concluded that the Bank’s stated efficiency purposes were not proportionate to justify the use of a form of data processing that EU data protection bodies have considered undesirable and constitute a high risk to data subjects' fundamental rights.\nThe NAIH also noted that not only the voices of the Bank's customers were analysed, but also the voices of its employees. The NAIH stated that although monitoring performance and quality assurance may give rise to legitimate interests in certain circumstances according to labour law, the question of suitability and proportionality was also relevant in this case, especially because employees are in a vulnerable position in the context of a labour relationship. The NAIH established that these factors were not taken into account due to the Bank's failure to conduct an adequate balance of interests, and that an adequate system of guarantees was not provided for employees.\nTherefore, the NAIH held that the bank could not claim legitimate interest as a valid legal basis under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR (or any other legal basis listed in Article 6(1) GDPR) for the processing in question. It therefore held that the Bank had violated Articles 5(1)(a), 6(1) GDPR and 6(4) GDPR.\n\nFine and order to comply with GDPR\nBased on these considerations, the NAIH imposed a fine of HUF 250,000,000 (approximately €700,000) on the Bank, and ordered the Bank to cease its use of AI to analyse emotions in the recordings of customer service calls unless it provided proof, within 60 days, that: an appropriate scope of data was defined; a proper data impact assessment was carried out; and a valid legal basis was provided which ensured that data subjects’ rights are protected to the maximum extent possible.\nWith regard to the Bank's employees, the NAIH held that processing should be limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which it is intended, and that they should be provided with appropriate information, indicating the assessment criteria and consequences, and including a specific balancing of interests that addresses their vulnerability due to the nature of their labour relationship, with appropriate internal safeguards.","title":"NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-85-3/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9556625","text":"The Italian DPA noted that MISE failed to appoint a DPO by the established deadline (May 25, 2018).\nFurthermore, it has found that there was no adequate legal basis for the online publication of managers' personal data, as there were less intrusive methods to ensure that SMEs would have access to the managers' consultancy services, such as ensuring restricted access to said information through the use of passwords and usernames. As such, the Authority found that the dissemination of their personal information also consisted of disproportionate processing of data.\nIn light of the above and given that the MISE has appointed a DPO then, the Italian DPA issued a fine of €75,000.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9556625"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00143/2020","text":"The Spanish DPA held that the defendant cannot rely on the argument that the notification would arrive too late using burofax. The defendant could just send the notification earlier.\nThe DPA nonetheless outlined that notification via notification on the public notice board was authorised by virtue of Article 9(1)(h) of the Law on Horizontal Properties (\"Ley de Propiedad Horizontal\"). However, it also held that publishing the claimant's personal data on a public notice board was in breach of Article 5(1)(f) GDPR (\"integrity and confidentiality\").\nTherefore, the Spanish DPA held that there was an infringement of the GDPR. It imposed a warning sanction on the neighbourhood community.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00143/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_CNPD (Luxembourg) - Délibération n° 3018","text":"Luxembourg DPA argues it cannot proceed against a company established abroad that has not designated an EU Represenative.","title":"CNPD (Luxembourg) - Délibération n° 3018"}
{"_id":"holding_IDPC (Malta) - CDP/DBN/31/2020","text":"On the controllership\nThe IDPC concluded that C-Planet was the controller of the data base, considering that no factual elements could substantiate the view of C-PLANET that a third party (name redacted) was the controller of this specific database.\n\nOn the lawfulness of the processing\nThe IDPC concluded that although some of the data was collected from the Electoral Register, a proper legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR was still needed in this case, which also stems from Article 5(1)(b) GDPR.\nThe IDPC also considered the processed personal data which was not publicly available such as data subjects' ballot box number, voting document number, district, date of birth, phone number and sex. According to the General Elections Act, this data is only made available to political parties. The Electoral Commission confirmed that this data was not made available to the party delegates mentioned in the investigation.\nFinally, a reference was made to special categories of data since the database contained numerals identified from 1 to 4, which the IDPC confirmed to be referring to the political opinions of the data subjects. This category, which was not processed by the Electoral Commission, is subject to particular protection under Article 9(1) GDPR. The IDPC confirmed that none of the exceptions under Article 9(2) GDPR were applicable to lawfully process this data. This therefore amounted to a violation of Article 9(1).\n\nObligation to provide information to the data subjects\nThe IDPC established that Article 14 GDPR was particularly relevant, since the data was obtained from third party sources. In this regard, the controller is obliged to inform the data subjects of the details of the processing operations, which is an essential condition for ensuring the transparency and fairness of the processing, as well as enabling the data subjects to exercise control over their personal data. The IDPC confirmed that the controller did not inform the affected data subjects in the manner prescribed by Article 14 GDPR, and hence violated this provision.\n\nObligation to notify the data breach (Article 33 and Article 34 GDPR)\nThe IDPC considered that the breach entailed a high risk for individuals considering the following elements: the sensitivity of the data involved, the large volume of data within the breach, the risk of harm for individuals, the ease with which individuals could be identified, the severity of consequences for the affected individuals, and the number of affected individuals.\nTherefore, the IDPC held that the controller should have notified the IDPC no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of the breach, and should have also communicated the breach to the data subjects, as no exception to these obligations were applicable, therefore violating Article 33 and Article 34 GDPR.\n\nOn the technical and organisational measures\nAccording to Article 32(1) GDPR, controllers and processors should implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, and a non-exhaustive list of these measures is provided. A detailed report by an auditor concluded that technical measures were lacking, especially considering the nature of the data and the risk involved.\nThe IDPC also took into account the large-scale nature of the database, and the fact that the data at stake was matched or combined with other data. The IDPC noted that the controller did not even evaluate the risk at stake and the impact of the processing activities, and hence made it impossible for them to manage a risk that had not even been previously identified. Therefore, the IDPC held that the controller violated Article 32 GDPR by not implementing the appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks involved.\n\nOn the corrective measure\nBased on the criteria of Article 83 GDPR, the IDPC decided to impose a fine of €65,000 against C-Planet, and ordered the controller to erase the personal data contained in the database file stored on the compromised server with immediate effect, and provide the IDPC with evidence thereof.","title":"IDPC (Malta) - CDP/DBN/31/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00183/2021","text":"The AEPD brought forward Recital 59, emphasizing the controller to facilitate data subjects the access of their rights.\nFurthermore, the AEPD argued that there is a legitimate interest of the data subject to access the evidence and that new techniques to anonymize images would allow to prevent harm to third parties. There is no reason why the data subject should not be able to have access to the recordings that may constitute a fundamental part of the selection process to obtain a job.\nAccordingly, the AEPD concluded that the controller still had the obligation to provide an answer, either by means of granting access to the data or by means of a justified refusal.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - TD/00183/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2022-018","text":"The DPA held that the controller violated Article 5(1)(e) GDPR because personal data was kept for more than 36 months.\nFirst, the DPA held that purpose and the deletion period stated by the controller could only concern the personal data of \"subscribers\" and not of \"members\", because \"members\" were paying immediately for a service or document. The DPA also held that some purposes were not identified by the controller, such as the purpose to provide a document for \"members\", accounting purposes and tax purposes.\nThe DPA held the retention of data could appear justified for the purposes of providing documents, accounting and tax purposes. However, according to the DPA, when relevant personal data had to be retained longer than the retention period, some extra measures needed to be implemented. The data had to be stored in a temporary separate storage location, for example in a dedicated archive database or in a separate part of an existing database. This data shouldn't be kept for a longer period then what's necessary for the respective purposes of the controller. The DPA also held that only authorized people should have access to this data. None of these described measures were implemented by the controller in this case.\nThe DPA also found that the manual anonymization procedure at the request of users concerned a small number of accounts. Anonymization was not implemented for 25% of accounts where this should have been the case. The DPA also held that no automatic anonymization procedure was implemented by the controller. Therefore, the controller was able to keep identifying data without any time limit. Because of these facts, the DPA held that Article 5(1)(e) GDPR had been breached, despite the fact that the controller had deleted inactive user-accounts during the procedure.\nThe DPA also held that article 32 GDPR was violated because of several security problems. The DPA discovered that the controller stored passwords in plain text in a database. Furthermore, users were not allowed to create a password of more than 8 characters, without any complexity requirements and other security measures. Passwords were also transmitted in plain text during email conversations with users. Finally, users were not warned when their password was being changed, thus not ensuring a safe level security protecting against identity theft.\nConsidering the high number of users (3.7 million) and the sensitivity of the data concerned (bank related, name, address, phone numbers etc.) the CNIL considered the infringement as 'serious' and enforced a €250,000 fine.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2022-018"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9761383","text":"The Garante held that public entities can only disclose personal data when it is permitted by law, and that therefore the legal basis invoked by the Agency under Article 6(1)(b) GDPR regarding the necessity of the processing for the performance of a contract was not applicable in this case. As to the legal basis under Article 6(1)(c) GDPR regarding the Agency’s legal transparency obligations, the Garante noted that the resolution in question was of a different nature than the type of public acts and documents which national law require public entities to publish, and that therefore this was not a valid legal basis either.\nAdditoinally, the Garante rebutted the Agency’s claims that it had not disclosed any personal data related to criminal offenses only because neither the specific criminal offenses with which the data subject had been charged, nor any conviction, had been mentioned. The Garante cited Court of Justice of the European Union case law which states that any information relating to judicial proceedings against a person, including the opening of an investigation or the initiation of a trial, themselves constitute personal data relating to criminal convictions and offenses pursuant to Article 10 GDPR (see here). Therefore, the Garante reiterated that the disclosure of this data by the Agency required a specific legal basis under national law, and also to be compliant with the principles of data protection under Article 5(1) GDPR, in particular the principle of lawfulness, fairness and transparency, as well as the principle of data minimisation. The Garante also held that the fact the data subject might have made this information public himself was irrelevant regarding the disclosure carried out by the Agency without an applicable legal basis to justify it.\nBased on these considerations, the Garante issued a fine of €8000 for the violation of Articles 5(1), 6 and 10 GDPR, and proposed no corrective measures in light of the fact that the document had already been taken off the website and de-indexed on search engines.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9761383"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00408/2019","text":"Thus, the AEPD understood that the defendant has infringed its collaboration duties as per Article 58(2) GDPR, according to which, he/she shall provide the AEPD with any information required in the course of an investigation. Consequently, after considering some mitigating circumstances [the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement taking into account the nature scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as the number of data subjects affected and the level of damage suffered by them, as per Art. 83(2)(a)], the AEPD decided to impose a warning to the defendant.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00408/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02319","text":"The DPA held that Komplett Bank ASA had:\n  * violated Article 6(1) GDPR by processing personal data for direct marketing purposes without a lawful basis. The DPA held that main subject-matter of the contract was the issuance of a credit card, not direct marketing, and that the controller's use of Article 6(1)(b) GDPR «Necessary for the performance of a contract» was unlawful.\n  * violated Articles 12(1) and 13(1) GDPR by providing misleading information about the lawful basis used for processing of personal data for direct marketing purposes.\n  * violated Article 12(3) GDPR by exceeding the time limit for responding to the data subjects requests for information.\n  * violated Articles 13(2) and 21(4) GDPR by not making the data subject aware of his right to object to the processing of his personal data for direct marketing purposes.\n  * violated Article 21(3) GDPR by not respecting the data subject's prior objection to direct marketing.\nFor the above violations, the DPA issued Komplett Bank ASA a Compliance Order and Reprimand.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02319"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2019-001","text":"On the admissibility, the CNIL replied that the admissibility of the complaints would in any case have no influence on the legality of the procedure because the CNIL’s competency is not subject to the receipt of a complaint, the DPA can initiate proceedings ex officio on the basis of its own findings.\nOn the alleged violation of the defendant's rights to a fair trial, the CNIL rejected both arguments.\nOn the failure to comply with transparency and information obligations:\nIn essence, the CNIL acknowledged that Google has made progress in terms of transparency and control given to users over their personal data. It then comes to the notion information accessibility, according to which the data subject must be able to determine in advance which processing operations will be performed. The CNIL notes that Google has scattered the information in several documents, not all of which are directly accessible, and that Google's design choices fragment the information (buttons and links must be clicked to access the relevant information). According to the CNIL, the amount of information to be read before data processing operations can be identified is too large. Finally, the data subject will have to cross-reference the information to understand what processing operations are being carried out.\nThe CNIL therefore concluded that there is a general lack of accessibility of information; Interestingly, the CNIL also concedes that exhaustive information, from the first level, would be counterproductive and would not respect the requirement of transparency.\nThe CNIL goes on to point out that the processing operations carried out by Google are \"particularly massive and intrusive\" and that the data come from many sources.\nThe information provided to the user must be clear and comprehensible, in accordance with Art. 12 GDPR, and it is in the light of the processing operations carried out that the clear and comprehensible nature must be analysed.\nIn short, with regard to the information made available by Google, the CNIL considered that:\n- the purposes of the processing operations are described in a way that is far too generic given the scope and consequences of the processing operations carried out;\n- the description of the purposes does not allow users to measure the extent of the processing and the degree of intrusion into their private sphere;\n- the description of the data collected is imprecise and incomplete.\nThe lack of clarity and understandability must also be analysed according to the legal basis on which the processing operation is based (in this case: consent). The CNIL states that Google's formulations do not allow the user to distinguish between personalized advertising (carried out using user data, and on the basis of their consent) and other forms of targeting based on legitimate interest.\nFinally, the CNIL stresses that Google's efforts with regard to the tools it makes available to users (information pop-up, privacy check-up, dashboard) only partially contribute to the objective of transparency. As the information must be provided at the time the data is collected, the tools in question are only made available once the Google Account has been created, in other words after a multitude of data processing operations have been carried out.\nRegarding the lack of a legal basis for the implementation of processing operations:\nGoogle declared that it only relies on consent for processing operations related to targeted advertising, and complies with the GDPR in this respect.\nConsent must be informed. In view of the dissemination of the information, the CNIL considers that this requirement is not met. In particular, it is not possible to view the Google services, sites and applications referred to by Google in its Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.\nConsent must be specific and unambiguous. The CNIL noted first of all that when creating a Google account, the user has the possibility to modify certain parameters. However, settings related to account customization and display of targeted ads were enabled by default. The CNIL concluded that:\n- consent was not validly obtained because it was not given through a positive act but by an opposition to the processing operation (opt-out)\n- consent was not specific because the acceptance of the T&Cs and the privacy policy was only possible in bulk, thus preventing a granular choice of processing. The CNIL noted that at the very least, before the user is given the choice of accepting or refusing everything, he or she should be given the opportunity to give his or her specific consent for each processing operation.\nFor all these reasons, the CNIL decided to impose a penalty of € 50 million and an additional to have the decision published.\nOn June 19th 2020, the Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d'Etat) confirmed fully the CNIL's decision in CE - N° 430810.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2019-001"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10095791","text":"The authority held that the controller violated Articles 5(1)(f), 25, and 32 GDPR by failing to implement appropriate security measures. Therefore, the authority fined the controller €10,000.\nThe authority clarified that controllers are responsible for the security of the processing of personal data even when processors and sub-processors are involved. The authority referenced EDPB Guidelines in this regard[1].","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10095791"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - Civilstyrelsen indstilles til bøde","text":"The Danish DPA held that removable storage devices (including USB flash drives) pose a higher risk for data subjects. At the same time, encryption is a relatively easy security measure for the controller to implement. Therefore, especially in these cases, encryption must be regarded as a necessary and required security measure. Moreover, the DPA emphasized that where the controller processes large volumes of sensitive and confidential information, appropriate guidelines for the use of USB flash drives must be provided to whoever handles them. Hence, the DPA held that by not encrypting the personal data in question, and by not having any guidelines on the use of removable storage devices and portable media, the Agency was in violation of its security obligations under the GDPR. In addition, the DPA held that the Agency was in violation of Article 33(1) GDPR for not reporting the breach after it became aware of it.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - Civilstyrelsen indstilles til bøde"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 35/2024","text":"Firstly, the DPA noted that a person's name, first name and photograph are considered personal data under Article 4(1) GDPR and the publishing of such data is considered to be processing under Article 4(2) GDPR.\nSecondly, the APD noted that each processing activity should have a legal basis according to Article 5(1)(a) GDPR read together with Article 6(1) GDPR. The DPA examined consent, contract and legitimate interest as possible legal bases.\nRegarding consent, the DPA stressed that consent seemed impossible because there can be no 'free' consent in the context of an employee-employer relationship according to Article 6(1)(a) GDPR and Article 4(11) GDPR.\nRegarding contract, the APD stated that to successfully invoke the performance of a contract as a legal basis, the processing needs to be necessary to perform that contract according to Article 6(1)(b) GDPR. Since the data subject's contract had already ended in 2021, the controller could no longer invoke this legal basis. Additionally, the DPA stated that the controller would also not be able to invoke contract as a legal basis during the employment contract, since the publishing of the data subject's photo on the controller's social media and website did not seem necessary to perform that the employment contract.\nRegarding legitimate interest, the DPA performed a legitimate interest assessment composed of a purpose test, a necessity test and a balancing test between the consequences for the data subject and the consequences for the controller. Concerning the purpose test, the DPA confirmed that attracting new employees can be considered as a legitimate interest for the controller. Regarding the necessity test, the DPA did not find it necessary to publish images of employees to reach this purpose, especially since the employee in question was no longer working for the controller. Concerning the balancing test, the DPA considered that it may not be within the data subject's reasonable expectations as a former employee that her photograph be published on the data subject's website and social media to recruit new colleagues. Especially, since the data subject was employed by a competitor. The DPA also took into account that the data subject had not been employed by the controller since 2021. The DPA found that that legitimate interest as a legal basis under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR did not apply.\nThe DPA noted that no other legal bases under Article 6(1) GDPR seemed to apply and therefore did not need to be examined. The DPA concluded that the publication of the the data subject's photograph constituted unlawful processing.\nThirdly, the DPA confirmed that the data subject has the right to request the erasure of her personal data under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR. This Article establishes that the data subject may obtain the erasure of their personal data if such data has been unlawfully processed. The DPA held that there might have been a breach of Article 17(1)(d) GDPR.\nFinally, Article 12(3) GDPR indicates that the controller shall provide information on action taken regarding data subject's rights without undue delay. The data subject exercised this right on 31 August 2023 and the controller responded the same day that it refused to erase the photographs since this was covered by the work regulations. The DPA therefore held no infringement regarding Article 12(3) GDPR as the controller did respond (negatively) to the request.\nTherefore, the DPA ordered the controller to comply with the data subject's erasure request within 30 days of the notification of the decision.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 35/2024"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 137/2022","text":"The DPA held that the data subject had exercised its right to be forgotten according to Article 17(1) GDPR and had done so in a way as described in the privacy policy of the controller. Since the controller did not provide an answer at all, the DPA held that it had violated Article 12(3) GDPR (the controller failed to answer within a month), Article 12(4) GDPR (The controller failed to provide a reason why it did not comply with the request) and Article 17(1) GDPR. The DPA held that the controller had to comply with the request of the data subject and ordered the controller to delete the personal data within 30 days, based on Article 58(2)(c) GDPR and Article 95 §1,5 WOG. The DPA also held that the controller had notify the DPA within 30 days about the result of this decision.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 137/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_DPC (Ireland) - Meta Ireland","text":"The DPC found the following violations:\n1. Article 33(1) GDPR, for failure to notify the DPC the data breach concerning storage of user passwords in plaintext. 2. Article 33(5) GDPR, for failure to document personal data breaches concerning the storage of user passwords in plaintext. 3. Article 5(1)(f) GDPR, for failure to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to secure users’ passwords against unauthorized processing. 4. Article 32(1) GDPR, for failure to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk including confidentiality of user passwords.\nHighlighting that an unaddressed personal data breach can result in damage such as loss of control over personal data, the DPC reprimanded MPIL pursuant to Article 58(2)(b) GDPR and issued a fine of €91 million pursuant to Article 58(2)(i) and Article 83 GDPR.","title":"DPC (Ireland) - Meta Ireland"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 8979/162/21","text":"On the basis of the information provided by the controller, the DPA considered that the processing of personal data in accordance with Article 4(2) GDPR also covers situations where the controller requires the data subject to disclose documents containing personal data and where the controller reviews them.\nThe DPA stated that the objective of the right of access is the opportunity of the data subject to stay informed about the lawfulness of the processing and to confirm it. The DPA emphasised that public authorities may not require the data subject to provide them with information based on the data subject's access request, and thus may not use the right of access as a means of obtaining information.\nOn the basis of the information gathered, the DPA held that the controller had violated Article 6(1) GDPR and Article 10 GDPR by requiring foster parent applicants to exercise their right of access, as it had no legal basis to process the personal data in question. As a result, the DPA issued a reprimand to the controller in accordance with Article 58(2)(b) GDPR.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 8979/162/21"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10077129","text":"The DPA started this ex officio procedure on the basis of Article 58(1)(a) GDPR due to some alarming preliminary considerations.\nFirst, the party to the contract with the controller is OpenAI OpCo LLC, while according to the contract the data will be shared to OpenAI Ireland Ltd. Moreover, the contract is made with GEDI Gruppo Editoriale S.p.A., however the editorial content referred to belong to subsidiaries to GERI.\nSecond, the legal basis for the processing, namely the transfer of data from GEDI to OpenAI, was Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. However, considering that the data processing will be of “large scale” and of “particular nature”, the DPIA did not sufficiently consider this in the context of Article 9 and 10 GDPR.\nThird, it is unclear how the claimed legal basis would also be relevant to train OpenAI’s artificial intelligence operations.\nFourth, the transparency requirements as per Article 13 and 14 GDPR were not met.\nIn light of all these considerations, under Article 58(1)(a) GDPR, the DPA deemed it fit to issue a warning for the plausible violations of Article 9, 10, 13 and 14 GDPR.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10077129"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 14/2014","text":"The Hellenic DPA, took into account that the registration of the data subject in the List of Inadmissible Third Country Nationals happened because of the judicial expulsion. Also the DPA considered the fact that the judgment imposing the deportation has been annulled. Thus, the DPA decided that the registration needs to be automatically ceased according to the provisions of the immigration legislation.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 14/2014"}
{"_id":"holding_OLG Graz - 2 R 192/24h","text":"The appellate Court firstly highlighted that, contrary to the controller’s claims, there are no special formality requirements for the validity of a signed power of attorney, either under Austrian civil law, or for identity verification under the GDPR.\nThe Court noted that the controller is obliged to demonstrate that they are not in a position to identify a data subject where they refuse to respond to a data subject right request on that basis.\nThe Court held that in requesting the hand-signed power of attorney, the controller failed to demonstrate that they were not in a position to identify the data subject, and infringed Article 12 GDPR.\nAccordingly, the Court rejected the appeal.","title":"OLG Graz - 2 R 192/24h"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 202001629/2/A3","text":"The preliminary relief judge cannot order DPA to investigate the decommissioning of the ATB system because the judge cannot be sure that the DPA will get the same order as the result of the main proceedings.\nThe judge founds it important that the ATB system stayed in use until the end of 2019, so it was possible to buy such ticket at the time of the applicant’s objection to the DPA. Also, Dutch DPA’s enforcement powers regarding foreign transportation companies would need to be considered separately as NS is indeed acting as a processor to those companies.\nLastly, the preliminary relief judge did not agree that the dissemination of the ATB system would be irreversible. If at any point NS is found violating the GDPR by not offering an option to buy tickets without providing personal data, it will be the obligation of NS to provide a solution.","title":"RvS - 202001629/2/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00362/2020","text":"The AEPD considered that the conduct of the company \"bieNNova\" infringed Article 21 LSSI (Ley de Servicios de Sociedad de la Información y de Comercio Electronico).\nArticle 21 establishes that it is forbidden to send advertising or promotional communications by e-mail or any other equivalent means of electronic communication that have not been previously requested or expressly authorised by the recipients of such communications.\nArticle 38(4)(d) of the same law graduates the sanction as minor, defining the conduct as \"the sending of commercial communications by electronic mail or other equivalent means of electronic communication when such mailings do not comply with the requirements set out in Article 21 and do not constitute a serious infringement\".\nIn this case, the aggravating circumstance of the existence of intentionality was taken into account (Article 40(a) LSSI).\nThe AEPD fined the controller €2000 for failing to comply with Article 21 LSSI.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00362/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS (Netherlands) - 202004638/1/A3","text":"The court in turn assessed the lawfulness of (1) the original processing and (2) all further processing.\n(1) The original processing consisted of the Minister obtaining the agricultural and technical data of the partnership per Article 24 of the Agriculture Act in order to carry out a task of public interest as referred to in Article 6(1)(e) GDPR. The purpose of collecting this agricultural and technical data is the agricultural census, which describes the structure of the Dutch agricultural sector for the purpose of research and the development of policy. Of the data obtained for this purpose, the minister only wants to pass on the name, address and so-called Chamber of Commerce number of the partnership to the Sector Organisation for Arable Farming.\nThe court found this processing to be lawful.\n(2) The purpose of passing on the data of the partnership was to make it easier for the 'Brancheorganisatie Akkerbouw' to register companies and to collect the financial contributions used to finance its research within the framework of the Joint Program of arable farmers. The court highlighted it was not disputed that this is a different purpose than the purpose for which the Minister originally obtained and processed this data. No consent had been given for this processing.\nThe court held this further processing to be unlawful, as it was incompatible with the initial purpose for which the appellant's personal data had been collected. It allowed the appeal and overturned the original judgment.","title":"RvS (Netherlands) - 202004638/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-31-5743","text":"The DPA held that the controller violated Article 32(1) GDPR. The obligation under Article 32(1) GDPR to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk normally entails preventing unauthorized third parties' access to personal data and thereby a data breach.\nThe DPA observed that in its risk assessment, the controller should have considered and mitigated the risk that its employees would not comply with the internal procedures in place due to lack of space or stressful situations in the store. Similarly, the controller should have taken into account that the personal data stored on the data subject's TV, such as his browsing history, could include special categories of data. The TV could also contain the data subject's financial information, such as a credit card number.\nConsidering these risk factors, the DPA held that that the personal data on the TV should have been encrypted or deleted before it was stored in the warehouse, or it should have been stored sufficiently securely before such deletion. The controllers in such situations must ensure that its employees are aware of the internal procedures for handling personal data and that these procedures are being continuously updated.\nConsequently, the DPA reprimanded the controller for violating Article 32(1) GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-31-5743"}
{"_id":"holding_NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-373-31/2023","text":"The controller infringed the principles of - accountability as it did not prove the existence of legitimate interest in processing the data of the addressees of the mailing - lawfulness as the legal basis of the mailings was not proven - purpose limitation in respect of some mailings as the purpose was different from what was stated - fairness as it stated a wrong reason for requesting the data from the official register - lawfulness in respect of sending the newsletters - transparency as it did not provide appropriate information to the registrants - the rights of the data subjects by not deleting their data when consent was withdrawn. The DPA ordered the controller to permanently delete the data stored in its database of the data subjects who unsubscribed from the newsletter, or whose contact information was unsuccessful, in a documented manner, levied a fine and ordered to publish the decision. Alleviating circumstances were mainly that during the investigation, the practice was already discontinued and that the reason of the infringement was negligent and not intentional. The large volume of data processed and that data of minors were processed, were aggravating circumstances as well as that the processing was oriented to generating profitable business.","title":"NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-373-31/2023"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Midden-Nederland - AWB - 20 3811","text":"The court considered whether the child's personal data was legally shared with the tax office under the GDPR, and where it was not, whether the representative of the child have a right to monetary compensation.\nIt held that whilst there was an infringement of the GDPR, the claimant is not entitled to compensation as damages could not be proven.\nThe court considers that there is a proper legal basis in the law for sharing the data in the start-messages in the form of Article 38 of the Algemene wet inkomensafhankelijke regelingen (General law on income-related schemes) which requires state organs to share all relevant information with the tax office which they may need to fulfil their obligations.\nHowever, the data sharing through start-messages as required by the agreement between the SVB and the tax office is excessive. The court considers that data of all children is shared, whereas only about 42% of them qualify for the child-related budget. The agreement could therefore also have specified that when the tax office receives an application for the child-related budget, it requests data on the child in question from the SVB. This would eliminate 58% of the personal data processing without prejudice to the overall aim of the law and agreement. The court considers that the current setup of the agreement therefore fails the test of proportionality and subsidiarity (as established by the Dutch Supreme Court decision in the case of Santander, issued under the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act), and that the processing is not necessary. Additionally, the court considers that the current setup thus also interferes with the principle of data minimization.\nBe that as it may, this infringement of the GDPR does not entitle claimant to a compensation of damages. Claimant failed to substantiate that it led to any concrete damages to his daughter. In line with Dutch jurisprudence, the mere infringement of a fundamental right does not lead to damages for which compensation can be sought. The court further considers that damages under the GDPR are not punitive in nature. The obligation in this respect does not go beyond full compensation of the actual damage suffered. Since such damage has not been demonstrated, there is no right to compensation.","title":"Rb. Midden-Nederland - AWB - 20 3811"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 64/2022","text":"The DPA examined the rules for the removal of identification data displayed on theDPA's decisions in order to be posted on its website.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 64/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Realmedia Network SA","text":"The DPA held that the controller violated Articles 32(1)(b) and 32(2) GDPR for not implementing adequate technical and organizational measures to ensure a security level according to the processing risk.\nConsequently, the DPA fined the €8,000.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Realmedia Network SA"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Midden-Nederland - UTR 21/2729","text":"The central question of this ruling is whether or not the data subject's request could be seen as a rectification request within the meaning of the GDPR. The court ruled that the data subject’s request to rectify changes made to his employee file could not be classified as a request within the meaning of Article 16 GDPR. The court stated that Article 16 GDPR is limited to rectifying incorrect personal data and completing personal data which is incomplete. The court stated that this was not the initial intention of the data subject, who only made his request more specific at the hearing for this ruling. However, even with this clarification, the data subject was not able to prove that his request was a rectification request within the meaning of Article 16 GDPR.\nThe court also noted that the request did also not qualify as a request for getting access to personal data (Article 15 GDPR), erasing personal data (Article 17 GDPR) or restricting the processing of personal data (Article 18 GDPR).\nThe court concluded that the data subject's request was not a request within the meaning of the GDPR. Therefore, a (lacking) response from the controller to this request was not a \"decision\" (Besluit) within the meaning of Article 6(2)(b) of the General Administrative Law Act (Awb), a Dutch administrative law provision. The data subject's request itself could also not be regarded as an \"application\" (aanvraag) in the sense of Article 1(3)(3) Awb either.\nBecause of the fact that both the request from the data subject, as well as the (lacking) response from the controller did not fall under these national provisions, the appeal was deemed inadmissible by the court.","title":"Rb. Midden-Nederland - UTR 21/2729"}
{"_id":"holding_Cass.Civ. - 1/26778/2019","text":"The Court found that the processing of the customer's sensitive data was not necessary for the execution of the relevant contract. Such a clause violates the principle of data minimization as provided for in Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. Consequently, according to Article 1418 of the Italian Civil Code, the contractual clause was declared invalid as contrary to mandatory rules.","title":"Cass.Civ. - 1/26778/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00425/2019","text":"The AEPD found that the data controller has infringed not only the integrity and confidentiality principle, but also the accountability principle of Article 5(2) GDPR and, after considering some aggravating circumstances [(i) the data controller has performed a not intentional, but significantly negligent action; (ii) basic personal identification data have been affected (name, surname, domicile)], it decided to impose a fine of 30,000 € to the data controller.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00425/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10068155","text":"First, the DPA pointed out that referring to the Italian Law 104/1992, notoriously known in Italy for entitling to disability benefits, combined with the reference to the fact that data subject was suffering from \"illnesses\", is enough affirm that the email contained health data as defined by Article 4(15) GDPR.\nSecondly, the DPA noted that, pursuant to Article 2-ter of the Italian Data Protection Code, a public administration can disclose personal data only if a specific piece of legislation authorises it to do so.\nOn this point, the DPA held that, even though the recipients of the email were employees of the controller, this rule however applies. Pursuant to the data minimisation principle, the controller should share personal data among its employees only when that specific employee needs to know the information.\nThe DPA held that in the case at hand this did not happen, since the data was disclosed to the warehouse employees, that did not need to know the data subject's health and disability status. The DPA emphasized that colleagues' potential prior knowledge of the employee's health condition was irrelevant.\nTherefore, the DPA found a violation of Articles 5, 6 and 9(2)(b) GDPR and of Article 2-ter of the Italian Data Protection Code.\nOn these grounds, the DPA fined the controller €10,000 and ordered the controller to implement appropriate measures to prevent unauthorized internal circulation of employees' health data, even when such information might be already known to colleagues through workplace interactions.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 10068155"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-41-0149","text":"The DPA held that visitors of the controller's website did not give informed consent, as visitors who clicked on \"Accept all\" did not receive information about all processing purposes. Namely, information about the preferential purpose only appeared from the \"second layer\". As a result, the consent did not meet the requirements of Article 4(11) GDPR, and thus the controller could not rely on Article 6(1)(a) GDPR as a legal basis for the processing.\nFurthermore, the DPA also held that using a traffic light-like colour and design scheme in the consent solution constitutes a form of \"guiding\" (nudging). Therefore, as it interferes with the user's ability to make an informed choice, it is incompatible with the principles of lawfulness, fairness, and transparency of Article 5(1)(a) GDPR. Consequently, the DPA reprimanded the controller for the identified violations.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2021-41-0149"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Solarwave Limited EN","text":"ICO confirmed that Solarwave Limited contravened regulation 21 of PECR, by making unsolicited direct marketing calls to subscribers who had registered with the TPS at least 28 days prior to receiving the calls, and who had not given their prior consent to Solarwave to receive calls.\nICO also found that the conditions under section 55A DPA for the imposition of a monetary penalty were met.\nFirst, if found that the contravention was serious due to (among other) a substantial number (73,217) of unsolicited calls over a nine-month period, for which Solarwave Limited could not demonstrate that it held valid consent. Valid consent was defined by reference to the concept of consent in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).\nSecond, ICO found that Solarwave Limited acted negligently. It stated that companies have at their disposal detailed guidelines on carrying out marketing and on consent under the GDPR, which is why Solarwave Limited knew or ought reasonably to have known that there was a risk that this contravention would occur. Also, in line with standard practice of the TPS to notify the company of complaints, Solarwave Limited must have been aware of the contraventions. In addition, ICO found that Solarwave Limited failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the contravention. Relying on the assurance of third-party providers that the data had been screened prior to purchasing, without undertaking proper due diligence, was not considered as acceptable.\nFinally, ICO took account some aggravating features of the case, such as the fact that Solarwave Limited was seen to be rude and persistent when making calls and that it continued to make unsolicited calls pending the outcome of ICO’s investigation.\nTaking into account all of the above, ICO has decided that a penalty in the sum of £100,000 is reasonable and proportionate.","title":"ICO (UK) - Solarwave Limited EN"}
{"_id":"holding_LG Köln - 28 O 221/21","text":"The Regional Court of Cologne (Landgericht Köln - LG Köln) rejected the data subject's lawsuit. It found that the the data subject had no right to erasure under Article 17(1)(a), (c) or (d) GDPR, because the controller was processing the data lawfully under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and the processing was still necessary in relation to the controller's purposes of providing relevant credit rating information to to its customers.\nFirst, the court reasoned that the services of a credit rating agency are carried out in the public interest, but Article 6(1)(e) GDPR could not constitute a legal basis for the processing because there was no specific legal basis in Union or Member State Law as required by Article 6(3)(b) GDPR.\nSecond, the court found that the interests pursed by the controller and its customers overrode the interests of the data subject under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The court determined that the purpose of the controller's activity is to provide the customers of the controller with relevant credit rating information and to help lenders fulfill their legal obligation to check the financial capacity of their contract partners, thereby safeguarding the stability of economic transactions in Germany. The court held that these interests - although partly of abstract nature - can be considered in the balancing act under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and rejected the opinion of the Higher Regional Court Schleswig (OLG Schleswig - 17 U 15/21) that the interests of the controller's customers can only be considered under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR if a request to information was made to the controller. The court further held that the \"Rules of Conduct\" itself do not constitute a valid legal basis for the processing and do not substitute the balancing of interests by the courts under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, but can generally be considered a fair result if there are no specific atypical circumstances to the contrary. Moreover, the court rejected the view of the OLG Schleswig (17 U 15/21) that information about insolvency proceedings must be deleted by a credit rating agency after 6 months according to the objective pursued by § 3(1) InsoBekV. The court found that § 3(1) InsoBekV is not directly applicable, because it only refers to the official publication of information about an insolvency proceedings under www.insolvenzbekanntmachungen.de and not the processing of the data by a credit rating agency. It also found that § 3(1) InsoBekV cannot be applied analogously, because the two requirements of an analogous application were not met. The first requirement is an unintended gap in the law which the court found was not there, because the legislator once intended to prescribe shorter retention periods for credit rating agencies but in the end did not pass such a provision because of concerns about its conformity with EU law. The court also reasoned that the second requirement was not met, which is that the situation in question is in every crucial characteristic comparable to the situation regulated by the provision. It found that the situation regulated by § 3(1) InsoBekV is crucially different because it refers to a public accessible database and not a credit rating agency. Moreover, the court found that it is legally not persuasive to refer to a national provision in order to interpret and apply a EU provision, such as Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, without their being an escape clause like Article 23 GDPR.\nThird, the court held that the data subject did not validly object to the processing of the data under Article 21(1) GDPR, because he did not bring forward any \"grounds relating to his [...] particular situation\". It found that this requires the data subject to provide facts which form an atypical situation and give the interests of the data subject a special significance. The court reasoned that the consequences of the entry brought forward by the data subject did not establish such an atypical situation. Regarding a new apartment and a new job, the court found that the data subject did not sufficiently show that he was in fact looking for a new apartment or a new job. Regarding a new bank account, the court considered it sufficient that the data subject already had one. Regarding a new mobile phone and power supply contract, the court reasoned that this is not an atypical but a typical consequence of a discharge of residual debt. Finally, the court held that, even if there were \"grounds relating to [the data subject's] particular situation\", the interests of the controller and its customer would have overridden the data subject's interests.","title":"LG Köln - 28 O 221/21"}
{"_id":"holding_Commissioner (Cyprus) - 11.17.001.010.064","text":"Violation of Article 24(1) GDPR\nThe DPA determined that the controller violated Article 24(1) GDPR, because the controller did not implement appropriate technical and organizational measures in advance to ensure that its processing was GDPR compliant. The DPA confirmed that the procedure described in Article 31 KEF.170 did not enable the possibility to provide the consent form to another party other than the land owner (data subject). The controller did not implement measures to detect and/or verify any breach. The DPA stated that the controller would have been able to the determine whether the consent form was delivered to the owner, if it had established a procedure that would allow it to check this. The DPA provided two examples how this violation could have been avoided. One example was that the controller could deliver the form in duplicate. This way, one of the two forms could be returned to the controller with a signature from the data subject to confirm the delivery of the consent form. The DPA later confirmed that the controller had adopted this recommendation.\nViolation of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32 GDPR\nThe DPA also determined that the controller violated Article 32 GDPR, because the controller did not implement appropriate measures in advance in order to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of the consent form. The DPA stated that the controller had the sole responsibility as the controller for training and informing its staff. This responsibility was also accepted by the controller. The training and periodic briefings that the controller already provided were deemed inadequate by the DPA.\nThe DPA also determined that the controller violated the principle of integrity and confidentiality (Article 5(1)(f) GDPR) because the personal data of the data subject was processed in such a way that allowed unauthorized and/or unlawful processing.\nAfter considering several mitigating (8) and aggravating (6) factors, the DPA fined the controller €5,000. For example, The DPA considered the fact that the breach only affected one data subject as a mitigating factor, while it considered the non-participation of all staff in data protection related training as an aggravating factor.","title":"Commissioner (Cyprus) - 11.17.001.010.064"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00028/2021","text":"The Spanish DPA acknowledged the right of the Ministry of Defence to obtain such recordings through the camera, with grounds on Article 6(1)(e) GDPR and Article 22 of the Spanish Data Protection Act (LOPDGDD), that allows the recording of public spaces when it is necessary to ensure the security of strategic facilities, as long as they do not record the inside of private homes.\nHowever, the AEPD held that there had been a violation of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. Even if the Ministry had a legal basis for the treatment, the minimization principle shall always be complied with. The AEPD concluded that some of the cameras gathered images that were not strictly necessary for security purposes (such as the ones that recorded a whole avenue, obtaining images of private parking spots, or the ones pointing to the facade of buildings), therefore infringing Article 5(1)(c).\nFor this, the AEPD warned the Ministry of Defence, given that the Spanish Data Protection Act does not allow for fines to public institutions.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00028/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202303130","text":"The DPA held that the controller violated Article 5(1)(f) GDPR by not using the security measures available to the controller, and by allowing unauthorised persons to access the data. The controller also violated Article 32 GDPR by failing to have reasonable security measures on place based on the possible estimated risks. In particular, a messaging system should have been used that guaranteed delivery only to the person/s in positions who must have access to the documents in order to carry out their functions.\nThe AEPD declined to fine the controller, instead ordering the controller to adopt security measures to prevent the dissemination of health data via email so that processing is carried out with complete security.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202303130"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 02/2023","text":"The DPA first confirmed that the data subject correctly exercised his right to erasure. The DPA held that the controller breached Articles 12(3) GDPR, 12(4) GDPR and 17(1) GDPR because it did not respond in time to the erasure request and even sent a promotional e-mail after the request had been submitted. The DPA ordered the controller to comply with the erasure request and ordered the controller to provide the DPA with an update within 30 days on which action it had taken.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 02/2023"}
{"_id":"holding_RvS - 202206218/1/A3","text":"The court held that the data subject did not present any reasons why the processing of the personal data was unlawful, nor has there been any such evidence. She is therefore not entitled to the erasure of the personal data in the RvdK files under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR. It also pointed out that these proceedings could not lead to a judgment on the measure to terminate custody.\n\nThe court also ruled that RvdK was obliged by statutory law to retain the contested personal data in the files for the envisaged time period, according to the Dutch Archives Act. In the case of a custody order the time period would be 100 years. This means that, even if the personal data of the data subject and her children were unlawfully processed by the RvdK, the provisions of Article 17(3)(b) GDPR would in principle preclude the right to erasure.","title":"RvS - 202206218/1/A3"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Overijssel - AK 20 2097","text":"With regard to the completeness of the personal data provided to the claimant, the court considered that there is no reason to doubt the defendant's position that it has provided all the information necessary pursuant to Article 15 GDPR. The court is of the opinion that the claimant has not demonstrated that it likely that information was missing, and the mere existence of a suspicion of missing information is not sufficient in this context. The court referred to a judgment of the Council of State of 31 March 2021 (ECLI:NL:RVS:2021:675).\nThe Court did not rule on the legality of the defendant's processing of the claimant's personal data for customer research purposes under Article 6(1)(e). Rather, it merely ruled that the defendant had acted in accordance with with Articles 17(1) and 21(1) GDPR when handling the complainants (inferred) objection to the processing. The court stated that, in its opinion, the fact that the defendant claims that its initial processing of the data was not unlawful, does not alter the fact that the respondent had deleted the e-mail address for this purpose and has stopped processing it.\nFinally, with respect to the damages for the harm suffered as a result of the disclosure of his personal data to third parties, the court stated the following:\n  * The claimant had not demonstrated that he suffered material or immaterial damage as a result of the provision of his personal data to third parties through the letter of 25 June 2019 or the provision of his e-mail address to KCM;\n  * The adverse consequences of the breach (regarding the letter) and alleged breach (regarding the transfer to KCM) are not obvious, and in any case, are not so serious as to be qualified as violating a fundamental right.\n  * The claimant has also not made it clear why the provision of personal data concerning him in the mistakenly addressed letter or the provision of his e-mail address for customer research can be qualified as 'harm of his person', which is the legal ground for the compensation of immaterial damages under Article 6:106 (1)(b) Dutch Civil Code. He has also not made it plausible what adverse consequences the provision of this information had for him, and there is no indication that the data has been misused.\n  * In this way, the infringement of the GDPR will not automatically lead to compensable damage;\nThe court therefore rejected the claim for damages insofar as it is related to the letter of June 25, 2019 and the provision of the plaintiffs e-mail address to KCM.","title":"Rb. Overijssel - AK 20 2097"}
{"_id":"holding_IP - N/A","text":"On 15 March 2021, with the aim of protecting the rights of individuals, the IP issued a provisional decision to taxpayers - the Ministry of Public Administration (MPA), the Ministry of Health and the National Institute of Public Health (NIJZ) - imposing an obligation to provide clear, accurate and reliable information in accordance with Article 13 of the General Regulation (GDPR) - including who manages all personal data, what their purposes are and the legal basis for their processing - and restricting further processing of the personal data collected.","title":"IP - N/A"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - E/09208/2018","text":"The AEPD considered that the controller had correctly assessed the risks and implemented adequate measures to mitigate them. Their three-strikes mechanism for users that fake their location is deemed to be enough to deal with the alleged risk. Therefore, the DPA decided to archive the case.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - E/09208/2018"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9771142","text":"The DPA found violations related in particular to the inadequate privacy notice provided to data subjects (insofar as it lacks an indication of joint ownership of the processing) and 'formulated in a generic and approximate manner' with 'unclear and incomplete information' and 'not easy to understand'. Purposes of the processing were not well specified, the references to the rights of the data subjects were vague and incomplete, and it was not clear whether data subjects were obliged or not to provide their data, nor what the consequences of a possible refusal would be.\nThe DPA found the following violations:\n1. Violation of article 13 Privacy Code, for failure to acquire the consent of the data subjects.\n2. Violation of articles 37 and 163 Privacy Code, for failure to notify the DPA of the breach.\n3. Violation of Article 164-bis (2) Privacy Code, because the violations committed relate to databases of particular relevance or size.\nConsequently, the DPA fined Uber B.V. (Holland) and Uber Technologies Inc. (USA), €2,120,000 respectively (a total of €4,240,000), for violations relating to 1,5 million data subjects in Italy, including drivers and passengers.\nIn defining the amount of the sanctions, the DPA, in addition to the seriousness of the violations ascertained, also took into account the significant number of data subjects involved and the economic conditions of the company.","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9771142"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 7684/171/22","text":"The DPA cited the “Schrems II” decision (C-311/18) and held that the controller had infringed Articles 44 and 46 GDPR because 1) the controller had not established a lawful basis for the transfers in accordance with Chapter V GDPR and 2) nor had the controller put in place appropriate safeguards for the transfers. Therefore, the controller had unlawfully transferred personal data of its website visitors to the United States by using Google Analytics and reCAPTCHA services.\nAs a result, the DPA 1) issued a reprimand to the controller and 2) ordered the controller to delete all personal data that were transferred to the United States without a lawful basis. Because the controller had already disabled the Google services from its website, the DPA did not deem necessary to order the controller to do the same and to bring the processing into compliance with the GDPR.\nFinally, the DPA highlighted that controllers cannot transfer their responsibility to data subjects by instructing data subjects, for example, to install a Google add-on on their browser to block the use of Google's tracking technologies, such as Google Analytics. The DPA added that Google add-on does not completely prevent the transmission of the data subject's data to Google, as it does not prevent the downloading of Google Analytics scripts from Google's servers.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 7684/171/22"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Natural Person","text":"The DPA held that the publication of the personal data constituted a violation of the provisions of Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, Article 5(1)(f) GDPR, Article 6(1)(a) GDPR. As such, the DPA imposed a fined on the controller of €100 (for violating the provisions of Article 5(1)(a), 5(1)(f), and Article 6(1)(a) GDPR) and €50 (for violating Article 58(1)(a), 58(1)(e) and Article 83(5)(e) GDPR).\nThus, the DPA fined the controller €150 in total.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Natural Person"}
{"_id":"holding_DSB (Austria) - 2022-0.930.971","text":"Preliminarily, the DPA noted that the processing of personal data in the context of archiving, scientific, historical or statistical purposes is regulated under Austrian law by § 7 of the Data Protection Law (Datenschutzgesetz - DSG). Such a provision is an implementation of Article 89 GDPR, which enables Member States to adopt rules limiting data subjects’ rights in the context of the above mentioned processing activities, provided that safeguards are implemented.\nAccording to § 7(2) DSG, processing of personal data that were not previously publicly available or were not subsequently anonymised could be based only on specific legal provisions, consent or authorisation by the supervisory authority. In the case at issue, the controller could rely exclusively on the latter legal basis.\nThe DPA considered several elements in the authorisation process:\n1) The controller planned to erase or anonymise data as soon as they were no longer necessary for the purposes of the processing. These considerations also applied to data transferred to third parties, insofar as the disclosure was necessary to the research purposes. The controller guaranteed that when anonymisation was not a feasible measure, disclosure would have been possible only to the extent that legitimate interests of the controller outweighted data subject’s rights. The controller also planned to make use of processors that could guarantee compliance with the GDPR, pursuant to Article 28 GDPR.\n2) The controller also stated that European data protection standards would have been respected in case data were transferred outside the EU.\n3) The collection of consent from data subjects would have been impossible or a disproportionate effort for the controller.\n4) The objective pursued by the controller – namely a higher level of safety in the development of automated vehicles - was in the public interest.\nIn light of the above, the DPA granted the authorisation to the processing. However, the DPA imposed two additional conditions: first, processing of data subjects’ faces should be limited as far as possible; second, the controller was not allowed to transfer data to third parties in lack of an additional administrative authorisation.","title":"DSB (Austria) - 2022-0.930.971"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 12/2025","text":"The DPA held the following:\nLawfulness of the processing and transparency under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR in conjunction with Article 6, 12 and 13 GDPR\nThe DPA considers that the controller had a lawful legal basis for processing fingerprints in the context of creating ID cards under Article 6(1)(c) GDPR. The DPA goes as far as stating that there is an “unmistakably” legal obligation on the controller to process fingerprints for ID cards creation.\nViolation of Articles 5(1)(a), 12 and 13 GDPR\nThe DPA starts its analysis by stating that no document can confirm that whether the data subject obtained the information when the fingerprints were provided, i.e. when the processing started.\nNevertheless, the DPA reiterated that the controller is under the obligation of provide a data subject with all information required when the fingerprints are first taken, as per Article 13 GDPR. The controller is under the further obligation to provide the information requested when the personal data are obtained from the data subject as per Article 13 GDPR and to ensure transparency in information and communication under Article 12 GDPR.\nThe DPA found that no violation of Articles 5(1)(a), 12 and 13 GDPR.\nViolation of Article 5(1)(b) GDPR and Article 5(1)(c) GDPR\nIn relation to a possible violation of Article 5(1)(b) GDPR, the DPA considered first the fact that fingerprints are digitalized by ad hoc sensors at the initiative of the municipal authority. The digital image of these prints is then securely transmitted through the services for the National Registry to issue ID cards. This means that after fingerprints are registered and kept for up to three months to produce electronic ID cards. This is necessary so that the card producer can put the correct data on the chip, avoiding the need to re-register fingerprints in case of any technical malfunction. No later than three months from registration, the fingerprints are removed from the system and only one fingerprint per hand remains on the chip of the electronic ID.\nThus, the DPA concluded that there is no indication that the principle of purpose limitation, under Article 5(1)(b) GDPR, is violated.\nIn relation to a possible violation of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR, the fact that multiple fingerprints are processed per hand is motivated by the fact that it is prescribed by law that the best quality fingerprint should be integrated into the chip. This justifies the fact that several fingerprints per hand should be taken to select the best one.\nMoreover, the storing of fingerprints for maximum three months indicates that the digital image of the fingerprints is only kept for the time necessary for the creation and issuance of the ID card. This ensures that fingerprints are not kept longer than necessary.\nThus, the DPA concluded that no violation of the principle of data minimization, as per Article 5(1)(c) GDPR.\nTo conclude, the DPA did not find any violation of Article 5(1)(b), 5(1)(c), 6(1)(a), 12 and 13 GDPR.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 12/2025"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd - 2020010738","text":"The DPA held that the data controller was authorized to process the payment history data on the basis of legitimate interests which outweigh the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. The court emphasized that the issue in question is subject of the implementation of the Data Protection Act and of resolved case. Further, applicable Icelandic law requires that a consumer's creditworthiness be assessed prior to the granting of a consumer loan and state, inter alia, that information from the financial information databases may be used for this purpose. According to the applicable law, the processing of personal data relating to four years from the date of its registration is permitted.","title":"Persónuvernd - 2020010738"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 36/2021","text":"Governmental Bodies\nThe DPA clarifies its vision on why the defendant does not qualify for an exemption for administrative fines for public entities and/or government bodies. What falls under this definition is not defined in Article 83(7) and it is up to the member states to implement this in line with Union law.\nIn Belgium, Article 83(7) is not applicable to government bodies unless it is a legal entity under public law that offers goods or services on a market.\nAccording the Article 5(2) of the Belgian Data Protection Law (Wet Gegevensbescherming), the defendant is classified as a government because it is an educational institution, in the form of a private not for profit. They were established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest that are not of an industrial or commercial nature (namely, to provide primary and secondary education), and its activities are primarily financed by the Flemish government and it is also under government supervision.\nHowever, the exemption is not applicable when this 'government body' offers goods or services on a market. In Belgium, there is a market for private education as there is (non-)recognised private education available and thus competition.\nThe DPA holds that the term \"public authorities and public bodies\" in Article 83(7) cannot be interpreted so broadly as to include legal persons under private law that perform a task of general interest, such as free educational institutions.\nThe DPA holds that giving a broad interpretation to article 221(2) Wet Gegevensbescherming would contradict, on the one hand, the explicit will of the Belgian legislator not to exempt schools from administrative fines and, on the other hand, the restrictive interpretation that Article 83(7) should be given as an exception;\nAs such, Article 83(7) is not applicable which means article 221(2) Wet Gegevensbescherming is not applicable and thus free educational institutions are not exempt from administrative fines for violations of the GDPR.\n\nAdministrative fine\nThere are three factors which the DPA takes into consideration to determine a fine: gravity, duration and dissuasive effect.\nThe severity of the infraction on Article 6 GDPR and Article 8 GDPR is very high because it concerns fundamental principles of data protection and special protection of minors.\nRegarding the duration, there was an earlier complaint against the defendant in 2016 concerning the same survey. In 2018, the survey was used again. The survey of 2016 is not taken into account since the GDPR was not yet into effect.\nThe DPA does take into account that the defendant anonymised the survey and that it is prepared to take additional measures. On top of that, it is also a not for profit organisation.\nLastly, a part of the infractions from Decision 31/2020 have been annulled.\nConsidering the above, the DPA lowers the fine to €1,000.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 36/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_ICO (UK) - Advanced Computer Software Group Limited","text":"The DPA found that the processor did not have in place a system to perform regular vulnerability scanning in relation to the breached systems. The DPA noted that this practice was in stark contrast to the advice issued by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). The DPA found that the processor had infringed the obligation to adopt appropriate technical and organisational safety measures in Article 32(1)(b) UK GDPR in failing to implement comprehensive and regular vulnerability scanning in their systems.\nThe investigation also revealed that the attainment of administrator privileges was explicable due to the exploitation of the “ZeroLogon” vulnerability, a vulnerability which had been discovered and widely publicised about two years prior to the incident. Although some work had been performed to address this vulnerability, the DPA found this to be “ad hoc”, with no record of the patch having been implemented and the processor unable to confirm if it had been implemented at the time of the breach. The DPA found that the failure of the processor to fully implement this patch constituted an infringement of Article 32(1)(b) UK GDPR.\nThe investigation also revealed that the breached server did not have Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enabled. The implementation of MFA, the investigation revealed, would have prevented the data breach. The DPA noted the high turnover of the processor, and the scope of personal data they process on their systems (between 25-30 million data subjects). The DPA found that the failure to implement MFA on the breached system constituted an infringement of Article 32(1)(b) UK GDPR.\nThe DPA, in light of the nature and scope of the breach, categorized the infringement as having a high degree of seriousness. The DPA issued a provisional fine of £6.09 million (€7.28 million) in August 2022, but following acknowledgment by the processor of the fine and agreement to a voluntary settlement, the fine was reduced to £3.07 million (€3.68 million).","title":"ICO (UK) - Advanced Computer Software Group Limited"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03530","text":"Temporary ban on processing (order)\nPursuant to Article 66(1) GDPR and 58(2)(f) GDPR the Norwegian DPA consequently issued a temporary ban on Meta and Facebook Norway AS regarding the processing of personal data for behavioural advertising on Facebook and Instagram based on Article 6(1)(b) or 6(1)(f) GDPR. The order applies in Norway and remains valid provisionally for three (3) months from 4 August 2023 until 3 November 2023. However, the ban will be lifted if Meta would impelement remedial measures before that date. In this context, the authority welcomes a dialogue with Meta on elements such as limiting the scope of processing of personal data for behavioural advertising and introducing new user settings for behavioural advertising. Additionally, if the order is not complied with, the authority may impose a coercive fine of up to NOK 1,000,000 (approx. € 90,000) per day.\nUrgent binding decision by the EDPB\nFurthermore, subsequent to the issuance of the order, the Norwegian supervisory authority stated the intention to request an urgent binding decision by the EDPB correspondingly, pursuant to Article 66(2) GDPR, so that that final measures may urgently be adopted.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 21/03530"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 4300/182/2019","text":"Concerning the first question, the DPA held that under Article 2(2)(d) GDPR, the Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by competent authorities, including courts, for criminal prosecution. Furthermore, according to the CJEU's case C-245/20 - Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, the procedure whereby a court temporarily makes available to journalists procedural documents containing personal data to enable them to understand better the course of the proceedings falls within the scope of that court's \"judicial functions\". Therefore, under Article 55(3) GDPR, the DPA is not competent to supervise such processing.\nRegarding the second question, the DPA held that courts charge a fee under § 34 of the Public Access to Information Act for providing access to documents. Further, the payment in the present case is charged ex post facto, and according to § 29(2) of the Finnish Data Protection Act, a personal identity number may be processed for debt collection. Consequently, the processing is justified under Article 6(1)(c) GDPR as it is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject.\nFinally, the DPA also requested the Supreme Court to reassess the likelihood and severity of the risk of discovering the data subject's identity by accessing information from the billing system where it is stored. The Supreme Court must announce the reassessment and possible measures to reduce or eliminate the risks by 15 September 2022.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 4300/182/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_IP - 07120-1/2021/168","text":"The DPA held that under its current practice, it is not possible under Article 15 GDPR to obtain information about specific individuals who have processed personal data within the controller. This applies irrespective of the fact:\n- that the person is employed by a controller,\n- which systems and collections the employee has accessed, and - whether the access was lawful or unlawful.","title":"IP - 07120-1/2021/168"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd - 2020082249","text":"The Icelandic DPA outlined the importance of media and freedom of expression in a democratic society. It went on to say that the media must also guarantee democratic principles, including the respect for rights such as the right to privacy.\nThe DPA outlined that freedom of expression, as well as the right to privacy, were enshrined in the Icelandic Constitution. The right to freedom of expression can be found under Article 73, whilst the right to privacy falls within Article 71 of the Constitution. Elaboration on the latter Article can be found in the national Act 90/2018 and the GDPR.\nThe Icelandic DPA outlined that Article 6 Act 90/2018 provides for the harmonization of the right to privacy and freedom of expression. The Article is based on Article 85 GDPR which obliges member states to reconcile data protection law and freedom of expression in national law. Article 6 Act 90/2018 establishes that only Article 5(1)(a) and (d), Articles 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, 40-43 and 82 GDPR will apply in the context processing for journalistic purposes.\nThe Icelandic DPA then went on to describe its tasks pursuant to Article 39 Act 90/2018. This includes deciding whether there is a breach of the Act or the GDPR on the basis of complaints made. However, the DPA does not consider itself to be competent to assess the boundaries between the constitutional rights to privacy and freedom of expression where a media entity is concerned. It deems that a court is better place to make such decisions. Therefore, the DPA does not have jurisdiction to determine whether an individual has gone beyond it constitutional right to freedom of expression and thereby breached another’s right to data protection. The DPA mentioned that depending on the fact, it could rule on the legitimacy of processing where the data controller is a non-media entity (individual or private company).\nIn any case, parties processing personal data for journalistic purposes must comply with Article 5(1)(a) and (d), Articles 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, 40-43 and 82 GDPR. The Iceland DPA then went on to outline what certain of these provisions entailed (such as Article 5(1)(a) and (d)) for journalists. It notably highlighted that under Article 26 Media Act 38/2011, journalists have a duty to respect human rights including the right to privacy.\nThe Icelandic DPA also provided some suggestions as each case is to be determined on a case by case basis. The sensitivity of the personal data is significant. Additionally, the status of the person in question (whether they are a public figure, for example) should be considered. This is particularly important as Article 73 of the Constitution on freedom of expression has been interpreted broadly by Icelandic courts where it concerns public figures. The context of the publication must be considered before publishing personal information.","title":"Persónuvernd - 2020082249"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Vodafone România S.A. 3","text":"The ANSPDCP held that the controller failed to meet its obligations, as it could not prove that it had replied to or complied with the requests from data subject. The DPA therefore fined Vodafone €4000 for breaching Articles 12, 15, and 17 GDPR.\nFurthermore, the DPA imposed the corrective measure of ordering the controller to adequately respond to the data subject who submitted the requests.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Vodafone România S.A. 3"}
{"_id":"holding_Personvernnemnda - PVN-2024-01","text":"The appeal board held that access to an employee's mailbox constitutes processing of personal data, thus the GDPR applies. The appeal board also held that in order for the inspection to be lawful, the employer must also follow the procedures set out in the national E-Mail Regulations The appeal board agreed with the DPA and the Court of Appeal that the controller had not proceeded in line with national law and the requirements of the GDPR when carrying out the inspection.\nThe Board also agreed with the DPA’s and Court of Appeal’s assessment that the inspection of the data subject’s mailbox was sufficiently justified under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR and §2(b) of the Norwegian E-mail Regulations. The appeal board agreed with the district court and appeal court that the data subject had shared insider information, as well as other confidential information, which constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty.\nThe disclosure of personal data to a third party requires a legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR. The appeal board agreed with the DPA that the controller had no legal basis for the disclosure of personal data to the third party under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. The DPA rightly issued a reprimand against the controller under Article 58(2)(b) GDPR. The appeal board rejected the data subject’s argument that the third party was a data processor.\nUnder Article 30 GDPR, the controller is obliged to keep a record of processing activities. It also follows from Article 30(3) GDPR and Article 30(4) GDPR that these records must be in writing and must make them available to the DPA on request.\nAlthough the data subject had the right to lodge a complaint with a DPA under Article 77 GDPR, this right does not extend to separate complaints about possible non-compliance with the controller's general obligations under Chapter IV of the GDPR, including the obligation to keep records under Article 30 GDPR. It is up to the DPA to assess whether or not this is a matter to be pursued against a controller. Therefore, the appeal board rejected the data subject's argument.\nThe appeal board held that the fact that the DPA chose to impose a reprimand, but did not find it necessary to impose a fine, is not a decision directed at the data subject and does not affect their rights and obligations. The appeal board refers to their cases PVN-2019-12 and PVN-2020-07, in which the appeal board took a similar legal view.\nThe appeal board therefore dismissed the data subject’s appeal about the DPA’s choice of measures taken against the controller.","title":"Personvernnemnda - PVN-2024-01"}
{"_id":"holding_Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Finland) - 3620/2023","text":"The Court noted that, despite the opportunity reserved for it, the controller had not sufficiently demonstrated that some other entity had acted as a controller of the personal data generated in connection with the treatment that took place on its premises. In its appeal, the controller had not denied that the data subject had received treatment from the controller. Thus, the Court stated that the controller had to be considered as a controller within the meaning of the GDPR.\nIn light of this, the Court agreed with the DPA that the controller had violated Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, Article 12 GDPR, Article 13 GDPR, Article 15 GDPR and Article 25(1) GDPR by not implementing the data subject's access request and failing to inform data subjects about the processing of personal data. The Court also considered that the administrative fine issued by the DPA had been effective, proportionate and dissuasive in accordance with Article 83(1) GDPR.","title":"Helsingin hallinto-oikeus (Finland) - 3620/2023"}
{"_id":"holding_LG Köln - 28 O 328/21","text":"The court ordered the controller to pay €1200 as non-material damages to the data subject. The court found that the controller violated Article 32(1) and Article 5(1)(f) GDPR because it had not implemented technical and organisational measures to ensure an appropriate level of security, especially in regards to “integrity and confidentiality”. The controller contributed to the data breach and potential identity theft by not deactivating or changing CodeShip’s credentials for several years.\nAlthough it could not be verified by the court that the data subject’s identity was fraudulently used by a third person, the court found that the risk alone establishes an immaterial damage pursuant to Article 82(1) GDPR.\nWhen assessing the amount of damages pursuant to Article 82(2) GDPR, the court considered as mitigating factors that the data was not used for any fraudulent behaviour until the time of the decision and that the controller paid for the identity protection service.[1] Therefore, the court considered the amount of €1,200 appropriate.","title":"LG Köln - 28 O 328/21"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 38/2020","text":"The HDPA found that the politician acts as data controller for this communication and that he did not obtain the recipient's consent. Moreover, he initially collected the complainant's contact details for different purposes. However, the politician provided and satisfied the complainant's right to objection.\nThe HDPA upheld the complaint and imposed the proportionate fine of EUR 2000.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 38/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_Persónuvernd - 2020010613","text":"The Icelandic DPA decided that the processing of the Complainant's personal data by Creditinfo Lánstraust hf. in connection with the preparation of their credit report, was in compliance with Act no. 90/2018 on Data Protection and the Processing of Personal Data.\nThe DPA pointed out that it had previously taken a position on the issue in question with a ruling, cf. January 26, 2017, in case no. 2016/950; on December 6, 2016, in case no. 2016/580; on September 28, 2017, in case no. 2016/1138; and on May 31, 2018, in case no. 2017/537. In all of the foregoing rulings, the DPA considered that Creditinfo could use information on the entry of the company's defaults list for four years from the registration of such information.","title":"Persónuvernd - 2020010613"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202317282","text":"The AEPD found that the controller infringed Articles 6(1) and 17 GDPR because it processed the data subject’s account number without a legal basis and failed to comply with the data subject’s deletion request.\nSince 2022, the controller has been erroneously processing the data subject’s bank account information in its debt contract with the third party debtor, in its databases, and in its transmission to a future debt buyer in June 2023. At no point during this period did the controller correct the issue. As a result, the controller was processing the data subject’s data without a legal basis in violation of Article 6(1) GDPR. The AEPD considered the processing in 2022 and 2023 (between which the data subject had made a deletion request) separately – thus, it found that two Article 6(1) GDPR violations occurred on the separate processing occasions.\nThe AEPD also found that the controller violated Article 17(1)(d) GDPR when it failed to delete the data subject’s data pursuant to an erasure request. After it received the data subject’s deletion request and even though it alleged to have erased the data in 2022, the controller continued making charges on the data subject’s account in 2023.\nThe AEPD recommended a sanction of €250,000. Pursuant to Law 39/2015, a Spanish law concerning administrative proceedings, the AEPD informed the controller that it may acknowledge its responsibility for the alleged violations and/or pay the proposed fine. Each of these actions reduces the imposed fine by 20%. The controller opted to reduce the fine by 40%, both acknowledging its responsibility for the violations and paying the reduced sanction amount of €150,000.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202317282"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet - Datatilsynet - Arp-Hansen Hotel Group A/S indstilles til bøde","text":"The Danish DPA held that Arp-Hansen was indeed in violation of Article 5(1)(e), noting in particular Arp-Hansen's lack of an objective reason for the extensive storage of information. Therefore, the DPA fined the hotel chain DKK 1,100,000.","title":"Datatilsynet - Datatilsynet - Arp-Hansen Hotel Group A/S indstilles til bøde"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00093/2019","text":"Although Vodaphone insisted on the fact that a mistake has been made by an employee, the AEPD held that personal data was processed in a manner which does no ensure appropriate security. As a consequence, Vodaphone violated Article 5(1)(f) GDPR, as interpreted in the light of the last sentence of the recital 39 GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00093/2019"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00315/2020","text":"The DPA stated that the controller cannot exercise a right to access, which is a personal right that belongs to the data subject, and that the controller can only compel the processor to comply with its legal obligations.\nThe DPA also remarked that the controller may leave a certain degree of discretion as to how best to serve the interests of the controller, allowing the processor to choose the most appropriate technical and organisational means.\nUltimately, the DPA concluded that there had been a violation of Article 28(3)(g) GDPR, that obliges the processor, at the choice of the controller, to delete or return all the personal data, as well as existing copies, to the controller after the end of the provision of services relating to processing. For not complying with this obligation, the DPA fined the processor €100,000.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00315/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - TD/00085/2020","text":"The Spanish DPA admitted the claim and urged the controller to send the claimant a certificate stating that his/her request to exercise the right of access has been satisfied or to refuse it, indicating the reasons why his/her request should not be satisfied.\nIf the company complained of fails to comply with this resolution, this could lead to the commission of a very serious infringement, which will be sanctioned in accordance with art. 58 (2) of the GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - TD/00085/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against S.C. Delivery Solutions S.A. (Sameday)","text":"The DPA noted that a processor is obliged to take all necessary measures to protect systematically the processing of personal data of natural persons, as required by Article 28(3)(c) GDPR, including against disclosure and/or unauthorised access to data.\nDuring its investigation, the DPA found that the database for sale on website contained data relating to 26.566 individuals. The data included: AWB number and date (the transport document which must accompany the dispatch of any parcel), courier details, sender's name, consignee's name and surname, telephone number, address, delivery status, type of service, parcel weight, amount to be collected and delivery interval.\nThe DPA held that the processor did not implement adequate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk of the processing for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, which led to the disclosure and/or unauthorised access to personal data of 26,566 natural persons. As result, the DPA held that the controller violated Article 29, Article 32(1)(b), and Article 32(2) GDPR.\nThe DPA fined the processor €3,000 (RON 14,825.70).","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against S.C. Delivery Solutions S.A. (Sameday)"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Asociația de Proprietari Aviației Park","text":"The Romanian DPA fined the controller €7000 for violating Article 5(1)(a), (c), (e), (2) GDPR and Article 6 GDPR by processing the personal data without a legal basis, by violating the principles of data minimisation and storage limitation. €2,000 (RON 9,885.80) of the fine was for the violation of Article 5(1)(a), (c) (2) GDPR and Article 6 GDPR by keeping the access register and €5,000 (RON 24,714.50) for the violation of Article 5(1)(e), (2) GDPR by storing the video footage longer than necessary for the purpose of monitoring the access to the complex.\nAdditionally, the DPA ordered the controller under Article 58(2)(d) GDPR to bring is processing into compliance with the GDPR by:\n 1. reviewing and updating the technical and organisational measures on the basis of a risk assessement, especially establishing a deadline after which collected data is anonymised and which is in accordance with the storage limitation principle.\n 2. evaluating the processing carried out to implement the necessary measures to comply with the principles of Article 5 GDPR.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Asociația de Proprietari Aviației Park"}
{"_id":"holding_LG Lübeck - 15 O 262/23","text":"No legal basis\nThe court found that the controller could not rely on any legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR for the data transfer. The court rejected the argument that the processing could be based on the legitimate interest of fraud prevention.\nThe court explained that prevention of fraud committed by the data subject cannot be a legitimate interest in this case as the contract has already been concluded. The controller therefore doesn’t directly benefit from transferring the data subject’s contract information but instead can benefit from an informed and detailed credit rating system in order to assess future customers to prevent fraud.\nThe court highlighted that telecommunication providers, including the controller, have ceased the transfer of data to SCHUFA without this having any impact on their business. The court concludes that this shows the practice was not of significant importance never mind a necessity. Instead, the court determined that the true interest of the controller is to participate in the credit rating system by supplying information so that others can draw on these scores.\nThe court held that whether or not the registration of the contract information is based on a legitimate interest is not the key question as the interests of the data subject nevertheless outweigh. The court declared that an outweighing interest is worthy of protection especially when the purpose of the data transfer is the creation of a profile, the scope of the collected data is particularly large and if the collection of data can substantially impact the data subject.\nInformational\nIn relation to the supplied informational, the court declared that the document amounted to a mere formality, as it didn’t provide the data subject with any options. The controller supplied this document knowing that the only option for the data subject in response to the information was not to continue with the contract. The court concluded that to follow that logic would render the protections of the GDPR useless.\nRegardless, the court further highlighted that the informational didn’t clearly communicate that every formation of contract would be disclosed as it stated that this would occur if the information was sufficiently relevant.\nDamage\nThe court rejected the data subject’s claims of loss of control and worry truly impact his life as in the oral hearing he did not focus on this. However, the court declared that the violation of the right to informational self-determination itself classifies as damage under Article 82 GDPR. To illustrate this, the court referred to a lead decision by the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof – BGH) which showed that the mere loss of control and the resulting violation of the right to informational self-determination can constitute damage.\nThe court stated that the registration of the contract information itself violated the data subject’s right to informational self-determination, which encompasses the ability to freely determine who can access your data.\nThe controller was ordered to pay the data subject €400 in damages and based this number off the European General Court judgment T-354/22, in which the unlawful disclosure of an IP-address warranted the same amount of damages.\nThe court ordered the data subject to pay 89% of the procedural fees while the controller had to pay 11%, additionally the controller was ordered to pay €368.70 in pre-litigation lawyer fees.","title":"LG Lübeck - 15 O 262/23"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - TSV/35/2022","text":"On the basis of the information provided by the controller, the DPA considered that the email sent from the controller's information system was promoting services offered by another organisation and that such use of the personal data was comparable to disclosure.\nThe DPA emphasised that in accordance with Article 32(4) GDPR, the controller must ensure that its employees have sufficient understanding and competence regarding the processing of personal data and data protection.\nThe DPA stated that the controller must also comply with Section 16(3) of the Finnish Act on the Openness of Government Activities, according to which the disclosure of personal data for direct marketing requires the data subject's consent. Since there was no legal basis to disclose the students' personal data, the controller processed the personal data in violation of the lawfulness principle.\nOn the basis of the information gathered, the DPA held that the controller had violated Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, as the processing of personal data was not related to the activities of the controller and there were no legal grounds for the processing. The controller's purpose in collecting the personal data was for processing related to college operations. As the advertisement for another organisation did not relate to college operations, the DPA also found a violation of Article 5(1)(b) GDPR.\nAs a result, the DPA issued a reprimand to the controller in accordance with Article 58(2)(b) GDPR.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - TSV/35/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 6097/161/21","text":"The DPA held that requiring the printing, filling and signing of a separate form to identify the data subject does not conform with Articles 12(2), 12(6), 5(1)(c) and 25(2) GDPR as it complicates the exercise of data subject rights and processes more personal data than necessary for the data subject's identification. The DPA stressed that the unnecessary collection of data subjects' signature data may actually increase, rather than decrease, the potential risks of misuse while making it more difficult for data subjects to exercise their rights. The controller should have also considered the nature of the personal data concerned, the nature of the request, and the context in which the request is made in determining the means of identification. Whilst controllers may offer different options for the exercise of data subjects' rights, digital identification, such as using the same identifiers when logging in online services provided by the controller, should be one of them.\nFurthermore, the DPA held that the controller neglected the data protection by design principle of Article 25(1) GDPR by not testing its email system, which was used as a main electronic channel for data subjects to exercise their rights. In conclusion, the DPA ordered Otavamedia Oy to pay an €85,000 fine and bring its subject requests processing system in conformity with the GDPR.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 6097/161/21"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - PPC Energie Muntenia S.A.","text":"The DPA found that the controller illegally processed the personal data, i.e. the phone number, of the data subject by making them available to a partner. This making available of the phone number happened solely for marketing and advertising reasons. However, the controller did so without any legal basis. This entailed a violation of Article 5(1)(a) and (b) GDPR, as well as Article 6 GDPR.\nMoreover, the DPA considered that the controller did not properly manage the access request advanced by the data subject and thus violated Article 12(3) and (4) GDPR, as well as Article 15 GDPR.\nTherefore, the DPA deemed it appropriate to impose a twofold fine:\n- First, a fine of RON 9,950 (€2,000) for the violation of Article 5(1)(a), (b) GDPR and Article 6 GDPR;\n- Second, a fine of RON 4,975 (€1,000) for the violation of Article 12(3) and (4) GDPR and Article 15 GDPR.\nAdditionally, the DPA recommended the controller to take the following actions:\n- To ensure that the data collected is processed in compliance with the GDPR; and\n- To submit a complete and applicable legal provision to access requests.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - PPC Energie Muntenia S.A."}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202311911","text":"According to the DPA, the controller duplicated the data subject’s SIM card without a valid legal basis under Article 6(1) GDPR, despite the protocols set in place by the controller. The protocol to verify an individual’s identity was based solely on matching specific data with its database, and did not ensure that the data subject was involved or aware. The DPA stated that the coincidence of the data provided by an individual and the database is not enough to process the data under consent (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR) or any other legal basis. The issue in this case was not that the controller did not follow its internal protocol or lacked security measures, but rather that it was processing the personal data without a valid legal basis.\nThe DPA dismissed the mitigating circumstances presented by the controller. The DPA argued that the controller had not taken the initiative in resolving the situation or detected the fraud. Therefore, applying the mitigating circumstance under Article 82(2)(c) GDPR would “artificially” decrease the fine and its deterrent effect. Furthermore, while the processing did not involve special categories of data, the DPA considered that the data (full name and ID) had a sensitive nature. The unauthorised access was particularly serious because it was accessed with the intent of committing identity theft, and it involved a loss of control of the data subject over their data.\nFinally, the DPA highlighted three previous fines it had given the controller for duplicating a SIM card without a legal basis, each resulting in a €70,000 fine. As a very important telecommunications company in Spain, the DPA considered that the controller had the responsibility to more rigorously guarantee the protection of personal data principles according to national case law[1].\nThe DPA maintained the €200,000 fine imposed on the controller in its previous decision on the grounds that the controller had not presented new legal facts.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202311911"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00051/2020","text":"The AEPD concludes that VOX España has infringed the lawfulness principle as per Article 6(1)(a) GDPR.\nThe controller has processed the personal data of its former representative without her consent and despite the fact that she had requested the full erasure of her data. Consequently, after considering some circumstances including, (1) the local scope of the processing activity made by the defendant, (2) only one person has been affected by the processing activity, (3) there is no evidence that the defendant has adopted any measures in order to prevent such issues to happen again in the future, (4) there is no evidence of wilful misconduct by the defendant, even being this issue a very serious breach of the law, (5) the link between the activity of the defendant and the processing of personal data, and (6) the defendant is a national political party, the AEPD decided to impose a fine of 1,500 € to the defendant.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00051/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_APD/GBA (Belgium) - 160/2022","text":"The DPA held that the data subject properly submitted his access - and erasure requests (Articles 15 and 17 GDPR). The DPA held that the controller breached Articles 12(3) GDPR, Article 15(1) GDPR and Article 17(1) GDPR by not responding to any request made by the data subject. The DPA ordered the controller to fulfil the data subject requests within 30 days. This order was based on Article 95, § 1, 5° WOG (law establishing the Belgian DPA) and Article 58(2)(c) GDPR. This order was not a final decision in light of article 100 WOG but a decision in a procedure prior to the decision on the merits.","title":"APD/GBA (Belgium) - 160/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Telekom Romania Communications SA 3","text":"The DPA warned Telekom for the processing performed without legal ground, breaching Article 6 GDPR, and fined it approximately €2,000 (RON 9,851.40) for contacting a data subject subsequent to his/her opposition request, breaching Article 21 GDPR.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Fine against Telekom Romania Communications SA 3"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Den Haag - AWB - 22 5012","text":"First, the court assessed the claim against the controller. The court determined that it did not have the authority to assess the decision of the controller regarding the access request. Therefore, the court also did not have the authority to order the controller to provide financial compensation for the data subject.\nSecond, the court assessed the data subject's claim against the DPA for immaterial damages. The court rejected this claim for several reasons. Among other reasons, the data subject had not explained what the claimed immaterial damage exactly entailed. Also, since the data subjec alrerady received financial compensation, additional compensation was deemed unnecessary by the court.\nThird, regarding the claim against the DPA about the reasonable time (Article 6 ECHR), the court determined that a term of 2 years was reasonable in this case, where two public institutions were involved in the procedure. In this case, the court determined that the two-year period had started on 2 November 2021, the date of the first appeal (bezwaar).\nTo determine if a reasonable term had been violated, the court took into account the following circumstances: the complexity of the case, the manner in which the complaint was handled by the administrative body and the court, the procedural conduct of the data subject throughout the proceedings and the nature of the measure and the interest of the data subject. However, the court merely determined that the procedure had not exceeded two years, which seems to be the only circumstance which was assessed by the court to reject the data subject's claim.\nFourth, regarding the information provided by the controller to the DPA about any procedures between the controller and the data subject, the court determined that the GDPR had not been infringed. The DPA was allowed to ask questions to the controller. The court did not provide an explanation/ motivation for this conclusion that the GDPR had not been breached.\nIn conclusion, the court refused all the claims of the data subject.","title":"Rb. Den Haag - AWB - 22 5012"}
{"_id":"holding_BfDI (Germany) - 11.02.2021","text":"The President of the Bundesnetzagentur Jochen Homann held that it is not acceptable that consumers are concerned that way by impermissible telephone advertising and supposed conclusions of a contract.","title":"BfDI (Germany) - 11.02.2021"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2024-442-4149","text":"The DPA held that there had been unauthorised access to personal data, and thus found there was a personal data breach under Article 4(12) GDPR.\nThe DPA stated that it follows from Article 32(1) GDPR that the controller must take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by the controller's processing of personal data. The DPA held that the controller did not ensure that only employees with a work-related need had access to the drive and that there was a set-up where a single employee's error could result in a breach involving 3.7 million people. The DPA also criticised the controller that it did not test immediately after the transfer of the data whether the correct employees had access to the drive. This would have immediately revealed the error. Therefore, the DPA found that the controller’s processing of personal data had not been carried out in accordance with Article 32(1) GDPR.\nThe DPA held that when developing new applications or swapping file drives, it must first be assessed whether it is necessary to move and store the data in personally identifiable form in the future. The DPA stated that if it is necessary for the purpose of the processing, a possible security measure could be that the controller ensures that the data is encrypted so that only an authorised person can read and unlock the data. The DPA held that a proprietary data format cannot be equated with encryption, as there are often viewers or plugins that make it relatively easy to read these file formats. Moreover, the DPA held that the controller is also required to check that the intended access management, control and logging are working before the change is released for operation.\nThe DPA took into account that the controller is implementing a number of measures to prevent a similar situation from occurring again. Thus, the DPA issued a reprimand against the controller for violating Article 32(1) GDPR.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2024-442-4149"}
{"_id":"holding_DSB (Austria) - DPA 2021-0.415.529","text":"The DPA held that the controller is required to not only justify the lawfulness of its data processing under Article 6 GDPR, but also to comply with the principles of processing under Article 5 GDPR. Under Article 5(2) GDPR, the controller is not only obligated to comply with these principles, but must also be able to prove compliance. The DPA stated that the controller failed to provide such proof.\nAccording to Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, personal data must be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner. The DPA explained that from this transparency principle follows Article 14 GDPR, which states that the controller has an information obligation if the data was not collected from the data subject themselves. The DPA stated that the controller took the data subject’s data from a job advertisement created by the data subject themselves in the e-Job-Room of the AMS without the data subject’s participation and thus without the knowledge of the data collection. The exception of the information obligation under Article 14(5)(a) GDPR thus did not apply here. The controller should therefore have provided the data subject with the information under Article 14 GDPR at the latest at the time of the first text message to the data subject. The DPA stated that the controller failed to do so and thus violated the principle of transparency under Article 5(1)(a) GDPR and thus processed the data subject’s data unlawfully.\nRegarding the request for erasure, the DPA stated that under Article 17(1)(d) GDPR, the data subject has a right to erasure without undue delay and that the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where the personal data have been unlawfully processed. The DPA found it unnecessary to go into further detail on other possible grounds for erasure, such as the data subject objecting to the processing under Article 17(1)(c) GDPR.\nThe DPA therefore held that the controller was obliged to erase the data subject's data immediately after receiving their request for erasure, but at the latest within the one-month period pursuant to Article 12(3) GDPR. By failing to do so, it violated the data subject's right to erasure under Article 17 GDPR.\nThe DPA thus ordered the controller to comply with the data subject’s request to erasure.","title":"DSB (Austria) - DPA 2021-0.415.529"}
{"_id":"holding_Rb. Den Haag - C/09/662309 / HA RK 24-104","text":"First, the court assessed if there has been an automated decision-making by the controller.\nThe court upheld the controller’s argument, ruling that there was no ADM since the subsequent investigation and the final decision was carried out by employees of the controller.\nSecondly, the court noted that providing more information about how the transaction monitoring system works could have the effect of providing insight into how the controller's process, designed to prevent criminal offences, operates. According to the court, disclosing this information could result in malicious persons gaining knowledge that could undermine the operation of the system.\nThus, the court found that the controller rightfully relied on Article 41(1)(d) UAVG in order to partially restrict the data subject’s right of access.\nOn these grounds, the court rejected the data subject’s claims.","title":"Rb. Den Haag - C/09/662309 / HA RK 24-104"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02376","text":"First, the DPA held that the bank did not comply with the GDPR requirements for conducting risk assessments. Both Article 24 and Article 32 GDPR impose such an obligation.\nConsidering the individual case a thorough assessment would have been necessary. This is due to the following facts: Although financial data do not constitute special categories of personal data within the meaning of Article 9 GDPR, they are nevertheless to be considered sensitive data. Personal data in a large number were processed.\nHowever, the controller could not present documentation or in any other way demonstrate that they have made the necessary assessments.\nSecond, the DPA found that the controller failed to take appropriate technical measures (testing) when launching the new online portal.\nThe DPA repeated that the controller did not assess the risk correctly.\nWith regard to measures under Article 32 of the GDPR, the DPA has ruled the following. Despite of the facts that the controller tested the portal in its own test environment and only launched it for a selection of customers, those measures were not sufficient. The testing was not specifically described and documented. Further, the error occurred during frequent navigation of the page. The DPA considered that the breach could have been avoided if the bank had tested sufficiently.\nConsequently, the DPA fined the controller NOK 400,000 (€ 39,700) for failing to assess risks and conduct testing when launching a new customer portal.","title":"Datatilsynet (Norway) - 20/02376"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00357/2020","text":"The AEPD imposes a warning sanction and explains that imposing a sanction under Article 83(5)(b) of the GDPR against the respondent would be a disproportionate burden on it. In addition, the AEPD takes into account two factors: 1) that the main activity of the respondent is not directly linked to the processing of personal data and 2) that there is no record of previous data protection infringements.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00357/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00368/2021","text":"With regard to the information obligation from Article 13 GDPR, the AEPD considered different issues. First, that the RFEF could not prove that the participants had been informed that the second meeting was being recorded, since it was only at the beginning of the first meeting where RFEF's representative warned the participants that the meeting was being recorded. However, the AEPD noted that no more information was given, and the fact that future meetings would also be recorded was not mentioned. Additionally, the AEPD observed that this communication would have been insufficient since some participants in the second meeting had not attended the first one. Therefore, the AEPD held that the RFEF could not prove that the participants in the meeting had been informed about the processing of personal data as required by Article 13 GDPR. Furthermore, the AEPD, highlighted that the RFEF did not provide the information required by Article 13(3) GDPR about further processing of the data, which in this case was related to sharing the recording with two radio broadcasters. Therefore, the AEPD held that the RFEF had breached Article 13 GDPR.\nOn the other hand, the AEPD established that the RFEF did have a valid legal basis for the processing of personal data in this case, since Article 18 of the Spanish Act for the Regulation of the Public Sector (Ley 40/2015, de 1 de octubre, de Régimen Jurídico del Sector Público - LRJSP) allows public bodies to record their meetings and to store them in order to keep a literal transcript of the minutes. However, the AEPD noted that having a valid legal basis does not excuse the controller from properly informing the data subjects with the requirements included under Article 13 GDPR. According to the AEPD, stating that the recording would take place in order to keep a transcript of the meeting, did not amount to providing adequate information under this provision, including basic information regarding the legal basis and the purposes of the processing.\nIn relation to public bodies' transparency obligations related to keeping a record of their meetings' minutes and disclosing them, the AEPD observed that this obligation only includes a written record of certain aspects, not a recording of the meeting itself. Therefore, although these obligations would allow RFEF to record the meeting, as well as to provide access to the written minutes, it would not allow it to share the actual recording. The AEPD highlighted Recital 50 GDPR, which states that \"the processing of personal data for purposes other than those for which the personal data were initially collected should be allowed only where the processing is compatible with the purposes for which the personal data were initially collected.\" For the subsequent processing which occurred when sharing the video with the broadcasters, the RFEF relied on freedom of information and expression, considering that it had the legitimacy to refute a press released by the AFE which was not factual, and to substantiate this refutation by providing a recording of what was exactly said during the meeting. However, the AEPD held these rights could have been exercised by sharing the written record of the meeting, and not the actual recording. The AEPD also noted that the recording contained comments of a personal and private nature, and that therefore the RFEF should have only shared the minimum amount of data necessary to achieve that purpose, according to the data minimization principle. Consequently, the AEPD held that the RFEF had violated Article 6(1) GDPR, processing personal data without a valid legal basis by sharing the recording instead of a transcript limited to the relevant details.\nBased on these considerations, the AEPD fined the RFEF a total of €200,000 ( €100,000 for the violating Article 13 GDPR, and €100,000 for the violating Article 6(1) GDPR).","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00368/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_ANSPDCP (Romania) - Compania Națională Poșta Română SA","text":"In October 2022, the Romanian DPA completed an investigation at the processor Compania Nationala Poșta Română SA and found a violation of the provisions of Article 32(1)(b) GDPR and Article 32(2) GDPR.\nThe DPA fined the processor €2,000 for this data breach.\nUnder the Article 58(2)(d) GDPR  it was decided against the Compania Națională Poșta Română SA  the corrective measure to review and update the technical and organizational measures implemented as a result of the risk assessment for the rights and freedoms of individuals, including the work procedures related to the protection of personal data, in order to ensure the protection of data processed both on workstations (PCs), and for the provision of postal services in physical format (receiving or delivering postal items), as well as ensuring physical protection of the work spaces where they are processed mailings and measures regarding the training of persons acting under the authority of the company.","title":"ANSPDCP (Romania) - Compania Națională Poșta Română SA"}
{"_id":"holding_EDPB - Binding Decision 2/2022 - 'Instagram'","text":"The EDPB declared most of the objections of the other DPA’s both relevant and reasoned in the context of Article 4(24) GDPR. After this assessment, the EDPB looked into the reasoning of the DPC regarding the legal ground for processing of child user’s data by Meta in the context of business accounts.\nProcessing of contact information on child user’s business accounts\nArticle 6(1)(b) GDPR\nThe EDPB held that the DPC could not have concluded that the contact information processing may be regarded as necessary for the performance of a contract between Meta and child users. As a consequence, the EDPB held that Meta IE could not have relied on Article 6(1)(b) GDPR as a legal basis for processing of contact information. The EDPB focused on the assessment by the DPC regarding the ‘necessity’ for the performance of the contract form Meta. The EDPB formulated several reasons why the processing was not necessary.\nThe EDPB held that it was important to determine the exact rationale of the contract, regarding substance and objective, to determine whether or not the processing is necessary. Factors to consider are the particular aim, purpose, or objective of the service. The processing should be objectively necessary for a purpose and must be integral to the delivery of the service to the data subject. The controller should also be able to justify the necessity in the context of the mutually understood purpose. This depends both on the controller’s perspective as the perspective of the data subject (an ordinary user). Children merit special protection in this consideration.\nThe EDPB started by considering that the publication of the contact details on children’s profiles could have not been reasonably expected by these children, considering the high-level information in the Terms of Use and the fact that no specific information about business accounts was provided. Also, the EDPB did not agree that the contact information processing (publishing of phone number or e-mail), could be considered as “integral” or “central” to Instagram. The EPDB referred to a remark by the DPC in its original draft, that it was now possible to operate a professional profile without also publishing contact information.\nThe EDPB also considered that if there are realistic, less intrusive alternatives, the processing cannot be considered ‘necessary’. The principle of proportionality should be taken into account here. The DPC had even stated in its original draft that there was a possibility on Instagram to contact users directly through direct messaging within the platform. This was even the preferred method for communication for some business account users. This contact method should have been taken into consideration by the DPC as a less intrusive alternative judging the ‘necessity’ of the processing, according to the EDPB.\nThe EDPB observed that Meta had claimed that the publication of the contact details was intended for traditional businesses. The EDPB held that it was technically possible to distinguish these traditional businesses from child users during the Instagram registration process based on age information. It would have therefore also been possible to avoid publishing child users’ contact information.\nThe EDPB also held that the publication of the contact information in the HTML source code on the Instagram website was not considered necessary by Facebook’s security team and was therefore discontinued by Facebook. The EDPB also considered here that the principle of data minimization (Article 5(1)(c) GDPR) is relevant for the ‘necessity’ assessment. Considering these facts, the EDPB held that the contact information in the HTML should therefore not have been regarded as ‘necessary’ by the DPC.\nThe EDPB also held that the publication of contact information meant massive risks to the rights and freedoms of children. This should also have been taken into consideration by the DPC whether or not this processing was ‘necessary’.\nArticle 6(1)(f) GDPR\nThe EDPB held that the publication of Children’s contact information did not meet the requirements under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR, because the interests of the data subjects overrode the respective legitimate interests. Therefore, the EDPB held that Meta couldn’t use this legal ground for the processing. The EDPB formulated an opinion on all of the three cumulative arguments, which were necessary for the controller to fulfill in order to use this processing ground.\n1) Legitimate Interest(s): The EDPB held that the interests were not specific enough because the controller mentioned them in vague fashion. The EDPB mentioned that the evaluation of the existence of the legitimate interest(s) pursued should have been conducted by the DPC in a better way. Despite the fact that the EDPB could have stopped here, it decided to also assess the other assessments of the DPC on the cumulative criteria.\n2) Necessity: The EDPB didn’t agree with the assessment of the DPC regarding the necessity of the processing. For assessing necessity, the EDPB stated that the existence of less intrusive means that would contribute effectively to achieving the interests pursued should be analyzed. The principle of proportionality should also be taken into account. The DPC held that Meta had violated the data minimization principle (Article 5(1)(c) GDPR) because of the mandatory display of contact information for business users in the HTML code of the Instagram website. The problem according to the EDPB was the fact that the DPC didn’t follow this up with a conclusion that the processing was not necessary. The EDPB held that the recognition of the HTML-processing should have concluded the assessment of the DPC that the processing was not necessary. The EDPB also noted that the DPC should have considered direct messaging on Instagram as a less intrusive way of communication for the assessment of necessity, which the DPC hadn’t done in its draft decision. The EDPB continued by calling the DPC approach to determine the ‘necessity’ requirement ‘substantially erroneous’. This was because of the fact that the DPC had named the interests of business users as legitimate interest. The business users are the data subjects, whose interests cannot be seen as legitimate interest. Only interests of the controller or a third party can be regarded as a legitimate interest. The DPC had therefore failed to justify why it considered the publication of the contact details necessary, also considering other communication means, such as direct messaging on Instagram.\n3) Balancing exercise: The EDPB held that the risk assessment made the DPC was accurate. The EDPB agreed with the DPC with regard to the lack of adequate safeguards and transparency by Meta. The EDPB did however not agree with the statement of the DPC that it was possible that the legitimate interests of Meta or third parties would not be overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the child users in some circumstances. The EDPB held that the DPC did not properly assess the impact of the processing when performing this balancing exercise, stating it had only taken into account the positive aspects of the processing, despite the risks the DPC had identified itself.\nPublic-by-default Instagram accounts\nThe EDPB dismissed the objection from the Norwegian DPA against the DPC’s original draft regarding public-by-default Instagram accounts, because the Norwegian DPA failed to establish a direct connection with the specific legal and factual content of the decision of the DPC. The compliance of 'public by default' processing with Article 6 GDPR was not part of the original DPC decision and the objection of the DPA was not 'reasoned' (Article 4(24) GDPR).\nOther grounds\nThe decision of the EDPB contained other supposed violations of the GDPR. Most of these objections which were brought forward by other DPA’s. These were mostly not analyzed by the EDPB because they were deemed to be neither “relevant”, nor “reasoned” (Article 4(24) GDPR).\nObjections to fine:\nAfter the EDPB considered several objections from other DPA’s regarding the fine, the EDPB formulated this binding decision, after which the DPC adapted its original decision and fined Meta €405,000,000.","title":"EDPB - Binding Decision 2/2022 - 'Instagram'"}
{"_id":"holding_LfDI (Bremen) - 03/2022","text":"The DPA of Bremen (LfDI Bremen) held that processing this data was not necessary for the conclusion of rental agreements and that this kind of data is particularly protected under the GDPR. Furthermore, it found that BREBAU GmbH also deliberately thwarted requests from data subjects for transparency about the processing of their data.\nRegarding the amount of the fine, the DPA concluded that, because of the extraordinary gravity of the violation, a significantly higher fine would actually have been appropriate. However, the DPA reasoned that the amount of the fine could be reduced considerably because BREBAU GmbH cooperated extensively in the supervisory procedure, endeavoured to minimise the damage, to clarify the facts on its own and to ensure that such violations would not be repeated.","title":"LfDI (Bremen) - 03/2022"}
{"_id":"holding_Personvernnemnda (Norway) - 2021-13 (20/01874)","text":"The PVN agreed with the DPA that the the Company had infringed Article 6(1)(f) GDPR because of the absence of a valid legal basis for the processing of personal data through the installation of surveillance cameras. However, the PVN considered that the breach of Article 6 GDPR as not as serious as the DPA had found. In the opinion of the PVN, the breaches of Article 13 and 24 GDPR were more serious.\nAfter an overall assessment, the PVN concluded that the amount of the administrative fine for such violations should be limited to €10,127 (NOK 100,000). After considering the length of the procedure, however, the PVN decided to annul the fine altogether due to the DPA's long case processing time (i.e. in total, almost three years).","title":"Personvernnemnda (Norway) - 2021-13 (20/01874)"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - EXP202206302","text":"The DPA held that Article 6 of the GDPR had been violated because AAA could not show that using the data subject's photograph to create a false profile on Instagram was with the consent of the data subject, or that any other legal ground for processing could be relied on.\nThe DPA also referred to a Spanish Supreme Court, second chamber, case STS 363/2017 of 15 February 2017, where it was noted that in opening a social network account, while 'the owner of the profile has“uploaded” a photograph of himself that is accessible to the general public, it does not authorize a third party to reproduce it in a media without the owner's consent. Such an action cannot be considered a natural consequence of the accessible nature of the data and images of a public profile.'\nAAA was held to be responsible for the actions of his minor child, since Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code states that 'parents are responsible for damages caused by children under their care.…' and therefore 'whoever holds parental authority has the obligation to monitor what his minor children do.' No evidence indicated that AAA had complied with his duty of care when his child posted the photograph of another minor.\nIn imposing a fine of €10,000, the DPA took into consideration seriousness of the facts, since the image was used in a profile with images of sexual content, the type of data processed, since it affected a minor, and the intentionality of the action.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - EXP202206302"}
{"_id":"holding_First-tier Tribunal - Vestani v Information Commissioner","text":"The First-tier Tribunal decided that it can only review the actions of the ICO carrying out its obligations under section 165 of the UK Data Protection Act 2018, as empowered to do so by section 166 of the UK Data Protection Act 2018.\nThe Commissioner has wide discretion as the expert regulator in complaint investigations. The Tribunal held its role was limited under the law to assessing the “appropriateness” of steps taken by the Commissioner, not re-examining the actual merits or substance of Mr. Vestani’s complaint itself. Accordingly, the Tribunal struck out the application.","title":"First-tier Tribunal - Vestani v Information Commissioner"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-019","text":"The CNIL held that it was unlawful to process information on the number of days an agent had been on strike in the context of career advancement procedures because such information was unnecessary for the purpose of the processing. In particular, the RATP should have limited such information to the number of days of absence of each agent, regardless of the reason behind such absence(s). As a consequence, the CNL found that the RATP had been processing these data in breach of the principle of data minimization (Article 5(1)(c) GDPR).\nThe investigation also revealed other breaches with respect to the principle of storage limitation (Article 5(1)(e) GDPR). Indeed, the app used to monitor the work of RATP's agents was storing personal data for an excessive period of time. Moreover, agents' files were kept for more than three years after the commission on careers advancement had taken a decision. In the opinion of the CNIL, the RATP should have kept such files for 18 months maximum.\nFinally, the investigation also revealed severe security flaws. In particular, it was found that authorized agents could access an excessive amount of data (including human resources files) regardless of their role, from all bus transport units, and could also extract all the data from the app, without any restriction. Because of this, the CNIL considered that the RATP had violated Article 32 GDPR.\nTaking into account the scope and severity of these violations, the CNIL decided to impose a fine of 400,000 EUR on the RATP.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2021-019"}
{"_id":"holding_AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 21-07-2022 (car dealership)","text":"The Croatian DPA held that the controller violated Article 27(1) of the Croatian GDPR Implementing Act which provides for an obligation to clearly mark premises that are under video surveillance. This notice must be visible at the latest when entering the area in question. The DPA found that the controller did not put up a notice that its premises were under video surveillance and hence violated the Act.","title":"AZOP (Croatia) - Decision 21-07-2022 (car dealership)"}
{"_id":"holding_CNIL (France) - SAN-2019-010","text":"The investigation carried out by the CNIL revealed that the controller had received several letters from people complaining that they were still being solicited despite their opposition. It also appeared that the company's files contained several excessive comments related to customers or their health conditions. In addition, people were not properly informed about the processing of their personal data, or about the recording of the conversations they had with the company.\nIn total, following its investigations the CNIL found five breaches of the GDPR:\n- Violation of the right to object, Article 21(2) GDPR: no procedure was implemented to ensure effectively that persons who opposed telephone solicitation were no longer called);\n- Violation of the principle of data minimization, Article 5(1)(c) GDPR: inadequate and offensive comments or irrelevant comments related to people's health were found in the company's customer file;\n- Violation of Articles 12 and 13 GDPR: insufficient information on the processing of data subject’s personal data and their rights;\n- Violation of Articles 46 and 49 GDPR: the controller did not provide appropriate safeguards for data subjects;\n- Failure to cooperate with the CNIL, Article 31 GDPR.\nAs a consequence, the CNIL imposed a fine of EUR 500.000.","title":"CNIL (France) - SAN-2019-010"}
{"_id":"holding_Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9435753","text":"The main violations of the GDPR and of the Italian Privacy Code observed by the Garante were due to the following behaviours: • The lack of transparency towards data subjects, concerning the information provided to them, including information regarding the company’s communications channels; • Consent collection contrary to data protection regulation, as well as various issues related to the exercise of data subjects’ rights; • Serious shortcomings in the management and control of Wind Tre supply chain, including the absence of compliance audits.\nMore specifically, the Garante held that Wind Tre had violated the following articles of the GDPR: Articles 5(1), 5(2), 6(1)(a), 7, 12(1), 12(2), 24 and 25. It subsequently fined Wind Tre 16,729,600 EUR, prohibited any further processing and ordered the company to bring their processing practices in line with the GDPR.\nThe Italian DPA found that Wind Tre operating methods incentivised sellers to collect ‘as much consent as possible’ from data subjects, while impairing their ability to object to processing of data for promotional purposes. According to the Garante, the numerous complaints received suggest that, behind the lack of clarity, there was an intention to force the will of the users towards consenting to the processing of personal data for commercial purposes. A conduct that was “not only negligent, but deliberately designed to circumvent the rules set out to protect the freedom of expression of the will of data subjects.” As a result, the Authority found a lack of appropriate technical and organisational measures to enable interested parties to exercise their rights, with the consequence that the revocation of consent or the objection to data processing was unjustifiably hindered. As regards the management of consents by sellers in physical shops, the indications given to staff to gather as many consents as possible, the presence of a single button in the management system to facilitate the tick of all consent boxes, the small prints used to inform about consent collection and, in some cases, the bundling of consents, were considered further negative elements by the DPA.\nConcerning the control of the supply chain, the Garante held that the fact itself that subcontractors were conducting promotional campaigns in the interest of Wind Tre, while the company disowned such activities, was a sign that marketing communications were carried out without the necessary control of the supply chain – which is necessary, according to the Italian DPA, also when subcontractors are considered as independent data controller. Moreover, discrepancies in the communications from contractors concerning the source of contact data, should have made the company aware of the illicit practices. Such conduct showed a lack of adequate technical and organisational measures, in this case “with particular regard to the inability to effectively control the chain of partners who carry out promotional activities for the benefit of the Company.” Controls across the procurement network should have been stricter, and the relationship among Wind Tre, its contractors and sub-contractors should have been framed in the context of the processing of personal data, as per Article 28 and 29 GDPR.\nTaking into account all these elements, Wind Tre’s conduct was, according to the Italian DPA, generally elusive of the principles of accountability and privacy by design. In fact, \"taking into account the state of the art and the costs of implementation, as well as the nature, scope, context and purpose of the processing, as well as the risks having different probability and seriousness for the rights and freedoms of individuals\", the company had sufficient tools and knowledge to assess the risks associated with the data processing, and to prepare, consequently, adequate technical and organizational procedures. This was particularly due to well-established decisions of the Garante, some of which even directly addressed to Wind Tre.\nRegarding the size of the fine, the Garante found it was proportionate on the basis of the duration of the infringements, both the wilful and negligent violations of the GDPR committed by Wind Tre, and the number of people affected by the breach. To quantify the former, the Garante based its assessment not on the number of complainants, but on the number of people in Wind Tre's client base. The Garante also noted that previous sanctions against the telemarketing sector had not been sufficiently dissuasive.\nKey excerpts from the Garante's decision include the following:\n\"... [T]he Company's responses revealed an uncertain and contradictory picture in the description of the technical and organizational measures taken to identify the parties concerned in a reasonable manner, representative of an insufficient assessment of the different interests at stake.\"\n\"pursuant to art. 58, paragraph 2, letter d), to adopt, without prejudice to the corrective measures already introduced, suitable procedures to verify the correctness of the procedures for the acquisition of consent by its sales network and that persons who have already expressed opposition to the treatment against Wind Tre are not contacted by third parties who operate as independent owners.\"\n\"The preliminary findings showed an overall picture unsuitable for satisfying this requirement of adequacy, since the lack of suitable technical and organisational measures was noted several times, in some cases adding the aggravating circumstance of pre-ordering the conduct (in cases relating to the collection of consent through apps and by signing the contract with dealers) and also having to note that, on several occasions, the Company has not been able to demonstrate compliance with the rules of the treatments put in place and the effectiveness of the measures taken, as required by Article 5, paragraph 2 of the Regulation.\"\n\"In fact, it cannot but be strongly noted that the lack of control of the supply chain involves the Company in a \"market of personal data\", already the subject of specific information from the Guarantor to the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Court of Rome, in which, in addition to the violation of the provisions concerning the processing of personal information, serious profiles of violation of labour law, tax law and probably criminal law emerge, fuelling an \"undergrowth\" which in some cases could also be the object of attention by criminals.\"","title":"Garante per la protezione dei dati personali (Italy) - 9435753"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00332/2020","text":"The AEPD maintains that the defendant infringed the LSSI by sending commercial communications without consent. Likewise, the AEPD points out that the contact form did not meet the requirements of the GDPR regarding consent. The data subject simply wanted to communicate with the company about a data protection issue. To do so, he was forced to accept that his personal data would be processed (also) for advertising purposes. Therefore, the consent was neither free nor specific (Article 4(11)).\nThe AEPD decided to impose on the defendant €4000 for each of the infringements, that is, €8000 in total. Finally, the company used the system of reductions for voluntary payment provided for in the Spanish administrative law and paid a fine of €4800.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00332/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 8493/161/21","text":"On the basis of the information provided by the controller, the DPA considered that the controller had not provided sufficient explanation of which entity acted as the controller with regard to patient data that was generated during the treatment of the data subject at the controller's premises. Thus, the controller had not implemented the data subject’s right to access their personal data in accordance with Article 15(1) GDPR and Article 15(3) GDPR or informed the data subject of the reason for not taking action in accordance with Article 12(4) GDPR.\nThe DPA stated that the controller's practice of not sending personal data by email was unreasonable, considering that the controller shall facilitate the exercise of data subject rights pursuant to Article 12(2) GDPR. The controller had also not provided the information to the data subject within the deadline defined in Article 12(3) GDPR.\nThe DPA also noted that the controller's website did not contain information about the processing of personal data, such as which entity acted as the controller of patient data. The DPA considered that the controller had not fulfilled its obligation to provide data subjects with the information required by Article 12(1) GDPR, Article 13(1) GDPR and Article 13(2) GDPR regarding the processing of personal data. Therefore, the controller had not taken into account data protection by design and by default in its operations as required by Article 25(1) GDPR and had processed the personal data in violation of the transparency principle.\nOn the basis of the information gathered, the DPA held that the controller had violated Article 5(1)(a) GDPR, Article 12 GDPR, Article 13 GDPR, Article 15 GDPR and Article 25(1) GDPR. As a result, the DPA issued a reprimand to the controller in accordance with Article 58(2)(b) GDPR. Pursuant to Article 58(2)(c) GDPR, the DPA also ordered the controller to comply with the data subject's access request insofar as it concerned the personal data processed by the controller.\nIn addition to the reprimand and the order, the Sanctions Board of the DPA imposed an administrative fine of €5,000 on the controller pursuant to Article 83 GDPR. The Board considered the controller’s practice to be systematic, and in addition, the violation had been long-term and concerned a large number of data subjects.","title":"Tietosuojavaltuutetun toimisto (Finland) - 8493/161/21"}
{"_id":"holding_ArbG Köln - 18 Ca 6830/21","text":"The court held that the controller was entitled to terminate the employment relationship after the data subject had presented a forged vaccination card. It rejected the data subject's argument and found that it was procedurally allowed to consider the missing vaccination of the data subject. The court reasoned that a procedural prohibition to consider evidence or submissions of a party only exists if two requirements are met, which it found not to be met in the present case. The first requirement is that the controller must have obtained the information in violation of the GDPR. The second requirement is that the violation of the data subject's right to informational self-determination must outweigh the interest of the controller in using the information and its right to be heard as well as the public interest in a functioning administration of justice and any other interests at stake.\nThe court held that already the first requirement was missing since the processing of the data was lawful under Article 6(1)(c) GDPR in conjunction with the third and first sentence of § 28b(3) IfSG (German Infection Protection Act). According to the first sentence of § 28b(3) IfSG the controller was legally obliged to check whether its employees were vaccinated, recovered or tested negative. According the third sentence of § 28b(3) IfSG the controller was allowed to process personal data and data relating to the vaccination, recovery or test status insofar as it was necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations. The court concluded that - in the absence of a QR code - making a copy of the vaccination card and performing a batch query was the only way for the controller to ensure that the data subject was truly vaccinated.\nThe court further assessed that, even if performing the batch query was not covered by the GDPR and consequently unlawful, it would still not lead to a procedural prohibition because the public's interest in accurate vaccination certificates overrides the data subject’s right to informational self-determination.","title":"ArbG Köln - 18 Ca 6830/21"}
{"_id":"holding_OLG Köln - 15 U 249/24","text":"The Court reversed the first instance ruling: it held that the storage of the data was unlawful and awarded non-material damages.\nOn the lawfulness of the data storage\nThe Court held that the controller stored the claims unlawfully. This finding was based on both national law and the case law of the Court of Justice.\nFirst, the Court referred to the SCHUFA Holding[1] ruling of the EU Court of Justice and held that the controller could not store information about the data subject’s debts for any longer than the law allowed for this information to be stored in public databases. Then, the Court observed that under the Civil Procedure Code[2], debts must be erased from the public insolvency registry as there is proof that they have been paid.\nOn these bases, the Court held that the storage of paid debts fails to balance the interest of the controller with that of the data subject. Therefore, the Court held that the processing could not be based on the controller’s legitimate and was ultimately unlawful.\nWith regards to lawfulness, the Court also held that the code of conduct invoked by the controller, could not be taken into account for the purpose of assessing the balancing of legitimate interest.\nOn damages\nThe Court partly upheld the data subject’s claim for damage. In this regard, the Court held that the controller damaged the data subject’s reputation by providing third parties with credit scores based on the data. The Court valued this damage €500. The Court clarified that this damage was a direct consequence of the disclosure of the data to third parties, regardless of any further consequences of such disclosures.\nThe Court explicitly left two questions open: whether the unlawful storage of the data constituted a loss of control for the data subject over their data, and whether the storage itself harmed the data subject’s reputation. The Court held that the questions were irrelevant because, in the case at hand, the data were disclosed and the disclosure caused reputational damage.\nThe Court rejected the data subject’s damages claim with regards to the further adverse consequences they suffered from the storage and disclosure of the data. The Court held that such consequences (i.e.: the refusal of certain third parties to conclude a contract with the data subject) occurred at a time when the controller was still entitled to store the data.","title":"OLG Köln - 15 U 249/24"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00464/2020","text":"The AEPD concluded that the facts constitute a personal data breach and that the controller had not adopted the necessary technical and organizational measures to prevent it. The AEPD reminds that the GDPR does not require the adoption of specific measures, but that controller must assess in each case what measures are necessary according to a risk assessment.\nThe AEPD found that there was therefore a violation of Article 32(1) GDPR.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00464/2020"}
{"_id":"holding_AEPD (Spain) - PS/00377/2021","text":"The AEPD upheld the complaint.\nFirst, the recording of personal conversations is an invasion of privacy. This is therefore strictly forbidden and can lead to a violation of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR.\nSecond, the cameras must be limited to the purpose for which they are intended. Also, the way of capturing and processing this data must be proportionate in relation to this purpose (surveillance/security).\nThird, the AEPD recalls that, in order to comply with Article 12 GDPR, a clear sign must be placed in a visible area (e.g. access door) indicating that it is a video-surveilled area, and it must indicate:\n  * the existence of the processing.\n  * the identity of the data controller.\n  * the possibility of exercising the rights provided for in Articles 15 to 22 GDPR.\nIf there is not a clear sign informing employees of the video-surveillance area, which provides this information, this leads to a violation of Article 13 GDPR. Respondent had failed to install and show a clear sign that provided this information. Moreover, the purpose of security had not been known to the legal representatives of all the public employees of the aforementioned entity, although they must be aware of the purpose(s) of the images obtained. Hence, this constituted an infringement, attributable to the respondent, for violation of Articles 5(1)(c) and 13 GDPR.\nTherefore, the AEPD (1) imposed a warning on the Municipality and (2) ordered respondent to:\n  * Place information signs duly approved to the current GDPR at the main entrances to the Town Hall within one month of the decision.\n  * Inform all public employees of the measures adopted, in particular those related to the purpose(s) of the processing.\n  * To place the entrance camera so that it is used for the security function of the Town Hall, but avoids capturing the work area of the employees exclusively, disabling the audio option if necessary.","title":"AEPD (Spain) - PS/00377/2021"}
{"_id":"holding_HDPA (Greece) - 2/2024","text":"The HDPA assessed the above facts and the late submission of the questionnaire, but also the failure to inform the authority about the technical problem faced by the Ministry, as claimed.\nBased on the above, the Authority found that the Ministry of Rural Development and Food violated Article 31 GDPR with regard to the cooperation of the controller with the Authority and Article 37 GDPR with regard to non-designation of DPO for the period from 04.08.2022 to 20.06.2023.\nTaking into account the above and the fact that no material damage occurred to the data subjects in the interim period when no DPO was appointed, but also the late submission of the questionnaire, the HDPA imposed an administrative fine on the Ministry of Rural Development and Food for a total amount of 5. 000 euros, for violation of Article 31 GDPR, and an administrative fine for a total of 20,000 euros, for violation of Article 37 GDPR.","title":"HDPA (Greece) - 2/2024"}
{"_id":"holding_Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2022-432-0099","text":"The DPA concluded that the controller violated the data minimisation principle of Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. The principle should have been complied with despite the system being the only possible solution according to the current technical structure of the driving licence register. It further stated that the accessibility needs described by the controller and the mere fact that it is convenient for citizens to have the Driving Licence app, as they can leave their physical driving licence at home, cannot justify the processing in question. Thus, the DPA concluded that data processing of all holders of a valid Danish driving licence is not justifiable, as the controller was processing data of a very large number of people - approximately 2.26 million people - who had not actively joined the Driving Licence app.\nHence, the DPA issued serious criticism to the controller under Article 58(2)(b) GDPR. In addition, per Article 58(2)(f) GDPR, it banned the storing and processing of personal data about persons who have not actively joined the Driving Licence app.\nThe controller has four weeks from when the decision was issued to comply with the prohibition.","title":"Datatilsynet (Denmark) - 2022-432-0099"}
{"_id":"holding_NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-2501-10/2022","text":"The DPA found that, on the form sent out by the controller, the information was provided in very small print, so barely legible. When requesting consent for direct marketing, only the identity of the controller was indicated, with a very general purpose to send “further favourable offers.” The information also stated that the processing was unlimited in time and scope, until consent would be withdrawn. The DPA noted that a more specific purpose limitation and other information as required under Article 13 GDPR, as well as the fact of data transfer abroad, were completely missing. The DPA stated that Article 13 GDPR only provides the bare minimum content. Additional, case-specific information would be necessary for transparency and informed choice. On the forms of the controller, the mandatory data were distinguished from the non-mandatory data with a tiny asterisk. Thus, the DPA found that the average data subject was not given clear and easily accessible information. It was not possible to indicate that you only wanted to provide your data to receive updates on an order, and not for direct marketing. Individual purposes and individual contact methods were not separated on the postal form.\nOver the phone – if the data subjects shared that they did not have an internet connection – a list of data processors was read out to them. In this case, it was not possible either to choose whether the data subject wished to consent to be contacted only by certain means, e.g. by post only, by phone only, by e-mail only, or by any combination of these. As in the case of postal communications, no information was provided about other forms of processing, such as Google and Facebook targeted advertising.\nFor online orders, the data subject could easily access the privacy notice, which contained information on data processing related to direct marketing. However, the DPA found that it was not possible to give specific, separate consent for receiving emails and targeted advertising through Google and Facebook. The DPA noted that the absence of any meaningful information on the use of these complex services in itself raised a serious validity issue in relation to consent.\nWith regard to the legal basis for consent, the DPA stressed that consent was not intended to be a general authorization for the controller to process any personal data without restriction, at any time and for any reason, irrespective of other legal conditions. It was only valid when requested for specific, separately identifiable purposes, and preceded by appropriate information that puts the data subject in a position to make an informed decision. Article 12(1) GDPR explicitly requires the controller to be result-oriented, i.e. to provide the data subject with the assistance necessary to enable him or her to exercise all his or her data subject rights in an informed manner. The DPA deemed it not the responsibility of the data subject to obtain the information from another source. It should be readily and reasonably available to them at the time of the request for consent. The DPA concluded a data subject would most likely not look online for information on data processing before placing an order by post or phone. This is also not expected by GDPR. The DPA held that the controller had an active obligation to provide the information to the data subject, appropriate for the communication channel used.\nThe DPA further stated that there was currently no DPO under the name of the controller in the designated database operated by the DPA (accessible for everyone). The controller also did not prove otherwise that it had in fact appointed a DPO. DPA noted that, if there was a technical reason beyond the control of the controller for which the entry was not made, it could have been detected and corrected by the controller in the last 4 years since the introduction of the GDPR, if it really considers data protection to be of high importance.\nIn short, the DPA found that the processing was explicitly for profit, using small print and without easily accessible information, implementing a poor business practice that was, and is problematic, even before the GDPR. The lack of adequate information put the data subjects in a position where they were not aware of their rights and how to exercise them. Therefore, the DPA fined the controller €73,500. The DPA further instructed the controller to modify its data processing practices in relation to direct marketing in order to properly separate specific purposes, obtaining the consent of data subjects, and providing them with adequate prior information appropriately. Also, to delete contact personal data where there was no valid consent.","title":"NAIH (Hungary) - NAIH-2501-10/2022"}