17. (23)
One who was in error
Cannot commit error.
One who was not in error
Cannot commit error.


18. (23)
One who is committing error
Cannot commit error.
Who can commit error?
Examine this on your own!


19. (23)
If error has not arisen,
How could it come to exist?
If error is not arisen,
How could one be in error?
12


20. (23)
Since an entity does not arise from itself,
Nor from another,
Nor from another and itself,
How could one be in error?


21. (23)
If the self and the pure,
The permanent and happiness existed,
The [the view of the] self, the pure, the permanent,
And happiness would not be erroneous.


22. (23)
If the self and the pure,
The permanent and happiness are non-existent,
The non-self, the impure, the impermanent,
And suffering do not exist.


23. (23)
Thus through the ceasing of error
Ignorance ceases.
When ignorance ceases,
Formative actions, and so forth cease.


24. (23)
If anyone’s afflictions
Existed inherently,
How could they be eliminated?
Who could eliminate the existent?
13


25. (23)
If anyone’s afflictions
Did not exist inherently,
How can they be eliminated?
Who can eliminate the non-existent?

24. Chapter:
Examination of the four noble truths


1. (24)
If all this were empty,
There would be neither arising nor ceasing,
For you, it would follow
That the Four Noble Truths do not exist.


2. (24)
Since the Four Noble Truths would not exist,
Complete understanding, eliminating,
Meditation, and actualizing
Would not be feasible.


3. (24)
As these would not exist,
The four results would not exist.
Without the results, there would be no one abiding in
the result,
Nor would there be path-enterers.
14


4. (24)
If the eight kinds of person did not exist,
There would be no sangha;
There would be no Noble Truths,
And thus no exalted Dharma.


5. (24)
If there were no Dharma nor Sangha,
How could there be a Buddha?
If emptiness were construed in this way,
The existence of the Three Jewels would be
undermined.


6. (24)
The existence of activities and results,
The profane, Dharma itself,
And worldly conventions:
All those would be undermined.


7. (24)
Here we say that you do not realize
Emptiness, the purpose of emptiness,
Or the meaning of emptiness.
Hence, you are harmed by it.


8. (24)
The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma
Is based on the two truths:
The truth of worldly convention,
And the ultimate truth.
15


9. (24)
Those who do not understand
The distinction between these two truths
Do not understand
The Buddha's profound teaching.


10. (24)
Without depending on conventions,
The meaning of the ultimate cannot be taught.
Without realizing the meaning of the ultimate,
Nirvana cannot be achieved.


11. (24)
Misperception of emptiness
Destroys those of little intelligence:
Like a snake seized incorrectly,
Or a spell incorrectly cast.


12. (24)
Therefore, aware that
For the weak-minded, this deep Dharma
Is difficult to realize,
Buddha’s awareness [initially] turned away from
teaching the Dharma.


13. (24)
Since the absurd consequences you adduce
Are not plausible with regard to emptiness,
Your rejection of emptiness
Is not plausible to me.
16


14. (24)
For one to whom emptiness makes sense,
Everything makes sense.
For one to whom emptiness does not make sense,
Nothing makes sense.


15. (24)
When you foist on us
All of your errors,
You are like someone who has mounted his horse
And forgotten the horse itself.


16. (24)
If you regard all things
As existing inherently,
Then you should regard all things
As being without causes and conditions.


17. (24)
Results and causes;
Agents, instruments and actions;
Arising and ceasing;
As well as the results would be undermined.


18. (24)
That which is dependently arisen
Is explained to be emptiness.
That, being dependently imputed,
Is the middle way.
17


19. (24)
There is no phenomenon
That is not dependently arisen.
Therefore, there is no phenomenon
That is not empty.


20. (24)
If all this were not empty
There would be no arising and ceasing.
It would follow that according to you,
The Four Noble Truths would not exist.


21. (24)
If it were not dependently arisen,
How could suffering come to be?
[Only] the impermanent is taught to be suffering,
And so [suffering] cannot exist inherently.


22. (24)
If it existed inherently,
How could it have an origin?
Thus for one who undermines emptiness
There can be no origin.


23. (24)
If suffering existed inherently,
Its cessation would not exist.
So if one takes it to exist inherently,
One undermines cessation.
18


24. (24)
If the path existed inherently,
Meditation would not be feasible.
If the path is to be meditated,
Your [path] cannot exist inherently.


25. (24)
If suffering, its origin, and
Its cessation did not exist,
What path could be asserted
To bring about the cessation of suffering?


26. (24)
If a lack of completely understanding
Existed inherently
How could it become complete understanding?
Does inherence not endure?


27. (24)
For you, just like complete understanding,
Eliminating, actualizing,
Meditating, and the four results
Would not make sense either.


28. (24)
For one who grasps at inherence,
How would it be possible
To attain the four results
That are inherently unattained?
19


29. (24)
Without the results, there would be no dwelling in the
result,
Nor would there be anyone entering it.
If the eight kinds of beings or persons did not exist,
There would be no sangha.


30. (24)
Since the Noble Truths would not exist
The noble Dharma would not exist either.
If there were neither Dharma nor Sangha,
How could there be a Buddha?


31. (24)
Also, for you it would follow that a Buddha
Would not depend on enlightenment;
And likewise enlightenment
Would not depend on a Buddha.


32. (24)
For you, someone who is
Inherently not a Buddha
Could not attain enlightenment, even if he exerted
himself
In the Bodhisattva practices to become enlightened.


33. (24)
No one could ever perform
Virtuous or non-virtuous actions.
If all this were not empty, what could one do?
There are no inherent actions!
20


34. (24)
According to you, there would be a result
Even without virtuous or non-virtuous causes.
According to you, there would be no result
That has arisen from virtuous or non-virtuous causes.


35. (24)
If according to you, a result arose
From virtuous or non-virtuous causes,
Then, having arisen from virtuous or non-virtuous
causes,
How could that result not be empty?


36. (24)
Those who undermine emptiness,
Which is dependent arising,
Undermine all
Worldly conventions.


37. (24)
To undermine emptiness means
That there is no action;
That there can be action without effort;
And that there can be an agent who performs no
action.


38. (24)
If there were inherence, migratory beings
Would not be born, nor cease,
Nor eternally endure.
They would be without a variety of states.
21


39. (24)
If they were not empty,
Then there would be no attainment of the unattained;
Nor the act of ending suffering;
Nor the elimination of karma and all the afflictions.


40. (24)
Whoever sees dependent arising
Sees suffering,
And its origin,
And its cessation, as well as the path.

22. Chapter:
Examination of the Tathagata


1. (22)
He is not the aggregates, nor different from the
aggregates;
The aggregates are not in him, nor is he in the
aggregates.
The Tathagata does not possess the aggregates.
What is the Tathagata?


2. (22)
If the Buddha, who depends on the aggregates,
Does not exist inherently,
How can he who does not exist inherently
Exist [inherently] through the entity of something else?
22


3. (22)
Something dependent on the entity of something else,
Its self is not tenable.
How could one who does not have a self
Be a Tathagata?


4. (22)
If something does not exist inherently,
How can it have the entity of something else?
Apart from existing inherently or having the entity of
another,
What could the Tathagata be?


5. (22)
If, without depending on the aggregates
There could be a Tathagata at all,
He would presently depend on his face.
By depending on it he would be dependent.


6. (22)
There is no Tathagata at all
Who does not depend upon the aggregates,
If he could not exist without depending on them,
How could he appropriate them?


7. (22)
Without the appropriated,
There is no appropriation.
Without appropriation,
There is no Tathagata whatsoever.
23


8. (22)
Having been sought in the fivefold way,
How can that which is neither identical nor different
Be designated as the Tathagata
By virtue of appropriating?


9. (22)
Whatever is appropriated
Does not exist inherently.
And when something does not exist through its own
entity,
It can never exist through the entity of another.


10. (22)
Thus the appropriated and appropriator
Are empty in every respect.
As he is empty how can
the Tathagata be designated [as existing inherently]?


11. (22)
We do not state “Empty.”
Nor do we state “Not empty.”
We state neither both nor neither.
They are stated only for the purpose of designation.


12. (22)
How can the four — permanent, impermanent, etc., —
Exist for the pacified?
How can the four — finite, infinite, etc., —
Exist for the pacified?
24


13. (22)
One who holds firmly
That the Tathagata exists
Will have to fabricate his non-existence
After having achieved nirvana.


14. (22)
Since he is empty of inherence,
Neither the thought that the Buddha exists
Nor that he does not exist — after
He has achieved nirvana — is tenable.


15. (22)
Beings who are encumbered by engaging
In mental fabrications about the Buddha —
He who is not extinguished and has gone beyond all
fabrications —
Fail to see the Tathagata.


16. (22)
Whatever is the nature of the Tathagata,
That is the nature of migrating beings.
The Tathagata has no inherence;
Migrating beings have no inherence.

25

1. Chapter:
Examination of conditions


1. (1)
Neither from itself nor from another
Nor from both,
Nor without a cause
Is anything ever generated anywhere.


2. (1)
There are four conditions: causal [condition],
Observed object [condition], immediately preceding
[condition],
And empowering [condition].
There is no fifth condition.


3. (1)
The inherence of entities
Does not exist in such things as the conditions.
If the entity that is self does not exist,
The entity that is other does not exist.


4. (1)
Actions do not have conditions.
Without conditions there can be no actions.
There are no conditions without actions.
Nor do any [conditions] have actions.

26


5. (1)
Since something is generated in dependence on them
They are called conditions.
As long as it is not generated
Why are they not non-conditions?


6. (1)
For an existent or a non-existent object
A condition is not possible:
If something were non-existent, of what would [its
condition] be a condition?
If something existed, what would a condition do?


7. (1)
When phenomena are not established
As existent, non-existent, or both existent and nonexistent
How can one propose a cause establishing [a
phenomenon]?
If one did so, it would not be reasonable.


8. (1)
You taught emphatically that an existent phenomenon
Has no observed object at all.
So if phenomena do not have objects,
How could there be an observed object?


9. (1)
Since phenomena are not generated,
Cessation is not feasible.
Therefore, an immediately preceding [condition]
makes no sense.
If something has ceased, how could it be a condition?
27


10. (1)
Since there is no existence of
Entities that do not exist,
The statement “If this exists, that will arise”
Is not tenable.


11. (1)
A result is neither in the individual
Nor the united conditions.
How could something not in the conditions
Be generated from the conditions?


12. (1)
If it were not in the condition
but generated by them.
Why would it not be generated
By non-conditions?


13. (1)
If a result had the nature of a condition,
A condition would not have its own nature.
How could a result without its own entity
Have the nature of a condition?


14. (1)
Therefore, results have neither the nature of
conditions,
Nor the nature of non-conditions.
If there are no such results,
How could there be conditions or non-conditions?
28

29


9. Wisdom
1. All these branches of the Doctrine
The Enlightened Sage expounded for the sake of wisdom.106
Therefore they must cultivate this wisdom
Who wish to have an end of suffering. 2. Relative and ultimate,
These the two truths are declared to be. The ultimate is not within the reach of intellect,
For intellect is said to be the relative.107
3. In light of this, within the world, two kinds of people are observed:
Those with yogic insight and the common run of people. In this regard, the views of ordinary folk
Are undermined by yogis who themselves are in the world108
4. (Within whose ranks
The lower, in degrees of insight, are confuted by the higher)
By means of the examples that the yogis and the worldly both accept. And for the sake of the result, analysis is left aside. 5. When ordinary folk perceive phenomena,
They look on them as real, and not illusory. This, then, is the subject of debate
Where ordinary and yogis differ. 6.


Forms and so forth, which we all perceive,
Exist by general acclaim but not by valid reasoning. They’re false just like, for instance, unclean things
Regarded in the common view as pure. 7. But that he might instruct the worldly,
Our Protector spoke of “things.”
But these in truth lack even momentariness. Now if you say it’s wrong to claim the momentary as relative,
8. There is no fault. For momentariness
Is relative for yogis, but for worldly beings, ultimate. Were it otherwise, the common view
Could fault the yogic insight into corporal impurity.


9. “Through a Buddha, who is but illusion, how does merit spring?”
As if the Buddha were existing truly. “But,” you ask, “if beings are like illusions,
How, when dying, can they take rebirth?”
10. As long as the conditions are assembled,
Illusions, likewise, will persist and manifest. Why, through simply being more protracted,
Should sentient beings be regarded as more real? 11. If one kills or harms the magical illusion of a man,
There is no mind in such a thing and therefore there’s no sin. But beings do indeed have mirage-like minds;
Sin and merit will, in consequence, arise. 12. There is no power in things like spells,
So mirage-like minds do not occur through them. Illusions spring from various causes;
Thus illusions are of different kinds. 13. A single cause for everything
There never was! “If ultimately, beings are in nirvāṇa,” you will say,
“But relatively circle in saṃsāra,
14. “Even Buddhahood reverts to the saṃsāric state.


So why,” you ask, “pursue the Bodhisattva path?”
As long as there’s no cutting of the causal stream,
There is no halting even of illusory displays. 15. But when the causal stream is severed,
Even relative phenomena do not appear. “If even that which is deceived does not exist,
What is it,” you will ask, “that sees illusion?”
16. But if, for you, these same illusions have no being,
What, indeed, is there to be perceived? “But objects have another mode of being,” you will say,
“That very mode is but the mind itself.”
17. But if the mirage is the mind itself,
What is then perceived by what?


The Guardian of the World himself has said
That mind cannot be seen by mind. 18. In just the same way, he has said,
The sword’s edge cannot cut the sword. “But,” you say, “it’s like the flame
That perfectly illuminates itself.”
19. The flame, in fact, can never light itself. And why? Because the darkness never dims it! “The blueness of a thing by nature blue,” you say,
“Depends, unlike a crystal, upon nothing else. 20. “Likewise some perceptions
Come from other things, while some do not.”
But something that’s by nature blue has never of itself imposed
A blueness on its non-blue self. 21. The phrase “The lamp illuminates itself”
The mind can know and formulate. But what is there to know and say
That “mind is self-illuminating?”
22. The mind, indeed, is never seen by anything. And therefore, whether it can know, or cannot know, itself,
Is like the beauty of a barren woman’s daughter:
Something that it’s pointless to discuss. 23.


“But if,” you ask, “the mind is not self-knowing,
How does it remember what it knew?”
We say that, like the poison of the water rat,
It’s through the link with things experienced that memory occurs. 24. “In certain cases,” you will say, “the mind
Can see the minds of others, how then not itself?”
But through the application of a magic balm,
The eye may see the treasure, but the salve it does not see. 25. It’s not indeed our purpose to disprove
Experiences of sight or sound or knowing. Our aim is here to undermine the cause of sorrow:
The thought that such phenomena have true existence.


26. “Illusions are not other than the mind,” you say,
And yet you don’t consider them the same. How could they not be different if the mind is real? And how can mind be real if you deny a difference? 27. Although it is unreal, a mirage can be seen;
And that which sees is just the same. “But saṃsāra must be based on something real,” you say,
“Or else it is like empty space.”
28. But how could the unreal be causally effective,
Even if it rests on something real? This mind of yours is isolated and alone,
Alone, in solitude, and unaccompanied. 29. If the mind indeed is free of objects,
All beings must be Buddhas, Thus-Gone and enlightened. And so, what purpose can there be
In saying thus, that there is “Only Mind”? 30. “Even if we know that all is like illusion,
How,” you ask, “will this dispel afflictive passion? Magicians may indeed themselves desire
The mirage-women they themselves create.”
31.


The reason is they have not rid themselves
Of habits of desiring objects of perception;
And when they gaze upon such things,
Their aptitude for emptiness is weak indeed. 32. By training in this aptitude for emptiness,
The habit to perceive real things will be relinquished. By training in the thought “There isn’t anything,”
This view itself will also be abandoned. 33. “There is nothing”—when this is asserted,
No thing is there to be examined. How can a “nothing,” wholly unsupported,
Rest before the mind as something present? 34. When something and its nonexistence
Both are absent from before the mind,


No other option does the latter have:
It comes to perfect rest, from concepts free. 35. As the wishing jewel and tree of miracles
Fulfill and satisfy all hopes and wishes,
Likewise, through their prayers for those who might be trained,
The physical appearance of the Conquerors occurs. 36. The healing shrine of the garuḍa,
Even when its builder was long dead,
Continued even ages thence
To remedy and soothe all plagues and venom. 37. Likewise having gained the “shrine of victory”
In accordance with their deeds for sake of Buddhahood,
Though Bodhisattvas pass beyond all grief,
They yet can satisfy all ends. 38. “But how,” you ask, “can offerings made
To beings freed from all discursiveness give fruit?”
It’s said that whether Buddhas live or pass beyond,
The offerings made to them are equal in their merit. 39. Whether you assert them in the ultimate or relative,
Merit, so the scriptures say, arises,
Just as there will be results
When Buddhas are considered truly real. 40.


“We’re free,” you say, “through seeing the (Four) Truths—
What use is it to us, this view of emptiness?”
But as the scriptures have themselves proclaimed,
Without this path there can be no enlightenment. 41. You say the Mahāyāna has no certainty. But how do you substantiate your own tradition? “Because it is accepted by both parties,” you will say. But at the outset, you yourself lacked proof! 42. The reasons why you trust in your tradition
May likewise be applied to Mahāyāna. Moreover, if accord between two parties shows the truth,
The Vedas and the rest are also true.


43. “Mahāyāna is at fault,” you say, “because it is contested.”
But Buddhist texts are questioned by extremists,
While Buddhists also vie among themselves;
And so your own tradition you must now abandon. 44. The true monk is the root of Dharma,
And to be a monk is difficult indeed. It’s hard for minds enmeshed in thoughts
To pass beyond the bonds of suffering. 45. You say there’s liberation in the instant
That defilements are entirely forsaken. Yet those who from defilements are set free
Continue to display the influence of karma. 46. “Only for a while,” you say. “For it is certain
That the causes of rebirth, their cravings, are no more.”
They have no craving, granted, through defilement,
But like their ignorance, why should they not have craving undefiled? 47. This craving is produced by virtue of sensation,
And sensation, this they surely have. Concepts linger still within their minds;
And it is to these concepts that they cling. 48.


The mind that has not realized voidness,
May be halted, but will once again arise,
Just as from a non-perceptual absorption. Therefore one must train in emptiness. 49. If all the words recorded in the sūtras
You admit to be the Buddha’s perfect speech,
Why don’t you now accept the greater part of Mahāyāna,
With which your sūtras are in perfect harmony? 109
50. If due to just a single jarring element,
The whole is held to be at fault,
Why should a single sūtra in agreement with your texts
Not vindicate the rest as Buddha’s teaching? 51. Mahākāshyapa110 himself and others
Could not sound the depths of such a teaching.


Who will therefore say that they’re to be rejected
Just because they are not grasped by you? 52. To linger and abide within saṃsāra,
Freed from every craving and from every fear,
In order to achieve the good of those who ignorantly suffer:
Such is the fruit that emptiness will bear. 53. Therefore it is incorrect
To find fault with this view of emptiness. And so, with every doubt abandoned,
We should meditate on it! 54. Afflictive passion and the veil upon cognition—
The cure for their obscurity is emptiness. How then shall they not meditate on this
Who wish for swift attainment of omniscience? 55. Whatever is the source of suffering,
Let that be the object of our fear. But voidness will allay our every grief,
How could it be for us a thing of dread? 56. If such a thing as “I” exists indeed,
Then terrors, granted, will torment it. But since no self or “I” exists at all,
What is there left for fears to terrify? 57.


The teeth, the hair, the nails are not the “I,”
And “I” is not the bones or blood,
The mucus from the nose and phlegm are not the “I,”
And neither is it made of lymph or pus. 58. The “I” is not the body’s grease or sweat,
The lungs and liver likewise do not constitute it. Neither are the inner organs “I,”
Nor yet the body’s excrement and waste. 59. The flesh and skin are not the “I,”
And neither are the body’s warmth and breath. The cavities within the frame are not the “I,”
And “I” is not accounted for in sixfold consciousness.


60. If the hearing consciousness is permanent,
It follows that it’s hearing all the time. And if there is no object, what does it cognize? On what grounds do you call it consciousness? 61. If something that’s unconscious knows,
It follows that a stick has knowledge also. Therefore in the absence of a thing to know,
It’s clear that consciousness will not arise. 62. If the selfsame consciousness detects a form,
At that time, why does it not hear? Perhaps you say the sound’s no longer there. Then neither is there consciousness of sound. 63. How could that which has the nature of a sound-perceiver
Ever be transformed into a form-perceiver? “A single man,” you say, “can be both son and father.”
But these are merely names; his nature is not so. 64. And likewise “pain,” “neutrality,” and “pleasure”
Are neither fatherhood nor sonship;
And we indeed have never yet observed
A consciousness of form perceiving sound. 65.


“But like an actor,” you reply, “it takes a different role and sees.”
If so, this consciousness is not a constant thing. And if its later mode is still the first,
That’s identity indeed and never seen before! 66. “But its different modes,” you say, “are quite unreal.”
Its essence therefore you must now describe. You say that this is simply knowing. It follows that all beings are a single thing. 67. What has mind and what does not have mind
Are thus identical, for both are equal in existing. If the different kinds of mind are all unreal,
What common basis can there be for them? 68. Something destitute of mind, we hold, is not a self. For mindlessness means matter, like a vase.


“But,” you say, “the self has consciousness when joined to mind.”
Then this refutes its nature of unconsciousness. 69. If the self, moreover, is immutable,
What change in it could mingling with the mind produce? And selfhood we might equally affirm
Of empty space, inert and destitute of mind. 70. “If self does not exist,” you say,
“There is no link connecting actions with results. If when the deed is done, the doer is no more,
Who is there to reap the karmic fruit?”
71. The bases of the act and fruit are not the same,
In both a self is without scope for action. This is valid both for you and us;
What point is there, therefore, in our debate? 72. “A cause coterminous with its result”
Is something quite impossible to see. And only in the context of a single mental stream
Can it be said that one who acts will later reap the fruit. 73. The thoughts now passed, and those to come, are not the self;
They are no more, or are not yet. Is then the self the thought which now is born?


If so, it sinks to nothing when the latter fades. 74. For instance, we may take banana trees—
Cutting through the fibers, finding nothing. Likewise analytical investigation
Will find no “I,” no underlying self. 75. “If beings,” you will say, “have no existence,
Who will be the object of compassion?”
Those whom ignorance imputes,
For whose sake we have pledged ourselves. 76. “If,” you ask, “there are no beings, who will gain the fruit?”
It’s true! It is through ignorance that they are said to be! But for the total vanquishing of sorrow,
The goal, which ignorance conceives, should not be spurned.


77. The source of sorrow is the pride of saying “I,”
It’s fostered and increased by false belief in self. To this you may believe that there is no redress,
But meditation on no-self will be the supreme way. 78. What we call the body is not feet or shins;
The body, likewise, is not thighs or loins. It’s not the belly nor indeed the back,
And from the chest and arms the body is not formed. 79. The body is not ribs or hands,
Armpits, shoulders, bowels, or entrails. It is not the head, and it is not the throat. What is the “body,” then, in all of this? 80. If the “body” spreads itself
And with the members coincides,
Its parts indeed are present in those parts. But where does “body,” in itself, abide? 81. But if the “body,” single and entire
Is present in the hands and other members,
However many parts there are, the hands and all the rest,
You’ll find an equal quantity of “bodies.”
82. If “body” is not outside or within its parts,
How is it, then, residing in its members?


And since it is not other than its parts,
How can you say that it exists at all? 83. Thus there is no “body.” It is through illusion,
With regard to hands and other parts, that “body” as a notion is conceived—
Just as on account of its specific shape
A pile of stones is taken for a man. 84. As long as the conditions are assembled,
The body will appear to be a man. As long as all the parts are likewise present,
A body will appear therein. 85. Likewise, since it is a group of fingers,
The hand itself does not exist as such.


And so it is with fingers, made of joints—
And joints themselves consist of many parts. 86. These parts themselves will break down into particles,
And particles divide according to direction. These fragments, too, lack partless parts; they are like space. Thus even particles have no existence. 87. All form, therefore, is like a dream,
And who will be attached to it, who thus investigates? The body, in this way, has no existence;
What, therefore, is male and what is female? 88. If suffering itself is truly real,
Why is joy not altogether quenched thereby? If pleasure’s real, then why will pleasant tastes
Not comfort and amuse a man in agony? 89. If the feeling fails to be experienced,
Through being overwhelmed by something stronger,
How can “feeling” rightly be ascribed
To that which lacks the character of being felt? 90.


Perhaps you say that only subtle pain remains,
Its grosser form has now been overmastered—
Or rather it is felt as “mere pleasure.”
But what is subtle still remains itself. 91. If, because its opposite is present,
Discomfort fails to manifest,
Is not the claim that it’s a “feeling”
No more than a mental imputation? 92. Since so it is, the antidote
Is meditation and analysis. Absorption grown in fields of their investigation
Is indeed the food and sustenance of yogis. 93. If between the sense power and a thing
There is a space, how will the two terms meet? And if there is no space, they form a unity,
And therefore what is it that meets with what?


94. No penetration can there be of particle by particle,
For they are both the same in lacking volume. But if they do not penetrate, they do not merge;
And if they do not merge, there’s no encounter. 95. For how could anyone accept
That what is partless could be said to meet? And you must show me, if you ever saw,
A contact taking place between two partless things. 96. Consciousness is immaterial,
And so one cannot speak of contact with it. A combination, too, has no reality,
Just as we have previously shown. 97. If therefore there’s no touch or contact,
Whence is it that feeling takes its rise? What purpose is there, then, in all our toil,
For what is it, indeed, that torments what? 98. Since there is no subject for sensation,
And sensation, too, lacks all existence,
How is craving not arrested
When all this is clearly understood? 99. What we see and what we touch
Is stuff of dreams and mirages. If feeling is coincident with consciousness,
It follows that it is not seen thereby. 100.


If the one arises first, the other after,
Memory occurs and not direct sensation. Sensation is without perception of itself
And likewise, by another it is not perceived. 101. The agent of sensation has no real existence,
Thus sensation, likewise, has no being. What damage, therefore, can sensation do to it—
This aggregate deprived of self? 102. The mind within the senses does not dwell,
It has no place in outer things like form.


And in between, the mind does not abide:
Not out, not in, not elsewhere, can the mind be found. 103. It is not in the body, yet is nowhere else. It does not merge with it nor stand apart—
Something such as this does not exist, not even slightly. Beings by their nature are beyond the reach of suffering. 104. If consciousness precedes the cognized object,
With regard to what does it arise? If consciousness arises at the same time as its object,
Again, regarding what does it arise? 105. If consciousness comes later than its object,
Once again, from what does it arise? Thus the origin of all phenomena
Exceeds the reach of understanding. 106. “If this is so,” you say, “there is no relative,
And then the two truths—what becomes of them? Moreover, if the relative derives from beings’ minds,
How can they pass beyond their sorrows?”
107. But that is just the thought of others;
It is not what I mean by the relative.


If subsequently there are thoughts, the relative’s still there;
If not, the relative has ceased indeed. 108. The analyzing mind and what is analyzed
Are linked together, mutually dependent. It is on the basis of conventional consensus
That all investigation is expressed. 109. “But when,” you say, “the process of analysis
Is made, in turn, the object of our scrutiny,
This investigation likewise may be analyzed,
And thus we find an infinite regress.”
110. If phenomena are truly analyzed,
No basis for analysis remains. And when the object is removed, the subject too subsides. That indeed is said to be nirvāṇa.


111. Those who say that both are true,
Are hard-pressed to maintain their case. If consciousness reveals the truth of things,
On what grounds, in its turn, does consciousness exist? 112. If knowledge objects show that consciousness exists,
What is it that shows that they exist? If both subsist through mutual dependence,
Both will thereby lose their true existence. 113. If, without a son, a man cannot be father,
Whence, indeed, will such a son arise? There is no father in the absence of a son. Just so, the mind and object have no true existence. 114. “The plant arises from the seed,” you say,
“And through it is the seed deduced. It’s just the same with consciousness arising from its object. How can it fail to show the thing’s existence?”
115. A consciousness that’s different from the plant itself
Deduces the existence of the seed. But what will show that consciousness exists,
Whereby the object is itself established? 116. In everyday perception
There’s a cause for everything.


The different segments of the lotus flower
Arise from a variety of causes. 117. “But what gives rise,” you ask, “to such variety of causes?”
An even earlier variety of causes, we declare. “And how,” you ask, “do causes give their fruits?”
Through power, we answer, of preceding causes. 118. If Īshvara is held to be the cause of beings,
You must now define for us his nature. If, by this, you simply mean the elements,
No need to tire ourselves disputing names! 119. Yet earth and other elements are many,
Impermanent, inert, without divinity.


Trampled underfoot, they are impure,
And thus they cannot be a God Omnipotent. 120. The Deity cannot be space—inert and unproductive. He cannot be the self, for this we have refuted. He’s inconceivable, they say—then likewise his creatorship. Is there any point, therefore, to such a claim? 121. What is it that he wishes to create? Has he made the self and all the elements? But are not self and elements and he himself eternal? And consciousness, we know, arises from its object. 122. Pain and pleasure have, from all time, sprung from karma,
So tell us, what has his Divinity produced? And if there’s no beginning in the cause,
How can there be beginnings in its fruits? 123. Why are creatures not created constantly,
For Īshvara relies on nothing but himself? And if there’s nothing that he has not made,
What remains on which he might depend? 124. If Īshvara depends, the cause of all
Is but the meeting of conditions and not Īshvara.


When these obtain, he cannot but create;
When these are absent, he is powerless to make. 125. If Almighty God does not intend,
But yet creates, another thing has forced him. If he wishes to create, he’s swayed by his desire. So even though Creator, what of his omnipotence? 126. Those who hold the permanence of particles
Were indeed refuted earlier. The Sāṃkhyas are the ones who hold
That permanent prakṛiti is the cause of the evolving world. 127. “Pleasure,” “pain,” “neutrality,” so-called,
Are qualities which, when they rest
In equilibrium are termed “prakṛiti.”
The universe arises when this balance is disturbed.


128. Three natures in a unity are disallowed,
And thus prakṛiti is without existence. These qualities likewise do not exist,
For each of them indeed is three. 129. If these qualities have no existence,
A thing like sound is very far from plausible! And cloth and other mindless objects
Cannot be the seat of feelings such as pleasure. 130. “But,” you say, “these things possess the nature of their cause.”
But have we not investigated “things” already? For you the cause is “pleasure” and the like,
And yet from pleasure, cloth has never sprung! 131. Pleasure, rather, is produced from cloth. If this is nonexistent, pleasure likewise. As for permanence of pleasure and the rest—
Well, there’s a thing that’s never been observed! 132. If pleasure and the rest are manifestly present,
How comes it that they’re not perceived? And if you claim they take on subtle form,
How is it that they are both gross and subtle? 133.


If coarseness is abandoned, subtlety assumed,
Subtlety and grossness both lack permanence. So why not grant that, in this way,
All things possess the character of transience? 134. If the coarser aspect is none other than the pleasure,
It’s clear that pleasure is itself impermanent. If you claim that what does not exist in any sense
(Because it has no being) cannot manifest,
135. Although you have denied the birth of things
That did not previously exist, it’s this that you’re now saying! But if results exist within their cause,
Those who eat their food consume their excrement. 136. And likewise with the money they would spend on clothing,
Let them rather buy the cotton grains to wear!


“But,” you say, “the world is ignorant and blind. For this is taught by ‘those who know the truth.’”
137. This knowledge must be present in the worldly too! And if they have it, why do they not see? If now you say that what the worldly see has no validity,
This means that what they clearly see is false. 138. “If,” you ask, “there’s no validity in valid knowledge,
Is not all that it assesses false? And therefore it becomes untenable
To meditate on voidness, ultimate reality.”
139. If there is no object for analysis,
There can be no grasping of its nonexistence. And so deceptive objects of whatever kind
Will also have a nonexistence equally deceptive. 140. When therefore in one’s dream a child has died,
The state of mind that thinks it is no more
Supplants the thought that it is living still. And yet both thoughts are equally deceptive. 141.


Therefore, as we see through such investigation,
Nothing is that does not have a cause;
And nothing is existent in its causes
Taken one by one or in the aggregate. 142. It does not come from somewhere else,
Neither does it stay nor yet depart. How will what confusion takes for truth
In any sense be different from a mirage? 143. Things, then, bodied forth by magic spells,
And that which is displayed by dint of causes—
Whence have these arisen? we should ask;
And where they go to, that we should examine! 144. What is seen when circumstances meet
And is not seen in absence of the same
Is not real; it is like an image in a mirror. How can true existence be ascribed to it?


145. What need is there for cause
In something that’s already real? But then, what need is there for cause
In something that does not exist? 146. Even through a hundred million causes,
No change takes place in nonexistent things,
For in that state of “non-thing,” how could “things” occur? And into what could nonexistent things transform? 147. Since things cannot become when they are nonexistent,
When could such existent things occur? For insofar as entities do not arise,
Nonentities themselves will not depart. 148. And if nonentity is not dispersed,
No chance is there for entity to manifest. And entity cannot be changed into nonentity,
For otherwise it has a double nature. 149. Thus there are no entities
And likewise there’s no ceasing of the same. And therefore beings, each and every one,
Are without origin and never cease. 150. Wandering beings, thus, resemble dreams,
And also the banana tree, if you examine well.


In ultimate reality there’s no distinguishing
Between the states of sorrow and beyond all sorrow. 151. With things that in this way are empty
What is there to gain and what to lose? Who is there to pay me court and honors,
And who is there to scorn and to revile me? 152. Pleasure, sorrow—whence do these arise? What is there to give me joy and pain? And if I search their very suchness,
Who is craving? What is craved? 153. Examine now this world of living beings:
Who is there therein to pass away?


What is there to come, and what has been? And who, indeed, are relatives and friends? 154. May beings like myself discern and grasp
That all things have the character of space! But those who seek their happiness and ease,
Through disputes or enjoyments,
155. All are deeply troubled, or else thrilled with joy. They suffer, strive, contend among themselves,
Slashing, stabbing, injuring each other:
They live their lives engulfed in evil and travail. 156. From time to time they surface in the states of bliss,
Abandoning themselves to many pleasures. But dying, down they fall to suffer torment,
Long, unbearable, in realms of sorrow. 157. Many are the chasms and abysses of existence,
Where the truth of suchness is not found. All is contradiction, all denial;
Suchness in this world is not like this. 158. Here, exceeding all description,
Is the shoreless sea of pain unbearable. Here it is that strength is low,
And lives are flickering and brief. 159.


All activities for sake of life and health,
Relief of hunger and of weariness,
Time consumed in sleep, all accident and injury,
And sterile friendships with the childish—
160. Thus life passes quickly, meaningless. True discernment—hard it is to have! How therefore shall we ever find the means
To curb the futile wanderings of the mind? 161. Further, evil forces work and strain
To cast us down into the states of woe;
Manifold are false, deceptive trails,
And it is hard to dissipate our doubts.


162. Hard it is to find again this state of freedom,
Harder yet to come upon enlightened teachers,
Hard, indeed, to turn aside the torrent of defilement! Alas, our sorrows fall in endless streams! 163. Alas indeed that living beings,
Carried on the flood of bitter pain,
However terrible their plight may be,
Do not perceive they suffer so! 164. They are like those who bathe themselves repeatedly
And then proceed to scorch themselves with fire. They suffer greatly in this way,
Yet there they stay, proclaiming loud their bliss. 165. Likewise there are some who live and act
As though old age and death will never come to them. But first they’re slain and then there comes
The dreadful fall into the states of loss. 166. When shall I be able to allay and quench
The dreadful heat of suffering’s blazing fires
With plenteous rains of my own bliss
That pour torrential from my clouds of merit? 167.


My wealth of merit gathered in,
With reverence but without conceptual target,
When shall I reveal this truth of emptiness
To those who go to ruin through belief in real existence?


Chapter 9 - The Dharma-Door of Non-duality
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Then, the Licchavi Vimalakirti asked those bodhisattvas, "Good sirs, please explain how the bodhisattvas enter the Dharma-door of non-duality!"


The bodhisattva Dharmavikurvana declared, "Noble sir, production and destruction are two, but what is not produced and does not occur cannot be destroyed. Thus the attainment of the tolerance of the birthlessness of things is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Srigandha declared, " 'I' and 'mine' are two. If there is no presumption of a self, there will be no possessiveness. Thus, the absence of presumption is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Srikuta declared, " 'Defilement' and 'purification' are two. When there is thorough knowledge of defilement, there will be no conceit about purification. The path leading to the complete conquest of all conceit is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Bhadrajyotis declared, " 'Distraction' and 'attention' are two. When there is no distraction, there will be no attention, no mentation, and no mental intensity. Thus, the absence of mental intensity is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Subahu declared, " 'Bodhisattva-spirit' and 'disciple-spirit' are two. When both are seen to resemble an illusory spirit, there is no bodhisattva-spirit, nor any disciple-spirit. Thus, the sameness of natures of spirits is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Animisa declared, " 'Grasping' and 'non-grasping' are two. What is not grasped is not perceived, and what is not perceived is neither presumed nor repudiated. Thus, the inaction and noninvolvement of all things is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Sunetra declared, " 'Uniqueness' and 'character-less-ness' are two. Not to presume or construct something is neither to establish its uniqueness nor to establish its character-less-ness. To penetrate the equality of these two is to enter non-duality."


The bodhisattva Tisya declared, " 'Good' and 'evil' are two. Seeking neither good nor evil, the understanding of the non-duality of the significant and the meaningless is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Simha declared, " 'Sinfulness' and 'sin-less-ness' are two. By means of the diamond-like wisdom that pierces to the quick, not to be bound or liberated is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Simhamati declared, "To say, 'This is impure' and 'this is immaculate' makes for duality. One who, attaining equanimity, forms no conception of impurity or immaculateness, yet is not utterly without conception, has equanimity without any attainment of equanimity - he enters the absence of conceptual knots.


Thus, he enters into non-duality." The bodhisattva Suddhadhimukti declared, "To say, 'This is happiness' and 'That is misery' is dualism. One who is free of all calculations, through the extreme purity of gnosis - his mind is aloof, like empty space; and thus he enters into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Narayana declared, "To say, 'This is mundane' and 'that is transcendental' is dualism. This world has the nature of void ness, so there is neither transcendence nor involvement, neither progress nor standstill. Thus, neither to transcend nor to be involved, neither to go nor to stop - this is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Dantamati declared, "'Life' and 'liberation' are dualistic. Having seen the nature of life, one neither belongs to it nor is one utterly liberated from it. Such understanding is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Pratyaksadarsana declared, "'Destructible' and 'indestructible' are dualistic. What is destroyed is ultimately destroyed. What is ultimately destroyed does not become destroyed; hence, it is called 'indestructible.' What is indestructible is instantaneous, and what is instantaneous is indestructible. The experience of such is called 'the entrance into the principle of non-duality.'"


The bodhisattva Parigudha declared, "'Self' and 'selflessness' are dualistic. Since the existence of self cannot be perceived, what is there to be made 'selfless'? Thus, the non-dualism of the vision of their nature is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Vidyuddeva declared, "'Knowledge' and 'ignorance' are dualistic. The natures of ignorance and knowledge are the same, for ignorance is undefined, incalculable, and beyond the sphere of thought. The realization of this is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Priyadarsana declared, "Matter itself is void. Void ness does not result from the destruction of matter, but the nature of matter is itself void ness. Therefore, to speak of void ness on the one hand, and of matter, or of sensation, or of intellect, or of motivation, or of consciousness on the other - is entirely dualistic.


Consciousness itself is void ness. Void ness does not result from the destruction of consciousness, but the nature of consciousness is itself void ness. Such understanding of the five compulsive aggregates and the knowledge of them as such by means of gnosis is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Prabhaketu declared, "To say that the four main elements are one thing and the etheric space-element another is dualistic. The four main elements are themselves the nature of space. The past itself is also the nature of space. The future itself is also the nature of space. Likewise, the present itself is also the nature of space. The gnosis that penetrates the elements in such a way is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Pramati declared, "'Eye' and 'form' are dualistic. To understand the eye correctly, and not to have attachment, aversion, or confusion with regard to form - that is called 'peace.' Similarly, 'ear' and 'sound,' 'nose' and 'smell,' 'tongue' and taste,' 'body' and touch,' and 'mind' and 'phenomena' - all are dualistic. But to know the mind, and to be neither attached, averse, nor confused with regard to phenomena - that is called 'peace.' To live in such peace is to enter into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Aksayamati declared, "The dedication of generosity for the sake of attaining omniscience is dualistic. The nature of generosity is itself omniscience, and the nature of omniscience itself is total dedication.


Likewise, it is dualistic to dedicate morality, tolerance, effort, meditation, and wisdom for the sake of omniscience. Omniscience is the nature of wisdom, and total dedication is the nature of omniscience. Thus, the entrance into this principle of uniqueness is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Gambhiramati declared, "It is dualistic to say that void-ness is one thing, sign-less-ness another, and wish-less-ness still another. What is void has no sign. What has no sign has no wish. Where there is no wish there is no process of thought, mind, or consciousness. To see the doors of all liberations in the door of one liberation is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Santendriya declared, "It is dualistic to say 'Buddha,' 'Dharma,' and 'Sangha.' The Dharma is itself the nature of the Buddha, the Sangha is itself the nature of the Dharma, and all of them are uncompounded. The uncompounded is infinite space, and the processes of all things are equivalent to infinite space. Adjustment to this is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Apratihatanetra declared, "It is dualistic to refer to 'aggregates' and to the 'cessation of aggregates.' Aggregates themselves are cessation. Why? The egoistic views of aggregates, being un-produced themselves, do not exist ultimately. Hence such views do not really conceptualize 'These are aggregates' or 'These aggregates cease.' Ultimately, they have no such discriminative constructions and no such conceptualizations. Therefore, such views have themselves the nature of cessation. Nonoccurrence and non-destruction are the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Suvinita declared, "Physical, verbal, and mental vows do not exist dualistically. Why? These things have the nature of inactivity. The nature of inactivity of the body is the same as the nature of inactivity of speech, whose nature of inactivity is the same as the nature of inactivity of the mind. It is necessary to know and to understand this fact of the ultimate inactivity of all things, for this knowledge is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Punyaksetra declared, "It is dualistic to consider actions meritorious, sinful, or neutral. The non-undertaking of meritorious, sinful, and neutral actions is not dualistic. The intrinsic nature of all such actions is void ness, wherein ultimately there is neither merit, nor sin, nor neutrality, nor action itself. The non-accomplishment of such actions is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Padmavyuha declared, "Dualism is produced from obsession with self, but true understanding of self does not result in dualism. Who thus abides in non-duality is without ideation, and that absence of ideation is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Srigarbha declared, "Duality is constituted by perceptual manifestation. Non-duality is object-less-ness. Therefore, non-grasping and non-rejection is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Candrottara declared, "'Darkness' and 'light' are dualistic, but the absence of both darkness and light is non-duality. Why? At the time of absorption in cessation, there is neither darkness nor light, and likewise with the natures of all things. The entrance into this equanimity is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Ratnamudrahasta declared, "It is dualistic to detest the world and to rejoice in liberation, and neither detesting the world nor rejoicing in liberation is non-duality. Why? Liberation can be found where there is bondage, but where there is ultimately no bondage where is there need for liberation? The mendicant who is neither bound nor liberated does not experience any like or any dislike and thus he enters non-duality."


The bodhisattva Manikutaraja declared, "It is dualistic to speak of good paths and bad paths. One who is on the path is not concerned with good or bad paths. Living in such unconcern, he entertains no concepts of 'path' or 'non-path.' Understanding the nature of concepts, his mind does not engage in duality. Such is the entrance into non-duality."


The bodhisattva Satyarata declared, "It is dualistic to speak of 'true' and 'false.' When one sees truly, one does not ever see any truth, so how could one see falsehood? Why? One does not see with the physical eye, one sees with the eye of wisdom. And with the wisdom-eye one sees only insofar as there is neither sight nor non-sight.


There, where there is neither sight nor non-sight, is the entrance into non-duality."


When the bodhisattvas had given their explanations, they all addressed the crown prince Manjusri: "Manjusri, what is the bodhisattva's entrance into non-duality?"


Manjusri replied, "Good sirs, you have all spoken well. Nevertheless, all your explanations are themselves dualistic. To know no one teaching, to express nothing, to say nothing, to explain nothing, to announce nothing, to indicate nothing, and to designate nothing - that is the entrance into non-duality."


Then the crown prince Manjusri said to the Licchavi Vimalakirti, "We have all given our own teachings, noble sir. Now, may you elucidate the teaching of the entrance into the principle of non-duality!"


Thereupon, the Licchavi Vimalakirti kept his silence, saying nothing at all.


The crown prince Manjusri applauded the Licchavi Vimalakirti: "Excellent! Excellent, noble sir! This is indeed the entrance into the non-duality of the bodhisattvas. Here there is no use for syllables, sounds, and ideas."


When these teachings had been declared, five thousand bodhisattvas entered the door of the Dharma of non-duality and attained tolerance of the birthlessness of things.


SAMADHINIRMOCANA The Noble Great Vehicle Sūtra
Unraveling the Intent
p.
Prologue
p.1
Homage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas!


Thus did I hear at one time. The Blessed One was dwelling in an unfathomable palace, built with the blazing seven precious substances, that emitted great light rays suffusing countless universes. Each of its rooms was well arranged and its design was infinite. It was the undivided maṇḍala, the domain transcending the three worlds. Arising from the supreme roots of virtue of the one who transcends the world, it was characterized by the perfectly pure cognition of the one who has achieved complete mastery. Abode of the Tathāgata where the assembly of innumerable bodhisattvas gathered, it was attended by countless gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, demigods, garuḍas, kinnaras, mahoragas, humans, and nonhumans. Supported by the great joy and bliss of savoring the Dharma and designed to accomplish the complete welfare of all beings, it was free of any harm caused by the stains of afflictions and clear of any demon.


Surpassing all manifestations, this unfathomable palace was displayed by the sovereign power of the Tathāgata. Mindfulness, intelligence, and realization were its pathway; mental stillness and insight were the vehicle leading to it; the great gates of liberation—emptiness, appearancelessness, and wishlessness—were its entrance. It was set on foundations adorned with an infinite accumulation of excellent qualities, which were like great kings of jeweled lotuses.


p.2
The Blessed One had a perfectly realized mind and was free from dualistic behavior. Absorbed in the Dharma of the nonexistence of defining characteristics, he was residing in the domain of the buddhas. He had attained equality with all buddhas. His realization was unobstructed and his qualities were irreversible. He could not be overcome by objects of experience. His abode was inconceivable. Perfectly skilled in the sameness of the three times, his five bodies were present in all worlds. His knowledge of all phenomena was free from doubt. He understood all practices. His knowledge of phenomena was without uncertainty. His body was unimaginable. He possessed the gnosis bodhisattvas vow to accomplish. He had attained the nondual abode of the buddhas, the sublime perfection, the supreme indivisible gnosis of the Tathāgata’s liberation.


He had realized the sameness [of all phenomena], the state of a buddha in which there is neither a center nor a periphery, and reached the ultimate within the domain of truth, the point where the sphere of space ends.


p.3
The Blessed One was accompanied by the entire immeasurable assembly of hearers. Children of noble family, they were the heirs of the Buddha. Their minds were liberated, their wisdom was emancipated, and their discipline was completely pure. They happily gathered with those who longed for the Dharma. They had heard much, kept in mind what they had heard, and accumulated [merit from] what they had heard. They excelled in thought, speech, and deeds. Their wisdom was swift, quick, sharp, emancipating, discerning, vast, extensive, profound, and unequaled. They possessed the jewel of wisdom and the three forms of knowledge. They had attained the supreme state of happiness in this life. The purity of their merit, the excellence of their peaceful conduct, their patience, and their gentleness were vast. They were fully engaged in the teaching of the Tathāgata.


p.4
The Blessed One was also accompanied by all the innumerable bodhisattvas assembled from various buddha realms. Firmly settled and engaged in a vast state, they had gone forth through the Dharma of the Great Vehicle. Impartial toward all beings, they were free from all conceptions, conceptualizations, and fabrications. Victorious over all demons and opposition, they were not involved with the considerations of the hearers and solitary realizers. Steadfast through the great joy and happiness of savoring the Dharma, they were free from the five great fears. Solely progressing toward the stages from which there is no regression, they had perfectly actualized the stage in which one pacifies the torment of beings. Among them were thus the bodhisattva mahāsattvas Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana, Vidhivatparipṛcchaka, Dharmodgata, Suviśuddhamati, Viśālamati, Guṇākara, Paramārthasamudgata, Āryāvalokiteśvara, Maitreya, and Mañjuśrī.


1.
Chapter 1
1.1
At that time, the bodhisattva Vidhivatparipṛcchaka questioned the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana on the ultimate whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and nondual: “O son of the Victorious One, when it is said that all phenomena are nondual, what are these phenomena? In what way are they nondual?”


Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana replied, “Noble son, all phenomena, what we refer to as all phenomena, are of just two kinds: conditioned and unconditioned. With respect to these, the conditioned is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The unconditioned is neither unconditioned nor conditioned.”


1.2
Vidhivatparipṛcchaka inquired, “O son of the Victorious One, why is the conditioned neither conditioned nor unconditioned and the unconditioned neither unconditioned nor conditioned?”


Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana answered, “Noble son, the term conditioned is a word, a label used by the Teacher. Words that are labels used by the Teacher are conventional expressions arising from imagination. These conventional expressions arising from imagination are always unreal conventional expressions arising from imagination in its diversity. Therefore, the term conditioned is not the conditioned. Noble son, the term unconditioned is also included within conventions, just as expressions other than conditioned and unconditioned are and will [always] be. One might object that there is, however, no expression in the absence of the object [to which it refers]. What is then this object? It is the complete and perfect awakening to inexpressible [reality] through the sublime gnosis and vision of the noble ones. But in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, the Teacher labels this object with the term conditioned.


1.3
“Noble son, the term unconditioned is also a word, a label used by the Teacher. Words that are labels used by the Teacher are conventional expressions arising from imagination. These conventional expressions arising from imagination are always conventional expressions deprived of any actuality that arise from imagination in its diversity. Therefore, the term unconditioned is not the unconditioned. Noble son, the term conditioned is also included within conventions, just as expressions other than conditioned and unconditioned are and will [always] be. One might object that there is, however, no expression in the absence of the object [to which it refers]. What is then this object? It is the complete and perfect awakening to inexpressible [reality] through the sublime gnosis and vision of the noble ones. But in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, the Teacher labels this object with the term unconditioned.”


1.4
Vidhivatparipṛcchaka asked, “O son of the Victorious One, as the noble ones completely and perfectly awaken to inexpressible [reality] through their sublime gnosis and perception, why do they label this object with the terms conditioned and unconditioned in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena?”


Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana replied, “Noble son, it is like the following example: A magician or his skillful apprentice, finding himself at the juncture of four great roads, assembles grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones and produces all kinds of magic illusions, such as regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as an abundance of wealth and grain in treasuries and granaries. At that time, in the presence of these illusions, those who are naive, slow-witted, or confused, not perceiving the grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones, see and hear those magical tricks and think that whatever appears exists—that these regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, exist.


Clinging to these magical illusions according to the way they see and hear things and strongly believing in them, they express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false.’ They still need to examine these illusions.


“Those who are not naive or confused but have wisdom perceive the grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones. They see and hear those magical tricks and understand that whatever appears does not exist—that these regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, do not exist. Yet, they understand that the conception of an elephant regiment exists since its manifestation as a conception through an expedient exists, as do the manifestations as conceptions of regiments of horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, together with other similar manifestations. So they understand that all those magical illusions, these magic illusions deceiving the eye, exist [in the way magical illusions do].


Thinking in this way, [these wise beings] do not express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false,’ on account of clinging to these magical illusions in the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. However, they do express themselves through conventions in order to convey the true nature [of these illusions to others], although they do not need to further examine these illusions.


1.5
Likewise, some childish or ordinary beings have not attained the transcendent sublime wisdom. They have not understood that the nature of all phenomena is inexpressible. When those beings perceive conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, they believe that whatever appears as a conditioned or unconditioned phenomenon exists, and they express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false,’ on account of clinging to these appearances according to the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. They still need to examine these appearances.


“With regard to this, some beings who are not childish and have seen the truth have attained the transcendent sublime wisdom. They have understood that the nature of all phenomena is inexpressible. When they perceive conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, they believe that whatever appears as a conditioned or unconditioned phenomenon does not exist. However, with respect to these appearances, they think that the conceptions in terms of conditioned and unconditioned, the manifestation of conceptions through an expedient in terms of conditioned and unconditioned, the occurrence of conceptualization, and the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena exist in the way magical illusions do. That which deludes the mind exists [in the way magical illusions do].


Thinking in that way, they do not express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false,’ on account of clinging to these appearances according to the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. However, they do express themselves through conventions in order to convey the true nature [of these appearances to others], although they do not need to further examine these appearances.


“Noble son, the noble ones are thus completely and perfectly awakened to inexpressible [reality] through their sublime gnosis and vision of this object, but in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, they label this object with the terms conditioned and unconditioned.”


1.6
At that time, the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana recited these verses:


“The profound, which is inaccessible to foolish beings,
Inexpressible and nondual, has been taught by the Victorious One.
Yet, fools deluded by ignorance
Take delight in mental elaborations and dwell on duality.
“Deprived of understanding, afflicted by misunderstanding,
They will be reborn as sheep or oxen.
Casting aside the words of the wise,
They will wander in saṃsāra for a great length of time.”
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana—the first chapter.


2. Chapter 2
2.1
Then the bodhisattva Dharmodgata spoke these words: “Blessed One, very long ago in ancient times, beyond as many universes as there are grains of sand in seventy-seven Ganges rivers, I was residing in the world Kīrtimat of the tathāgata Viśālakīrti. There I saw 7,700,000 non-Buddhists, together with their teachers, who had gathered in one place to consider the ultimate defining characteristic of phenomena. Although they had examined, analyzed, investigated, and considered in detail the ultimate defining characteristic of phenomena, they did not understand it. They had changing opinions, lacked certainty, and were slow-witted as well as argumentative. Insulting one another with harsh words, they became abusive, agitated, unprincipled, and violent.


Then, Blessed One, I thought to myself, ‘This is so sad, and yet, how marvelous, how wonderful are the manifestations of the tathāgatas in the world and, through their manifestations, the realization and actualization of the ultimate whose defining characteristic is beyond all speculation!’ ”


2.2
The Blessed One answered to the bodhisattva Dharmodgata: “So it is, Dharmodgata. So it is. I have completely and perfectly awakened to the ultimate characterized as being beyond all speculation. Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings. One might ask why I did this. I have explained that the ultimate is what is cognized by noble beings in a personal and intuitive way, whereas ordinary beings’ knowledge [resulting from interacting] with one another belongs to the domain of speculation. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate represents the domain in which there is no phenomenal appearance, whereas speculation is the domain of phenomenal appearance.


Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is inexpressible, whereas speculation is the domain of verbalization. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is free from all conventions, whereas speculation is the domain of conventions. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is devoid of argumentative disputation, whereas speculation is the domain of argumentative disputation.


Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation.


2.3
“Dharmodgata, it is like this: beings who have only tasted pungent or bitter flavors their entire lives cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the taste of honey and sugar. Those who have indulged in desire and have been burnt by the torment of desire for a long time cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the inner happiness of the recluse, which is independent from all phenomenal appearances related to form, sound, smell, taste, and contact. Those who have indulged and taken delight in conversations for a long time cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the inner happiness of the noble beings who remain silent. Those who have indulged and taken delight in conventions for a long time through seeing, hearing, discriminating, and cognizing cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the cessation of all conventions, the nirvāṇa that is the extinction of transitory aggregates.


Dharmodgata, it is like this: Those who have indulged and taken delight in argumentative disputations for a long time on account of their attachment to the self cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate that there is no attachment to the self and no argumentative disputations in Uttarakuru.


“Dharmodgata, likewise, those who [have indulged for a long time in] speculation cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the ultimate whose defining characteristic transcends all speculation.”


2.4
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:


“It is the domain whose characteristic must be intuitively cognized,
Beyond all expressions, apart from all conventions,
And free from argumentative disputations—
Such is the ultimate whose characteristic transcends all speculation.”
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Dharmodgata—the second chapter.


3. Chapter 3
3.1
Then the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati addressed the Blessed One, “Blessed One, at an earlier time, you spoke these words: ‘The ultimate is subtle and profound. Characterized as transcending what is distinct or indistinct [from conditioned phenomena], it is difficult to understand.’ How wonderful indeed are these words of yours! Blessed One, regarding this point, I once saw many bodhisattvas who, having attained the stage of engagement through aspiration, assembled in one place to discuss in the following way whether conditioned phenomena and the ultimate are distinct or indistinct.


Among them, some declared, ‘The defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct.’ Others replied, ‘It is not the case that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct, for they are distinct indeed.’ Some others, who were perplexed and lacked certainty, said, ‘Some pretend that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct. Some pretend that they are indistinct. Which bodhisattvas speak the truth? Which speak falsity? Which are mistaken? Which are not?’ Blessed One, I thought to myself, ‘So, none of these noble sons understands the ultimate whose subtle defining characteristic transcends whether it is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. These bodhisattvas are truly naive, confused, dull, unskilled, and mistaken.’ ”


3.2
The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati, “So it is, Suviśuddhamati. So it is. Indeed, none of these noble sons understands the ultimate whose subtle defining characteristic transcends whether it is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. These [bodhisattvas] are truly naive, confused, dull, unskilled, and mistaken. Why is this so? Suviśuddhamati, it is because those who analyze conditioned phenomena in this way neither realize nor actualize the ultimate.


3.3
“Why? Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were indistinct, [even] spiritually immature people—all ordinary beings—would, as a consequence, realize the truth. As mere ordinary beings, not only would they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, but they would also fully and completely awaken to unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening.


“If the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, even those who realize the truth would, as a consequence, not be detached from the phenomenal appearances of conditioned phenomena. Since they would not be detached from the phenomenal appearances of conditioned phenomena, they would also not be liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearances. If they were not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearances, they would not be liberated from the bondage of corruption. If they were not liberated from these two kinds of bondage, those who realize the truth would neither attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, nor fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening.


“Suviśuddhamati, ordinary beings do not realize the truth and, as mere ordinary beings, neither do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, nor do they fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. For these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those who consider the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate to be indistinct are not right but wrong.


“Suviśuddhamati, it is not the case that those who realize the truth are not detached from the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, for they are indeed detached from it. Neither are they not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearance, for they are indeed liberated from it. Nor are they not liberated from the bondage of corruption, for they are indeed liberated from it. Since they are liberated from these two kinds of bondage, not only do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, but they will also fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. For all these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those who consider the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate to be distinct are not right but wrong.


3.4
“Moreover, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were indistinct, then, just as the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena is encompassed by the defining characteristic of affliction, so too would the defining characteristic of the ultimate be included in the defining characteristic of affliction.


“However, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, then the defining characteristic of the ultimate could not be the universal defining characteristic within all the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena.


“Suviśuddhamati, the defining characteristic of the ultimate is not encompassed by the defining characteristic of affliction, and the defining characteristic of the ultimate is the universal defining characteristic within all the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena. For these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are either indistinct or distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those pretending that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct or distinct are not right but wrong.


3.5
“Moreover, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were not distinct, then, just as the defining characteristic of the ultimate is not specific to any defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena, so too would all defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena not be specific to any conditioned phenomenon, and yogis would also not look for the ultimate beyond whatever they see, hear, distinguish, or know with regard to conditioned phenomena.


“However, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, then, the mere selflessness and essencelessness of conditioned phenomena would not be the defining characteristic of the ultimate. The defining characteristic of affliction and the defining characteristic of purity themselves would be simultaneously established as distinct defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena.


“Suviśuddhamati, the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena are specific and not unspecific to conditioned phenomena; yogis do look for the ultimate beyond whatever they see, hear, distinguish, or know with regard to conditioned phenomena; the ultimate is indeed characterized by the mere selflessness and essencelessness of conditioned phenomena; and the defining characteristic of affliction and the defining characteristic of purity also are not simultaneously established as distinct defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena. For all these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are neither indistinct nor distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through these approaches that those pretending that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct or distinct are not right but wrong.


3.6
“Suviśuddhamati, it is like this: It is not easy to decide whether the whiteness of the conch is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of the conch, likewise with the yellowness of gold. It is not easy to decide whether the quality of the sound produced by a vīṇā is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of sound, likewise with aloe and its fragrance, pepper and its heat, myrobalan and its astringency, cotton and its softness, and clarified butter and butter. Thus it is not easy to decide whether the impermanence of all conditioned phenomena is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena, likewise with the suffering of all beings with outflows and the defining characteristic of beings with outflows, as well as the selflessness of all phenomena and the defining characteristic of phenomena.


“Suviśuddhamati, it is like this: It is not easy to decide whether the defining characteristic of restless desire and the defining characteristic of afflictions are distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of desire. You should know it is just like this with anger and delusion too. Likewise, Suviśuddhamati, you should not see anything good in deciding whether the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct or indistinct. In this way, Suviśuddhamati, I have completely and fully awakened to the ultimate that is subtle, extremely subtle, [profound], extremely profound, difficult to understand, extremely difficult to understand, and characterized as transcending being distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena.


Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings.”


3.7
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:


“The defining characteristics of the domains of conditioned phenomena and of the ultimate
Are free from being distinct or indistinct.
Those who imagine them to be distinct or indistinct are mistaken.
“As beings practice mental stillness and insight,
They will be liberated from the bonds of corruption
And the bonds of phenomenal appearance.”
This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati—the third chapter.


4.
Chapter 4
4.1
Then the Blessed One spoke these words to Subhūti: “Subhūti, do you know how many beings in the world display their knowledge under the influence of conceit? Do you know how many beings in the world display their knowledge without conceit?”


Subhūti answered, “Blessed One, according to my knowledge, there are only a few in the world of beings who present their knowledge without conceit, but countless, innumerable, and inexpressible in number are those who do so under its influence. Blessed One, at one time I was staying in a hermitage set in a great forest. There were many monks living in the vicinity who had also established themselves there. At sunrise, I saw them gather together. They showed their knowledge and revealed their understanding by taking various aspects of phenomena as referential objects.


4.2
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the five aggregates as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their arising, their disintegration, their cessation, and the acknowledgment of their cessation. In the same way, some showed their knowledge by taking the twelve sense domains as referential objects, some by taking dependent arising as a referential object. Some showed their knowledge by taking the four kinds of sustenance as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their arising, their disintegration, their cessation, and the acknowledgment of their cessation.


4.3
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the four noble truths as referential objects: their defining characteristic, the comprehension of suffering, the abandoning of the cause of suffering, the actualization of the cessation of suffering, and the practice of the path.


4.4
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the eighteen constituents as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their varieties, their manifoldness, their cessation, and the actualization of their cessation.


4.5
“Some showed their knowledge by taking the four applications of mindfulness as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their adverse factors, their antidotes, their practice, their arising from having been non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing. In the same way, some showed their knowledge by taking as referential objects the four correct self-restraints, as well as the four bases of supernatural powers, the five faculties, the five forces, and the seven branches of awakening. Some showed their knowledge by taking as referential objects the eight branches of the noble path: their phenomenal appearance, the antidotes to their adverse factors, their practice, their arising from having been non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing.


4.6
“Then I thought to myself, ‘These venerable monks displayed their knowledge by revealing their understanding by taking various aspects of phenomena as referential objects, but they have not perceived the ultimate, whose defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere.’ These venerable persons have conceit and, without doubt, display their knowledge under the influence of conceit. Blessed One, at an earlier time, you spoke these words: ‘The ultimate is subtle, profound, difficult to understand, extremely difficult to understand, and characterized as being of a single nature everywhere.’ How wonderful indeed are these very words of yours! Blessed One, if even those who practice your teaching, such as these beings who became monks, find it difficult to understand in this way the ultimate whose defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere, what need is there to mention how difficult it is for those outsiders who do not follow your teaching?”


4.7
The Blessed One replied, “So it is, Subhūti. So it is. I have completely and fully awakened to the ultimate that, being characterized as being of a single nature everywhere, is subtle, extremely subtle, profound, extremely profound, difficult to understand, and extremely difficult to understand. Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings. One might ask why I did this.


4.8
“Subhūti, it is because I teach that the ultimate is the referential object conducive to purification within the aggregates, as well as within the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and, Subhūti, the eightfold path. This referential object conducive to purification within the aggregates is of a single nature everywhere and its defining characteristic is not different from theirs. It is just the same from the sense domains up to the eightfold path: the referential object conducive to purification within these various referential objects is of a single nature everywhere and its defining characteristic is not different from theirs. Subhūti, through this approach, you should thus know that what is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere is the ultimate.


4.9
“Moreover, Subhūti, once renunciants who practice yoga have realized in reference to a single aggregate the selflessness of phenomena, which is the ultimate reality, they do not look for this ultimate reality, this selflessness, individually within the other aggregates or in the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the eightfold path. Instead, they rely upon the nondual gnosis that is in accordance with true reality. Through this alone, they infallibly ascertain and realize the ultimate, characterized as being of a single nature everywhere. Subhūti, through this approach, you should thus know that what is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere is the ultimate.


4.10
“Moreover, Subhūti, if ultimate reality itself, the selflessness of phenomena, had a defining characteristic distinct [from the defining characteristics of phenomena] in the way the aggregates, the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the eightfold path have defining characteristics distinct from one another, then, on account of this, ultimate reality itself, the selflessness of phenomena, would have causes and arise from causes. If it arose from causes, it would be conditioned. If it were the conditioned, it would not be the ultimate. If it were not the ultimate, one would need to look for some other ultimate. Subhūti, this ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena, does not arise from causes. It is not conditioned. Neither is it the case that it is not the ultimate.


One must [therefore] not look for an ultimate other than that ultimate. Thus, whether tathāgatas manifest or not, because it is the case that it permanently and immutably abides within phenomena, only this nature of phenomena, this constituent abiding in phenomena, is constant. Subhūti, for all these reasons, you should know through this approach that the ultimate is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere.


4.11
“Subhūti, it is like this: although there are many varieties of forms with distinct defining characteristics within space, since space itself is free from phenomenal appearances, devoid of conceptions, and without change, its defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere. Likewise, Subhūti, you should know that the ultimate is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere, within all phenomena whose defining characteristics are distinct from one another.”


4.12
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:


“As proclaimed by the buddhas,
This ultimate is not distinct from phenomena,
And its defining characteristic is everywhere of a single nature.
Those who imagine it to be distinct from phenomena
Are conceited and deluded.”
This was the chapter of Subhūti—the fourth chapter.


5.
Chapter 5
5.1
Then, the bodhisattva Viśālamati asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas who are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition are called ‘skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition,’ what does it mean? When they are designated in this way, what does it refer to?”


The Blessed One answered, “Viśālamati, you are asking this for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Viśālamati. I will explain to you in which way bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition.


5.2
“Viśālamati, when such and such beings are reborn and manifest in this saṃsāra comprised of six destinies, in any class of beings or state of birth, be it egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born, or spontaneously generated, there is first a twofold appropriation: the appropriation of the physical sense faculties together with their supports, and the appropriation of mental imprints producing the elaboration of conventional expressions with regard to phenomenal appearances, names, and conceptualizations. In dependence upon this twofold appropriation, the mind containing all the seeds matures, merges [with the embryo], grows, increases, and expands. This twofold appropriation occurs in the realm of form but it does not appear in the realm of the formless.


5.3
“Viśālamati, this cognition is also called ‘appropriating cognition’ because it grasps and appropriates the body. It is also called ‘subliminal cognition,’ because it dwells and lies hidden in this body, sharing a common destiny. It is also called ‘mind,’ because it is accumulated and developed by visual forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangible objects, and phenomena.


5.4
“Viśālamati, taking this appropriating cognition as support and basis, the six kinds of cognition, that is, visual, auditive, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental cognitions, arise. Among these, a visual cognition arises on the basis of the eye, which is connected with a visual cognition and a visual form. Simultaneously and in conformity with this visual cognition, a mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises at the same time, having the same object. [Likewise,] Viśālamati, an auditive, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile cognition arises on the basis of a sense faculty connected to a cognition, such as the ear, nose, tongue, or body, and a sound, smell, flavor, or tangible object. Simultaneously and in conformity with this auditive, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile cognition, a mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises at the same time, having the same object.


If only one visual cognition arises at one time, then only one mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises simultaneously, having the same object. If two, three, four, or five cognitions arise simultaneously, then also in that case, having the same object as the group of five cognitions, only one mental cognition that conceptualizes this object arises simultaneously.


5.5
“Viśālamati, it is like this: If the conditions for the arising of a single wave in a large stream of water are present, then only one wave arises. If the conditions for the arising of two or many waves are present, then two or many waves arise. However, the river [itself] neither stops as a stream of water nor becomes exhausted. If the conditions for the arising of a single reflection in a perfectly polished mirror are present, then only one reflection arises. If the conditions for the arising of two or many reflections are present, then two or many reflections arise. However, the mirror neither transforms itself into the object corresponding to the reflection nor manifests reflections by being in close contact [with the reflected objects]. Viśālamati, similarly, taking this appropriating cognition as support and basis, as in the examples of the river and the mirror, if the conditions for the arising of one visual cognition are present, then only one visual cognition arises.


If the conditions for the simultaneous arising of up to five cognitions are present, then up to five cognitions simultaneously arise.


5.6
“Viśālamati, taking in this way the knowledge of this doctrine as a support and basis, bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition. Yet, when the Tathāgata designates the bodhisattvas as skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition, they are not designated as completely skilled merely on account of this.


Viśālamati, I call bodhisattvas ‘skilled in the ultimate’ as soon as they, by themselves and in their own experience, neither perceive the appropriation nor the appropriating cognition but [instead perceive] in accordance with the truth; as soon as they neither perceive the subliminal nor the subliminal cognition; neither the accumulated nor the mind; neither the eye, nor the form, nor the visual cognition; neither the ear, nor the sound, nor the auditive cognition; neither the nose, nor the smell, nor the olfactory cognition; neither the tongue, nor the flavor, nor the gustatory cognition; and neither the body, nor the tangible object, nor the tactile cognition. Viśālamati, I call bodhisattvas ‘skilled in the ultimate’ as soon as they, by themselves and in their own experience, neither perceive thought, nor phenomena, nor mental cognition but instead perceive in accordance with the truth.


Viśālamati, the Tathāgata designates as skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition the bodhisattvas who are skilled in the ultimate. Viśālamati, for this reason, bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition. Also, when the Tathāgata designates them as such, it is for this reason.”


5.7
Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:


“Profound and subtle is the appropriating cognition.
Containing all the seeds, it flows like a stream of water.
I did not teach it to the immature,
Lest they would imagine it to be a self.”
This was the chapter of Viśālamati— the fifth chapter.


6.
Chapter 6
6.1
Then, the bodhisattva Guṇākara asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas who are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena are called ‘skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena,’ what does it mean? Moreover, when the Tathāgata designates them as such, what does it refer to?”


6.2
The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Guṇākara, “Guṇākara, for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans, you are asking this. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Guṇākara, I will explain to you in which way bodhisattvas are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena.


6.3
“Guṇākara, the defining characteristics of phenomena are three. What are these three? They are the imaginary defining characteristic, the other-dependent defining characteristic, and the actual defining characteristic.


6.4
“Guṇākara, what is the imaginary defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is what is nominally and conventionally posited as the essence or the distinctive [characteristic] of phenomena, even just in order to designate [them].


6.5
“Guṇākara, what is the other-dependent defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is the dependent arising of phenomena. It is like this: ‘When this is, that arises; because this arises, that arises.’ It is also from ‘[in dependence upon ignorance as a condition,] conditioning mental factors [arise]’ up to ‘thus, the whole great mass of suffering comes to be.’


6.6
“Guṇākara, what is the actual defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is their true reality, namely, the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening that is finally attained by bodhisattvas as they realize this [true reality] through their diligence and correct application of mind and then become perfectly familiar with the realization of this [true reality].


6.7
“Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the imaginary defining characteristic to be just like the falsity of the visual aberrations [perceived] by someone suffering from the timira visual disorder.


“Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like the phenomenal appearances manifesting to this very person suffering from the timira disease, such as [actually nonexistent] hairs, flies, sesame seeds, [or patches of] blue, yellow, red, or white [in their visual field].