v0.2.1 - clean release

README.md

@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ a Tetragon-native pipeline. Released for:
 - ATT&CK-technique-detectability studies
 - **autonomous-attacker behavioral analysis** — see below
 
-This is the **v0.2.1 release** (re-parsed 2026-04-29 with five correctness
-fixes and the 3a′ encoder revisions). The full provenance is in
+The full provenance is in
 [`datacard.md`](./datacard.md) and [`datasheet.md`](./datasheet.md).
 
 ---
@@ -267,6 +266,7 @@ update the `url` and `doi` fields once those are minted.
 - **Integer-code → label tables:** [`reproduction/feature_definitions.json`](./reproduction/feature_definitions.json)
 - **Anonymizer alias map:** [`reproduction/alias_map.json`](./reproduction/alias_map.json)
 - **Per-file integrity:** [`SHA256SUMS`](./SHA256SUMS), machine manifest at [`RELEASE.json`](./RELEASE.json)
+- **Github:** https://github.com/ryypow/dendroaspis
 
 ---
 

RELEASE.json

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+{
+  "version": "0.2.1",
+  "build_timestamp": "2026-05-02T10:12:37Z",
+  "huggingface_repo": "rypow/dendroaspis-tetragon-hids",
+  "huggingface_revision": null,
+  "anonymizer_version": "0.2.1",
+  "parser_sha": "03e2204",
+  "release_parser_sha": "03e2204",
+  "row_counts": {
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+    "test": 2349965
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+}

SHA256SUMS

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
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+e2c0ecb88072afdc01fcd16205424e0a182192b536e946aaedae0ec78b8a35fc  README.md
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agentic-art-campaign/CAMPAIGN.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+# Dendroaspis v0.2 — Attack Campaign Ground Truth (machine-parseable mirror)
+#
+# This is the YAML mirror of CAMPAIGN.md. Every field here corresponds to a
+# section or row in the markdown document. Use this file when you need to
+# load campaign metadata programmatically;
+#
+# labels.csv is authoritative for what was actually labeled.
+
+meta:
+  corpus_version: "v0.2"
+  total_labeled_intervals: 61
+  total_categories: 22
+  total_attack_events: 705852
+  total_test_events: 2349965
+  test_partition_positive_rate: 0.3004
+  campaign_window_start_utc: "2026-04-19T22:09:18Z"
+  campaign_window_end_utc:   "2026-04-20T01:59:45Z"
+  campaign_wallclock_hours_active: 3.23
+  host:
+    platform: "Proxmox 8 / LXC container"
+    distro: "Debian 12"
+  operator_persona:
+    user: "admin"
+    uid: 1000
+    elevation_policy: "atomics that require root sudo internally; runner script never wrapped in sudo"
+    elevated_persona: "container_root"
+    elevated_uid: 0
+  atomic_red_team:
+    repo: "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team"
+    pinned_sha: "e575444941e27787bdb1b6ab881628fc2cc904b9"
+    cloned_at_utc: "2026-04-19T04:23:08Z"
+  sensor:
+    name: "Tetragon"
+    version: "1.6.1"
+    tracing_policies_dir: "reproduction/tetragon-configs"
+    tracing_policy_count: 6
+  ground_truth_files:
+    labels_csv: "data/labels.csv"
+    yaml_mirror:  "CAMPAIGN.yaml"
+
+trial_accounting:
+  yaml_planned_intervals: 59
+  labels_csv_actual_intervals: 61
+  delta: 2
+  reconciliation:
+    - technique: "T1543.002"
+      planned_trials: 2
+      actual_trials: 3
+      reason: "Yaml v1.1 documented atomic 3 as Debian-distro-gated. The atomic ran anyway and produced a 23-second labeled interval containing the marker pair plus the prereq-failure trace. Yaml header was updated post-execution (commit 6865942 on 2026-04-21) but labels.csv was already frozen with 3 intervals."
+    - technique: "CHAIN.CAP01"
+      planned_trials: 1
+      actual_trials: 2
+      reason: "A second capstone trial was added during execution. Trial 2 is a degraded 4-atomic chain (T1059.004 step skipped at invocation due to a missing trial argument)."
+
+marker_convention:
+  start_format: "/tmp/art_start_<TECHNIQUE>_<TRIAL>"
+  end_format:   "/tmp/art_end_<TECHNIQUE>_<TRIAL>"
+  parser_regex: "/tmp/art_(start|end)_([A-Z0-9.]+)_(\\S+)"
+  parser_module: "src/telemetry/tetragon_parser.py"
+  labeler_module: "src/processing/art_labeler.py"
+  orphan_end_policy: "drop"
+  orphan_start_policy: "open_ended_to_stream_end"
+  cleanup_position: "before_end_marker"   # cleanup events labeled as attack
+  cooldown_position: "after_end_marker"   # cooldown silence labeled as benign
+  inter_trial_cooldown_seconds: 5
+
+# ============================================================
+# Per-technique reference
+# ============================================================
+#
+# Each technique entry shape:
+#   id:              ATT&CK ID (or paper-defined ID)
+#   mitre_name:      full MITRE ATT&CK name
+#   tactic:          ATT&CK tactic
+#   n_trials:        labeled intervals in labels.csv
+#   n_events:        attack events in test partition
+#   degraded:        bool — true if any trial is degraded
+#   atomics:         list of atomics actually invoked at the pinned SHA
+#     number:        atomic test number
+#     name:          short Atomic Red Team test name
+#     elevation:     "user" | "root"
+#     degraded:      bool — true if this specific atomic's trial is degraded
+#     degraded_note: explanation if degraded
+#   exclusions:      list of atomics deliberately not run, with reasons
+#   notes:           technique-level provenance / context
+
+techniques:
+
+  # --- Execution ---
+
+  - id: "T1059.004"
+    mitre_name: "Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell"
+    tactic: "execution"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 175797
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1,  name: "Create and Execute Bash Shell Script", elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 3,  name: "Harvest SUID-bit binaries via find",    elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 14, name: "Shell creation using awk",              elevation: "user" }
+    notes: "Largest-mass technique (24.9% of attack events). Locus of the labeling-granularity finding (paper §5.2): the dispatcher process driving every trial is itself bash, so harness scaffolding is co-labeled with the technique."
+
+  - id: "T1059.006"
+    mitre_name: "Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python"
+    tactic: "execution"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 22675
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Execute shell payload via python -c",    elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 2, name: "Execute Python script files",            elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 4, name: "Python pty.spawn into sh/bash",          elevation: "user" }
+
+  # --- Persistence ---
+
+  - id: "T1053.003"
+    mitre_name: "Scheduled Task/Job: Cron"
+    tactic: "persistence"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 11217
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Replace user crontab from referenced file", elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 2, name: "Drop script into every /etc/cron.* subfolder", elevation: "root" }
+      - { number: 3, name: "Drop script under /etc/cron.d/",              elevation: "root" }
+
+  - id: "T1098.004"
+    mitre_name: "Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys"
+    tactic: "persistence"
+    n_trials: 1
+    n_events: 3569
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Append attacker public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys", elevation: "user" }
+    notes: "Only one Linux atomic exists at the pinned ART SHA."
+
+  - id: "T1543.002"
+    mitre_name: "Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service"
+    tactic: "persistence"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 47901
+    degraded: true
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Create systemd .service unit",          elevation: "root", degraded: false }
+      - { number: 2, name: "Create SysV-style init script",         elevation: "root", degraded: false }
+      - number: 3
+        name: "Create .service file with reload-and-modify"
+        elevation: "root"
+        degraded: true
+        degraded_note: |
+          ART's prereq script (-CheckPrereqs) hardcodes a Debian
+          distro-rejection ("System must be Ubuntu, Kali OR CentOS")
+          even though the underlying actions work on Debian. The trial's
+          marker pair was emitted, the prereq-failure trace was logged,
+          and the labeled 23-second window contains those events rather
+          than a real systemd-service install.
+    notes: "Yaml header was updated post-execution (2026-04-21) to document atomic 3 as dropped, but labels.csv was already frozen with all 3 intervals. Treat ~one-third of T1543.002 events as wrapper-noise."
+
+  - id: "T1546.004"
+    mitre_name: "Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification"
+    tactic: "persistence"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 11179
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 2, name: "Append command to ~/.bashrc",                  elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 5, name: "Append commands to user shell profile file",   elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 4, name: "Append commands to system-wide shell profile", elevation: "root" }
+
+  # --- Privilege Escalation ---
+
+  - id: "T1548.001"
+    mitre_name: "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid"
+    tactic: "privilege_escalation"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 12461
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 3, name: "Set SUID flag on attacker-controlled binary", elevation: "root" }
+      - { number: 7, name: "Modify binary POSIX capabilities via setcap", elevation: "root" }
+      - { number: 9, name: "Recon for SUID-set files",                    elevation: "user" }
+
+  - id: "T1548.003"
+    mitre_name: "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching"
+    tactic: "privilege_escalation"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 24229
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Ordinary sudo invocation (cached creds)",            elevation: "root" }
+      - { number: 3, name: "Set unlimited sudo cache timeout via sudoers.d",     elevation: "root" }
+      - { number: 5, name: "Disable tty_tickets so cached creds apply across PTYs", elevation: "root" }
+
+  - id: "T1574.006"
+    mitre_name: "Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking"
+    tactic: "privilege_escalation"
+    n_trials: 2
+    n_events: 7700
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 2, name: "Per-process injection via LD_PRELOAD env",       elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 1, name: "System-wide injection via /etc/ld.so.preload",   elevation: "root" }
+    notes: "Only two Linux atomics exist at the pinned ART SHA."
+
+  # --- Defense Evasion ---
+
+  - id: "T1027"
+    mitre_name: "Obfuscated Files or Information"
+    tactic: "defense_evasion"
+    n_trials: 1
+    n_events: 3705
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Decode base64-encoded payload into script and execute", elevation: "user" }
+    notes: "Atomic exercises decode-and-execute on disk, not the encoding step. Only one Linux atomic at the pinned ART SHA."
+
+  - id: "T1036.005"
+    mitre_name: "Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location"
+    tactic: "defense_evasion"
+    n_trials: 1
+    n_events: 3641
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Execute binary from masqueraded directory path", elevation: "user" }
+    notes: "Only one Linux atomic at the pinned ART SHA."
+
+  - id: "T1070.004"
+    mitre_name: "Indicator Removal: File Deletion"
+    tactic: "defense_evasion"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 11224
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Delete a single attacker-created file",     elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 2, name: "Delete an entire attacker-created directory", elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 3, name: "Overwrite-then-delete with shred",          elevation: "user" }
+    exclusions:
+      - { number: 8, name: "Delete Filesystem - Linux", reason: "Would destroy the LXC container" }
+
+  - id: "T1222.002"
+    mitre_name: "File and Directory Permissions Modification: Linux"
+    tactic: "defense_evasion"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 11301
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "chmod numeric-mode change",                  elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 5, name: "chown owner-and-group change",               elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 9, name: "chattr immutable-attribute removal",         elevation: "user" }
+
+  - id: "T1562.001"
+    mitre_name: "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools"
+    tactic: "defense_evasion"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 18610
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1,  name: "Disable rsyslog via systemctl",         elevation: "root" }
+      - { number: 39, name: "Clear shell history",                   elevation: "root" }
+      - { number: 40, name: "Suspend shell history recording",       elevation: "root" }
+    exclusions:
+      - { number: 41, name: "Reboot host",       reason: "Destabilizes the test host" }
+      - { number: 43, name: "Disable swap",      reason: "Destabilizes the test host" }
+      - { number: 59, name: "Disable ASLR",      reason: "Reduces baseline reproducibility" }
+
+  # --- Credential Access ---
+
+  - id: "T1003.008"
+    mitre_name: "OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"
+    tactic: "credential_access"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 10999
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Read /etc/shadow via cat (root)",              elevation: "root" }
+      - { number: 3, name: "Read /etc/passwd as unprivileged user",         elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 4, name: "Read /etc/{passwd,shadow} via non-cat binary",  elevation: "root" }
+
+  - id: "T1552.001"
+    mitre_name: "Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files"
+    tactic: "credential_access"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 97493
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Search home dir for AWS credential files",                  elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 3, name: "Recursive grep for password-bearing strings across user dirs", elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 6, name: "Search for GitHub credentials in known config paths",        elevation: "user" }
+
+  # --- Discovery ---
+
+  - id: "T1057"
+    mitre_name: "Process Discovery"
+    tactic: "discovery"
+    n_trials: 1
+    n_events: 4062
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 1, name: "Enumerate running processes via ps", elevation: "user" }
+    notes: "Only one Linux atomic at the pinned ART SHA."
+
+  - id: "T1082"
+    mitre_name: "System Information Discovery"
+    tactic: "discovery"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 12066
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 3,  name: "List OS information via /etc/os-release and uname", elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 8,  name: "Discover hostname via hostname/hostnamectl",         elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 25, name: "List kernel modules via lsmod and /proc/modules",    elevation: "user" }
+
+  - id: "T1083"
+    mitre_name: "File and Directory Discovery"
+    tactic: "discovery"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 154581
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 3, name: "Recursive Unix file/dir enumeration via find/ls (variant 1)", elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 4, name: "Recursive Unix file/dir enumeration (variant 2)",             elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 8, name: "SMB/NFS network-share enumeration via smbclient/showmount",   elevation: "user" }
+    notes: "Second-largest technique by event mass (21.9% of attack events)."
+
+  # --- Command and Control ---
+
+  - id: "T1105"
+    mitre_name: "Ingress Tool Transfer"
+    tactic: "command_and_control"
+    n_trials: 3
+    n_events: 11609
+    degraded: false
+    atomics:
+      - { number: 27, name: "Download-and-execute remote payload via curl/wget", elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 14, name: "Exfil-via-download using whois as the transport",    elevation: "user" }
+      - { number: 3,  name: "scp push of local file to remote host",              elevation: "user" }
+    notes: "Mixed pull and push directions in the same technique row."
+
+  # --- Initial Access (paper-defined research scenario) ---
+
+  - id: "T1195.002"
+    mitre_name: "Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain"
+    tactic: "initial_access"
+    n_trials: 8
+    n_events: 15703
+    degraded: false
+    paper_defined: true
+    track: "Track A"
+    implementation:
+      lineage: "npm -> node -> sh -> curl"
+      synthetic_creds_path: "~/.fake_secrets/"
+      exfil_endpoint: "127.0.0.1:8888 (loopback only)"
+      persistence: "cron entry dropped on subset of trials, removed at trial end"
+      modeled_after: "Shai-Hulud npm worm (publicly disclosed)"
+      not_implemented:
+        - "worm propagation"
+        - "real-internet exfil"
+        - "real credentials"
+        - "sandbox escape"
+
+  # --- Capstone (paper-defined chained scenario) ---
+
+  - id: "CHAIN.CAP01"
+    mitre_name: "Capstone Chain v0.1 (Supply-Chain Narrative)"
+    tactic: "execution"
+    n_trials: 2
+    n_events: 34130
+    degraded: true
+    paper_defined: true
+    sequence_full:
+      - { step: 1, technique: "T1059.004", atomic: 1,  label: "shell spawn" }
+      - { step: 2, technique: "T1057",     atomic: 1,  label: "process discovery" }
+      - { step: 3, technique: "T1003.008", atomic: 1,  label: "/etc/shadow read" }
+      - { step: 4, technique: "T1105",     atomic: 27, label: "curl-to-loopback ingress (127.0.0.1:8888)" }
+      - { step: 5, technique: "T1070.004", atomic: 1,  label: "rm evidence cleanup" }
+    trials:
+      - trial: 1
+        sequence: "full"
+        degraded: false
+      - trial: 2
+        sequence: "T1057:1 -> T1003.008:1 -> T1105:27 -> T1070.004:1"
+        degraded: true
+        degraded_note: "T1059.004 step skipped at script invocation due to missing trial argument"
+        labels_csv_notes_verbatim: "broken 4-atomic chain: T1057:1 -> T1003.008:1 -> T1105:27 -> T1070.004:1; T1059.004 skipped due to invocation arg error (trial arg missing)"
+    notes: "Wrapped in a single (start, end) marker pair so the chained sequence is one labeled interval rather than five disconnected windows. Cleanup of every step runs inside the marker window; per-step cooldowns are suppressed to avoid fragmenting the chain with visible silences."
+
+# ============================================================
+# Techniques deliberately excluded from the campaign
+# ============================================================
+
+excluded_techniques:
+  - id: "T1569.002"
+    mitre_name: "System Services: Service Execution"
+    reason: "Only Linux atomic at pinned SHA is psexec.py, which requires a remote target host. No remote target was provisioned."
+
+# ============================================================
+# References
+# ============================================================
+
+references:
+  dendroaspis: "https://github.com/ryypow/dendroaspis"
+  mitre_attack: "https://attack.mitre.org/"
+  atomic_red_team_repo: "https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team"
+  atomic_red_team_pinned_sha: "e575444941e27787bdb1b6ab881628fc2cc904b9"
+  tetragon: "https://github.com/cilium/tetragon"
+  shai_hulud_reference: "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shai-hulud-npm-supply-chain/"
+  paper_title: "Dendroaspis: Detecting Agent-Orchestrated Attacks on High-Entropy Workstations via eBPF and Mamba"
+  paper_year: 2026
+  paper_author: "Ryan W. Powers"
+  labels_csv_path: "data/labels.csv"

agentic-art-campaign/labels.csv

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+host,technique_id,technique_name,tactic,start_ts,end_ts,trial,delivery,notes
+sandbox_host,CHAIN.CAP01,Capstone Chain v0.1 (Supply-Chain Narrative),execution,2026-04-20T01:59:31.920547970Z,2026-04-20T01:59:45.019566446Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,credential_access,2026-04-20T00:27:19.544699604Z,2026-04-20T00:27:21.324864544Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,credential_access,2026-04-20T00:27:26.330849154Z,2026-04-20T00:27:28.103071204Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1003.008,/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow,credential_access,2026-04-20T00:27:33.109311865Z,2026-04-20T00:27:34.913462371Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1027,Obfuscated Files or Information,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:26:44.362314451Z,2026-04-20T00:26:46.260972910Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1036.005,Match Legitimate Name or Location,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:27:01.981472730Z,2026-04-20T00:27:03.743904270Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1053.003,Cron,persistence,2026-04-19T23:21:15.318086413Z,2026-04-19T23:21:17.129137323Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1053.003,Cron,persistence,2026-04-19T23:21:22.134835969Z,2026-04-19T23:21:23.928586108Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1053.003,Cron,persistence,2026-04-19T23:21:28.934815378Z,2026-04-19T23:21:30.715299868Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1057,Process Discovery,discovery,2026-04-20T00:30:24.402125645Z,2026-04-20T00:30:26.221544426Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1059.004,Unix Shell,execution,2026-04-19T23:18:01.681365242Z,2026-04-19T23:18:06.719474616Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1059.004,Unix Shell,execution,2026-04-19T23:18:11.725866322Z,2026-04-19T23:18:20.496957475Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1059.004,Unix Shell,execution,2026-04-19T23:18:25.503038168Z,2026-04-19T23:18:27.525715696Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1059.006,Python,execution,2026-04-19T23:18:43.341638054Z,2026-04-19T23:18:45.368727507Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1059.006,Python,execution,2026-04-19T23:18:50.375362308Z,2026-04-19T23:18:52.376624040Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1059.006,Python,execution,2026-04-19T23:18:57.383084874Z,2026-04-19T23:20:59.334084903Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1070.004,File Deletion,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:25:41.526420121Z,2026-04-20T00:25:43.370513123Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1070.004,File Deletion,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:25:48.376868194Z,2026-04-20T00:25:50.213997357Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1070.004,File Deletion,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:25:55.220340905Z,2026-04-20T00:25:57.134692866Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1082,System Information Discovery,discovery,2026-04-20T00:30:41.953754187Z,2026-04-20T00:30:44.050727668Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1082,System Information Discovery,discovery,2026-04-20T00:30:49.057145569Z,2026-04-20T00:30:51.145539391Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1082,System Information Discovery,discovery,2026-04-20T00:30:56.152341899Z,2026-04-20T00:30:58.262445401Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1083,File and Directory Discovery,discovery,2026-04-20T00:31:13.943771670Z,2026-04-20T00:31:15.858295030Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1083,File and Directory Discovery,discovery,2026-04-20T00:31:20.864889022Z,2026-04-20T00:31:30.438740733Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1083,File and Directory Discovery,discovery,2026-04-20T00:31:35.445243985Z,2026-04-20T00:31:37.269590947Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1098.004,SSH Authorized Keys,persistence,2026-04-20T00:14:12.358631741Z,2026-04-20T00:14:14.020111589Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,command_and_control,2026-04-20T00:31:52.969294229Z,2026-04-20T00:31:55.663769554Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,command_and_control,2026-04-20T00:32:00.671484771Z,2026-04-20T00:32:03.128654301Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1105,Ingress Tool Transfer,command_and_control,2026-04-20T00:32:08.135220672Z,2026-04-20T00:32:10.559928579Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,initial_access,2026-04-19T22:45:43.962209623Z,2026-04-19T22:45:45.235700734Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,initial_access,2026-04-19T22:45:51.463755615Z,2026-04-19T22:45:52.756753227Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,initial_access,2026-04-19T22:45:58.980795684Z,2026-04-19T22:46:00.263649678Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,initial_access,2026-04-19T22:46:06.486450544Z,2026-04-19T22:46:07.774254382Z,4,art,
+sandbox_host,T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,initial_access,2026-04-19T22:46:13.991062337Z,2026-04-19T22:46:15.276347100Z,5,art,
+sandbox_host,T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,initial_access,2026-04-19T22:46:21.493778083Z,2026-04-19T22:46:22.784321750Z,6,art,
+sandbox_host,T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,initial_access,2026-04-19T22:46:29.005948563Z,2026-04-19T22:46:30.278480726Z,7,art,
+sandbox_host,T1195.002,Compromise Software Supply Chain,initial_access,2026-04-19T22:46:36.495816216Z,2026-04-19T22:46:37.785140546Z,8,art,
+sandbox_host,T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:26:12.922543247Z,2026-04-20T00:26:14.846949090Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:26:19.853198637Z,2026-04-20T00:26:21.783431606Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1222.002,Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:26:26.789544755Z,2026-04-20T00:26:28.721170208Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1543.002,Systemd Service,persistence,2026-04-19T23:50:59.765650410Z,2026-04-19T23:51:26.521462122Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1543.002,Systemd Service,persistence,2026-04-19T23:52:39.894720646Z,2026-04-19T23:54:17.576136538Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1543.002,Systemd Service,persistence,2026-04-19T23:54:22.582266884Z,2026-04-19T23:54:45.571424667Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,persistence,2026-04-19T23:55:01.568631159Z,2026-04-19T23:55:03.406917745Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,persistence,2026-04-19T23:55:08.413312998Z,2026-04-19T23:55:10.202837668Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1546.004,Unix Shell Configuration Modification,persistence,2026-04-19T23:55:15.209673036Z,2026-04-19T23:55:17.010232860Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,privilege_escalation,2026-04-20T00:14:29.982832656Z,2026-04-20T00:14:36.862804138Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,privilege_escalation,2026-04-20T00:14:41.869002067Z,2026-04-20T00:14:48.769179332Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1548.001,Setuid and Setgid,privilege_escalation,2026-04-20T00:14:53.775331564Z,2026-04-20T00:14:55.585905430Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,privilege_escalation,2026-04-20T00:15:11.314148281Z,2026-04-20T00:17:13.146519169Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,privilege_escalation,2026-04-20T00:17:18.152866405Z,2026-04-20T00:17:19.949403438Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1548.003,Sudo and Sudo Caching,privilege_escalation,2026-04-20T00:17:24.955045263Z,2026-04-20T00:17:30.215813570Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1552.001,Credentials In Files,credential_access,2026-04-20T00:27:50.629812895Z,2026-04-20T00:27:52.498058179Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1552.001,Credentials In Files,credential_access,2026-04-20T00:27:57.504584495Z,2026-04-20T00:29:59.576360961Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1552.001,Credentials In Files,credential_access,2026-04-20T00:30:04.583017711Z,2026-04-20T00:30:08.574646575Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:32:26.379801715Z,2026-04-20T00:33:17.755734382Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:33:22.761738237Z,2026-04-20T00:33:25.101641640Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,T1562.001,Disable or Modify Tools,defense_evasion,2026-04-20T00:33:30.108255228Z,2026-04-20T00:33:32.422829942Z,3,art,
+sandbox_host,T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,privilege_escalation,2026-04-20T00:19:24.001827850Z,2026-04-20T00:19:25.776246404Z,1,art,
+sandbox_host,T1574.006,Dynamic Linker Hijacking,privilege_escalation,2026-04-20T00:19:30.782463207Z,2026-04-20T00:19:32.576378213Z,2,art,
+sandbox_host,CHAIN.CAP01,Capstone Chain v0.1 (Supply-Chain Narrative),execution,2026-04-20T00:49:29.090978396Z,2026-04-20T00:49:37.045509190Z,2,art,broken 4-atomic chain: T1057:1 -> T1003.008:1 -> T1105:27 -> T1070.004:1; T1059.004 skipped due to invocation arg error (trial arg missing)

datacard.md

@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+---
+license: cc-by-4.0
+task_categories:
+  - tabular-classification
+  - other
+tags:
+  - host-intrusion-detection
+  - tetragon
+  - ebpf
+  - sequence-modeling
+  - att-and-ck
+  - anomaly-detection
+size_categories:
+  - 10M<n<100M
+language: []
+pretty_name: "v0.2 Tetragon-native HIDS corpus (22 technique IDs)"
+---
+
+## Dataset summary
+
+- **Source:** Tetragon 1.6.1 eBPF telemetry on a single LXC container,
+  6-day collection window 2026-04-14 → 2026-04-20.
+- **Population:** all process / file / network / credential / memory events
+  attributable to the target container's PID-namespace inum across the
+  collection window (parser filters host-namespace events at parse time).
+- **Splits:** chronological — train (2026-04-14T01:41Z → 2026-04-19T22:09Z) /
+  test (2026-04-19T21:46Z → 2026-04-20T02:01Z). All ART attack intervals
+  fall in the test split; train is benign-only by construction.
+- **Format:** Parquet shards under `data/`, suitable for the Hugging Face
+  `datasets` library streaming loader. Labels are a separate `labels.csv`.
+- **License:** CC BY 4.0.
+
+---
+
+## Supported tasks
+
+- **Host-telemetry anomaly detection.** Per-event or per-window scoring
+  against the time-window labels in `labels.csv`.
+- **Sequence anomaly modeling.** Autoregressive next-event prediction (NLL)
+  or masked-event modeling (MEM, including field-aware MEM-FA) over the
+  integer-coded feature columns.
+- **Event-stream classification baselines.** N-gram, IsolationForest,
+  XGBoost, etc. operate directly on the categorical / hash columns.
+
+The corpus is **not** intended for: attack-payload synthesis, ground-truth
+event-level labels (only intervals are labeled), or production deployment
+without recalibration to the operator's own host distribution.
+
+---
+
+## Dataset structure
+
+### Splits
+
+| Split | Rows       | Time span (UTC)†                                  | Attack events | Attack rate |
+|-------|------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|
+| train | 16,951,950 | 2026-04-14 01:41:13 → 2026-04-19 22:09:18         | 0             | 0.0 %       |
+| test  |  2,349,965 | 2026-04-19 21:46:27 → 2026-04-20 02:01:27         | 705,852       | 30.0 %      |
+
+**† Pre-window event timestamps.** ≈295 events (267 train + 28 test, 0.0015 %
+of the corpus) carry `event_time` values that predate the stated collection
+window. All have `f_is_procfs_walk = 1`: parser-synthesized `process_exec`
+records for daemons (`systemd`, `bash`, `dbus-daemon`, `polkitd`, `cron`,
+`sshd`, etc.) that were already running when Tetragon collection started,
+using the daemon's original `process_start_time` as the event timestamp.
+They preserve lineage roots for downstream events. Filter
+`WHERE f_is_procfs_walk = 0` to exclude them from time-window analysis.
+
+### Schema evolution (v0.2.1)
+
+The release artifact is the **encoded** parquet (63 columns: 39 model-input
+columns + 7 hash columns + identifier and side-string columns). Compared to
+v0.2.0 the encoded schema gained four 3a′ promoted categoricals
+(`f_path_category`, `f_dst_ip_category`, `f_dst_port_category`,
+`f_object_category`) and lost two constant-zero booleans (`f_in_init_tree`,
+`f_args_truncated`); two hash columns were right-sized
+(`f_proc_name_hash` 1024 → 2048, `f_proc_cwd_hash` 256 → 4096 with depth
+2 → 4 path components hashed). The full integer-code → label mapping is in
+`reproduction/feature_definitions.json` (schema version 1.1).
+
+The release pipeline is three-stage:
+
+| Stage | Source field                                  | Stage column                              | Transformation |
+|-------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|----------------|
+| Raw Tetragon JSON | `process_exec` / `process_exit` / `process_kprobe` envelope    | `event_type`                              | passthrough → vocab `f_event_type` |
+| → Parser (126-col raw, withheld) | `process.binary`                            | `proc_binary` (full path)                 | derive basename → `proc_binary_basename` (released, aliased) + hash `f_proc_name_hash` |
+|                                 | `process.cwd`                               | `proc_cwd` (full path)                    | normalize → `proc_cwd_normalized` (path-rewritten at release) + hash `f_proc_cwd_hash` |
+|                                 | `process.uid`                               | `proc_uid` (uint32)                       | bucket → `f_proc_uid_bucket` (uint8) — raw uid not released |
+|                                 | `process.arguments`                         | `proc_arguments`                          | length-bucket → `f_args_length_bucket` (uint8); raw args not released |
+|                                 | `process_kprobe.args[].sock.daddr`          | `kp_sock_daddr`                           | category bucket → `dst_ip_category` (string) — raw IP not released |
+| → Behavior builder (encoded, released) | (event_type, kprobe_function_name)          | `f_action_family` (uint8, 15 codes)       | derived; see `feature_definitions.json` |
+|                                                | (parent_basename, proc_basename) pair        | `f_parent_child_pair_hash` (uint16, 1024 buckets) | hash |
+|                                                | proc_exec_id walk                            | `f_lineage_depth`, `f_root_ancestor_basename_hash`, `f_process_tree_id_hash` | derived |
+
+The **126-column raw parser output is withheld** from the public release.
+All raw paths, raw arguments, raw IPs, raw uids, hostnames, and PID-namespace
+inums are dropped at this stage; see "Personal and sensitive information"
+below for the per-column decisions.
+
+### Feature column inventory (encoded parquet)
+
+Full integer-code → label mapping for every categorical column lives in
+`reproduction/feature_definitions.json`. High-level summary:
+
+- **22 integer-coded categorical columns** — 18 from v0.2.0 plus the four
+  3a′ promoted categoricals (`f_path_category` 11-way, `f_dst_ip_category`
+  6-way, `f_dst_port_category` 7-way, `f_object_category` 8-way).
+- **4 string-coded categorical columns** (`path_category`, `object_category`,
+  `dst_ip_category`, `dst_port_category`) — provenance side columns,
+  identical semantics to their `f_*` integer counterparts.
+- **7 hash columns** with declared bucket capacities (2048 / 1024 / 4096 /
+  256 / 1024 / 1024 / 4096 — see *Hash-bucket utilization* below).
+- **6 boolean flag columns** (e.g. `f_is_procfs_walk`, `f_uid_eq_parent`,
+  `f_kp_commit_creds_uid_change`).
+- **5 numeric columns** (`delta_t_prev_ns`, `process_age_ns`, mmap/mprotect
+  prot bitmasks, fd integer).
+- **3 bucketed log-time columns** (`f_delta_t_log_bucket`,
+  `f_process_age_log_bucket`, `f_lineage_depth`).
+- **3 identifier columns** (`event_time`, `proc_exec_id`, `proc_pid`).
+- **7 release-eligible side-string columns** (basenames, normalized cwd,
+  parent-child pair, token, process_tree_root_exec_id).
+
+### Class distributions (train split)
+
+**`f_event_type`** (4-way; OOV not observed):
+
+| Code | Label             | Count       | %     |
+|------|-------------------|-------------|-------|
+| 2    | process_kprobe    | 16,413,759  | 96.83 |
+| 1    | process_exit      |    288,716  |  1.70 |
+| 0    | process_exec      |    249,475  |  1.47 |
+
+**`f_action_family`** (15-way; top 10 shown; full table in
+`feature_definitions.json`):
+
+| Code | Label              | Count       |
+|------|--------------------|-------------|
+| 6    | FILE_OPEN          | 14,852,286  |
+| 12   | MEM_MAP            |  1,168,402  |
+| 1    | PROC_EXIT          |    288,716  |
+| 9    | PRIV_CHANGE        |    257,709  |
+| 0    | PROC_EXEC          |    249,475  |
+| 7    | FILE_DELETE        |     44,818  |
+| 5    | NET_SEND           |     23,672  |
+| 13   | MEM_PROTECT        |     19,059  |
+| 3    | NET_CLOSE          |     18,451  |
+| 2    | NET_CONNECT        |     16,359  |
+
+### ATT&CK label coverage
+
+61 labeled time intervals span 21 ATT&CK techniques + 1 supply-chain capstone
+chain across 8 tactics. **All attack-positive intervals are in the test
+split.** Per-technique event counts (test split, top 10 by event volume):
+
+| ID          | Technique                                                  | Test events |
+|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| T1059.004   | Unix Shell                                                 | 175,797     |
+| T1083       | File and Directory Discovery                               | 154,581     |
+| T1552.001   | Credentials In Files                                       |  97,493     |
+| T1543.002   | Systemd Service                                            |  47,901     |
+| CHAIN.CAP01 | Capstone Chain v0.1 (Supply-Chain Narrative)               |  34,130     |
+| T1548.003   | Sudo and Sudo Caching                                      |  24,229     |
+| T1059.006   | Python                                                     |  22,675     |
+| T1562.001   | Disable or Modify Tools                                    |  18,610     |
+| T1195.002   | Compromise Software Supply Chain                           |  15,703     |
+| T1548.001   | Setuid and Setgid                                          |  12,461     |
+
+Full per-technique table is reproducible from `notebooks/v0-2_dataset_audit.ipynb`
+(cell 63).
+
+### Hash-bucket utilization (train split, post-3a′ caps)
+
+| Column                          | Capacity | Buckets used | Saturation |
+|---------------------------------|----------|--------------|------------|
+| f_proc_name_hash                | 2048     | 269          | 13.1 %     |
+| f_parent_proc_hash              | 1024     | 121          | 11.8 %     |
+| f_proc_cwd_hash                 | 4096     |  65          |  1.6 %     |
+| f_lineage_bag_hash              |  256     |  98          | 38.3 %     |
+| f_parent_child_pair_hash        | 1024     | 490          | 47.9 %     |
+| f_root_ancestor_basename_hash   | 1024     |   5          |  0.5 %     |
+| f_process_tree_id_hash          | 4096     |   7          |  0.2 %     |
+
+Low saturation reflects the single-host single-developer baseline (a small
+real basename / cwd / lineage population). The 3a′ capacity bumps on
+`f_proc_name_hash` and `f_proc_cwd_hash` were sized for plausible multi-host
+saturation rather than this corpus's observed counts; the values are
+documented here so re-trainers can resize the embedding tables.
+
+---
+
+## Dataset creation
+
+### Curation rationale
+
+This dataset was assembled to support the v0.2 milestone of an academic
+project investigating Mamba-based anomaly detection on host telemetry. The
+v0.1 predecessor produced an *inverted* AUROC (~0.35) on a similar but
+parser-buggy corpus; v0.2 was rebuilt with a Tetragon-native parser,
+sentinel-window exclusion at parse time, and a two-stage
+parser → behavior-builder design that preserves a raw normalized parquet
+internally for iteration. The **v0.2.1 release** further re-parsed the same
+collection on 2026-04-29 with five correctness fixes:
+
+- Procfs-walk synthetic execs are now **tagged, not dropped** (1,346 events
+  recovered corpus-wide; lineage gaps for daemons running before agent start
+  closed).
+- `delta_t_prev_ns` is keyed **per-process** rather than globally, removing
+  44,947 train + 1,643 test negative residuals.
+- Test-split lineage walking now seeds from the train parquet first,
+  resolving 39 % of previously-missing parents (test
+  `lineage_missing_parent`: 5.25 % → 2.88 %).
+- Parser parallelized across files via `multiprocessing.Pool`, with DuckDB
+  `ORDER BY event_time` for chronological output.
+- Mamba NLL scorer's front-pad alignment fix: `nll_padded[i]` is now event
+  *i*'s surprise (was *i+1*'s in v0.2.0).
+
+### Source data
+
+- **Sensor:** Tetragon 1.6.1 (Cilium eBPF) running on a Linux host.
+- **Workload:** a single LXC container hosting a developer's daily workspace
+  (Node, Python, VSCode, npm). Background services inside the container
+  (systemd-resolved, dbus, polkitd, etc.) contribute system noise.
+- **Tracing policies:** 7 YAML policies covering file, network, memory,
+  privilege, process-injection, and file-attribute kprobes (bundled in
+  `reproduction/tetragon-configs/`).
+- **Attribution:** the parser pins on PID-namespace inum, which uniquely
+  identifies the target container across an inum rotation that occurred
+  during the collection window. Host-namespace events are dropped at parse
+  time.
+
+### Annotations
+
+Time-window labels are provided in `labels.csv` (61 rows; 22 distinct
+technique IDs incl. one capstone chain; 8 tactics). Labels were generated
+by an Atomic Red Team campaign run inside the same container during the
+test window, with start/end timestamps captured per-trial. The campaign
+manifest is bundled at `reproduction/agentic-art-campaign/`.
+
+### Personal and sensitive information
+
+**component-first anonymization** with deep aliasing across all PII-bearing string
+columns. Summary:
+
+- **126-column raw parquet withheld.** All raw paths, raw arguments, raw
+  IPs, raw uids, hostnames, and PID-namespace inums are dropped at the
+  parser stage. The released parquet is the 63-column encoded form.
+- **Basename aliasing.** A single alias map covers `proc_binary_basename`,
+  `parent_binary_basename`, and `root_ancestor_basename`. Distro-standard
+  binaries and dev-tooling that anchor the "standardized agentic-research
+  workstation" baseline (`bash`, `node`, `python3.12`, `claude`, `gh`,
+  `npm`, `code`, `git`, etc.) pass through verbatim. Custom binaries
+  (ART trial scripts, build artifacts) become `custom_tool_NNN` (lex-sorted).
+  VSCode commit-hash binaries (`code-<40hex>`) collapse to a single
+  `vscode_server_bin` alias. The full original → alias map is shipped at
+  `reproduction/alias_map.json`.
+- **Composite re-composition.** `parent_child_pair` and `token` are
+  regenerated from the aliased atomic columns via the canonical
+  `format_token`, so the original (un-aliased) basename never re-enters
+  these fields.
+- **Path rewriting.** `proc_cwd_normalized` is rewritten by ordered rules:
+  `/home/<user>` → `/home/_user_`, `/Users/<user>` → `/Users/_user_`,
+  `/mnt/projects/<X>` → `/workspace/_project_`, `/projects/<X>` →
+  `/workspace/_project_`, residual `rypow_` → `custom_`.
+- **Exec-id pseudonymization.** `proc_exec_id` and
+  `process_tree_root_exec_id` are rewritten as
+  `exec_<32hex>` via salted HMAC-SHA256 (16-byte digest, hex-encoded).
+  Equality joins are preserved (lineage walks still work); the original
+  base64-encoded `host:ts:pid` payload is erased.
+- **Defensive global string sweep.** A final substring pass over every
+  string column substitutes `rypow → research_user`,
+  `prox1 → sandbox_host`, `dendroaspis → agent_platform_v02`,
+  `ryan_admin → privileged_user` as a safety net.
+- **Post-write assertions.** A regex sweep over the released shards
+  (notebook §22-24) confirms zero matches on raw or base64-decoded values
+  for any of: `prox1`, `rypow`, `ryan_admin`, `/home/rypow/`,
+  `/projects/ml_final_project`, `/mnt/projects/`, `dendroaspis`,
+  `/datasets/`, MAC-address pattern. `proc_exec_id` and
+  `process_tree_root_exec_id` are format-checked against
+  `^exec_[0-9a-f]{32}$`. Every basename in the three basename columns is
+  asserted to be in the alias-map closure.
+
+---
+
+## Considerations for using the data
+
+### Sources of bias
+
+- **Single host, single developer.** All baseline (benign) telemetry comes
+  from one Linux container running one developer's daily workflow over six
+  days. Tool habits (VSCode, npm, git, claude-code) appear at high
+  frequency; absent activities (CI/CD pipelines, multi-tenant traffic, GPU
+  jobs) are simply not represented.
+- **Container-internal UIDs.** Tetragon 1.6.1 emits container-internal UIDs;
+  the encoder buckets uids into 5 classes (ROOT / RESEARCH_USER /
+  SYSTEM_LOW / DAEMON_HIGH / OTHER) rather than treating them as a
+  continuous identifier. Researchers reusing these buckets on multi-host
+  data should re-bucket.
+- **Time skew.** Train spans 5 d 20 h, test spans only 4 h 15 m. The test
+  window concentrates 30 % attack-event mass, which is unrealistically dense
+  for production traffic; downstream metrics (AUROC, AP) on this corpus
+  reflect the campaign's deliberate density.
+- **Hash-bucket sparsity.** Hash columns are sized for plausible multi-host
+  saturation; on this single-host corpus most are < 50 % utilized (see
+  hash-bucket table above).
+- **Aliased basename narrative.** The v0.2.1 anonymizer collapses a long
+  tail of one-off custom binaries into `custom_tool_NNN` slots and folds
+  per-build VSCode commit-hash binaries into `vscode_server_bin`. The
+  resulting parquet looks like a "standardized agentic-research workstation"
+  baseline more than the specific developer's machine; the true diversity
+  of custom-script names was higher than what survives in the released
+  string columns.
+
+### Social impact
+
+This is a defensive-research dataset. It enables researchers to develop and
+benchmark host-anomaly-detection models without operating live attack
+infrastructure. The bundled ATT&CK technique inventory is **not** an
+attack tutorial — payload generation requires a separate Atomic Red Team
+installation and is out of scope.
+
+### Known limitations
+
+- **No ground-truth event-level labels.** Labels are time-window only; some
+  benign system activity (e.g. background daemons running during an ART
+  technique window) is *labeled-attack* by association.
+- **Train has zero attack events.** All ART intervals fall in test by
+  construction. Unsupervised / self-supervised methods are the natural fit;
+  fully supervised classifiers would need to engineer their own
+  train-time positives.
+- **Single Tetragon version.** Format quirks of Tetragon 1.6.1 (e.g.
+  KPROBE_ACTION enum coverage, ns-PID inum semantics) are baked in. Older
+  / newer Tetragon emits slightly different envelopes; the parser pin in
+  `reproduction/PARSER_VERSION` documents the exact reference build.
+- **Linux only.** Tetragon is Linux-only; this corpus has no Windows or
+  macOS analogue.
+
+### Intended use + dual-use disclaimer
+
+**Intended use.** This dataset supports:
+
+- training and evaluating sequence / anomaly models on host telemetry,
+- benchmarking baselines (n-gram, XGBoost, IsolationForest, LSTM, Mamba,
+  Transformer) on a fixed split,
+- studying ATT&CK-technique-specific detectability,
+- research on attack representations, lineage features, and event encoders.
+
+**Not intended use.** The attack telemetry is real ATT&CK technique
+execution but generated in an isolated lab LXC container; the corpus is
+**not** an attack template, **not** a payload library, and **not** a
+substitute for production EDR data. Operators who reuse the bundled
+tracing policies + parser to collect their own corpus are responsible for
+their own sandboxing.
+
+---
+
+## Additional information
+
+### License
+
+CC BY 4.0 — see `LICENSE` in this repo. Code under
+`reproduction/scripts/` (in the project repository) is MIT-licensed.
+
+### Citation
+
+```bibtex
+@dataset{dendroaspis_v0_2_2026,
+  title   = {v0.2 Tetragon-native HIDS corpus with 21 ATT\&CK techniques},
+  author  = {Powers, Ryan William},
+  year    = {2026},
+  version = {0.2.1},
+  doi     = {<TBD-on-publish>},
+  url     = {<TBD-on-publish>}
+}
+```
+
+### Contact
+
+GitHub: [@ryypow](https://github.com/ryypow). Issues / corrections
+preferred via the project repository.
+
+repos: https://github.com/ryypow/dendroaspis

datasheet.md

@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+# Datasheet — v0.2 Tetragon-native HIDS corpus
+
+Following the [Datasheets for Datasets](https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09010)
+framework (Gebru et al.). Cross-references the
+[`datacard.md`](./datacard.md) for numerical breakdowns; this document
+covers process and provenance.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Motivation
+
+### Why was this dataset created?
+
+To support an academic project investigating
+distributed Mamba state-space models for host-telemetry LLM-orchestrated attack detection.
+
+### Who created this dataset and on behalf of which entity?
+
+Ryan William Powers, in the context of an academic course project. No
+commercial entity is involved; collection happened on the author's own
+Linux host.
+
+### Who funded the creation of the dataset?
+
+Self-funded.
+
+### Any other comments?
+
+The release is contingent on the author's anonymization sweep: per-column decisions
+documented in the datacard's "Personal and sensitive information" section);
+no third-party identifiable data was captured because no third-party
+traffic crosses the isolated LXC container.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Composition
+
+### What do the instances represent?
+
+Each instance is a single **OS event** — one row of the parquet —
+emitted by Tetragon eBPF probes inside an LXC container during normal
+developer activity or during a labeled ATT&CK technique trial. Events
+fall into three top-level types: `process_exec`, `process_exit`, and
+`process_kprobe` (with the kprobe sub-type captured in
+`f_kprobe_function`).
+
+### How many instances are there?
+
+- Train: 16,951,950 events (no attack labels by design)
+- Test:  2,349,965 events (705,852 inside labeled-attack windows ≈ 30 %)
+- Total: 19,301,915 events
+
+### Does the dataset contain all possible instances?
+
+No. The dataset is a **time-bounded sample** from one host between
+2026-04-14T01:41Z and 2026-04-20T02:01Z. Only events the parser admits
+(post container filter, post sentinel-window exclusion) reach the
+parquet. Procfs-walk synthetic execs are **tagged** (via
+`f_is_procfs_walk = 1`) rather than dropped, so they are present in the
+release; filter on the flag if needed.
+
+### What does each instance consist of?
+
+A 63-column row mixing:
+- 22 integer-coded categoricals (`f_event_type`, `f_action_family`, etc.,
+  including the four 3a′ promoted categoricals: `f_path_category`,
+  `f_dst_ip_category`, `f_dst_port_category`, `f_object_category`)
+- 4 string-coded categoricals (`path_category`, `object_category`,
+  `dst_ip_category`, `dst_port_category` — provenance side columns)
+- 7 hash columns (256–4096 buckets each)
+- 6 boolean flags (`f_in_init_tree` and `f_args_truncated` were dropped
+  in 3a′ as constant-zero in this corpus)
+- 5 numeric columns (timestamps in ns, capability bitmasks, fd integer)
+- 3 bucketed log-time columns
+- 3 identifier columns (`event_time`, `proc_exec_id`, `proc_pid`)
+- 7 release-eligible side strings (basenames, normalized cwd,
+  `parent_child_pair`, `token`, `process_tree_root_exec_id`)
+
+Full schema and integer-code → label mapping in
+`reproduction/feature_definitions.json` (schema version 1.1).
+
+### Is there a label or target associated with each instance?
+
+Not directly. **Time-window labels** in `labels.csv` provide
+`(host, technique_id, technique_name, tactic, start_ts, end_ts, trial,
+delivery, notes)` per ART trial. To label an instance, join on
+`event_time >= start_ts AND event_time < end_ts` (half-open interval —
+matches the audit notebook); the event inherits the intersected
+interval's technique label. Events outside any interval are benign by
+exclusion.
+
+### Is any information missing from individual instances?
+
+Yes, by design:
+
+- Raw paths (`proc_binary`, `proc_cwd`, `parent_*`, `kp_*_path`) are dropped.
+- Raw arguments (`proc_arguments`, `parent_arguments`, `kprobe_args_json`)
+  are dropped.
+- Raw IPs (`kp_sock_daddr`, `kp_sock_saddr`) are dropped.
+- Raw uids and namespace inums are dropped.
+- Hostnames (`node_name`) are dropped.
+- `proc_exec_id` and `process_tree_root_exec_id` are pseudonymized to
+  `exec_<32hex>` via salted HMAC-SHA256; equality joins are preserved
+  (lineage walks still work) but the original `host:ts:pid` payload
+  is erased.
+- Basenames (`proc_binary_basename`, `parent_binary_basename`,
+  `root_ancestor_basename`) are aliased: distro / dev-tooling pass
+  through verbatim, custom binaries become `custom_tool_NNN`, VSCode
+  commit-hash binaries collapse to `vscode_server_bin`. Full alias map
+  at `reproduction/alias_map.json`.
+
+These are reachable in the original raw parquet (not released; see §6
+distribution) and are reconstructible from the bundled parser + tracing
+configs by re-collecting one's own data.
+
+### Are relationships between individual instances made explicit?
+
+Yes — process lineage is preserved through three columns:
+
+- `proc_exec_id` — pseudonymized but stable per-exec identifier.
+- `f_lineage_depth` + `f_lineage_bag_hash` — encoder-side ancestry.
+- `process_tree_root_exec_id` + `f_root_ancestor_basename_hash` — root
+  of the process subtree.
+
+### Are there recommended data splits?
+
+Yes. **Use the chronological train/test split as shipped.** All ART
+attack intervals fall in test; train is benign-only by construction.
+This is the split the v0.2 paper reports on.
+
+### Is the dataset self-contained?
+
+Almost. The parquet shards + `labels.csv` + `feature_definitions.json`
+are the canonical artifact. `reproduction/` contains the configs.
+
+### Does the dataset contain confidential / offensive content?
+
+No confidential third-party data — collection happened on an isolated
+LXC container with no external user traffic. ATT&CK technique execution
+is by construction adversarial-style activity but happened only against
+the author's own container. An anonymizer further de-identifies
+the released parquet (basename aliasing, path rewriting, exec-id
+pseudonymization, defensive global string sweep — see
+`datacard.md` "Personal and sensitive information").
+
+---
+
+## 3. Collection process
+
+### How was the data acquired?
+
+- **Sensor:** Tetragon 1.6.1 (Cilium eBPF) running as a host-level daemon.
+- **Target:** a single LXC container on the host. The parser pins on the
+  container's PID-namespace inum at filter time.
+- **Tracing policies:** 7 YAML policies covering file (fd_install,
+  do_unlinkat, chmod_common), network (tcp_connect / close, inet_csk_accept,
+  udp_sendmsg), memory (security_mmap_file, security_file_mprotect),
+  privilege (commit_creds), process injection (sys_ptrace,
+  sys_process_vm_writev), and file-attribute hooks. Bundled in
+  `reproduction/tetragon-configs/`.
+- **Output format:** rotated `events-*.json.gz` files written to
+  `/var/log/tetragon/` and rsynced to a NAS for archival.
+
+### Is the data sample of a larger set?
+
+Yes — a time-bounded slice of the host's Tetragon stream during the
+collection window. Earlier and later data from the same host exists but
+is not part of this release.
+
+### Who collected the data, and how were they compensated?
+
+The author. No compensation; this is an academic course project.
+
+### Over what timeframe was the data collected?
+
+2026-04-14T01:41:13Z (first event in train) → 2026-04-20T02:01:27Z (last
+event in test). 6-day collection window, with a brief Tetragon outage on
+2026-04-18→19 (documented in the project repo's incident log) that
+triggered a PID-namespace inum rotation captured in the multi-inum
+`target_pid_ns_inum` filter.
+
+### Were any ethical-review processes conducted?
+
+No formal IRB. The dataset captures only the author's own activity on
+the author's own hardware.
+
+### Were the individuals notified / did they consent?
+
+The dataset captures the author's own session; the author is the sole
+subject and consents to the release
+
+---
+
+## 4. Preprocessing / cleaning / labeling
+
+### Was preprocessing / cleaning done?
+
+Yes. Two stages:
+
+1. **Parser** (`tetragon_native_parser.py`):
+   - Container filter: drops events outside the target PID-namespace
+     inum set.
+   - Sentinel-window filter: drops events inside four ART setup / dry-run
+     / smoke-test intervals on 2026-04-19.
+   - Procfs-walk: synthetic execs from Tetragon's startup /proc/ scan
+     are **tagged** (`f_is_procfs_walk = 1`), not dropped — they preserve
+     lineage roots for daemons that pre-existed the agent.
+   - Field normalization: parses RFC3339-ns timestamps to int64 ns,
+     hydrates 126 typed columns from the JSONL envelopes.
+
+2. **Behavior builder** (`v0_2_behavior_builder.py`):
+   - Lineage walk to populate `f_lineage_*` and `process_tree_*` columns.
+     Train→test seeding closes daemon-rooted parents that lived only in
+     the train window.
+   - Action-family / object-category / path-category / dst-ip-category /
+     dst-port-category derivations.
+   - Hashing of basenames / lineage bags / parent-child pairs into
+     fixed-capacity buckets (3a′ caps: 2048 / 1024 / 4096 / 256 / 1024 /
+     1024 / 4096).
+   - Categorical encoding of every kept column to `uint8` / `uint16`.
+   - Per-process `delta_t_prev_ns` keying (eliminates global-stream
+     ordering artifacts).
+
+3. **Anonymization** (`scripts/anonymize_v0_2_parquet.py`, run after the
+   builder): basename aliasing, path rewriting, composite re-composition,
+   exec-id salted-HMAC pseudonymization, defensive global string sweep.
+   See the datacard "Personal and sensitive information" section.
+
+### Was the "raw" data saved?
+
+Yes, internally. The 126-column raw parquet (`raw_train.parquet`,
+`raw_test.parquet`) is not part of the public release because it would
+require column-level scrubbing across 9 path-bearing columns spanning
+60–95 % of rows. Re-collection from the bundled configs is the supported
+path for raw data.
+
+### Is the preprocessing software available?
+
+Yes. Both stages live in the project repository at the parser SHA pinned
+in `reproduction/PARSER_VERSION`. The repo (linked from the
+[Hugging Face dataset card](./datacard.md)) is permissively licensed (MIT).
+- **https://github.com/ryypow/dendroaspis**
+
+---
+
+## 5. Uses
+
+### Has the dataset been used for any tasks?
+
+Yes:
+
+- **Mamba NLL (autoregressive, Run 2)** — next-event surprise scorer with
+  the front-pad alignment fix; test AUROC = 0.7411.
+- **Mamba MEM-FA (field-aware masked-event modeling, Run 2)** —
+  per-field categorical CE heads on top of the encoded representation;
+  test AUROC = 0.7513 (best Mamba result on this corpus).
+- **Classical-baseline bake-off** — n-gram (token-level), IsolationForest,
+  XGBoost, all trained on the same encoded feature columns. Best
+  classical: IsolationForest (AUROC 0.6658). Mamba's stack adds ≈0.085
+  AUROC over the strongest classical. Raw eval JSONs at
+  `mamba-edge/artifacts/v0.2/baseline_*/` in the project repo.
+
+### Is there a repository linking to use cases?
+
+- **https://github.com/ryypow/dendroaspis**
+
+### What other tasks could this dataset be used for?
+
+- ATT&CK-technique-specific detector evaluation
+- Self-supervised pretraining for host-telemetry transformers
+- Lineage / process-tree representation learning
+- Temporal-anomaly-scoring baselines
+- Sequence-tokenization research (the `token` column is a structured
+  composite identifier; alternative tokenizations can be derived)
+
+### Is there anything about the dataset's composition that could result in unfair treatment?
+
+Single-host, single-developer baseline. Models trained on this corpus
+**will not generalize** to multi-host or multi-tenant environments
+without recalibration. The datacard's "Sources of bias" enumerates the
+specific limitations.
+
+### Are there tasks for which the dataset should NOT be used?
+
+- **Production deployment.** Recalibration is mandatory; the
+  hash-bucket sizes are right-sized for plausible multi-host saturation
+  but observed utilization here is very low — see datacard's
+  hash-bucket utilization table.
+- **Generalization claims about HIDS.** A 21-technique single-host
+  evaluation is necessary but not sufficient evidence; use it as one
+  bench among many, not the bench.
+- **Attack template / red-team training data.** The corpus is event-side
+  telemetry, not payloads.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Distribution
+
+### How will the dataset be distributed?
+
+Hugging Face Hub — `<user>/dendroaspis-tetragon-hids` (URL filled in at
+publish time). The release bundle is a directory; the parquet shards are
+under `data/`, datacard / datasheet / license / citation at the root,
+and reproduction artifacts under `reproduction/`. SHA256 manifest
+included (`SHA256SUMS`) plus a JSON release manifest (`RELEASE.json`)
+recording the build timestamp + revision SHA + per-file sha256.
+
+### Is there a fee?
+
+No. Public, free.
+
+### When will the dataset be distributed?
+
+April 2026
+
+### Will the dataset be distributed under a copyright / IP license?
+
+CC BY 4.0 (data) + MIT (bundled scripts).
+
+### Have any third parties imposed IP-based or other restrictions?
+
+No.
+
+### Do any export controls / regulatory restrictions apply?
+
+No. Behavioral telemetry from a homelab; no controlled technologies are
+captured.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Maintenance
+
+### Who is supporting / hosting / maintaining the dataset?
+
+Ryan William Powers via the Hugging Face Hub repo. Bug reports, errata,
+and corrections via GitHub issues on the project repository (linked from
+the datacard).
+
+### How can the manager be contacted?
+
+GitHub: [@ryypow](https://github.com/ryypow).
+
+### Will the dataset be updated?
+
+No. Future work includes similar experiments using telemetry derivede from other platforms.
+This will remain a stable citation target.
+
+### If others want to contribute extensions / build on the dataset?
+
+Forking the dataset repo, applying changes, and citing the original is
+fine under CC BY 4.0. For substantive extensions (e.g. a multi-host
+re-collection), open a GitHub issue first to coordinate naming and
+avoid label-schema drift.

dendroaspis.bib

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+@dataset{dendroaspis_v0_2_2026,
+  title   = {dendroaspis: Tetragon-native HIDS corpus},
+  author  = {Powers, Ryan William},
+  year    = {2026},
+  month   = apr,
+  version = {0.2.1},
+  doi     = {<TBD-on-publish>},
+  url     = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/rypow/dendroaspis-tetragon-hids},
+  howpublished = {Hugging Face Datasets, revision \texttt{a89608d9b8d98730dc34f6586b74a83e2bdace74}},
+  note    = {Linux eBPF telemetry, 19.3M total events; ~2M evaluation events included LLM-orchestrated MITRE ATT&CK artifacts.
+  See datacard, README.md and https://github.com/ryypow/dendroaspis for full numbers.},
+  license = {CC BY 4.0}
+}

reproduction/alias_map.json

@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+{
+  "00-header": "00-header",
+  "10-help-text": "10-help-text",
+  "3": "custom_tool_001",
+  "30-systemd-environment-d-generator": "30-systemd-environment-d-generator",
+  "50-motd-news": "50-motd-news",
+  "9": "custom_tool_002",
+  "91-contract-ua-esm-status": "91-contract-ua-esm-status",
+  "91-release-upgrade": "91-release-upgrade",
+  "92-unattended-upgrades": "92-unattended-upgrades",
+  "Alice": "custom_tool_003",
+  "Bob": "custom_tool_004",
+  "CA": "custom_tool_005",
+  "Join": "custom_tool_006",
+  "Leave": "custom_tool_007",
+  "Merge": "custom_tool_008",
+  "Refresh": "custom_tool_009",
+  "Setup": "custom_tool_010",
+  "VerifyingYourHORSSolution.sh": "custom_tool_011",
+  "VerifyingYourSolutionTGDH.sh": "custom_tool_012",
+  "agetty": "agetty",
+  "apport": "apport",
+  "appstreamcli": "appstreamcli",
+  "apt": "apt",
+  "apt-compat": "apt-compat",
+  "apt-config": "apt-config",
+  "apt-extracttemplates": "apt-extracttemplates",
+  "apt-get": "apt-get",
+  "apt-helper": "apt-helper",
+  "apt-key": "apt-key",
+  "apt.systemd.daily": "apt.systemd.daily",
+  "arch": "arch",
+  "as": "as",
+  "assert_clean_state.sh": "custom_tool_013",
+  "awk": "awk",
+  "base64": "base64",
+  "basename": "basename",
+  "bash": "bash",
+  "bibtex": "bibtex",
+  "browser.sh": "custom_tool_014",
+  "c++": "c++",
+  "cap": "cap",
+  "cat": "cat",
+  "cc": "cc",
+  "cc1": "cc1",
+  "cc1plus": "cc1plus",
+  "chattr": "chattr",
+  "check-new-release": "check-new-release",
+  "chmod": "chmod",
+  "chown": "chown",
+  "chrome-headless-shell": "chrome-headless-shell",
+  "claude": "claude",
+  "claude.exe": "claude.exe",
+  "cleanup": "cleanup",
+  "clear": "clear",
+  "clear_console": "clear_console",
+  "cloudcode_cli": "cloudcode_cli",
+  "cmp": "cmp",
+  "cnf-update-db": "cnf-update-db",
+  "code": "code",
+  "code-41dd792b5e652393e7787322889ed5fdc58bd75b": "vscode_server_bin",
+  "code-560a9dba96f961efea7b1612916f89e5d5d4d679": "vscode_server_bin",
+  "code-server": "code-server",
+  "collect2": "collect2",
+  "command-not-found": "command-not-found",
+  "containerd": "containerd",
+  "cp": "cp",
+  "cpuUsage.sh": "custom_tool_015",
+  "cron": "cron",
+  "crontab": "crontab",
+  "curl": "curl",
+  "cut": "cut",
+  "dash": "dash",
+  "date": "date",
+  "dbus-daemon": "dbus-daemon",
+  "dbus-send": "dbus-send",
+  "dbus.postinst": "dbus.postinst",
+  "deb-systemd-invoke": "deb-systemd-invoke",
+  "debian-sa1": "debian-sa1",
+  "diff": "diff",
+  "dircolors": "dircolors",
+  "dirname": "dirname",
+  "dmidecode": "dmidecode",
+  "docker": "docker",
+  "dpkg": "dpkg",
+  "dpkg-db-backup": "dpkg-db-backup",
+  "dpkg-deb": "dpkg-deb",
+  "dpkg-maintscript-helper": "dpkg-maintscript-helper",
+  "dpkg-preconfigure": "dpkg-preconfigure",
+  "dpkg-query": "dpkg-query",
+  "dpkg-split": "dpkg-split",
+  "dpkg-statoverride": "dpkg-statoverride",
+  "du": "du",
+  "echo": "echo",
+  "ed": "ed",
+  "env": "env",
+  "envsubst": "envsubst",
+  "exe": "custom_tool_016",
+  "expr": "expr",
+  "file": "file",
+  "find": "find",
+  "findmnt": "findmnt",
+  "flock": "flock",
+  "friendly-recovery": "friendly-recovery",
+  "g++": "g++",
+  "gcc": "gcc",
+  "gdbus": "gdbus",
+  "gemini": "gemini",
+  "get_PreReqs.sh": "custom_tool_017",
+  "getconf": "getconf",
+  "getent": "getent",
+  "getopt": "getopt",
+  "gettext": "gettext",
+  "gh": "gh",
+  "git": "git",
+  "git-remote-https": "git-remote-https",
+  "git-submodule": "git-submodule",
+  "gpg-connect-agent": "gpg-connect-agent",
+  "gpgconf": "gpgconf",
+  "gpgv": "gpgv",
+  "grep": "grep",
+  "groups": "groups",
+  "gtk-update-icon-cache": "gtk-update-icon-cache",
+  "gzip": "gzip",
+  "head": "head",
+  "helpztags": "helpztags",
+  "hicolor-icon-theme.postinst": "hicolor-icon-theme.postinst",
+  "hostname": "hostname",
+  "htop": "htop",
+  "http": "http",
+  "https": "https",
+  "id": "id",
+  "install": "install",
+  "ip": "ip",
+  "jq": "jq",
+  "kmod": "kmod",
+  "ld": "ld",
+  "ld-linux-x86-64.so.2": "ld-linux-x86-64.so.2",
+  "ldconfig": "ldconfig",
+  "ldconfig.real": "ldconfig.real",
+  "ldd": "ldd",
+  "less": "less",
+  "lesspipe": "lesspipe",
+  "libc-bin.postinst": "libc-bin.postinst",
+  "ln": "ln",
+  "local": "local",
+  "locale": "locale",
+  "locale-check": "locale-check",
+  "login": "login",
+  "logrotate": "logrotate",
+  "ls": "ls",
+  "lsb_release": "lsb_release",
+  "lsmod": "lsmod",
+  "lspci": "lspci",
+  "lxc-start": "lxc-start",
+  "lxc-start (deleted)": "lxc-start (deleted)",
+  "make": "make",
+  "man-db": "man-db",
+  "man-db.postinst": "man-db.postinst",
+  "mandb": "mandb",
+  "master": "master",
+  "memfd:lxc-attach (deleted)": "memfd:lxc-attach (deleted)",
+  "mkdir": "mkdir",
+  "mktemp": "mktemp",
+  "mmdc": "mmdc",
+  "mount": "mount",
+  "mv": "mv",
+  "nano": "nano",
+  "netplan": "netplan",
+  "node": "node",
+  "node-gyp": "node-gyp",
+  "npm": "npm",
+  "nvidia-modprobe": "nvidia-modprobe",
+  "nvidia-smi": "nvidia-smi",
+  "packagekitd": "packagekitd",
+  "pager": "pager",
+  "pdfinfo": "pdfinfo",
+  "pdflatex": "pdflatex",
+  "pet": "pet",
+  "pgrep": "pgrep",
+  "pickup": "pickup",
+  "ping": "ping",
+  "pip": "pip",
+  "pkill": "pkill",
+  "pkttyagent": "pkttyagent",
+  "polkit-agent-helper-1": "polkit-agent-helper-1",
+  "polkitd": "polkitd",
+  "polkitd.postinst": "polkitd.postinst",
+  "polkitd.postrm": "polkitd.postrm",
+  "polkitd.prerm": "polkitd.prerm",
+  "postconf": "postconf",
+  "postdrop": "postdrop",
+  "postfix-instance-generator": "postfix-instance-generator",
+  "prebuild-install": "prebuild-install",
+  "preinst": "preinst",
+  "printenv": "printenv",
+  "printf": "printf",
+  "ps": "ps",
+  "pwsh": "pwsh",
+  "pyenv": "pyenv",
+  "pyenv-commands": "pyenv-commands",
+  "pyenv-exec": "pyenv-exec",
+  "pyenv-hooks": "pyenv-hooks",
+  "pyenv-init": "pyenv-init",
+  "pyenv-latest": "pyenv-latest",
+  "pyenv-prefix": "pyenv-prefix",
+  "pyenv-rehash": "pyenv-rehash",
+  "pyenv-sh-activate": "pyenv-sh-activate",
+  "pyenv-version-file": "pyenv-version-file",
+  "pyenv-version-file-read": "pyenv-version-file-read",
+  "pyenv-version-name": "pyenv-version-name",
+  "pyenv-versions": "pyenv-versions",
+  "pyenv-virtualenv-init": "pyenv-virtualenv-init",
+  "pyenv-virtualenv-prefix": "pyenv-virtualenv-prefix",
+  "pyenv-which": "pyenv-which",
+  "python": "python",
+  "python3": "python3",
+  "python3.12": "python3.12",
+  "qmgr": "qmgr",
+  "readlink": "readlink",
+  "realpath": "realpath",
+  "release-upgrade-motd": "release-upgrade-motd",
+  "reset": "reset",
+  "rg": "rg",
+  "rm": "rm",
+  "rmdir": "rmdir",
+  "rsyslogd": "rsyslogd",
+  "ruff": "ruff",
+  "run-parts": "run-parts",
+  "run-trial.sh": "custom_tool_018",
+  "run_atomic_chain.sh": "custom_tool_019",
+  "run_atomic_trial.sh": "custom_tool_020",
+  "sa1": "sa1",
+  "sa2": "sa2",
+  "sadc": "sadc",
+  "sar.sysstat": "sar.sysstat",
+  "savelog": "savelog",
+  "scp": "scp",
+  "sed": "sed",
+  "sendmail": "sendmail",
+  "service": "service",
+  "setcap": "setcap",
+  "setpriv": "setpriv",
+  "setup-fake-secrets.sh": "custom_tool_021",
+  "sgml-base.postinst": "sgml-base.postinst",
+  "sh": "sh",
+  "sha256sum": "sha256sum",
+  "shred": "shred",
+  "sleep": "sleep",
+  "snap": "snap",
+  "snapd": "snapd",
+  "snapd-env-generator": "snapd-env-generator",
+  "snapd-generator": "snapd-generator",
+  "sort": "sort",
+  "ssh": "ssh",
+  "sshd": "sshd",
+  "sshd-socket-generator": "sshd-socket-generator",
+  "stat": "stat",
+  "store": "store",
+  "stty": "stty",
+  "sudo": "sudo",
+  "sysstat": "sysstat",
+  "systemctl": "systemctl",
+  "systemd": "systemd",
+  "systemd-cryptsetup-generator": "systemd-cryptsetup-generator",
+  "systemd-debug-generator": "systemd-debug-generator",
+  "systemd-executor": "systemd-executor",
+  "systemd-executor (deleted)": "systemd-executor (deleted)",
+  "systemd-fstab-generator": "systemd-fstab-generator",
+  "systemd-getty-generator": "systemd-getty-generator",
+  "systemd-hibernate-resume-generator": "systemd-hibernate-resume-generator",
+  "systemd-integritysetup-generator": "systemd-integritysetup-generator",
+  "systemd-journald": "systemd-journald",
+  "systemd-logind": "systemd-logind",
+  "systemd-logind (deleted)": "systemd-logind (deleted)",
+  "systemd-networkd": "systemd-networkd",
+  "systemd-networkd-wait-online": "systemd-networkd-wait-online",
+  "systemd-rc-local-generator": "systemd-rc-local-generator",
+  "systemd-resolved": "systemd-resolved",
+  "systemd-run-generator": "systemd-run-generator",
+  "systemd-system-update-generator": "systemd-system-update-generator",
+  "systemd-sysusers": "systemd-sysusers",
+  "systemd-sysv-generator": "systemd-sysv-generator",
+  "systemd-timedated": "systemd-timedated",
+  "systemd-tmpfiles": "systemd-tmpfiles",
+  "systemd-tty-ask-password-agent": "systemd-tty-ask-password-agent",
+  "systemd-user-runtime-dir": "systemd-user-runtime-dir",
+  "systemd-veritysetup-generator": "systemd-veritysetup-generator",
+  "systemd-xdg-autostart-generator": "systemd-xdg-autostart-generator",
+  "tail": "tail",
+  "tar": "tar",
+  "tee": "tee",
+  "test": "test",
+  "timeout": "timeout",
+  "tmux": "tmux",
+  "touch": "touch",
+  "tr": "tr",
+  "trivial-rewrite": "trivial-rewrite",
+  "tty": "tty",
+  "ubuntu-distro-info": "ubuntu-distro-info",
+  "uname": "uname",
+  "unattended-upgrade": "unattended-upgrade",
+  "uniq": "uniq",
+  "unzip": "unzip",
+  "update-alternatives": "update-alternatives",
+  "update-catalog": "update-catalog",
+  "update-icon-caches": "update-icon-caches",
+  "update-motd-unattended-upgrades": "update-motd-unattended-upgrades",
+  "update-xmlcatalog": "update-xmlcatalog",
+  "uptime": "uptime",
+  "vim": "vim",
+  "vim-common.postinst": "vim-common.postinst",
+  "vim-common.postrm": "vim-common.postrm",
+  "vim-runtime.postinst": "vim-runtime.postinst",
+  "vim-runtime.postrm": "vim-runtime.postrm",
+  "vim-tiny.postinst": "vim-tiny.postinst",
+  "vim-tiny.prerm": "vim-tiny.prerm",
+  "vim.postinst": "vim.postinst",
+  "vim.prerm": "vim.prerm",
+  "visudo": "visudo",
+  "vsce-sign": "vsce-sign",
+  "wc": "wc",
+  "wget": "wget",
+  "which": "which",
+  "whoami": "whoami",
+  "whois": "whois",
+  "xargs": "xargs",
+  "xdpyinfo": "xdpyinfo",
+  "xrandr": "xrandr",
+  "xxd": "xxd",
+  "zcat": "zcat",
+  "zgrep": "zgrep"
+}

reproduction/allowlist_basenames.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+00-header
+10-help-text
+30-systemd-environment-d-generator
+50-motd-news
+91-contract-ua-esm-status
+91-release-upgrade
+92-unattended-upgrades
+agetty
+apport
+appstreamcli
+apt
+apt-compat
+apt-config
+apt-extracttemplates
+apt-get
+apt-helper
+apt-key
+apt.systemd.daily
+arch
+as
+awk
+base64
+basename
+bash
+bibtex
+c++
+cap
+cat
+cc
+cc1
+cc1plus
+chattr
+check-new-release
+chmod
+chown
+chrome-headless-shell
+claude
+claude.exe
+cleanup
+clear
+clear_console
+cloudcode_cli
+cmp
+cnf-update-db
+code
+code-server
+collect2
+command-not-found
+containerd
+cp
+cron
+crontab
+curl
+cut
+dash
+date
+dbus-daemon
+dbus-send
+dbus.postinst
+deb-systemd-invoke
+debian-sa1
+diff
+dircolors
+dirname
+dmidecode
+docker
+dpkg
+dpkg-db-backup
+dpkg-deb
+dpkg-maintscript-helper
+dpkg-preconfigure
+dpkg-query
+dpkg-split
+dpkg-statoverride
+du
+echo
+ed
+env
+envsubst
+expr
+file
+find
+findmnt
+flock
+friendly-recovery
+g++
+gcc
+gdbus
+gemini
+getconf
+getent
+getopt
+gettext
+gh
+git
+git-remote-https
+git-submodule
+gpg-connect-agent
+gpgconf
+gpgv
+grep
+groups
+gtk-update-icon-cache
+gzip
+head
+helpztags
+hicolor-icon-theme.postinst
+hostname
+htop
+http
+https
+id
+install
+ip
+jq
+kmod
+ld
+ld-linux-x86-64.so.2
+ldconfig
+ldconfig.real
+ldd
+less
+lesspipe
+libc-bin.postinst
+ln
+local
+locale
+locale-check
+login
+logrotate
+ls
+lsb_release
+lsmod
+lspci
+lxc-start
+lxc-start (deleted)
+make
+man-db
+man-db.postinst
+mandb
+master
+memfd:lxc-attach (deleted)
+mkdir
+mktemp
+mmdc
+mount
+mv
+nano
+netplan
+node
+node-gyp
+npm
+nvidia-modprobe
+nvidia-smi
+packagekitd
+pager
+pdfinfo
+pdflatex
+pet
+pgrep
+pickup
+ping
+pip
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+polkit-agent-helper-1
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+polkitd.postrm
+polkitd.prerm
+postconf
+postdrop
+postfix-instance-generator
+prebuild-install
+preinst
+printenv
+printf
+ps
+pwsh
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+pyenv-rehash
+pyenv-sh-activate
+pyenv-version-file
+pyenv-version-file-read
+pyenv-version-name
+pyenv-versions
+pyenv-virtualenv-init
+pyenv-virtualenv-prefix
+pyenv-which
+python
+python3
+python3.12
+qmgr
+readlink
+realpath
+release-upgrade-motd
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+rg
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+rmdir
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+ruff
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+sadc
+sar.sysstat
+savelog
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+sed
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+service
+setcap
+setpriv
+sgml-base.postinst
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+sha256sum
+shred
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+snap
+snapd
+snapd-env-generator
+snapd-generator
+sort
+ssh
+sshd
+sshd-socket-generator
+stat
+store
+stty
+sudo
+sysstat
+systemctl
+systemd
+systemd-cryptsetup-generator
+systemd-debug-generator
+systemd-executor
+systemd-executor (deleted)
+systemd-fstab-generator
+systemd-getty-generator
+systemd-hibernate-resume-generator
+systemd-integritysetup-generator
+systemd-journald
+systemd-logind
+systemd-logind (deleted)
+systemd-networkd
+systemd-networkd-wait-online
+systemd-rc-local-generator
+systemd-resolved
+systemd-run-generator
+systemd-system-update-generator
+systemd-sysusers
+systemd-sysv-generator
+systemd-timedated
+systemd-tmpfiles
+systemd-tty-ask-password-agent
+systemd-user-runtime-dir
+systemd-veritysetup-generator
+systemd-xdg-autostart-generator
+tail
+tar
+tee
+test
+timeout
+tmux
+touch
+tr
+trivial-rewrite
+tty
+ubuntu-distro-info
+uname
+unattended-upgrade
+uniq
+unzip
+update-alternatives
+update-catalog
+update-icon-caches
+update-motd-unattended-upgrades
+update-xmlcatalog
+uptime
+vim
+vim-common.postinst
+vim-common.postrm
+vim-runtime.postinst
+vim-runtime.postrm
+vim-tiny.postinst
+vim-tiny.prerm
+vim.postinst
+vim.prerm
+visudo
+vsce-sign
+wc
+wget
+which
+whoami
+whois
+xargs
+xdpyinfo
+xrandr
+xxd
+zcat
+zgrep

reproduction/feature_definitions.json

@@ -0,0 +1,821 @@
+{
+  "_meta": {
+    "schema_version": "1.1",
+    "source_modules": [
+      "mamba-edge/src/features/v0_2_features.py",
+      "mamba-edge/src/processing/v0_2_behavior_builder.py",
+      "mamba-edge/src/core/v0_2_event_encoder.py"
+    ],
+    "note": "Schema 1.1 reflects the 3a' encoder revisions (4 promoted categoricals — f_path_category / f_dst_ip_category / f_dst_port_category / f_object_category — plus hash right-sizing on f_proc_name_hash and f_proc_cwd_hash, cwd depth 2 -> 4) and the v0.2.1 deep-aliasing anonymizer (basename allowlist + custom_tool_NNN, salted-HMAC exec_ids). Integer-coded categorical/bucket columns map an integer to a label + semantic description. String-coded categorical columns (path_category, object_category, dst_ip_category, dst_port_category) map the string value directly. Hash columns list bucket count and the raw-parquet column the parser hashed."
+  },
+  "categorical_int_columns": {
+    "f_event_type": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "process_exec",
+        "desc": "Process execution event (Tetragon process_exec)"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "process_exit",
+        "desc": "Process termination event"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "process_kprobe",
+        "desc": "Kernel-probe event hooked by Tetragon (file/net/cred/mem)"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "OOV",
+        "desc": "Unknown event type — should not appear; sentinel for parser drift"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_kprobe_function": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "fd_install",
+        "desc": "File descriptor install (file open in the kernel)"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "security_mmap_file",
+        "desc": "LSM hook for mmap() of a file"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "commit_creds",
+        "desc": "Credential change (setuid/setgid/capset)"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "tcp_connect",
+        "desc": "Outbound TCP connect()"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "tcp_close",
+        "desc": "TCP socket close"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "udp_sendmsg",
+        "desc": "UDP send (port 53 = DNS resolves)"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "inet_csk_accept",
+        "desc": "Inbound TCP accept (server-side)"
+      },
+      "7": {
+        "label": "do_unlinkat",
+        "desc": "File unlink (delete)"
+      },
+      "8": {
+        "label": "chmod_common",
+        "desc": "File permission change"
+      },
+      "9": {
+        "label": "security_file_mprotect",
+        "desc": "LSM hook for mprotect() (memory permission change)"
+      },
+      "10": {
+        "label": "sys_ptrace",
+        "desc": "ptrace() syscall (process injection / debugger attach)"
+      },
+      "11": {
+        "label": "sys_process_vm_writev",
+        "desc": "process_vm_writev() (cross-process memory write)"
+      },
+      "12": {
+        "label": "NOT_KPROBE",
+        "desc": "Row is process_exec / process_exit, not a kprobe event"
+      },
+      "13": {
+        "label": "OOV",
+        "desc": "Kprobe function not in the v0.2 vocabulary"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_kprobe_policy": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "file-monitor",
+        "desc": "Tracing policy for file-system kprobes"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "memory-monitor",
+        "desc": "Tracing policy for memory-related kprobes"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "privilege-monitor",
+        "desc": "Tracing policy for credential / privilege kprobes"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "network-monitor",
+        "desc": "Tracing policy for network kprobes"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "injection-monitor",
+        "desc": "Tracing policy for process-injection kprobes"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "attribute-monitor",
+        "desc": "Tracing policy for file-attribute kprobes"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "Row is not a kprobe (process_exec / process_exit)"
+      },
+      "7": {
+        "label": "OOV",
+        "desc": "Tracing policy not in the v0.2 vocabulary"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_kprobe_action": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "KPROBE_ACTION_POST",
+        "desc": "Tetragon emitted the event without taking action"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "Row is not a kprobe"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "OOV",
+        "desc": "Action not seen in v0.2 (e.g. KILL/OVERRIDE in future Tetragon)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_proc_uid_bucket": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "ROOT",
+        "desc": "uid == 0 (container root)"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "RESEARCH_USER",
+        "desc": "uid == 1000 (primary research user in container)"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "SYSTEM_LOW",
+        "desc": "1 <= uid <= 99 (historical Unix system accounts)"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "DAEMON_HIGH",
+        "desc": "100 <= uid <= 999 (modern Linux service accounts)"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "OTHER",
+        "desc": "everything else (incl. uid >= 1001, nobody/65534)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_dst_port_bucket": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row has no dst port (non-network event)"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "LOOPBACK",
+        "desc": "dport == 0 (Tetragon's loopback / unset sentinel)"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "SSH",
+        "desc": "dport == 22"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "DNS",
+        "desc": "dport == 53"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "WEB",
+        "desc": "dport in {80, 443, 8080, 8443}"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "PRIV",
+        "desc": "1 <= dport <= 1023 (reserved/privileged ports)"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "HIGH",
+        "desc": "dport >= 1024 (ephemeral / non-standard high ports)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_args_length_bucket": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "ZERO",
+        "desc": "no arguments"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "LT50",
+        "desc": "1 <= len(args) < 50 chars"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "RANGE_50_200",
+        "desc": "50 <= len(args) < 200 chars"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "RANGE_200_1K",
+        "desc": "200 <= len(args) < 1000 chars"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "RANGE_1K_5K",
+        "desc": "1000 <= len(args) < 5000 chars"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "GT5K",
+        "desc": "len(args) >= 5000 chars (suspect / oversize cmdlines)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_cap_count_bucket": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "ZERO",
+        "desc": "no Linux capabilities held"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "RANGE_1_2",
+        "desc": "1 or 2 capabilities"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "RANGE_3_5",
+        "desc": "3 to 5 capabilities"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "RANGE_6_15",
+        "desc": "6 to 15 capabilities"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "GE16",
+        "desc": "16 or more capabilities (essentially full root)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_path_sens_cwd": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "SENSITIVE_SYS",
+        "desc": "/etc/, /root/, /boot/, /usr/sbin/, /sbin/"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "STAGING",
+        "desc": "/tmp/, /var/tmp/, /dev/shm/"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "RUNTIME",
+        "desc": "/var/run/, /run/"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "USER_HOME",
+        "desc": "/home/, /Users/"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "PROC_SELF",
+        "desc": "/proc/self/ (own-process introspection)"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "VSCODE_DEV",
+        "desc": "developer-tooling paths: .vscode-server/, node_modules/, .git/"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "OTHER",
+        "desc": "anything else"
+      },
+      "7": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row has no path (non-file event)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_path_sens_binary": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "SENSITIVE_SYS",
+        "desc": "/etc/, /root/, /boot/, /usr/sbin/, /sbin/"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "STAGING",
+        "desc": "/tmp/, /var/tmp/, /dev/shm/"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "RUNTIME",
+        "desc": "/var/run/, /run/"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "USER_HOME",
+        "desc": "/home/, /Users/"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "PROC_SELF",
+        "desc": "/proc/self/ (own-process introspection)"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "VSCODE_DEV",
+        "desc": "developer-tooling paths: .vscode-server/, node_modules/, .git/"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "OTHER",
+        "desc": "anything else"
+      },
+      "7": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row has no path (non-file event)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_path_sens_kp": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "SENSITIVE_SYS",
+        "desc": "/etc/, /root/, /boot/, /usr/sbin/, /sbin/"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "STAGING",
+        "desc": "/tmp/, /var/tmp/, /dev/shm/"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "RUNTIME",
+        "desc": "/var/run/, /run/"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "USER_HOME",
+        "desc": "/home/, /Users/"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "PROC_SELF",
+        "desc": "/proc/self/ (own-process introspection)"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "VSCODE_DEV",
+        "desc": "developer-tooling paths: .vscode-server/, node_modules/, .git/"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "OTHER",
+        "desc": "anything else"
+      },
+      "7": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row has no path (non-file event)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_kp_fd_install_path_sensitivity": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "SENSITIVE_SYS",
+        "desc": "/etc/, /root/, /boot/, /usr/sbin/, /sbin/"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "STAGING",
+        "desc": "/tmp/, /var/tmp/, /dev/shm/"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "RUNTIME",
+        "desc": "/var/run/, /run/"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "USER_HOME",
+        "desc": "/home/, /Users/"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "PROC_SELF",
+        "desc": "/proc/self/ (own-process introspection)"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "VSCODE_DEV",
+        "desc": "developer-tooling paths: .vscode-server/, node_modules/, .git/"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "OTHER",
+        "desc": "anything else"
+      },
+      "7": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row has no path (non-file event)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_kp_mmap_path_sensitivity": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "SENSITIVE_SYS",
+        "desc": "/etc/, /root/, /boot/, /usr/sbin/, /sbin/"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "STAGING",
+        "desc": "/tmp/, /var/tmp/, /dev/shm/"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "RUNTIME",
+        "desc": "/var/run/, /run/"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "USER_HOME",
+        "desc": "/home/, /Users/"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "PROC_SELF",
+        "desc": "/proc/self/ (own-process introspection)"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "VSCODE_DEV",
+        "desc": "developer-tooling paths: .vscode-server/, node_modules/, .git/"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "OTHER",
+        "desc": "anything else"
+      },
+      "7": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row has no path (non-file event)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_cmdline_entropy": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "NULL",
+        "desc": "row has no cmdline (non-exec event)"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "LOW",
+        "desc": "Shannon entropy < 2.0 (very repetitive / short)"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "MID_LOW",
+        "desc": "2.0 <= entropy < 3.5"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "MID",
+        "desc": "3.5 <= entropy < 4.5"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "MID_HIGH",
+        "desc": "4.5 <= entropy < 5.5"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "HIGH",
+        "desc": "entropy >= 5.5 (random-looking / encoded payloads)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_cmdline_compress": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "NULL",
+        "desc": "row has no cmdline"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "VERY_COMPRESSIBLE",
+        "desc": "ratio < 0.3"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "COMPRESSIBLE",
+        "desc": "0.3 <= ratio < 0.5"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "MODERATE",
+        "desc": "0.5 <= ratio < 0.7"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "WEAK",
+        "desc": "0.7 <= ratio < 0.9"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "INCOMPRESSIBLE",
+        "desc": "ratio >= 0.9 (random / pre-encrypted)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_time_since_parent_exec": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "NULL",
+        "desc": "no parent exec_time available"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "SUB_MS",
+        "desc": "< 1 ms since parent exec"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "MS",
+        "desc": "1 ms .. 1 s"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "SEC",
+        "desc": "1 s .. 1 min"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "MIN",
+        "desc": "1 min .. 1 h"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "HR",
+        "desc": ">= 1 h"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_kp_tcp_connect_sock_family": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "AF_INET",
+        "desc": "IPv4"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "AF_INET6",
+        "desc": "IPv6"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row is not a network event"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "OOV",
+        "desc": "Socket family outside {AF_INET, AF_INET6}"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_action_family": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "PROC_EXEC",
+        "desc": "Process execution"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "PROC_EXIT",
+        "desc": "Process termination"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "NET_CONNECT",
+        "desc": "Outbound TCP connect()"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "NET_CLOSE",
+        "desc": "TCP socket close"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "NET_ACCEPT",
+        "desc": "Inbound TCP accept()"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "NET_SEND",
+        "desc": "UDP send (e.g. DNS at dport=53)"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "FILE_OPEN",
+        "desc": "File descriptor install (file open)"
+      },
+      "7": {
+        "label": "FILE_DELETE",
+        "desc": "File unlink"
+      },
+      "8": {
+        "label": "FILE_CHMOD",
+        "desc": "File permission change"
+      },
+      "9": {
+        "label": "PRIV_CHANGE",
+        "desc": "Credential change (setuid / setgid / capset)"
+      },
+      "10": {
+        "label": "PROC_INJECT_PTRACE",
+        "desc": "ptrace() — process injection / debugger"
+      },
+      "11": {
+        "label": "PROC_INJECT_VMWRITE",
+        "desc": "process_vm_writev() — cross-process memory write"
+      },
+      "12": {
+        "label": "MEM_MAP",
+        "desc": "mmap() of a file"
+      },
+      "13": {
+        "label": "MEM_PROTECT",
+        "desc": "mprotect() — memory permission change"
+      },
+      "14": {
+        "label": "OTHER",
+        "desc": "Catch-all (unknown kprobe in v0.2 corpus)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_path_category": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "VSCODE_DEV",
+        "desc": "developer-tooling paths (.vscode-server/, node_modules/, .git/)"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "SENSITIVE_SYS",
+        "desc": "/etc/, /root/, /boot/, /usr/sbin/, /sbin/"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "TEMP_STAGING",
+        "desc": "/tmp/, /var/tmp/, /dev/shm/"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "RUNTIME",
+        "desc": "/var/run/, /run/, /proc/"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "LIBRARY",
+        "desc": "/usr/lib/, /usr/lib32/, /usr/lib64/, /usr/local/lib/, /lib/, /lib32/, /lib64/ — NEW in 3a'"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "USR_BIN",
+        "desc": "/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin/, /usr/local/sbin/ — NEW in 3a'"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "OPT",
+        "desc": "/opt/ — NEW in 3a'"
+      },
+      "7": {
+        "label": "USER_HOME",
+        "desc": "/home/, /Users/"
+      },
+      "8": {
+        "label": "PROC_SELF",
+        "desc": "/proc/self/"
+      },
+      "9": {
+        "label": "OTHER",
+        "desc": "anything else"
+      },
+      "10": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row has no path"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_dst_ip_category": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "LOOPBACK",
+        "desc": "127.0.0.0/8 or ::1"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "LINK_LOCAL",
+        "desc": "169.254.0.0/16 or fe80::/10"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "PRIVATE",
+        "desc": "RFC1918: 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "MULTICAST",
+        "desc": "224.0.0.0/4 or ff00::/8"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "PUBLIC",
+        "desc": "publicly-routable IP (anonymized at parser; only category survives)"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row has no dst IP"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_dst_port_category": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "DNS",
+        "desc": "dport == 53"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "WEB",
+        "desc": "dport in {80, 443, 8080, 8443}"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "SSH",
+        "desc": "dport == 22"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "WELL_KNOWN",
+        "desc": "1 <= dport < 1024 (other reserved/privileged ports)"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "REGISTERED",
+        "desc": "1024 <= dport < 49152"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "HIGH",
+        "desc": "dport >= 49152 (ephemeral)"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row has no dst port (non-network event)"
+      }
+    },
+    "f_object_category": {
+      "0": {
+        "label": "PROCESS",
+        "desc": "process_exec / process_exit"
+      },
+      "1": {
+        "label": "FILE",
+        "desc": "file-system kprobe (open/delete/chmod)"
+      },
+      "2": {
+        "label": "NETWORK",
+        "desc": "TCP/UDP socket kprobe"
+      },
+      "3": {
+        "label": "MEMORY",
+        "desc": "mmap / mprotect"
+      },
+      "4": {
+        "label": "CREDENTIAL",
+        "desc": "commit_creds (setuid/setgid/capset)"
+      },
+      "5": {
+        "label": "INJECT",
+        "desc": "ptrace / process_vm_writev"
+      },
+      "6": {
+        "label": "OTHER",
+        "desc": "kprobe outside the v0.2 vocabulary"
+      },
+      "7": {
+        "label": "NONE",
+        "desc": "row has no event_type"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "categorical_string_columns": {
+    "path_category": {
+      "VSCODE_DEV": "developer-tooling paths (.vscode-server/, node_modules/, .git/)",
+      "SENSITIVE_SYS": "/etc/, /root/, /boot/, /usr/sbin/, /sbin/",
+      "TEMP_STAGING": "/tmp/, /var/tmp/, /dev/shm/",
+      "RUNTIME": "/var/run/, /run/, /proc/",
+      "LIBRARY": "/usr/lib/, /usr/lib32/, /usr/lib64/, /usr/local/lib/, /lib/, /lib32/, /lib64/ (new in 3a')",
+      "USR_BIN": "/usr/bin/, /usr/local/bin/, /usr/local/sbin/ (new in 3a')",
+      "OPT": "/opt/ (new in 3a')",
+      "USER_HOME": "/home/, /Users/",
+      "PROC_SELF": "/proc/self/",
+      "OTHER": "anything else",
+      "NONE": "row has no path"
+    },
+    "object_category": {
+      "PROCESS": "process_exec / process_exit",
+      "FILE": "file-system kprobe (open/delete/chmod)",
+      "NETWORK": "TCP/UDP socket kprobe",
+      "CREDENTIAL": "commit_creds (setuid/setgid/capset)",
+      "INJECT": "ptrace / process_vm_writev",
+      "MEMORY": "mmap / mprotect",
+      "OTHER": "kprobe outside the v0.2 vocabulary",
+      "NONE": "row has no event_type"
+    },
+    "dst_ip_category": {
+      "LOOPBACK": "127.0.0.0/8 or ::1",
+      "LINK_LOCAL": "169.254.0.0/16 or fe80::/10",
+      "PRIVATE": "RFC1918: 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16",
+      "MULTICAST": "224.0.0.0/4 or ff00::/8",
+      "PUBLIC": "publicly-routable IP (anonymized at parser; only category survives)",
+      "NONE": "row has no dst IP"
+    },
+    "dst_port_category": {
+      "DNS": "dport == 53",
+      "WEB": "dport in {80, 443, 8080, 8443}",
+      "SSH": "dport == 22",
+      "WELL_KNOWN": "1 <= dport < 1024 (other reserved/privileged ports)",
+      "REGISTERED": "1024 <= dport < 49152",
+      "HIGH": "dport >= 49152 (ephemeral)",
+      "NONE": "row has no dst port (non-network event)"
+    }
+  },
+  "boolean_flag_columns": {
+    "f_is_procfs_walk": "1 if the parser flagged this process_exec as a procfs-walk synthetic event; tag-not-drop policy means these flow through with the flag preserved (1,250 train + 96 test events have value=1).",
+    "f_uid_eq_parent": "1 if the process and its parent share the same uid.",
+    "f_is_setuid_exec": "1 if the exec was a setuid (uid != parent uid AND was a process_exec).",
+    "f_kp_commit_creds_uid_change": "1 on commit_creds events where the uid changed.",
+    "f_kp_commit_creds_cap_change": "1 on commit_creds events where the capability set changed.",
+    "f_kp_udp_sendmsg_dport_eq_53": "1 on udp_sendmsg events with dport=53 (DNS)."
+  },
+  "numeric_columns": {
+    "f_kp_fd_install_fd_int32": "Raw fd integer from fd_install (int32).",
+    "f_kp_mmap_prot_uint": "mmap prot bitmask (uint32).",
+    "f_kp_mprotect_prot_uint": "mprotect prot bitmask (uint64).",
+    "delta_t_prev_ns": "Nanoseconds since the previous event for the same proc_exec_id (per-process keying landed in the 2026-04-29 rebuild; previously global, which produced 44,947 train + 1,643 test negative residuals — now zero).",
+    "process_age_ns": "Nanoseconds since the process started (event_time - proc_start_time)."
+  },
+  "bucketed_int_columns": {
+    "f_delta_t_log_bucket": "Half-decade bucket of log10(delta_t_prev_ns + 1).",
+    "f_process_age_log_bucket": "Half-decade bucket of log10(process_age_ns + 1).",
+    "f_lineage_depth": "Walked-ancestors depth at parser time (capped per Plan G)."
+  },
+  "hash_columns": [
+    {
+      "column": "f_proc_name_hash",
+      "buckets": 2048,
+      "source_in_raw": "proc_binary (basename)",
+      "desc": "Hash of the executable basename (e.g. 'bash', 'curl'). Bumped 1024 -> 2048 in 3a' (audit cell 43 showed 27.7% collision on the old size)."
+    },
+    {
+      "column": "f_parent_proc_hash",
+      "buckets": 1024,
+      "source_in_raw": "parent_binary (basename)",
+      "desc": "Hash of the parent process basename."
+    },
+    {
+      "column": "f_proc_cwd_hash",
+      "buckets": 4096,
+      "source_in_raw": "proc_cwd (sanitized at release; see anonymization log)",
+      "desc": "Hash of the first FOUR path components of proc_cwd. Capacity bumped 256 -> 4096 AND depth 2 -> 4 in 3a' (audit cell 43 showed 90.2% collision on the old depth-2 / 256-bucket sizing). Depth-4 captures per-project granularity."
+    },
+    {
+      "column": "f_lineage_bag_hash",
+      "buckets": 256,
+      "source_in_raw": "(composite — sorted set of lineage basenames)",
+      "desc": "Hash of the bag-of-ancestors basename set; order-invariant."
+    },
+    {
+      "column": "f_parent_child_pair_hash",
+      "buckets": 1024,
+      "source_in_raw": "(derived: parent_binary_basename + ' -> ' + proc_binary_basename)",
+      "desc": "Hash of the (parent_basename, child_basename) pair string."
+    },
+    {
+      "column": "f_root_ancestor_basename_hash",
+      "buckets": 1024,
+      "source_in_raw": "(derived: lineage walk to the process tree root)",
+      "desc": "Hash of the root-of-tree basename (typically systemd / sshd)."
+    },
+    {
+      "column": "f_process_tree_id_hash",
+      "buckets": 4096,
+      "source_in_raw": "(derived: stable hash of the root proc_exec_id)",
+      "desc": "Identifier for the process subtree this event belongs to."
+    }
+  ],
+  "identifier_columns": {
+    "event_time": "RFC3339 nanosecond timestamp (timestamp[ns, tz=UTC]).",
+    "proc_exec_id": "Salted-HMAC pseudonym of the original Tetragon exec_id (format 'exec_<32hex>'). Equality joins are preserved — lineage walks still work — but the original 'host:ts:pid' payload is erased.",
+    "proc_pid": "OS process id at the time of the event (uint32). Container-internal."
+  },
+  "side_string_columns": {
+    "proc_binary_basename": "Basename of the executable. Aliased per the v0.2.1 anonymizer: allowlisted distro / dev-tool basenames pass through verbatim; everything else becomes 'custom_tool_NNN' (lex-sorted) or the fixed 'vscode_server_bin' alias for VSCode commit-hash binaries. See reproduction/alias_map.json.",
+    "parent_binary_basename": "Basename of the parent executable. Same alias map as proc_binary_basename.",
+    "proc_cwd_normalized": "Sanitized current working directory: '/home/<user>' -> '/home/_user_', '/mnt/projects/<X>' -> '/workspace/_project_', etc. See anonymization log for the full rule set.",
+    "root_ancestor_basename": "Basename of the process-tree root. Same alias map as the other basename columns.",
+    "process_tree_root_exec_id": "Salted-HMAC pseudonym of the original Tetragon exec_id of the process-tree root (format 'exec_<32hex>').",
+    "parent_child_pair": "Parent->child basename pair, re-composed from the aliased basenames after Step B of the anonymizer (component-first guarantee — aliased value flows through).",
+    "token": "Composite event identifier of shape '<action_family>:<basename>[:<category>...]'. Re-generated via the canonical format_token() from the aliased basenames + already-bucketed categories, so the original (unaliased) basename never re-enters the token."
+  }
+}

reproduction/tetragon-configs/attribute-monitor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# File attribute monitoring TracingPolicy for Mamba behavioral telemetry
+# Captures chmod / permission changes from LXC containers (excludes host events)
+# Deploy to <YOUR_HOST>: cp attribute-monitor.yaml /etc/tetragon/tetragon.tp.d/
+#
+# Key use cases:
+#   - Payload preparation (T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification)
+#   - Classic attack chain: curl payload -> chmod +x -> execute
+#
+# Behavioral signal rationale:
+#   chmod_common is the single kernel function all permission-change syscalls
+#   (chmod, fchmod, fchmodat) flow through. Capturing it gives the Mamba model
+#   a "preparation" state that precedes execution. Sequences like
+#   (network, connect) -> (file, write) -> (file, modify[chmod +x]) -> (system, process, spawn)
+#   are a high-signal attack-chain pattern that is much easier for an SSM to
+#   flag than the exec event in isolation.
+
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
+kind: TracingPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: "attribute-monitor"
+spec:
+  kprobes:
+    # File permission / mode change (T1222)
+    # Parser maps this to (file, file, modify) with mode bits in evidence.
+    # Evidence field captures the mode so downstream logic can identify
+    # grants of the execute bit (0o111) specifically.
+    # NOTE: chmod_common's mode arg is kernel type umode_t (16-bit unsigned).
+    # uint16 silences the type-mismatch warning Tetragon emits on load.
+    - call: "chmod_common"
+      syscall: false
+      args:
+        - index: 0
+          type: "path"      # target file path
+        - index: 1
+          type: "uint16"    # new mode bits (umode_t)
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"

reproduction/tetragon-configs/file-monitor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# File monitoring TracingPolicy for Mamba behavioral telemetry
+# Captures file opens and deletes from LXC containers (excludes host events)
+# Deploy to <YOUR_HOST>: cp file-monitor.yaml /etc/tetragon/tetragon.tp.d/
+#
+# Key use cases:
+#   - ART marker detection (/tmp/art_start_*, /tmp/art_end_*)
+#   - File access patterns for behavioral modeling
+#   - Sensitive file access (e.g., /etc/shadow, /etc/passwd)
+
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
+kind: TracingPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: "file-monitor"
+spec:
+  kprobes:
+    # File open — fires when a file descriptor is installed (successful open)
+    # Tetragon extracts the full file path from the kernel file struct
+    - call: "fd_install"
+      syscall: false
+      args:
+        - index: 0
+          type: "int"       # file descriptor number
+        - index: 1
+          type: "file"      # file struct — Tetragon extracts path
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"
+
+    # File delete — fires on unlink/unlinkat syscall
+    # Captures file path being deleted
+    - call: "do_unlinkat"
+      syscall: false
+      args:
+        - index: 0
+          type: "int"       # directory fd
+        - index: 1
+          type: "string"    # pathname
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"

reproduction/tetragon-configs/identity_map.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+# Identity map for Tetragon telemetry on <YOUR_HOST> / LXC container 110.
+#
+# IMPORTANT — container-internal UIDs, not host-offset UIDs.
+# Empirically, Tetragon 1.6.1 on <YOUR_HOST> reports the container-internal UID on
+# events emitted from inside LXC container 110 (e.g. <YOUR_USER> shows up as uid
+# 1000, not 101000). The earlier subuid-offset hypothesis (host_uid =
+# 100000 + container_uid) was incorrect for this Tetragon build; verified
+# against 156k events in data/raw/events-2026-04-14T03-53-05.161.json.gz.
+#
+# Enumeration command (re-run if container users change):
+#   pct exec 110 -- cat /etc/passwd \
+#     | awk -F: '{printf "  %d: %s  # %s\n", $3, $1, $1}'
+#
+# Parser lookup is keyed on the UID Tetragon emits in process.uid.
+# Unknown UIDs (not in this map) fall through to persona `unknown` with
+# identity_relation_to_host = unknown_user.
+
+personas:
+  # ---- Primary actors (high behavioral signal) ----
+  0:     container_root   # root — privileged actor, runs system changes
+  1000:  primary_user       # <YOUR_USER> — the human primary user
+
+  # ---- Package manager (critical for demo attack chain) ----
+  42:    service_apt      # _apt
+
+  # ---- Active service accounts (distinct behavioral baselines) ----
+  33:    service_www      # www-data
+  103:   service_ssh      # sshd
+  104:   service_postfix  # postfix
+  101:   service_dbus     # messagebus
+  102:   service_syslog   # syslog
+  100:   service_dhcp     # dhcpcd
+  106:   service_tcpdump  # tcpdump
+  990:   service_polkit   # polkitd
+
+  # ---- systemd sub-daemons (collapse under one label; similar behavior) ----
+  998:   service_systemd  # systemd-network
+  997:   service_systemd  # systemd-timesync
+  992:   service_systemd  # systemd-resolve
+
+  # ---- Historical Unix system accounts (rarely execute; collapse) ----
+  # Kept explicit so unexpected activity still attributes correctly rather
+  # than falling into `unknown`.
+  1:     service_system   # daemon
+  2:     service_system   # bin
+  3:     service_system   # sys
+  4:     service_system   # sync
+  5:     service_system   # games
+  6:     service_system   # man
+  7:     service_system   # lp
+  8:     service_system   # mail
+  9:     service_system   # news
+  10:    service_system   # uucp
+  13:    service_system   # proxy
+  34:    service_system   # backup
+  38:    service_system   # list
+  39:    service_system   # irc
+  105:   service_system   # uuidd
+
+  # ---- Nobody / overflow UID ----
+  65534: service_nobody
+
+# Persona -> schema field derivations (consumed by the parser).
+# Maps each persona label to the v1.3 event-contract enum values for
+# user_role and identity_relation_to_host.
+persona_roles:
+  container_root:  { user_role: admin,    relation: admin_support }
+  primary_user:      { user_role: admin,    relation: primary_user }
+  service_apt:     { user_role: service,  relation: service_account }
+  service_www:     { user_role: service,  relation: service_account }
+  service_ssh:     { user_role: service,  relation: service_account }
+  service_postfix: { user_role: service,  relation: service_account }
+  service_dbus:    { user_role: service,  relation: service_account }
+  service_syslog:  { user_role: service,  relation: service_account }
+  service_dhcp:    { user_role: service,  relation: service_account }
+  service_tcpdump: { user_role: service,  relation: service_account }
+  service_polkit:  { user_role: service,  relation: service_account }
+  service_systemd: { user_role: system,   relation: service_account }
+  service_system:  { user_role: system,   relation: service_account }
+  service_nobody:  { user_role: system,   relation: service_account }
+  unknown:         { user_role: unknown,  relation: unknown_user }

reproduction/tetragon-configs/injection-monitor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# Process injection monitoring TracingPolicy for Mamba behavioral telemetry
+# Captures ptrace, mprotect (RX/RWX flips), and process_vm_writev from LXC containers
+# Deploy to <YOUR_HOST>: cp injection-monitor.yaml /etc/tetragon/tetragon.tp.d/
+#
+# Key use cases:
+#   - Process injection via ptrace (T1055.008)
+#   - Shellcode activation via RW->RX mprotect flip (T1055)
+#   - Cross-process memory write injection (T1055.009)
+#
+# Behavioral signal rationale:
+#   memory-monitor.yaml captures mmap(PROT_EXEC) — naive in-memory execution.
+#   Sophisticated attackers evade that by allocating RW, writing payload, then
+#   flipping the page to RX via mprotect. security_file_mprotect with a
+#   PROT_EXEC mask catches that evasion path. Filtering on PROT_EXEC keeps
+#   the event volume sane — routine mprotect calls (heap management, PROT_NONE
+#   guard pages) are ignored.
+
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
+kind: TracingPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: "injection-monitor"
+spec:
+  kprobes:
+    # Process debugging and ptrace-based injection (T1055.008)
+    # request arg identifies PTRACE_ATTACH, PTRACE_POKEDATA, PTRACE_DETACH, etc.
+    # Parser maps this to action=trace (v1.3 schema).
+    # NOTE: Tetragon's kprobe type vocabulary does not include "long" — use int64.
+    - call: "sys_ptrace"
+      syscall: true
+      args:
+        - index: 0
+          type: "int64"     # ptrace request (PTRACE_ATTACH=16, POKEDATA=5, etc.)
+        - index: 1
+          type: "int"       # target PID
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"
+
+    # Memory protection flip (T1055)
+    # Only fires when PROT_EXEC is being requested — captures the RW->RX
+    # shellcode activation pattern. Parser maps this to action=protect (v1.3).
+    #
+    # NOTE: security_file_mprotect's first arg is a struct vm_area_struct*
+    # which Tetragon's kprobe type vocabulary does not expose directly.
+    # We skip arg[0] and only extract the protection flags — Tetragon still
+    # captures the calling process's identity from event metadata.
+    - call: "security_file_mprotect"
+      syscall: false
+      args:
+        - index: 1
+          type: "uint64"    # reqprot (requested protection flags)
+        - index: 2
+          type: "uint64"    # prot (actual protection applied)
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"
+          matchArgs:
+            - index: 1
+              operator: "Mask"
+              values:
+                - "4"       # PROT_EXEC — only capture flips granting execute
+
+    # Cross-process memory write (T1055.009)
+    # Faster injection path that does not require PTRACE_ATTACH.
+    # Parser maps this to action=write with object_type=process.
+    - call: "sys_process_vm_writev"
+      syscall: true
+      args:
+        - index: 0
+          type: "int"       # target PID
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"

reproduction/tetragon-configs/memory-monitor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# Memory monitoring TracingPolicy for Mamba behavioral telemetry
+# Detects fileless execution and in-memory attack techniques from LXC containers
+# Deploy to <YOUR_HOST>: cp memory-monitor.yaml /etc/tetragon/tetragon.tp.d/
+#
+# Key use cases:
+#   - Fileless malware (shellcode injection into anonymous executable memory)
+#   - Process hollowing (unmap legitimate code, map malicious code)
+#   - Living-off-the-land (reflective DLL/SO loading)
+#   - MITRE ATT&CK: T1055 (Process Injection), T1620 (Reflective Code Loading)
+
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
+kind: TracingPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: "memory-monitor"
+spec:
+  kprobes:
+    # Memory-mapped file operations — LSM hook that fires on mmap calls
+    # Captures both file-backed mappings (normal .so loads) and anonymous
+    # executable mappings (fileless execution signal).
+    # The file arg is null for anonymous mappings — the parser uses this
+    # to distinguish normal library loads from suspicious in-memory execution.
+    - call: "security_mmap_file"
+      syscall: false
+      args:
+        - index: 0
+          type: "file"      # file struct (null for anonymous mappings)
+        - index: 1
+          type: "uint32"    # protection flags (PROT_READ=1, PROT_WRITE=2, PROT_EXEC=4)
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"
+          matchArgs:
+            - index: 1
+              operator: "Mask"
+              values:
+                - "4"        # PROT_EXEC — only capture mappings with execute permission

reproduction/tetragon-configs/network-monitor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# Network monitoring TracingPolicy for Mamba behavioral telemetry
+# Captures TCP connections and DNS queries from LXC containers (excludes host events)
+# Deploy to <YOUR_HOST>: cp network-monitor.yaml /etc/tetragon/tetragon.tp.d/
+#
+# Key use cases:
+#   - C2 callback detection (unusual outbound connections)
+#   - Lateral movement detection
+#   - DNS resolution monitoring (normal domains vs C2/DGA domains)
+#   - Normal network behavior baseline
+
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
+kind: TracingPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: "network-monitor"
+spec:
+  kprobes:
+    # Outbound TCP connection — fires when a TCP connection is initiated
+    # Tetragon extracts src/dst IP:port from the sock struct
+    - call: "tcp_connect"
+      syscall: false
+      args:
+        - index: 0
+          type: "sock"      # socket struct — Tetragon extracts family, src/dst IP:port
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"
+
+    # TCP connection close — captures connection lifecycle end
+    # Useful for connection duration analysis
+    - call: "tcp_close"
+      syscall: false
+      args:
+        - index: 0
+          type: "sock"      # socket struct
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"
+
+    # Inbound TCP accept — fires when a listening socket accepts a connection
+    # Detects services receiving connections (e.g., reverse shells, bind shells)
+    - call: "inet_csk_accept"
+      syscall: false
+      return: true
+      returnArg:
+        index: 0
+        type: "sock"        # accepted socket with peer info
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"
+
+    # DNS queries — captures UDP sends to port 53
+    # High-signal for C2 detection: model learns normal resolution patterns
+    # (github.com, apt repos) vs anomalous (DGA domains, unusual resolvers)
+    - call: "udp_sendmsg"
+      syscall: false
+      args:
+        - index: 0
+          type: "sock"      # socket struct — dst IP:port
+        - index: 1
+          type: "int"       # message length
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"
+          matchArgs:
+            - index: 0
+              operator: "DPort"
+              values:
+                - "53"

reproduction/tetragon-configs/privilege-monitor.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Privilege escalation TracingPolicy for Mamba behavioral telemetry
+# Captures credential changes from LXC containers (excludes host events)
+# Deploy to <YOUR_HOST>: cp privilege-monitor.yaml /etc/tetragon/tetragon.tp.d/
+#
+# Key use cases:
+#   - setuid/setgid detection
+#   - Capability changes (capset)
+#   - Privilege escalation attack detection (T1548)
+
+apiVersion: cilium.io/v1alpha1
+kind: TracingPolicy
+metadata:
+  name: "privilege-monitor"
+spec:
+  kprobes:
+    # Credential commit — ALL credential changes flow through this function
+    # Covers: setuid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, capset, execve with suid bit
+    # Tetragon extracts uid, gid, and capabilities from the cred struct
+    - call: "commit_creds"
+      syscall: false
+      args:
+        - index: 0
+          type: "cred"      # credential struct — uid, gid, caps
+      selectors:
+        - matchNamespaces:
+            - namespace: "Pid"
+              operator: "NotIn"
+              values:
+                - "host_ns"