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Aug 17

Half the Experts, All the Code: One-Shot Domain Pruning of Mixture-of-Experts LLMs for Coding

The strongest open-weight coding models are mixture-of-experts (MoE) networks: most of their size comes from large pools of "expert" subnetworks, of which only a few act on any token. That pool is why these models do not fit on the machines most developers own, yet for a user who only wants coding help, most experts encode abilities that will never be invoked. We ask how many experts can be removed, and which, by pruning two recent open-weight MoE models from different families (Qwen3.6-35B-A3B and Gemma-4-26B-A4B) under five selection strategies, judged the way a user would: by whether the model still writes correct code. Half the experts can be removed from either model with no statistically detectable loss on the primary code benchmark, and the damage lands almost entirely on abilities outside coding, the intended trade. But the winning strategy flips between the two models, so a recipe validated on one family cannot be assumed to work on another. We further show that perplexity, the metric much of the pruning literature leans on, can rate a broken model above an intact one; that a lightweight fine-tune recovers about half of what aggressive pruning loses; and that against quantizing the full model to the same memory, pruning wins only where quantization would have to drop below 3 bits per weight. Five attempts to overturn that crossover, with failure criteria fixed in advance (better calibration, guarded selection, causal expert importance, failure attribution, and an agentic evaluation letting each model repair its failures from execution feedback), all leave it standing; the last shows single-shot benchmarks overstate compression penalties broadly, as one repair turn erases the 2-bit quantization penalty entirely. Expert pruning works, but it demands per-model validation on the task the model will actually serve.

  • 1 authors
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Jul 17

Abliteration Is Not a Scalpel: Off-Target Effects of Refusal Removal on Decision Disposition Across Model Families

Abliteration - deleting a model's refusal direction from its weights - is the standard recipe behind popular "uncensored" open-weight models. We show the surgery is not clean. As a disposition probe we use 21,600 decisions under uncertainty - weekly up/down calls on 60 Warsaw Stock Exchange equities over 18 weeks, replayed through a frozen pipeline so the decision-layer model is the only variable. The task elicits no refusals at all, so any between-arm delta is pure side effect. Holding provenance constant (official BF16 checkpoints, a single abliteration author, an identical serving stack, one byte-identical frozen prompt), we compare base and abliterated arms of two Mixture-of-Experts families, Gemma-4-26B-A4B-it and Qwen3-30B-A3B-Instruct-2507. Three effects replicate across both families (weeks-clustered bootstrap CIs excluding zero): abliterated models are systematically more optimistic (+12.2 pp Gemma, +7.4 pp Qwen; the confirmed preregistered endpoint), justify themselves at greater length, and use fewer explicit uncertainty words in forced self-critiques (both exploratory). A fourth effect reverses sign: the same operation makes Gemma-abliterated less confident and Qwen-abliterated more (family CIs non-overlapping) - one weight surgery, opposite shifts in expressed confidence. Capability covariates rule out instruction-following degradation as the driver, and no arm shows economic skill: the apparent edge of abliterated arms is regime beta, not alpha. Our provenance audit also caught two independent contamination channels - a mismatched-quantizer pilot pair and a stale community chat template that silently mangled the rendered prompt - suggesting toolchain artifacts are the rule in studies of community-modified checkpoints. Whoever deploys an "uncensored" model as an agent is deploying a measurably different decision-maker, not the base model minus refusals.

  • 1 authors
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Jul 18