Daily Papers

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, is fundamental for human social intelligence and a critical capability for advanced Artificial Intelligence. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising performance on ToM benchmarks, raising the question: Do these benchmarks necessitate explicit human-like reasoning processes, or can models succeed through alternative strategies? We investigate this question empirically by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) to LLMs of varying scales (0.5B to 7B parameters) and evaluating them across multiple ToM datasets. Our results reveal a scale-dependent impact of RL: while RL significantly improves accuracy and fosters high-quality, interpretable, and transferable belief-tracking reasoning in larger models (7B), it leads to "reasoning collapse" in smaller models (leq3B), where high accuracy and generalization ability are achieved via drastically shortened, less meaningful responses. Surprisingly, further SFT achieves competitive and generalizable performance across these benchmarks, often matching or exceeding RL models in accuracy, despite not being explicitly trained to produce structured reasoning traces. These findings highlight a critical discrepancy between benchmark accuracy and the nature of learned reasoning. Our work suggests that current ToM benchmarks may be solvable without requiring the explicit, human-like simulation of mental states they were designed to probe. LLMs, particularly when scale is limited or training signals focus solely on output correctness, may leverage alternative rules effective for benchmark data structures.

The last couple of years have witnessed emerging research that appropriates Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks designed for humans to benchmark LLM's ToM capabilities as an indication of LLM's social intelligence. However, this approach has a number of limitations. Drawing on existing psychology and AI literature, we summarize the theoretical, methodological, and evaluation limitations by pointing out that certain issues are inherently present in the original ToM tasks used to evaluate human's ToM, which continues to persist and exacerbated when appropriated to benchmark LLM's ToM. Taking a human-computer interaction (HCI) perspective, these limitations prompt us to rethink the definition and criteria of ToM in ToM benchmarks in a more dynamic, interactional approach that accounts for user preferences, needs, and experiences with LLMs in such evaluations. We conclude by outlining potential opportunities and challenges towards this direction.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental variables based on their behavior, is key to developing socially intelligent agents. Current approaches to Theory of Mind reasoning either rely on prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), which are prone to systematic errors, or use rigid, handcrafted Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM) models, which are more robust but cannot generalize across different domains. In this work, we introduce AutoToM, an automated Bayesian Theory of Mind method for achieving open-ended machine Theory of Mind. AutoToM can operate in any domain, infer any mental variable, and conduct robust Theory of Mind reasoning of any order. Given a Theory of Mind inference problem, AutoToM first proposes an initial BToM model. It then conducts automated Bayesian inverse planning based on the proposed model, leveraging an LLM as the backend. Based on the uncertainty of the inference, it iteratively refines the model, by introducing additional mental variables and/or incorporating more timesteps in the context. Empirical evaluations across multiple Theory of Mind benchmarks demonstrate that AutoToM consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance, offering a scalable, robust, and interpretable approach to machine Theory of Mind.

Existing LLM reasoning methods have shown impressive capabilities across various tasks, such as solving math and coding problems. However, applying these methods to scenarios without ground-truth answers or rule-based verification methods - such as tracking the mental states of an agent - remains challenging. Inspired by the sequential Monte Carlo algorithm, we introduce thought-tracing, an inference-time reasoning algorithm designed to trace the mental states of specific agents by generating hypotheses and weighting them based on observations without relying on ground-truth solutions to questions in datasets. Our algorithm is modeled after the Bayesian theory-of-mind framework, using LLMs to approximate probabilistic inference over agents' evolving mental states based on their perceptions and actions. We evaluate thought-tracing on diverse theory-of-mind benchmarks, demonstrating significant performance improvements compared to baseline LLMs. Our experiments also reveal interesting behaviors of the recent reasoning models - e.g., o3 and R1 - on theory-of-mind, highlighting the difference of social reasoning compared to other domains.

Recent work on distillation transfers the capabilities of large models to smaller ones often by updating the latter's parameters, through teacher forcing, on-policy distillation, and related training-time methods. In this paper, we ask whether such transfer can instead occur at test time. We study strong-to-weak scaffolding: whether a stronger builder model can construct inference-time harnesses that help a weaker target model solve tasks more reliably without any parameter updates. Using four representative Theory-of-Mind benchmarks, each builder model uses 5% of the data as a validation set to iteratively refine its harness over multiple rounds, after which the finalized harness is evaluated on the full test set. Empirically, this form of test-time capability transfer is highly effective, nearly doubling average target-model performance from 0.49 to 0.91. Our analysis shows that the gains come primarily from offloading unstable model reasoning into deterministic code, benchmark-specific routing, and strict answer-format enforcement, rather than from encouraging the target model to reason more extensively or sample more broadly. We further find that builder-model reasoning effort improves harness quality monotonically, platform effects are modest relative to the builder model's own capability, and weaker target models receive the largest gains. These results suggest that inference-time harness design is an important complement to conventional training-time distillation, enabling strong models to transfer cognitive structure to weaker models without retraining.

Existing Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks diverge from real-world scenarios in three aspects: 1) they assess a limited range of mental states such as beliefs, 2) false beliefs are not comprehensively explored, and 3) the diverse personality traits of characters are overlooked. To address these challenges, we introduce ToMATO, a new ToM benchmark formulated as multiple-choice QA over conversations. ToMATO is generated via LLM-LLM conversations featuring information asymmetry. By employing a prompting method that requires role-playing LLMs to verbalize their thoughts before each utterance, we capture both first- and second-order mental states across five categories: belief, intention, desire, emotion, and knowledge. These verbalized thoughts serve as answers to questions designed to assess the mental states of characters within conversations. Furthermore, the information asymmetry introduced by hiding thoughts from others induces the generation of false beliefs about various mental states. Assigning distinct personality traits to LLMs further diversifies both utterances and thoughts. ToMATO consists of 5.4k questions, 753 conversations, and 15 personality trait patterns. Our analysis shows that this dataset construction approach frequently generates false beliefs due to the information asymmetry between role-playing LLMs, and effectively reflects diverse personalities. We evaluate nine LLMs on ToMATO and find that even GPT-4o mini lags behind human performance, especially in understanding false beliefs, and lacks robustness to various personality traits.

Humans continuously infer the states, goals, and behaviors of others by perceiving their surroundings in dynamic, real-world social interactions. However, most Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks only evaluate static, text-based scenarios, which have a significant gap compared to real interactions. We propose the SoMi-ToM benchmark, designed to evaluate multi-perspective ToM in embodied multi-agent complex social interactions. This benchmark is based on rich multimodal interaction data generated by the interaction environment SoMi, covering diverse crafting goals and social relationships. Our framework supports multi-level evaluation: (1) first-person evaluation provides multimodal (visual, dialogue, action, etc.) input from a first-person perspective during a task for real-time state inference, (2) third-person evaluation provides complete third-person perspective video and text records after a task for goal and behavior inference. This evaluation method allows for a more comprehensive examination of a model's ToM capabilities from both the subjective immediate experience and the objective global observation. We constructed a challenging dataset containing 35 third-person perspective videos, 363 first-person perspective images, and 1225 expert-annotated multiple-choice questions (three options). On this dataset, we systematically evaluated the performance of human subjects and several state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). The results show that LVLMs perform significantly worse than humans on SoMi-ToM: the average accuracy gap between humans and models is 40.1% in first-person evaluation and 26.4% in third-person evaluation. This indicates that future LVLMs need to further improve their ToM capabilities in embodied, complex social interactions.

Do large language models (LLMs) have theory of mind? A plethora of papers and benchmarks have been introduced to evaluate if current models have been able to develop this key ability of social intelligence. However, all rely on limited datasets with simple patterns that can potentially lead to problematic blind spots in evaluation and an overestimation of model capabilities. We introduce ExploreToM, the first framework to allow large-scale generation of diverse and challenging theory of mind data for robust training and evaluation. Our approach leverages an A* search over a custom domain-specific language to produce complex story structures and novel, diverse, yet plausible scenarios to stress test the limits of LLMs. Our evaluation reveals that state-of-the-art LLMs, such as Llama-3.1-70B and GPT-4o, show accuracies as low as 0% and 9% on ExploreToM-generated data, highlighting the need for more robust theory of mind evaluation. As our generations are a conceptual superset of prior work, fine-tuning on our data yields a 27-point accuracy improvement on the classic ToMi benchmark (Le et al., 2019). ExploreToM also enables uncovering underlying skills and factors missing for models to show theory of mind, such as unreliable state tracking or data imbalances, which may contribute to models' poor performance on benchmarks.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly participate in human-AI interactions, evaluating their Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities - particularly their ability to track dynamic mental states - becomes crucial. While existing benchmarks assess basic ToM abilities, they predominantly focus on static snapshots of mental states, overlooking the temporal evolution that characterizes real-world social interactions. We present DynToM, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate LLMs' ability to understand and track the temporal progression of mental states across interconnected scenarios. Through a systematic four-step framework, we generate 1,100 social contexts encompassing 5,500 scenarios and 78,100 questions, each validated for realism and quality. Our comprehensive evaluation of ten state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that their average performance underperforms humans by 44.7\%, with performance degrading significantly when tracking and reasoning about the shift of mental states. This performance gap highlights fundamental limitations in current LLMs' ability to model the dynamic nature of human mental states.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' perceptions and mental states, is fundamental to human interaction but remains a challenging task for Large Language Models (LLMs). While existing ToM reasoning methods show promise with reasoning via perceptual perspective-taking, they often rely excessively on LLMs, reducing their efficiency and limiting their applicability to high-order ToM reasoning, which requires multi-hop reasoning about characters' beliefs. To address these issues, we present EnigmaToM, a novel neuro-symbolic framework that enhances ToM reasoning by integrating a Neural Knowledge Base of entity states (Enigma) for (1) a psychology-inspired iterative masking mechanism that facilitates accurate perspective-taking and (2) knowledge injection that elicits key entity information. Enigma generates structured representations of entity states, which construct spatial scene graphs -- leveraging spatial information as an inductive bias -- for belief tracking of various ToM orders and enhancing events with fine-grained entity state details. Experimental results on multiple benchmarks, including ToMi, HiToM, and FANToM, show that EnigmaToM significantly improves ToM reasoning across LLMs of varying sizes, particularly excelling in high-order reasoning scenarios.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand people's mental states, is an essential ingredient for developing machines with human-level social intelligence. Recent machine learning models, particularly large language models, seem to show some aspects of ToM understanding. However, existing ToM benchmarks use unimodal datasets - either video or text. Human ToM, on the other hand, is more than video or text understanding. People can flexibly reason about another person's mind based on conceptual representations (e.g., goals, beliefs, plans) extracted from any available data. To address this, we introduce a multimodal Theory of Mind question answering (MMToM-QA) benchmark. MMToM-QA comprehensively evaluates machine ToM both on multimodal data and on different kinds of unimodal data about a person's activity in a household environment. To engineer multimodal ToM capacity, we propose a novel method, BIP-ALM (Bayesian Inverse Planning Accelerated by Language Models). BIP-ALM extracts unified representations from multimodal data and utilizes language models for scalable Bayesian inverse planning. We conducted a systematic comparison of human performance, BIP-ALM, and state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4. The experiments demonstrate that large language models and large multimodal models still lack robust ToM capacity. BIP-ALM, on the other hand, shows promising results, by leveraging the power of both model-based mental inference and language models.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other's beliefs, intentions, and states of knowledge, is central to social interaction, yet remains challenging for current Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), especially in multi-party meetings where cues are distributed across speech and behavior. Existing multimodal ToM benchmarks mainly focus on video-grounded question answering over overt, externally verifiable signals, and provide limited coverage of latent social states and group dynamics. We introduce MeetingToM, a benchmark for complex social behavior reasoning in naturalistic multi-party meetings. MeetingToM targets meeting-specific phenomena such as pseudo-consensus, where apparent agreement masks private dissent under social pressure. The benchmark is hierarchically organized to evaluate ToM at increasing levels of social granularity, including (i) subject-level mental state prediction, (ii) dyadic-level addressee understanding, and (iii) group-level consensus reasoning. We provide a unified evaluation protocol and conduct systematic analyses of representative MLLMs, revealing persistent limitations in integrating non-verbal cues, inferring hidden attitudes, and distinguishing genuine consensus from pseudo-consensus. Our results highlight key challenges and establish MeetingToM as a testbed for advancing meeting-grounded ToM in multimodal models.

Theory of Mind (ToM) can be used to assess the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in complex scenarios where social reasoning is required. While the research community has proposed many ToM benchmarks, their hardness varies greatly, and their complexity is not well defined. This work proposes a framework inspired by cognitive load theory to measure the complexity of ToM tasks. We quantify a problem's complexity as the number of states necessary to solve it correctly. Our complexity measure also accounts for spurious states of a ToM problem designed to make it apparently harder. We use our method to assess the complexity of five widely adopted ToM benchmarks. On top of this framework, we design a prompting technique that augments the information available to a model with a description of how the environment changes with the agents' interactions. We name this technique Discrete World Models (DWM) and show how it elicits superior performance on ToM tasks.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks pose a unique challenge for small language models (SLMs) with limited scale, which often lack the capacity to perform deep social reasoning. In this work, we propose DEL-ToM, a framework that improves ToM reasoning through inference-time scaling rather than architectural changes. Our approach decomposes ToM tasks into a sequence of belief updates grounded in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), enabling structured and transparent reasoning. We train a verifier, called the Process Belief Model (PBM), to score each belief update step using labels generated automatically via a DEL simulator. During inference, candidate belief traces generated by a language model are evaluated by the PBM, and the highest-scoring trace is selected. This allows SLMs to emulate more deliberate reasoning by allocating additional compute at test time. Experiments across multiple model scales and benchmarks show that DEL-ToM consistently improves performance, demonstrating that verifiable belief supervision can significantly enhance ToM abilities of SLMs without retraining.

Do Large Language Models (LLMs) possess a Theory of Mind (ToM)? Research into this question has focused on evaluating LLMs against benchmarks and found success across a range of social tasks. However, these evaluations do not test for the actual representations posited by ToM: namely, a causal model of mental states and behavior. Here, we use a cognitively-grounded definition of ToM to develop and test a new evaluation framework. Specifically, our approach probes whether LLMs have a coherent, domain-general, and consistent model of how mental states cause behavior -- regardless of whether that model matches a human-like ToM. We find that even though LLMs succeed in approximating human judgments in a simple ToM paradigm, they fail at a logically equivalent task and exhibit low consistency between their action predictions and corresponding mental state inferences. As such, these findings suggest that the social proficiency exhibited by LLMs is not the result of an domain-general or consistent ToM.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is a fundamental psychological capability that allows humans to understand and interpret the mental states of others. Humans infer others' thoughts by integrating causal cues and indirect clues from broad contextual information, often derived from past interactions. In other words, human ToM heavily relies on the understanding about the backgrounds and life stories of others. Unfortunately, this aspect is largely overlooked in existing benchmarks for evaluating machines' ToM capabilities, due to their usage of short narratives without global backgrounds. In this paper, we verify the importance of understanding long personal backgrounds in ToM and assess the performance of LLMs in such realistic evaluation scenarios. To achieve this, we introduce a novel benchmark, CharToM-QA, comprising 1,035 ToM questions based on characters from classic novels. Our human study reveals a significant disparity in performance: the same group of educated participants performs dramatically better when they have read the novels compared to when they have not. In parallel, our experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs, including the very recent o1 model, show that LLMs still perform notably worse than humans, despite that they have seen these stories during pre-training. This highlights the limitations of current LLMs in capturing the nuanced contextual information required for ToM reasoning.

Large Language models are revolutionizing the conversational recommender systems through their impressive capabilities in instruction comprehension, reasoning, and human interaction. A core factor underlying effective recommendation dialogue is the ability to infer and reason about users' mental states (such as desire, intention, and belief), a cognitive capacity commonly referred to as Theory of Mind. Despite growing interest in evaluating ToM in LLMs, current benchmarks predominantly rely on synthetic narratives inspired by Sally-Anne test, which emphasize physical perception and fail to capture the complexity of mental state inference in realistic conversational settings. Moreover, existing benchmarks often overlook a critical component of human ToM: behavioral prediction, the ability to use inferred mental states to guide strategic decision-making and select appropriate conversational actions for future interactions. To better align LLM-based ToM evaluation with human-like social reasoning, we propose RecToM, a novel benchmark for evaluating ToM abilities in recommendation dialogues. RecToM focuses on two complementary dimensions: Cognitive Inference and Behavioral Prediction. The former focus on understanding what has been communicated by inferring the underlying mental states. The latter emphasizes what should be done next, evaluating whether LLMs can leverage these inferred mental states to predict, select, and assess appropriate dialogue strategies. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that RecToM poses a significant challenge. While the models exhibit partial competence in recognizing mental states, they struggle to maintain coherent, strategic ToM reasoning throughout dynamic recommendation dialogues, particularly in tracking evolving intentions and aligning conversational strategies with inferred mental states.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM), machine's ability to understand and keep track of the mental states of others, is pivotal in developing socially intelligent agents. However, prevalent N-ToM benchmarks have several shortcomings, including the presence of ambiguous and artificial narratives, absence of personality traits and preferences, a lack of questions addressing characters' psychological mental states, and limited diversity in the questions posed. In response to these issues, we construct OpenToM, a new benchmark for assessing N-ToM with (1) longer and clearer narrative stories, (2) characters with explicit personality traits, (3) actions that are triggered by character intentions, and (4) questions designed to challenge LLMs' capabilities of modeling characters' mental states of both the physical and psychological world. Using OpenToM, we reveal that state-of-the-art LLMs thrive at modeling certain aspects of mental states in the physical world but fall short when tracking characters' mental states in the psychological world.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have generated considerable interest and debate regarding their potential emergence of Theory of Mind (ToM). Several recent inquiries reveal a lack of robust ToM in these models and pose a pressing demand to develop new benchmarks, as current ones primarily focus on different aspects of ToM and are prone to shortcuts and data leakage. In this position paper, we seek to answer two road-blocking questions: (1) How can we taxonomize a holistic landscape of machine ToM? (2) What is a more effective evaluation protocol for machine ToM? Following psychological studies, we taxonomize machine ToM into 7 mental state categories and delineate existing benchmarks to identify under-explored aspects of ToM. We argue for a holistic and situated evaluation of ToM to break ToM into individual components and treat LLMs as an agent who is physically situated in environments and socially situated in interactions with humans. Such situated evaluation provides a more comprehensive assessment of mental states and potentially mitigates the risk of shortcuts and data leakage. We further present a pilot study in a grid world setup as a proof of concept. We hope this position paper can facilitate future research to integrate ToM with LLMs and offer an intuitive means for researchers to better position their work in the landscape of ToM. Project page: https://github.com/Mars-tin/awesome-theory-of-mind

Monitoring autonomous large language model (LLM) agents for covert malicious behavior is challenging due to delayed, context-dependent, and long-horizon attack patterns. Agents may pursue hidden objectives while maintaining superficially benign behavior, making detection difficult even with full trajectory access. Prior monitoring approaches improve scaffolding or ensemble aggregation, but treat each trajectory independently and do not learn from prior monitoring experience. Moreover, standard reasoning methods explain observed behavior without explicitly reasoning about agent beliefs, intentions, and goal alignment required to distinguish benign task execution from covert deviation. We propose Agent-ToM, a learning-to-monitor framework grounded in Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning for security analysis of autonomous agents. Agent-ToM performs structured full-trajectory analysis by inferring beliefs, intent hypotheses with calibrated confidence, expected actions, and deviations from task-consistent behavioral baselines. At inference time, it employs a Reason-Verify-Refine pipeline to construct and validate monitoring decisions. At training time, Agent-ToM distills critique signals into a persistent semantic guardrail memory, enabling reusable belief- and intent-conditioned constraints across episodes. We evaluate Agent-ToM on adversarial agent monitoring benchmarks (SHADE-Arena and CUA-SHADE-Arena). Agent-ToM achieves strong precision-recall balance and outperforms state-of-the-art monitoring baselines, including ensemble methods, while using a coherent two-call reasoning pipeline. These results demonstrate that learning at the monitoring layer, combined with structured ToM reasoning and verification, provides an effective and deployable foundation for securing autonomous LLM agents.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to track others epistemic state, makes humans efficient collaborators. AI agents need the same capacity in multi agent settings, yet existing benchmarks mostly test literal ToM by asking direct belief questions. The ability act optimally on implicit beliefs in embodied environments, called functional ToM, remains largely untested. We introduce EnactToM, an evolving benchmark of 300 embodied multi-agent tasks set in a 3D household with partial observability, private information, and constrained communication. Each task is formally verified for solvability and required epistemic depth, and new tasks are generated increase difficulty as models improve. On the hard split, all seven evaluated frontier models score 0.0% Pass^3 on functional task completion, while averaging 45.0% on literal belief probes. Manual analysis traces 93% of sampled failures to epistemic coordination breakdowns such as withheld information, ignored partner constraints, and misallocated messages, providing a concrete target for future work.

Principle-based alignment often lacks context sensitivity and completeness. Grounded in Theory of Mind, we propose role conditioning as a compact alternative: social roles (e.g., mother, judge) implicitly encode both values and the cognitive schemas required to apply them. We introduce a training-free pipeline featuring a role-conditioned generator and iterative role-based critics for refinement. Across five model families, our approach consistently outperforms principle-based, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and other baselines across benchmarks. Notably, it reduces unsafe outputs on the WildJailbreak benchmark from 81.4\% to 3.6\% with DeepSeek-V3. Not only for common safety benchmarks, it consistently applies for agentic safety tasks. These results establish role assignment as a powerful, interpretable paradigm for AI alignment and LLM-as-a-Judge construction.

TextArena is an open-source collection of competitive text-based games for training and evaluation of agentic behavior in Large Language Models (LLMs). It spans 57+ unique environments (including single-player, two-player, and multi-player setups) and allows for easy evaluation of model capabilities via an online-play system (against humans and other submitted models) with real-time TrueSkill scores. Traditional benchmarks rarely assess dynamic social skills such as negotiation, theory of mind, and deception, creating a gap that TextArena addresses. Designed with research, community and extensibility in mind, TextArena emphasizes ease of adding new games, adapting the framework, testing models, playing against the models, and training models. Detailed documentation of environments, games, leaderboard, and examples are available on https://github.com/LeonGuertler/TextArena and https://www.textarena.ai/.

Understanding people's social interactions in complex real-world scenarios often relies on intricate mental reasoning. To truly understand how and why people interact with one another, we must infer the underlying mental states that give rise to the social interactions, i.e., Theory of Mind reasoning in multi-agent interactions. Additionally, social interactions are often multi-modal -- we can watch people's actions, hear their conversations, and/or read about their past behaviors. For AI systems to successfully and safely interact with people in real-world environments, they also need to understand people's mental states as well as their inferences about each other's mental states based on multi-modal information about their interactions. For this, we introduce MuMA-ToM, a Multi-modal Multi-Agent Theory of Mind benchmark. MuMA-ToM is the first multi-modal Theory of Mind benchmark that evaluates mental reasoning in embodied multi-agent interactions. In MuMA-ToM, we provide video and text descriptions of people's multi-modal behavior in realistic household environments. Based on the context, we then ask questions about people's goals, beliefs, and beliefs about others' goals. We validated MuMA-ToM in a human experiment and provided a human baseline. We also proposed a novel multi-modal, multi-agent ToM model, LIMP (Language model-based Inverse Multi-agent Planning). Our experimental results show that LIMP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, including large multi-modal models (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini-1.5 Pro) and a recent multi-modal ToM model, BIP-ALM.

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

Despite rapid progress in multimodal large language models (MLLMs), their capability for deep emotional understanding remains limited. We argue that genuine affective intelligence requires explicit modeling of Theory of Mind (ToM), the cognitive substrate from which emotions arise. To this end, we introduce HitEmotion, a ToM-grounded hierarchical benchmark that diagnoses capability breakpoints across increasing levels of cognitive depth. Second, we propose a ToM-guided reasoning chain that tracks mental states and calibrates cross-modal evidence to achieve faithful emotional reasoning. We further introduce TMPO, a reinforcement learning method that uses intermediate mental states as process-level supervision to guide and strengthen model reasoning. Extensive experiments show that HitEmotion exposes deep emotional reasoning deficits in state-of-the-art models, especially on cognitively demanding tasks. In evaluation, the ToM-guided reasoning chain and TMPO improve end-task accuracy and yield more faithful, more coherent rationales. In conclusion, our work provides the research community with a practical toolkit for evaluating and enhancing the cognition-based emotional understanding capabilities of MLLMs. Our dataset and code are available at: https://HitEmotion.github.io/.

Theory of mind (ToM) evaluations currently focus on testing models using passive narratives that inherently lack interactivity. We introduce FANToM, a new benchmark designed to stress-test ToM within information-asymmetric conversational contexts via question answering. Our benchmark draws upon important theoretical requisites from psychology and necessary empirical considerations when evaluating large language models (LLMs). In particular, we formulate multiple types of questions that demand the same underlying reasoning to identify illusory or false sense of ToM capabilities in LLMs. We show that FANToM is challenging for state-of-the-art LLMs, which perform significantly worse than humans even with chain-of-thought reasoning or fine-tuning.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the cognitive capability to perceive and ascribe mental states to oneself and others. Recent research has sparked a debate over whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit a form of ToM. However, existing ToM evaluations are hindered by challenges such as constrained scope, subjective judgment, and unintended contamination, yielding inadequate assessments. To address this gap, we introduce ToMBench with three key characteristics: a systematic evaluation framework encompassing 8 tasks and 31 abilities in social cognition, a multiple-choice question format to support automated and unbiased evaluation, and a build-from-scratch bilingual inventory to strictly avoid data leakage. Based on ToMBench, we conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the ToM performance of 10 popular LLMs across tasks and abilities. We find that even the most advanced LLMs like GPT-4 lag behind human performance by over 10% points, indicating that LLMs have not achieved a human-level theory of mind yet. Our aim with ToMBench is to enable an efficient and effective evaluation of LLMs' ToM capabilities, thereby facilitating the development of LLMs with inherent social intelligence.

We introduce EgoToM, a new video question-answering benchmark that extends Theory-of-Mind (ToM) evaluation to egocentric domains. Using a causal ToM model, we generate multi-choice video QA instances for the Ego4D dataset to benchmark the ability to predict a camera wearer's goals, beliefs, and next actions. We study the performance of both humans and state of the art multimodal large language models (MLLMs) on these three interconnected inference problems. Our evaluation shows that MLLMs achieve close to human-level accuracy on inferring goals from egocentric videos. However, MLLMs (including the largest ones we tested with over 100B parameters) fall short of human performance when inferring the camera wearers' in-the-moment belief states and future actions that are most consistent with the unseen video future. We believe that our results will shape the future design of an important class of egocentric digital assistants which are equipped with a reasonable model of the user's internal mental states.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

Theory of Mind (ToM)-an understanding of the mental states of others-is a key aspect of human social intelligence, yet, chatbots and LLM-based social agents do not typically integrate it. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs that explicitly use ToM get better at dialogue, achieving goals more effectively. After showing that simply prompting models to generate mental states between dialogue turns already provides significant benefit, we further introduce ToMAgent (ToMA), a ToM-focused dialogue agent. ToMA is trained by pairing ToM with dialogue lookahead to produce mental states that are maximally useful for achieving dialogue goals. Experiments on the Sotopia interactive social evaluation benchmark demonstrate the effectiveness of our method over a range of baselines. Comprehensive analysis shows that ToMA exhibits more strategic, goal-oriented reasoning behaviors, which enable long-horizon adaptation, while maintaining better relationships with their partners. Our results suggest a step forward in integrating ToM for building socially intelligent LLM agents.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, there is increasing interest in their ability to infer human mental states and demonstrate a human-like Theory of Mind (ToM). Most existing ToM evaluations, however, are centered on text-based inputs, while scenarios relying solely on visual information receive far less attention. This leaves a gap, since real-world human-AI interaction typically requires multimodal understanding. In addition, many current methods regard the model as a black box and rarely probe how its internal attention behaves in multiple-choice question answering (QA). The impact of LLM hallucinations on such tasks is also underexplored from an interpretability perspective. To address these issues, we introduce VisionToM, a vision-oriented intervention framework designed to strengthen task-aware reasoning. The core idea is to compute intervention vectors that align visual representations with the correct semantic targets, thereby steering the model's attention through different layers of visual features. This guidance reduces the model's reliance on spurious linguistic priors, leading to more reliable multimodal language model (MLLM) outputs and better QA performance. Experiments on the EgoToM benchmark-an egocentric, real-world video dataset for ToM with three multiple-choice QA settings-demonstrate that our method substantially improves the ToM abilities of MLLMs. Furthermore, results on an additional open-ended generation task show that VisionToM enables MLLMs to produce free-form explanations that more accurately capture agents' mental states, pushing machine-human collaboration toward greater alignment.

Effective multi-agent collaboration requires agents to infer the rationale behind others' actions, a capability rooted in Theory-of-Mind (ToM). While recent Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at logical inference, their ability to infer rationale in dynamic, collaborative settings remains under-explored. This study introduces LLM-Hanabi, a novel benchmark that uses the cooperative game Hanabi to evaluate the rationale inference and ToM of LLMs. Our framework features an automated evaluation system that measures both game performance and ToM proficiency. Across a range of models, we find a significant positive correlation between ToM and in-game success. Notably, first-order ToM (interpreting others' intent) correlates more strongly with performance than second-order ToM (predicting others' interpretations). These findings highlight that for effective AI collaboration, the ability to accurately interpret a partner's rationale is more critical than higher-order reasoning. We conclude that prioritizing first-order ToM is a promising direction for enhancing the collaborative capabilities of future models.

While recent studies explore Large Language Models' (LLMs) performance on Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning tasks, research on ToM abilities that require more nuanced social context is limited, such as white lies. We introduce TactfulToM, a novel English benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs' ability to understand white lies within real-life conversations and reason about prosocial motivations behind them, particularly when they are used to spare others' feelings and maintain social harmony. Our benchmark is generated through a multi-stage human-in-the-loop pipeline where LLMs expand manually designed seed stories into conversations to maintain the information asymmetry between participants necessary for authentic white lies. We show that TactfulToM is challenging for state-of-the-art models, which perform substantially below humans, revealing shortcomings in their ability to fully comprehend the ToM reasoning that enables true understanding of white lies.

Collaborative tasks often begin with partial task knowledge and incomplete initial plans from each partner. To complete these tasks, agents need to engage in situated communication with their partners and coordinate their partial plans towards a complete plan to achieve a joint task goal. While such collaboration seems effortless in a human-human team, it is highly challenging for human-AI collaboration. To address this limitation, this paper takes a step towards collaborative plan acquisition, where humans and agents strive to learn and communicate with each other to acquire a complete plan for joint tasks. Specifically, we formulate a novel problem for agents to predict the missing task knowledge for themselves and for their partners based on rich perceptual and dialogue history. We extend a situated dialogue benchmark for symmetric collaborative tasks in a 3D blocks world and investigate computational strategies for plan acquisition. Our empirical results suggest that predicting the partner's missing knowledge is a more viable approach than predicting one's own. We show that explicit modeling of the partner's dialogue moves and mental states produces improved and more stable results than without. These results provide insight for future AI agents that can predict what knowledge their partner is missing and, therefore, can proactively communicate such information to help their partner acquire such missing knowledge toward a common understanding of joint tasks.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer mental states in others, is pivotal for human social cognition. Existing evaluations of ToM in LLMs are largely limited to English, neglecting the linguistic diversity that shapes human cognition. This limitation raises a critical question: can LLMs exhibit Multilingual Theory of Mind, which is the capacity to reason about mental states across diverse linguistic contexts? To address this gap, we present XToM, a rigorously validated multilingual benchmark that evaluates ToM across five languages and incorporates diverse, contextually rich task scenarios. Using XToM, we systematically evaluate LLMs (e.g., DeepSeek R1), revealing a pronounced dissonance: while models excel in multilingual language understanding, their ToM performance varies across languages. Our findings expose limitations in LLMs' ability to replicate human-like mentalizing across linguistic contexts.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods struggle with the non-stationarity of multi-agent systems and fail to adaptively learn online when tested with novel agents. Here, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to create an autonomous agent that can handle these challenges. Our agent, Hypothetical Minds, consists of a cognitively-inspired architecture, featuring modular components for perception, memory, and hierarchical planning over two levels of abstraction. We introduce the Theory of Mind module that scaffolds the high-level planning process by generating hypotheses about other agents' strategies in natural language. It then evaluates and iteratively refines these hypotheses by reinforcing hypotheses that make correct predictions about the other agents' behavior. Hypothetical Minds significantly improves performance over previous LLM-agent and RL baselines on a range of competitive, mixed motive, and collaborative domains in the Melting Pot benchmark, including both dyadic and population-based environments. Additionally, comparisons against LLM-agent baselines and ablations reveal the importance of hypothesis evaluation and refinement for succeeding on complex scenarios.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand the mental states of oneself and others, remains a challenging area for large language models (LLMs), which often fail to predict human mental states accurately. In this paper, we introduce UniToMBench, a unified benchmark that integrates the strengths of SimToM and TOMBENCH to systematically improve and assess ToM capabilities in LLMs by integrating multi-interaction task designs and evolving story scenarios. Supported by a custom dataset of over 1,000 hand-written scenarios, UniToMBench combines perspective-taking techniques with diverse evaluation metrics to better stimulate social cognition in LLMs. Through evaluation, we observe that while models like GPT-4o and GPT-4o Mini show consistently high accuracy in tasks involving emotional and belief-related scenarios, with results usually above 80%, there is significant variability in their performance across knowledge-based tasks. These results highlight both the strengths and limitations of current LLMs in ToM-related tasks, underscoring the value of UniToMBench as a comprehensive tool for future development. Our code is publicly available here: https://github.com/Shamant/unifiedtombenchmark.

A compelling portrayal of characters is essential to the success of narrative writing. For readers, appreciating a character's traits requires the ability to infer their evolving beliefs, desires, and intentions over the course of a complex storyline, a cognitive skill known as Theory-of-Mind (ToM). Performing ToM reasoning in prolonged narratives requires readers to integrate historical context with current narrative information, a task at which humans excel but Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle. To systematically evaluate LLMs' ToM reasoning capability in long narratives, we construct LitCharToM, a benchmark of character-centric questions across four ToM dimensions from classic literature. Further, we introduce EvolvTrip, a perspective-aware temporal knowledge graph that tracks psychological development throughout narratives. Our experiments demonstrate that EvolvTrip consistently enhances performance of LLMs across varying scales, even in challenging extended-context scenarios. EvolvTrip proves to be particularly valuable for smaller models, partially bridging the performance gap with larger LLMs and showing great compatibility with lengthy narratives. Our findings highlight the importance of explicit representation of temporal character mental states in narrative comprehension and offer a foundation for more sophisticated character understanding. Our data and code are publicly available at https://github.com/Bernard-Yang/EvolvTrip.

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has accelerated their application in reasoning, with strategic reasoning drawing increasing attention. To evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning capabilities, game theory, with its concise structure, has become a preferred approach. However, current research focuses on a limited selection of games, resulting in low coverage. Classic game scenarios risk data leakage, and existing benchmarks often lack extensibility, making them inadequate for evaluating state-of-the-art models. To address these challenges, we propose TMGBench, a benchmark with comprehensive game type coverage, novel scenarios, and flexible organization. Specifically, we incorporate all 144 game types summarized by the Robinson-Goforth topology of 2x2 games, constructed as classic games. We also employ synthetic data generation to create diverse, higher-quality scenarios through topic guidance and human inspection, referred to as story-based games. Lastly, we provide a sustainable framework for increasingly powerful LLMs by treating these games as atomic units and organizing them into more complex forms via sequential, parallel, and nested structures. Our comprehensive evaluation of mainstream LLMs covers tests on rational reasoning, robustness, Theory-of-Mind (ToM), and reasoning in complex forms. Results reveal flaws in accuracy, consistency, and varying mastery of ToM. Additionally, o1-mini, OpenAI's latest reasoning model, achieved accuracy rates of 66.6%, 60.0%, and 70.0% on sequential, parallel, and nested games, highlighting TMGBench's challenges.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

In this paper, we propose the use of the popular word-based board game Codenames as a suitable benchmark for evaluating the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). Codenames presents a highly interesting challenge for achieving successful AI performance, requiring both a sophisticated understanding of language, theory of mind, and epistemic reasoning capabilities. Prior attempts to develop agents for Codenames have largely relied on word embedding techniques, which have a limited vocabulary range and perform poorly when paired with differing approaches. LLMs have demonstrated enhanced reasoning and comprehension capabilities for language-based tasks, but can still suffer in lateral thinking challenges. We evaluate the capabilities of several state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Llama 3.1, across a variety of board setups. Our results indicate that while certain LLMs perform better than others overall, different models exhibit varying emergent behaviours during gameplay and excel at specific roles. We also evaluate the performance of different combinations of LLMs when playing cooperatively together, demonstrating that LLM agents are more generalisable to a wider range of teammates than prior techniques.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly serve as personal assistants and workplace collaborators, where their utility depends on memory systems that extract, retrieve, and apply information across long-running conversations. However, both existing memory systems and benchmarks are built around the dyadic, single-user setup, even though real deployments routinely span groups and channels with multiple users interacting with the agent and with each other. This mismatch leaves three properties of group memory unmeasured: (i) group dynamics that go beyond concatenated one-on-one chats, (ii) speaker-grounded belief tracking, where the per-user memory modeling is needed, and (iii) audience-adapted language, where Theory-of-Mind shifts produce role-specific vocabulary. We introduce GroupMemBench, a benchmark that exposes all three. A graph-grounded synthesis pipeline produces multi-party conversations with controllable reply structure and conditions each message on per-user personas and target audiences. An adversarial query pipeline then binds every question to a specific asker across six categories, spanning multi-hop reasoning, knowledge update, term ambiguity, user-implicit reasoning, temporal reasoning, and abstention, and iteratively searches challenging, realistic queries that reflect comprehensive memory capability. Benchmarking leading memory systems exposes a sharp collapse: the strongest one reaches only 46.0% average accuracy, with knowledge update at 27.1% and term ambiguity at 37.7%, while a simple BM25 baseline matches or exceeds most agent memory systems. This indicates current memory ingestion erases the structural and lexical features group memory depends on, leaving multi-user memory far from solved.

Humans learn social norms and behaviors from verbal feedback (e.g., a parent saying "that was rude" or a friend explaining "here's why that hurt"). Yet, learning from feedback for LLMs has largely focused on domains like code and math, where RL rewards are directly verifiable and condensed into scalar values. As LLMs are increasingly used to simulate human behavior, e.g., standing in for users, patients, students, and other personas, there is a pressing need to make them more human-like, which requires embracing a fundamentally different kind of signal: feedback that is verbal, subjective, and multi-faceted. We present DITTO, a model trained by treating verbal feedback as a first-class signal in reinforcement learning. After each rollout, DITTO receives verbal feedback and generates a feedback-conditioned improved rollout; both outputs are jointly optimized with GRPO, distilling verbal guidance into the base policy without requiring feedback at test time. We also introduce SOUL (Simulation gym Of hUman-Like behavior), a unified benchmark and training data suite spanning 10 tasks across six categories: Theory of Mind, character role play, social skill, learner simulation, user simulation, and persona simulation. DITTO achieves an average 36% improvement over the base model and exceeds GPT-5.4 on 6 of 10 SOUL benchmarks, demonstrating that RL with verbal feedback is a promising direction for training LLMs to simulate human behavior.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our everyday lives, understanding their ability to comprehend human mental states becomes critical for ensuring effective interactions. However, despite the recent attempts to assess the Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities of LLMs, the degree to which these models can align with human ToM remains a nuanced topic of exploration. This is primarily due to two distinct challenges: (1) the presence of inconsistent results from previous evaluations, and (2) concerns surrounding the validity of existing evaluation methodologies. To address these challenges, we present a novel framework for procedurally generating evaluations with LLMs by populating causal templates. Using our framework, we create a new social reasoning benchmark (BigToM) for LLMs which consists of 25 controls and 5,000 model-written evaluations. We find that human participants rate the quality of our benchmark higher than previous crowd-sourced evaluations and comparable to expert-written evaluations. Using BigToM, we evaluate the social reasoning capabilities of a variety of LLMs and compare model performances with human performance. Our results suggest that GPT4 has ToM capabilities that mirror human inference patterns, though less reliable, while other LLMs struggle.

We introduce PerceptionBench, a benchmark specifically designed to evaluate the atomic visual perception capabilities of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). Existing benchmarks often fail to isolate perception: holistic evaluations conflate perceptual errors with failures in reasoning or domain knowledge, while application-driven benchmarks only cover narrow, fragmented domains shaped by heuristic designs. To address these limitations, PerceptionBench adopts a bottom-up approach: by diagnosing the earliest failure points in the responses of frontier MLLMs across 42 existing benchmarks, we construct an error taxonomy whose perception branch defines ten atomic perceptual capabilities. Guided by this taxonomy, we construct 3,000 verified questions with short, unambiguous answers, each isolating a single capability, with difficulty stemming from perception rather than reasoning or knowledge. Benchmark results across sixteen frontier MLLMs reveal that atomic perception remains largely unsolved---no model reaches 60\% accuracy, perception-related hallucination is the weakest capability on average, and similar overall scores conceal sharply divergent capability profiles. PerceptionBench thus provides a capability-level standard for measuring and diagnosing the visual perception boundaries of MLLMs.

Evaluating Large Language Models (LLMs) for mental health support is challenging due to the emotionally and cognitively complex nature of therapeutic dialogue. Existing benchmarks are limited in scale, reliability, often relying on synthetic or social media data, and lack frameworks to assess when automated judges can be trusted. To address the need for large-scale dialogue datasets and judge reliability assessment, we introduce two benchmarks that provide a framework for generation and evaluation. MentalBench-100k consolidates 10,000 one-turn conversations from three real scenarios datasets, each paired with nine LLM-generated responses, yielding 100,000 response pairs. MentalAlign-70k}reframes evaluation by comparing four high-performing LLM judges with human experts across 70,000 ratings on seven attributes, grouped into Cognitive Support Score (CSS) and Affective Resonance Score (ARS). We then employ the Affective Cognitive Agreement Framework, a statistical methodology using intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) with confidence intervals to quantify agreement, consistency, and bias between LLM judges and human experts. Our analysis reveals systematic inflation by LLM judges, strong reliability for cognitive attributes such as guidance and informativeness, reduced precision for empathy, and some unreliability in safety and relevance. Our contributions establish new methodological and empirical foundations for reliable, large-scale evaluation of LLMs in mental health. We release the benchmarks and codes at: https://github.com/abeerbadawi/MentalBench/

Existing benchmarks for frontier models often test specialized, ``PhD-level'' knowledge that is difficult for non-experts to grasp. In contrast, we present a benchmark based on the NPR Sunday Puzzle Challenge that requires only general knowledge. Our benchmark is challenging for both humans and models, however correct solutions are easy to verify, and models' mistakes are easy to spot. Our work reveals capability gaps that are not evident in existing benchmarks: OpenAI o1 significantly outperforms other reasoning models that are on par on benchmarks that test specialized knowledge. Furthermore, our analysis of reasoning outputs uncovers new kinds of failures. DeepSeek R1, for instance, often concedes with ``I give up'' before providing an answer that it knows is wrong. R1 can also be remarkably ``uncertain'' in its output and in rare cases, it does not ``finish thinking,'' which suggests the need for an inference-time technique to ``wrap up'' before the context window limit is reached. We also quantify the effectiveness of reasoning longer with R1 and Gemini Thinking to identify the point beyond which more reasoning is unlikely to improve accuracy on our benchmark.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

The effectiveness of Large Language Models (LLMs) is heavily influenced by the reasoning strategies, or styles of thought, employed in their prompts. However, the interplay between these reasoning styles, model architecture, and task type remains poorly understood. To address this, we introduce StyleBench, a comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating reasoning styles across diverse tasks and models. We assess five representative reasoning styles, including Chain of Thought (CoT), Tree of Thought (ToT), Algorithm of Thought (AoT), Sketch of Thought (SoT), and Chain-of-Draft (CoD) on five reasoning tasks, using 15 open-source models from major families (LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral, Gemma, GPT-OSS, Phi, and DeepSeek) ranging from 270M to 120B parameters. Our large-scale analysis reveals that no single style is universally optimal. We demonstrate that strategy efficacy is highly contingent on both model scale and task type: search-based methods (AoT, ToT) excel in open-ended problems but require large-scale models, while concise styles (SoT, CoD) achieve radical efficiency gains on well-defined tasks. Furthermore, we identify key behavioral patterns: smaller models frequently fail to follow output instructions and default to guessing, while reasoning robustness emerges as a function of scale. Our findings offer a crucial roadmap for selecting optimal reasoning strategies based on specific constraints, we open source the benchmark in https://github.com/JamesJunyuGuo/Style_Bench.

LLM companions are deployed at scale in personally consequential settings, yet poorly evaluated. Existing benchmarks use hand-authored scenarios and prompted simulators, aggregate empathy into one score, and overlook judge biases such as same-family favoritism and scale drift. We introduce CompanionBench, an interactive bilingual benchmark. To our knowledge, it is the first companion benchmark to ground both its scenarios and a trained user simulator in de-identified real-world data. A hidden disclosure gate branches each persona's trajectory on the agent's own behavior, controlling the interaction state space without scripting dialogue. We operationalize ten capabilities derived from 25 theories across psychology and counseling, four of them not graded explicitly by prior work: holding ambiguity, selfobject responsiveness, positive resonance and calibrated challenge. Agents are assessed on two complementary axes: a subjective ten-capability rubric and a deterministic measure of whether deeper disclosure was earned. A cross-family panel dilutes same-family favoritism; an Item Response Theory model separates agent quality from judge severity. Theory fixes what to measure and how personas are structured; real data supply events, history, and profiles -- coverage from theory, authenticity from data. Rankings are reproducible in both languages (rho = 0.996 ZH / 0.953 EN). Evaluating 28 agents reveals capability-level differences obscured by aggregate scores. Emotion regulation and calibrated challenge remain common weaknesses; holding ambiguity discriminates most. Role-play agents rank near the bottom: immersion does not imply relational competence. Across agents, the dominant failure mode is substituting surface warmth for substantive relational support. We will release 500 Chinese-English parallel pairs and the evaluation code.

Demand for mental health support through AI chatbots is surging, though current systems present several limitations, like sycophancy or overvalidation, and reinforcement of maladaptive beliefs. A core obstacle to the creation of better systems is the scarcity of benchmarks that capture the complexity of real therapeutic interactions. Most existing benchmarks either only test clinical knowledge through multiple-choice questions or assess single responses in isolation. To bridge this gap, we present MindEval, a framework designed in collaboration with Ph.D-level Licensed Clinical Psychologists for automatically evaluating language models in realistic, multi-turn mental health therapy conversations. Through patient simulation and automatic evaluation with LLMs, our framework balances resistance to gaming with reproducibility via its fully automated, model-agnostic design. We begin by quantitatively validating the realism of our simulated patients against human-generated text and by demonstrating strong correlations between automatic and human expert judgments. Then, we evaluate 12 state-of-the-art LLMs and show that all models struggle, scoring below 4 out of 6, on average, with particular weaknesses in problematic AI-specific patterns of communication. Notably, reasoning capabilities and model scale do not guarantee better performance, and systems deteriorate with longer interactions or when supporting patients with severe symptoms. We release all code, prompts, and human evaluation data.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown increasing capability in problem-solving and decision-making, largely based on the step-by-step chain-of-thought reasoning processes. However, it has been increasingly challenging to evaluate the reasoning capability of LLMs. Concretely, existing outcome-based benchmarks begin to saturate and become less sufficient to monitor the progress. To this end, we present a process-based benchmark MR-BEN that demands a meta reasoning skill, where LMs are asked to locate and analyse potential errors in automatically generated reasoning steps. MR-BEN is a comprehensive benchmark comprising 5,975 questions collected from human experts, covering various subjects such as physics, chemistry, logic, coding, and more. Through our designed metrics for assessing meta-reasoning on this benchmark, we identify interesting limitations and weaknesses of current LLMs (open-source and closed-source models). For example, open-source models are seemingly comparable to GPT-4 on outcome-based benchmarks, but they lag far behind on our benchmark, revealing the underlying reasoning capability gap between them. Our dataset and codes are available on https://randolph-zeng.github.io/Mr-Ben.github.io/.

World models aim to understand, remember, and predict dynamic visual environments, yet a unified benchmark for evaluating their fundamental abilities remains lacking. To address this gap, we introduce MIND, the first open-domain closed-loop revisited benchmark for evaluating Memory consIstency and action coNtrol in worlD models. MIND contains 250 high-quality videos at 1080p and 24 FPS, including 100 (first-person) + 100 (third-person) video clips under a shared action space and 25 + 25 clips across varied action spaces covering eight diverse scenes. We design an efficient evaluation framework to measure two core abilities: memory consistency and action control, capturing temporal stability and contextual coherence across viewpoints. Furthermore, we design various action spaces, including different character movement speeds and camera rotation angles, to evaluate the action generalization capability across different action spaces under shared scenes. To facilitate future performance benchmarking on MIND, we introduce MIND-World, a novel interactive Video-to-World baseline. Extensive experiments demonstrate the completeness of MIND and reveal key challenges in current world models, including the difficulty of maintaining long-term memory consistency and generalizing across action spaces. Project page: https://csu-jpg.github.io/MIND.github.io/

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to an agent's ability to model the internal states of others. Contributing to the debate whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit genuine ToM capabilities, our study investigates their ToM robustness using perturbations on false-belief tasks and examines the potential of Chain-of-Thought prompting (CoT) to enhance performance and explain the LLM's decision. We introduce a handcrafted, richly annotated ToM dataset, including classic and perturbed false belief tasks, the corresponding spaces of valid reasoning chains for correct task completion, subsequent reasoning faithfulness, task solutions, and propose metrics to evaluate reasoning chain correctness and to what extent final answers are faithful to reasoning traces of the generated CoT. We show a steep drop in ToM capabilities under task perturbation for all evaluated LLMs, questioning the notion of any robust form of ToM being present. While CoT prompting improves the ToM performance overall in a faithful manner, it surprisingly degrades accuracy for some perturbation classes, indicating that selective application is necessary.

The frontier of visual reasoning is shifting toward models like OpenAI o3, which can intelligently create and operate tools to transform images for problem-solving, also known as thinking-with-images in chain-of-thought. Yet existing benchmarks fail to fully capture this advanced capability. Even Visual Search, the most common benchmark for current thinking-with-images methods, tests only basic operations such as localization and cropping, offering little insight into more complex, dynamic, and tool-dependent reasoning. We introduce TIR-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating agentic thinking-with-images across 13 diverse tasks, each requiring novel tool use for image processing and manipulation in chain-of-thought. We evaluate 22 multimodal large language models (MLLMs), from leading open-sourced and proprietary models to those with explicit tool-use augmentation. Results show that TIR-Bench is universally challenging, and strong performance requires genuine thinking-with-images capabilities. Finally, we present a pilot study comparing direct versus agentic fine-tuning.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Existing long-horizon memory benchmarks mostly use multi-turn dialogues or synthetic user histories, which makes retrieval performance an imperfect proxy for person understanding. We present \BenchName, a publicly releasable benchmark built from long-form autobiographical narratives, where actions, context, and inner thoughts provide dense evidence for inferring stable motivations and decision principles. \BenchName~reconstructs each narrative into a flashback-aware, time-anchored stream and evaluates models with evidence-linked questions spanning factual recall, subjective state attribution, and principle-level reasoning. Across diverse narrative sources, retrieval-augmented systems mainly improve factual accuracy, while errors persist on temporally grounded explanations and higher-level inferences, highlighting the need for memory mechanisms beyond retrieval. Our data is in KnowMeBench{https://github.com/QuantaAlpha/KnowMeBench}.

We introduce S1-Bench, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate Large Reasoning Models' (LRMs) performance on simple tasks that favor intuitive system 1 thinking rather than deliberative system 2 reasoning. While LRMs have achieved significant breakthroughs in complex reasoning tasks through explicit chains of thought, their reliance on deep analytical thinking may limit their system 1 thinking capabilities. Moreover, a lack of benchmark currently exists to evaluate LRMs' performance in tasks that require such capabilities. To fill this gap, S1-Bench presents a set of simple, diverse, and naturally clear questions across multiple domains and languages, specifically designed to assess LRMs' performance in such tasks. Our comprehensive evaluation of 22 LRMs reveals significant lower efficiency tendencies, with outputs averaging 15.5 times longer than those of traditional small LLMs. Additionally, LRMs often identify correct answers early but continue unnecessary deliberation, with some models even producing numerous errors. These findings highlight the rigid reasoning patterns of current LRMs and underscore the substantial development needed to achieve balanced dual-system thinking capabilities that can adapt appropriately to task complexity.

Successful and effective communication between humans and AI relies on a shared experience of the world. By training solely on written text, current language models (LMs) miss the grounded experience of humans in the real-world -- their failure to relate language to the physical world causes knowledge to be misrepresented and obvious mistakes in their reasoning. We present Mind's Eye, a paradigm to ground language model reasoning in the physical world. Given a physical reasoning question, we use a computational physics engine (DeepMind's MuJoCo) to simulate the possible outcomes, and then use the simulation results as part of the input, which enables language models to perform reasoning. Experiments on 39 tasks in a physics alignment benchmark demonstrate that Mind's Eye can improve reasoning ability by a large margin (27.9% zero-shot, and 46.0% few-shot absolute accuracy improvement on average). Smaller language models armed with Mind's Eye can obtain similar performance to models that are 100x larger. Finally, we confirm the robustness of Mind's Eye through ablation studies.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

We propose a novel multimodal video benchmark - the Perception Test - to evaluate the perception and reasoning skills of pre-trained multimodal models (e.g. Flamingo, BEiT-3, or GPT-4). Compared to existing benchmarks that focus on computational tasks (e.g. classification, detection or tracking), the Perception Test focuses on skills (Memory, Abstraction, Physics, Semantics) and types of reasoning (descriptive, explanatory, predictive, counterfactual) across video, audio, and text modalities, to provide a comprehensive and efficient evaluation tool. The benchmark probes pre-trained models for their transfer capabilities, in a zero-shot / few-shot or limited finetuning regime. For these purposes, the Perception Test introduces 11.6k real-world videos, 23s average length, designed to show perceptually interesting situations, filmed by around 100 participants worldwide. The videos are densely annotated with six types of labels (multiple-choice and grounded video question-answers, object and point tracks, temporal action and sound segments), enabling both language and non-language evaluations. The fine-tuning and validation splits of the benchmark are publicly available (CC-BY license), in addition to a challenge server with a held-out test split. Human baseline results compared to state-of-the-art video QA models show a significant gap in performance (91.4% vs 43.6%), suggesting that there is significant room for improvement in multimodal video understanding. Dataset, baselines code, and challenge server are available at https://github.com/deepmind/perception_test

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have led to remarkable performance across a wide range of language understanding and mathematical tasks. As a result, increasing attention has been given to assessing the true reasoning capabilities of LLMs, driving research into commonsense, numerical, logical, and qualitative reasoning. However, with the rapid progress of reasoning-focused models such as OpenAI's o1 and DeepSeek's R1, there has been a growing demand for reasoning benchmarks that can keep pace with ongoing model developments. In this paper, we introduce MastermindEval, a simple, scalable, and interpretable deductive reasoning benchmark inspired by the board game Mastermind. Our benchmark supports two evaluation paradigms: (1) agentic evaluation, in which the model autonomously plays the game, and (2) deductive reasoning evaluation, in which the model is given a pre-played game state with only one possible valid code to infer. In our experimental results we (1) find that even easy Mastermind instances are difficult for current models and (2) demonstrate that the benchmark is scalable to possibly more advanced models in the future Furthermore, we investigate possible reasons why models cannot deduce the final solution and find that current models are limited in deducing the concealed code as the number of statement to combine information from is increasing.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

Recent advancements in Chain of Thought (COT) generation have significantly improved the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), with reinforcement learning (RL) emerging as an effective post-training approach. Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) inherit this reasoning potential but remain underexplored in tasks requiring both perception and logical reasoning. To address this, we introduce SEED-Bench-R1, a benchmark designed to systematically evaluate post-training methods for MLLMs in video understanding. It includes intricate real-world videos and complex everyday planning tasks in the format of multiple-choice questions, requiring sophisticated perception and reasoning. SEED-Bench-R1 assesses generalization through a three-level hierarchy: in-distribution, cross-environment, and cross-environment-task scenarios, equipped with a large-scale training dataset with easily verifiable ground-truth answers. Using Qwen2-VL-Instruct-7B as a base model, we compare RL with supervised fine-tuning (SFT), demonstrating RL's data efficiency and superior performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution tasks, even outperforming SFT on general video understanding benchmarks like LongVideoBench. Our detailed analysis reveals that RL enhances visual perception but often produces less logically coherent reasoning chains. We identify key limitations such as inconsistent reasoning and overlooked visual cues, and suggest future improvements in base model reasoning, reward modeling, and RL robustness against noisy signals.

Recent advances in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) mark a shift from non-thinking models to post-trained reasoning models capable of solving complex problems through thinking. However, whether such thinking mitigates hallucinations in multimodal perception and reasoning remains unclear. Self-reflective reasoning enhances robustness but introduces additional hallucinations, and subtle perceptual errors still result in incorrect or coincidentally correct answers. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on models before the emergence of reasoning MLLMs, neglecting the internal thinking process and failing to measure the hallucinations that occur during thinking. To address these challenges, we introduce MM-THEBench, a comprehensive benchmark for assessing hallucinations of intermediate CoTs in reasoning MLLMs. MM-THEBench features a fine-grained taxonomy grounded in cognitive dimensions, diverse data with verified reasoning annotations, and a multi-level automated evaluation framework. Extensive experiments on mainstream reasoning MLLMs reveal insights into how thinking affects hallucination and reasoning capability in various multimodal tasks.

As LLM benchmarks saturate, the evaluation community has pursued two strategies to increase difficulty: escalating knowledge demands (GPQA, HLE) or removing knowledge entirely in favor of abstract reasoning (ARC-AGI). The first conflates memorization with capability; the second divorces reasoning from the practical contexts in which it matters. We take a different approach. The Grounded Integration Measure (GIM) is a benchmark of 820 original problems (615 public, 205 private) where difficulty comes from integration; individual problems require coordinating multiple cognitive operations (constraint satisfaction, state tracking, epistemic vigilance, audience calibration) over broadly accessible knowledge, so that reasoning stays grounded in realistic tasks without being gated on specialized expertise. Each problem is an original expert-authored composition, majority with rubric-decomposed scoring (median 6 independently judged criteria). A balanced public--private split provides built-in contamination diagnostic. We calibrate a continuous response 2-parameter logistic (2PL) IRT model over >200k prompt-response pairs across 28 models, producing robust ability estimates that correctly order test-configurations even when raw accuracy is distorted by errors or missing data, addressing a common challenge in benchmark reporting. Using this framework, we present a comprehensive leaderboard spanning 22 models and 47 test-configurations (unique model, thinking-level pairs), and conduct what is to our knowledge the most extensive published study of how test-time compute trades off against model capability on a fixed benchmark: 11 models swept across 35 test-configurations. We observe that within-family configuration choices, such as thinking budget and quantization, matter as much as model selection. We release the evaluation framework, calibrated IRT parameters, and all public problems.

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

While text-to-image generation has achieved unprecedented fidelity, the vast majority of existing models function fundamentally as static text-to-pixel decoders. Consequently, they often fail to grasp implicit user intentions. Although emerging unified understanding-generation models have improved intent comprehension, they still struggle to accomplish tasks involving complex knowledge reasoning within a single model. Moreover, constrained by static internal priors, these models remain unable to adapt to the evolving dynamics of the real world. To bridge these gaps, we introduce Mind-Brush, a unified agentic framework that transforms generation into a dynamic, knowledge-driven workflow. Simulating a human-like 'think-research-create' paradigm, Mind-Brush actively retrieves multimodal evidence to ground out-of-distribution concepts and employs reasoning tools to resolve implicit visual constraints. To rigorously evaluate these capabilities, we propose Mind-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 500 distinct samples spanning real-time news, emerging concepts, and domains such as mathematical and Geo-Reasoning. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Mind-Brush significantly enhances the capabilities of unified models, realizing a zero-to-one capability leap for the Qwen-Image baseline on Mind-Bench, while achieving superior results on established benchmarks like WISE and RISE.

Benchmarks for vision-language models (VLMs) mostly test observational spatial reasoning: models describe relations already visible in the input. Existing what-if tasks typically vary the observer while keeping the scene fixed. Can VLMs instead predict the consequences of hypothetically moving or rotating an object? We introduce MindEdit-Bench, a benchmark of six spatial reasoning tasks built from three-photo smartphone triplets of newly captured indoor scenes via an automatic in-the-wild 3D scene-graph extraction pipeline. Four tasks probe perception and perspective transformation over observed structure; two new tasks, L4 (spatial editing) and L5 (cross-view visibility editing), probe object-level counterfactual reasoning, where correct answers are absent from all input images. Each question provides 8-24 structured answer choices, enabling answer-letter-level diagnosis of spatial and fallback errors. The benchmark covers 120 private indoor scenes not drawn from public datasets, reducing public-data pretraining-overlap risk. Across 15 VLMs on 1,003 human-verified questions, task-wise mean VLM accuracy is only 8%-31%, versus 81%-97% human majority-vote accuracy. The pooled human--best-VLM gap is 53 pp, with at least 39 pp on every task. The structured answer space further reveals non-uniform failures, including weaker camera-depth-axis inference and fallback behavior on difficult visibility-editing cases.

Lifelong digital companions must integrate cross-session cues, continually update their understanding of users, and adapt to shifting privacy boundaries. Existing evaluations fail to capture this, testing memory recall and short-term empathy in isolation. To bridge this gap, we introduce \benchmark, a benchmark centered on multi-session Memory-Emotion-Environment loops. By modeling users as persistent worlds with layered profiles and event trajectories, \benchmark uses multi-agent simulation to project environmental dynamics into dialogue, preserving the critical gap between latent thoughts and observable expressions. Evaluating 2,000 personas and 111K tasks across memory tracking, user understanding, privacy control, and emotional companionship, our experiment results reveal a stark reality: even models that saturate current memory benchmarks fail to sustain accurate user understanding and true companionship over long horizons.

We introduce a benchmark to evaluate the capability of AI to solve problems in theoretical physics, focusing on high-energy theory and cosmology. The first iteration of our benchmark consists of 57 problems of varying difficulty, from undergraduate to research level. These problems are novel in the sense that they do not come from public problem collections. We evaluate our data set on various open and closed language models, including o3-mini, o1, DeepSeek-R1, GPT-4o and versions of Llama and Qwen. While we find impressive progress in model performance with the most recent models, our research-level difficulty problems are mostly unsolved. We address challenges of auto-verifiability and grading, and discuss common failure modes. While currently state-of-the art models are still of limited use for researchers, our results show that AI assisted theoretical physics research may become possible in the near future. We discuss the main obstacles towards this goal and possible strategies to overcome them. The public problems and solutions, results for various models, and updates to the data set and score distribution, are available on the website of the dataset tpbench.org.

Large vision-language models (VLMs) face challenges in achieving robust, transferable reasoning abilities due to reliance on labor-intensive manual instruction datasets or computationally expensive self-supervised methods. To address these issues, we introduce MindGYM, a framework that enhances VLMs through synthetic self-challenging questions, consisting of three stages: (1) Seed Single-Hop Question Synthesis, generating cognitive questions across textual (e.g., logical deduction) and multimodal contexts (e.g., diagram-based queries) spanning eight semantic areas like ethical analysis; (2) Challenging Multi-Hop Question Synthesis, combining seed questions via diverse principles like bridging, visual-textual alignment, to create multi-step problems demanding deeper reasoning; and (3) Thinking-Induced Curriculum Fine-Tuning, a structured pipeline that progressively trains the model from scaffolded reasoning to standalone inference. By leveraging the model's self-synthesis capability, MindGYM achieves high data efficiency (e.g., +16% gains on MathVision-Mini with only 400 samples), computational efficiency (reducing both training and inference costs), and robust generalization across tasks. Extensive evaluations on seven benchmarks demonstrate superior performance over strong baselines, with notable improvements (+15.77% win rates) in reasoning depth and breadth validated via GPT-based scoring. MindGYM underscores the viability of self-challenging for refining VLM capabilities while minimizing human intervention and resource demands. Code and data are released to advance multimodal reasoning research.

Thinking LLMs solve complex tasks at the expense of increased compute and overthinking on simpler problems, while non-thinking LLMs are faster and cheaper but underthink on harder reasoning problems. This has led to the development of separate thinking and non-thinking LLM variants, leaving the onus of selecting the optimal model for each query on the end user. In this work, we introduce OptimalThinkingBench, a unified benchmark that jointly evaluates overthinking and underthinking in LLMs and also encourages the development of optimally-thinking models that balance performance and efficiency. Our benchmark comprises two sub-benchmarks: OverthinkingBench, featuring simple queries in 72 domains, and UnderthinkingBench, containing 11 challenging reasoning tasks. Using novel thinking-adjusted accuracy metrics, we perform extensive evaluation of 33 different thinking and non-thinking models and show that no model is able to optimally think on our benchmark. Thinking models often overthink for hundreds of tokens on the simplest user queries without improving performance. In contrast, large non-thinking models underthink, often falling short of much smaller thinking models. We further explore several methods to encourage optimal thinking, but find that these approaches often improve on one sub-benchmark at the expense of the other, highlighting the need for better unified and optimal models in the future.

Theory of mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) broadly refers to humans' ability to represent the mental states of others, including their desires, beliefs, and intentions. We propose to train a machine to build such models too. We design a Theory of Mind neural network -- a ToMnet -- which uses meta-learning to build models of the agents it encounters, from observations of their behaviour alone. Through this process, it acquires a strong prior model for agents' behaviour, as well as the ability to bootstrap to richer predictions about agents' characteristics and mental states using only a small number of behavioural observations. We apply the ToMnet to agents behaving in simple gridworld environments, showing that it learns to model random, algorithmic, and deep reinforcement learning agents from varied populations, and that it passes classic ToM tasks such as the "Sally-Anne" test (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) of recognising that others can hold false beliefs about the world. We argue that this system -- which autonomously learns how to model other agents in its world -- is an important step forward for developing multi-agent AI systems, for building intermediating technology for machine-human interaction, and for advancing the progress on interpretable AI.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform well at a variety of syntactic, discourse, and reasoning tasks. While LLMs are increasingly deployed in many forms including conversational agents that interact with humans, we lack a grounded benchmark to measure how well LLMs understand social language. Here, we introduce a new theory-driven benchmark, SocKET, that contains 58 NLP tasks testing social knowledge which we group into five categories: humor & sarcasm, offensiveness, sentiment & emotion, and trustworthiness. In tests on the benchmark, we demonstrate that current models attain only moderate performance but reveal significant potential for task transfer among different types and categories of tasks, which were predicted from theory. Through zero-shot evaluations, we show that pretrained models already possess some innate but limited capabilities of social language understanding and training on one category of tasks can improve zero-shot testing on others. Our benchmark provides a systematic way to analyze model performance on an important dimension of language and points to clear room for improvement to build more socially-aware LLMs. The associated resources are released at https://github.com/minjechoi/SOCKET.

Existing Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) typically rely on static, homogeneous model configurations, limiting their ability to exploit the distinct strengths of differently post-trained models. To address this, we introduce Team-of-Thoughts, a novel MAS architecture that leverages the complementary capabilities of heterogeneous agents via an orchestrator-tool paradigm. Our framework introduces two key mechanisms to optimize performance: (1) an orchestrator calibration scheme that identifies models with superior coordination capabilities, and (2) a self-assessment protocol where tool agents profile their own domain expertise to account for variations in post-training skills. During inference, the orchestrator dynamically activates the most suitable tool agents based on these proficiency profiles. Experiments on five reasoning and code generation benchmarks show that Team-of-Thoughts delivers consistently superior task performance. Notably, on AIME24 and LiveCodeBench, our approach achieves accuracies of 96.67% and 72.53%, respectively, substantially outperforming homogeneous role-play baselines, which score 80% and 65.93%.

Reasoning and strategic behavior in social interactions is a hallmark of intelligence. This form of reasoning is significantly more sophisticated than isolated planning or reasoning tasks in static settings (e.g., math problem solving). In this paper, we present Strategic Planning, Interaction, and Negotiation (SPIN-Bench), a new multi-domain evaluation designed to measure the intelligence of strategic planning and social reasoning. While many existing benchmarks focus on narrow planning or single-agent reasoning, SPIN-Bench combines classical PDDL tasks, competitive board games, cooperative card games, and multi-agent negotiation scenarios in one unified framework. The framework includes both a benchmark as well as an arena to simulate and evaluate the variety of social settings to test reasoning and strategic behavior of AI agents. We formulate the benchmark SPIN-Bench by systematically varying action spaces, state complexity, and the number of interacting agents to simulate a variety of social settings where success depends on not only methodical and step-wise decision making, but also conceptual inference of other (adversarial or cooperative) participants. Our experiments reveal that while contemporary LLMs handle basic fact retrieval and short-range planning reasonably well, they encounter significant performance bottlenecks in tasks requiring deep multi-hop reasoning over large state spaces and socially adept coordination under uncertainty. We envision SPIN-Bench as a catalyst for future research on robust multi-agent planning, social reasoning, and human--AI teaming.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable progress on task-specific benchmarks, yet their evaluation methods remain constrained by isolated problem-solving paradigms. Existing benchmarks predominantly assess single-question reasoning through sequential testing, resulting critical limitations: (1) vulnerability to data contamination and less challenging (e.g., DeepSeek-R1 achieves 97.0% on MATH500), forcing costly and perpetual creation of new questions with large human efforts, (2) failure to evaluate models under multi-context pressure, a key requirement for real-world deployment. To bridge this gap, we present REST (Reasoning Evaluation through Simultaneous Testing), a stress-testing framework that concurrently exposes LRMs to multiple problems simultaneously. Beyond basic reasoning, REST specifically evaluates several under-tested capabilities: contextual priority allocation, cross-problem interference resistance, and dynamic cognitive load management. Our evaluation reveals several striking findings: Even state-of-the-art (SOTA) models like DeepSeek-R1 exhibit substantial performance degradation under stress testing. Crucially, REST demonstrates stronger discriminative power than existing benchmarks, revealing pronounced performance differences among models that exhibit similar, near-ceiling performance under single-question evaluations. Some key mechanistic insights emerge from our analysis: (1) the "overthinking trap" is a critical factor contributing to the performance degradation; (2) the models trained with "long2short" technique preserve more accuracy of their single-problem performance under REST, outperforming standard-trained counterparts. These results establish REST as a cost-efficient, future-proof evaluation paradigm that better reflects real-world reasoning demands while reducing reliance on continuous human annotation.

With the advancement of large language models (LLMs), solving complex reasoning tasks has gained increasing attention. Inference-time computation methods (e.g., Best-of-N, beam search, et al.) are particularly valuable as they can enhance reasoning performance without modifying model parameters or requiring additional training. However, these techniques come with implementation challenges, and most existing methods remain at the proof-of-concept stage with limited practical adoption due to their computational complexity and varying effectiveness across different tasks. In this paper, we investigate and benchmark diverse inference-time computation strategies across reasoning tasks of varying complexity. Since most current methods rely on a proposer-verifier pipeline that first generates candidate solutions (e.g., reasoning solutions) and then selects the best one based on reward signals (e.g., RLHF rewards, process rewards), our research focuses on optimizing both candidate solution generation (e.g., instructing prompts, hyperparameters such as temperature and top-p) and reward mechanisms (e.g., self-evaluation, reward types). Through extensive experiments (more than 20,000 A100-80G GPU hours with over 1,000 experiments) across a variety of models (e.g., Llama, Qwen, and Mistral families) of various sizes, our ablation studies reveal that previously overlooked strategies can significantly enhance performance (e.g., tuning temperature can improve reasoning task performance by up to 5%). Furthermore, we establish a standardized benchmark for inference-time computation by systematically evaluating six representative methods across eight reasoning tasks. These findings provide a stronger foundation for future research. The code is available at https://github.com/usail-hkust/benchmark_inference_time_computation_LLM

We introduce MentalBench, a benchmark for evaluating psychiatric diagnostic decision-making in large language models (LLMs). Existing mental health benchmarks largely rely on social media data, limiting their ability to assess DSM-grounded diagnostic judgments. At the core of MentalBench is MentalKG, a psychiatrist-built and validated knowledge graph encoding DSM-5 diagnostic criteria and differential diagnostic rules for 23 psychiatric disorders. Using MentalKG as a golden-standard logical backbone, we generate 24,750 synthetic clinical cases that systematically vary in information completeness and diagnostic complexity, enabling low-noise and interpretable evaluation. Our experiments show that while state-of-the-art LLMs perform well on structured queries probing DSM-5 knowledge, they struggle to calibrate confidence in diagnostic decision-making when distinguishing between clinically overlapping disorders. These findings reveal evaluation gaps not captured by existing benchmarks.

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Large Language Models have demonstrated strong performance on many established reasoning benchmarks. However, these benchmarks primarily evaluate structured skills like quantitative problem-solving, leaving a gap in assessing flexible, multifaceted reasoning abilities that are central to human intelligence. These abilities require integrating logical deduction with spatial awareness and constraint satisfaction, which current evaluations do not measure well. To address this, we introduce RiddleBench, a benchmark of 1,737 challenging puzzles in English designed to probe these core reasoning capabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art models on RiddleBench shows fundamental weaknesses. Even top proprietary models like Gemini 2.5 Pro, o3, and Claude 4 Sonnet achieve accuracy just above 60% (60.30%, 63.37%, and 63.16%). Analysis further reveals deep failures, including hallucination cascades (accepting flawed reasoning from other models) and poor self-correction due to a strong self-confirmation bias. Their reasoning is also fragile, with performance degrading significantly when constraints are reordered or irrelevant information is introduced. RiddleBench functions as a diagnostic tool for these issues and as a resource for guiding the development of more robust and reliable language models.

We propose a framework for robust evaluation of reasoning capabilities of language models, using functional variants of benchmarks. Models that solve a reasoning test should exhibit no difference in performance over the static version of a problem compared to a snapshot of the functional variant. We have rewritten the relevant fragment of the MATH benchmark into its functional variant MATH(), with functionalization of other benchmarks to follow. When evaluating current state-of-the-art models over snapshots of MATH(), we find a reasoning gap -- the percentage difference between the static and functional accuracies. We find reasoning gaps from 58.35% to 80.31% among the state-of-the-art closed and open weights models that perform well on static benchmarks, with the caveat that the gaps are likely to be smaller with more sophisticated prompting strategies. Here we show that models which anecdotally have good reasoning performance over real-world tasks, have quantifiable lower gaps, motivating the open problem of building "gap 0" models. Code for evaluation and new evaluation datasets, three MATH() snapshots, are publicly available at https://github.com/consequentai/fneval/.

The rapid evolution of video generative models has shifted their focus from producing visually plausible outputs to tackling tasks requiring physical plausibility and logical consistency. However, despite recent breakthroughs such as Veo 3's chain-of-frames reasoning, it remains unclear whether these models can exhibit reasoning capabilities similar to large language models (LLMs). Existing benchmarks predominantly evaluate visual fidelity and temporal coherence, failing to capture higher-order reasoning abilities. To bridge this gap, we propose TiViBench, a hierarchical benchmark specifically designed to evaluate the reasoning capabilities of image-to-video (I2V) generation models. TiViBench systematically assesses reasoning across four dimensions: i) Structural Reasoning & Search, ii) Spatial & Visual Pattern Reasoning, iii) Symbolic & Logical Reasoning, and iv) Action Planning & Task Execution, spanning 24 diverse task scenarios across 3 difficulty levels. Through extensive evaluations, we show that commercial models (e.g., Sora 2, Veo 3.1) demonstrate stronger reasoning potential, while open-source models reveal untapped potential that remains hindered by limited training scale and data diversity. To further unlock this potential, we introduce VideoTPO, a simple yet effective test-time strategy inspired by preference optimization. By performing LLM self-analysis on generated candidates to identify strengths and weaknesses, VideoTPO significantly enhances reasoning performance without requiring additional training, data, or reward models. Together, TiViBench and VideoTPO pave the way for evaluating and advancing reasoning in video generation models, setting a foundation for future research in this emerging field.

In this paper, we introduce a novel psychological benchmark, CPsyExam, constructed from questions sourced from Chinese language examinations. CPsyExam is designed to prioritize psychological knowledge and case analysis separately, recognizing the significance of applying psychological knowledge to real-world scenarios. From the pool of 22k questions, we utilize 4k to create the benchmark that offers balanced coverage of subjects and incorporates a diverse range of case analysis techniques.Furthermore, we evaluate a range of existing large language models~(LLMs), spanning from open-sourced to API-based models. Our experiments and analysis demonstrate that CPsyExam serves as an effective benchmark for enhancing the understanding of psychology within LLMs and enables the comparison of LLMs across various granularities.

We introduce TFRBench, the first benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning capabilities of forecasting systems. Traditionally, time-series forecasting has been evaluated solely on numerical accuracy, treating foundation models as ``black boxes.'' Unlike existing benchmarks, TFRBench provides a protocol for evaluating the reasoning generated by forecasting systems--specifically their analysis of cross-channel dependencies, trends, and external events. To enable this, we propose a systematic multi-agent framework that utilizes an iterative verification loop to synthesize numerically grounded reasoning traces. Spanning ten datasets across five domains, our evaluation confirms that this reasoning is causally effective; useful for evaluation; and prompting LLMs with our generated traces significantly improves forecasting accuracy compared to direct numerical prediction (e.g., avg. sim40.2%to56.6%), validating the quality of our reasoning. Conversely, benchmarking experiments reveal that off-the-shelf LLMs consistently struggle with both reasoning (lower LLM-as-a-Judge scores) and numerical forecasting, frequently failing to capture domain-specific dynamics. TFRBench thus establishes a new standard for interpretable, reasoning-based evaluation in time-series forecasting. Our benchmark is available at: https://tfrbench.github.io

Recent advances in generative foundational models, often termed "world models," have propelled interest in applying them to critical tasks like robotic planning and autonomous system training. For reliable deployment, these models must exhibit high physical fidelity, accurately simulating real-world dynamics. Existing physics-based video benchmarks, however, suffer from entanglement, where a single test simultaneously evaluates multiple physical laws and concepts, fundamentally limiting their diagnostic capability. We introduce WorldBench, a novel video-based benchmark specifically designed for concept-specific, disentangled evaluation, allowing us to rigorously isolate and assess understanding of a single physical concept or law at a time. To make WorldBench comprehensive, we design benchmarks at two different levels: 1) an evaluation of intuitive physical understanding with concepts such as object permanence or scale/perspective, and 2) an evaluation of low-level physical constants and material properties such as friction coefficients or fluid viscosity. When SOTA video-based world models are evaluated on WorldBench, we find specific patterns of failure in particular physics concepts, with all tested models lacking the physical consistency required to generate reliable real-world interactions. Through its concept-specific evaluation, WorldBench offers a more nuanced and scalable framework for rigorously evaluating the physical reasoning capabilities of video generation and world models, paving the way for more robust and generalizable world-model-driven learning.

Evaluating AI agents within complex, interactive environments that mirror real-world challenges is critical for understanding their practical capabilities. While existing agent benchmarks effectively assess skills like tool use or performance on structured tasks, they often do not fully capture an agent's ability to operate autonomously in exploratory environments that demand sustained, self-directed reasoning over a long and growing context. To spur the development of agents capable of more robust intrinsic reasoning over long horizons, we introduce TextQuests, a benchmark based on the Infocom suite of interactive fiction games. These text-based adventures, which can take human players over 30 hours and require hundreds of precise actions to solve, serve as an effective proxy for evaluating AI agents on focused, stateful tasks. The benchmark is specifically designed to assess an LLM agent's capacity for self-contained problem-solving by precluding the use of external tools, thereby focusing on intrinsic long-context reasoning capabilities in an exploratory environment characterized by the need for trial-and-error learning and sustained problem-solving within a single interactive session. We release TextQuests at https://textquests.ai.

Scientific reasoning relies not only on logical inference but also on activating prior knowledge and experiential structures. Memory can efficiently reuse knowledge and enhance reasoning consistency and stability. However, existing benchmarks mainly evaluate final answers or step-by-step coherence, overlooking the memory-driven mechanisms that underlie human reasoning, which involves activating anchors and attractors, then integrating them into multi-step inference. To address this gap, we propose A^3-Bench~ https://a3-bench.github.io, a benchmark designed to evaluate scientific reasoning through dual-scale memory-driven activation, grounded in Anchor and Attractor Activation. First, we annotate 2,198 science reasoning problems across domains using the SAPM process(subject, anchor & attractor, problem, and memory developing). Second, we introduce a dual-scale memory evaluation framework utilizing anchors and attractors, along with the AAUI(Anchor--Attractor Utilization Index) metric to measure memory activation rates. Finally, through experiments with various base models and paradigms, we validate A^3-Bench and analyze how memory activation impacts reasoning performance, providing insights into memory-driven scientific reasoning.

Test-time compute has empowered multimodal large language models to generate extended reasoning chains, yielding strong performance on tasks such as multimodal math reasoning. However, this improved reasoning ability often comes with increased hallucination: as generations become longer, models tend to drift away from image-grounded content and rely more heavily on language priors. Attention analysis shows that longer reasoning chains lead to reduced focus on visual inputs, which contributes to hallucination. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce RH-AUC, a metric that quantifies how a model's perception accuracy changes with reasoning length, allowing us to evaluate whether the model preserves visual grounding during reasoning. We also release RH-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark that spans a variety of multimodal tasks, designed to assess the trade-off between reasoning ability and hallucination. Our analysis reveals that (i) larger models typically achieve a better balance between reasoning and perception, and (ii) this balance is influenced more by the types and domains of training data than by its overall volume. These findings underscore the importance of evaluation frameworks that jointly consider both reasoning quality and perceptual fidelity.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has marked a significant advancement in enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Previous studies have developed various extensions of CoT, which focus primarily on enhancing end-task performance. In addition, there has been research on assessing the quality of reasoning chains in CoT. This raises an intriguing question: Is it possible to predict the accuracy of LLM outputs by scrutinizing the reasoning chains they generate? To answer this research question, we introduce a benchmark, R2PE, designed specifically to explore the relationship between reasoning chains and performance in various reasoning tasks spanning five different domains. This benchmark aims to measure the falsehood of the final output of LLMs based on the reasoning steps. To make full use of information in multiple reasoning chains, we propose the process discernibility score (PDS) framework that beats the answer-checking baseline by a large margin. Concretely, this resulted in an average of 5.1% increase in the F1 score across all 45 subsets within R2PE. We further demonstrate our PDS's efficacy in advancing open-domain QA accuracy. Data and code are available at https://github.com/XinXU-USTC/R2PE.

Despite the rapid progress of Vision-Language Models (VLMs), the field lacks benchmarks that rigorously diagnose their true reasoning abilities and chart meaningful progress toward human-like multimodal intelligence. Most existing evaluations focus on piecemeal or disconnected tasks, obscuring critical cognitive weaknesses and providing little insight for targeted improvement. To address this gap, we introduce BloomBench, part of the Almieyar benchmarking series, the first cognitively human-grounded, bilingual (English-Arabic) multimodal benchmark for VLMs. Grounded in Bloom's Taxonomy, BloomBench systematically evaluates six levels of cognition (Remember, Understand, Apply, Analyze, Evaluate, Create) through carefully designed image-question-answer tasks. Built with a semi-automated pipeline and validated through a stratified hybrid quality assurance protocol, it ensures scalability, cultural inclusivity, and linguistic fidelity. Leveraging this framework, we conduct a comprehensive study of state-of-the-art VLMs to diagnose their cognitive profiles. Our analysis reveals a sharp cognitive asymmetry: while state-of-the-art models achieve strong performance ceilings in semantic understanding, they struggle substantially with factual recall and creative synthesis. This demonstrates that current general multimodal proficiency masks deeper limitations in specific cognitive layers. Furthermore, our study highlights a critical performance gap between Arabic and English, exposing limitations in current cross-lingual multimodal reasoning. These findings establish a foundation for developing more cognitively aligned and inclusive VLMs. The benchmark framework and dataset is available at: https://github.com/qcri/Almieyar-Oryx-BloomBench.

We present Mind DeepResearch (MindDR), an efficient multi-agent deep research framework that achieves leading performance with only ~30B-parameter models through a meticulously designed data synthesis and multi-stage training pipeline. The core innovation of MindDR lies in a collaborative three-agent architecture (Planning Agent, DeepSearch Agent, and Report Agent) and a four-stage agent-specialized training pipeline comprising SFT cold-start, Search-RL, Report-RL and preference alignment. With this regime, MindDR demonstrates competitive performance even with ~30B-scale models. Specifically, MindDR achieves 45.7% on BrowseComp-ZH, 42.8% on BrowseComp, 46.5% on WideSearch, 75.0% on xbench-DS, and 52.5 on DeepResearch Bench, outperforming comparable-scale open-source agent systems and rivaling larger-scale models. MindDR has been deployed as an online product in Li Auto. Furthermore, we introduce MindDR Bench, a curated benchmark of 500 real-world Chinese queries from our internal product user interactions, evaluated through a comprehensive multi-dimensional rubric system rather than relying on a single RACE metric. On MindDR Bench, MindDR achieves a state-of-the-art score of 51.8.

Large language models (LLMs) with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting achieve strong reasoning but often produce unnecessarily long explanations, increasing cost and sometimes reducing accuracy. Fair comparison of efficiency-oriented approaches is hindered by fragmented evaluation practices. We introduce EffiReason-Bench, a unified benchmark for rigorous cross-paradigm evaluation of efficient reasoning methods across three categories: Reasoning Blueprints, Dynamic Execution, and Post-hoc Refinement. To enable step-by-step evaluation, we construct verified CoT annotations for CommonsenseQA and LogiQA via a pipeline that enforces standardized reasoning structures, comprehensive option-wise analysis, and human verification. We evaluate 7 methods across 6 open-source LLMs (1B-70B) on 4 datasets spanning mathematics, commonsense, and logic, and propose the E3-Score, a principled metric inspired by economic trade-off modeling that provides smooth, stable evaluation without discontinuities or heavy reliance on heuristics. Experiments show that no single method universally dominates; optimal strategies depend on backbone scale, task complexity, and architecture.

As language models (LMs) evolve from chat assistants to long-horizon agents capable of multi-step reasoning and tool use, existing benchmarks remain largely confined to structured or exam-style tasks that fall short of real-world professional demands. To this end, we introduce \OneMillion-Bench OneMillion-Bench, a benchmark of 400 expert-curated tasks spanning Law, Finance, Industry, Healthcare, and Natural Science, built to evaluate agents across economically consequential scenarios. Unlike prior work, the benchmark requires retrieving authoritative sources, resolving conflicting evidence, applying domain-specific rules, and making constraint decisions, where correctness depends as much on the reasoning process as the final answer. We adopt a rubric-based evaluation protocol scoring factual accuracy, logical coherence, practical feasibility, and professional compliance, focused on expert-level problems to ensure meaningful differentiation across agents. Together, \$OneMillion-Bench provides a unified testbed for assessing agentic reliability, professional depth, and practical readiness in domain-intensive scenarios.

The rapid proliferation of benchmarks for evaluating large language models (LLMs) has created an urgent need for systematic methods to assess benchmark quality itself. We propose Benchmark^2, a comprehensive framework comprising three complementary metrics: (1) Cross-Benchmark Ranking Consistency, measuring whether a benchmark produces model rankings aligned with peer benchmarks; (2) Discriminability Score, quantifying a benchmark's ability to differentiate between models; and (3) Capability Alignment Deviation, identifying problematic instances where stronger models fail but weaker models succeed within the same model family. We conduct extensive experiments across 15 benchmarks spanning mathematics, reasoning, and knowledge domains, evaluating 11 LLMs across four model families. Our analysis reveals significant quality variations among existing benchmarks and demonstrates that selective benchmark construction based on our metrics can achieve comparable evaluation performance with substantially reduced test sets.

Faithfulness hallucinations are claims generated by a Large Language Model (LLM) not supported by contexts provided to the LLM. Lacking assessment standards, existing benchmarks focus on "factual statements" that rephrase source materials while overlooking "cognitive statements" that involve making inferences from the given context. Consequently, evaluating and detecting the hallucination of cognitive statements remains challenging. Inspired by how evidence is assessed in the legal domain, we design a rigorous framework to assess different levels of faithfulness of cognitive statements and introduce the CogniBench dataset where we reveal insightful statistics. To keep pace with rapidly evolving LLMs, we further develop an automatic annotation pipeline that scales easily across different models. This results in a large-scale CogniBench-L dataset, which facilitates training accurate detectors for both factual and cognitive hallucinations. We release our model and datasets at: https://github.com/FUTUREEEEEE/CogniBench

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the cognitive ability to infer and attribute mental states to oneself and others. As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated for social and cognitive capabilities, it remains unclear to what extent these models demonstrate ToM across diverse languages and cultural contexts. In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive study of multilingual ToM capabilities aimed at addressing this gap. Our approach includes two key components: (1) We translate existing ToM datasets into multiple languages, effectively creating a multilingual ToM dataset and (2) We enrich these translations with culturally specific elements to reflect the social and cognitive scenarios relevant to diverse populations. We conduct extensive evaluations of six state-of-the-art LLMs to measure their ToM performance across both the translated and culturally adapted datasets. The results highlight the influence of linguistic and cultural diversity on the models' ability to exhibit ToM, and questions their social reasoning capabilities. This work lays the groundwork for future research into enhancing LLMs' cross-cultural social cognition and contributes to the development of more culturally aware and socially intelligent AI systems. All our data and code are publicly available.

Agent self-evolution in long-horizon LLM systems is largely procedural: useful experience is not merely stored information, but reusable procedures for searching, debugging, and verification. Yet current evaluations do not isolate this form of transfer. Agent benchmarks test single-episode task solving; memory benchmarks target information retention rather than procedural reuse. We introduce EvoAgentBench, a benchmark for agent self-evolution via Ability-guided transfer across four agentic domains: web research, algorithmic reasoning, software engineering, and knowledge work. EvoAgentBench extracts trace-grounded Abilities from agent executions, canonicalizes them into operational units, and builds domain-specific Ability Graphs linking tasks that share procedural overlap. By design, every test task is backed by verified training-side Ability support. Across a 528/267 train/test split, two scaffolds, and three backbones, curated Ability content transfers reliably across model families, but no current automatic method sustains positive gain in all settings. EvoAgentBench shifts self-evolution evaluation from aggregate accuracy comparison to fine-grained diagnosis of experience encoding, routing, and uptake. The benchmark is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/EverMind-AI/EvoAgentBench.

Large reasoning models such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1 have achieved remarkable performance in the domain of reasoning. A key component of their training is the incorporation of verifiable rewards within reinforcement learning (RL). However, existing reward benchmarks do not evaluate reference-based reward systems, leaving researchers with limited understanding of the accuracy of verifiers used in RL. In this paper, we introduce two benchmarks, VerifyBench and VerifyBench-Hard, designed to assess the performance of reference-based reward systems. These benchmarks are constructed through meticulous data collection and curation, followed by careful human annotation to ensure high quality. Current models still show considerable room for improvement on both VerifyBench and VerifyBench-Hard, especially smaller-scale models. Furthermore, we conduct a thorough and comprehensive analysis of evaluation results, offering insights for understanding and developing reference-based reward systems. Our proposed benchmarks serve as effective tools for guiding the development of verifier accuracy and the reasoning capabilities of models trained via RL in reasoning tasks.

Recent studies have shown that long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning can significantly enhance the performance of large language models (LLMs) on complex tasks. However, this benefit is yet to be demonstrated in the domain of video understanding, since most existing benchmarks lack the reasoning depth required to demonstrate the advantages of extended CoT chains. While recent efforts have proposed benchmarks aimed at video reasoning, the tasks are often knowledge-driven and do not rely heavily on visual content. To bridge this gap, we introduce VideoReasonBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate vision-centric, complex video reasoning. To ensure visual richness and high reasoning complexity, each video in VideoReasonBench depicts a sequence of fine-grained operations on a latent state that is only visible in part of the video. The questions evaluate three escalating levels of video reasoning skills: recalling observed visual information, inferring the content of latent states, and predicting information beyond the video. Under such task setting, models have to precisely recall multiple operations in the video, and perform step-by-step reasoning to get correct final answers for these questions. Using VideoReasonBench, we comprehensively evaluate 18 state-of-the-art multimodal LLMs (MLLMs), finding that most perform poorly on complex video reasoning, e.g., GPT-4o achieves only 6.9% accuracy, while the thinking-enhanced Gemini-2.5-Pro significantly outperforms others with 56.0% accuracy. Our investigations on "test-time scaling" further reveal that extended thinking budget, while offering none or minimal benefits on existing video benchmarks, is essential for improving the performance on VideoReasonBench.

Recent progress in generative video models, such as Veo-3, has shown surprising zero-shot reasoning abilities, creating a growing need for systematic and reliable evaluation. We introduce V-ReasonBench, a benchmark designed to assess video reasoning across four key dimensions: structured problem-solving, spatial cognition, pattern-based inference, and physical dynamics. The benchmark is built from both synthetic and real-world image sequences and provides a diverse set of answer-verifiable tasks that are reproducible, scalable, and unambiguous. Evaluations of six state-of-the-art video models reveal clear dimension-wise differences, with strong variation in structured, spatial, pattern-based, and physical reasoning. We further compare video models with strong image models, analyze common hallucination behaviors, and study how video duration affects Chain-of-Frames reasoning. Overall, V-ReasonBench offers a unified and reproducible framework for measuring video reasoning and aims to support the development of models with more reliable, human-aligned reasoning skills.

The evaluation of large language models (LLMs) via benchmarks is widespread, yet inconsistencies between different leaderboards and poor separability among top models raise concerns about their ability to accurately reflect authentic model capabilities. This paper provides a critical analysis of benchmark effectiveness, examining main-stream prominent LLM benchmarks using results from diverse models. We first propose a new framework for accurate and reliable estimations of item characteristics and model abilities. Specifically, we propose Pseudo-Siamese Network for Item Response Theory (PSN-IRT), an enhanced Item Response Theory framework that incorporates a rich set of item parameters within an IRT-grounded architecture. Based on PSN-IRT, we conduct extensive analysis which reveals significant and varied shortcomings in the measurement quality of current benchmarks. Furthermore, we demonstrate that leveraging PSN-IRT is able to construct smaller benchmarks while maintaining stronger alignment with human preference.

Ensuring safe and effective use of AI requires understanding and anticipating its performance on novel tasks, from advanced scientific challenges to transformed workplace activities. So far, benchmarking has guided progress in AI, but it has offered limited explanatory and predictive power for general-purpose AI systems, given the low transferability across diverse tasks. In this paper, we introduce general scales for AI evaluation that can explain what common AI benchmarks really measure, extract ability profiles of AI systems, and predict their performance for new task instances, in- and out-of-distribution. Our fully-automated methodology builds on 18 newly-crafted rubrics that place instance demands on general scales that do not saturate. Illustrated for 15 large language models and 63 tasks, high explanatory power is unleashed from inspecting the demand and ability profiles, bringing insights on the sensitivity and specificity exhibited by different benchmarks, and how knowledge, metacognition and reasoning are affected by model size, chain-of-thought and distillation. Surprisingly, high predictive power at the instance level becomes possible using these demand levels, providing superior estimates over black-box baseline predictors based on embeddings or finetuning, especially in out-of-distribution settings (new tasks and new benchmarks). The scales, rubrics, battery, techniques and results presented here represent a major step for AI evaluation, underpinning the reliable deployment of AI in the years ahead. (Collaborative platform: https://kinds-of-intelligence-cfi.github.io/ADELE.)

Mental health disorders affect hundreds of millions globally, and the Web now serves as a primary medium for accessing support, information, and assessment. Large language models (LLMs) offer scalable and accessible assistance, yet their deployment in mental-health settings remains risky when their reasoning is incomplete, inconsistent, or ungrounded. Existing psychological LLMs emphasize emotional understanding or knowledge recall but overlook the step-wise, clinically aligned reasoning required for appraisal, diagnosis, intervention planning, abstraction, and verification. To address these issues, we introduce MentraSuite, a unified framework for advancing reliable mental-health reasoning. We propose MentraBench, a comprehensive benchmark spanning five core reasoning aspects, six tasks, and 13 datasets, evaluating both task performance and reasoning quality across five dimensions: conciseness, coherence, hallucination avoidance, task understanding, and internal consistency. We further present Mindora, a post-trained model optimized through a hybrid SFT-RL framework with an inconsistency-detection reward to enforce faithful and coherent reasoning. To support training, we construct high-quality trajectories using a novel reasoning trajectory generation strategy, that strategically filters difficult samples and applies a structured, consistency-oriented rewriting process to produce concise, readable, and well-balanced trajectories. Across 20 evaluated LLMs, Mindora achieves the highest average performance on MentraBench and shows remarkable performances in reasoning reliability, demonstrating its effectiveness for complex mental-health scenarios.

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.

Existing benchmarks for LLM agents' social behavior typically focus on a single capability dimension and evaluate only behavioral outcomes, overlooking process signals from reasoning and communication. We present M3-BENCH, a benchmark of 24 mixed-motive games with a process-aware evaluation framework spanning three complementary views: Behavioral Trajectory Analysis (BTA), Reasoning Process Analysis (RPA), and Communication Content Analysis (CCA). Evaluating 11 frontier LLMs and a human baseline, M3-BENCH reveals substantial differences in social competence that outcome-only evaluation misses. In particular, we identify an "overthink-undercommunicate" pattern: reasoning models achieve strong internal deliberation scores but often fail to translate them into effective social communication. Although top models can surpass humans on task outcomes, humans exhibit markedly higher cross-view consistency, suggesting that current LLM agents still lack the behavioral coherence characteristic of human social competence. Our analysis further shows that the three-view decomposition surfaces safety-relevant risks, such as cooperative behavior paired with latent opportunistic reasoning, that remain hidden under outcome-only metrics.

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Domain Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly prominent in the field of artificial intelligence. These models not only excel in traditional vision-language tasks but also demonstrate impressive performance in contemporary multi-modal benchmarks. Although many of these benchmarks attempt to holistically evaluate MLLMs, they typically concentrate on basic reasoning tasks, often yielding only simple yes/no or multi-choice responses. These methods naturally lead to confusion and difficulties in conclusively determining the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs. To mitigate this issue, we manually curate a benchmark dataset specifically designed for MLLMs, with a focus on complex reasoning tasks. Our benchmark comprises three key reasoning categories: deductive, abductive, and analogical reasoning. The queries in our dataset are intentionally constructed to engage the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs in the process of generating answers. For a fair comparison across various MLLMs, we incorporate intermediate reasoning steps into our evaluation criteria. In instances where an MLLM is unable to produce a definitive answer, its reasoning ability is evaluated by requesting intermediate reasoning steps. If these steps align with our manual annotations, appropriate scores are assigned. This evaluation scheme resembles methods commonly used in human assessments, such as exams or assignments, and represents what we consider a more effective assessment technique compared with existing benchmarks. We evaluate a selection of representative MLLMs using this rigorously developed open-ended multi-step elaborate reasoning benchmark, designed to challenge and accurately measure their reasoning capabilities. The code and data will be released at https://core-mm.github.io/

Thousands of diverse benchmarks have been developed to measure the quality of large language models (LLMs). Yet prior work has demonstrated that LLM performance is often sufficiently explained by a small set of latent factors, or abilities. This suggests the potential for more efficient and principled benchmarking, but it remains difficult to compare the quality of different methods. Motivated by predictive validity, we argue that the quality of a benchmarking framework should be grounded in how efficiently it enables the prediction of model performance on unseen tasks. To analyze this objective, we collect the "Wide-scale Item Level Dataset" (WILD), a dataset of item-model response pairs, comprising evaluations of 65 models on 109,564 unique items spanning 163 tasks drawn from 27 datasets. This dataset enables the first analysis of how different techniques can predict a model's performance on a large, diverse collection of unseen tasks under different budget constraints. We demonstrate that combining a modified multidimensional item response theory (IRT) model with adaptive item selection driven by optimal experimental design can predict performance on 112 held-out benchmark tasks with a mean absolute error (MAE) of less than 7%, and can do so after observing only 16 items. We further demonstrate that incorporating cost-aware discount factors into our selection criteria can reduce the total tokens needed to reach 7% MAE from 141,000 tokens to only 22,000, an 85% reduction in evaluation cost.

Despite rapid advances in vision-language models (VLMs), current benchmarks for multimodal reasoning fall short in three key dimensions. First, they overwhelmingly rely on static images, failing to capture the temporal complexity of real-world environments. Second, they narrowly focus on mathematical problem-solving, neglecting the broader spectrum of reasoning skills -- including abstract, physical, planning, spatial, and temporal capabilities -- required for robust multimodal intelligence. Third, many benchmarks quickly saturate, offering limited headroom for diagnosing failure modes or measuring continued progress. We introduce MORSE-500 (Multimodal Reasoning Stress-test Environment), a video benchmark composed of 500 fully scripted clips with embedded questions spanning six complementary reasoning categories. Each instance is programmatically generated using deterministic Python scripts (via Manim, Matplotlib, MoviePy), generative video models, and curated real footage. This script-driven design allows fine-grained control over visual complexity, distractor density, and temporal dynamics -- enabling difficulty to be scaled systematically as models improve. Unlike static benchmarks that become obsolete once saturated, MORSE-500 is built to evolve: its controllable generation pipeline supports the creation of arbitrarily challenging new instances, making it ideally suited for stress-testing next-generation models. Initial experiments with state-of-the-art systems -- including various Gemini 2.5 Pro and OpenAI o3 which represent the strongest available at the time, alongside strong open-source models -- reveal substantial performance gaps across all categories, with particularly large deficits in abstract and planning tasks. We release the full dataset, generation scripts, and evaluation harness to support transparent, reproducible, and forward-looking multimodal reasoning research.