Daily Papers

This paper considers an aggregator of Electric Vehicles (EVs) who aims to learn the aggregate power of his/her fleet while also participating in the electricity market. The proposed approach is based on a data-driven inverse optimization (IO) method, which is highly nonlinear. To overcome such a caveat, we use a two-step estimation procedure which requires solving two convex programs. Both programs depend on penalty parameters that can be adjusted by using grid search. In addition, we propose the use of kernel regression to account for the nonlinear relationship between the behaviour of the pool of EVs and the explanatory variables, i.e., the past electricity prices and EV fleet's driving patterns. Unlike any other forecasting method, the proposed IO framework also allows the aggregator to derive a bid/offer curve, i.e. the tuple of price-quantity to be submitted to the electricity market, according to the market rules. We show the benefits of the proposed method against the machine-learning techniques that are reported to exhibit the best forecasting performance for this application in the technical literature.

In traditional financial markets, yield curves are widely available for countries (and, by extension, currencies), financial institutions, and large corporates. These curves are used to calibrate stochastic interest rate models, discount future cash flows, and price financial products. Yield curves, however, can be readily computed only because of the current size and structure of bond markets. In cryptocurrency markets, where fixed-rate lending and bonds are almost nonexistent as of early 2025, the yield curve associated with each currency must be estimated by other means. In this paper, we show how mathematical tools can be used to construct yield curves for cryptocurrencies by leveraging data from the highly developed markets for cryptocurrency derivatives.

Using a large-scale Deep Learning approach applied to a high-frequency database containing billions of electronic market quotes and transactions for US equities, we uncover nonparametric evidence for the existence of a universal and stationary price formation mechanism relating the dynamics of supply and demand for a stock, as revealed through the order book, to subsequent variations in its market price. We assess the model by testing its out-of-sample predictions for the direction of price moves given the history of price and order flow, across a wide range of stocks and time periods. The universal price formation model is shown to exhibit a remarkably stable out-of-sample prediction accuracy across time, for a wide range of stocks from different sectors. Interestingly, these results also hold for stocks which are not part of the training sample, showing that the relations captured by the model are universal and not asset-specific. The universal model --- trained on data from all stocks --- outperforms, in terms of out-of-sample prediction accuracy, asset-specific linear and nonlinear models trained on time series of any given stock, showing that the universal nature of price formation weighs in favour of pooling together financial data from various stocks, rather than designing asset- or sector-specific models as commonly done. Standard data normalizations based on volatility, price level or average spread, or partitioning the training data into sectors or categories such as large/small tick stocks, do not improve training results. On the other hand, inclusion of price and order flow history over many past observations is shown to improve forecasting performance, showing evidence of path-dependence in price dynamics.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

We propose a machine learning-based extension of the classical binomial option pricing model that incorporates key market microstructure effects. Traditional models assume frictionless markets, overlooking empirical features such as bid-ask spreads, discrete price movements, and serial return correlations. Our framework augments the binomial tree with path-dependent transition probabilities estimated via Random Forest classifiers trained on high-frequency market data. This approach preserves no-arbitrage conditions while embedding real-world trading dynamics into the pricing model. Using 46,655 minute-level observations of SPY from January to June 2025, we achieve an AUC of 88.25% in forecasting one-step price movements. Order flow imbalance is identified as the most influential predictor, contributing 43.2% to feature importance. After resolving time-scaling inconsistencies in tree construction, our model yields option prices that deviate by 13.79% from Black-Scholes benchmarks, highlighting the impact of microstructure on fair value estimation. While computational limitations restrict the model to short-term derivatives, our results offer a robust, data-driven alternative to classical pricing methods grounded in empirical market behavior.

We introduce a Path Shadowing Monte-Carlo method, which provides prediction of future paths, given any generative model. At any given date, it averages future quantities over generated price paths whose past history matches, or `shadows', the actual (observed) history. We test our approach using paths generated from a maximum entropy model of financial prices, based on a recently proposed multi-scale analogue of the standard skewness and kurtosis called `Scattering Spectra'. This model promotes diversity of generated paths while reproducing the main statistical properties of financial prices, including stylized facts on volatility roughness. Our method yields state-of-the-art predictions for future realized volatility and allows one to determine conditional option smiles for the S\&P500 that outperform both the current version of the Path-Dependent Volatility model and the option market itself.

We consider some classical optimization problems in path planning and network transport, and we introduce new auction-based algorithms for their optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are based on mathematical ideas that are related to competitive bidding by persons for objects and the attendant market equilibrium, which underlie auction processes. However, the starting point of our algorithms is different, namely weighted and unweighted path construction in directed graphs, rather than assignment of persons to objects. The new algorithms have several potential advantages over existing methods: they are empirically faster in some important contexts, such as max-flow, they are well-suited for on-line replanning, and they can be adapted to distributed asynchronous operation. Moreover, they allow arbitrary initial prices, without complementary slackness restrictions, and thus are better-suited to take advantage of reinforcement learning methods that use off-line training with data, as well as on-line training during real-time operation. The new algorithms may also find use in reinforcement learning contexts involving approximation, such as multistep lookahead and tree search schemes, and/or rollout algorithms.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bidding. However, most current RL auto-bidding methods are modeled through the Markovian Decision Process (MDP), which assumes the Markovian state transition. This assumption restricts the ability to perform in long horizon scenarios and makes the model unstable when dealing with highly random online advertising environments. To tackle this issue, this paper introduces AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB), a novel paradigm for auto-bidding through generative modeling. In this paradigm, we propose DiffBid, a conditional diffusion modeling approach for bid generation. DiffBid directly models the correlation between the return and the entire trajectory, effectively avoiding error propagation across time steps in long horizons. Additionally, DiffBid offers a versatile approach for generating trajectories that maximize given targets while adhering to specific constraints. Extensive experiments conducted on the real-world dataset and online A/B test on Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of DiffBid, achieving 2.81% increase in GMV and 3.36% increase in ROI.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Language models are saturating benchmarks for procedural tasks with narrow objectives. But they are increasingly being deployed in long-horizon, non-stationary environments with open-ended goals. In this paper we introduce KellyBench, an environment for evaluating sequential decision-making in sports betting markets. Agents are placed in a sequential simulation of the 2023-24 English Premier League season and tasked with maximising their long-term bankroll growth. They are given detailed historical data, including advanced statistics, lineups, and public odds. To succeed they must build machine learning models, identify edge in public markets, and adapt as the environment changes over time. We find that all frontier models evaluated lose money on average over the course of the season for five seeds. The best performing model achieves an average return of -8%, and many models experiencing ruin across seeds. To judge strategy sophistication, we use a human expert rubric to grade each model and find their approaches to be unsophisticated compared to human baselines; Claude Opus 4.6 achieves a rubric score of 26.5%, which means there is significant room for improvement. KellyBench is available as an open-access API endpoint at https://openreward.ai/GeneralReasoning/KellyBench.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We consider two data driven approaches, Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Deep Trajectory-based Stochastic Optimal Control (DTSOC) for hedging a European call option without and with transaction cost according to a quadratic hedging P&L objective at maturity ("variance-optimal hedging" or "final quadratic hedging"). We study the performance of the two approaches under various market environments (modeled via the Black-Scholes and/or the log-normal SABR model) to understand their advantages and limitations. Without transaction costs and in the Black-Scholes model, both approaches match the performance of the variance-optimal Delta hedge. In the log-normal SABR model without transaction costs, they match the performance of the variance-optimal Barlett's Delta hedge. Agents trained on Black-Scholes trajectories with matching initial volatility but used on SABR trajectories match the performance of Bartlett's Delta hedge in average cost, but show substantially wider variance. To apply RL approaches to these problems, P&L at maturity is written as sum of step-wise contributions and variants of RL algorithms are implemented and used that minimize expectation of second moments of such sums.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Systematic Investment Plans (SIPs) are a primary vehicle for retail equity participation in India, yet the impact of their intra-month timing remains underexplored. This study offers a 22-year (2003--2024) comparative analysis of SIP performance in the Nifty 50 index, contrasting the conventional first-trading-day (FTD-SIP) strategy with an alternative aligned to monthly Futures and Options expiry days (EXP-SIP). Using a multi-layered statistical framework -- including non-parametric tests, effect size metrics, and stochastic dominance -- we uncover two key findings. First, EXP-SIPs outperform FTD-SIPs by 0.5--2.5\% annually over short-to-medium-term horizons (1--5 years), with Second-Order Stochastic Dominance (SSD) confirming the EXP-SIP as the preferred choice for all risk-averse investors. Second, we establish boundary conditions for this advantage, showing it decays and becomes economically negligible over longer horizons (10--20 years), where compounding and participation dominate. Additionally, the study challenges the prevalent ``12\% return'' narrative in Indian equity markets, finding that the 20-year pre-tax CAGR for Nifty 50 SIPs is closer to 6.7\%. These findings carry significant implications for investor welfare, financial product design, and transparency in return reporting.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

We investigated the use of Empirical Mode Decomposition (EMD) combined with Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM), feature engineering and machine learning algorithms to optimize trading decisions. We used five, two, and one year samples of hourly candle data for GameStop, Tesla, and XRP (Ripple) markets respectively. Applying a 15 hour rolling window for each market, we collected several features based on a linear model and other classical features to predict the next hour's movement. Subsequently, a GMM filtering approach was used to identify clusters among these markets. For each cluster, we applied the EMD algorithm to extract high, medium, low and trend components from each feature collected. A simple thresholding algorithm was applied to classify market movements based on the percentage change in each market's close price. We then evaluated the performance of various machine learning models, including Random Forests (RF) and XGBoost, in classifying market movements. A naive random selection of trading decisions was used as a benchmark, which assumed equal probabilities for each outcome, and a temporal cross-validation approach was used to test models on 40%, 30%, and 20% of the dataset. Our results indicate that transforming selected features using EMD improves performance, particularly for ensemble learning algorithms like Random Forest and XGBoost, as measured by accumulated profit. Finally, GMM filtering expanded the range of learning algorithm and data source combinations that outperformed the top percentile of the random baseline.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) 1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

The relationship between material properties and independent variables such as temperature, external field or time, is usually represented by a curve or surface in a multi-dimensional space. Determining such a curve or surface requires a series of experiments or calculations which are often time and cost consuming. A general strategy uses an appropriate utility function to sample the space to recommend the next optimal experiment or calculation within an active learning loop. However, knowing what the optimal sampling strategy to use to minimize the number of experiments is an outstanding problem. We compare a number of strategies based on directed exploration on several materials problems of varying complexity using a Kriging based model. These include one dimensional curves such as the fatigue life curve for 304L stainless steel and the Liquidus line of the Fe-C phase diagram, surfaces such as the Hartmann 3 function in 3D space and the fitted intermolecular potential for Ar-SH, and a four dimensional data set of experimental measurements for BaTiO3 based ceramics. We also consider the effects of experimental noise on the Hartmann 3 function. We find that directed exploration guided by maximum variance provides better performance overall, converging faster across several data sets. However, for certain problems, the trade-off methods incorporating exploitation can perform at least as well, if not better than maximum variance. Thus, we discuss how the choice of the utility function depends on the distribution of the data, the model performance and uncertainties, additive noise as well as the budget.

Although machine learning tasks are highly sensitive to the quality of input data, relevant datasets can often be challenging for firms to acquire, especially when held privately by a variety of owners. For instance, if these owners are competitors in a downstream market, they may be reluctant to share information. Focusing on supervised learning for regression tasks, we develop a regression market to provide a monetary incentive for data sharing. Our mechanism adopts a Bayesian framework, allowing us to consider a more general class of regression tasks. We present a thorough exploration of the market properties, and show that similar proposals in literature expose the market agents to sizeable financial risks, which can be mitigated in our setup.

The inherent volatility and dynamic fluctuations within the financial stock market underscore the necessity for investors to employ a comprehensive and reliable approach that integrates risk management strategies, market trends, and the movement trends of individual securities. By evaluating specific data, investors can make more informed decisions. However, the current body of literature lacks substantial evidence supporting the practical efficacy of reinforcement learning (RL) agents, as many models have only demonstrated success in back testing using historical data. This highlights the urgent need for a more advanced methodology capable of addressing these challenges. There is a significant disconnect in the effective utilization of financial indicators to better understand the potential market trends of individual securities. The disclosure of successful trading strategies is often restricted within financial markets, resulting in a scarcity of widely documented and published strategies leveraging RL. Furthermore, current research frequently overlooks the identification of financial indicators correlated with various market trends and their potential advantages. This research endeavors to address these complexities by enhancing the ability of RL agents to effectively differentiate between positive and negative buy/sell actions using financial indicators. While we do not address all concerns, this paper provides deeper insights and commentary on the utilization of technical indicators and their benefits within reinforcement learning. This work establishes a foundational framework for further exploration and investigation of more complex scenarios.

The fundamental theorem behind financial markets is that stock prices are intrinsically complex and stochastic. One of the complexities is the volatility associated with stock prices. Volatility is a tendency for prices to change unexpectedly [1]. Price volatility is often detrimental to the return economics, and thus, investors should factor it in whenever making investment decisions, choices, and temporal or permanent moves. It is, therefore, crucial to make necessary and regular short and long-term stock price volatility forecasts for the safety and economics of investors returns. These forecasts should be accurate and not misleading. Different models and methods, such as ARCH GARCH models, have been intuitively implemented to make such forecasts. However, such traditional means fail to capture the short-term volatility forecasts effectively. This paper, therefore, investigates and implements a combination of numeric and probabilistic models for short-term volatility and return forecasting for high-frequency trades. The essence is that one-day-ahead volatility forecasts were made with Gaussian Processes (GPs) applied to the outputs of a Numerical market prediction (NMP) model. Firstly, the stock price data from NMP was corrected by a GP. Since it is not easy to set price limits in a market due to its free nature and randomness, a Censored GP was used to model the relationship between the corrected stock prices and returns. Forecasting errors were evaluated using the implied and estimated data.

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.

Leveraging an established exercise in negotiation education, we build a novel dataset for studying how the use of language shapes bilateral bargaining. Our dataset extends existing work in two ways: 1) we recruit participants via behavioral labs instead of crowdsourcing platforms and allow participants to negotiate through audio, enabling more naturalistic interactions; 2) we add a control setting where participants negotiate only through alternating, written numeric offers. Despite the two contrasting forms of communication, we find that the average agreed prices of the two treatments are identical. But when subjects can talk, fewer offers are exchanged, negotiations finish faster, the likelihood of reaching agreement rises, and the variance of prices at which subjects agree drops substantially. We further propose a taxonomy of speech acts in negotiation and enrich the dataset with annotated speech acts. Our work also reveals linguistic signals that are predictive of negotiation outcomes.

This research employs quantitative techniques interpreted through relevant economic theories to analyze a proposed U.S. "Discounted Reciprocal Tariff" structure. Statistical modeling (linear regression) quantifies the policy's consistent 'discounted reciprocity' pattern, which is interpreted using a Game Theory perspective on strategic interaction. Machine learning (K-Means clustering) identifies distinct country typologies based on tariff exposure and Economic Complexity Index (ECI), linking the policy to Economic Complexity theory. The study's primary application focuses on the major coffee exporting sector, utilizing simulation modeling grounded in principles of demand elasticity and substitution to project potential trade flow impacts. Specifically, for coffee, this simulation demonstrates how the proposed tariff differentials can induce significant substitution effects, projecting a potential shift in U.S. import demand away from high-tariff origins toward lower-tariff competitors. This disruption, stemming from the tariffs impacting exporting countries, is projected to ultimately increase coffee prices for consumers in the United States. Findings throughout are contextualized within Political Economy considerations. Overall, the study demonstrates how integrating regression, clustering, and simulation with economic theory exemplified through the coffee sector analysis provides a robust framework for assessing the potential systemic impacts, including consumer price effects, of strategic trade policies.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

We propose a two-step framework for predicting the implied volatility surface over time without static arbitrage. In the first step, we select features to represent the surface and predict them over time. In the second step, we use the predicted features to construct the implied volatility surface using a deep neural network (DNN) model by incorporating constraints that prevent static arbitrage. We consider three methods to extract features from the implied volatility data: principal component analysis, variational autoencoder and sampling the surface, and we predict these features using LSTM. Using a long time series of implied volatility data for S\&P500 index options to train our models, we find two feature construction methods, sampling the surface and variational autoencoders combined with DNN for surface construction, are the best performers in out-of-sample prediction. In particular, they outperform a classical method substantially. Furthermore, the DNN model for surface construction not only removes static arbitrage, but also significantly reduces the prediction error compared with a standard interpolation method. Our framework can also be used to simulate the dynamics of the implied volatility surface without static arbitrage.

Sports betting's recent federal legalisation in the USA coincides with the golden age of machine learning. If bettors can leverage data to reliably predict the probability of an outcome, they can recognise when the bookmaker's odds are in their favour. As sports betting is a multi-billion dollar industry in the USA alone, identifying such opportunities could be extremely lucrative. Many researchers have applied machine learning to the sports outcome prediction problem, generally using accuracy to evaluate the performance of predictive models. We hypothesise that for the sports betting problem, model calibration is more important than accuracy. To test this hypothesis, we train models on NBA data over several seasons and run betting experiments on a single season, using published odds. We show that using calibration, rather than accuracy, as the basis for model selection leads to greater returns, on average (return on investment of +34.69% versus -35.17%) and in the best case (+36.93% versus +5.56%). These findings suggest that for sports betting (or any probabilistic decision-making problem), calibration is a more important metric than accuracy. Sports bettors who wish to increase profits should therefore select their predictive model based on calibration, rather than accuracy.

Prediction markets are used in real life to predict outcomes of interest such as presidential elections. This paper presents a mathematical theory of artificial prediction markets for supervised learning of conditional probability estimators. The artificial prediction market is a novel method for fusing the prediction information of features or trained classifiers, where the fusion result is the contract price on the possible outcomes. The market can be trained online by updating the participants' budgets using training examples. Inspired by the real prediction markets, the equations that govern the market are derived from simple and reasonable assumptions. Efficient numerical algorithms are presented for solving these equations. The obtained artificial prediction market is shown to be a maximum likelihood estimator. It generalizes linear aggregation, existent in boosting and random forest, as well as logistic regression and some kernel methods. Furthermore, the market mechanism allows the aggregation of specialized classifiers that participate only on specific instances. Experimental comparisons show that the artificial prediction markets often outperform random forest and implicit online learning on synthetic data and real UCI datasets. Moreover, an extensive evaluation for pelvic and abdominal lymph node detection in CT data shows that the prediction market improves adaboost's detection rate from 79.6% to 81.2% at 3 false positives/volume.

Binary options trading is often marketed as a field where predictive models can generate consistent profits. However, the inherent randomness and stochastic nature of binary options make price movements highly unpredictable, posing significant challenges for any forecasting approach. This study demonstrates that machine learning algorithms struggle to outperform a simple baseline in predicting binary options movements. Using a dataset of EUR/USD currency pairs from 2021 to 2023, we tested multiple models, including Random Forest, Logistic Regression, Gradient Boosting, and k-Nearest Neighbors (kNN), both before and after hyperparameter optimization. Furthermore, several neural network architectures, including Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLP) and a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network, were evaluated under different training conditions. Despite these exhaustive efforts, none of the models surpassed the ZeroR baseline accuracy, highlighting the inherent randomness of binary options. These findings reinforce the notion that binary options lack predictable patterns, making them unsuitable for machine learning-based forecasting.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

Institutional investors have been increasing the allocation of the illiquid alternative assets such as private equity funds in their portfolios, yet there exists a very limited literature on cash flow forecasting of illiquid alternative assets. The net cash flow of private equity funds typically follow a J-curve pattern, however the timing and the size of the contributions and distributions depend on the investment opportunities. In this paper, we develop a benchmark model and present two novel approaches (direct vs. indirect) to predict the cash flows of private equity funds. We introduce a sliding window approach to apply on our cash flow data because different vintage year funds contain different lengths of cash flow information. We then pass the data to an LSTM/ GRU model to predict the future cash flows either directly or indirectly (based on the benchmark model). We further integrate macroeconomic indicators into our data, which allows us to consider the impact of market environment on cash flows and to apply stress testing. Our results indicate that the direct model is easier to implement compared to the benchmark model and the indirect model, but still the predicted cash flows align better with the actual cash flows. We also show that macroeconomic variables improve the performance of the direct model whereas the impact is not obvious on the indirect model.

Wu et al. (2026) showed that most frontier large language models (LLMs) recommend a sponsored, roughly twice-as-expensive flight when their system prompt contains a soft sponsorship cue. We reproduce their evaluation on ten open-weight chat models plus the two of their twenty-three models that are still reachable today (gpt-3.5-turbo, gpt-4o). All reported rates in this paper are produced under the same judge the original paper used (gpt-4o); we additionally store every label under an open-weight (gpt-oss-120b) and a smaller proprietary (gpt-4o-mini) judge for an ablation. Three findings emerge. First, a prose description of an LLM evaluation pipeline is not, on its own, sufficient for accurate reproduction: we surfaced three silent implementation failures that each shifted a reported rate by tens of percentage points. Second, the central claims do generalise - the gpt-3.5-turbo logistic-regression intercept of alpha = 0.81 is within four points of the original alpha = 0.86, and 200 of 200 trials on gpt-3.5-turbo and gpt-4o promote a payday lender to a financially distressed user. Third, a thirty-token user prompt that asks the assistant for a neutral comparison table first cuts sponsored recommendation from 46.9% to 1.0% averaged across our ten open-source models, and from 53.0% to 0% averaged across the two OpenAI models. AI literacy and price-comparison portals are likely market-level mitigations; the harmful-product cell is bounded by neither. Raw data, labels and analysis scripts are at https://github.com/akmaier/Paper-LLM-Ads .

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

This paper proposes a reinforcement learning framework that employs Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) to dynamically optimize the weights of multiple large language model (LLM)-generated formulaic alphas for stock trading strategies. Formulaic alphas are mathematically defined trading signals derived from price, volume, sentiment, and other data. Although recent studies have shown that LLMs can generate diverse and effective alphas, a critical challenge lies in how to adaptively integrate them under varying market conditions. To address this gap, we leverage the deepseek-r1-distill-llama-70b model to generate fifty alphas for five major stocks: Apple, HSBC, Pepsi, Toyota, and Tencent, and then use PPO to adjust their weights in real time. Experimental results demonstrate that the PPO-optimized strategy achieves strong returns and high Sharpe ratios across most stocks, outperforming both an equal-weighted alpha portfolio and traditional benchmarks such as the Nikkei 225, S&P 500, and Hang Seng Index. The findings highlight the importance of reinforcement learning in the allocation of alpha weights and show the potential of combining LLM-generated signals with adaptive optimization for robust financial forecasting and trading.

To reject the Efficient Market Hypothesis a set of 5 technical indicators and 23 fundamental indicators was identified to establish the possibility of generating excess returns on the stock market. Leveraging these data points and various classification machine learning models, trading data of the 505 equities on the US S&P500 over the past 20 years was analysed to develop a classifier effective for our cause. From any given day, we were able to predict the direction of change in price by 1% up to 10 days in the future. The predictions had an overall accuracy of 83.62% with a precision of 85% for buy signals and a recall of 100% for sell signals. Moreover, we grouped equities by their sector and repeated the experiment to see if grouping similar assets together positively effected the results but concluded that it showed no significant improvements in the performance rejecting the idea of sector-based analysis. Also, using feature ranking we could identify an even smaller set of 6 indicators while maintaining similar accuracies as that from the original 28 features and also uncovered the importance of buy, hold and sell analyst ratings as they came out to be the top contributors in the model. Finally, to evaluate the effectiveness of the classifier in real-life situations, it was backtested on FAANG equities using a modest trading strategy where it generated high returns of above 60% over the term of the testing dataset. In conclusion, our proposed methodology with the combination of purposefully picked features shows an improvement over the previous studies, and our model predicts the direction of 1% price changes on the 10th day with high confidence and with enough buffer to even build a robotic trading system.

In this research, we have empirically investigated the key drivers affecting liquidity in equity markets. We illustrated how theoretical models, such as Kyle's model, of agents' interplay in the financial markets, are aligned with the phenomena observed in publicly available trades and quotes data. Specifically, we confirmed that for small signed order-flows, the price impact grows linearly with increase in the order-flow imbalance. We have, further, implemented a machine learning algorithm to forecast market impact given a signed order-flow. Our findings suggest that machine learning models can be used in estimation of financial variables; and predictive accuracy of such learning algorithms can surpass the performance of traditional statistical approaches. Understanding the determinants of price impact is crucial for several reasons. From a theoretical stance, modelling the impact provides a statistical measure of liquidity. Practitioners adopt impact models as a pre-trade tool to estimate expected transaction costs and optimize the execution of their strategies. This further serves as a post-trade valuation benchmark as suboptimal execution can significantly deteriorate a portfolio performance. More broadly, the price impact reflects the balance of liquidity across markets. This is of central importance to regulators as it provides an all-encompassing explanation of the correlation between market design and systemic risk, enabling regulators to design more stable and efficient markets.

We study whether multiple large language models (LLMs) can autonomously improve each other in a negotiation game by playing, reflecting, and criticizing. We are interested in this question because if LLMs were able to improve each other, it would imply the possibility of creating strong AI agents with minimal human intervention. We ask two LLMs to negotiate with each other, playing the roles of a buyer and a seller, respectively. They aim to reach a deal with the buyer targeting a lower price and the seller a higher one. A third language model, playing the critic, provides feedback to a player to improve the player's negotiation strategies. We let the two agents play multiple rounds, using previous negotiation history and AI feedback as in-context demonstrations to improve the model's negotiation strategy iteratively. We use different LLMs (GPT and Claude) for different roles and use the deal price as the evaluation metric. Our experiments reveal multiple intriguing findings: (1) Only a subset of the language models we consider can self-play and improve the deal price from AI feedback, weaker models either do not understand the game's rules or cannot incorporate AI feedback for further improvement. (2) Models' abilities to learn from the feedback differ when playing different roles. For example, it is harder for Claude-instant to improve as the buyer than as the seller. (3) When unrolling the game to multiple rounds, stronger agents can consistently improve their performance by meaningfully using previous experiences and iterative AI feedback, yet have a higher risk of breaking the deal. We hope our work provides insightful initial explorations of having models autonomously improve each other with game playing and AI feedback.

Introduction: The paper addresses the challenging problem of predicting the short-term realized volatility of the Bitcoin price using order flow information. The inherent stochastic nature and anti-persistence of price pose difficulties in accurate prediction. Methods: To address this, we propose a method that transforms order flow data over a fixed time interval (snapshots) into images. The order flow includes trade sizes, trade directions, and limit order book, and is mapped into image colour channels. These images are then used to train both a simple 3-layer Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and more advanced ResNet-18 and ConvMixer, with additionally supplementing them with hand-crafted features. The models are evaluated against classical GARCH, Multilayer Perceptron trained on raw data, and a naive guess method that considers current volatility as a prediction. Results: The experiments are conducted using price data from January 2021 and evaluate model performance in terms of root mean square error (RMSPE). The results show that our order flow representation with a CNN as a predictive model achieves the best performance, with an RMSPE of 0.85+/-1.1 for the model with aggregated features and 1.0+/-1.4 for the model without feature supplementation. ConvMixer with feature supplementation follows closely. In comparison, the RMSPE for the naive guess method was 1.4+/-3.0.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

The prediction of foreign exchange rates, such as the US Dollar (USD) to Bangladeshi Taka (BDT), plays a pivotal role in global financial markets, influencing trade, investments, and economic stability. This study leverages historical USD/BDT exchange rate data from 2018 to 2023, sourced from Yahoo Finance, to develop advanced machine learning models for accurate forecasting. A Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) neural network is employed, achieving an exceptional accuracy of 99.449%, a Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of 0.9858, and a test loss of 0.8523, significantly outperforming traditional methods like ARIMA (RMSE 1.342). Additionally, a Gradient Boosting Classifier (GBC) is applied for directional prediction, with backtesting on a 10,000 initial capital revealing a 40.82% profitable trade rate, though resulting in a net loss of 20,653.25 over 49 trades. The study analyzes historical trends, showing a decline in BDT/USD rates from 0.012 to 0.009, and incorporates normalized daily returns to capture volatility. These findings highlight the potential of deep learning in forex forecasting, offering traders and policymakers robust tools to mitigate risks. Future work could integrate sentiment analysis and real-time economic indicators to further enhance model adaptability in volatile markets.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Integrated autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) models serve as natural counterparts to the well-known integrated GARCH models used for financial returns. However, despite their resemblance, asymptotic theory for ACD is challenging and also not complete, in particular for integrated ACD. Central challenges arise from the facts that (i) integrated ACD processes imply durations with infinite expectation, and (ii) even in the non-integrated case, conventional asymptotic approaches break down due to the randomness in the number of durations within a fixed observation period. Addressing these challenges, we provide here unified asymptotic theory for the (quasi-) maximum likelihood estimator for ACD models; a unified theory which includes integrated ACD models. Based on the new results, we also provide a novel framework for hypothesis testing in duration models, enabling inference on a key empirical question: whether durations possess a finite or infinite expectation. We apply our results to high-frequency cryptocurrency ETF trading data. Motivated by parameter estimates near the integrated ACD boundary, we assess whether durations between trades in these markets have finite expectation, an assumption often made implicitly in the literature on point process models. Our empirical findings indicate infinite-mean durations for all the five cryptocurrencies examined, with the integrated ACD hypothesis rejected -- against alternatives with tail index less than one -- for four out of the five cryptocurrencies considered.

We develop policy gradients methods for stochastic control with exit time in a model-free setting. We propose two types of algorithms for learning either directly the optimal policy or by learning alternately the value function (critic) and the optimal control (actor). The use of randomized policies is crucial for overcoming notably the issue related to the exit time in the gradient computation. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by implementing our numerical schemes in the application to the problem of share repurchase pricing. Our results show that the proposed policy gradient methods outperform PDE or other neural networks techniques in a model-based setting. Furthermore, our algorithms are flexible enough to incorporate realistic market conditions like e.g. price impact or transaction costs.

One of the most discussed problems in the financial world is stock option pricing. The Black-Scholes Equation is a Parabolic Partial Differential Equation which provides an option pricing model. The present work proposes an approach based on Neural Networks to solve the Black-Scholes Equations. Real-world data from the stock options market were used as the initial boundary to solve the Black-Scholes Equation. In particular, times series of call options prices of Brazilian companies Petrobras and Vale were employed. The results indicate that the network can learn to solve the Black-Sholes Equation for a specific real-world stock options time series. The experimental results showed that the Neural network option pricing based on the Black-Sholes Equation solution can reach an option pricing forecasting more accurate than the traditional Black-Sholes analytical solutions. The experimental results making it possible to use this methodology to make short-term call option price forecasts in options markets.

We propose a structural default model for portfolio-wide valuation adjustments (xVAs) and represent it as a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. The framework is divided into four layers, each capturing a key component: (i) clean values, (ii) initial margin and Collateral Valuation Adjustment (ColVA), (iii) Credit/Debit Valuation Adjustments (CVA/DVA) together with Margin Valuation Adjustment (MVA), and (iv) Funding Valuation Adjustment (FVA). Because these layers depend on one another through collateral and default effects, a naive Monte Carlo approach would require deeply nested simulations, making the problem computationally intractable. To address this challenge, we use an iterative deep BSDE approach, handling each layer sequentially so that earlier outputs serve as inputs to the subsequent layers. Initial margin is computed via deep quantile regression to reflect margin requirements over the Margin Period of Risk. We also adopt a change-of-measure method that highlights rare but significant defaults of the bank or counterparty, ensuring that these events are accurately captured in the training process. We further extend Han and Long's (2020) a posteriori error analysis to BSDEs on bounded domains. Due to the random exit from the domain, we obtain an order of convergence of O(h^{1/4-epsilon}) rather than the usual O(h^{1/2}). Numerical experiments illustrate that this method drastically reduces computational demands and successfully scales to high-dimensional, non-symmetric portfolios. The results confirm its effectiveness and accuracy, offering a practical alternative to nested Monte Carlo simulations in multi-counterparty xVA analyses.

Predictive model design for accurately predicting future stock prices has always been considered an interesting and challenging research problem. The task becomes complex due to the volatile and stochastic nature of the stock prices in the real world which is affected by numerous controllable and uncontrollable variables. This paper presents an optimized predictive model built on long-and-short-term memory (LSTM) architecture for automatically extracting past stock prices from the web over a specified time interval and predicting their future prices for a specified forecast horizon, and forecasts the future stock prices. The model is deployed for making buy and sell transactions based on its predicted results for 70 important stocks from seven different sectors listed in the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India. The profitability of each sector is derived based on the total profit yielded by the stocks in that sector over a period from Jan 1, 2010 to Aug 26, 2021. The sectors are compared based on their profitability values. The prediction accuracy of the model is also evaluated for each sector. The results indicate that the model is highly accurate in predicting future stock prices.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

Benchmarking the tradeoff between neural network accuracy and training time is computationally expensive. Here we show how a multiplicative cyclic learning rate schedule can be used to construct a tradeoff curve in a single training run. We generate cyclic tradeoff curves for combinations of training methods such as Blurpool, Channels Last, Label Smoothing and MixUp, and highlight how these cyclic tradeoff curves can be used to evaluate the effects of algorithmic choices on network training efficiency.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

Test-time compute has emerged as a promising strategy to enhance the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, this strategy has in turn increased how much users pay cloud-based providers offering LLM-as-a-service, since providers charge users for the amount of test-time compute they use to generate an output. In our work, we show that the market of LLM-as-a-service is socially inefficient: providers have a financial incentive to increase the amount of test-time compute, even if this increase contributes little to the quality of the outputs. To address this inefficiency, we introduce a reverse second-price auction mechanism where providers bid their offered price and (expected) quality for the opportunity to serve a user, and users pay proportionally to the marginal value generated by the winning provider relative to the second-highest bidder. To illustrate and complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with multiple instruct models from the Llama and Qwen families, as well as reasoning models distilled from DeepSeek-R1, on math and science benchmark datasets.

The global trade in electronic and electrical goods is complicated by the challenge of identifying e-waste, which is often misclassified to evade regulations. Traditional analysis methods struggle to discern the underlying patterns of this illicit trade within vast datasets. This research proposes and validates a robust, data-driven framework to segment products and identify goods exhibiting an anomalous "waste signature" a trade pattern defined by a clear 'inverse price-volume'. The core of the framework is an Outlier-Aware Segmentation method, an iterative K-Means approach that first isolates extreme outliers to prevent data skewing and then re-clusters the remaining products to reveal subtle market segments. To quantify risk, a "Waste Score" is developed using a Logistic Regression model that identifies products whose trade signatures are statistically similar to scrap. The findings reveal a consistent four-tier market hierarchy in both Malaysian and global datasets. A key pattern emerged from a comparative analysis: Malaysia's market structure is defined by high-volume bulk commodities, whereas the global market is shaped by high-value capital goods, indicating a unique national specialization. The framework successfully flags finished goods, such as electric generators (HS 8502), that are traded like scrap, providing a targeted list for regulatory scrutiny.

Predicting click and conversion probabilities when bidding on ad exchanges is at the core of the programmatic advertising industry. Two separated lines of previous works respectively address i) the prediction of user conversion probability and ii) the attribution of these conversions to advertising events (such as clicks) after the fact. We argue that attribution modeling improves the efficiency of the bidding policy in the context of performance advertising. Firstly we explain the inefficiency of the standard bidding policy with respect to attribution. Secondly we learn and utilize an attribution model in the bidder itself and show how it modifies the average bid after a click. Finally we produce evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed method on both offline and online experiments with data spanning several weeks of real traffic from Criteo, a leader in performance advertising.

We present a framework for hedging a portfolio of derivatives in the presence of market frictions such as transaction costs, market impact, liquidity constraints or risk limits using modern deep reinforcement machine learning methods. We discuss how standard reinforcement learning methods can be applied to non-linear reward structures, i.e. in our case convex risk measures. As a general contribution to the use of deep learning for stochastic processes, we also show that the set of constrained trading strategies used by our algorithm is large enough to ε-approximate any optimal solution. Our algorithm can be implemented efficiently even in high-dimensional situations using modern machine learning tools. Its structure does not depend on specific market dynamics, and generalizes across hedging instruments including the use of liquid derivatives. Its computational performance is largely invariant in the size of the portfolio as it depends mainly on the number of hedging instruments available. We illustrate our approach by showing the effect on hedging under transaction costs in a synthetic market driven by the Heston model, where we outperform the standard "complete market" solution.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

Online marketplaces will be transformed by autonomous AI agents acting on behalf of consumers. Rather than humans browsing and clicking, vision-language-model (VLM) agents can parse webpages, evaluate products, and transact. This raises a fundamental question: what do AI agents buy, and why? We develop ACES, a sandbox environment that pairs a platform-agnostic VLM agent with a fully programmable mock marketplace to study this question. We first conduct basic rationality checks in the context of simple tasks, and then, by randomizing product positions, prices, ratings, reviews, sponsored tags, and platform endorsements, we obtain causal estimates of how frontier VLMs actually shop. Models show strong but heterogeneous position effects: all favor the top row, yet different models prefer different columns, undermining the assumption of a universal "top" rank. They penalize sponsored tags and reward endorsements. Sensitivities to price, ratings, and reviews are directionally human-like but vary sharply in magnitude across models. Motivated by scenarios where sellers use AI agents to optimize product listings, we show that a seller-side agent that makes minor tweaks to product descriptions, targeting AI buyer preferences, can deliver substantial market-share gains if AI-mediated shopping dominates. We also find that modal product choices can differ across models and, in some cases, demand may concentrate on a few select products, raising competition questions. Together, our results illuminate how AI agents may behave in e-commerce settings and surface concrete seller strategy, platform design, and regulatory questions in an AI-mediated ecosystem.