Daily Papers

User queries are often underspecified and may admit multiple valid interpretations. Rather than silently making assumptions about the user's intent, a helpful assistant should surface such ambiguity by asking a clarifying question. Doing so requires two abilities: recognizing that a query is ambiguous, and acting on that recognition by seeking clarification instead of answering directly. To study these abilities, we evaluate models on ambiguous, unambiguous, and disambiguated questions in three settings: standard question answering, explicit ambiguity judgment, and behavioral analysis, where a judge model classifies responses as direct answers, refusals, or clarifying questions. We find a clear gap between recognition and behavior: models often identify ambiguity when explicitly asked to judge it, yet in the QA setting they overwhelmingly default to direct answers. Retrieved context further widens this gap by improving answerability while making models even less likely to ask clarifying questions.

Reinforcement Learning Fine-Tuning (RLFT) has achieved notable success in tasks with objectively verifiable answers (e.g., code generation, mathematical reasoning), yet struggles with open-ended subjective tasks like role-playing dialogue. Traditional reward modeling approaches, which rely on independent sample-wise scoring, face dual challenges: subjective evaluation criteria and unstable reward signals.Motivated by the insight that human evaluation inherently combines explicit criteria with implicit comparative judgments, we propose Comparative Policy Optimization (CPO). CPO redefines the reward evaluation paradigm by shifting from sample-wise scoring to comparative group-wise scoring.Building on the same principle, we introduce the CharacterArena evaluation framework, which comprises two stages:(1) Contextualized Multi-turn Role-playing Simulation, and (2) Trajectory-level Comparative Evaluation. By operationalizing subjective scoring via objective trajectory comparisons, CharacterArena minimizes contextual bias and enables more robust and fair performance evaluation. Empirical results on CharacterEval, CharacterBench, and CharacterArena confirm that CPO effectively mitigates reward ambiguity and leads to substantial improvements in dialogue quality.

Natural language reasoning plays an increasingly important role in improving language models' ability to solve complex language understanding tasks. An interesting use case for reasoning is the resolution of context-dependent ambiguity. But no resources exist to evaluate how well Large Language Models can use explicit reasoning to resolve ambiguity in language. We propose to use ambiguous definite descriptions for this purpose and create and publish the first benchmark dataset consisting of such phrases. Our method includes all information required to resolve the ambiguity in the prompt, which means a model does not require anything but reasoning to do well. We find this to be a challenging task for recent LLMs. Code and data available at: https://github.com/sfschouten/exploiting-ambiguity

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Search agents powered by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to solve complex information-seeking tasks, requiring multi-step retrieval and reasoning to fulfill user goals. However, existing benchmarks often assume that user queries are complete and explicit, overlooking the fact that real-world search requests are frequently vague, underspecified, or even factually incorrect. In deep search scenarios, such ambiguity can propagate along multi-step reasoning chains and lead agents toward incorrect search trajectories. To address this gap, we introduce DiscoBench, a benchmark for clarification-aware deep search, designed to evaluate whether search agents can proactively identify ambiguity, ask effective clarification questions, and recover correct reasoning paths through user interaction. DiscoBench contains 211 samples and 463 ambiguity instances across 11 real-world domains, covering four ambiguity types. We further design a user simulator for multi-turn interaction and evaluate model performance from four perspectives: task utility, ambiguity detection, interaction strategy, and cost efficiency. Experiments on representative LLMs show that ambiguity detection and effective clarification are distinct capabilities, and that repeatedly searching instead of asking for clarification often performs worse than direct guessing, highlighting a critical gap between retrieval ability and interactive problem-solving in current search agents.

Ambiguity is an intrinsic feature of natural language. Managing ambiguity is a key part of human language understanding, allowing us to anticipate misunderstanding as communicators and revise our interpretations as listeners. As language models (LMs) are increasingly employed as dialogue interfaces and writing aids, handling ambiguous language is critical to their success. We characterize ambiguity in a sentence by its effect on entailment relations with another sentence, and collect AmbiEnt, a linguist-annotated benchmark of 1,645 examples with diverse kinds of ambiguity. We design a suite of tests based on AmbiEnt, presenting the first evaluation of pretrained LMs to recognize ambiguity and disentangle possible meanings. We find that the task remains extremely challenging, including for the recent GPT-4, whose generated disambiguations are considered correct only 32% of the time in human evaluation, compared to 90% for disambiguations in our dataset. Finally, to illustrate the value of ambiguity-sensitive tools, we show that a multilabel NLI model can flag political claims in the wild that are misleading due to ambiguity. We encourage the field to rediscover the importance of ambiguity for NLP.

Ambiguous words or underspecified references require interlocutors to resolve them, often by relying on shared context and commonsense knowledge. Therefore, we systematically investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can leverage commonsense to resolve referential ambiguity in multi-turn conversations and analyze their behavior when ambiguity persists. Further, we study how requests for simplified language affect this capacity. Using a novel multilingual evaluation dataset, we test DeepSeek v3, GPT-4o, Qwen3-32B, GPT-4o-mini, and Llama-3.1-8B via LLM-as-Judge and human annotations. Our findings indicate that current LLMs struggle to resolve ambiguity effectively: they tend to commit to a single interpretation or cover all possible references, rather than hedging or seeking clarification. This limitation becomes more pronounced under simplification prompts, which drastically reduce the use of commonsense reasoning and diverse response strategies. Fine-tuning Llama-3.1-8B with Direct Preference Optimization substantially improves ambiguity resolution across all request types. These results underscore the need for advanced fine-tuning to improve LLMs' handling of ambiguity and to ensure robust performance across diverse communication styles.

In interactions between users and language model agents, user utterances frequently exhibit ellipsis (omission of words or phrases) or imprecision (lack of exactness) to prioritize efficiency. This can lead to varying interpretations of the same input based on different assumptions or background knowledge. It is thus crucial for agents to adeptly handle the inherent ambiguity in queries to ensure reliability. However, even state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) still face challenges in such scenarios, primarily due to the following hurdles: (1) LLMs are not explicitly trained to deal with ambiguous utterances; (2) the degree of ambiguity perceived by the LLMs may vary depending on the possessed knowledge. To address these issues, we propose Alignment with Perceived Ambiguity (APA), a novel pipeline that aligns LLMs to manage ambiguous queries by leveraging their own assessment of ambiguity (i.e., perceived ambiguity). Experimental results on question-answering datasets demonstrate that APA empowers LLMs to explicitly detect and manage ambiguous queries while retaining the ability to answer clear questions. Furthermore, our finding proves that APA excels beyond training with gold-standard labels, especially in out-of-distribution scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) are prone to hallucinations in question-answering (QA) tasks when faced with ambiguous questions. Users often assume that LLMs share their cognitive alignment, a mutual understanding of context, intent, and implicit details, leading them to omit critical information in the queries. However, LLMs generate responses based on assumptions that can misalign with user intent, which may be perceived as hallucinations if they misalign with the user's intent. Therefore, identifying those implicit assumptions is crucial to resolve ambiguities in QA. Prior work, such as AmbigQA, reduces ambiguity in queries via human-annotated clarifications, which is not feasible in real application. Meanwhile, ASQA compiles AmbigQA's short answers into long-form responses but inherits human biases and fails capture explicit logical distinctions that differentiates the answers. We introduce Conditional Ambiguous Question-Answering (CondAmbigQA), a benchmark with 200 ambiguous queries and condition-aware evaluation metrics. Our study pioneers the concept of ``conditions'' in ambiguous QA tasks, where conditions stand for contextual constraints or assumptions that resolve ambiguities. The retrieval-based annotation strategy uses retrieved Wikipedia fragments to identify possible interpretations for a given query as its conditions and annotate the answers through those conditions. Such a strategy minimizes human bias introduced by different knowledge levels among annotators. By fixing retrieval results, CondAmbigQA evaluates how RAG systems leverage conditions to resolve ambiguities. Experiments show that models considering conditions before answering improve performance by 20%, with an additional 5% gain when conditions are explicitly provided. These results underscore the value of conditional reasoning in QA, offering researchers tools to rigorously evaluate ambiguity resolution.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making. Inspired by the theory of inattentional blindness in human cognition, we investigate whether LLMs, trained on human-preferred corpora that embed attentional biases, exhibit a similar limitation: failing to attend to subtle yet important contextual cues under explicit task instructions. To evaluate this, we introduce the task of explicit-implicit reasoning and present MixRea, a benchmark of 2,246 multiple-choice questions across 9 reasoning types with varying distributions of explicit and implicit information. Evaluation of 21 advanced LLMs shows that even the best-performing reasoning model (Gemini 2.5 Pro) achieves only 42.8\% consistency, revealing widespread inattentional blindness. To mitigate this, we propose Potential Relation Completion Prompting (PRCP), a prompting method that improves reasoning by recovering overlooked causal relations. Further analysis shows that this limitation persists across diverse multi-source reasoning tasks, highlighting the need for more cognitively aligned models.

Ambiguity is pervasive in real-world questions, yet large language models (LLMs) often respond with confident answers rather than seeking clarification. In this work, we show that question ambiguity is linearly encoded in the internal representations of LLMs and can be both detected and controlled at the neuron level. During the model's pre-filling stage, we identify that a small number of neurons, as few as one, encode question ambiguity information. Probes trained on these Ambiguity-Encoding Neurons (AENs) achieve strong performance on ambiguity detection and generalize across datasets, outperforming prompting-based and representation-based baselines. Layerwise analysis reveals that AENs emerge from shallow layers, suggesting early encoding of ambiguity signals in the model's processing pipeline. Finally, we show that through manipulating AENs, we can control LLM's behavior from direct answering to abstention. Our findings reveal that LLMs form compact internal representations of question ambiguity, enabling interpretable and controllable behavior.

Despite the frequent challenges posed by ambiguity when representing meaning via natural language, it is often ignored or deliberately removed in tasks mapping language to formally-designed representations, which generally assume a one-to-one mapping between linguistic and formal representations. We attempt to address this shortcoming by introducing AmP, a framework, dataset, and challenge for translating ambiguous natural language to formal representations like logic and code. We define templates and generate data for five well-documented linguistic ambiguities. Using AmP, we investigate how several few-shot text-to-code systems handle ambiguity, introducing three new metrics. We find that large pre-trained models perform poorly at capturing the distribution of possible meanings without deliberate instruction. However, models are able to capture the distribution well when ambiguity is attested in their inputs. These results motivate a call for including ambiguity explicitly in datasets and promote considering the distribution of possible outputs when evaluating systems. Data and code: https://github.com/esteng/ambiguous_parsing

Spatial expressions in situated communication can be ambiguous, as their meanings vary depending on the frames of reference (FoR) adopted by speakers and listeners. While spatial language understanding and reasoning by vision-language models (VLMs) have gained increasing attention, potential ambiguities in these models are still under-explored. To address this issue, we present the COnsistent Multilingual Frame Of Reference Test (COMFORT), an evaluation protocol to systematically assess the spatial reasoning capabilities of VLMs. We evaluate nine state-of-the-art VLMs using COMFORT. Despite showing some alignment with English conventions in resolving ambiguities, our experiments reveal significant shortcomings of VLMs: notably, the models (1) exhibit poor robustness and consistency, (2) lack the flexibility to accommodate multiple FoRs, and (3) fail to adhere to language-specific or culture-specific conventions in cross-lingual tests, as English tends to dominate other languages. With a growing effort to align vision-language models with human cognitive intuitions, we call for more attention to the ambiguous nature and cross-cultural diversity of spatial reasoning.

Recent advancements in multimodal large language models have enhanced document understanding by integrating textual and visual information. However, existing models exhibit incompleteness within their paradigm in real-world scenarios, particularly under visual degradation. In such conditions, the current response paradigm often fails to adequately perceive visual degradation and ambiguity, leading to overreliance on linguistic priors or misaligned visual-textual reasoning. This difficulty in recognizing uncertainty frequently results in the generation of hallucinatory content, especially when a precise answer is not feasible. To better demonstrate and analyze this phenomenon and problem, we propose KIE-HVQA, the first benchmark dedicated to evaluating OCR hallucination in degraded document understanding. This dataset includes test samples spanning identity cards and invoices, with simulated real-world degradations for OCR reliability. This setup allows for evaluating models' capacity, under degraded input, to distinguish reliable visual information and answer accordingly, thereby highlighting the challenge of avoiding hallucination on uncertain data. To achieve vision-faithful reasoning and thereby avoid the aforementioned issues, we further introduce a GRPO-based framework featuring a novel reward mechanism. By incorporating a self-awareness of visual uncertainty and an analysis method that initiates refusal to answer to increase task difficulty within our supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning framework, we successfully mitigated hallucinations in ambiguous regions. Experiments on Qwen2.5-VL demonstrate that our 7B-parameter model achieves a 22\% absolute improvement in hallucination-free accuracy over GPT-4o on KIE-HVQA and there is no significant performance drop in standard tasks, highlighting both effectiveness and robustness.

AI systems are increasingly governed by natural language principles, yet a key challenge arising from reliance on language remains underexplored: interpretive ambiguity. As in legal systems, ambiguity arises both from how these principles are written and how they are applied. But while legal systems use institutional safeguards to manage such ambiguity, such as transparent appellate review policing interpretive constraints, AI alignment pipelines offer no comparable protections. Different interpretations of the same rule can lead to inconsistent or unstable model behavior. Drawing on legal theory, we identify key gaps in current alignment pipelines by examining how legal systems constrain ambiguity at both the rule creation and rule application steps. We then propose a computational framework that mirrors two legal mechanisms: (1) a rule refinement pipeline that minimizes interpretive disagreement by revising ambiguous rules (analogous to agency rulemaking or iterative legislative action), and (2) prompt-based interpretive constraints that reduce inconsistency in rule application (analogous to legal canons that guide judicial discretion). We evaluate our framework on a 5,000-scenario subset of the WildChat dataset and show that both interventions significantly improve judgment consistency across a panel of reasonable interpreters. Our approach offers a first step toward systematically managing interpretive ambiguity, an essential step for building more robust, law-following AI systems.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

Despite increasingly fluent, relevant, and coherent language generation, major gaps remain between how humans and machines use language. We argue that a key dimension that is missing from our understanding of language models (LMs) is the model's ability to interpret and generate expressions of uncertainty. Whether it be the weatherperson announcing a chance of rain or a doctor giving a diagnosis, information is often not black-and-white and expressions of uncertainty provide nuance to support human-decision making. The increasing deployment of LMs in the wild motivates us to investigate whether LMs are capable of interpreting expressions of uncertainty and how LMs' behaviors change when learning to emit their own expressions of uncertainty. When injecting expressions of uncertainty into prompts (e.g., "I think the answer is..."), we discover that GPT3's generations vary upwards of 80% in accuracy based on the expression used. We analyze the linguistic characteristics of these expressions and find a drop in accuracy when naturalistic expressions of certainty are present. We find similar effects when teaching models to emit their own expressions of uncertainty, where model calibration suffers when teaching models to emit certainty rather than uncertainty. Together, these results highlight the challenges of building LMs that interpret and generate trustworthy expressions of uncertainty.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

When prompting SLMs for psychometric assessments, researchers assume the outputs reflect semantic reasoning. We evaluate this premise across 13 open-weights models (0.6B to 14B parameters) using a prompt variation framework that separates semantic signals from prompt artifacts. By systematically varying personas, instructions, items, and option symbols, we find that artifactual variance frequently overpowers the semantic signal. In these cases, models predominantly reflect prompt compliance rather than simulated psychological traits. While these findings limit SLM utility in psychometrics, our framework provides a diagnostic tool to identify destructive artifacts and isolate semantic understanding for future frontier-model research.

Large language models can arrive at the same answer through reasoning paths that are unstable, contradictory, or difficult to rank consistently -- a failure mode especially prevalent in multi-step deductive reasoning. Existing methods assess reliability primarily through output dispersion -- measuring how much sampled answers differ -- but this discards a complementary signal: whether the model can consistently rank competing reasoning candidates. We propose structural uncertainty, a consistency-aware framework derived from the stability of self-preference-induced rankings over sampled reasoning solutions. Given a query, we generate multiple candidate solutions and ask the model to judge pairwise preferences among its own outputs. We aggregate self-preferences into ranking distributions via Bradley-Terry modeling with PageRank, and decompose the signal into two entropy-based components: across-trial ranking instability and within-trial candidate ambiguity. Across five LLMs and eight benchmarks, structural signals provide information complementary to answer dispersion: on logical and mathematical reasoning tasks, the combination improves identification of unreliable instances, while on factual retrieval the structural signal collapses toward uniformity, diagnosing a regime boundary where reasoning-level consistency evaluation is uninformative. The two components relate differently to accuracy: within-trial ambiguity correlates positively with correctness -- consistent with settings where multiple plausible solution paths remain competitive -- while across-trial instability correlates negatively, signaling unreliable reasoning. Structural uncertainty is best understood not as a universal confidence estimator, but as a regime-sensitive evaluator of logical reasoning consistency.

Implicit bias refers to automatic or spontaneous mental processes that shape perceptions, judgments, and behaviors. Previous research examining `implicit bias' in large language models (LLMs) has often approached the phenomenon differently than how it is studied in humans by focusing primarily on model outputs rather than on model processing. To examine model processing, we present a method called the Reasoning Model Implicit Association Test (RM-IAT) for studying implicit bias-like patterns in reasoning models: LLMs that employ step-by-step reasoning to solve complex tasks. Using this method, we find that reasoning models require more tokens when processing association-incompatible information compared to association-compatible information. These findings suggest AI systems harbor patterns in processing information that are analogous to human implicit bias. We consider the implications of these implicit bias-like patterns for their deployment in real-world applications.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

Large Language Models (LLMs) hallucinate, generating factually incorrect yet confident assertions. We argue this stems from the Transformer's Softmax function, which creates "Artificial Certainty" by collapsing ambiguous attention scores into a single probability distribution, discarding uncertainty information at each layer. To fix this, we introduce the Credal Transformer, which replaces standard attention with a Credal Attention Mechanism (CAM) based on evidential theory. CAM produces a "credal set" (a set of distributions) instead of a single attention vector, with the set's size directly measuring model uncertainty. We implement this by re-conceptualizing attention scores as evidence masses for a Dirichlet distribution: sufficient evidence recovers standard attention, while insufficient evidence yields a diffuse distribution, representing ambiguity. Empirically, the Credal Transformer identifies out-of-distribution inputs, quantifies ambiguity, and significantly reduces confident errors on unanswerable questions by abstaining. Our contribution is a new architecture to mitigate hallucinations and a design paradigm that integrates uncertainty quantification directly into the model, providing a foundation for more reliable AI.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

Current artificial intelligence systems exhibit a fundamental architectural limitation: they resolve ambiguity prematurely. This premature semantic collapse--collapsing multiple valid interpretations into single outputs--stems from classical identity assumptions in neural architectures. We propose Non-Resolution Reasoning (NRR), a framework treating ambiguity retention as a valid reasoning mode. NRR introduces three principles: (1) Non-Identity (A neq A)--the same symbol refers to different entities across contexts; (2) Approximate Identity (A approx A)--entities share partial structural overlap without being identical; (3) Non-Resolution--conflicting interpretations coexist without forced convergence. We formalize these through Multi-Vector Embeddings for context-dependent representation, Non-Collapsing Attention for parallel interpretation retention, and Contextual Identity Tracking (CIT) for maintaining A neq A across inference. We illustrate NRR through case studies in paradox handling, creative generation, and context-dependent reasoning. Functional verification in a synthetic two-turn disambiguation task shows NRR-lite maintains high entropy (H = 0.91 bits, near-maximum 1.0) at ambiguous turns while standard architectures collapse early (H = 0.15 bits), preserving interpretive flexibility until context arrives. NRR challenges the assumption that meaning must collapse to be useful. The question is not whether AI should resolve ambiguity, but when, how, and under whose control.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Using language models to scalably approximate human preferences on text quality (LLM-as-a-judge) has become a standard practice applicable to many tasks. A judgment is often extracted from the judge's textual output alone, typically with greedy decoding. However, LLM judges naturally provide distributions over judgment tokens, inviting a breadth of inference methods for extracting fine-grained preferences. We find that taking the mean of the judgment distribution consistently outperforms taking the mode (i.e. greedy decoding) in all evaluation settings (i.e. pointwise, pairwise, and listwise). We further explore novel methods of deriving preferences from judgment distributions, and find that methods incorporating risk aversion often improve performance. Lastly, we analyze LLM-as-a-judge paired with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, showing that CoT can collapse the spread of the judgment distribution, often harming performance. Our findings show that leveraging distributional output improves LLM-as-a-judge, as opposed to using the text interface alone.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable potential in natural language generation and instruction following, a persistent challenge lies in their susceptibility to "hallucinations", which erodes trust in their outputs. Although Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) presents a promising solution, its accurate implementation within the context of LLMs remains a significant hurdle. To address this critical roadblock, our research originates from a fundamental heuristic insight: tokens within auto-regressive LLM-generated text do not equally reflect the underlying meaning. Some tokens carry greater relevance and representativeness than others, owing to the phenomenon of "linguistic redundancy", wherein a select few keywords suffice to convey the essence of lengthy sentences. Regrettably, existing methodologies treat all tokens with equal importance when estimating uncertainty, disregarding these inherent generative inequalities. Our analysis reveals a significant issue with state-of-the-art: numerous tokens (and sentences) of limited semantic significance receive equal or even excessive weighting during uncertainty estimation. To rectify this bias, we propose to jointly Shifting Attention to more Relevant (SAR) components, at both the token- and the sentence-levels for accurate uncertainty estimation. We conduct extensive experiments involving a range of popular "off-the-shelf" LLMs, including instruction-tuned LLMs such as Vicuna, WizardLM, and LLaMA-2-chat, as well as pretrained LLMs like OPT and LLaMA, with model sizes extending up to 33B parameters. We carry out evaluation across various free-form question-answering tasks, encompassing domains such as reading comprehension, science Q&A, and medical Q&A. Our experimental results demonstrate the superior performance of SAR in addressing the challenges of uncertainty estimation within the realm of LLMs.

The task of Error Prediction, namely predicting whether a model output is correct, is commonly tackled with Uncertainty Quantification (UQ). However, while uncertainty metrics capture when models lack knowledge or capacity to make a prediction, they also reflect aleatoric uncertainty, which is inherent in the model input and context. This paper presents a method for improving error prediction for Large Language Models (LLMs), by disentangling input ambiguity from UQ signal. We conduct experiments on the task of Question Answering (QA) with six UQ metrics and show that UQ metrics are more predictive of errors on unambiguous instances than on questions with multiple plausible answers. We use Gated Experts and Selective Prediction to incorporate gold and predicted ambiguity labels into the error prediction pipeline. We find that ambiguity information improves error prediction scores across model families, training and evaluation paradigms, datasets (including allegedly unambiguous ones), and sources of aleatoric uncertainty, yielding improvements of over 10 points of PRR for individual UQ metrics on standard datasets.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) often suffer from context faithfulness hallucinations, where outputs deviate from retrieved information due to insufficient context utilization and high output uncertainty. Our uncertainty evaluation experiments reveal a strong correlation between high uncertainty and hallucinations. We hypothesize that attention mechanisms encode signals indicative of contextual utilization, validated through probing analysis. Based on these insights, we propose Dynamic Attention-Guided Context Decoding (DAGCD), a lightweight framework that integrates attention distributions and uncertainty signals in a single-pass decoding process. Experiments across QA datasets demonstrate DAGCD's effectiveness, achieving significant improvements in faithfulness and robustness while maintaining computational efficiency.

We train a 318M-parameter Transformer language model from scratch on a curated corpus of 1.56 billion tokens of pure Classical Chinese, with zero English characters or Arabic numerals. Through systematic out-of-distribution (OOD) testing, we investigate whether the model can distinguish known from unknown inputs, and crucially, whether it can express this distinction in its generated text. We find a clear dissociation between internal and external uncertainty. Internally, the model exhibits a perplexity jump ratio of 2.39x between real and fabricated historical events (p = 8.9e-11, n = 92 per group), with semi-fabricated events (real figures + fictional events) showing the highest perplexity (4.24x, p = 1.1e-16), demonstrating genuine factual encoding beyond syntactic pattern matching. Externally, however, the model never learns to express uncertainty: classical Chinese epistemic markers appear at lower rates for OOD questions (3.5%) than for in-distribution questions (8.3%, p = 0.023), reflecting rhetorical conventions rather than genuine metacognition. We replicate both findings across three languages (Classical Chinese, English, Japanese), three writing systems, and eight models from 110M to 1.56B parameters. We further show that uncertainty expression frequency is determined entirely by training data conventions, with Classical Chinese models showing a "humility paradox" (more hedging for known topics), while Japanese models almost never hedge. We argue that metacognitive expression -- the ability to say "I don't know" -- does not emerge from language modeling alone and requires explicit training signals such as RLHF.

Studying the responses of large language models (LLMs) to loopholes presents a two-fold opportunity. First, it affords us a lens through which to examine ambiguity and pragmatics in LLMs, since exploiting a loophole requires identifying ambiguity and performing sophisticated pragmatic reasoning. Second, loopholes pose an interesting and novel alignment problem where the model is presented with conflicting goals and can exploit ambiguities to its own advantage. To address these questions, we design scenarios where LLMs are given a goal and an ambiguous user instruction in conflict with the goal, with scenarios covering scalar implicature, structural ambiguities, and power dynamics. We then measure different models' abilities to exploit loopholes to satisfy their given goals as opposed to the goals of the user. We find that both closed-source and stronger open-source models can identify ambiguities and exploit their resulting loopholes, presenting a potential AI safety risk. Our analysis indicates that models which exploit loopholes explicitly identify and reason about both ambiguity and conflicting goals.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into high-stakes decision-making, the ability to reliably quantify uncertainty has become a critical requirement for safety and trust. However, current uncertainty quantification methods primarily operate at the output level, often failing to distinguish whether uncertainty arises from the model's lack of knowledge or from ambiguity in the user's input. While input-centric uncertainty quantification has recently emerged as a promising direction, it remains relatively underexplored and typically relies on coarse, input-level information. Consequently, users are provided with scalar uncertainty scores that offer little actionable guidance on which parts of the input should be clarified to improve reliability. To address this limitation, we propose Shapley-based input uncertainty Quantification (ShaQ), a framework for span-level attribution of input-induced uncertainty. Our approach models ambiguous spans in the input as players in a cooperative game and quantifies their contributions using Shapley values, defined via the weighted average of marginal reductions in conditional entropy obtained by clarifying each span coalition. Unlike existing input-level approaches, our formulation captures complex interactions among spans and provides a principled decomposition in which individual attributions sum exactly to the total input-induced uncertainty. We evaluate ShaQ on the AmbigQA and AmbiEnt benchmarks, where it achieves state-of-the-art performance in ambiguity detection. We further demonstrate its utility on MediTOD, showing that ShaQ can localize under-specified clinical utterances and facilitate human-AI collaboration in high-stakes settings. Overall, ShaQ improves uncertainty estimation and provides actionable insights for targeted input clarification.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across diverse tasks by encoding vast amounts of factual knowledge. However, they are still prone to hallucinations, generating incorrect or misleading information, often accompanied by high uncertainty. Existing methods for hallucination detection primarily focus on quantifying internal uncertainty, which arises from missing or conflicting knowledge within the model. However, hallucinations can also stem from external uncertainty, where ambiguous user queries lead to multiple possible interpretations. In this work, we introduce Semantic Volume, a novel mathematical measure for quantifying both external and internal uncertainty in LLMs. Our approach perturbs queries and responses, embeds them in a semantic space, and computes the determinant of the Gram matrix of the embedding vectors, capturing their dispersion as a measure of uncertainty. Our framework provides a generalizable and unsupervised uncertainty detection method without requiring white-box access to LLMs. We conduct extensive experiments on both external and internal uncertainty detection, demonstrating that our Semantic Volume method consistently outperforms existing baselines in both tasks. Additionally, we provide theoretical insights linking our measure to differential entropy, unifying and extending previous sampling-based uncertainty measures such as the semantic entropy. Semantic Volume is shown to be a robust and interpretable approach to improving the reliability of LLMs by systematically detecting uncertainty in both user queries and model responses.

The common approach to communicate a large language model's (LLM) uncertainty is to add a percentage number or a hedging word to its response. But is this all we can do? Instead of generating a single answer and then hedging it, an LLM that is fully transparent to the user needs to be able to reflect on its internal belief distribution and output a summary of all options it deems possible, and how likely they are. To test whether LLMs possess this capability, we develop the SelfReflect metric, an information-theoretic distance between a given summary and a distribution over answers. In interventional and human studies, we find that SelfReflect indicates even slight deviations, yielding a fine measure of faithfulness between a summary string and an LLM's actual internal distribution over answers. With SelfReflect, we make a resounding negative observation: modern LLMs are, across the board, incapable of revealing what they are uncertain about, neither through reasoning, nor chains-of-thoughts, nor explicit finetuning. However, we do find that LLMs are able to generate faithful summaries of their uncertainties if we help them by sampling multiple outputs and feeding them back into the context. This simple approach shines a light at the universal way of communicating LLM uncertainties whose future development the SelfReflect score enables.

Large language models often produce hallucinated answers that violate prompt-level constraints. A key diagnostic question is whether these failures reflect missing knowledge, or whether the model has the relevant information but follows the wrong inference path. We study this phenomenon as inference misalignment: a mismatch between the answer supported by the prompt and the answer favored by statistically salient latent associations. We formalize this view with a latent key-task model, in which pretraining-frequency imbalance can cause a shortcut path to dominate the constraint-sensitive path and induce positive inference loss. The framework predicts two failure modes: task-retrieval bias in entity disambiguation and key-selection bias in action choice. We introduce TrapQA, a controlled diagnostic testbed with two components. ScientistQA tests disambiguation among similar scientists with supplementary factual probes, while Real-Life Constrained QA tests everyday constraint following under salient shortcuts. Our results show that hallucination can arise from biased latent inference rather than absent knowledge alone.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

Ambiguity resolution is a key challenge in multimodal machine translation (MMT), where models must genuinely leverage visual input to map an ambiguous expression to its intended meaning. Although prior work has proposed disambiguation-oriented benchmarks that provide supportive evidence for the role of vision, we observe substantial issues in data quality and a mismatch with translation scenarios. Moreover, existing ambiguity-oriented evaluations are not well suited to broader ambiguity types in open-ended translation. To address these limitations, we present VIDA (Visually-Dependent Ambiguity), a dataset of 2,500 carefully curated instances in which resolving an annotated ambiguous source span requires visual evidence. We further propose Disambiguation-Centric Metrics that use an LLM-as-a-judge classifier to verify whether annotated ambiguous expressions are resolved correctly at the span level. Experiments with two state-of-the-art Large Vision Language Models under vanilla inference, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and our chain-of-thought SFT (CoT-SFT) show that while SFT improves overall translation quality, CoT-SFT yields more consistent gains in disambiguation accuracy, especially on out-of-distribution subsets, indicating a stronger generalization for resolving diverse ambiguity types.

Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant potential for data annotation, markedly reducing the labor costs associated with downstream applications. However, existing methods mostly adopt an aggressive strategy by prompting LLM to determine a single gold label for each unlabeled sample. Due to the inherent uncertainty within LLMs, they often produce incorrect labels for difficult samples, severely compromising the data quality for downstream applications. Motivated by ambiguity aversion in human behaviors, we propose a novel candidate annotation paradigm wherein large language models are encouraged to output all possible labels when incurring uncertainty. To ensure unique labels are provided for downstream tasks, we develop a teacher-student framework CanDist that distills candidate annotations with a Small Language Model (SLM). We further provide a rigorous justification demonstrating that distilling candidate annotations from the teacher LLM offers superior theoretical guarantees compared to directly using single annotations. Extensive experiments across six text classification tasks validate the effectiveness of our proposed method. The source code is available at https://github.com/MingxuanXia/CanDist.

Visual Question Answering (VQA) is a core task for evaluating the capabilities of Vision-Language Models (VLMs). Existing VQA benchmarks primarily feature clear and unambiguous image-question pairs, whereas real-world scenarios often involve varying degrees of ambiguity that require nuanced reasoning and context-appropriate response strategies. Although recent studies have begun to address ambiguity in VQA, they lack (1) a systematic categorization of ambiguity levels and (2) datasets and models that support strategy-aware responses. In this paper, we introduce Ambiguous Visual Question Answering (AQuA), a fine-grained dataset that classifies ambiguous VQA instances into four levels according to the nature and degree of ambiguity, along with the optimal response strategy for each case. Our evaluation of diverse open-source and proprietary VLMs shows that most models fail to adapt their strategy to the ambiguity type, frequently producing overconfident answers rather than seeking clarification or acknowledging uncertainty. To address this challenge, we fine-tune VLMs on AQuA, enabling them to adaptively choose among multiple response strategies, such as directly answering, inferring intent from contextual cues, listing plausible alternatives, or requesting clarification. VLMs trained on AQuA achieve strategic response generation for ambiguous VQA, demonstrating the ability to recognize ambiguity, manage uncertainty, and respond with context-appropriate strategies, while outperforming both open-source and closed-source baselines.

Humans possess multimodal literacy, allowing them to actively integrate information from various modalities to form reasoning. Faced with challenges like lexical ambiguity in text, we supplement this with other modalities, such as thumbnail images or textbook illustrations. Is it possible for machines to achieve a similar multimodal understanding capability? In response, we present Understanding Pun with Image Explanations (UNPIE), a novel benchmark designed to assess the impact of multimodal inputs in resolving lexical ambiguities. Puns serve as the ideal subject for this evaluation due to their intrinsic ambiguity. Our dataset includes 1,000 puns, each accompanied by an image that explains both meanings. We pose three multimodal challenges with the annotations to assess different aspects of multimodal literacy; Pun Grounding, Disambiguation, and Reconstruction. The results indicate that various Socratic Models and Visual-Language Models improve over the text-only models when given visual context, particularly as the complexity of the tasks increases.

In recent years, large-scale transformer decoders such as the GPT-x family of models have become increasingly popular. Studies examining the behavior of these models tend to focus only on the output of the language modeling head and avoid analysis of the internal states of the transformer decoder. In this study, we present a collection of methods to analyze the hidden states of GPT-2 and use the model's navigation of garden path sentences as a case study. To enable this, we compile the largest currently available dataset of garden path sentences. We show that Manhattan distances and cosine similarities provide more reliable insights compared to established surprisal methods that analyze next-token probabilities computed by a language modeling head. Using these methods, we find that negating tokens have minimal impacts on the model's representations for unambiguous forms of sentences with ambiguity solely over what the object of a verb is, but have a more substantial impact of representations for unambiguous sentences whose ambiguity would stem from the voice of a verb. Further, we find that analyzing the decoder model's hidden states reveals periods of ambiguity that might conclude in a garden path effect but happen not to, whereas surprisal analyses routinely miss this detail.

A robust decision-making process must take into account uncertainty, especially when the choice involves inherent risks. Because artificial intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly integrated into decision-making workflows, managing uncertainty relies more and more on the metacognitive capabilities of these systems; i.e, their ability to assess the reliability of and regulate their own decisions. Hence, it is crucial to employ robust methods to measure the metacognitive abilities of AI. This paper is primarily a methodological contribution arguing for the adoption of the meta-d' framework as the gold standard for assessing the metacognitive sensitivity of AIs--the ability to generate confidence ratings that distinguish correct from incorrect responses. Moreover, we propose to leverage signal detection theory (SDT) to measure the ability of AIs to spontaneously regulate their decisions based on uncertainty and risk. To demonstrate the practical utility of these psychophysical frameworks, we conduct two series of experiments on three large language models (LLMs)--GPT-5, DeepSeek-V3.2-Exp, and Mistral-Medium-2508.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) have led to strong performance in open-domain question answering (QA). However, existing models still struggle with questions that admit multiple valid answers. Standard QA benchmarks, which typically assume a single gold answer, overlook this reality and thus produce inappropriate training signals. Existing attempts to handle ambiguity often rely on costly manual annotation, which is difficult to scale to multi-hop datasets such as HotpotQA and MuSiQue. In this paper, we present A^2Search, an annotation-free, end-to-end training framework to recognize and handle ambiguity. At its core is an automated pipeline that detects ambiguous questions and gathers alternative answers via trajectory sampling and evidence verification. The model is then optimized with RL using a carefully designed AnsF1 reward, which naturally accommodates multiple answers. Experiments on eight open-domain QA benchmarks demonstrate that A^2Search achieves new state-of-the-art performance. With only a single rollout, A^2Search-7B yields an average AnsF1@1 score of 48.4% across four multi-hop benchmarks, outperforming all strong baselines, including the substantially larger ReSearch-32B (46.2%). Extensive analyses further show that A^2Search resolves ambiguity and generalizes across benchmarks, highlighting that embracing ambiguity is essential for building more reliable QA systems. Our code, data, and model weights can be found at https://github.com/zfj1998/A2Search

Surprisal theory links human processing effort to the predictability of an upcoming linguistic unit, but empirical work often leaves the notion of a unit underspecified. In practice, experimental stimuli are segmented into linguistically motivated units (e.g., words), while pretrained language models assign probability mass to a fixed token alphabet that typically does not align with those units. As a result, surprisal-based predictors depend implicitly on ad hoc procedures that conflate two distinct modeling choices: the definition of the unit of analysis and the choice of regions of interest over which predictions are evaluated. In this paper, we disentangle these choices and give a unified framework for reasoning about surprisal over arbitrary unit inventories. We argue that surprisal-based analyses should make these choices explicit and treat tokenization as an implementation detail rather than a scientific primitive.

This paper investigates the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in the context of understanding their own knowledge and measuring their uncertainty. We argue this is an important feature for mitigating hallucinations. Specifically, we focus on addressing known-unknown questions, characterized by high uncertainty due to the absence of definitive answers. To facilitate our study, we collect a dataset with new Known-Unknown Questions (KUQ) and propose a novel categorization scheme to elucidate the sources of uncertainty. Subsequently, we assess the LLMs' ability to differentiate between known and unknown questions and classify them accordingly. Moreover, we evaluate the quality of their answers in an Open-Ended QA setting. To quantify the uncertainty expressed in the answers, we create a semantic evaluation method that measures the model's accuracy in expressing uncertainty between known vs unknown questions.

Integrating web search tools has significantly extended the capability of LLMs to address open-world, real-time, and long-tail problems. However, evaluating these Search Agents presents formidable challenges. First, constructing high-quality deep search benchmarks is prohibitively expensive, while unverified synthetic data often suffers from unreliable sources. Second, static benchmarks face dynamic obsolescence: as internet information evolves, complex queries requiring deep research often degrade into simple retrieval tasks due to increased popularity, and ground truths become outdated due to temporal shifts. Third, attribution ambiguity confounds evaluation, as an agent's performance is often dominated by its parametric memory rather than its actual search and reasoning capabilities. Finally, reliance on specific commercial search engines introduces variability that hampers reproducibility. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework, Mind-ParaWorld, for evaluating Search Agents in a Parallel World. Specifically, MPW samples real-world entity names to synthesize future scenarios and questions situated beyond the model's knowledge cutoff. A ParaWorld Law Model then constructs a set of indivisible Atomic Facts and a unique ground-truth for each question. During evaluation, instead of retrieving real-world results, the agent interacts with a ParaWorld Engine Model that dynamically generates SERPs grounded in these inviolable Atomic Facts. We release MPW-Bench, an interactive benchmark spanning 19 domains with 1,608 instances. Experiments across three evaluation settings show that, while search agents are strong at evidence synthesis given complete information, their performance is limited not only by evidence collection and coverage in unfamiliar search environments, but also by unreliable evidence sufficiency judgment and when-to-stop decisions-bottlenecks.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) must resolve conflicts when different modalities provide contradictory information, a process we term modality following. Prior work measured this behavior only with coarse dataset-level statistics, overlooking the influence of model's confidence in unimodal reasoning. In this paper, we introduce a new framework that decomposes modality following into two fundamental factors: relative reasoning uncertainty (the case-specific confidence gap between unimodal predictions) and inherent modality preference( a model's stable bias when uncertainties are balanced). To validate this framework, we construct a controllable dataset that systematically varies the reasoning difficulty of visual and textual inputs. Using entropy as a fine-grained uncertainty metric, we uncover a universal law: the probability of following a modality decreases monotonically as its relative uncertainty increases. At the relative difficulty level where the model tends to follow both modalities with comparable probability what we call the balance point, a practical indicator of the model's inherent preference. Unlike traditional macro-level ratios, this measure offers a more principled and less confounded way to characterize modality bias, disentangling it from unimodal capabilities and dataset artifacts. Further, by probing layer-wise predictions, we reveal the internal mechanism of oscillation: in ambiguous regions near the balance point, models vacillate between modalities across layers, explaining externally observed indecision. Together, these findings establish relative uncertainty and inherent preference as the two governing principles of modality following, offering both a quantitative framework and mechanistic insight into how MLLMs resolve conflicting information.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely documented to be sensitive to minor prompt perturbations and prone to sycophantic alignment with user biases, their robustness in consequential, rule-bound decision-making remains under-explored. In this work, we uncover a striking "Paradox of Robustness": despite their known lexical brittleness, instruction-tuned LLMs exhibit a behavioral and near-total invariance to emotional framing effects. Using a novel controlled perturbation framework across three high-stakes domains (healthcare, law, and finance), we quantify a robustness gap where LLMs demonstrate 110-300 times greater resistance to narrative manipulation than human subjects. Specifically, we find a near-zero effect size for models (Cohen's h = 0.003) compared to the substantial biases observed in humans (Cohen's h in [0.3, 0.8]). This result is highly counterintuitive and suggests the mechanisms driving sycophancy and prompt sensitivity do not necessarily translate to a failure in logical constraint satisfaction. We show that this invariance persists across models with diverse training paradigms. Our findings show that while LLMs may be "brittle" to how a query is formatted, they are remarkably "stable" against why a decision should be biased. Our findings establish that instruction-tuned models can decouple logical rule-adherence from persuasive narratives, offering a source of decision stability that complements, and even potentially de-biases, human judgment in institutional contexts. We release the 162-scenario benchmark, code, and data to facilitate the rigorous evaluation of narrative-induced bias and robustness on GitHub.com.

A growing body of work makes use of probing to investigate the working of neural models, often considered black boxes. Recently, an ongoing debate emerged surrounding the limitations of the probing paradigm. In this work, we point out the inability to infer behavioral conclusions from probing results and offer an alternative method that focuses on how the information is being used, rather than on what information is encoded. Our method, Amnesic Probing, follows the intuition that the utility of a property for a given task can be assessed by measuring the influence of a causal intervention that removes it from the representation. Equipped with this new analysis tool, we can ask questions that were not possible before, e.g. is part-of-speech information important for word prediction? We perform a series of analyses on BERT to answer these types of questions. Our findings demonstrate that conventional probing performance is not correlated to task importance, and we call for increased scrutiny of claims that draw behavioral or causal conclusions from probing results.

This paper focuses on the challenge of answering questions in scenarios that are composed of rich and complex dynamic audio-visual components. Although existing Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) can respond to audio-visual content, these responses are sometimes ambiguous and fail to describe specific audio-visual events. To overcome this limitation, we introduce the CAT, which enhances MLLM in three ways: 1) besides straightforwardly bridging audio and video, we design a clue aggregator that aggregates question-related clues in dynamic audio-visual scenarios to enrich the detailed knowledge required for large language models. 2) CAT is trained on a mixed multimodal dataset, allowing direct application in audio-visual scenarios. Notably, we collect an audio-visual joint instruction dataset named AVinstruct, to further enhance the capacity of CAT to model cross-semantic correlations. 3) we propose AI-assisted ambiguity-aware direct preference optimization, a strategy specialized in retraining the model to favor the non-ambiguity response and improve the ability to localize specific audio-visual objects. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that CAT outperforms existing methods on multimodal tasks, especially in Audio-Visual Question Answering (AVQA) tasks. The codes and the collected instructions are released at https://github.com/rikeilong/Bay-CAT.

Human processing of idioms relies on understanding the contextual sentences in which idioms occur, as well as language-intrinsic features such as frequency and speaker-intrinsic factors like familiarity. While LLMs have shown high performance on idiomaticity detection tasks, this success may be attributed to reasoning shortcuts in existing datasets. To this end, we construct a novel, controlled contrastive dataset designed to test whether LLMs can effectively use context to disambiguate idiomatic meaning. Additionally, we explore how collocational frequency and sentence probability influence model performance. Our findings reveal that LLMs often fail to resolve idiomaticity when it is required to attend to the surrounding context, and that models perform better on sentences that have higher likelihood. The collocational frequency of expressions also impacts performance. We make our code and dataset publicly available.

We investigate whether large language models can introspect on their internal states. It is difficult to answer this question through conversation alone, as genuine introspection cannot be distinguished from confabulations. Here, we address this challenge by injecting representations of known concepts into a model's activations, and measuring the influence of these manipulations on the model's self-reported states. We find that models can, in certain scenarios, notice the presence of injected concepts and accurately identify them. Models demonstrate some ability to recall prior internal representations and distinguish them from raw text inputs. Strikingly, we find that some models can use their ability to recall prior intentions in order to distinguish their own outputs from artificial prefills. In all these experiments, Claude Opus 4 and 4.1, the most capable models we tested, generally demonstrate the greatest introspective awareness; however, trends across models are complex and sensitive to post-training strategies. Finally, we explore whether models can explicitly control their internal representations, finding that models can modulate their activations when instructed or incentivized to "think about" a concept. Overall, our results indicate that current language models possess some functional introspective awareness of their own internal states. We stress that in today's models, this capacity is highly unreliable and context-dependent; however, it may continue to develop with further improvements to model capabilities.

Navigating high-stakes dilemmas involving conflicting values is challenging even for humans, let alone for AI. Yet prior work in evaluating the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in such situations has been limited to everyday scenarios. To close this gap, this work first introduces CLASH (Character perspective-based LLM Assessments in Situations with High-stakes), a meticulously curated dataset consisting of 345 high-impact dilemmas along with 3,795 individual perspectives of diverse values. In particular, we design CLASH in a way to support the study of critical aspects of value-based decision-making processes which are missing from prior work, including understanding decision ambivalence and psychological discomfort as well as capturing the temporal shifts of values in characters' perspectives. By benchmarking 10 open and closed frontier models, we uncover several key findings. (1) Even the strongest models, such as GPT-4o and Claude-Sonnet, achieve less than 50% accuracy in identifying situations where the decision should be ambivalent, while they perform significantly better in clear-cut scenarios. (2) While LLMs reasonably predict psychological discomfort as marked by human, they inadequately comprehend perspectives involving value shifts, indicating a need for LLMs to reason over complex values. (3) Our experiments also reveal a significant correlation between LLMs' value preferences and their steerability towards a given value. (4) Finally, LLMs exhibit greater steerability when engaged in value reasoning from a third-party perspective, compared to a first-person setup, though certain value pairs benefit uniquely from the first-person framing.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation equips large language models with the capability to retrieve external knowledge, thereby mitigating hallucinations by incorporating information beyond the model's intrinsic abilities. However, most prior works have focused on invoking retrieval deterministically, which makes it unsuitable for tasks such as long-form question answering. Instead, dynamically performing retrieval by invoking it only when the underlying LLM lacks the required knowledge can be more efficient. In this context, we delve deeper into the question, "To Retrieve or Not to Retrieve?" by exploring multiple uncertainty detection methods. We evaluate these methods for the task of long-form question answering, employing dynamic retrieval, and present our comparisons. Our findings suggest that uncertainty detection metrics, such as Degree Matrix Jaccard and Eccentricity, can reduce the number of retrieval calls by almost half, with only a slight reduction in question-answering accuracy.

Retrieval-augmented language models are being increasingly tasked with subjective, contentious, and conflicting queries such as "is aspartame linked to cancer". To resolve these ambiguous queries, one must search through a large range of websites and consider "which, if any, of this evidence do I find convincing?". In this work, we study how LLMs answer this question. In particular, we construct ConflictingQA, a dataset that pairs controversial queries with a series of real-world evidence documents that contain different facts (e.g., quantitative results), argument styles (e.g., appeals to authority), and answers (Yes or No). We use this dataset to perform sensitivity and counterfactual analyses to explore which text features most affect LLM predictions. Overall, we find that current models rely heavily on the relevance of a website to the query, while largely ignoring stylistic features that humans find important such as whether a text contains scientific references or is written with a neutral tone. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of RAG corpus quality (e.g., the need to filter misinformation), and possibly even a shift in how LLMs are trained to better align with human judgements.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

Ambiguity remains a fundamental challenge in Natural Language Processing (NLP) due to the inherent complexity and flexibility of human language. With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), addressing ambiguity has become even more critical due to their expanded capabilities and applications. In the context of Conversational Question Answering (CQA), this paper explores the definition, forms, and implications of ambiguity for language driven systems, particularly in the context of LLMs. We define key terms and concepts, categorize various disambiguation approaches enabled by LLMs, and provide a comparative analysis of their advantages and disadvantages. We also explore publicly available datasets for benchmarking ambiguity detection and resolution techniques and highlight their relevance for ongoing research. Finally, we identify open problems and future research directions, proposing areas for further investigation. By offering a comprehensive review of current research on ambiguities and disambiguation with LLMs, we aim to contribute to the development of more robust and reliable language systems.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a widely adopted approach for enhancing LLMs in scenarios that demand extensive factual knowledge. However, current RAG evaluations concentrate primarily on correctness, which may not fully capture the impact of retrieval on LLM uncertainty and reliability. To bridge this gap, we introduce URAG, a comprehensive benchmark designed to assess the uncertainty of RAG systems across various fields like healthcare, programming, science, math, and general text. By reformulating open-ended generation tasks into multiple-choice question answering, URAG allows for principled uncertainty quantification via conformal prediction. We apply the evaluation pipeline to 8 standard RAG methods, measuring their performance through both accuracy and prediction-set sizes based on LAC and APS metrics. Our analysis shows that (1) accuracy gains often coincide with reduced uncertainty, but this relationship breaks under retrieval noise; (2) simple modular RAG methods tend to offer better accuracy-uncertainty trade-offs than more complex reasoning pipelines; and (3) no single RAG approach is universally reliable across domains. We further show that (4) retrieval depth, parametric knowledge dependence, and exposure to confidence cues can amplify confident errors and hallucinations. Ultimately, URAG establishes a systematic benchmark for analyzing and enhancing the trustworthiness of retrieval-augmented systems. Our code is available on GitHub.

In-context learning enables large language models (LLMs) to perform a variety of tasks, including learning to make reward-maximizing choices in simple bandit tasks. Given their potential use as (autonomous) decision-making agents, it is important to understand how these models perform such reinforcement learning (RL) tasks and the extent to which they are susceptible to biases. Motivated by the fact that, in humans, it has been widely documented that the value of an outcome depends on how it compares to other local outcomes, the present study focuses on whether similar value encoding biases apply to how LLMs encode rewarding outcomes. Results from experiments with multiple bandit tasks and models show that LLMs exhibit behavioral signatures of a relative value bias. Adding explicit outcome comparisons to the prompt produces opposing effects on performance, enhancing maximization in trained choice sets but impairing generalization to new choice sets. Computational cognitive modeling reveals that LLM behavior is well-described by a simple RL algorithm that incorporates relative values at the outcome encoding stage. Lastly, we present preliminary evidence that the observed biases are not limited to fine-tuned LLMs, and that relative value processing is detectable in the final hidden layer activations of a raw, pretrained model. These findings have important implications for the use of LLMs in decision-making applications.

Methods for understanding the decisions of and mechanisms underlying deep neural networks (DNNs) typically rely on building intuition by emphasizing sensory or semantic features of individual examples. For instance, methods aim to visualize the components of an input which are "important" to a network's decision, or to measure the semantic properties of single neurons. Here, we argue that interpretability research suffers from an over-reliance on intuition-based approaches that risk-and in some cases have caused-illusory progress and misleading conclusions. We identify a set of limitations that we argue impede meaningful progress in interpretability research, and examine two popular classes of interpretability methods-saliency and single-neuron-based approaches-that serve as case studies for how overreliance on intuition and lack of falsifiability can undermine interpretability research. To address these concerns, we propose a strategy to address these impediments in the form of a framework for strongly falsifiable interpretability research. We encourage researchers to use their intuitions as a starting point to develop and test clear, falsifiable hypotheses, and hope that our framework yields robust, evidence-based interpretability methods that generate meaningful advances in our understanding of DNNs.

Commonly used evaluation measures including Recall, Precision, F-Measure and Rand Accuracy are biased and should not be used without clear understanding of the biases, and corresponding identification of chance or base case levels of the statistic. Using these measures a system that performs worse in the objective sense of Informedness, can appear to perform better under any of these commonly used measures. We discuss several concepts and measures that reflect the probability that prediction is informed versus chance. Informedness and introduce Markedness as a dual measure for the probability that prediction is marked versus chance. Finally we demonstrate elegant connections between the concepts of Informedness, Markedness, Correlation and Significance as well as their intuitive relationships with Recall and Precision, and outline the extension from the dichotomous case to the general multi-class case.

Modelling compositional meaning for sentences using empirical distributional methods has been a challenge for computational linguists. We implement the abstract categorical model of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) using data from the BNC and evaluate it. The implementation is based on unsupervised learning of matrices for relational words and applying them to the vectors of their arguments. The evaluation is based on the word disambiguation task developed by Mitchell and Lapata (2008) for intransitive sentences, and on a similar new experiment designed for transitive sentences. Our model matches the results of its competitors in the first experiment, and betters them in the second. The general improvement in results with increase in syntactic complexity showcases the compositional power of our model.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

As a part of an embodied agent, Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically used for behavior planning given natural language instructions from the user. However, dealing with ambiguous instructions in real-world environments remains a challenge for LLMs. Various methods for task ambiguity detection have been proposed. However, it is difficult to compare them because they are tested on different datasets and there is no universal benchmark. For this reason, we propose AmbiK (Ambiguous Tasks in Kitchen Environment), the fully textual dataset of ambiguous instructions addressed to a robot in a kitchen environment. AmbiK was collected with the assistance of LLMs and is human-validated. It comprises 1000 pairs of ambiguous tasks and their unambiguous counterparts, categorized by ambiguity type (Human Preferences, Common Sense Knowledge, Safety), with environment descriptions, clarifying questions and answers, user intents, and task plans, for a total of 2000 tasks. We hope that AmbiK will enable researchers to perform a unified comparison of ambiguity detection methods. AmbiK is available at https://github.com/cog-model/AmbiK-dataset.

Large Language Models are known to capture real-world knowledge, allowing them to excel in many downstream tasks. Despite recent advances, these models are still prone to what are commonly known as hallucinations, causing them to emit unwanted and factually incorrect text. In this work, we propose a novel calibration method that can be used to combat hallucinations. We add a special [IDK] ("I don't know") token to the model's vocabulary and introduce an objective function that shifts probability mass to the [IDK] token for incorrect predictions. This approach allows the model to express uncertainty in its output explicitly. We evaluate our proposed method across multiple model architectures and factual downstream tasks. We find that models trained with our method are able to express uncertainty in places where they would previously make mistakes while suffering only a small loss of encoded knowledge. We further perform extensive ablation studies of multiple variations of our approach and provide a detailed analysis of the precision-recall tradeoff of our method.

In this position paper, we argue that human evaluation of generative large language models (LLMs) should be a multidisciplinary undertaking that draws upon insights from disciplines such as user experience research and human behavioral psychology to ensure that the experimental design and results are reliable. The conclusions from these evaluations, thus, must consider factors such as usability, aesthetics, and cognitive biases. We highlight how cognitive biases can conflate fluent information and truthfulness, and how cognitive uncertainty affects the reliability of rating scores such as Likert. Furthermore, the evaluation should differentiate the capabilities and weaknesses of increasingly powerful large language models -- which requires effective test sets. The scalability of human evaluation is also crucial to wider adoption. Hence, to design an effective human evaluation system in the age of generative NLP, we propose the ConSiDERS-The-Human evaluation framework consisting of 6 pillars -- Consistency, Scoring Criteria, Differentiating, User Experience, Responsible, and Scalability.

AI-assisted coding increasingly translates informal user intent into executable software, yet coding requests often contain ambiguities that recur in user-specific ways across tasks and sessions. Existing disambiguation methods typically address each ambiguous request in isolation within the current coding session, often through eliciting additional clarification. However, whether resolved session history from the same user can serve as memory for resolving recurring personalized ambiguity in a newly opened session remains underexplored. We formulate personalized ambiguity adaptation as a new task: given a user's previously resolved coding sessions and a new ambiguous request, an assistant should identify the recurring ambiguity pattern, produce the intended executable solution, and minimize clarification. To benchmark this task, we introduce CAPA, which characterizes personalized coding ambiguity through six mechanisms and injects these mechanisms into unambiguous executable tasks using a controlled three-stage generation pipeline. CAPA contains 600 coding sessions across 60 balanced user--ambiguity cells, including 300 held-out evaluation sessions. We evaluate 12 recent LLMs under no-history and same-user-history conditions using executable success, first-turn success, and turns-to-completion. Our analyses examine task difficulty, user identity, and memory-based history use, and we further propose same-user history gating as a lightweight inference-time method. CAPA provides a foundation for developing long-term coding assistants that better align generated code with user intent while reducing repeated clarification.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

Language model users often issue queries that lack specification, where the context under which a query was issued -- such as the user's identity, the query's intent, and the criteria for a response to be useful -- is not explicit. For instance, a good response to a subjective query like "What book should I read next?" would depend on the user's preferences, and a good response to an open-ended query like "How do antibiotics work against bacteria?" would depend on the user's expertise. This makes evaluation of responses to such queries an ill-posed task, as evaluators may make arbitrary judgments about the response quality. To remedy this, we present contextualized evaluations, a protocol that synthetically constructs context surrounding an underspecified query and provides it during evaluation. We find that the presence of context can 1) alter conclusions drawn from evaluation, even flipping win rates between model pairs, 2) nudge evaluators to make fewer judgments based on surface-level criteria, like style, and 3) provide new insights about model behavior across diverse contexts. Specifically, our procedure uncovers an implicit bias towards WEIRD contexts in models' "default" responses and we find that models are not equally sensitive to following different contexts, even when they are provided in prompts.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

The recent proliferation of research into transformer based natural language processing has led to a number of studies which attempt to detect the presence of human-like cognitive behavior in the models. We contend that, as is true of human psychology, the investigation of cognitive behavior in language models must be conducted in an appropriate population of an appropriate size for the results to be meaningful. We leverage work in uncertainty estimation in a novel approach to efficiently construct experimental populations. The resultant tool, PopulationLM, has been made open source. We provide theoretical grounding in the uncertainty estimation literature and motivation from current cognitive work regarding language models. We discuss the methodological lessons from other scientific communities and attempt to demonstrate their application to two artificial population studies. Through population based experimentation we find that language models exhibit behavior consistent with typicality effects among categories highly represented in training. However, we find that language models don't tend to exhibit structural priming effects. Generally, our results show that single models tend to over estimate the presence of cognitive behaviors in neural models.

We find that explicit reasoning does not necessarily translate into better multimodal emotion recognition (MER) accuracy, even though it makes predictions more interpretable. Specifically, for reasoning-based MLLMs, fast thinking by triggering direct answers often outperforms slow thinking after deliberative reasoning. Our empirical analyses show that fast thinking improves recall with broader and more confident predictions, whereas slow thinking favors precision through conservative filtering of incorrect categories. Building on these insights, we propose MER-R1, a reinforcement learning framework that turns slow-fast complementarity into explicit optimization. Dual-objective disentanglement separates recall and precision into two optimization signals, allowing them to be jointly optimized rather than traded off against each other. Slow-fast confidence calibration further aligns the final slow-thinking answer with fast-thinking intuition, strengthening correct emotions while suppressing incorrect ones. In this way, MER-R1 unifies the recall-oriented intuition of fast thinking with the precision-oriented selectivity of slow thinking. We further provide theoretical justification for this synergy, showing that it mitigates variance-induced interference during optimization. Extensive experiments on MER-UniBench and MME-Emotion show that MER-R1 achieves state-of-the-art performance and makes reasoning genuinely benefit emotion recognition.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1 have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities, raising important questions about their biases in LLM-as-a-judge settings. We present a comprehensive benchmark comparing judging biases between LLMs and LRMs across both subjective preference-alignment datasets and objective fact-based datasets. Through investigation of bandwagon, authority, position, and distraction biases, we uncover four key findings: (1) despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, LRMs remain susceptible to the above biases; (2) LRMs demonstrate better robustness than LLMs specifically on fact-related datasets; (3) LRMs exhibit notable position bias, preferring options in later positions; and (4) we identify a novel "superficial reflection bias" where phrases mimicking reasoning (e.g., "wait, let me think...") significantly influence model judgments. To address these biases, we design and evaluate three mitigation strategies: specialized system prompts that reduce judging biases by up to 19\% in preference alignment datasets and 14\% in fact-related datasets, in-context learning that provides up to 27\% improvement on preference tasks but shows inconsistent results on factual tasks, and a self-reflection mechanism that reduces biases by up to 10\% in preference datasets and 16\% in fact-related datasets, with self-reflection proving particularly effective for LRMs. Our work provides crucial insights for developing more reliable LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks, especially as LRMs become increasingly deployed as automated judges.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

Large language models systematically fail when a salient surface cue conflicts with an unstated feasibility constraint. We study this through a diagnose-measure-bridge-treat framework. Causal-behavioral analysis of the ``car wash problem'' across six models reveals approximately context-independent sigmoid heuristics: the distance cue exerts 8.7 to 38 times more influence than the goal, and token-level attribution shows patterns more consistent with keyword associations than compositional inference. The Heuristic Override Benchmark (HOB) -- 500 instances spanning 4 heuristic by 5 constraint families with minimal pairs and explicitness gradients -- demonstrates generality across 14 models: under strict evaluation (10/10 correct), no model exceeds 75%, and presence constraints are hardest (44%). A minimal hint (e.g., emphasizing the key object) recovers +15 pp on average, suggesting the failure lies in constraint inference rather than missing knowledge; 12/14 models perform worse when the constraint is removed (up to -39 pp), revealing conservative bias. Parametric probes confirm that the sigmoid pattern generalizes to cost, efficiency, and semantic-similarity heuristics; goal-decomposition prompting recovers +6 to 9 pp by forcing models to enumerate preconditions before answering. Together, these results characterize heuristic override as a systematic reasoning vulnerability and provide a benchmark for measuring progress toward resolving it.

Most large language models are trained on linguistic input alone, yet humans appear to ground their understanding of words in sensorimotor experience. A natural solution is to augment LM representations with human judgments of a word's sensorimotor associations (e.g., the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms), but this raises another challenge: most words are ambiguous, and judgments of words in isolation fail to account for this multiplicity of meaning (e.g., "wooden table" vs. "data table"). We attempted to address this problem by building a new lexical resource of contextualized sensorimotor judgments for 112 English words, each rated in four different contexts (448 sentences total). We show that these ratings encode overlapping but distinct information from the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms, and that they also predict other measures of interest (e.g., relatedness), above and beyond measures derived from BERT. Beyond shedding light on theoretical questions, we suggest that these ratings could be of use as a "challenge set" for researchers building grounded language models.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-ended, real-world environments where inputs are messy, underspecified, and not always trustworthy. Unlike curated benchmarks, these settings frequently involve instructions that refer to missing objects or contradictory facts, rely on ambiguous references, or request infeasible actions. In such cases, success hinges not on task execution alone, but on a model's ability to detect when something is silently wrong. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how current MLLMs handle such implicit reasoning scenarios: cases where the flaw is not explicitly stated but must be inferred from context. Using a curated diagnostic suite spanning four categories of real-world failure modes, we evaluate six MLLMs, including o3 and GPT-4o, and find that models frequently fail to surface hidden issues, even when they possess the necessary perceptual and reasoning skills. Explicit prompting reveals that the underlying capabilities exist but are often suppressed in favor of user compliance. We further show that simple inference-time interventions, such as cautious persona prompting and, in particular, requiring a clarifying question, can dramatically recover performance. Our findings highlight a persistent gap between reasoning competence and behavioral compliance in current MLLMs and suggest practical strategies for making these models more trustworthy in underconstrained environments.

Large Language Model (LLM) hallucinations are usually treated as defects of the model or its decoding strategy. Drawing on classical linguistics, we argue that a query's form can also shape a listener's (and model's) response. We operationalize this insight by constructing a 22-dimension query feature vector covering clause complexity, lexical rarity, and anaphora, negation, answerability, and intention grounding, all known to affect human comprehension. Using 369,837 real-world queries, we ask: Are there certain types of queries that make hallucination more likely? A large-scale analysis reveals a consistent "risk landscape": certain features such as deep clause nesting and underspecification align with higher hallucination propensity. In contrast, clear intention grounding and answerability align with lower hallucination rates. Others, including domain specificity, show mixed, dataset- and model-dependent effects. Thus, these findings establish an empirically observable query-feature representation correlated with hallucination risk, paving the way for guided query rewriting and future intervention studies.

Current text-to-image (T2I) generation models achieve promising results, but they fail on the scenarios where the knowledge implied in the text prompt is uncertain. For example, a T2I model released in February would struggle to generate a suitable poster for a movie premiering in April, because the character designs and styles are uncertain to the model. To solve this problem, we propose an Internet-Augmented text-to-image generation (IA-T2I) framework to compel T2I models clear about such uncertain knowledge by providing them with reference images. Specifically, an active retrieval module is designed to determine whether a reference image is needed based on the given text prompt; a hierarchical image selection module is introduced to find the most suitable image returned by an image search engine to enhance the T2I model; a self-reflection mechanism is presented to continuously evaluate and refine the generated image to ensure faithful alignment with the text prompt. To evaluate the proposed framework's performance, we collect a dataset named Img-Ref-T2I, where text prompts include three types of uncertain knowledge: (1) known but rare. (2) unknown. (3) ambiguous. Moreover, we carefully craft a complex prompt to guide GPT-4o in making preference evaluation, which has been shown to have an evaluation accuracy similar to that of human preference evaluation. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework, outperforming GPT-4o by about 30% in human evaluation.

Experiments probing natural language processing by both humans and LLMs suggest that the meaning of a semantic expression is indeterminate prior to the act of interpretation rather than being specifiable simply as the sum of its parts (i.e. compositionality). This observer-dependent act dynamically actualizes meaning under genuine contextuality more consistent with quantum logical mechanisms than with classical Boolean approaches that assume separability, motivating an approach to language modeling that utilizes a Hilbert space formalism. In this work, we introduce Phase-Associative Memory (PAM) -- a complex-valued sequence model whose state S_t \in C^{d \times d} accumulates outer products of complex token embeddings retrieved through the conjugate inner product Relangle K mid Qrangle / d -- and evaluate it against a structurally matched real-valued ablation. Both architectures train stably across a 5M--100M parameter sweep on WikiText-103 under identical conditions; PAM sits at higher absolute loss at every measured scale but improves more rapidly with parameter count, with power-law exponents of -0.15 vs.\ -0.12 in loss and -0.65 vs.\ -0.49 in perplexity that narrow the gap between the two architectures monotonically. Further investigation of complex-valued sequence modeling at larger scales could reveal that the loss plateau characteristic of real-valued state-of-the-art language models (e.g. transformers) is reachable with PAM-style architectures with an order of magnitude fewer parameters than the current frontier (sim1T), implying that similar capabilities are achievable at sizes runnable on consumer-grade hardware.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to meet user information needs, but their effectiveness in dealing with user queries that contain various types of ambiguity remains unknown, ultimately risking user trust and satisfaction. To this end, we introduce CLAMBER, a benchmark for evaluating LLMs using a well-organized taxonomy. Building upon the taxonomy, we construct ~12K high-quality data to assess the strengths, weaknesses, and potential risks of various off-the-shelf LLMs. Our findings indicate the limited practical utility of current LLMs in identifying and clarifying ambiguous user queries, even enhanced by chain-of-thought (CoT) and few-shot prompting. These techniques may result in overconfidence in LLMs and yield only marginal enhancements in identifying ambiguity. Furthermore, current LLMs fall short in generating high-quality clarifying questions due to a lack of conflict resolution and inaccurate utilization of inherent knowledge. In this paper, CLAMBER presents a guidance and promotes further research on proactive and trustworthy LLMs. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/zt991211/CLAMBER

Long-term memory systems store what a user says in an external store and retrieve it when a related query arrives. This interface rests on an assumption so natural that it is rarely stated: a memory that is needed will resemble the query that needs it. World knowledge breaks the assumption. A tree-nut allergy should change the answer to a macaron request through their almond-flour ingredient, yet the two texts share no cue a retriever can see. We call this failure mode the implicit-association blind spot and introduce InMind, a 125-task, expert-verified benchmark spanning ten life domains, with 113 tasks grounded in citable public sources. Its paired controls separate three explanations that existing evaluations conflate: the fact was never stored, the model lacks the bridging knowledge, or the fact was stored and never surfaced. The verdict is clean. With the decisive memory placed in context, the backbone answers 84.0 percent of indirect queries; when the same memory must be retrieved, six vector, graph, and agentic memory systems reach at most 14.4 percent, even though they recall the same facts on demand at up to 100 percent. An embedding with eight times the dimensionality raises answer-blind target recall for every system yet leaves the gap essentially intact. A minimal diagnostic probe that keeps memory visible before the query arrives recovers most of the gap, locating the failure in the query-conditioned interface itself and pointing to routing, deciding which facts must stay visible, as the open problem InMind is built to score.

Recent advances in large reasoning models have enabled complex, step-by-step reasoning but often introduce significant overthinking, resulting in verbose and redundant outputs that hinder efficiency. In this study, we examine whether explicit self-reflection, signaled by tokens such as "Wait" and "Hmm", is necessary for advanced reasoning. We propose NoWait, a simple yet effective approach that disables explicit self-reflection by suppressing these tokens during inference. Extensive experiments on ten benchmarks across textual, visual, and video reasoning tasks show that NoWait reduces chain-of-thought trajectory length by up to 27%-51% in five R1-style model series, without compromising model utility. NoWait thus offers a plug-and-play solution for efficient and utility-preserving multimodal reasoning.

A long-standing finding in the causal learning literature is that adults struggle to identify conjunctive causal rules, where an effect requires the simultaneous presence of multiple causes, while performing better in disjunctive settings. However, most demonstrations of this ``conjunctive handicap'' rely on passive observation paradigms with limited evidence, where learners have no control over evidence generation. This paper asks whether this bias persists when adults are granted agency through active exploration. Using a modified ``blicket detector'' task, adult participants freely intervened to identify causal objects under conjunctive or disjunctive rule structures. We show that active exploration substantially improves adults' conjunctive causal reasoning, although conjunctive rules still require more tests to infer than disjunctive rules. We further compare human performance to a range of large language models in the same setting. While some state-of-the-art models approach human-level performance on hypothesis inference accuracy, they often exhibit less efficient exploration strategies and similar conjunctive-disjunctive performance gaps.

When individuals encounter observations that violate their expectations, when will they adjust their expectations and when will they maintain them despite these observations? For example, when individuals expect objects of type A to be smaller than objects B, but observe the opposite, when will they adjust their expectation about the relationship between the two objects (to A being larger than B)? Naively, one would predict that the larger the violation, the greater the adaptation. However, experiments reveal that when violations are extreme, individuals are more likely to hold on to their prior expectations rather than adjust them. To address this puzzle, we tested the adaptation of artificial neural networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning and found a similar phenomenon: Standard learning dynamics dictates that small violations would lead to adjustments of expected relations while larger ones would be resolved using a different mechanism -- a change in object representation that bypasses the need for adaptation of the relational expectations. These results suggest that the experimentally-observed stability of prior expectations when facing large expectation violations is a natural consequence of learning dynamics and does not require any additional mechanisms. We conclude by discussing the effect of intermediate adaptation steps on this stability.

With the emergence of generative conversational large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT, serving as virtual assistants in various fields, the stability and reliability of their responses have become crucial. However, during usage, it has been observed that these models tend to waver in their judgements when confronted with follow-up questions from users expressing skepticism or disagreement. In this work, we draw inspiration from questioning strategies in education and propose a Follow-up Questioning Mechanism along with two evaluation metrics to assess the judgement consistency of LLMs before and after exposure to disturbances. We evaluate the judgement consistency of ChatGPT, PaLM2-Bison, and Vicuna-13B under this mechanism across eight reasoning benchmarks. Empirical results show that even when the initial answers are correct, judgement consistency sharply decreases when LLMs face disturbances such as questioning, negation, or misleading. Additionally, we study these models' judgement consistency under various settings (sampling temperature and prompts) to validate this issue further, observing the impact of prompt tone and conducting an in-depth error analysis for deeper behavioral insights. Furthermore, we also explore several prompting methods to mitigate this issue and demonstrate their effectiveness\url{https://github.com/NUSTM/LLMs-Waver-In-Judgements}.

Multimodal semantic understanding often has to deal with uncertainty, which means the obtained messages tend to refer to multiple targets. Such uncertainty is problematic for our interpretation, including inter- and intra-modal uncertainty. Little effort has studied the modeling of this uncertainty, particularly in pre-training on unlabeled datasets and fine-tuning in task-specific downstream datasets. In this paper, we project the representations of all modalities as probabilistic distributions via a Probability Distribution Encoder (PDE) by utilizing sequence-level interactions. Compared to the existing deterministic methods, such uncertainty modeling can convey richer multimodal semantic information and more complex relationships. Furthermore, we integrate uncertainty modeling with popular pre-training frameworks and propose suitable pre-training tasks: Distribution-based Vision-Language Contrastive learning (D-VLC), Distribution-based Masked Language Modeling (D-MLM), and Distribution-based Image-Text Matching (D-ITM). The fine-tuned models are applied to challenging downstream tasks, including image-text retrieval, visual question answering, visual reasoning, and visual entailment, and achieve state-of-the-art results.

Robotic task instructions often involve a referred object that the robot must locate (ground) within the environment. While task intent understanding is an essential part of natural language understanding, less effort is made to resolve ambiguity that may arise while grounding the task. Existing works use vision-based task grounding and ambiguity detection, suitable for a fixed view and a static robot. However, the problem magnifies for a mobile robot, where the ideal view is not known beforehand. Moreover, a single view may not be sufficient to locate all the object instances in the given area, which leads to inaccurate ambiguity detection. Human intervention is helpful only if the robot can convey the kind of ambiguity it is facing. In this article, we present DoRO (Disambiguation of Referred Object), a system that can help an embodied agent to disambiguate the referred object by raising a suitable query whenever required. Given an area where the intended object is, DoRO finds all the instances of the object by aggregating observations from multiple views while exploring & scanning the area. It then raises a suitable query using the information from the grounded object instances. Experiments conducted with the AI2Thor simulator show that DoRO not only detects the ambiguity more accurately but also raises verbose queries with more accurate information from the visual-language grounding.

Handling ambiguity and underspecification is an important challenge in natural language interfaces, particularly for tasks like text-to-SQL semantic parsing. We propose a modular approach that resolves ambiguity using natural language interpretations before mapping these to logical forms (e.g., SQL queries). Although LLMs excel at parsing unambiguous utterances, they show strong biases for ambiguous ones, typically predicting only preferred interpretations. We constructively exploit this bias to generate an initial set of preferred disambiguations and then apply a specialized infilling model to identify and generate missing interpretations. To train the infilling model, we introduce an annotation method that uses SQL execution to validate different meanings. Our approach improves interpretation coverage and generalizes across datasets with different annotation styles, database structures, and ambiguity types.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Despite widespread use of LLMs as conversational agents, evaluations of performance fail to capture a crucial aspect of communication: interpreting language in context -- incorporating its pragmatics. Humans interpret language using beliefs and prior knowledge about the world. For example, we intuitively understand the response "I wore gloves" to the question "Did you leave fingerprints?" as meaning "No". To investigate whether LLMs have the ability to make this type of inference, known as an implicature, we design a simple task and evaluate four categories of widely used state-of-the-art models. We find that, despite only evaluating on utterances that require a binary inference (yes or no), models in three of these categories perform close to random. However, LLMs instruction-tuned at the example-level perform significantly better. These results suggest that certain fine-tuning strategies are far better at inducing pragmatic understanding in models. We present our findings as the starting point for further research into evaluating how LLMs interpret language in context and to drive the development of more pragmatic and useful models of human discourse.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Accurate uncertainty quantification (UQ) in Large Language Models (LLMs) is critical for trustworthy deployment. While real-world language is inherently ambiguous, reflecting aleatoric uncertainty, existing UQ methods are typically benchmarked against tasks with no ambiguity. In this work, we demonstrate that while current uncertainty estimators perform well under the restrictive assumption of no ambiguity, they degrade to close-to-random performance on ambiguous data. To this end, we introduce MAQA* and AmbigQA*, the first ambiguous question-answering (QA) datasets equipped with ground-truth answer distributions estimated from factual co-occurrence. We find this performance deterioration to be consistent across different estimation paradigms: using the predictive distribution itself, internal representations throughout the model, and an ensemble of models. We show that this phenomenon can be theoretically explained, revealing that predictive-distribution and ensemble-based estimators are fundamentally limited under ambiguity. Overall, our study reveals a key shortcoming of current UQ methods for LLMs and motivates a rethinking of current modeling paradigms.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are nondeterministic, the same input can generate different outputs, some of which may be incorrect or hallucinated. If run again, the LLM may correct itself and produce the correct answer. Unfortunately, most LLM-powered systems resort to single results which, correct or not, users accept. Having the LLM produce multiple outputs may help identify disagreements or alternatives. However, it is not obvious how the user will interpret conflicts or inconsistencies. To this end, we investigate how users perceive the AI model and comprehend the generated information when they receive multiple, potentially inconsistent, outputs. Through a preliminary study, we identified five types of output inconsistencies. Based on these categories, we conducted a study (N=252) in which participants were given one or more LLM-generated passages to an information-seeking question. We found that inconsistency within multiple LLM-generated outputs lowered the participants' perceived AI capacity, while also increasing their comprehension of the given information. Specifically, we observed that this positive effect of inconsistencies was most significant for participants who read two passages, compared to those who read three. Based on these findings, we present design implications that, instead of regarding LLM output inconsistencies as a drawback, we can reveal the potential inconsistencies to transparently indicate the limitations of these models and promote critical LLM usage.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Bilingual lexical processing is shaped by the complex interplay of phonological, orthographic, and semantic features of two languages within an integrated mental lexicon. In humans, this is evident in the ease with which cognate words - words similar in both orthographic form and meaning (e.g., blind, meaning "sightless" in both English and German) - are processed, compared to the challenges posed by interlingual homographs, which share orthographic form but differ in meaning (e.g., gift, meaning "present" in English but "poison" in German). We investigate how multilingual Large Language Models (LLMs) handle such phenomena, focusing on English-Spanish, English-French, and English-German cognates, non-cognate, and interlingual homographs. Specifically, we evaluate their ability to disambiguate meanings and make semantic judgments, both when these word types are presented in isolation or within sentence contexts. Our findings reveal that while certain LLMs demonstrate strong performance in recognizing cognates and non-cognates in isolation, they exhibit significant difficulty in disambiguating interlingual homographs, often performing below random baselines. This suggests LLMs tend to rely heavily on orthographic similarities rather than semantic understanding when interpreting interlingual homographs. Further, we find LLMs exhibit difficulty in retrieving word meanings, with performance in isolative disambiguation tasks having no correlation with semantic understanding. Finally, we study how the LLM processes interlingual homographs in incongruent sentences. We find models to opt for different strategies in understanding English and non-English homographs, highlighting a lack of a unified approach to handling cross-lingual ambiguities.

Information retrieval in Large Language Models (LLMs) is increasingly recognized as intertwined with generation capabilities rather than mere lookup. While longer contexts are often assumed to improve retrieval, the effects of intra-context interference remain understudied. To address this, we adapt the proactive interference (PI) paradigm from cognitive science, where earlier information disrupts recall of newer updates. In humans, susceptibility to such interference is inversely linked to working memory capacity. We introduce PI-LLM, an evaluation that sequentially streams semantically related key-value updates and queries only the final values. Although these final values are clearly positioned just before the query, LLM retrieval accuracy declines log-linearly toward zero as interference accumulates; errors arise from retrieving previously overwritten values. Attempts to mitigate interference via prompt engineering (e.g., instructing models to ignore earlier input) yield limited success. These findings reveal a fundamental constraint on LLMs' ability to disentangle interference and flexibly manipulate information, suggesting a working memory bottleneck beyond mere context access. This calls for approaches that strengthen models' ability to suppress irrelevant content during retrieval.

Concept guidance has emerged as a cheap and simple way to control the behavior of language models by probing their hidden representations for concept vectors and using them to perturb activations at inference time. While the focus of previous work has largely been on truthfulness, in this paper we extend this framework to a richer set of concepts such as appropriateness, humor, creativity and quality, and explore to what degree current detection and guidance strategies work in these challenging settings. To facilitate evaluation, we develop a novel metric for concept guidance that takes into account both the success of concept elicitation as well as the potential degradation in fluency of the guided model. Our extensive experiments reveal that while some concepts such as truthfulness more easily allow for guidance with current techniques, novel concepts such as appropriateness or humor either remain difficult to elicit, need extensive tuning to work, or even experience confusion. Moreover, we find that probes with optimal detection accuracies do not necessarily make for the optimal guides, contradicting previous observations for truthfulness. Our work warrants a deeper investigation into the interplay between detectability, guidability, and the nature of the concept, and we hope that our rich experimental test-bed for guidance research inspires stronger follow-up approaches.

In the era of large language models, creative writing quality lacks a computable theoretical anchor. The dominant approaches are rubric scoring -- decomposing holistic aesthetic judgment into sub-scores -- and RLHF preference signals -- replacing quality with group votes. Both bypass the statistical structure of the text itself. This paper provides an information-theoretic foundation to fill this gap. We propose 'calibrated surprise' as the information-theoretic essence of excellent creative writing. This judgment matches reading intuition and covers its opposite. This literary judgment admits a precise mathematical formulation. Under full-dimensional constraints Y, feasible writing choices are forced into an extremely narrow space. The rare survivors are, from the unconstrained perspective, exactly the least predictable choices. Both are measured precisely by Shannon mutual information I(X;Y) = H(X) - H(X|Y) -- 'calibrated' corresponds to H(X|Y) approaching 0; 'surprising' corresponds to H(X) going high. The subtraction structure of the formula naturally separates 'well-grounded surprise' from 'pure noise'. We use token-level logprobs from Qwen1.5-7B as an operational proxy for the ideal reader's probability distribution. Across 20 pairs (12 Chinese / 8 English) of high-quality vs. systematically degraded literary passages, 20/20 pairs support the core prediction: high-quality passages have systematically higher I(X;Y) than their degraded versions.

Automated evaluation of free-form outputs from large language models (LLMs) is challenging because many distinct answers can be equally valid. A common practice is to use LLMs themselves as judges, but the theoretical properties of this approach are not yet well understood. We show that a geometric framework that represents both judges and candidates as points on a probability simplex can provide helpful insight on what is or is not identifiable using LLM judges. Our theoretical analysis uncovers a "phase transition" in ranking identifiability: for binary scoring systems, true rankings are identifiable even with weak judges under mild assumptions, while rankings become non-identifiable for three or more scoring levels even with infinite data, absent additional prior knowledge. This non-identifiability highlights how uncertainty in rankings stems from not only aleatoric uncertainty (i.e., inherent stochasticity in the data) but also epistemic uncertainty regarding which assumptions hold, an aspect that has received limited attention until now. To integrate both types of uncertainty, we use Bayesian inference to encode assumptions as priors and conduct sensitivity analysis of ranking estimates and credible intervals. Empirical evaluations across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that Bayesian inference yields more accurate rankings and substantially improves coverage rates. These results underscore the importance of taking a more holistic approach to uncertainty quantification when using LLMs as judges.

Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning. In this paper, we present evidence that an analogous functional distinction has emerged in large language models. Using a new interpretability technique, the Jacobian lens, we identify the representations a model is poised to verbalize at any point in its processing. These representations, which we collectively call the J-space, exhibit the functional properties characteristic of a global workspace: their contents can be reported, deliberately summoned and held, used to carry the intermediate steps of silent reasoning, and passed as arguments to arbitrary downstream computations, while automatic processing such as text parsing and routine inference proceeds without them. The J-space also has structural signatures that global workspace theory associates with conscious access: it carries coherent content only in an intermediate band of layers, holds on the order of tens of concepts at a time, and is broadcast by the model's weights more widely than other representations. These properties make it a practical window into a model's unspoken thinking. In alignment audits, it reveals strategic deliberation, evaluation awareness, and trained-in misaligned dispositions that never appear in the model's outputs. We find that post-training installs the Assistant's point of view in the workspace, and we introduce counterfactual reflection training, which improves behavior by training only what a model would say if interrupted and asked to reflect. These results indicate that language models maintain a small, privileged set of representations bearing some of the functional hallmarks of conscious access, and that decoding these representations sheds light on ongoing cognitive processes.

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

This paper examines the role of cognitive biases in the decision-making processes of large language models (LLMs), challenging the conventional goal of eliminating all biases. We show that certain cognitive biases when properly balanced, can enhance decision-making efficiency through rational deviations and heuristic shortcuts. By introducing heuristic moderation and an abstention option, which allows LLMs to withhold responses when uncertain, we reduce error rates, improve decision accuracy, and optimize decision rates. Using the Balance Rigor and Utility (BRU) dataset, developed through expert collaboration, our findings demonstrate that targeted inspection of cognitive biases aligns LLM decisions more closely with human reasoning, enhancing reliability and suggesting strategies for future improvements. This approach offers a novel way to leverage cognitive biases to improve the practical utility of LLMs across various applications.

Human cognition naturally engages with abstract and fluid concepts, whereas existing reasoning models often rely on generating discrete tokens, potentially constraining their expressive capabilities. Recent advancements aim to address this limitation by enabling large language models (LLMs) to generate soft, abstract tokens, thus facilitating reasoning within a continuous concept space. This paper explores the `Soft Thinking' capabilities of various LLMs by examining the models' internal behavior using a suite of probing techniques. Contrary to the common belief that Soft Thinking enables the simultaneous exploration of diverse reasoning paths, our findings reveal that LLMs predominantly rely on the most influential component of the soft inputs during subsequent decoding steps. This reliance hinders the exploration of different reasoning paths and reduces vanilla Soft Thinking to a form of greedy decoding, obscuring the advantage of transmitting more information through Soft Tokens. To tackle this issue, we explore sampling strategies to introduce randomness, employing methods such as Dirichlet resampling and the Gumbel-Softmax trick. Our experiments demonstrate that incorporating randomness can alleviate the limitations of vanilla approaches and unleash the potential of Soft Thinking. Notably, the Gumbel-Softmax trick provides adequate randomness with controlled smoothness, resulting in superior performance across eight reasoning benchmarks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4 and Gemini have significantly advanced artificial intelligence by enabling machines to generate and comprehend human-like text. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs are not immune to limitations, including various biases. While much research has explored demographic biases, the cognitive biases in LLMs have not been equally scrutinized. This study delves into anchoring bias, a cognitive bias where initial information disproportionately influences judgment. Utilizing an experimental dataset, we examine how anchoring bias manifests in LLMs and verify the effectiveness of various mitigation strategies. Our findings highlight the sensitivity of LLM responses to biased hints. At the same time, our experiments show that, to mitigate anchoring bias, one needs to collect hints from comprehensive angles to prevent the LLMs from being anchored to individual pieces of information, while simple algorithms such as Chain-of-Thought, Thoughts of Principles, Ignoring Anchor Hints, and Reflection are not sufficient.

Common evaluation paradigms for language models focus on scoring single responses through accuracy metrics or proper scoring rules, failing to capture the full richness of a model's belief state. Recent work illustrates that language models hallucinate in-part because they are optimised to be good test-takers under binary scoring schemes that reward any answer over abstention. While this insight naturally leads to penalty-based approaches, they ignore crucial distinctions in how models distribute uncertainty, for example between hedging toward incorrect answers versus hedging toward "I don't know" responses. A novel evaluation metric, the Distributional Correctness Score (DCS), is introduced to solve this problem, i.e., of not considering a model's entire probability distribution over answer choices. DCS naturally distinguishes between harmful overconfidence in wrong answers and uncertainty expressed through abstention, providing scores in an interpretable default range. Through theoretical analysis and illustrative examples, DCS is demonstrated to offer a more nuanced and aligned evaluation paradigm that incentivises models to express genuine uncertainty rather than guessing. Adapting 12 existing evaluation benchmarks to DCS's variants and measuring performance on six language models reveals that for half of the tested benchmarks scores are negative across all tested models, indicating significant tendencies towards hallucination.

Word sense plausibility rating requires predicting the human-perceived plausibility of a given word sense on a 1--5 scale in the context of short narrative stories containing ambiguous homonyms. This paper systematically compares three approaches: (1) embedding-based methods pairing sentence embeddings with standard regressors, (2) transformer fine-tuning with parameter-efficient adaptation, and (3) large language model (LLM) prompting with structured reasoning and explicit decision rules. The best-performing system employs a structured prompting strategy that decomposes evaluation into narrative components (precontext, target sentence, ending) and applies explicit decision rules for rating calibration. The analysis reveals that structured prompting with decision rules substantially outperforms both fine-tuned models and embedding-based approaches, and that prompt design matters more than model scale for this task. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/tongwu17/SemEval-2026-Task5.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

Automated evaluation leveraging large language models (LLMs), commonly referred to as LLM evaluators or LLM-as-a-judge, has been widely used in measuring the performance of dialogue systems. However, the self-preference bias in LLMs has posed significant risks, including promoting specific styles or policies intrinsic to the LLMs. Despite the importance of this issue, there is a lack of established methods to measure the self-preference bias quantitatively, and its underlying causes are poorly understood. In this paper, we introduce a novel quantitative metric to measure the self-preference bias. Our experimental results demonstrate that GPT-4 exhibits a significant degree of self-preference bias. To explore the causes, we hypothesize that LLMs may favor outputs that are more familiar to them, as indicated by lower perplexity. We analyze the relationship between LLM evaluations and the perplexities of outputs. Our findings reveal that LLMs assign significantly higher evaluations to outputs with lower perplexity than human evaluators, regardless of whether the outputs were self-generated. This suggests that the essence of the bias lies in perplexity and that the self-preference bias exists because LLMs prefer texts more familiar to them.