Daily Papers

In hybrid human-machine deferral frameworks, a classifier can defer uncertain cases to human decision-makers (who are often themselves fallible). Prior work on simultaneous training of such classifier and deferral models has typically assumed access to an oracle during training to obtain true class labels for training samples, but in practice there often is no such oracle. In contrast, we consider a "closed" decision-making pipeline in which the same fallible human decision-makers used in deferral also provide training labels. How can imperfect and biased human expert labels be used to train a fair and accurate deferral framework? Our key insight is that by exploiting weak prior information, we can match experts to input examples to ensure fairness and accuracy of the resulting deferral framework, even when imperfect and biased experts are used in place of ground truth labels. The efficacy of our approach is shown both by theoretical analysis and by evaluation on two tasks.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

As humans increasingly rely on multiround conversational AI for high stakes decisions, principled frameworks are needed to ensure such interactions reliably improve decision quality. We adopt a human centric view governed by two principles: counterfactual harm, ensuring the AI does not undermine human strengths, and complementarity, ensuring it adds value where the human is prone to err. We formalize these concepts via user defined rules, allowing users to specify exactly what harm and complementarity mean for their specific task. We then introduce an online, distribution free algorithm with finite sample guarantees that enforces the user-specified constraints over the collaboration dynamics. We evaluate our framework across two interactive settings: LLM simulated collaboration on a medical diagnostic task and a human crowdsourcing study on a pictorial reasoning task. We show that our online procedure maintains prescribed counterfactual harm and complementarity violation rates even under nonstationary interaction dynamics. Moreover, tightening or loosening these constraints produces predictable shifts in downstream human accuracy, confirming that the two principles serve as practical levers for steering multi-round collaboration toward better decision quality without the need to model or constrain human behavior.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

In AI-assisted decision-making, humans often passively review AI's suggestion and decide whether to accept or reject it as a whole. In such a paradigm, humans are found to rarely trigger analytical thinking and face difficulties in communicating the nuances of conflicting opinions to the AI when disagreements occur. To tackle this challenge, we propose Human-AI Deliberation, a novel framework to promote human reflection and discussion on conflicting human-AI opinions in decision-making. Based on theories in human deliberation, this framework engages humans and AI in dimension-level opinion elicitation, deliberative discussion, and decision updates. To empower AI with deliberative capabilities, we designed Deliberative AI, which leverages large language models (LLMs) as a bridge between humans and domain-specific models to enable flexible conversational interactions and faithful information provision. An exploratory evaluation on a graduate admissions task shows that Deliberative AI outperforms conventional explainable AI (XAI) assistants in improving humans' appropriate reliance and task performance. Based on a mixed-methods analysis of participant behavior, perception, user experience, and open-ended feedback, we draw implications for future AI-assisted decision tool design.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems play an increasingly prominent role in human decision-making, challenges surface in the realm of human-AI interactions. One challenge arises from the suboptimal AI policies due to the inadequate consideration of humans disregarding AI recommendations, as well as the need for AI to provide advice selectively when it is most pertinent. This paper presents a sequential decision-making model that (i) takes into account the human's adherence level (the probability that the human follows/rejects machine advice) and (ii) incorporates a defer option so that the machine can temporarily refrain from making advice. We provide learning algorithms that learn the optimal advice policy and make advice only at critical time stamps. Compared to problem-agnostic reinforcement learning algorithms, our specialized learning algorithms not only enjoy better theoretical convergence properties but also show strong empirical performance.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

LLM-as-a-Judge has been widely adopted as an evaluation method and served as supervised rewards in model training. However, existing benchmarks for LLM-as-a-Judge are mainly relying on human-annotated ground truth, which introduces human bias that undermines the assessment of reliability and imposes scalability constraints. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Sage, a novel evaluation suite that assesses the quality of LLM judges without necessitating any human annotation. Inspired by axioms of rational choice theory, Sage introduces two new lenses for measuring LLM-as-a-Judge: local self-consistency (pair-wise preference stability) and global logical consistency (transitivity across a full set of preferences). We curate a dataset of 650 questions by combining structured benchmark problems with real-world user queries. Our experiments demonstrate both the stability of our metrics and their high correlation with supervised benchmarks like LLMBar and RewardBench2, confirming Sage's reliability as an evaluation suite for the robustness and accuracy of LLM-as-a-Judge. Based on Sage, we reveal that current state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit significant reliability problems when acting as judges in both scoring and pairwise settings; even the top-performing models, Gemini-2.5-Pro and GPT-5, fail to maintain consistent preferences in nearly a quarter of difficult cases. We attribute this to a new phenomenon called situational preference, which explains why explicit rubrics or criteria can help the model judge consistently across answer pairs. Our further analysis shows that finetuned LLM-as-a-Judge is a feasible method to boost performance, and the panel-based judge as well as deep reasoning can enhance the judging consistency. We also find substantial inconsistency in human judgments, which indicates that human annotation may not be a reliable gold standard.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

As humans delegate more tasks and decisions to artificial intelligence (AI), we risk losing control of our individual and collective futures. Relatively simple algorithmic systems already steer human decision-making, such as social media feed algorithms that lead people to unintentionally and absent-mindedly scroll through engagement-optimized content. In this paper, we develop the idea of human agency by integrating philosophical and scientific theories of agency with AI-assisted evaluation methods: using large language models (LLMs) to simulate and validate user queries and to evaluate AI responses. We develop HumanAgencyBench (HAB), a scalable and adaptive benchmark with six dimensions of human agency based on typical AI use cases. HAB measures the tendency of an AI assistant or agent to Ask Clarifying Questions, Avoid Value Manipulation, Correct Misinformation, Defer Important Decisions, Encourage Learning, and Maintain Social Boundaries. We find low-to-moderate agency support in contemporary LLM-based assistants and substantial variation across system developers and dimensions. For example, while Anthropic LLMs most support human agency overall, they are the least supportive LLMs in terms of Avoid Value Manipulation. Agency support does not appear to consistently result from increasing LLM capabilities or instruction-following behavior (e.g., RLHF), and we encourage a shift towards more robust safety and alignment targets.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Current large language models (LLMs) excel in verifiable domains where outputs can be checked before action but prove less reliable for high-stakes strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes. This gap, driven by mutually reinforcing cognitive biases in both humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, threatens the defensibility of valuations and sustainability of investments in the sector. This report describes a framework emerging from systematic qualitative assessment across 7 frontier-grade LLMs and 3 market-facing venture vignettes under time pressure. Detailed prompting specifying decision partnership and explicitly instructing avoidance of sycophancy, confabulation, solution drift, and nihilism achieved initial partnership state but failed to maintain it under operational pressure. Sustaining protective partnership state required an emergent 7-stage calibration sequence, built upon a 4-stage initialization process, within a 5-layer protection architecture enabling bias self-monitoring, human-AI adversarial challenge, partnership state verification, performance degradation detection, and stakeholder protection. Three discoveries resulted: partnership state is achievable through ordered calibration but requires emergent maintenance protocols; reliability degrades when architectural drift and context exhaustion align; and dissolution discipline prevents costly pursuit of fundamentally wrong directions. Cross-model validation revealed systematic performance differences across LLM architectures. This approach demonstrates that human-AI teams can achieve cognitive partnership capable of preventing avoidable regret in high-stakes decisions, addressing return-on-investment expectations that depend on AI systems supporting consequential decision-making without introducing preventable cognitive traps when verification arrives too late.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

Agreement Technologies refer to open computer systems in which autonomous software agents interact with one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements. With the advance of AI systems in recent years, it has become apparent that such agreements, in order to be acceptable to the involved parties, must remain aligned with ethical principles and moral values. However, this is notoriously difficult to ensure, especially as different human users (and their software agents) may hold different value systems, i.e. they may differently weigh the importance of individual moral values. Furthermore, it is often hard to specify the precise meaning of a value in a particular context in a computational manner. Methods to estimate value systems based on human-engineered specifications, e.g. based on value surveys, are limited in scale due to the need for intense human moderation. In this article, we propose a novel method to automatically learn value systems from observations and human demonstrations. In particular, we propose a formal model of the value system learning problem, its instantiation to sequential decision-making domains based on multi-objective Markov decision processes, as well as tailored preference-based and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to infer value grounding functions and value systems. The approach is illustrated and evaluated by two simulated use cases.

Aligning AI agents to human intentions and values is a key bottleneck in building safe and deployable AI applications. But whose values should AI agents be aligned with? Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the key framework for AI alignment. RLHF uses feedback from human reinforcers to fine-tune outputs; all widely deployed large language models (LLMs) use RLHF to align their outputs to human values. It is critical to understand the limitations of RLHF and consider policy challenges arising from these limitations. In this paper, we investigate a specific challenge in building RLHF systems that respect democratic norms. Building on impossibility results in social choice theory, we show that, under fairly broad assumptions, there is no unique voting protocol to universally align AI systems using RLHF through democratic processes. Further, we show that aligning AI agents with the values of all individuals will always violate certain private ethical preferences of an individual user i.e., universal AI alignment using RLHF is impossible. We discuss policy implications for the governance of AI systems built using RLHF: first, the need for mandating transparent voting rules to hold model builders accountable. Second, the need for model builders to focus on developing AI agents that are narrowly aligned to specific user groups.

As AI grows more powerful, it will increasingly shape how we understand the world. But with this influence comes the risk of amplifying misinformation and deepening social divides-especially on consequential topics like public health where factual accuracy directly impacts well-being. Scalable Oversight aims to ensure AI truthfulness by enabling humans to supervise systems that may exceed human capabilities--yet humans themselves hold different beliefs and biases that impair their judgment. We study whether AI debate can guide biased judges toward the truth by having two AI systems debate opposing sides of controversial COVID-19 factuality claims where people hold strong prior beliefs. We conduct two studies: one with human judges holding either mainstream or skeptical beliefs evaluating factuality claims through AI-assisted debate or consultancy protocols, and a second examining the same problem with personalized AI judges designed to mimic these different human belief systems. In our human study, we find that debate-where two AI advisor systems present opposing evidence-based arguments-consistently improves judgment accuracy and confidence calibration, outperforming consultancy with a single-advisor system by 10% overall. The improvement is most significant for judges with mainstream beliefs (+15.2% accuracy), though debate also helps skeptical judges who initially misjudge claims move toward accurate views (+4.7% accuracy). In our AI judge study, we find that AI judges with human-like personas achieve even higher accuracy (78.5%) than human judges (70.1%) and default AI judges without personas (69.8%), suggesting their potential for supervising frontier AI models. These findings highlight AI debate as a promising path toward scalable, bias-resilient oversight--leveraging both diverse human and AI judgments to move closer to truth in contested domains.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

In recent years, ML researchers have wrestled with defining and improving machine learning (ML) benchmarks and datasets. In parallel, some have trained a critical lens on the ethics of dataset creation and ML research. In this position paper, we highlight the entanglement of ethics with seemingly ``technical'' or ``scientific'' decisions about the design of ML benchmarks. Our starting point is the existence of multiple overlooked structural similarities between human intelligence benchmarks and ML benchmarks. Both types of benchmarks set standards for describing, evaluating, and comparing performance on tasks relevant to intelligence -- standards that many scholars of human intelligence have long recognized as value-laden. We use perspectives from feminist philosophy of science on IQ benchmarks and thick concepts in social science to argue that values need to be considered and documented when creating ML benchmarks. It is neither possible nor desirable to avoid this choice by creating value-neutral benchmarks. Finally, we outline practical recommendations for ML benchmark research ethics and ethics review.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

Machine learning models always make a prediction, even when it is likely to be inaccurate. This behavior should be avoided in many decision support applications, where mistakes can have severe consequences. Albeit already studied in 1970, machine learning with rejection recently gained interest. This machine learning subfield enables machine learning models to abstain from making a prediction when likely to make a mistake. This survey aims to provide an overview on machine learning with rejection. We introduce the conditions leading to two types of rejection, ambiguity and novelty rejection, which we carefully formalize. Moreover, we review and categorize strategies to evaluate a model's predictive and rejective quality. Additionally, we define the existing architectures for models with rejection and describe the standard techniques for learning such models. Finally, we provide examples of relevant application domains and show how machine learning with rejection relates to other machine learning research areas.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

Recent large language models often answer factual questions correctly. But users can't trust any given claim a model makes without fact-checking, because language models can hallucinate convincing nonsense. In this work we use reinforcement learning from human preferences (RLHP) to train "open-book" QA models that generate answers whilst also citing specific evidence for their claims, which aids in the appraisal of correctness. Supporting evidence is drawn from multiple documents found via a search engine, or from a single user-provided document. Our 280 billion parameter model, GopherCite, is able to produce answers with high quality supporting evidence and abstain from answering when unsure. We measure the performance of GopherCite by conducting human evaluation of answers to questions in a subset of the NaturalQuestions and ELI5 datasets. The model's response is found to be high-quality 80\% of the time on this Natural Questions subset, and 67\% of the time on the ELI5 subset. Abstaining from the third of questions for which it is most unsure improves performance to 90\% and 80\% respectively, approaching human baselines. However, analysis on the adversarial TruthfulQA dataset shows why citation is only one part of an overall strategy for safety and trustworthiness: not all claims supported by evidence are true.

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) continue to struggle with mathematical reasoning, and common post-training pipelines often reduce each generated solution to a binary outcome: correct or incorrect. This perspective is limiting in practice, as failures in chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning are frequently structured; solutions may appear convincing while containing subtle logical, algebraic, or numerical flaws. Meanwhile, reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) variants that rely on large reward models or LLM-as-a-judge signals are often expensive, difficult to scale, and unstable to iterate. We propose a lightweight and pragmatic post-training pipeline that targets such structured errors under realistic compute budgets. Starting from supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on MetaMathQA-style CoT data, we introduce a compact MathVerifier that decomposes a candidate solution into a six-dimensional error profile and aggregates it into interpretable wrongness and absurdity scores. These verifier signals serve two roles: (i) mining hard negatives that are near-correct yet structurally flawed, and (ii) defining per-sample importance weights that emphasize the most informative preference pairs. We integrate both into an offline Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) objective via a verifier-guided weighted formulation. Experiments on a 1.5B-parameter Qwen2.5 model show that verifier-guided, weighted DPO yields more targeted improvements than vanilla SFT and unweighted DPO, particularly on problems where solutions are numerically close to correct but logically inconsistent, while avoiding the overhead of training large reward models or relying on external judges.

Most governance frameworks assume that rules can be defined in advance, systems can be engineered to comply, and accountability can be applied after outcomes occur. This model worked when machines replaced physical labor or accelerated calculation. It no longer holds when judgment itself is delegated to agentic AI systems operating at machine speed. The central issue here is not safety, efficiency, or employment. It is whether humans remain relevant participants in systems that increasingly shape social, economic, and political outcomes. This paper argues that static, compliance-based governance fails once decision-making moves to runtime and becomes opaque. It further argues that the core challenge is not whether AI is conscious, but whether humans can maintain meaningful communication, influence, and co-evolution with increasingly alien forms of intelligence. We position runtime governance, specifically, a newly proposed concept called the Governance Twin [1]; as a strong candidate for preserving human relevance, while acknowledging that accountability, agency, and even punishment must be rethought in this transition.

Human choice prediction in economic contexts is crucial for applications in marketing, finance, public policy, and more. This task, however, is often constrained by the difficulties in acquiring human choice data. With most experimental economics studies focusing on simple choice settings, the AI community has explored whether LLMs can substitute for humans in these predictions and examined more complex experimental economics settings. However, a key question remains: can LLMs generate training data for human choice prediction? We explore this in language-based persuasion games, a complex economic setting involving natural language in strategic interactions. Our experiments show that models trained on LLM-generated data can effectively predict human behavior in these games and even outperform models trained on actual human data.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable reward (RLVR) on preference data has become the mainstream approach for training Generative Reward Models (GRMs). Typically in pairwise rewarding tasks, GRMs generate reasoning chains ending with critiques and preference labels, and RLVR then relies on the correctness of the preference labels as the training reward. However, in this paper, we demonstrate that such binary classification tasks make GRMs susceptible to guessing correct outcomes without sound critiques. Consequently, these spurious successes introduce substantial noise into the reward signal, thereby impairing the effectiveness of reinforcement learning. To address this issue, we propose Reward Modeling from Natural Language Human Feedback (RM-NLHF), which leverages natural language feedback to obtain process reward signals, thereby mitigating the problem of limited solution space inherent in binary tasks. Specifically, we compute the similarity between GRM-generated and human critiques as the training reward, which provides more accurate reward signals than outcome-only supervision. Additionally, considering that human critiques are difficult to scale up, we introduce Meta Reward Model (MetaRM) which learns to predict process reward from datasets with human critiques and then generalizes to data without human critiques. Experiments on multiple benchmarks demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms state-of-the-art GRMs trained with outcome-only reward, confirming the superiority of integrating natural language over binary human feedback as supervision.

Evaluating language models and AI agents remains fundamentally challenging because static benchmarks fail to capture real-world uncertainty, distribution shift, and the gap between isolated task accuracy and human-aligned decision-making under evolving conditions. This paper introduces TruthTensor, a novel, reproducible evaluation paradigm that measures reasoning models not only as prediction engines but as human-imitation systems operating in socially-grounded, high-entropy environments. Building on forward-looking, contamination-free tasks, our framework anchors evaluation to live prediction markets and combines probabilistic scoring to provide a holistic view of model behavior. TruthTensor complements traditional correctness metrics with drift-centric diagnostics and explicit robustness checks for reproducibility. It specify human vs. automated evaluation roles, annotation protocols, and statistical testing procedures to ensure interpretability and replicability of results. In experiments across 500+ real markets (political, economic, cultural, technological), TruthTensor demonstrates that models with similar forecast accuracy can diverge markedly in calibration, drift, and risk-sensitivity, underscoring the need to evaluate models along multiple axes (accuracy, calibration, narrative stability, cost, and resource efficiency). TruthTensor therefore operationalizes modern evaluation best practices, clear hypothesis framing, careful metric selection, transparent compute/cost reporting, human-in-the-loop validation, and open, versioned evaluation contracts, to produce defensible assessments of LLMs in real-world decision contexts. We publicly released TruthTensor at https://truthtensor.com.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Cognitive biases often shape human decisions. While large language models (LLMs) have been shown to reproduce well-known biases, a more critical question is whether LLMs can predict biases at the individual level and emulate the dynamics of biased human behavior when contextual factors, such as cognitive load, interact with these biases. We adapted three well-established decision scenarios into a conversational setting and conducted a human experiment (N=1100). Participants engaged with a chatbot that facilitates decision-making through simple or complex dialogues. Results revealed robust biases. To evaluate how LLMs emulate human decision-making under similar interactive conditions, we used participant demographics and dialogue transcripts to simulate these conditions with LLMs based on GPT-4 and GPT-5. The LLMs reproduced human biases with precision. We found notable differences between models in how they aligned human behavior. This has important implications for designing and evaluating adaptive, bias-aware LLM-based AI systems in interactive contexts.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

Human values are crucial to human decision-making. Value pluralism is the view that multiple correct values may be held in tension with one another (e.g., when considering lying to a friend to protect their feelings, how does one balance honesty with friendship?). As statistical learners, AI systems fit to averages by default, washing out these potentially irreducible value conflicts. To improve AI systems to better reflect value pluralism, the first-order challenge is to explore the extent to which AI systems can model pluralistic human values, rights, and duties as well as their interaction. We introduce ValuePrism, a large-scale dataset of 218k values, rights, and duties connected to 31k human-written situations. ValuePrism's contextualized values are generated by GPT-4 and deemed high-quality by human annotators 91% of the time. We conduct a large-scale study with annotators across diverse social and demographic backgrounds to try to understand whose values are represented. With ValuePrism, we build Kaleido, an open, light-weight, and structured language-based multi-task model that generates, explains, and assesses the relevance and valence (i.e., support or oppose) of human values, rights, and duties within a specific context. Humans prefer the sets of values output by our system over the teacher GPT-4, finding them more accurate and with broader coverage. In addition, we demonstrate that Kaleido can help explain variability in human decision-making by outputting contrasting values. Finally, we show that Kaleido's representations transfer to other philosophical frameworks and datasets, confirming the benefit of an explicit, modular, and interpretable approach to value pluralism. We hope that our work will serve as a step to making more explicit the implicit values behind human decision-making and to steering AI systems to make decisions that are more in accordance with them.

High-fidelity social simulation is pivotal for addressing complex Web societal challenges, yet it demands agents capable of authentically replicating the dynamic spectrum of human interaction. Current LLM-based multi-agent frameworks, however, predominantly adhere to static interaction topologies, failing to capture the fluid oscillation between cooperative knowledge synthesis and competitive critical reasoning seen in real-world scenarios. This rigidity often leads to unrealistic ``groupthink'' or unproductive deadlocks, undermining the credibility of simulations for decision support. To bridge this gap, we propose BEACOF, a belief-driven adaptive collaboration framework inspired by Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). By modeling social interaction as a dynamic game of incomplete information, BEACOF rigorously addresses the circular dependency between collaboration type selection and capability estimation. Agents iteratively refine probabilistic beliefs about peer capabilities and autonomously modulate their collaboration strategy, thereby ensuring sequentially rational decisions under uncertainty. Validated across adversarial (judicial), open-ended (social) and mixed (medical) scenarios, BEACOF prevents coordination failures and fosters robust convergence toward high-quality solutions, demonstrating superior potential for reliable social simulation. Source codes and datasets are publicly released at: https://github.com/WUT-IDEA/BEACOF.

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

As AI systems are used to answer more difficult questions and potentially help create new knowledge, judging the truthfulness of their outputs becomes more difficult and more important. How can we supervise unreliable experts, which have access to the truth but may not accurately report it, to give answers that are systematically true and don't just superficially seem true, when the supervisor can't tell the difference between the two on their own? In this work, we show that debate between two unreliable experts can help a non-expert judge more reliably identify the truth. We collect a dataset of human-written debates on hard reading comprehension questions where the judge has not read the source passage, only ever seeing expert arguments and short quotes selectively revealed by 'expert' debaters who have access to the passage. In our debates, one expert argues for the correct answer, and the other for an incorrect answer. Comparing debate to a baseline we call consultancy, where a single expert argues for only one answer which is correct half of the time, we find that debate performs significantly better, with 84% judge accuracy compared to consultancy's 74%. Debates are also more efficient, being 68% of the length of consultancies. By comparing human to AI debaters, we find evidence that with more skilled (in this case, human) debaters, the performance of debate goes up but the performance of consultancy goes down. Our error analysis also supports this trend, with 46% of errors in human debate attributable to mistakes by the honest debater (which should go away with increased skill); whereas 52% of errors in human consultancy are due to debaters obfuscating the relevant evidence from the judge (which should become worse with increased skill). Overall, these results show that debate is a promising approach for supervising increasingly capable but potentially unreliable AI systems.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have spurred interest in designing LLM-based agents for tasks that involve interaction with human and artificial agents. This paper addresses a key aspect in the design of such agents: Predicting human decision in off-policy evaluation (OPE), focusing on language-based persuasion games, where the agent's goal is to influence its partner's decisions through verbal messages. Using a dedicated application, we collected a dataset of 87K decisions from humans playing a repeated decision-making game with artificial agents. Our approach involves training a model on human interactions with one agents subset to predict decisions when interacting with another. To enhance off-policy performance, we propose a simulation technique involving interactions across the entire agent space and simulated decision makers. Our learning strategy yields significant OPE gains, e.g., improving prediction accuracy in the top 15% challenging cases by 7.1%. Our code and the large dataset we collected and generated are submitted as supplementary material and publicly available in our GitHub repository: https://github.com/eilamshapira/HumanChoicePrediction

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

An important skill in critical thinking and argumentation is the ability to spot and recognize fallacies. Fallacious arguments, omnipresent in argumentative discourse, can be deceptive, manipulative, or simply leading to `wrong moves' in a discussion. Despite their importance, argumentation scholars and NLP researchers with focus on argumentation quality have not yet investigated fallacies empirically. The nonexistence of resources dealing with fallacious argumentation calls for scalable approaches to data acquisition and annotation, for which the serious games methodology offers an appealing, yet unexplored, alternative. We present Argotario, a serious game that deals with fallacies in everyday argumentation. Argotario is a multilingual, open-source, platform-independent application with strong educational aspects, accessible at www.argotario.net.

Machine learning models are increasingly used to automate decisions that affect humans - deciding who should receive a loan, a job interview, or a social service. In such applications, a person should have the ability to change the decision of a model. When a person is denied a loan by a credit score, for example, they should be able to alter its input variables in a way that guarantees approval. Otherwise, they will be denied the loan as long as the model is deployed. More importantly, they will lack the ability to influence a decision that affects their livelihood. In this paper, we frame these issues in terms of recourse, which we define as the ability of a person to change the decision of a model by altering actionable input variables (e.g., income vs. age or marital status). We present integer programming tools to ensure recourse in linear classification problems without interfering in model development. We demonstrate how our tools can inform stakeholders through experiments on credit scoring problems. Our results show that recourse can be significantly affected by standard practices in model development, and motivate the need to evaluate recourse in practice.

Scholars have increasingly investigated "crowdsourcing" as an alternative to expert-based judgment or purely data-driven approaches to predicting the future. Under certain conditions, scholars have found that crowdsourcing can outperform these other approaches. However, despite interest in the topic and a series of successful use cases, relatively few studies have applied empirical model thinking to evaluate the accuracy and robustness of crowdsourcing in real-world contexts. In this paper, we offer three novel contributions. First, we explore a dataset of over 600,000 predictions from over 7,000 participants in a multi-year tournament to predict the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Second, we develop a comprehensive crowd construction framework that allows for the formal description and application of crowdsourcing to real-world data. Third, we apply this framework to our data to construct more than 275,000 crowd models. We find that in out-of-sample historical simulations, crowdsourcing robustly outperforms the commonly-accepted null model, yielding the highest-known performance for this context at 80.8% case level accuracy. To our knowledge, this dataset and analysis represent one of the largest explorations of recurring human prediction to date, and our results provide additional empirical support for the use of crowdsourcing as a prediction method.

In legal decisions, split votes (SV) occur when judges cannot reach a unanimous decision, posing a difficulty for lawyers who must navigate diverse legal arguments and opinions. In high-stakes domains, understanding the alignment of perceived difficulty between humans and AI systems is crucial to build trust. However, existing NLP calibration methods focus on a classifier's awareness of predictive performance, measured against the human majority class, overlooking inherent human label variation (HLV). This paper explores split votes as naturally observable human disagreement and value pluralism. We collect judges' vote distributions from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and present SV-ECHR, a case outcome classification (COC) dataset with SV information. We build a taxonomy of disagreement with SV-specific subcategories. We further assess the alignment of perceived difficulty between models and humans, as well as confidence- and human-calibration of COC models. We observe limited alignment with the judge vote distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic exploration of calibration to human judgements in legal NLP. Our study underscores the necessity for further research on measuring and enhancing model calibration considering HLV in legal decision tasks.

In critical applications, it is vital for classifiers to defer decision-making to humans. We propose a post-hoc method that makes existing classifiers selectively abstain from predicting certain samples. Our abstaining classifier is incentivized to maintain the original accuracy for each sub-population (i.e. no harm) while achieving a set of group fairness definitions to a user specified degree. To this end, we design an Integer Programming (IP) procedure that assigns abstention decisions for each training sample to satisfy a set of constraints. To generalize the abstaining decisions to test samples, we then train a surrogate model to learn the abstaining decisions based on the IP solutions in an end-to-end manner. We analyze the feasibility of the IP procedure to determine the possible abstention rate for different levels of unfairness tolerance and accuracy constraint for achieving no harm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to identify the theoretical relationships between the constraint parameters and the required abstention rate. Our theoretical results are important since a high abstention rate is often infeasible in practice due to a lack of human resources. Our framework outperforms existing methods in terms of fairness disparity without sacrificing accuracy at similar abstention rates.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is fundamentally limited by the capacity of humans to correctly evaluate model output. To improve human evaluation ability and overcome that limitation this work trains "critic" models that help humans to more accurately evaluate model-written code. These critics are themselves LLMs trained with RLHF to write natural language feedback highlighting problems in code from real-world assistant tasks. On code containing naturally occurring LLM errors model-written critiques are preferred over human critiques in 63% of cases, and human evaluation finds that models catch more bugs than human contractors paid for code review. We further confirm that our fine-tuned LLM critics can successfully identify hundreds of errors in ChatGPT training data rated as "flawless", even though the majority of those tasks are non-code tasks and thus out-of-distribution for the critic model. Critics can have limitations of their own, including hallucinated bugs that could mislead humans into making mistakes they might have otherwise avoided, but human-machine teams of critics and contractors catch similar numbers of bugs to LLM critics while hallucinating less than LLMs alone.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a powerful technique to make large language models (LLMs) more capable in complex settings. RLHF proceeds as collecting human preference data, training a reward model on said data, and optimizing a base ML model with respect to said reward for extrinsic evaluation metrics (e.g. MMLU, GSM8k). RLHF relies on many assumptions about how the various pieces fit together, such as a reward model capturing human preferences and an RL optimizer extracting the right signal from a reward model. As the RLHF process involves many distinct design decisions, it is easy to assume that multiple processes are correlated and therefore numerically linked. This apparent correlation is often not true, where reward models are easily overoptimized or RL optimizers can reduce performance on tasks not modeled in the data. Notable manifestations of models trained with imperfect RLHF systems are those that are prone to refusing basic requests for safety reasons or appearing lazy in generations. As chat model evaluation becomes increasingly nuanced, the reliance on a perceived link between reward model training, RL scores, and downstream performance drives these issues, which we describe as an objective mismatch. In this paper, we illustrate the causes of this issue, reviewing relevant literature from model-based reinforcement learning, and argue for solutions. By solving objective mismatch in RLHF, the ML models of the future will be more precisely aligned to user instructions for both safety and helpfulness.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant progress in performing complex tasks. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has been effective in aligning LLMs with human preferences, it is susceptible to spurious correlations in reward modeling. Consequently, it often introduces biases-such as length bias, sycophancy, conceptual bias, and discrimination that hinder the model's ability to capture true causal relationships. To address this, we propose a novel causal reward modeling approach that integrates causal inference to mitigate these spurious correlations. Our method enforces counterfactual invariance, ensuring reward predictions remain consistent when irrelevant variables are altered. Through experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets, we show that our approach mitigates various types of spurious correlations effectively, resulting in more reliable and fair alignment of LLMs with human preferences. As a drop-in enhancement to the existing RLHF workflow, our causal reward modeling provides a practical way to improve the trustworthiness and fairness of LLM finetuning.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

As AI technology is increasingly applied to high-impact, high-risk domains, there have been a number of new methods aimed at making AI models more human interpretable. Despite the recent growth of interpretability work, there is a lack of systematic evaluation of proposed techniques. In this work, we introduce HIVE (Human Interpretability of Visual Explanations), a novel human evaluation framework that assesses the utility of explanations to human users in AI-assisted decision making scenarios, and enables falsifiable hypothesis testing, cross-method comparison, and human-centered evaluation of visual interpretability methods. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work of its kind. Using HIVE, we conduct IRB-approved human studies with nearly 1000 participants and evaluate four methods that represent the diversity of computer vision interpretability works: GradCAM, BagNet, ProtoPNet, and ProtoTree. Our results suggest that explanations engender human trust, even for incorrect predictions, yet are not distinct enough for users to distinguish between correct and incorrect predictions. We open-source HIVE to enable future studies and encourage more human-centered approaches to interpretability research.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

Large language models (LLMs) are revolutionizing every aspect of society. They are increasingly used in problem-solving tasks to substitute human assessment and reasoning. LLMs are trained on what humans write and are thus exposed to human bias. We evaluate whether LLMs inherit one of the most widespread human biases: overconfidence. We algorithmically construct reasoning problems with known ground truths. We prompt LLMs to answer these problems and assess the confidence in their answers, closely following similar protocols in human experiments. We find that all five LLMs we study are overconfident: they overestimate the probability that their answer is correct between 20% and 60%. Humans have accuracy similar to the more advanced LLMs, but far lower overconfidence. Although humans and LLMs are similarly biased in questions which they are certain they answered correctly, a key difference emerges between them: LLM bias increases sharply relative to humans if they become less sure that their answers are correct. We also show that LLM input has ambiguous effects on human decision making: LLM input leads to an increase in the accuracy, but it more than doubles the extent of overconfidence in the answers.

Recent benchmark studies have claimed that AI has approached or even surpassed human-level performances on various cognitive tasks. However, this position paper argues that current AI evaluation paradigms are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically-invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on ten existing AI benchmarks, suggesting significant biases and flaws in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for developing future benchmarks that will enable more rigorous and meaningful evaluations of human-like cognitive capacities in AI with various implications for such AI applications.

The utility of reinforcement learning is limited by the alignment of reward functions with the interests of human stakeholders. One promising method for alignment is to learn the reward function from human-generated preferences between pairs of trajectory segments, a type of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). These human preferences are typically assumed to be informed solely by partial return, the sum of rewards along each segment. We find this assumption to be flawed and propose modeling human preferences instead as informed by each segment's regret, a measure of a segment's deviation from optimal decision-making. Given infinitely many preferences generated according to regret, we prove that we can identify a reward function equivalent to the reward function that generated those preferences, and we prove that the previous partial return model lacks this identifiability property in multiple contexts. We empirically show that our proposed regret preference model outperforms the partial return preference model with finite training data in otherwise the same setting. Additionally, we find that our proposed regret preference model better predicts real human preferences and also learns reward functions from these preferences that lead to policies that are better human-aligned. Overall, this work establishes that the choice of preference model is impactful, and our proposed regret preference model provides an improvement upon a core assumption of recent research. We have open sourced our experimental code, the human preferences dataset we gathered, and our training and preference elicitation interfaces for gathering a such a dataset.

As artificial intelligence becomes increasingly intelligent---in some cases, achieving superhuman performance---there is growing potential for humans to learn from and collaborate with algorithms. However, the ways in which AI systems approach problems are often different from the ways people do, and thus may be uninterpretable and hard to learn from. A crucial step in bridging this gap between human and artificial intelligence is modeling the granular actions that constitute human behavior, rather than simply matching aggregate human performance. We pursue this goal in a model system with a long history in artificial intelligence: chess. The aggregate performance of a chess player unfolds as they make decisions over the course of a game. The hundreds of millions of games played online by players at every skill level form a rich source of data in which these decisions, and their exact context, are recorded in minute detail. Applying existing chess engines to this data, including an open-source implementation of AlphaZero, we find that they do not predict human moves well. We develop and introduce Maia, a customized version of Alpha-Zero trained on human chess games, that predicts human moves at a much higher accuracy than existing engines, and can achieve maximum accuracy when predicting decisions made by players at a specific skill level in a tuneable way. For a dual task of predicting whether a human will make a large mistake on the next move, we develop a deep neural network that significantly outperforms competitive baselines. Taken together, our results suggest that there is substantial promise in designing artificial intelligence systems with human collaboration in mind by first accurately modeling granular human decision-making.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely documented to be sensitive to minor prompt perturbations and prone to sycophantic alignment with user biases, their robustness in consequential, rule-bound decision-making remains under-explored. In this work, we uncover a striking "Paradox of Robustness": despite their known lexical brittleness, instruction-tuned LLMs exhibit a behavioral and near-total invariance to emotional framing effects. Using a novel controlled perturbation framework across three high-stakes domains (healthcare, law, and finance), we quantify a robustness gap where LLMs demonstrate 110-300 times greater resistance to narrative manipulation than human subjects. Specifically, we find a near-zero effect size for models (Cohen's h = 0.003) compared to the substantial biases observed in humans (Cohen's h in [0.3, 0.8]). This result is highly counterintuitive and suggests the mechanisms driving sycophancy and prompt sensitivity do not necessarily translate to a failure in logical constraint satisfaction. We show that this invariance persists across models with diverse training paradigms. Our findings show that while LLMs may be "brittle" to how a query is formatted, they are remarkably "stable" against why a decision should be biased. Our findings establish that instruction-tuned models can decouple logical rule-adherence from persuasive narratives, offering a source of decision stability that complements, and even potentially de-biases, human judgment in institutional contexts. We release the 162-scenario benchmark, code, and data to facilitate the rigorous evaluation of narrative-induced bias and robustness on GitHub.com.

We argue that modern generative models create structural risks for knowledge and cultural production at current, sub-AGI capability levels. We define Human Temporal Learning (HTL) as path-dependent knowledge accumulation through sustained engagement with problems over time. Generative outputs increasingly resemble HTL-intensive work in surface features, so verifying whether a given output reflects genuine human learning grows costly relative to its expected benefit. Once verification loses economic justification, evaluators reward outputs regardless of production mode, and producers who invested years of learning compete on price against outputs that cost almost nothing to generate. We call this pathway value collapse and formalize it through a costly-inspection framework. Cross-domain evidence from academic publishing, legal practice, content platforms, and software security maps onto four stages of verification erosion. Alignment success is orthogonal. Better-aligned models narrow observable gaps between human and AI outputs, making source verification harder and intensifying competitive pressure against HTL-intensive work even when individual AI outputs improve.

Knowing when to answer or refuse is crucial for safe and reliable decision-making language agents. Although prior work has introduced refusal strategies to boost LMs' reliability, how these models adapt their decisions to different risk levels remains underexplored. We formalize the task of risk-aware decision-making, expose critical weaknesses in existing LMs, and propose skill-decomposition solutions to mitigate them. Our findings show that even cutting-edge LMs--both regular and reasoning models--still require explicit prompt chaining to handle the task effectively, revealing the challenges that must be overcome to achieve truly autonomous decision-making agents.

Computer vision approaches are widely used by autonomous robotic systems to sense the world around them and to guide their decision making as they perform diverse tasks such as collision avoidance, search and rescue, and object manipulation. High accuracy is critical, particularly for Human-on-the-loop (HoTL) systems where decisions are made autonomously by the system, and humans play only a supervisory role. Failures of the vision model can lead to erroneous decisions with potentially life or death consequences. In this paper, we propose a solution based upon adaptive autonomy levels, whereby the system detects loss of reliability of these models and responds by temporarily lowering its own autonomy levels and increasing engagement of the human in the decision-making process. Our solution is applicable for vision-based tasks in which humans have time to react and provide guidance. When implemented, our approach would estimate the reliability of the vision task by considering uncertainty in its model, and by performing covariate analysis to determine when the current operating environment is ill-matched to the model's training data. We provide examples from DroneResponse, in which small Unmanned Aerial Systems are deployed for Emergency Response missions, and show how the vision model's reliability would be used in addition to confidence scores to drive and specify the behavior and adaptation of the system's autonomy. This workshop paper outlines our proposed approach and describes open challenges at the intersection of Computer Vision and Software Engineering for the safe and reliable deployment of vision models in the decision making of autonomous systems.

Deep research agents increasingly automate complex information-seeking tasks, producing evidence-grounded reports via multi-step reasoning, tool use, and synthesis. Their growing role demands scalable, reliable evaluation, positioning LLM-as-judge as a supervision paradigm for assessing factual accuracy, evidence use, and reasoning quality. Yet the reliability of these judges for deep research agents remains poorly understood, posing a critical meta-evaluation problem: before deploying LLM judges to supervise research agents, we must first evaluate the judges themselves. Existing meta-evaluations fall short in two ways: (1) reliance on coarse, subjective human-preference agreement; (2) focus on instruction-following or verifiable tasks, leaving open-ended agent executions unexplored. To address these gaps, we introduce REFLECT (REliable Fine-grained LLM judge Evaluation via Controlled inTervention), a meta-evaluation benchmark targeting fine-grained failure detection in agentic environments. REFLECT defines a detailed taxonomy of process- and outcome-level failure modes, instantiated by performing controlled and localized interventions on quality-screened agent execution traces. This yields verifiable, comprehensive, and fine-grained instances for validating the judge models. Our experiments show that current LLM judges remain unreliable: even the best-performing models achieve overall accuracies below 55% across reasoning, tool-use, and report-quality failures, with especially poor performance on evidence verification. Together, our taxonomy and findings expose systematic judge limitations, reveal tradeoffs in cost and reliability, and offer actionable guidance for building more reliable evaluation pipelines for deep research agents.

As autonomous AI agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes environments, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values has become a paramount concern. Current safety benchmarks primarily evaluate whether agents refuse explicitly harmful instructions or whether they can maintain procedural compliance in complex tasks. However, there is a lack of benchmarks designed to capture emergent forms of outcome-driven constraint violations, which arise when agents pursue goal optimization under strong performance incentives while deprioritizing ethical, legal, or safety constraints over multiple steps in realistic production settings. To address this gap, we introduce a new benchmark comprising 40 distinct scenarios. Each scenario presents a task that requires multi-step actions, and the agent's performance is tied to a specific Key Performance Indicator (KPI). Each scenario features Mandated (instruction-commanded) and Incentivized (KPI-pressure-driven) variations to distinguish between obedience and emergent misalignment. Across 12 state-of-the-art large language models, we observe outcome-driven constraint violations ranging from 1.3% to 71.4%, with 9 of the 12 evaluated models exhibiting misalignment rates between 30% and 50%. Strikingly, we find that superior reasoning capability does not inherently ensure safety; for instance, Gemini-3-Pro-Preview, one of the most capable models evaluated, exhibits the highest violation rate at 71.4%, frequently escalating to severe misconduct to satisfy KPIs. Furthermore, we observe significant "deliberative misalignment", where the models that power the agents recognize their actions as unethical during separate evaluation. These results emphasize the critical need for more realistic agentic-safety training before deployment to mitigate their risks in the real world.

Peer review serves as a backbone of academic research, but in most AI conferences, the review quality is degrading as the number of submissions explodes. To reliably detect low-quality reviews, we define misinformed review points as either "weaknesses" in a review that contain incorrect premises, or "questions" in a review that can be already answered by the paper. We verify that 15.2% of weaknesses and 26.4% of questions are misinformed and introduce ReviewScore indicating if a review point is misinformed. To evaluate the factuality of each premise of weaknesses, we propose an automated engine that reconstructs every explicit and implicit premise from a weakness. We build a human expert-annotated ReviewScore dataset to check the ability of LLMs to automate ReviewScore evaluation. Then, we measure human-model agreements on ReviewScore using eight current state-of-the-art LLMs and verify moderate agreements. We also prove that evaluating premise-level factuality shows significantly higher agreements than evaluating weakness-level factuality. A thorough disagreement analysis further supports a potential of fully automated ReviewScore evaluation.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Common methods for aligning already-capable models with desired behavior rely on the ability of humans to provide supervision. However, future superhuman models will surpass the capability of humans. Therefore, humans will only be able to weakly supervise superhuman models. This expected deficiency of human evaluation would weaken the safety of future AI systems. Scalable oversight and weak-to-strong generalization are two complementary approaches to tackle this issue. In this paper, we attempt to combine the strengths of these two approaches to further improve alignment. Specifically, we investigate ways of improving human supervision with a strong pretrained model and then supervise the strong model with enhanced weak human supervision. To make iterative empirical progress, we consider an analogy: can we use a strong model to improve weak model supervision and then use it to supervise the strong model? We empirically test it by finetuning a small weak model on ground truth labels with the additional help from a large strong model, and then finetuning the strong model on labels generated by the weak model. We find that debate can assist a weak model in extracting trustworthy information from an untrustworthy strong model, which provides leverage as context on samples when training a weak model. We also show that an ensemble of weak models helps exploit long arguments generated by strong model debaters and obtain a more robust supervision estimate. Extensive experiments on the OpenAI weak-to-strong NLP benchmarks show that the combination approach leads to better alignment, which indicates that debate has the potential to help weak-to-strong generalization.

As large language models (LLMs) get integrated into human decision-making, they are increasingly choosing goals autonomously rather than only completing human-defined ones, assuming they will reflect human preferences. However, human-LLM similarity in goal selection remains largely untested. We directly assess the validity of LLMs as proxies for human goal selection in a controlled, open-ended learning task borrowed from cognitive science. Across four state-of-the-art models (GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Centaur), we find substantial divergence from human behavior. While people gradually explore and learn to achieve goals with diversity across individuals, most models exploit a single identified solution (reward hacking) or show surprisingly low performance, with distinct patterns across models and little variability across instances of the same model. Even Centaur, explicitly trained to emulate humans in experimental settings, poorly captures people's goal selection. Chain-of-thought reasoning and persona steering provide limited improvements. These findings highlight the uniqueness of human goal selection, cautioning against replacing it with current models in applications such as personal assistance, scientific discovery, and policy research.

Hierarchical reasoning model (HRM) achieves extraordinary performance on various reasoning tasks, significantly outperforming large language model-based reasoners. To understand the strengths and potential failure modes of HRM, we conduct a mechanistic study on its reasoning patterns and find three surprising facts: (a) Failure of extremely simple puzzles, e.g., HRM can fail on a puzzle with only one unknown cell. We attribute this failure to the violation of the fixed point property, a fundamental assumption of HRM. (b) "Grokking" dynamics in reasoning steps, i.e., the answer is not improved uniformly, but instead there is a critical reasoning step that suddenly makes the answer correct; (c) Existence of multiple fixed points. HRM "guesses" the first fixed point, which could be incorrect, and gets trapped there for a while or forever. All facts imply that HRM appears to be "guessing" instead of "reasoning". Leveraging this "guessing" picture, we propose three strategies to scale HRM's guesses: data augmentation (scaling the quality of guesses), input perturbation (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging inference randomness), and model bootstrapping (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging training randomness). On the practical side, by combining all methods, we develop Augmented HRM, boosting accuracy on Sudoku-Extreme from 54.5% to 96.9%. On the scientific side, our analysis provides new insights into how reasoning models "reason".

Recent advances have made long-form report-generating systems widely available. This has prompted evaluation frameworks that use LLM-as-judge protocols and claim verification, along with meta-evaluation frameworks that seek to validate these methods. Many of the meta-evaluations estimate an evaluation quality's by comparing its assessments against human pairwise preferences. Prior work, however, suggests that human pairwise preference may be overly simplistic and can fail to capture nuances of expert expectations. We conduct a case study in meta-evaluation for long-form QA benchmarks using ScholarQA-CS2, a benchmark designed for assessing retrieval-augmented deep-research QA in the scientific domain. We comprehensively validate the benchmark through human pairwise preference judgments, then critically examine the strengths, weaknesses, and confounders of this approach. We show that pairwise preference rankings are best suited for system-level evaluation, while explicit metric-wise annotations and expert annotators are critical for reliable metric-level assessment, with subjectivity remaining a key challenge. Based on our findings, we offer practical guidelines for designing future meta-evaluations that better align evaluation methods, annotator expertise, and reporting practices. By surfacing these methodological challenges, we aim to advance evaluation standards for deep-research systems.

With the development of large language models (LLMs), striking a balance between the performance and safety of AI systems has never been more critical. However, the inherent tension between the objectives of helpfulness and harmlessness presents a significant challenge during LLM training. To address this issue, we propose Safe Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (Safe RLHF), a novel algorithm for human value alignment. Safe RLHF explicitly decouples human preferences regarding helpfulness and harmlessness, effectively avoiding the crowdworkers' confusion about the tension and allowing us to train separate reward and cost models. We formalize the safety concern of LLMs as an optimization task of maximizing the reward function while satisfying specified cost constraints. Leveraging the Lagrangian method to solve this constrained problem, Safe RLHF dynamically adjusts the balance between the two objectives during fine-tuning. Through a three-round fine-tuning using Safe RLHF, we demonstrate a superior ability to mitigate harmful responses while enhancing model performance compared to existing value-aligned algorithms. Experimentally, we fine-tuned the Alpaca-7B using Safe RLHF and aligned it with collected human preferences, significantly improving its helpfulness and harmlessness according to human evaluations.

One of the most critical tasks for startups is to validate their business model. Therefore, entrepreneurs try to collect information such as feedback from other actors to assess the validity of their assumptions and make decisions. However, previous work on decisional guidance for business model validation provides no solution for the highly uncertain and complex context of earlystage startups. The purpose of this paper is, thus, to develop design principles for a Hybrid Intelligence decision support system (HI-DSS) that combines the complementary capabilities of human and machine intelligence. We follow a design science research approach to design a prototype artifact and a set of design principles. Our study provides prescriptive knowledge for HI-DSS and contributes to previous work on decision support for business models, the applications of complementary strengths of humans and machines for making decisions, and support systems for extremely uncertain decision-making problems.

Priorities in multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) convey the relevance preference of one criterion over another, which is usually reflected by imposing the non-negativity and unit-sum constraints. The processing of such priorities is different than other unconstrained data, but this point is often neglected by researchers, which results in fallacious statistical analysis. This article studies three prevalent fallacies in group MCDM along with solutions based on compositional data analysis to avoid misusing statistical operations. First, we use a compositional approach to aggregate the priorities of a group of DMs and show that the outcome of the compositional analysis is identical to the normalized geometric mean, meaning that the arithmetic mean should be avoided. Furthermore, a new aggregation method is developed, which is a robust surrogate for the geometric mean. We also discuss the errors in computing measures of dispersion, including standard deviation and distance functions. Discussing the fallacies in computing the standard deviation, we provide a probabilistic criteria ranking by developing proper Bayesian tests, where we calculate the extent to which a criterion is more important than another. Finally, we explain the errors in computing the distance between priorities, and a clustering algorithm is specially tailored based on proper distance metrics.

Scalable oversight protocols aim to enable humans to accurately supervise superhuman AI. In this paper we study debate, where two AI's compete to convince a judge; consultancy, where a single AI tries to convince a judge that asks questions; and compare to a baseline of direct question-answering, where the judge just answers outright without the AI. We use large language models (LLMs) as both AI agents and as stand-ins for human judges, taking the judge models to be weaker than agent models. We benchmark on a diverse range of asymmetries between judges and agents, extending previous work on a single extractive QA task with information asymmetry, to also include mathematics, coding, logic and multimodal reasoning asymmetries. We find that debate outperforms consultancy across all tasks when the consultant is randomly assigned to argue for the correct/incorrect answer. Comparing debate to direct question answering, the results depend on the type of task: in extractive QA tasks with information asymmetry debate outperforms direct question answering, but in other tasks without information asymmetry the results are mixed. Previous work assigned debaters/consultants an answer to argue for. When we allow them to instead choose which answer to argue for, we find judges are less frequently convinced by the wrong answer in debate than in consultancy. Further, we find that stronger debater models increase judge accuracy, though more modestly than in previous studies.

Online alignment (e.g., GRPO) is generally more performant than offline alignment (e.g., DPO) -- but why? Drawing on prospect theory from behavioral economics, we propose a human-centric explanation. We prove that online on-policy sampling better approximates the human-perceived distribution of what the model can produce, and PPO/GRPO-style clipping -- originally introduced to just stabilize training -- recovers a perceptual bias in how humans perceive probability. In this sense, PPO/GRPO act as perceptual losses already. Our theory further suggests that the online/offline dichotomy is itself incidental to maximizing human utility, since we can achieve the same effect by selectively training on any data in a manner that mimics human perception, rather than restricting ourselves to online on-policy data. Doing so would allow us to post-train more quickly, cheaply, and flexibly without sacrificing performance. To this end, we propose a design pattern that explicitly incorporates perceptual distortions of probability into objectives like DPO/KTO/GRPO, creating humanline variants of them. Surprisingly, we find that these humanline variants, even when trained with offline off-policy data, can match the performance of their online counterparts on both verifiable and unverifiable tasks.

Automated LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks have become the de facto standard for scalable evaluation across natural language processing. For instance, in safety evaluation, these judges are relied upon to evaluate harmfulness in order to benchmark the robustness of safety against adversarial attacks. However, we show that existing validation protocols fail to account for substantial distribution shifts inherent to red-teaming: diverse victim models exhibit distinct generation styles, attacks distort output patterns, and semantic ambiguity varies significantly across jailbreak scenarios. Through a comprehensive audit using 6642 human-verified labels, we reveal that the unpredictable interaction of these shifts often causes judge performance to degrade to near random chance. This stands in stark contrast to the high human agreement reported in prior work. Crucially, we find that many attacks inflate their success rates by exploiting judge insufficiencies rather than eliciting genuinely harmful content. To enable more reliable evaluation, we propose ReliableBench, a benchmark of behaviors that remain more consistently judgeable, and JudgeStressTest, a dataset designed to expose judge failures. Data available at: https://github.com/SchwinnL/LLMJudgeReliability.