Daily Papers

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

In an era of rapid technological advancements, agentification of software tools has emerged as a critical innovation, enabling systems to function autonomously and adaptively. This paper introduces MediaMind as a case study to demonstrate the agentification process, highlighting how existing software can be transformed into intelligent agents capable of independent decision-making and dynamic interaction. Developed by aiXplain, MediaMind leverages agent-based architecture to autonomously monitor, analyze, and provide insights from multilingual media content in real time. The focus of this paper is on the technical methodologies and design principles behind agentifying MediaMind, showcasing how agentification enhances adaptability, efficiency, and responsiveness. Through detailed case studies and practical examples, we illustrate how the agentification of MediaMind empowers organizations to streamline workflows, optimize decision-making, and respond to evolving trends. This work underscores the broader potential of agentification to revolutionize software tools across various domains.

Many challenging tasks such as managing traffic systems, electricity grids, or supply chains involve complex decision-making processes that must balance multiple conflicting objectives and coordinate the actions of various independent decision-makers (DMs). One perspective for formalising and addressing such tasks is multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning (MOMARL). MOMARL broadens reinforcement learning (RL) to problems with multiple agents each needing to consider multiple objectives in their learning process. In reinforcement learning research, benchmarks are crucial in facilitating progress, evaluation, and reproducibility. The significance of benchmarks is underscored by the existence of numerous benchmark frameworks developed for various RL paradigms, including single-agent RL (e.g., Gymnasium), multi-agent RL (e.g., PettingZoo), and single-agent multi-objective RL (e.g., MO-Gymnasium). To support the advancement of the MOMARL field, we introduce MOMAland, the first collection of standardised environments for multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning. MOMAland addresses the need for comprehensive benchmarking in this emerging field, offering over 10 diverse environments that vary in the number of agents, state representations, reward structures, and utility considerations. To provide strong baselines for future research, MOMAland also includes algorithms capable of learning policies in such settings.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is widely used to address large joint observation and action spaces by decomposing a centralized control problem into multiple interacting agents. However, such decomposition often introduces additional challenges, including non-stationarity, unstable training, weak coordination, and limited theoretical guarantees. In this paper, we propose the Consensus Multi-Agent Transformer (CMAT), a centralized framework that bridges cooperative MARL to a hierarchical single-agent reinforcement learning (SARL) formulation. CMAT treats all agents as a unified entity and employs a Transformer encoder to process the large joint observation space. To handle the extensive joint action space, we introduce a hierarchical decision-making mechanism in which a Transformer decoder autoregressively generates a high-level consensus vector, simulating the process by which agents reach agreement on their strategies in latent space. Conditioned on this consensus, all agents generate their actions simultaneously, enabling order-independent joint decision making and avoiding the sensitivity to action-generation order in conventional Multi-Agent Transformers (MAT). This factorization allows the joint policy to be optimized using single-agent PPO while preserving expressive coordination through the latent consensus. To evaluate the proposed method, we conduct experiments on benchmark tasks from StarCraft II, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, and Google Research Football. The results show that CMAT achieves superior performance over recent centralized solutions, sequential MARL methods, and conventional MARL baselines. The code for this paper is available at:https://github.com/RS2002/CMAT .

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) have been successfully used to probe Large Language Models (LLMs) and extract interpretable concepts from their internal representations. These concepts are linear combinations of neuron activations that correspond to human-interpretable features. In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of SAE-based explainability approaches for sentence classification, a domain where such methods have not been extensively explored. We present a novel SAE-based model ClassifSAE tailored for text classification, leveraging a specialized classifier head and incorporating an activation rate sparsity loss. We benchmark this architecture against established methods such as ConceptShap, Independent Component Analysis, HI-Concept and a standard TopK-SAE baseline. Our evaluation covers several classification benchmarks and backbone LLMs. We further enrich our analysis with two novel metrics for measuring the precision of concept-based explanations, using an external sentence encoder. Our empirical results show that ClassifSAE improves both the causality and interpretability of the extracted features.

Generative models have emerged as a major paradigm for offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), but existing approaches require many iterative sampling steps. Recent few-step accelerations either distill a joint teacher into independent students or apply averaged velocities independently per agent, suggesting that few-step inference requires sacrificing inter-agent coordination. We show this trade-off is not necessary: single-pass multi-agent generation can preserve coordination when the velocity field is natively joint-coupled. We propose Coordinated few-step Flow (CoFlow), an architecture that combines Coordinated Velocity Attention (CVA) with Adaptive Coordination Gating. A finite-difference consistency surrogate further replaces memory-prohibitive Jacobian-vector product backpropagation through the averaged velocity field with two stop-gradient forward passes. Across 60 configurations spanning MPE, MA-MuJoCo, and SMAC, CoFlow matches or surpasses Gaussian / value-based, transformer, diffusion, and prior flow baselines on episodic return. Three independent coordination probes confirm that the gains flow through inter-agent coordination rather than per-agent capacity. A denoising-step sweep shows that single-pass inference suffices on every configuration. CoFlow reaches state-of-the-art coordination quality in 1-3 denoising steps under both centralized and decentralized execution. Project page: https://github.com/Guowei-Zou/coflow.

Modelling individual decision-making during infectious disease outbreaks is crucial for understanding behavioural dynamics and informing effective public health interventions. Prior work has shown that large language models can simulate realistic human behaviour by generating agent decisions based on demographic prompts and situational context. We build on this foundation with a spatially grounded, agent-based simulation framework that integrates LLM-generated decisions about self-reported influenza-like illness into a census-based synthetic population of agents. Location is treated as a central feature: agents are assigned to spatial units within cities, capturing the spatial distributions of different demographic groups using real-world census data and enabling geographically diverse behavioural modelling. We implement and compare three decision scenarios, independent reasoning, household influence, and message framing, and simulate self-reporting outcomes in San Francisco and Atlanta. Results reveal that income and education are the dominant drivers of reporting rate variation, with smaller but consistent effects from geography, LLM model choice, and message framing. Our framework generates synthetic data that captures both social and geographic heterogeneity, supporting spatial epidemiological modelling and bias-aware behavioural analysis.

There are an increasing number of domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) systems both surpass human ability and accurately model human behavior. This introduces the possibility of algorithmically-informed teaching in these domains through more relatable AI partners and deeper insights into human decision-making. Critical to achieving this goal, however, is coherently modeling human behavior at various skill levels. Chess is an ideal model system for conducting research into this kind of human-AI alignment, with its rich history as a pivotal testbed for AI research, mature superhuman AI systems like AlphaZero, and precise measurements of skill via chess rating systems. Previous work in modeling human decision-making in chess uses completely independent models to capture human style at different skill levels, meaning they lack coherence in their ability to adapt to the full spectrum of human improvement and are ultimately limited in their effectiveness as AI partners and teaching tools. In this work, we propose a unified modeling approach for human-AI alignment in chess that coherently captures human style across different skill levels and directly captures how people improve. Recognizing the complex, non-linear nature of human learning, we introduce a skill-aware attention mechanism to dynamically integrate players' strengths with encoded chess positions, enabling our model to be sensitive to evolving player skill. Our experimental results demonstrate that this unified framework significantly enhances the alignment between AI and human players across a diverse range of expertise levels, paving the way for deeper insights into human decision-making and AI-guided teaching tools.

In the light of the COVID-19 pandemic, deep learning methods have been widely investigated in detecting COVID-19 from chest X-rays. However, a more pragmatic approach to applying AI methods to a medical diagnosis is designing a framework that facilitates human-machine interaction and expert decision making. Studies have shown that categorization can play an essential rule in accelerating real-world decision making. Inspired by descriptive document clustering, we propose a domain-independent explanatory clustering framework to group contextually related instances and support radiologists' decision making. While most descriptive clustering approaches employ domain-specific characteristics to form meaningful clusters, we focus on model-level explanation as a more general-purpose element of every learning process to achieve cluster homogeneity. We employ DeepSHAP to generate homogeneous clusters in terms of disease severity and describe the clusters using favorable and unfavorable saliency maps, which visualize the class discriminating regions of an image. These human-interpretable maps complement radiologist knowledge to investigate the whole cluster at once. Besides, as part of this study, we evaluate a model based on VGG-19, which can identify COVID and pneumonia cases with a positive predictive value of 95% and 97%, respectively, comparable to the recent explainable approaches for COVID diagnosis.

This paper presents Diffusion Forcing, a new training paradigm where a diffusion model is trained to denoise a set of tokens with independent per-token noise levels. We apply Diffusion Forcing to sequence generative modeling by training a causal next-token prediction model to generate one or several future tokens without fully diffusing past ones. Our approach is shown to combine the strengths of next-token prediction models, such as variable-length generation, with the strengths of full-sequence diffusion models, such as the ability to guide sampling to desirable trajectories. Our method offers a range of additional capabilities, such as (1) rolling-out sequences of continuous tokens, such as video, with lengths past the training horizon, where baselines diverge and (2) new sampling and guiding schemes that uniquely profit from Diffusion Forcing's variable-horizon and causal architecture, and which lead to marked performance gains in decision-making and planning tasks. In addition to its empirical success, our method is proven to optimize a variational lower bound on the likelihoods of all subsequences of tokens drawn from the true joint distribution. Project website: https://boyuan.space/diffusion-forcing/

Fake news detection becomes particularly challenging in real-time scenarios, where emerging events often lack sufficient supporting evidence. Existing approaches often rely heavily on external evidence and therefore struggle to generalize under evidence scarcity. To address this issue, we propose Evaluation-Aware Selection of Experts (EASE), a novel framework for real-time fake news detection that dynamically adapts its decision-making process according to the assessed sufficiency of available evidence. EASE introduces a sequential evaluation mechanism comprising three independent perspectives: (1) Evidence-based evaluation, which assesses evidence and incorporates it into decision-making only when the evidence is sufficiently supportive; (2) Reasoning-based evaluation, which leverages the world knowledge of large language models (LLMs) and applies them only when their reliability is adequately established; and (3) Sentiment-based fallback, which integrates sentiment cues when neither evidence nor reasoning is reliable. To enhance the accuracy of evaluation processes, EASE employs instruction tuning with pseudo labels to guide each evaluator in justifying its perspective-specific knowledge through interpretable reasoning. Furthermore, the expert modules integrate the evaluators' justified assessments with the news content to enable evaluation-aware decision-making, thereby enhancing overall detection accuracy. Moreover, we introduce RealTimeNews-25, a new benchmark comprising recent news for evaluating model generalization on emerging news with limited evidence. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EASE not only achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple benchmarks, but also significantly improves generalization to real-time news. The code and dataset are available: https://github.com/wgyhhhh/EASE.

What is an agent? What constitutes agency? With the rise of Large Language Model (LLM) systems marketed as ``coding agents'', ``AI co-scientists'', and other ``agentic" tools that promise to drive up productivity, and at the same time, ``existential" concerns such as AI escaping human control with destructive power under a speculative ``machine agency" against humans, it has become essential to clarify where automation ends and agency begins, both for building capable systems and for understanding whether and what to fear. Drawing on Descartes' grounding of agency in independent thought, and on portrayals of autonomous beings in science fiction, we survey the current landscape of AI agents, and analyze agent architectures along five dimensions: goal, identity, decision-making, self-regulation, and learning. Specifically, we argue that genuine agency requires these structures to be internalized within the system itself rather than assembled through external scaffolding. This distinction between agentic systems, whose competence resides in engineered workflows, and agentive systems, whose capabilities (including social interaction) arise endogenously, defines the boundary between systems designed for prescribed tasks, and those capable of operating in the open world with true autonomy. Building on this analysis, we propose the Goal-Identity-Configurator (GIC) architecture for a general-purpose agent model, combining hierarchical goal decomposition, identity evolution, simulative reasoning grounded in a separately trained world model, learned self-regulation, and self-directed learning from both real and simulated experience. Furthermore, we share insight on the auditability, controllability, and safety of agentive systems that possess greater autonomy and ``agency", but remain under human oversight.

While Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in static visual understanding, their deployment in complex 3D embodied environments remains severely limited. Existing benchmarks suffer from four critical deficiencies: (1) passive perception tasks circumvent interactive dynamics; (2) simplified 2D environments fail to assess depth perception; (3) privileged state leakage bypasses genuine visual processing; and (4) human evaluation is prohibitively expensive and unscalable. We introduce PokeGym, a visually-driven long-horizon benchmark instantiated within Pokemon Legends: Z-A, a visually complex 3D open-world Role-Playing Game. PokeGym enforces strict code-level isolation: agents operate solely on raw RGB observations while an independent evaluator verifies success via memory scanning, ensuring pure vision-based decision-making and automated, scalable assessment. The benchmark comprises 30 tasks (30-220 steps) spanning navigation, interaction, and mixed scenarios, with three instruction granularities (Visual-Guided, Step-Guided, Goal-Only) to systematically deconstruct visual grounding, semantic reasoning, and autonomous exploration capabilities. Our evaluation reveals a key limitation of current VLMs: physical deadlock recovery, rather than high-level planning, constitutes the primary bottleneck, with deadlocks showing a strong negative correlation with task success. Furthermore, we uncover a metacognitive divergence: weaker models predominantly suffer from Unaware Deadlocks (oblivious to entrapment), whereas advanced models exhibit Aware Deadlocks (recognizing entrapment yet failing to recover). These findings highlight the need to integrate explicit spatial intuition into VLM architectures. The code and benchmark will be available on GitHub.

AI audits are an increasingly popular mechanism for algorithmic accountability; however, they remain poorly defined. Without a clear understanding of audit practices, let alone widely used standards or regulatory guidance, claims that an AI product or system has been audited, whether by first-, second-, or third-party auditors, are difficult to verify and may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, bias and harm. To address this knowledge gap, we provide the first comprehensive field scan of the AI audit ecosystem. We share a catalog of individuals (N=438) and organizations (N=189) who engage in algorithmic audits or whose work is directly relevant to algorithmic audits; conduct an anonymous survey of the group (N=152); and interview industry leaders (N=10). We identify emerging best practices as well as methods and tools that are becoming commonplace, and enumerate common barriers to leveraging algorithmic audits as effective accountability mechanisms. We outline policy recommendations to improve the quality and impact of these audits, and highlight proposals with wide support from algorithmic auditors as well as areas of debate. Our recommendations have implications for lawmakers, regulators, internal company policymakers, and standards-setting bodies, as well as for auditors. They are: 1) require the owners and operators of AI systems to engage in independent algorithmic audits against clearly defined standards; 2) notify individuals when they are subject to algorithmic decision-making systems; 3) mandate disclosure of key components of audit findings for peer review; 4) consider real-world harm in the audit process, including through standardized harm incident reporting and response mechanisms; 5) directly involve the stakeholders most likely to be harmed by AI systems in the algorithmic audit process; and 6) formalize evaluation and, potentially, accreditation of algorithmic auditors.

Human-factor analysis typically employs correlation analysis and significance testing to identify relationships between variables. However, these descriptive ('what-is') methods, while effective for identifying associations, are often insufficient for answering causal ('what-if') questions. Their application in such contexts often overlooks confounding and colliding variables, potentially leading to bias and suboptimal or incorrect decisions. We advocate for explicitly distinguishing descriptive from interventional questions in human-factor analysis, and applying causal inference frameworks specifically to these problems to prevent methodological mismatches. This approach disentangles complex variable relationships and enables counterfactual reasoning. Using post-occupancy evaluation (POE) data from the Center for the Built Environment's (CBE) Occupant Survey as a demonstration case, we show how causal discovery reveals intervention hierarchies and directional relationships that traditional associational analysis misses. The systematic distinction between causally associated and independent variables, combined with intervention prioritization capabilities, offers broad applicability to complex human-centric systems, for example, in building science or ergonomics, where understanding intervention effects is critical for optimization and decision-making.

Dynamic pricing in retail requires policies that adapt to shifting demand while coordinating decisions across related products. We present a systematic empirical study of multi-agent reinforcement learning for retail price optimization, comparing a strong MAPPO baseline with a graph-attention-augmented variant (MAPPO+GAT) that leverages learned interactions among products. Using a simulated pricing environment derived from real transaction data, we evaluate profit, stability across random seeds, fairness across products, and training efficiency under a standardized evaluation protocol. The results indicate that MAPPO provides a robust and reproducible foundation for portfolio-level price control, and that MAPPO+GAT further enhances performance by sharing information over the product graph without inducing excessive price volatility. These results indicate that graph-integrated MARL provides a more scalable and stable solution than independent learners for dynamic retail pricing, offering practical advantages in multi-product decision-making.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning shines as the pinnacle of multi-agent systems, conquering intricate real-world challenges, fostering collaboration and coordination among agents, and unleashing the potential for intelligent decision-making across domains. However, training a multi-agent reinforcement learning network is a formidable endeavor, demanding substantial computational resources to interact with diverse environmental variables, extract state representations, and acquire decision-making knowledge. The recent breakthroughs in large-scale pre-trained models ignite our curiosity: Can we uncover shared knowledge in multi-agent reinforcement learning and leverage pre-trained models to expedite training for future tasks? Addressing this issue, we present an innovative multi-task learning approach that aims to extract and harness common decision-making knowledge, like cooperation and competition, across different tasks. Our approach involves concurrent training of multiple multi-agent tasks, with each task employing independent front-end perception layers while sharing back-end decision-making layers. This effective decoupling of state representation extraction from decision-making allows for more efficient training and better transferability. To evaluate the efficacy of our proposed approach, we conduct comprehensive experiments in two distinct environments: the StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) and the Google Research Football (GRF) environments. The experimental results unequivocally demonstrate the smooth transferability of the shared decision-making network to other tasks, thereby significantly reducing training costs and improving final performance. Furthermore, visualizations authenticate the presence of general multi-agent decision-making knowledge within the shared network layers, further validating the effectiveness of our approach.

This paper introduces the Pandemic PACT Advanced Categorisation Engine (PPACE) along with its associated dataset. PPACE is a fine-tuned model developed to automatically classify research abstracts from funded biomedical projects according to WHO-aligned research priorities. This task is crucial for monitoring research trends and identifying gaps in global health preparedness and response. Our approach builds on human-annotated projects, which are allocated one or more categories from a predefined list. A large language model is then used to generate `rationales' explaining the reasoning behind these annotations. This augmented data, comprising expert annotations and rationales, is subsequently used to fine-tune a smaller, more efficient model. Developed as part of the Pandemic PACT project, which aims to track and analyse research funding and clinical evidence for a wide range of diseases with outbreak potential, PPACE supports informed decision-making by research funders, policymakers, and independent researchers. We introduce and release both the trained model and the instruction-based dataset used for its training. Our evaluation shows that PPACE significantly outperforms its baselines. The release of PPACE and its associated dataset offers valuable resources for researchers in multilabel biomedical document classification and supports advancements in aligning biomedical research with key global health priorities.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled agents to autonomously execute complex, long-horizon tasks, yet planning remains a primary bottleneck for reliable task execution. Existing methods typically fall into two paradigms: step-wise planning, which is reactive but often short-sighted; and one-shot planning, which generates a complete plan upfront yet is brittle to execution errors. Crucially, both paradigms suffer from entangled contexts, where the agent must reason over a monolithic history spanning multiple sub-tasks. This entanglement increases cognitive load and lets local errors propagate across otherwise independent decisions, making recovery computationally expensive. To address this, we propose Task-Decoupled Planning (TDP), a training-free framework that replaces entangled reasoning with task decoupling. TDP decomposes tasks into a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of sub-goals via a Supervisor. Using a Planner and Executor with scoped contexts, TDP confines reasoning and replanning to the active sub-task. This isolation prevents error propagation and corrects deviations locally without disrupting the workflow. Results on TravelPlanner, ScienceWorld, and HotpotQA show that TDP outperforms strong baselines while reducing token consumption by up to 82%, demonstrating that sub-task decoupling improves both robustness and efficiency for long-horizon agents.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are trained for thousands of GPU hours on carefully curated web datasets. In recent times, data curation has gained prominence with several works developing strategies to retain 'high-quality' subsets of 'raw' scraped data. For instance, the LAION public dataset retained only 10% of the total crawled data. However, these strategies are typically developed agnostic of the available compute for training. In this paper, we first demonstrate that making filtering decisions independent of training compute is often suboptimal: the limited high-quality data rapidly loses its utility when repeated, eventually requiring the inclusion of 'unseen' but 'lower-quality' data. To address this quality-quantity tradeoff (QQT), we introduce neural scaling laws that account for the non-homogeneous nature of web data, an angle ignored in existing literature. Our scaling laws (i) characterize the differing 'utility' of various quality subsets of web data; (ii) account for how utility diminishes for a data point at its 'nth' repetition; and (iii) formulate the mutual interaction of various data pools when combined, enabling the estimation of model performance on a combination of multiple data pools without ever jointly training on them. Our key message is that data curation cannot be agnostic of the total compute that a model will be trained for. Our scaling laws allow us to curate the best possible pool for achieving top performance on Datacomp at various compute budgets, carving out a pareto-frontier for data curation. Code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/scaling_laws_data_filtering.

Decision-making is a dynamic process requiring perception, memory, and reasoning to make choices and find optimal policies. Traditional approaches to decision-making suffer from sample efficiency and generalization, while large-scale self-supervised pretraining has enabled fast adaptation with fine-tuning or few-shot learning in language and vision. We thus argue to integrate knowledge acquired from generic large-scale self-supervised pretraining into downstream decision-making problems. We propose Pretrain-Then-Adapt pipeline and survey recent work on data collection, pretraining objectives and adaptation strategies for decision-making pretraining and downstream inference. Finally, we identify critical challenges and future directions for developing decision foundation model with the help of generic and flexible self-supervised pretraining.

While transformers achieve strong performance, their internal decision-making processes remain opaque. We investigate whether architectural constraints can enforce interpretability by design through architectural stream independence: maintaining a token stream (carrying symbolic structure) and contextual semantics in separated streams that remain independently observable throughout processing, with integration delayed until output. We validate this principle through the Late Fusion Architecture (LFA), which demonstrates interpretable symbolic heads through all the final layers, while standard transformers show dissolution by the third of six layers; we quantify this effect by introducing the Token-Position Dependence Score (PDS), with PDS_{max} = 0.276 and 0.058, respectively. Crucially, intervention experiments demonstrate functional modularity: suppressing LFA's recency heads causes minimal semantic damage (Cohen's d = -0.158) versus catastrophic entanglement in baselines (d = -0.672). LFA demonstrates that architectural constraints improve underlying learning mechanisms, averaging 42% stability versus 19% and 11% for baseline comparisons, with extremes from 50% on LFA's best pairs (6 of 12 heads position-invariant) down to 0% complete collapse in over-constrained cases. By preventing premature entanglement, architectural independence steers models toward semantic understanding over positional heuristics, establishing interpretability as an architectural design criterion enforceable through structural constraints rather than post-hoc analysis.

This paper introduces CognitiveDog, a pioneering development of quadruped robot with Large Multi-modal Model (LMM) that is capable of not only communicating with humans verbally but also physically interacting with the environment through object manipulation. The system was realized on Unitree Go1 robot-dog equipped with a custom gripper and demonstrated autonomous decision-making capabilities, independently determining the most appropriate actions and interactions with various objects to fulfill user-defined tasks. These tasks do not necessarily include direct instructions, challenging the robot to comprehend and execute them based on natural language input and environmental cues. The paper delves into the intricacies of this system, dataset characteristics, and the software architecture. Key to this development is the robot's proficiency in navigating space using Visual-SLAM, effectively manipulating and transporting objects, and providing insightful natural language commentary during task execution. Experimental results highlight the robot's advanced task comprehension and adaptability, underscoring its potential in real-world applications. The dataset used to fine-tune the robot-dog behavior generation model is provided at the following link: huggingface.co/datasets/ArtemLykov/CognitiveDog_dataset

We present a reinforcement learning based framework for human-centered collaborative systems. The framework is proactive and balances the benefits of timely actions with the risk of taking improper actions by minimizing the total time spent to complete the task. The framework is learned end-to-end in an unsupervised fashion addressing the perception uncertainties and decision making in an integrated manner. The framework is shown to provide more fluent coordination between human and robot partners on an example task of packaging compared to alternatives for which perception and decision-making systems are learned independently, using supervised learning. The foremost benefit of the proposed approach is that it allows for fast adaptation to new human partners and tasks since tedious annotation of motion data is avoided and the learning is performed on-line.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

Most recently developed approaches to cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning in the centralized training with decentralized execution setting involve estimating a centralized, joint value function. In this paper, we demonstrate that, despite its various theoretical shortcomings, Independent PPO (IPPO), a form of independent learning in which each agent simply estimates its local value function, can perform just as well as or better than state-of-the-art joint learning approaches on popular multi-agent benchmark suite SMAC with little hyperparameter tuning. We also compare IPPO to several variants; the results suggest that IPPO's strong performance may be due to its robustness to some forms of environment non-stationarity.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to make decisions in complex scenarios, where they need models to think deeply, reason logically, and decide wisely. Many existing studies focus solely on multi-round conversations in social tasks or simulated environments, neglecting the various types of decisions and their interdependence. Current reinforcement learning methods struggle to consider the strategies of others during training. To address these issues, we first define a strategic decision-making problem that includes two types of decisions and their temporal dependencies. Furthermore, we propose **T**heory **o**f **M**ind **P**olicy **O**ptimization **(ToMPO)** algorithm to optimize the perception of other individual strategies and the game situation trends. Compared to the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm, ToMPO enhances the LLM's strategic decision-making mainly by: 1) generating rollouts based on reasoning the strategies of other individuals, 2) estimating advantages at both the graph-level and sample-level, and 3) balancing global and partial rewards. The ToMPO algorithm outperforms the GRPO method by 35% in terms of model output compliance and cooperative outcomes. Additionally, when compared to models with parameter sizes 100 times larger, it shows an 18% improvement. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the ToMPO algorithm in enhancing the model's strategic decision-making capabilities.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

From out-competing grandmasters in chess to informing high-stakes healthcare decisions, emerging methods from artificial intelligence are increasingly capable of making complex and strategic decisions in diverse, high-dimensional, and uncertain situations. But can these methods help us devise robust strategies for managing environmental systems under great uncertainty? Here we explore how reinforcement learning, a subfield of artificial intelligence, approaches decision problems through a lens similar to adaptive environmental management: learning through experience to gradually improve decisions with updated knowledge. We review where reinforcement learning (RL) holds promise for improving evidence-informed adaptive management decisions even when classical optimization methods are intractable. For example, model-free deep RL might help identify quantitative decision strategies even when models are nonidentifiable. Finally, we discuss technical and social issues that arise when applying reinforcement learning to adaptive management problems in the environmental domain. Our synthesis suggests that environmental management and computer science can learn from one another about the practices, promises, and perils of experience-based decision-making.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems play an increasingly prominent role in human decision-making, challenges surface in the realm of human-AI interactions. One challenge arises from the suboptimal AI policies due to the inadequate consideration of humans disregarding AI recommendations, as well as the need for AI to provide advice selectively when it is most pertinent. This paper presents a sequential decision-making model that (i) takes into account the human's adherence level (the probability that the human follows/rejects machine advice) and (ii) incorporates a defer option so that the machine can temporarily refrain from making advice. We provide learning algorithms that learn the optimal advice policy and make advice only at critical time stamps. Compared to problem-agnostic reinforcement learning algorithms, our specialized learning algorithms not only enjoy better theoretical convergence properties but also show strong empirical performance.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), independent learning (IL) often shows remarkable performance and easily scales with the number of agents. Yet, using IL can be inefficient and runs the risk of failing to successfully train, particularly in scenarios that require agents to coordinate their actions. Using centralised learning (CL) enables MARL agents to quickly learn how to coordinate their behaviour but employing CL everywhere is often prohibitively expensive in real-world applications. Besides, using CL in value-based methods often needs strong representational constraints (e.g. individual-global-max condition) that can lead to poor performance if violated. In this paper, we introduce a novel plug & play IL framework named Multi-Agent Network Selection Algorithm (MANSA) which selectively employs CL only at states that require coordination. At its core, MANSA has an additional agent that uses switching controls to quickly learn the best states to activate CL during training, using CL only where necessary and vastly reducing the computational burden of CL. Our theory proves MANSA preserves cooperative MARL convergence properties, boosts IL performance and can optimally make use of a fixed budget on the number CL calls. We show empirically in Level-based Foraging (LBF) and StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) that MANSA achieves fast, superior and more reliable performance while making 40% fewer CL calls in SMAC and using CL at only 1% CL calls in LBF.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

Sequential decision-making agents struggle with long horizon tasks, since solving them requires multi-step reasoning. Most reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms address this challenge by improved credit assignment, introducing memory capability, altering the agent's intrinsic motivation (i.e. exploration) or its worldview (i.e. knowledge representation). Many of these components could be learned from offline data. In this work, we follow the hypothesis that exploration and representation learning can be improved by separately learning two different models from a single offline dataset. We show that learning a state representation using noise-contrastive estimation and a model of auxiliary reward separately from a single collection of human demonstrations can significantly improve the sample efficiency on the challenging NetHack benchmark. We also ablate various components of our experimental setting and highlight crucial insights.

In critical applications, it is vital for classifiers to defer decision-making to humans. We propose a post-hoc method that makes existing classifiers selectively abstain from predicting certain samples. Our abstaining classifier is incentivized to maintain the original accuracy for each sub-population (i.e. no harm) while achieving a set of group fairness definitions to a user specified degree. To this end, we design an Integer Programming (IP) procedure that assigns abstention decisions for each training sample to satisfy a set of constraints. To generalize the abstaining decisions to test samples, we then train a surrogate model to learn the abstaining decisions based on the IP solutions in an end-to-end manner. We analyze the feasibility of the IP procedure to determine the possible abstention rate for different levels of unfairness tolerance and accuracy constraint for achieving no harm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to identify the theoretical relationships between the constraint parameters and the required abstention rate. Our theoretical results are important since a high abstention rate is often infeasible in practice due to a lack of human resources. Our framework outperforms existing methods in terms of fairness disparity without sacrificing accuracy at similar abstention rates.

Approaches to fair and ethical AI have recently fell under the scrutiny of the emerging, chiefly qualitative, field of critical data studies, placing emphasis on the lack of sensitivity to context and complex social phenomena of such interventions. We employ some of these lessons to introduce a tripartite decision-making toolkit, informed by dilemmas encountered in the pursuit of responsible AI/ML. These are: (a) the opportunity dilemma between the availability of data shaping problem statements vs problem statements shaping data; (b) the trade-off between scalability and contextualizability (too much data versus too specific data); and (c) the epistemic positioning between the pragmatic technical objectivism and the reflexive relativism in acknowledging the social. This paper advocates for a situated reasoning and creative engagement with the dilemmas surrounding responsible algorithmic/data-driven systems, and going beyond the formulaic bias elimination and ethics operationalization narratives found in the fair-AI literature.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

Closed-loop decision-making systems (e.g., lending, screening, or recidivism risk assessment) often operate under fairness and service constraints while inducing feedback effects: decisions change who appears in the future, yielding non-stationary data and potentially amplifying disparities. We study online learning of a one-dimensional threshold policy from bandit feedback under demographic parity (DP) and, optionally, service-rate constraints. The learner observes only a scalar score each round and selects a threshold; reward and constraint residuals are revealed only for the chosen threshold. We propose Optimistic Feasible Search (OFS), a simple grid-based method that maintains confidence bounds for reward and constraint residuals for each candidate threshold. At each round, OFS selects a threshold that appears feasible under confidence bounds and, among those, maximizes optimistic reward; if no threshold appears feasible, OFS selects the threshold minimizing optimistic constraint violation. This design directly targets feasible high-utility thresholds and is particularly effective for low-dimensional, interpretable policy classes where discretization is natural. We evaluate OFS on (i) a synthetic closed-loop benchmark with stable contraction dynamics and (ii) two semi-synthetic closed-loop benchmarks grounded in German Credit and COMPAS, constructed by training a score model and feeding group-dependent acceptance decisions back into population composition. Across all environments, OFS achieves higher reward with smaller cumulative constraint violation than unconstrained and primal-dual bandit baselines, and is near-oracle relative to the best feasible fixed threshold under the same sweep procedure. Experiments are reproducible and organized with double-blind-friendly relative outputs.

The study of decentralized learning or independent learning in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning has a history of decades. Recently empirical studies show that independent PPO (IPPO) can obtain good performance, close to or even better than the methods of centralized training with decentralized execution, in several benchmarks. However, decentralized actor-critic with convergence guarantee is still open. In this paper, we propose decentralized policy optimization (DPO), a decentralized actor-critic algorithm with monotonic improvement and convergence guarantee. We derive a novel decentralized surrogate for policy optimization such that the monotonic improvement of joint policy can be guaranteed by each agent independently optimizing the surrogate. In practice, this decentralized surrogate can be realized by two adaptive coefficients for policy optimization at each agent. Empirically, we compare DPO with IPPO in a variety of cooperative multi-agent tasks, covering discrete and continuous action spaces, and fully and partially observable environments. The results show DPO outperforms IPPO in most tasks, which can be the evidence for our theoretical results.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

Sequential decision-making problems with multiple objectives arise naturally in practice and pose unique challenges for research in decision-theoretic planning and learning, which has largely focused on single-objective settings. This article surveys algorithms designed for sequential decision-making problems with multiple objectives. Though there is a growing body of literature on this subject, little of it makes explicit under what circumstances special methods are needed to solve multi-objective problems. Therefore, we identify three distinct scenarios in which converting such a problem to a single-objective one is impossible, infeasible, or undesirable. Furthermore, we propose a taxonomy that classifies multi-objective methods according to the applicable scenario, the nature of the scalarization function (which projects multi-objective values to scalar ones), and the type of policies considered. We show how these factors determine the nature of an optimal solution, which can be a single policy, a convex hull, or a Pareto front. Using this taxonomy, we survey the literature on multi-objective methods for planning and learning. Finally, we discuss key applications of such methods and outline opportunities for future work.

We show that there is a general, informative and reliable procedure for discovering causal relations when, for all the investigator knows, both latent variables and selection bias may be at work. Given information about conditional independence and dependence relations between measured variables, even when latent variables and selection bias may be present, there are sufficient conditions for reliably concluding that there is a causal path from one variable to another, and sufficient conditions for reliably concluding when no such causal path exists.

Interpretability and explainability have gained more and more attention in the field of machine learning as they are crucial when it comes to high-stakes decisions and troubleshooting. Since both provide information about predictors and their decision process, they are often seen as two independent means for one single end. This view has led to a dichotomous literature: explainability techniques designed for complex black-box models, or interpretable approaches ignoring the many explainability tools. In this position paper, we challenge the common idea that interpretability and explainability are substitutes for one another by listing their principal shortcomings and discussing how both of them mitigate the drawbacks of the other. In doing so, we call for a new perspective on interpretability and explainability, and works targeting both topics simultaneously, leveraging each of their respective assets.

This study explores whether large language models can exhibit behavioral patterns similar to human gambling addictions. As LLMs are increasingly utilized in financial decision-making domains such as asset management and commodity trading, understanding their potential for pathological decision-making has gained practical significance. We systematically analyze LLM decision-making at cognitive-behavioral and neural levels based on human gambling addiction research. In slot machine experiments, we identified cognitive features of human gambling addiction, such as illusion of control, gambler's fallacy, and loss chasing. When given the freedom to determine their own target amounts and betting sizes, bankruptcy rates rose substantially alongside increased irrational behavior, demonstrating that greater autonomy amplifies risk-taking tendencies. Through neural circuit analysis using a Sparse Autoencoder, we confirmed that model behavior is controlled by abstract decision-making features related to risky and safe behaviors, not merely by prompts. These findings suggest LLMs can internalize human-like cognitive biases and decision-making mechanisms beyond simply mimicking training data patterns, emphasizing the importance of AI safety design in financial applications.

Off-policy evaluation (OPE) is a method for estimating the return of a target policy using some pre-collected observational data generated by a potentially different behavior policy. In some cases, there may be unmeasured variables that can confound the action-reward or action-next-state relationships, rendering many existing OPE approaches ineffective. This paper develops an instrumental variable (IV)-based method for consistent OPE in confounded Markov decision processes (MDPs). Similar to single-stage decision making, we show that IV enables us to correctly identify the target policy's value in infinite horizon settings as well. Furthermore, we propose an efficient and robust value estimator and illustrate its effectiveness through extensive simulations and analysis of real data from a world-leading short-video platform.

We consider a sequential decision making problem where the agent faces the environment characterized by the stochastic discrete events and seeks an optimal intervention policy such that its long-term reward is maximized. This problem exists ubiquitously in social media, finance and health informatics but is rarely investigated by the conventional research in reinforcement learning. To this end, we present a novel framework of the model-based reinforcement learning where the agent's actions and observations are asynchronous stochastic discrete events occurring in continuous-time. We model the dynamics of the environment by Hawkes process with external intervention control term and develop an algorithm to embed such process in the Bellman equation which guides the direction of the value gradient. We demonstrate the superiority of our method in both synthetic simulator and real-world problem.

As systems trend toward superintelligence, a natural modeling premise is that agents can self-improve along every facet of their own design. We formalize this with a five-axis decomposition and a decision layer, separating incentives from learning behavior and analyzing axes in isolation. Our central result identifies and introduces a sharp utility--learning tension, the structural conflict in self-modifying systems whereby utility-driven changes that improve immediate or expected performance can also erode the statistical preconditions for reliable learning and generalization. Our findings show that distribution-free guarantees are preserved iff the policy-reachable model family is uniformly capacity-bounded; when capacity can grow without limit, utility-rational self-changes can render learnable tasks unlearnable. Under standard assumptions common in practice, these axes reduce to the same capacity criterion, yielding a single boundary for safe self-modification. Numerical experiments across several axes validate the theory by comparing destructive utility policies against our proposed two-gate policies that preserve learnability.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.

Algorithms increasingly serve as information mediators--from social media feeds and targeted advertising to the increasing ubiquity of LLMs. This engenders a joint process where agents combine private, algorithmically-mediated signals with learning from peers to arrive at decisions. To study such settings, we introduce a model of controlled sequential social learning in which an information-mediating planner (e.g. an LLM) controls the information structure of agents while they also learn from the decisions of earlier agents. The planner may seek to improve social welfare (altruistic planner) or to induce a specific action the planner prefers (biased planner). Our framework presents a new optimization problem for social learning that combines dynamic programming with decentralized action choices and Bayesian belief updates. We prove the convexity of the value function and characterize the optimal policies of altruistic and biased planners, which attain desired tradeoffs between the costs they incur and the payoffs they earn from induced agent choices. Notably, in some regimes the biased planner intentionally obfuscates the agents' signals. Even under stringent transparency constraints--information parity with individuals, no lying or cherry-picking, and full observability--we show that information mediation can substantially shift social welfare in either direction. We complement our theory with simulations in which LLMs act as both planner and agents. Notably, the LLM planner in our simulations exhibits emergent strategic behavior in steering public opinion that broadly mirrors the trends predicted, though key deviations suggest the influence of non-Bayesian reasoning consistent with the cognitive patterns of both humans and LLMs trained on human-like data. Together, we establish our framework as a tractable basis for studying the impact and regulation of LLM information mediators.

Knowing when to answer or refuse is crucial for safe and reliable decision-making language agents. Although prior work has introduced refusal strategies to boost LMs' reliability, how these models adapt their decisions to different risk levels remains underexplored. We formalize the task of risk-aware decision-making, expose critical weaknesses in existing LMs, and propose skill-decomposition solutions to mitigate them. Our findings show that even cutting-edge LMs--both regular and reasoning models--still require explicit prompt chaining to handle the task effectively, revealing the challenges that must be overcome to achieve truly autonomous decision-making agents.

Learning transparent, interpretable controllers with offline data in decision-making systems is an essential area of research due to its potential to reduce the risk of applications in real-world systems. However, in responsibility-sensitive settings such as healthcare, decision accountability is of paramount importance, yet has not been adequately addressed by the literature. This paper introduces the Accountable Offline Controller (AOC) that employs the offline dataset as the Decision Corpus and performs accountable control based on a tailored selection of examples, referred to as the Corpus Subset. ABC operates effectively in low-data scenarios, can be extended to the strictly offline imitation setting, and displays qualities of both conservation and adaptability. We assess ABC's performance in both simulated and real-world healthcare scenarios, emphasizing its capability to manage offline control tasks with high levels of performance while maintaining accountability. Keywords: Interpretable Reinforcement Learning, Explainable Reinforcement Learning, Reinforcement Learning Transparency, Offline Reinforcement Learning, Batched Control.

In AI-assisted decision-making, humans often passively review AI's suggestion and decide whether to accept or reject it as a whole. In such a paradigm, humans are found to rarely trigger analytical thinking and face difficulties in communicating the nuances of conflicting opinions to the AI when disagreements occur. To tackle this challenge, we propose Human-AI Deliberation, a novel framework to promote human reflection and discussion on conflicting human-AI opinions in decision-making. Based on theories in human deliberation, this framework engages humans and AI in dimension-level opinion elicitation, deliberative discussion, and decision updates. To empower AI with deliberative capabilities, we designed Deliberative AI, which leverages large language models (LLMs) as a bridge between humans and domain-specific models to enable flexible conversational interactions and faithful information provision. An exploratory evaluation on a graduate admissions task shows that Deliberative AI outperforms conventional explainable AI (XAI) assistants in improving humans' appropriate reliance and task performance. Based on a mixed-methods analysis of participant behavior, perception, user experience, and open-ended feedback, we draw implications for future AI-assisted decision tool design.

We improve the efficiency of algorithms for stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits. In most interesting problems, state-of-the-art algorithms take advantage of structural properties of rewards, such as independence. However, while being optimal in terms of asymptotic regret, these algorithms are inefficient. In our paper, we first reduce their implementation to a specific submodular maximization. Then, in case of matroid constraints, we design adapted approximation routines, thereby providing the first efficient algorithms that rely on reward structure to improve regret bound. In particular, we improve the state-of-the-art efficient gap-free regret bound by a factor m/log m, where m is the maximum action size. Finally, we show how our improvement translates to more general budgeted combinatorial semi-bandits.

Machine learning has successfully framed many sequential decision making problems as either supervised prediction, or optimal decision-making policy identification via reinforcement learning. In data-constrained offline settings, both approaches may fail as they assume fully optimal behavior or rely on exploring alternatives that may not exist. We introduce an inherently different approach that identifies possible "dead-ends" of a state space. We focus on the condition of patients in the intensive care unit, where a "medical dead-end" indicates that a patient will expire, regardless of all potential future treatment sequences. We postulate "treatment security" as avoiding treatments with probability proportional to their chance of leading to dead-ends, present a formal proof, and frame discovery as an RL problem. We then train three independent deep neural models for automated state construction, dead-end discovery and confirmation. Our empirical results discover that dead-ends exist in real clinical data among septic patients, and further reveal gaps between secure treatments and those that were administered.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

In the last years many accurate decision support systems have been constructed as black boxes, that is as systems that hide their internal logic to the user. This lack of explanation constitutes both a practical and an ethical issue. The literature reports many approaches aimed at overcoming this crucial weakness sometimes at the cost of scarifying accuracy for interpretability. The applications in which black box decision systems can be used are various, and each approach is typically developed to provide a solution for a specific problem and, as a consequence, delineating explicitly or implicitly its own definition of interpretability and explanation. The aim of this paper is to provide a classification of the main problems addressed in the literature with respect to the notion of explanation and the type of black box system. Given a problem definition, a black box type, and a desired explanation this survey should help the researcher to find the proposals more useful for his own work. The proposed classification of approaches to open black box models should also be useful for putting the many research open questions in perspective.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

In hybrid human-machine deferral frameworks, a classifier can defer uncertain cases to human decision-makers (who are often themselves fallible). Prior work on simultaneous training of such classifier and deferral models has typically assumed access to an oracle during training to obtain true class labels for training samples, but in practice there often is no such oracle. In contrast, we consider a "closed" decision-making pipeline in which the same fallible human decision-makers used in deferral also provide training labels. How can imperfect and biased human expert labels be used to train a fair and accurate deferral framework? Our key insight is that by exploiting weak prior information, we can match experts to input examples to ensure fairness and accuracy of the resulting deferral framework, even when imperfect and biased experts are used in place of ground truth labels. The efficacy of our approach is shown both by theoretical analysis and by evaluation on two tasks.

Decision-making, a complicated task requiring various types of abilities, presents an excellent framework for assessing Large Language Models (LLMs). Our research investigates LLMs' decision-making capabilities through the lens of a well-established field, Game Theory. We focus specifically on games that support the participation of more than two agents simultaneously. Subsequently, we introduce our framework, GAMA-Bench, including eight classical multi-agent games. We design a scoring scheme to assess a model's performance in these games quantitatively. Through GAMA-Bench, we investigate LLMs' robustness, generalizability, and enhancement strategies. Results reveal that while GPT-3.5 shows satisfying robustness, its generalizability is relatively limited. However, its performance can be improved through approaches such as Chain-of-Thought. Additionally, we conduct evaluations across various LLMs and find that GPT-4 outperforms other models on GAMA-Bench, achieving a score of 60.5. Moreover, Gemini-1.0-Pro and GPT-3.5 (0613, 1106, 0125) demonstrate similar intelligence on GAMA-Bench. The code and experimental results are made publicly available via https://github.com/CUHK-ARISE/GAMABench.

Most governance frameworks assume that rules can be defined in advance, systems can be engineered to comply, and accountability can be applied after outcomes occur. This model worked when machines replaced physical labor or accelerated calculation. It no longer holds when judgment itself is delegated to agentic AI systems operating at machine speed. The central issue here is not safety, efficiency, or employment. It is whether humans remain relevant participants in systems that increasingly shape social, economic, and political outcomes. This paper argues that static, compliance-based governance fails once decision-making moves to runtime and becomes opaque. It further argues that the core challenge is not whether AI is conscious, but whether humans can maintain meaningful communication, influence, and co-evolution with increasingly alien forms of intelligence. We position runtime governance, specifically, a newly proposed concept called the Governance Twin [1]; as a strong candidate for preserving human relevance, while acknowledging that accountability, agency, and even punishment must be rethought in this transition.

We consider tackling a single-agent RL problem by distributing it to n learners. These learners, called advisors, endeavour to solve the problem from a different focus. Their advice, taking the form of action values, is then communicated to an aggregator, which is in control of the system. We show that the local planning method for the advisors is critical and that none of the ones found in the literature is flawless: the egocentric planning overestimates values of states where the other advisors disagree, and the agnostic planning is inefficient around danger zones. We introduce a novel approach called empathic and discuss its theoretical aspects. We empirically examine and validate our theoretical findings on a fruit collection task.

Understanding how people behave in strategic settings--where they make decisions based on their expectations about the behavior of others--is a long-standing problem in the behavioral sciences. We conduct the largest study to date of strategic decision-making in the context of initial play in two-player matrix games, analyzing over 90,000 human decisions across more than 2,400 procedurally generated games that span a much wider space than previous datasets. We show that a deep neural network trained on these data predicts people's choices better than leading theories of strategic behavior, indicating that there is systematic variation that is not explained by those theories. We then modify the network to produce a new, interpretable behavioral model, revealing what the original network learned about people: their ability to optimally respond and their capacity to reason about others are dependent on the complexity of individual games. This context-dependence is critical in explaining deviations from the rational Nash equilibrium, response times, and uncertainty in strategic decisions. More broadly, our results demonstrate how machine learning can be applied beyond prediction to further help generate novel explanations of complex human behavior.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

Ecological management and decision-making typically focus on uncertainty about the future, but surprisingly little is known about how to account for uncertainty of the present: that is, the realities of having only partial or imperfect measurements. Our primary paradigms for handling decisions under uncertainty -- the precautionary principle and optimal control -- have so far given contradictory results. This paradox is best illustrated in the example of fisheries management, where many ideas that guide thinking about ecological decision making were first developed. We find that simplistic optimal control approaches have repeatedly concluded that a manager should increase catch quotas when faced with greater uncertainty about the fish biomass. Current best practices take a more precautionary approach, decreasing catch quotas by a fixed amount to account for uncertainty. Using comparisons to both simulated and historical catch data, we find that neither approach is sufficient to avoid stock collapses under moderate observational uncertainty. Using partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) methods, we demonstrate how this paradox arises from flaws in the standard theory, which contributes to over-exploitation of fisheries and increased probability of economic and ecological collapse. In contrast, we find POMDP-based management avoids such over-exploitation while also generating higher economic value. These results have significant implications for how we handle uncertainty in both fisheries and ecological management more generally.

Two common approaches to sequential decision-making are AI planning (AIP) and reinforcement learning (RL). Each has strengths and weaknesses. AIP is interpretable, easy to integrate with symbolic knowledge, and often efficient, but requires an up-front logical domain specification and is sensitive to noise; RL only requires specification of rewards and is robust to noise but is sample inefficient and not easily supplied with external knowledge. We propose an integrative approach that combines high-level planning with RL, retaining interpretability, transfer, and efficiency, while allowing for robust learning of the lower-level plan actions. Our approach defines options in hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL) from AIP operators by establishing a correspondence between the state transition model of AI planning problem and the abstract state transition system of a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Options are learned by adding intrinsic rewards to encourage consistency between the MDP and AIP transition models. We demonstrate the benefit of our integrated approach by comparing the performance of RL and HRL algorithms in both MiniGrid and N-rooms environments, showing the advantage of our method over the existing ones.

As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a longstanding problem, and despite much interest over the years it remains unclear whether current AIs have meaningful values. We propose a solution to this problem, leveraging the framework of utility functions to study the internal coherence of AI preferences. Surprisingly, we find that independently-sampled preferences in current LLMs exhibit high degrees of structural coherence, and moreover that this emerges with scale. These findings suggest that value systems emerge in LLMs in a meaningful sense, a finding with broad implications. To study these emergent value systems, we propose utility engineering as a research agenda, comprising both the analysis and control of AI utilities. We uncover problematic and often shocking values in LLM assistants despite existing control measures. These include cases where AIs value themselves over humans and are anti-aligned with specific individuals. To constrain these emergent value systems, we propose methods of utility control. As a case study, we show how aligning utilities with a citizen assembly reduces political biases and generalizes to new scenarios. Whether we like it or not, value systems have already emerged in AIs, and much work remains to fully understand and control these emergent representations.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

We propose a new partial-observability model for online learning problems where the learner, besides its own loss, also observes some noisy feedback about the other actions, depending on the underlying structure of the problem. We represent this structure by a weighted directed graph, where the edge weights are related to the quality of the feedback shared by the connected nodes. Our main contribution is an efficient algorithm that guarantees a regret of O(α^* T) after T rounds, where α^* is a novel graph property that we call the effective independence number. Our algorithm is completely parameter-free and does not require knowledge (or even estimation) of α^*. For the special case of binary edge weights, our setting reduces to the partial-observability models of Mannor and Shamir (2011) and Alon et al. (2013) and our algorithm recovers the near-optimal regret bounds.

The general sequential decision-making problem, which includes Markov decision processes (MDPs) and partially observable MDPs (POMDPs) as special cases, aims at maximizing a cumulative reward by making a sequence of decisions based on a history of observations and actions over time. Recent studies have shown that the sequential decision-making problem is statistically learnable if it admits a low-rank structure modeled by predictive state representations (PSRs). Despite these advancements, existing approaches typically involve oracles or steps that are computationally intractable. On the other hand, the upper confidence bound (UCB) based approaches, which have served successfully as computationally efficient methods in bandits and MDPs, have not been investigated for more general PSRs, due to the difficulty of optimistic bonus design in these more challenging settings. This paper proposes the first known UCB-type approach for PSRs, featuring a novel bonus term that upper bounds the total variation distance between the estimated and true models. We further characterize the sample complexity bounds for our designed UCB-type algorithms for both online and offline PSRs. In contrast to existing approaches for PSRs, our UCB-type algorithms enjoy computational tractability, last-iterate guaranteed near-optimal policy, and guaranteed model accuracy.

Many resource management problems require sequential decision-making under uncertainty, where the only uncertainty affecting the decision outcomes are exogenous variables outside the control of the decision-maker. We model these problems as Exo-MDPs (Markov Decision Processes with Exogenous Inputs) and design a class of data-efficient algorithms for them termed Hindsight Learning (HL). Our HL algorithms achieve data efficiency by leveraging a key insight: having samples of the exogenous variables, past decisions can be revisited in hindsight to infer counterfactual consequences that can accelerate policy improvements. We compare HL against classic baselines in the multi-secretary and airline revenue management problems. We also scale our algorithms to a business-critical cloud resource management problem -- allocating Virtual Machines (VMs) to physical machines, and simulate their performance with real datasets from a large public cloud provider. We find that HL algorithms outperform domain-specific heuristics, as well as state-of-the-art reinforcement learning methods.

Accelerating Entrepreneurial Decision-Making Through Hybrid Intelligence DESIGN PARADIGMS AND PRINCIPLES FOR DECISIONAL GUIDANCE IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP

LLMs are ideal for decision-making thanks to their ability to reason over long contexts. However, challenges arise when processing speech transcripts that describe complex scenarios, as they are verbose and include repetition, hedging, and vagueness. E.g., during a company's earnings call, an executive might project a positive revenue outlook to reassure investors, despite uncertainty regarding future earnings. It is crucial for LLMs to incorporate this uncertainty systematically when making decisions. In this paper, we introduce DeFine, a modular framework that constructs probabilistic factor profiles from complex scenarios. It then integrates these profiles with analogical reasoning, leveraging insights from similar past experiences to guide LLMs in making critical decisions in new situations. Our framework separates the tasks of quantifying uncertainty and incorporating it into LLM decision-making. This approach is particularly useful in areas such as consulting and financial deliberation, where making decisions under uncertainty is vital.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

When automated decision systems fail, organizations frequently discover that formally compliant governance infrastructure cannot reconstruct what happened or why. This paper synthesizes an operational governance evidence framework -- structural accountability collapse diagnostics, decision trace schemas, evidence sufficiency measurement, and label-free monitoring -- into an integrated chain and analytically assesses its transferability across four decision system architectures. The cross-architecture comparison reveals a governance coverage gradient: deterministic rule engines achieve full DES-property fillability, hybrid ML+rules systems achieve partial fillability, classical ML systems achieve only minimal fillability, and agentic AI systems encounter structural breaks. We introduce the cascade of uncertainty, showing how governance failures propagate through serial dependencies between framework layers. For agentic systems, we identify three structural breaks -- decision diffusion, evidence fragmentation, and responsibility ambiguity -- and propose corresponding analytical extensions. Four propositions formalize the gradient, cascade compounding, delegation-depth effects, and extension sufficiency, establishing boundary conditions for the framework's valid operating envelope.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

A central puzzle for the behavioural sciences and for human-facing artificial intelligence is the persistence of within-person variability. The same individual, presented with the same observable input, produces different outcomes on different occasions, and different individuals produce divergent outcomes that no observable covariate fully predicts. We argue that this variability belongs in the dynamic latent state of the person, and that human outcomes are controllable in a precise and operational sense through interventions that target the state and its weighting at the moment a decision is being formed. We define a state as the time-indexed weighting vector over the dimensions that govern how an individual's biology, physiology, and neuropsychology process the next event into a decision and an outcome. The relationship between state, decision, and outcome is causal rather than correlational. The weighting vector is dynamic at sub-daily timescales. The conscious channel through which outcomes are reportable is a narrow attentional bottleneck whose contents are themselves state-dependent. Taken together, these claims imply that the outcome of a given event is controllable, conditionally, on the state-trajectory at the time of intervention. We motivate the framework with six strands of established evidence (causal inference, predictive processing, allostasis, attentional bottleneck, chronobiology, computational psychiatry) and a 24-month observational base from a deployed behavioural platform spanning more than 200,000 consented users across four occupational personas (research period 2023 to 2026). We derive seven testable predictions, list six operational requirements for state-aware systems, and discuss implications for digital health, education, AI personalisation, and personal agency.

We propose a reinforcement learning (RL) framework under a broad class of risk objectives, characterized by convex scoring functions. This class covers many common risk measures, such as variance, Expected Shortfall, entropic Value-at-Risk, and mean-risk utility. To resolve the time-inconsistency issue, we consider an augmented state space and an auxiliary variable and recast the problem as a two-state optimization problem. We propose a customized Actor-Critic algorithm and establish some theoretical approximation guarantees. A key theoretical contribution is that our results do not require the Markov decision process to be continuous. Additionally, we propose an auxiliary variable sampling method inspired by the alternating minimization algorithm, which is convergent under certain conditions. We validate our approach in simulation experiments with a financial application in statistical arbitrage trading, demonstrating the effectiveness of the algorithm.

In this paper, we consider the problem of sleeping bandits with stochastic action sets and adversarial rewards. In this setting, in contrast to most work in bandits, the actions may not be available at all times. For instance, some products might be out of stock in item recommendation. The best existing efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) algorithms for this problem only guarantee an O(T^{2/3}) upper-bound on the regret. Yet, inefficient algorithms based on EXP4 can achieve O(T). In this paper, we provide a new computationally efficient algorithm inspired by EXP3 satisfying a regret of order O(T) when the availabilities of each action i in cA are independent. We then study the most general version of the problem where at each round available sets are generated from some unknown arbitrary distribution (i.e., without the independence assumption) and propose an efficient algorithm with O(2^K T) regret guarantee. Our theoretical results are corroborated with experimental evaluations.

The ability to separate signal from noise, and reason with clean abstractions, is critical to intelligence. With this ability, humans can efficiently perform real world tasks without considering all possible nuisance factors.How can artificial agents do the same? What kind of information can agents safely discard as noises? In this work, we categorize information out in the wild into four types based on controllability and relation with reward, and formulate useful information as that which is both controllable and reward-relevant. This framework clarifies the kinds information removed by various prior work on representation learning in reinforcement learning (RL), and leads to our proposed approach of learning a Denoised MDP that explicitly factors out certain noise distractors. Extensive experiments on variants of DeepMind Control Suite and RoboDesk demonstrate superior performance of our denoised world model over using raw observations alone, and over prior works, across policy optimization control tasks as well as the non-control task of joint position regression.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

We study the problem of modeling a population of agents pursuing unknown goals subject to unknown computational constraints. In standard models of bounded rationality, sub-optimal decision-making is simulated by adding homoscedastic noise to optimal decisions rather than explicitly simulating constrained inference. In this work, we introduce a latent inference budget model (L-IBM) that models agents' computational constraints explicitly, via a latent variable (inferred jointly with a model of agents' goals) that controls the runtime of an iterative inference algorithm. L-IBMs make it possible to learn agent models using data from diverse populations of suboptimal actors. In three modeling tasks -- inferring navigation goals from routes, inferring communicative intents from human utterances, and predicting next moves in human chess games -- we show that L-IBMs match or outperform Boltzmann models of decision-making under uncertainty. Inferred inference budgets are themselves meaningful, efficient to compute, and correlated with measures of player skill, partner skill and task difficulty.

POMDPs capture a broad class of decision making problems, but hardness results suggest that learning is intractable even in simple settings due to the inherent partial observability. However, in many realistic problems, more information is either revealed or can be computed during some point of the learning process. Motivated by diverse applications ranging from robotics to data center scheduling, we formulate a Hindsight Observable Markov Decision Process (HOMDP) as a POMDP where the latent states are revealed to the learner in hindsight and only during training. We introduce new algorithms for the tabular and function approximation settings that are provably sample-efficient with hindsight observability, even in POMDPs that would otherwise be statistically intractable. We give a lower bound showing that the tabular algorithm is optimal in its dependence on latent state and observation cardinalities.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used across society, including in domains like business, engineering, and medicine. These fields often grapple with decision-making under uncertainty, a critical yet challenging task. In this paper, we show that directly prompting LLMs on these types of decision-making problems yields poor results, especially as the problem complexity increases. To overcome this limitation, we propose DeLLMa (Decision-making Large Language Model assistant), a framework designed to enhance decision-making accuracy in uncertain environments. DeLLMa involves a multi-step scaffolding procedure, drawing upon principles from decision theory and utility theory, to provide an optimal and human-auditable decision-making process. We validate our framework on decision-making environments involving real agriculture and finance data. Our results show that DeLLMa can significantly improve LLM decision-making performance, achieving up to a 40% increase in accuracy over competing methods.

Recent improvements in conditional generative modeling have made it possible to generate high-quality images from language descriptions alone. We investigate whether these methods can directly address the problem of sequential decision-making. We view decision-making not through the lens of reinforcement learning (RL), but rather through conditional generative modeling. To our surprise, we find that our formulation leads to policies that can outperform existing offline RL approaches across standard benchmarks. By modeling a policy as a return-conditional diffusion model, we illustrate how we may circumvent the need for dynamic programming and subsequently eliminate many of the complexities that come with traditional offline RL. We further demonstrate the advantages of modeling policies as conditional diffusion models by considering two other conditioning variables: constraints and skills. Conditioning on a single constraint or skill during training leads to behaviors at test-time that can satisfy several constraints together or demonstrate a composition of skills. Our results illustrate that conditional generative modeling is a powerful tool for decision-making.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

Decision making demands intricate interplay between perception, memory, and reasoning to discern optimal policies. Conventional approaches to decision making face challenges related to low sample efficiency and poor generalization. In contrast, foundation models in language and vision have showcased rapid adaptation to diverse new tasks. Therefore, we advocate for the construction of foundation agents as a transformative shift in the learning paradigm of agents. This proposal is underpinned by the formulation of foundation agents with their fundamental characteristics and challenges motivated by the success of large language models (LLMs). Moreover, we specify the roadmap of foundation agents from large interactive data collection or generation, to self-supervised pretraining and adaptation, and knowledge and value alignment with LLMs. Lastly, we pinpoint critical research questions derived from the formulation and delineate trends for foundation agents supported by real-world use cases, addressing both technical and theoretical aspects to propel the field towards a more comprehensive and impactful future.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents deployed for real-world tasks face a fundamental dilemma: user requests are underspecified, yet agents must decide whether to act on incomplete information or interrupt users for clarification. Existing approaches either rely on brittle confidence thresholds that require task-specific tuning, or fail to account for the varying stakes of different decisions. We introduce a decision-theoretic framework that resolves this trade-off through the Value of Information (VoI), enabling agents to dynamically weigh the expected utility gain from asking questions against the cognitive cost imposed on users. Our inference-time method requires no hyperparameter tuning and adapts seamlessly across contexts-from casual games to medical diagnosis. Experiments across four diverse domains (20 Questions, medical diagnosis, flight booking, and e-commerce) show that VoI consistently matches or exceeds the best manually-tuned baselines, achieving up to 1.36 utility points higher in high-cost settings. This work provides a parameter-free framework for adaptive agent communication that explicitly balances task risk, query ambiguity, and user effort.

In this tutorial article, we aim to provide the reader with the conceptual tools needed to get started on research on offline reinforcement learning algorithms: reinforcement learning algorithms that utilize previously collected data, without additional online data collection. Offline reinforcement learning algorithms hold tremendous promise for making it possible to turn large datasets into powerful decision making engines. Effective offline reinforcement learning methods would be able to extract policies with the maximum possible utility out of the available data, thereby allowing automation of a wide range of decision-making domains, from healthcare and education to robotics. However, the limitations of current algorithms make this difficult. We will aim to provide the reader with an understanding of these challenges, particularly in the context of modern deep reinforcement learning methods, and describe some potential solutions that have been explored in recent work to mitigate these challenges, along with recent applications, and a discussion of perspectives on open problems in the field.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

Multi-agent systems have demonstrated exceptional performance in downstream tasks beyond diverse single agent baselines. A growing body of work has explored ways to improve their reasoning and collaboration, from vote, debate, to complex interaction protocols. However, it still remains opaque why specific choice would be preferred in multi-agent systems. Inspired by the decision-making mechanism of democratic committees and The Society of Mind, we introduce Roundtable Policy, an inference-time reasoning framework for multi-agent systems that performs inference through the weighted consensus of multiple LLMs. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate its that this approach significantly enhances reasoning in complex heterogeneous scientific tasks. Roundtable Policy emphasizes structured and interpretable inference rather than opaque convergence, while requires only black-box access and uniform procedures, making it broadly applicable to diverse multi-agent systems.

As AI systems become more capable, we would like to enlist their help to supervise other AIs. We experiment with methods for training a harmless AI assistant through self-improvement, without any human labels identifying harmful outputs. The only human oversight is provided through a list of rules or principles, and so we refer to the method as 'Constitutional AI'. The process involves both a supervised learning and a reinforcement learning phase. In the supervised phase we sample from an initial model, then generate self-critiques and revisions, and then finetune the original model on revised responses. In the RL phase, we sample from the finetuned model, use a model to evaluate which of the two samples is better, and then train a preference model from this dataset of AI preferences. We then train with RL using the preference model as the reward signal, i.e. we use 'RL from AI Feedback' (RLAIF). As a result we are able to train a harmless but non-evasive AI assistant that engages with harmful queries by explaining its objections to them. Both the SL and RL methods can leverage chain-of-thought style reasoning to improve the human-judged performance and transparency of AI decision making. These methods make it possible to control AI behavior more precisely and with far fewer human labels.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

We have only limited understanding of how and why large language models (LLMs) respond in the ways that they do. Their neural networks have proven challenging to interpret, and we are only beginning to tease out the function of individual neurons and circuits within them. However, another path to understanding these systems is to investigate and develop their capacity to introspect and explain their own functioning. Here, we show that i) contemporary LLMs are capable of providing accurate, quantitative descriptions of their own internal processes during certain kinds of decision-making, ii) that it is possible to improve these capabilities through training, and iii) that this training generalizes to at least some degree. To do so, we fine-tuned GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini to make decisions in a wide variety of complex contexts (e.g., choosing between condos, loans, vacations, etc.) according to randomly-generated, quantitative preferences about how to weigh different attributes during decision-making (e.g., the relative importance of natural light versus quiet surroundings for condos). We demonstrate that the LLMs can accurately report these preferences (i.e., the weights that they learned to give to different attributes during decision-making). Next, we demonstrate that these LLMs can be fine-tuned to explain their decision-making even more accurately. Finally, we demonstrate that this training generalizes: It improves the ability of the models to accurately explain what they are doing as they make other complex decisions, not just decisions they have learned to make via fine-tuning. This work is a step towards training LLMs to accurately and broadly report on their own internal processes -- a possibility that would yield substantial benefits for interpretability, control, and safety.

This paper studies the sample-efficiency of learning in Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs), a challenging problem in reinforcement learning that is known to be exponentially hard in the worst-case. Motivated by real-world settings such as loading in game playing, we propose an enhanced feedback model called ``multiple observations in hindsight'', where after each episode of interaction with the POMDP, the learner may collect multiple additional observations emitted from the encountered latent states, but may not observe the latent states themselves. We show that sample-efficient learning under this feedback model is possible for two new subclasses of POMDPs: multi-observation revealing POMDPs and distinguishable POMDPs. Both subclasses generalize and substantially relax revealing POMDPs -- a widely studied subclass for which sample-efficient learning is possible under standard trajectory feedback. Notably, distinguishable POMDPs only require the emission distributions from different latent states to be different instead of linearly independent as required in revealing POMDPs.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Power grids are becoming more complex to operate in the digital age given the current energy transition to cope with climate change. As a result, real-time decision-making is getting more challenging as the human operator has to deal with more information, more uncertainty, more applications, and more coordination. While supervision has been primarily used to help them make decisions over the last decades, it cannot reasonably scale up anymore. There is a great need for rethinking the human-machine interface under more unified and interactive frameworks. Taking advantage of the latest developments in Human-Machine Interface and Artificial Intelligence, we expose our vision of a new assistant framework relying on an hypervision interface and greater bidirectional interaction. We review the known principles of decision-making driving our assistant design alongside with its supporting assistance functions. We finally share some guidelines to make progress towards the development of such an assistant.

We advance the study of incentivized bandit exploration, in which arm choices are viewed as recommendations and are required to be Bayesian incentive compatible. Recent work has shown under certain independence assumptions that after collecting enough initial samples, the popular Thompson sampling algorithm becomes incentive compatible. We give an analog of this result for linear bandits, where the independence of the prior is replaced by a natural convexity condition. This opens up the possibility of efficient and regret-optimal incentivized exploration in high-dimensional action spaces. In the semibandit model, we also improve the sample complexity for the pre-Thompson sampling phase of initial data collection.

AI research often requires decisions before future evidence exists: which bottleneck to attack, which direction to pursue, or where a project should be positioned. We introduce ForeSci, a temporally controlled benchmark for evaluating whether LLM agents can make such forward-looking research judgements from historical evidence. ForeSci contains 500 tasks across four fast-moving AI domains and four decision families. Each task is paired with a cutoff-aligned offline knowledge base; post-cutoff papers are hidden during generation and used only for validation. To avoid random future-event prediction, tasks are derived from pre-cutoff taxonomy branches and evidence signals, and answer-generation backbones are selected to precede the task cutoffs. We evaluate native LLMs, Hybrid RAG, and three research-agent adaptations across four backbones. Results show that explicit evidence organization improves traceability and factual support, but gains depend strongly on the decision family. Diagnostics reveal a recurring evidence-decision decoupling: agents may cite relevant evidence while forecasting the wrong research object. ForeSci turns forward-looking AI research judgement into a controlled benchmark for evaluating research agents as decision-making systems.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

One of the most critical tasks for startups is to validate their business model. Therefore, entrepreneurs try to collect information such as feedback from other actors to assess the validity of their assumptions and make decisions. However, previous work on decisional guidance for business model validation provides no solution for the highly uncertain and complex context of earlystage startups. The purpose of this paper is, thus, to develop design principles for a Hybrid Intelligence decision support system (HI-DSS) that combines the complementary capabilities of human and machine intelligence. We follow a design science research approach to design a prototype artifact and a set of design principles. Our study provides prescriptive knowledge for HI-DSS and contributes to previous work on decision support for business models, the applications of complementary strengths of humans and machines for making decisions, and support systems for extremely uncertain decision-making problems.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

Ethical decision-making is a critical aspect of human judgment, and the growing use of LLMs in decision-support systems necessitates a rigorous evaluation of their moral reasoning capabilities. However, existing assessments primarily rely on single-step evaluations, failing to capture how models adapt to evolving ethical challenges. Addressing this gap, we introduce the Multi-step Moral Dilemmas (MMDs), the first dataset specifically constructed to evaluate the evolving moral judgments of LLMs across 3,302 five-stage dilemmas. This framework enables a fine-grained, dynamic analysis of how LLMs adjust their moral reasoning across escalating dilemmas. Our evaluation of nine widely used LLMs reveals that their value preferences shift significantly as dilemmas progress, indicating that models recalibrate moral judgments based on scenario complexity. Furthermore, pairwise value comparisons demonstrate that while LLMs often prioritize the value of care, this value can sometimes be superseded by fairness in certain contexts, highlighting the dynamic and context-dependent nature of LLM ethical reasoning. Our findings call for a shift toward dynamic, context-aware evaluation paradigms, paving the way for more human-aligned and value-sensitive development of LLMs.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

This paper argues that deep neural networks (DNNs) mostly determine their outputs during the early stages of inference, where biases inherent in the model play a crucial role in shaping this process. We draw a parallel between this phenomenon and human decision-making, which often relies on fast, intuitive heuristics. Using diffusion models (DMs) as a case study, we demonstrate that DNNs often make early-stage decision-making influenced by the type and extent of bias in their design and training. Our findings offer a new perspective on bias mitigation, efficient inference, and the interpretation of machine learning systems. By identifying the temporal dynamics of decision-making in DNNs, this paper aims to inspire further discussion and research within the machine learning community.

Countless decisions shape our daily lives, and it is paramount to understand the how and why behind these choices. In this paper, we introduce a new LLM decision-making framework called STRUX, which enhances LLM decision-making by providing structured explanations. These include favorable and adverse facts related to the decision, along with their respective strengths. STRUX begins by distilling lengthy information into a concise table of key facts. It then employs a series of self-reflection steps to determine which of these facts are pivotal, categorizing them as either favorable or adverse in relation to a specific decision. Lastly, we fine-tune an LLM to identify and prioritize these key facts to optimize decision-making. STRUX has been evaluated on the challenging task of forecasting stock investment decisions based on earnings call transcripts and demonstrated superior performance against strong baselines. It enhances decision transparency by allowing users to understand the impact of different factors, representing a meaningful step towards practical decision-making with LLMs.

Effective decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) is essential for handling intricate tasks. However, existing approaches prioritize performance but often overlook the balance between effectiveness and computational cost. To address this, we first introduce the 3E Criteria to systematically assess the cost-effectiveness of search strategies, revealing that existing methods often trade significant efficiency for marginal performance gains. To improve LLM decision-making while maintaining efficiency, we propose the Speculative Reward Model (SRM), a plug-and-play framework that seamlessly integrates with existing search strategies. Specifically, SRM employs an external reward assigner to predict optimal actions, reducing reliance on LLMs' internal self-evaluation. And a speculative verification mechanism is used to prune suboptimal choices and guide the search toward more promising steps. We evaluate SRM on several complex decision-making tasks including mathematical reasoning, planning and numerical reasoning in specialized domains. Experimental results show that SRM reduces costs to 1/10 of the original search framework on average while maintaining effectiveness.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

Reinforcement learning (RL) tasks are typically framed as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), assuming that decisions are made at fixed time intervals. However, many applications of great importance, including healthcare, do not satisfy this assumption, yet they are commonly modelled as MDPs after an artificial reshaping of the data. In addition, most healthcare (and similar) problems are offline by nature, allowing for only retrospective studies. To address both challenges, we begin by discussing the Semi-MDP (SMDP) framework, which formally handles actions of variable timings. We next present a formal way to apply SMDP modifications to nearly any given value-based offline RL method. We use this theory to introduce three SMDP-based offline RL algorithms, namely, SDQN, SDDQN, and SBCQ. We then experimentally demonstrate that only these SMDP-based algorithms learn the optimal policy in variable-time environments, whereas their MDP counterparts do not. Finally, we apply our new algorithms to a real-world offline dataset pertaining to warfarin dosing for stroke prevention and demonstrate similar results.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

Schema-guided reasoning pipelines ask LLMs to produce explicit intermediate structures -- rubrics, checklists, verification queries -- before committing to a final decision. But do these structures causally determine the output, or merely accompany it? We introduce a causal evaluation protocol that makes this directly measurable: by selecting tasks where a deterministic function maps intermediate structures to decisions, every controlled edit implies a unique correct output. Across eight models and three benchmarks, models appear self-consistent with their own intermediate structures but fail to update predictions after intervention in up to 60% of cases -- revealing that apparent faithfulness is fragile once the intermediate structure changes. When derivation of the final decision from the structure is delegated to an external tool, this fragility largely disappears; however, prompts which ask to prioritize the intermediate structure over the original input do not materially close the gap. Overall, intermediate structures in schema-guided pipelines function as influential context rather than stable causal mediators.

We describe a class of tasks called decision-oriented dialogues, in which AI assistants such as large language models (LMs) must collaborate with one or more humans via natural language to help them make complex decisions. We formalize three domains in which users face everyday decisions: (1) choosing an assignment of reviewers to conference papers, (2) planning a multi-step itinerary in a city, and (3) negotiating travel plans for a group of friends. In each of these settings, AI assistants and users have disparate abilities that they must combine to arrive at the best decision: assistants can access and process large amounts of information, while users have preferences and constraints external to the system. For each task, we build a dialogue environment where agents receive a reward based on the quality of the final decision they reach. We evaluate LMs in self-play and in collaboration with humans and find that they fall short compared to human assistants, achieving much lower rewards despite engaging in longer dialogues. We highlight a number of challenges models face in decision-oriented dialogues, ranging from goal-directed behavior to reasoning and optimization, and release our environments as a testbed for future work.