Daily Papers

Tackling real-world socio-economic challenges requires designing and testing economic policies. However, this is hard in practice, due to a lack of appropriate (micro-level) economic data and limited opportunity to experiment. In this work, we train social planners that discover tax policies in dynamic economies that can effectively trade-off economic equality and productivity. We propose a two-level deep reinforcement learning approach to learn dynamic tax policies, based on economic simulations in which both agents and a government learn and adapt. Our data-driven approach does not make use of economic modeling assumptions, and learns from observational data alone. We make four main contributions. First, we present an economic simulation environment that features competitive pressures and market dynamics. We validate the simulation by showing that baseline tax systems perform in a way that is consistent with economic theory, including in regard to learned agent behaviors and specializations. Second, we show that AI-driven tax policies improve the trade-off between equality and productivity by 16% over baseline policies, including the prominent Saez tax framework. Third, we showcase several emergent features: AI-driven tax policies are qualitatively different from baselines, setting a higher top tax rate and higher net subsidies for low incomes. Moreover, AI-driven tax policies perform strongly in the face of emergent tax-gaming strategies learned by AI agents. Lastly, AI-driven tax policies are also effective when used in experiments with human participants. In experiments conducted on MTurk, an AI tax policy provides an equality-productivity trade-off that is similar to that provided by the Saez framework along with higher inverse-income weighted social welfare.

Our motivation is to shed light the performance of the widely popular "R-Learner." Like many other methods for estimating conditional average treatment effects (CATEs), R-Learning can be expressed as a weighted pseudo-outcome regression (POR). Previous comparisons of POR techniques have paid careful attention to the choice of pseudo-outcome transformation. However, we argue that the dominant driver of performance is actually the choice of weights. Specifically, we argue that R-Learning implicitly performs an inverse-variance weighted form of POR. These weights stabilize the regression and allow for convenient simplifications of bias terms.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Weighting methods in causal inference have been widely used to achieve a desirable level of covariate balancing. However, the existing weighting methods have desirable theoretical properties only when a certain model, either the propensity score or outcome regression model, is correctly specified. In addition, the corresponding estimators do not behave well for finite samples due to large variance even when the model is correctly specified. In this paper, we consider to use the integral probability metric (IPM), which is a metric between two probability measures, for covariate balancing. Optimal weights are determined so that weighted empirical distributions for the treated and control groups have the smallest IPM value for a given set of discriminators. We prove that the corresponding estimator can be consistent without correctly specifying any model (neither the propensity score nor the outcome regression model). In addition, we empirically show that our proposed method outperforms existing weighting methods with large margins for finite samples.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

Is it possible to understand or imitate a policy maker's rationale by looking at past decisions they made? We formalize this question as the problem of learning social welfare functions belonging to the well-studied family of power mean functions. We focus on two learning tasks; in the first, the input is vectors of utilities of an action (decision or policy) for individuals in a group and their associated social welfare as judged by a policy maker, whereas in the second, the input is pairwise comparisons between the welfares associated with a given pair of utility vectors. We show that power mean functions are learnable with polynomial sample complexity in both cases, even if the comparisons are social welfare information is noisy. Finally, we design practical algorithms for these tasks and evaluate their performance.

This article introduces Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) with Distribution-Valued Outcomes (R3D), extending the standard RDD framework to settings where the outcome is a distribution rather than a scalar. Such settings arise when treatment is assigned at a higher level of aggregation than the outcome-for example, when a subsidy is allocated based on a firm-level revenue cutoff while the outcome of interest is the distribution of employee wages within the firm. Since standard RDD methods cannot accommodate such two-level randomness, I propose a novel approach based on random distributions. The target estimand is a "local average quantile treatment effect", which averages across random quantiles. To estimate this target, I introduce two related approaches: one that extends local polynomial regression to random quantiles and another based on local Fr\'echet regression, a form of functional regression. For both estimators, I establish asymptotic normality and develop uniform, debiased confidence bands together with a data-driven bandwidth selection procedure. Simulations validate these theoretical properties and show existing methods to be biased and inconsistent in this setting. I then apply the proposed methods to study the effects of gubernatorial party control on within-state income distributions in the US, using a close-election design. The results suggest a classic equality-efficiency tradeoff under Democratic governorship, driven by reductions in income at the top of the distribution.

Off-policy learning (OPL) aims at finding improved policies from logged bandit data, often by minimizing the inverse propensity scoring (IPS) estimator of the risk. In this work, we investigate a smooth regularization for IPS, for which we derive a two-sided PAC-Bayes generalization bound. The bound is tractable, scalable, interpretable and provides learning certificates. In particular, it is also valid for standard IPS without making the assumption that the importance weights are bounded. We demonstrate the relevance of our approach and its favorable performance through a set of learning tasks. Since our bound holds for standard IPS, we are able to provide insight into when regularizing IPS is useful. Namely, we identify cases where regularization might not be needed. This goes against the belief that, in practice, clipped IPS often enjoys favorable performance than standard IPS in OPL.

This paper studies distributional model risk in marginal problems, where each marginal measure is assumed to lie in a Wasserstein ball centered at a fixed reference measure with a given radius. Theoretically, we establish several fundamental results including strong duality, finiteness of the proposed Wasserstein distributional model risk, and the existence of an optimizer at each radius. In addition, we show continuity of the Wasserstein distributional model risk as a function of the radius. Using strong duality, we extend the well-known Makarov bounds for the distribution function of the sum of two random variables with given marginals to Wasserstein distributionally robust Markarov bounds. Practically, we illustrate our results on four distinct applications when the sample information comes from multiple data sources and only some marginal reference measures are identified. They are: partial identification of treatment effects; externally valid treatment choice via robust welfare functions; Wasserstein distributionally robust estimation under data combination; and evaluation of the worst aggregate risk measures.

For observational studies, we study the sensitivity of causal inference when treatment assignments may depend on unobserved confounders. We develop a loss minimization approach for estimating bounds on the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) when unobserved confounders have a bounded effect on the odds ratio of treatment selection. Our approach is scalable and allows flexible use of model classes in estimation, including nonparametric and black-box machine learning methods. Based on these bounds for the CATE, we propose a sensitivity analysis for the average treatment effect (ATE). Our semi-parametric estimator extends/bounds the augmented inverse propensity weighted (AIPW) estimator for the ATE under bounded unobserved confounding. By constructing a Neyman orthogonal score, our estimator of the bound for the ATE is a regular root-n estimator so long as the nuisance parameters are estimated at the o_p(n^{-1/4}) rate. We complement our methodology with optimality results showing that our proposed bounds are tight in certain cases. We demonstrate our method on simulated and real data examples, and show accurate coverage of our confidence intervals in practical finite sample regimes with rich covariate information.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.

Reward functions are difficult to design and often hard to align with human intent. Preference-based Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms address these problems by learning reward functions from human feedback. However, the majority of preference-based RL methods na\"ively combine supervised reward models with off-the-shelf RL algorithms. Contemporary approaches have sought to improve performance and query complexity by using larger and more complex reward architectures such as transformers. Instead of using highly complex architectures, we develop a new and parameter-efficient algorithm, Inverse Preference Learning (IPL), specifically designed for learning from offline preference data. Our key insight is that for a fixed policy, the Q-function encodes all information about the reward function, effectively making them interchangeable. Using this insight, we completely eliminate the need for a learned reward function. Our resulting algorithm is simpler and more parameter-efficient. Across a suite of continuous control and robotics benchmarks, IPL attains competitive performance compared to more complex approaches that leverage transformer-based and non-Markovian reward functions while having fewer algorithmic hyperparameters and learned network parameters. Our code is publicly released.

Ad-load balancing is a critical challenge in online advertising systems, particularly in the context of social media platforms, where the goal is to maximize user engagement and revenue while maintaining a satisfactory user experience. This requires the optimization of conflicting objectives, such as user satisfaction and ads revenue. Traditional approaches to ad-load balancing rely on static allocation policies, which fail to adapt to changing user preferences and contextual factors. In this paper, we present an approach that leverages off-policy learning and evaluation from logged bandit feedback. We start by presenting a motivating analysis of the ad-load balancing problem, highlighting the conflicting objectives between user satisfaction and ads revenue. We emphasize the nuances that arise due to user heterogeneity and the dependence on the user's position within a session. Based on this analysis, we define the problem as determining the optimal ad-load for a particular feed fetch. To tackle this problem, we propose an off-policy learning framework that leverages unbiased estimators such as Inverse Propensity Scoring (IPS) and Doubly Robust (DR) to learn and estimate the policy values using offline collected stochastic data. We present insights from online A/B experiments deployed at scale across over 80 million users generating over 200 million sessions, where we find statistically significant improvements in both user satisfaction metrics and ads revenue for the platform.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has proven effective in aligning large language models with human intentions, yet it often relies on complex methodologies like Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) that require extensive hyper-parameter tuning and present challenges in sample efficiency and stability. In this paper, we introduce Inverse-Q*, an innovative framework that transcends traditional RL methods by optimizing token-level reinforcement learning without the need for additional reward or value models. Inverse-Q* leverages direct preference optimization techniques but extends them by estimating the conditionally optimal policy directly from the model's responses, facilitating more granular and flexible policy shaping. Our approach reduces reliance on human annotation and external supervision, making it especially suitable for low-resource settings. We present extensive experimental results demonstrating that Inverse-Q* not only matches but potentially exceeds the effectiveness of PPO in terms of convergence speed and the alignment of model responses with human preferences. Our findings suggest that Inverse-Q* offers a practical and robust alternative to conventional RLHF approaches, paving the way for more efficient and adaptable model training approaches.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) denotes a powerful family of algorithms for recovering a reward function justifying the behavior demonstrated by an expert agent. A well-known limitation of IRL is the ambiguity in the choice of the reward function, due to the existence of multiple rewards that explain the observed behavior. This limitation has been recently circumvented by formulating IRL as the problem of estimating the feasible reward set, i.e., the region of the rewards compatible with the expert's behavior. In this paper, we make a step towards closing the theory gap of IRL in the case of finite-horizon problems with a generative model. We start by formally introducing the problem of estimating the feasible reward set, the corresponding PAC requirement, and discussing the properties of particular classes of rewards. Then, we provide the first minimax lower bound on the sample complexity for the problem of estimating the feasible reward set of order {Omega}Bigl( H^3SA{epsilon^2} bigl( log bigl(1{delta}bigl) + S bigl)Bigl), being S and A the number of states and actions respectively, H the horizon, epsilon the desired accuracy, and delta the confidence. We analyze the sample complexity of a uniform sampling strategy (US-IRL), proving a matching upper bound up to logarithmic factors. Finally, we outline several open questions in IRL and propose future research directions.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) is typically formulated as maximizing entropy subject to matching the distribution of expert trajectories. Classical (dual-ascent) IRL guarantees monotonic performance improvement but requires fully solving an RL problem each iteration to compute dual gradients. More recent adversarial methods avoid this cost at the expense of stability and monotonic dual improvement, by directly optimizing the primal problem and using a discriminator to provide rewards. In this work, we bridge the gap between these approaches by enabling monotonic improvement of the reward function and policy without having to fully solve an RL problem at every iteration. Our key theoretical insight is that a trust-region-optimal policy for a reward function update can be globally optimal for a smaller update in the same direction. This smaller update allows us to explicitly optimize the dual objective while only relying on a local search around the current policy. In doing so, our approach avoids the training instabilities of adversarial methods, offers monotonic performance improvement, and learns a reward function in the traditional sense of IRL--one that can be globally optimized to match expert demonstrations. Our proposed algorithm, Trust Region Inverse Reinforcement Learning (TRIRL), outperforms state-of-the-art imitation learning methods across multiple challenging tasks by a factor of 2.4x in terms of aggregate inter-quartile mean, while recovering reward functions that generalize to system dynamics shifts.

Unfair treatment and discrimination are critical ethical concerns in AI systems, particularly as their adoption expands across diverse domains. Addressing these challenges, the recent introduction of the EU AI Act establishes a unified legal framework to ensure legal certainty for AI innovation and investment while safeguarding public interests, such as health, safety, fundamental rights, democracy, and the rule of law (Recital 8). The Act encourages stakeholders to initiate dialogue on existing AI fairness notions to address discriminatory outcomes of AI systems. However, these notions often overlook the critical role of Socio-Economic Status (SES), inadvertently perpetuating biases that favour the economically advantaged. This is concerning, given that principles of equalization advocate for equalizing resources or opportunities to mitigate disadvantages beyond an individual's control. While provisions for discrimination are laid down in the AI Act, specialized directions should be broadened, particularly in addressing economic disparities perpetuated by AI systems. In this work, we explore the limitations of popular AI fairness notions using a real-world dataset (Adult), highlighting their inability to address SES-driven disparities. To fill this gap, we propose a novel fairness notion, Socio-Economic Parity (SEP), which incorporates SES and promotes positive actions for underprivileged groups while accounting for factors within an individual's control, such as working hours, which can serve as a proxy for effort. We define a corresponding fairness measure and optimize a model constrained by SEP to demonstrate practical utility. Our results show the effectiveness of SEP in mitigating SES-driven biases. By analyzing the AI Act alongside our method, we lay a foundation for aligning AI fairness with SES factors while ensuring legal compliance.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.

Debates about whether development projects improve living conditions persist, partly because observational estimates can be biased by incomplete adjustment and because reliable outcome data are scarce at the neighborhood level. We address both issues in a continent-scale, sector-specific evaluation of Chinese and World Bank projects across 9,899 neighborhoods in 36 African countries (2002 to 2013), representative of 88% of the population. First, we use a recent dataset that measures living conditions with a machine-learned wealth index derived from contemporaneous satellite imagery, yielding a consistent panel of 6.7 km square mosaics. Second, to strengthen identification, we proxy officials' map-based placement criteria using pre-treatment daytime satellite images and fuse these with rich tabular covariates to estimate funder- and sector-specific ATEs via inverse-probability weighting. Incorporating imagery systematically shrinks effects relative to tabular-only models, indicating prior work likely overstated benefits. On average, both donors raise wealth, with larger gains for China; sector extremes in our sample include Trade and Tourism for the World Bank (+6.27 IWI points), and Emergency Response for China (+14.32). Assignment-mechanism analyses show World Bank placement is generally more predictable from imagery alone, as well as from tabular covariates. This suggests that Chinese project placements are more driven by non-visible, political, or event-driven factors than World Bank placements. To probe residual concerns about selection on observables, we also estimate within-neighborhood (unit) fixed-effects models at a spatial resolution about 450 times finer than prior fixed effects analyses, leveraging the computer-vision-imputed IWI panels; these deliver smaller but directionally consistent effects.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

In observational studies, balancing covariates in different treatment groups is essential to estimate treatment effects. One of the most commonly used methods for such purposes is weighting. The performance of this class of methods usually depends on strong regularity conditions for the underlying model, which might not hold in practice. In this paper, we investigate weighting methods from a functional estimation perspective and argue that the weights needed for covariate balancing could differ from those needed for treatment effects estimation under low regularity conditions. Motivated by this observation, we introduce a new framework of weighting that directly targets the treatment effects estimation. Unlike existing methods, the resulting estimator for a treatment effect under this new framework is a simple kernel-based U-statistic after applying a data-driven transformation to the observed covariates. We characterize the theoretical properties of the new estimators of treatment effects under a nonparametric setting and show that they are able to work robustly under low regularity conditions. The new framework is also applied to several numerical examples to demonstrate its practical merits.

Two main challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL) are designing appropriate reward functions and ensuring the safety of the learned policy. To address these challenges, we present a theoretical framework for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) in constrained Markov decision processes. From a convex-analytic perspective, we extend prior results on reward identifiability and generalizability to both the constrained setting and a more general class of regularizations. In particular, we show that identifiability up to potential shaping (Cao et al., 2021) is a consequence of entropy regularization and may generally no longer hold for other regularizations or in the presence of safety constraints. We also show that to ensure generalizability to new transition laws and constraints, the true reward must be identified up to a constant. Additionally, we derive a finite sample guarantee for the suboptimality of the learned rewards, and validate our results in a gridworld environment.

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.

The ethical concept of fairness has recently been applied in machine learning (ML) settings to describe a wide range of constraints and objectives. When considering the relevance of ethical concepts to subset selection problems, the concepts of diversity and inclusion are additionally applicable in order to create outputs that account for social power and access differentials. We introduce metrics based on these concepts, which can be applied together, separately, and in tandem with additional fairness constraints. Results from human subject experiments lend support to the proposed criteria. Social choice methods can additionally be leveraged to aggregate and choose preferable sets, and we detail how these may be applied.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Federated learning (FL) has been a promising approach in the field of medical imaging in recent years. A critical problem in FL, specifically in medical scenarios is to have a more accurate shared model which is robust to noisy and out-of distribution clients. In this work, we tackle the problem of statistical heterogeneity in data for FL which is highly plausible in medical data where for example the data comes from different sites with different scanner settings. We propose IDA (Inverse Distance Aggregation), a novel adaptive weighting approach for clients based on meta-information which handles unbalanced and non-iid data. We extensively analyze and evaluate our method against the well-known FL approach, Federated Averaging as a baseline.

The growing capabilities and increasingly widespread deployment of AI systems necessitate robust benchmarks for measuring their cooperative capabilities. Unfortunately, most multi-agent benchmarks are either zero-sum or purely cooperative, providing limited opportunities for such measurements. We introduce a general-sum variant of the zero-sum board game Diplomacy -- called Welfare Diplomacy -- in which players must balance investing in military conquest and domestic welfare. We argue that Welfare Diplomacy facilitates both a clearer assessment of and stronger training incentives for cooperative capabilities. Our contributions are: (1) proposing the Welfare Diplomacy rules and implementing them via an open-source Diplomacy engine; (2) constructing baseline agents using zero-shot prompted language models; and (3) conducting experiments where we find that baselines using state-of-the-art models attain high social welfare but are exploitable. Our work aims to promote societal safety by aiding researchers in developing and assessing multi-agent AI systems. Code to evaluate Welfare Diplomacy and reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/mukobi/welfare-diplomacy.

We introduce and analyze distance preservation games (DPGs). In DPGs, agents express ideal distances to other agents and need to choose locations in the unit interval while preserving their ideal distances as closely as possible. We analyze the existence and computation of location profiles that are jump stable (i.e., no agent can benefit by moving to another location) or welfare optimal for DPGs, respectively. Specifically, we prove that there are DPGs without jump stable location profiles and identify important cases where such outcomes always exist and can be computed efficiently. Similarly, we show that finding welfare optimal location profiles is NP-complete and present approximation algorithms for finding solutions with social welfare close to optimal. Finally, we prove that DPGs have a price of anarchy of at most 2.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We develop a data-driven information-theoretic framework for sharp partial identification of causal effects under unmeasured confounding. Existing approaches often rely on restrictive assumptions, such as bounded or discrete outcomes; require external inputs (for example, instrumental variables, proxies, or user-specified sensitivity parameters); necessitate full structural causal model specifications; or focus solely on population-level averages while neglecting covariate-conditional effects. We overcome all four limitations simultaneously by establishing novel information-theoretic, data-driven divergence bounds. Our key theoretical contribution shows that the f-divergence between the observational distribution P(Y | A = a, X = x) and the interventional distribution P(Y | do(A = a), X = x) is upper bounded by a function of the propensity score alone. This result enables sharp partial identification of conditional causal effects directly from observational data, without requiring external sensitivity parameters, auxiliary variables, full structural specifications, or outcome boundedness assumptions. For practical implementation, we develop a semiparametric estimator satisfying Neyman orthogonality (Chernozhukov et al., 2018), which ensures root-n consistent inference even when nuisance functions are estimated via flexible machine learning methods. Simulation studies and real-world data applications, implemented in the GitHub repository (https://github.com/yonghanjung/Information-Theretic-Bounds), demonstrate that our framework provides tight and valid causal bounds across a wide range of data-generating processes.

When the performance of a machine learning model varies over groups defined by sensitive attributes (e.g., gender or ethnicity), the performance disparity can be expressed in terms of the probability distributions of the input and output variables over each group. In this paper, we exploit this fact to reduce the disparate impact of a fixed classification model over a population of interest. Given a black-box classifier, we aim to eliminate the performance gap by perturbing the distribution of input variables for the disadvantaged group. We refer to the perturbed distribution as a counterfactual distribution, and characterize its properties for common fairness criteria. We introduce a descent algorithm to learn a counterfactual distribution from data. We then discuss how the estimated distribution can be used to build a data preprocessor that can reduce disparate impact without training a new model. We validate our approach through experiments on real-world datasets, showing that it can repair different forms of disparity without a significant drop in accuracy.

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.