Daily Papers

Video production workflows offer a rich and demanding arena for evaluating multimodal AI agents: they require composite capabilities across text, image, audio, and video understanding, along with long-horizon planning, and tool use. To this end, we introduce AgenticVBench, a benchmark of 100 agentic tasks across 4 task families spanning the real world post-production workflow, constructed from real production workflows contributed by 20 industry experts averaging 6 years of professional experience. Tasks are paired with evaluation specifications that combine programmatic verifiers and expert rubrics. We evaluate frontier vision-language models (VLMs) with both vendor-native and open-source harnesses. The best evaluated agent stack barely crosses 30%, far below human expert performance on the same tasks. We further find that the choice of harness substantially affects model behavior, including scores, tool-use patterns, and failure modes. AgenticVBench provides a foundation for diagnosing and improving both models and harnesses for agentic video production. Benchmark website: https://agenticvbench.com.

Recent AI systems have achieved gold-medal-level performance on the International Mathematical Olympiad, demonstrating remarkable proficiency at competition-style problem solving. However, competition mathematics represents only a narrow slice of mathematical reasoning: problems are drawn from limited domains, require minimal advanced machinery, and can often reward insightful tricks over deep theoretical knowledge. We introduce , a private benchmark of 25 expert-curated problems designed to evaluate AI systems on research-level mathematics that goes far beyond the olympiad frontier. Problems are authored by Ivy League mathematics professors, graduate students, and PhD-holding IMO medalists, and routinely took their authors weeks to solve independently. Each problem undergoes double-blind verification by two independent domain experts who must solve the problem from scratch, and yields a unique, closed-form solution assessed by programmatic verifiers. We evaluate frontier models as unconstrained research agents, with full access to coding tools, search, and open-ended reasoning, using an unbiased statistical estimator computed over 100 independent runs per problem. Our results reveal that all frontier models currently score below 10\%, exposing a substantial gap between olympiad-level problem solving and genuine research-level mathematical reasoning. By keeping the benchmark fully private, we ensure that measured performance reflects authentic mathematical capability rather than memorization of training data.

Verifiers are auxiliary models that assess the correctness of outputs generated by base large language models (LLMs). They play a crucial role in many strategies for solving reasoning-intensive problems with LLMs. Typically, verifiers are LLMs themselves, often as large (or larger) than the base model they support, making them computationally expensive. In this work, we introduce a novel lightweight verification approach, LiLaVe, which reliably extracts correctness signals from the hidden states of the base LLM. A key advantage of LiLaVe is its ability to operate with only a small fraction of the computational budget required by traditional LLM-based verifiers. To demonstrate its practicality, we couple LiLaVe with popular meta-generation strategies, like best-of-n or self-consistency. Moreover, we design novel LiLaVe-based approaches, like conditional self-correction or conditional majority voting, that significantly improve both accuracy and efficiency in generation tasks with smaller LLMs. Our work demonstrates the fruitfulness of extracting latent information from the hidden states of LLMs, and opens the door to scalable and resource-efficient solutions for reasoning-intensive applications.

Synthesizing inductive loop invariants is fundamental to automating program verification. In this work, we observe that Large Language Models (such as gpt-3.5 or gpt-4) are capable of synthesizing loop invariants for a class of programs in a 0-shot setting, yet require several samples to generate the correct invariants. This can lead to a large number of calls to a program verifier to establish an invariant. To address this issue, we propose a {\it re-ranking} approach for the generated results of LLMs. We have designed a ranker that can distinguish between correct inductive invariants and incorrect attempts based on the problem definition. The ranker is optimized as a contrastive ranker. Experimental results demonstrate that this re-ranking mechanism significantly improves the ranking of correct invariants among the generated candidates, leading to a notable reduction in the number of calls to a verifier.

As LLMs see wide adoption in software engineering, the reliable assessment of the correctness and security of LLM-generated code is crucial. Notably, prior work has demonstrated that security is often overlooked, exposing that LLMs are prone to generating code with security vulnerabilities. These insights were enabled by specialized benchmarks, crafted through significant manual effort by security experts. However, relying on manually-crafted benchmarks is insufficient in the long term, because benchmarks (i) naturally end up contaminating training data, (ii) must extend to new tasks to provide a more complete picture, and (iii) must increase in difficulty to challenge more capable LLMs. In this work, we address these challenges and present AutoBaxBuilder, a framework that generates tasks and tests for code security benchmarking from scratch. We introduce a robust pipeline with fine-grained plausibility checks, leveraging the code understanding capabilities of LLMs to construct functionality tests and end-to-end security-probing exploits. To confirm the quality of the generated benchmark, we conduct both a qualitative analysis and perform quantitative experiments, comparing it against tasks constructed by human experts. We use AutoBaxBuilder to construct entirely new tasks and release them to the public as AutoBaxBench, together with a thorough evaluation of the security capabilities of LLMs on these tasks. We find that a new task can be generated in under 2 hours, costing less than USD 10.

Despite significant advancements in the general capability of large language models (LLMs), they continue to struggle with consistent and accurate reasoning, especially in complex tasks such as mathematical and code reasoning. One key limitation is that LLMs are trained primarily on correct solutions, reducing their ability to detect and learn from errors, which hampers their ability to reliably verify and rank outputs. To address this, we scale up the inference-time computation by generating multiple reasoning paths and employing verifiers to assess and rank the generated outputs by correctness. To facilitate this, we introduce a comprehensive dataset consisting of correct and incorrect solutions for math and code tasks, generated by multiple LLMs. This diverse set of solutions enables verifiers to more effectively distinguish and rank correct answers from erroneous outputs. The training methods for building verifiers were selected based on an extensive comparison of existing approaches. Moreover, to leverage the unique strengths of different reasoning strategies, we propose a novel collaborative method integrating Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Program-of-Thought (PoT) solutions for verification. CoT provides a clear, step-by-step reasoning process that enhances interpretability, while PoT, being executable, offers a precise and error-sensitive validation mechanism. By taking both of their strengths, our approach significantly improves the accuracy and reliability of reasoning verification. Our verifiers, Math-Rev and Code-Rev, demonstrate substantial performance gains to existing LLMs, achieving state-of-the-art results on benchmarks such as GSM8k and MATH and even outperforming GPT-4o with Qwen-72B-Instruct as the reasoner.

Large language models can generate useful code from natural language, but their outputs come without correctness guarantees. Verifiable code generation offers a path beyond testing by requiring models to produce not only executable code, but also formal specifications and machine-checkable proofs. Progress in this direction, however, is difficult to measure: existing benchmarks are often small, focus on only one part of the pipeline, lack ground-truth proofs or rigorous specification validation, or target verification settings far from mainstream software development. We present VeriContest, a benchmark of 946 competitive-programming problems from LeetCode and Codeforces for verifiable code generation in Rust with Verus. Each problem pairs a natural language description with expert-validated formal specifications, judge-accepted Rust code, Verus-checked proofs, and positive and negative test suites. VeriContest is constructed through a three-phase pipeline that scales from manually verified seed problems to semi-automated expansion with human-in-the-loop review. To further strengthen benchmark quality, we use testing as an additional quality-assurance layer for validating postcondition completeness. VeriContest supports isolated and compositional evaluation of specification generation, code generation, proof generation, and end-to-end verified program synthesis. Evaluating ten state-of-the-art models reveals a sharp gap between coding ability and verifiable code generation: the strongest model reaches 92.18% on natural-language-to-code generation, but only 48.31% on specification generation, 13.95% on proof generation, and 5.29% end-to-end. These results identify proof and specification generation as the central bottlenecks for models and establish VeriContest as a rigorous platform for measuring and training future systems that generate code with machine-checkable correctness.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated in software development, but ensuring correctness in LLM-generated code remains challenging and often requires costly manual review. Verifiable code generation -- jointly generating code, specifications, and proofs of code-specification alignment -- offers a promising path to address this limitation and further unleash LLMs' benefits in coding. Yet, there exists a significant gap in evaluation: current benchmarks often lack support for end-to-end verifiable code generation. In this paper, we introduce Verina (Verifiable Code Generation Arena), a high-quality benchmark enabling a comprehensive and modular evaluation of code, specification, and proof generation as well as their compositions. Verina consists of 189 manually curated coding tasks in Lean, with detailed problem descriptions, reference implementations, formal specifications, and extensive test suites. Our extensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLMs reveals significant challenges in verifiable code generation, especially in proof generation, underscoring the need for improving LLM-based theorem provers in verification domains. The best model, OpenAI o4-mini, generates only 61.4% correct code, 51.0% sound and complete specifications, and 3.6% successful proofs, with one trial per task. We hope Verina will catalyze progress in verifiable code generation by providing a rigorous and comprehensive benchmark. We release our dataset on https://huggingface.co/datasets/sunblaze-ucb/verina and our evaluation code on https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/verina.

The evolution of machine learning has increasingly prioritized the development of powerful models and more scalable supervision signals. However, the emergence of foundation models presents significant challenges in providing effective supervision signals necessary for further enhancing their capabilities. Consequently, there is an urgent need to explore novel supervision signals and technical approaches. In this paper, we propose verifier engineering, a novel post-training paradigm specifically designed for the era of foundation models. The core of verifier engineering involves leveraging a suite of automated verifiers to perform verification tasks and deliver meaningful feedback to foundation models. We systematically categorize the verifier engineering process into three essential stages: search, verify, and feedback, and provide a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art research developments within each stage. We believe that verifier engineering constitutes a fundamental pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence.

Verifying the success of computer use agent (CUA) trajectories is a critical challenge: without reliable verification, neither evaluation nor training signal can be trusted. In this paper, we present lessons learned from building a best-in-class verifier for web tasks we call the Universal Verifier. We design the Universal Verifier around four key principles: 1) constructing rubrics with meaningful, non-overlapping criteria to reduce noise; 2) separating process and outcome rewards that yield complementary signals, capturing cases where an agent follows the right steps but gets blocked or succeeds through an unexpected path; 3) distinguishing between controllable and uncontrollable failures scored via a cascading-error-free strategy for finer-grained failure understanding; and 4) a divide-and-conquer context management scheme that attends to all screenshots in a trajectory, improving reliability on longer task horizons. We validate these findings on CUAVerifierBench, a new set of CUA trajectories with both process and outcome human labels, showing that our Universal Verifier agrees with humans as often as humans agree with each other. We report a reduction in false positive rates to near zero compared to baselines like WebVoyager (geq 45\%) and WebJudge (geq 22\%). We emphasize that these gains stem from the cumulative effect of the design choices above. We also find that an auto-research agent achieves 70\% of expert quality in 5\% of the time, but fails to discover all strategies required to replicate the Universal Verifier. We open-source our Universal Verifier system along with CUAVerifierBench; available at https://github.com/microsoft/fara.

The advent of pre-trained code language models (CodeLMs) has lead to significant progress in language-to-code generation. State-of-the-art approaches in this area combine CodeLM decoding with sample pruning and reranking using test cases or heuristics based on the execution results. However, it is challenging to obtain test cases for many real-world language-to-code applications, and heuristics cannot well capture the semantic features of the execution results, such as data type and value range, which often indicates the correctness of the program. In this work, we propose LEVER, a simple approach to improve language-to-code generation by learning to verify the generated programs with their execution results. Specifically, we train verifiers to determine whether a program sampled from the CodeLM is correct or not based on the natural language input, the program itself and its execution results. The sampled programs are reranked by combining the verification score with the CodeLM generation probability, and marginalizing over programs with the same execution results. On four datasets across the domains of table QA, math QA and basic Python programming, LEVER consistently improves over the base CodeLMs (4.6% to 10.9% with code-davinci-002) and achieves new state-of-the-art results on all of them.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Loop invariants are fundamental to reasoning about programs with loops. They establish properties about a given loop's behavior. When they additionally are inductive, they become useful for the task of formal verification that seeks to establish strong mathematical guarantees about program's runtime behavior. The inductiveness ensures that the invariants can be checked locally without consulting the entire program, thus are indispensable artifacts in a formal proof of correctness. Finding inductive loop invariants is an undecidable problem, and despite a long history of research towards practical solutions, it remains far from a solved problem. This paper investigates the capabilities of the Large Language Models (LLMs) in offering a new solution towards this old, yet important problem. To that end, we first curate a dataset of verification problems on programs with loops. Next, we design a prompt for exploiting LLMs, obtaining inductive loop invariants, that are checked for correctness using sound symbolic tools. Finally, we explore the effectiveness of using an efficient combination of a symbolic tool and an LLM on our dataset and compare it against a purely symbolic baseline. Our results demonstrate that LLMs can help improve the state-of-the-art in automated program verification.

Automated code generation with large language models has gained significant traction, but there remains no guarantee on the correctness of generated code. We aim to use formal verification to provide mathematical guarantees that the generated code is correct. However, generating formally verified code with LLMs is hindered by the scarcity of training data and the complexity of formal proofs. To tackle this challenge, we introduce AlphaVerus, a self-improving framework that bootstraps formally verified code generation by iteratively translating programs from a higher-resource language and leveraging feedback from a verifier. AlphaVerus operates in three phases: exploration of candidate translations, Treefinement -- a novel tree search algorithm for program refinement using verifier feedback, and filtering misaligned specifications and programs to prevent reward hacking. Through this iterative process, AlphaVerus enables a LLaMA-3.1-70B model to generate verified code without human intervention or model finetuning. AlphaVerus shows an ability to generate formally verified solutions for HumanEval and MBPP, laying the groundwork for truly trustworthy code-generation agents.

The widespread availability of large-scale code datasets has accelerated the development of code large language models (CodeLLMs), raising concerns about unauthorized dataset usage. Dataset poisoning offers a proactive defense by reducing the utility of such unauthorized training. However, existing poisoning methods often require full dataset poisoning and introduce transformations that break code compilability. In this paper, we introduce FunPoison, a functionality-preserving poisoning approach that injects short, compilable weak-use fragments into executed code paths. FunPoison leverages reusable statement-level templates with automatic repair and conservative safety checking to ensure side-effect freedom, while a type-aware synthesis module suppresses static analysis warnings and enhances stealth. Extensive experiments show that FunPoison achieves effective poisoning by contaminating only 10% of the dataset, while maintaining 100% compilability and functional correctness, and remains robust against various advanced code sanitization techniques.

We describe a verification pipeline that takes production Rust cryptographic code and produces machine-checked correctness proofs in Lean 4. The pipeline combines three components: symbolic extraction tools (Charon and Aeneas, or Hax) that lift Rust into Lean 4; formal cryptographic specification libraries (ArkLib and CompPoly, from the Verified zkEVM project) that provide the mathematical targets; and AI provers (Aristotle from Harmonic AI and Aleph from Logical Intelligence) that close the resulting proof obligations. Every proof is checked by the Lean kernel, so AI output cannot compromise soundness. Within the scope of the Ethereum Foundation's zkEVM Verification Project, we applied the pipeline to cryptographic primitives in Plonky3 (FRI folding, Mersenne31 and KoalaBear field arithmetic, Horner polynomial evaluation) and RISC Zero (Merkle inclusion verification). In addition, Aleph authored proofs of two bounds-style theorems in Plonky3's compute_log_arity_for_round that previously stood as sorry. The paper describes the architecture, walks through a running example based on Aleph's two proofs, reports which classes of proof obligations AI closed and which required manual work, and discusses the engineering gaps we encountered: Lean 4 toolchain drift across tools and specific Aeneas/Hax extraction limits. We also document concrete missing lemmas, tactic gaps, and code-generation friction points discovered during proof development. We hope this contribution lowers the barrier to adoption of formal verification and facilitates more effective use of AI in this pipeline. The result is a working pipeline for formal verification of Rust, with kernel-checked proofs and reproducible artefacts.

We present OpenComputer, a verifier-grounded framework for constructing verifiable software worlds for computer-use agents. OpenComputer integrates four components: (1) app-specific state verifiers that expose structured inspection endpoints over real applications, (2) a self-evolving verification layer that improves verifier reliability using execution-grounded feedback, (3) a task-generation pipeline that synthesizes realistic and machine-checkable desktop tasks, and (4) an evaluation harness that records full trajectories and computes auditable partial-credit rewards. In its current form, OpenComputer covers 33 desktop applications and 1,000 finalized tasks spanning browsers, office tools, creative software, development environments, file managers, and communication applications. Experiments show that OpenComputer's hard-coded verifiers align more closely with human adjudication than LLM-as-judge evaluation, especially when success depends on fine-grained application state. Frontier agents struggle with end-to-end completion despite partial progress, and open-source models exhibit sharp drops from their OSWorld-Verified scores, exposing a persistent gap in robust computer automation.

Formal verification is the next frontier for ensuring the correctness of code generated by Large Language Models (LLMs). While methods that co-generate code and formal specifications in formal languages, like Dafny, can, in principle, prove alignment with user intent, progress is bottlenecked by specification quality evaluation. Current benchmarks rely on matching against ground-truth specifications, a manual and expertise-intensive process that has limited existing datasets to a few hundred simple problems and also suffers from a reliability issue. To address this, we introduce VeriEquivBench, a new benchmark with 2,389 complex algorithmic problems that probe the limitations of current models in both code generation and formal reasoning. Our evaluation framework replaces ground-truth matching with a formally grounded metric, the equivalence score, and rigorously verifies the quality of generated specifications and code. Our results show that generating formally verifiable code remains a profound challenge for state-of-the-art LLMs. This underscores both the difficulty of the task and the need for benchmarks like VeriEquivBench to drive progress toward scalable and reliable coding agents.

The recent paradigm shift towards training large language models (LLMs) using DeepSeek-R1-Zero-style reinforcement learning (RL) on verifiable rewards has led to impressive advancements in code and mathematical reasoning. However, this methodology is limited to tasks where rule-based answer verification is possible and does not naturally extend to real-world domains such as chemistry, healthcare, engineering, law, biology, business, and economics. Current practical workarounds use an additional LLM as a model-based verifier; however, this introduces issues such as reliance on a strong verifier LLM, susceptibility to reward hacking, and the practical burden of maintaining the verifier model in memory during training. To address this and extend DeepSeek-R1-Zero-style training to general reasoning domains, we propose a verifier-free method (VeriFree) that bypasses answer verification and instead uses RL to directly maximize the probability of generating the reference answer. We compare VeriFree with verifier-based methods and demonstrate that, in addition to its significant practical benefits and reduced compute requirements, VeriFree matches and even surpasses verifier-based methods on extensive evaluations across MMLU-Pro, GPQA, SuperGPQA, and math-related benchmarks. Moreover, we provide insights into this method from multiple perspectives: as an elegant integration of training both the policy and implicit verifier in a unified model, and as a variational optimization approach. Code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/VeriFree.

The performance of autonomous Web GUI agents heavily relies on the quality and quantity of their training data. However, a fundamental bottleneck persists: collecting interaction trajectories from real-world websites is expensive and difficult to verify. The underlying state transitions are hidden, leading to reliance on inconsistent and costly external verifiers to evaluate step-level correctness. To address this, we propose AutoWebWorld, a novel framework for synthesizing controllable and verifiable web environments by modeling them as Finite State Machines (FSMs) and use coding agents to translate FSMs into interactive websites. Unlike real websites, where state transitions are implicit, AutoWebWorld explicitly defines all states, actions, and transition rules. This enables programmatic verification: action correctness is checked against predefined rules, and task success is confirmed by reaching a goal state in the FSM graph. AutoWebWorld enables a fully automated search-and-verify pipeline, generating over 11,663 verified trajectories from 29 diverse web environments at only $0.04 per trajectory. Training on this synthetic data significantly boosts real-world performance. Our 7B Web GUI agent outperforms all baselines within 15 steps on WebVoyager. Furthermore, we observe a clear scaling law: as the synthetic data volume increases, performance on WebVoyager and Online-Mind2Web consistently improves.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited impressive capabilities across a myriad of tasks, yet they occasionally yield undesirable outputs. We posit that these limitations are rooted in the foundational autoregressive architecture of LLMs, which inherently lacks mechanisms for differentiating between desirable and undesirable results. Drawing inspiration from the dual-process theory of human cognition, we introduce LLM2, a novel framework that combines an LLM (System 1) with a process-based verifier (System 2). Within LLM2, the LLM is responsible for generating plausible candidates, while the verifier provides timely process-based feedback to distinguish desirable and undesirable outputs. The verifier is trained with a pairwise comparison loss on synthetic process-supervision data generated through our token quality exploration strategy. Empirical results on mathematical reasoning benchmarks substantiate the efficacy of LLM2, exemplified by an accuracy enhancement from 50.3 to 57.8 (+7.5) for Llama3-1B on GSM8K. Furthermore, when combined with self-consistency, LLM2 achieves additional improvements, boosting major@20 accuracy from 56.2 to 70.2 (+14.0).

Formal verification can provably guarantee the correctness of critical system software, but the high proof burden has long hindered its wide adoption. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown success in code analysis and synthesis. In this paper, we present a combination of LLMs and static analysis to synthesize invariants, assertions, and other proof structures for a Rust-based formal verification framework called Verus. In a few-shot setting, LLMs demonstrate impressive logical ability in generating postconditions and loop invariants, especially when analyzing short code snippets. However, LLMs lack the ability to retain and propagate context information, a strength of traditional static analysis. Based on these observations, we developed a prototype based on OpenAI's GPT-4 model. Our prototype decomposes the verification task into multiple smaller ones, iteratively queries GPT-4, and combines its output with lightweight static analysis. We evaluated the prototype with a developer in the automation loop on 20 vector-manipulating programs. The results demonstrate that it significantly reduces human effort in writing entry-level proof code.

Large language models can generate fluent answers that are unfaithful to the provided context, while many safeguards rely on external verification or a separate judge after generation. We introduce internal flow signatures that audit decision formation from depthwise dynamics at a fixed inter-block monitoring boundary. The method stabilizes token-wise motion via bias-centered monitoring, then summarizes trajectories in compact moving readout-aligned subspaces constructed from the top token and its close competitors within each depth window. Neighboring window frames are aligned by an orthogonal transport, yielding depth-comparable transported step lengths, turning angles, and subspace drift summaries that are invariant to within-window basis choices. A lightweight GRU validator trained on these signatures performs self-checking without modifying the base model. Beyond detection, the validator localizes a culprit depth event and enables a targeted refinement: the model rolls back to the culprit token and clamps an abnormal transported step at the identified block while preserving the orthogonal residual. The resulting pipeline provides actionable localization and low-overhead self-checking from internal decision dynamics. Code is available at github.com/EavnJeong/Internal-Flow-Signatures-for-Self-Checking-and-Refinement-in-LLMs.

Code verifiers play a critical role in post-verification for LLM-based code generation, yet existing supervised fine-tuning methods suffer from data scarcity, high failure rates, and poor inference efficiency. While reinforcement learning (RL) offers a promising alternative by optimizing models through execution-driven rewards without labeled supervision, our preliminary results show that naive RL with only functionality rewards fails to generate effective unit tests for difficult branches and samples. We first theoretically analyze showing that branch coverage, sample difficulty, syntactic and functional correctness can be jointly modeled as RL rewards, where optimizing these signals can improve the reliability of unit-test-based verification. Guided by this analysis, we design syntax- and functionality-aware rewards and further propose branch- and sample-difficulty--aware RL using exponential reward shaping and static analysis metrics. With this formulation, CVeDRL achieves state-of-the-art performance with only 0.6B parameters, yielding up to 28.97% higher pass rate and 15.08% higher branch coverage than GPT-3.5, while delivering over 20times faster inference than competitive baselines. Code is available at https://github.com/LIGHTCHASER1/CVeDRL.git

Large Language Models (LLMs) have catalyzed vibe coding, where users leverage LLMs to generate and iteratively refine code through natural language interactions until it passes their vibe check. Vibe check is tied to real-world human preference and goes beyond functionality: the solution should feel right, read cleanly, preserve intent, and remain correct. However, current code evaluation remains anchored to pass@k and captures only functional correctness, overlooking the non-functional instructions that users routinely apply. In this paper, we hypothesize that instruction following is the missing piece underlying vibe check that represents human preference in coding besides functional correctness. To quantify models' code instruction following capabilities with measurable signals, we present VeriCode, a taxonomy of 30 verifiable code instructions together with corresponding deterministic verifiers. We use the taxonomy to augment established evaluation suites, resulting in Vibe Checker, a testbed to assess both code instruction following and functional correctness. Upon evaluating 31 leading LLMs, we show that even the strongest models struggle to comply with multiple instructions and exhibit clear functional regression. Most importantly, a composite score of functional correctness and instruction following correlates the best with human preference, with the latter emerging as the primary differentiator on real-world programming tasks. Our work identifies core factors of the vibe check, providing a concrete path for benchmarking and developing models that better align with user preferences in coding.

Control Flow Attestation (CFA) allows remote verification of run-time software integrity in embedded systems. However, CFA is limited by the storage/transmission costs of generated control flow logs (CFlog). Recent work has proposed application-specific optimizations by speculating on likely sub-paths in CFlog and replacing them with reserved symbols at runtime. Albeit effective, prior approaches do not consider the representation of addresses in a control flow path for speculation. This work proposes RESPEC-CFA, an architectural extension for CFA allowing for speculation on (1) the locality of control flows and (2) their Huffman encoding. Alone, RESPEC-CFA reduces CFlog sizes by up to 90.1%. Combined with prior methods, RESPEC-CFA yields reductions of up to 99.7%, representing a significant step toward practical CFA.

Answer verification methods are widely employed in language model training pipelines spanning data curation, evaluation, and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). While prior work focus on developing unified verifiers applicable across multiple reasoning scenarios, significant challenges remain in computation-oriented scientific domains, such as algebraic equivalence checking and physical constant substitution. In this paper, we introduce \model, a tool-augmented verifier that leverages external executors to perform precise computations and symbolic simplifications. \model enables robust verification that goes beyond simple semantic matching. We propose a novel two-stage pipeline, which begin with cold-start fine-tuning and followed by multi-turn reinforcement learning with tool integration. Extensive experiments conducted on STEM subjects, general QA, and long-form reasoning tasks demonstrates strong generalization of \model. The results shows that the \model achieves state-of-the-art performance on VerifyBench-Hard and SCI-Bench. And we also employ our \model in RLVR as a reward model, the results show that it consistently outperforms both rubric-based and model-based verifiers on AIME'24 and AIME'25, demonstrating strong potential to enhance reasoning capabilities of LLM. Our model is released at https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B{https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B}.

Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning for complex tasks inherently involves a trade-off between solution accuracy and computational efficiency. The subsequent step of verification, while intended to improve performance, further complicates this landscape by introducing its own challenging trade-off: sophisticated Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) can be computationally prohibitive if naively integrated with LLMs at test-time, while simpler, faster methods may lack reliability. To overcome these challenges, we introduce FlexiVe, a novel generative verifier that flexibly balances computational resources between rapid, reliable fast thinking and meticulous slow thinking using a Flexible Allocation of Verification Budget strategy. We further propose the Solve-Detect-Verify pipeline, an efficient inference-time scaling framework that intelligently integrates FlexiVe, proactively identifying solution completion points to trigger targeted verification and provide focused solver feedback. Experiments show FlexiVe achieves superior accuracy in pinpointing errors within reasoning traces on ProcessBench. Furthermore, on challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks (AIME 2024, AIME 2025, and CNMO), our full approach outperforms baselines like self-consistency in reasoning accuracy and inference efficiency. Our system offers a scalable and effective solution to enhance LLM reasoning at test time.

This paper presents a quantitative program verification infrastructure for discrete probabilistic programs. Our infrastructure can be viewed as the probabilistic analogue of Boogie: its central components are an intermediate verification language (IVL) together with a real-valued logic. Our IVL provides a programming-language-style for expressing verification conditions whose validity implies the correctness of a program under investigation. As our focus is on verifying quantitative properties such as bounds on expected outcomes, expected run-times, or termination probabilities, off-the-shelf IVLs based on Boolean first-order logic do not suffice. Instead, a paradigm shift from the standard Boolean to a real-valued domain is required. Our IVL features quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs such as assume- and assert-statements. Verification conditions are generated by a weakest-precondition-style semantics, based on our real-valued logic. We show that our verification infrastructure supports natural encodings of numerous verification techniques from the literature. With our SMT-based implementation, we automatically verify a variety of benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, this establishes the first deductive verification infrastructure for expectation-based reasoning about probabilistic programs.

Code verification has recently found great success as a critical component in training large scale reasoning models for coding. Synthetic techniques such as self-generated test cases and reward models provide a way to enhance code capabilities beyond predefined tests. Building on these advancements, we propose new benchmarks designed to systematically evaluate the impact of synthetic verification methods on assessing solution correctness. We introduce HE-R, HE-R+, MBPP-R, and MBPP-R+, which transform existing coding benchmarks into scoring and ranking datasets to evaluate the effectiveness of synthetic verifiers. Using these benchmarks, we analyze synthetic verification methods in standard, reasoning-based, and reward-based LLMs. Our results show that recent reasoning models significantly improve test case generation and that scaling test cases enhances verification accuracy.

Step-by-step verifiers -- also known as process reward models (PRMs) -- are a key ingredient for test-time scaling. PRMs require step-level supervision, making them expensive to train. This work aims to build data-efficient PRMs as verbalized step-wise reward models that verify every step in the solution by generating a verification chain-of-thought (CoT). We propose ThinkPRM, a long CoT verifier fine-tuned on orders of magnitude fewer process labels than those required by discriminative PRMs. Our approach capitalizes on the inherent reasoning abilities of long CoT models, and outperforms LLM-as-a-Judge and discriminative verifiers -- using only 1% of the process labels in PRM800K -- across several challenging benchmarks. Specifically, ThinkPRM beats the baselines on ProcessBench, MATH-500, and AIME '24 under best-of-N selection and reward-guided search. In an out-of-domain evaluation on a subset of GPQA-Diamond and LiveCodeBench, our PRM surpasses discriminative verifiers trained on the full PRM800K by 8% and 4.5%, respectively. Lastly, under the same token budget, ThinkPRM scales up verification compute more effectively compared to LLM-as-a-Judge, outperforming it by 7.2% on a subset of ProcessBench. Our work highlights the value of generative, long CoT PRMs that can scale test-time compute for verification while requiring minimal supervision for training. Our code, data, and models will be released at https://github.com/mukhal/thinkprm.

We address the problem of runtime trajectory anomaly detection, a critical capability for enabling trustworthy LLM agents. Current safety measures predominantly focus on static input/output filtering. However, we argue that ensuring LLM agents reliability requires auditing the intermediate execution process. In this work, we formulate the task of Trajectory Anomaly Detection. The goal is not merely detection, but precise error localization. This capability is essential for enabling efficient rollback-and-retry. To achieve this, we construct TrajBench, a dataset synthesized via a perturb-and-complete strategy to cover diverse procedural anomalies. Using this benchmark, we investigate the capability of models in process supervision. We observe that general-purpose LLMs, even with zero-shot prompting, struggle to identify and localize these anomalies. This reveals that generalized capabilities do not automatically translate to process reliability. To address this, we propose TrajAD, a specialized verifier trained with fine-grained process supervision. Our approach outperforms baselines, demonstrating that specialized supervision is essential for building trustworthy agents.

The integration of machine learning (ML) systems into critical industries such as healthcare, finance, and cybersecurity has transformed decision-making processes, but it also brings new challenges around trust, security, and accountability. As AI systems become more ubiquitous, ensuring the transparency and correctness of AI-driven decisions is crucial, especially when they have direct consequences on privacy, security, or fairness. Verifiable AI, powered by Zero-Knowledge Machine Learning (zkML), offers a robust solution to these challenges. zkML enables the verification of AI model inferences without exposing sensitive data, providing an essential layer of trust and privacy. However, traditional zkML systems typically require deep cryptographic expertise, placing them beyond the reach of most ML engineers. In this paper, we introduce JSTprove, a specialized zkML toolkit, built on Polyhedra Network's Expander backend, to enable AI developers and ML engineers to generate and verify proofs of AI inference. JSTprove provides an end-to-end verifiable AI inference pipeline that hides cryptographic complexity behind a simple command-line interface while exposing auditable artifacts for reproducibility. We present the design, innovations, and real-world use cases of JSTprove as well as our blueprints and tooling to encourage community review and extension. JSTprove therefore serves both as a usable zkML product for current engineering needs and as a reproducible foundation for future research and production deployments of verifiable AI.

The main issue with most evaluation schemes today is their "static" nature: the same problems are reused repeatedly, allowing for memorization, format exploitation, and eventual saturation. To measure genuine AI progress, we need evaluation that is robust by construction, not by post-hoc detection. In response, we propose VeRA (Verified Reasoning Data Augmentation), a framework that converts benchmark problems into executable specifications, comprising (i) a natural language template with placeholder slots, (ii) a coherent generator that samples valid configurations, and (iii) a deterministic verifier that validates parameters and calculates the corresponding correct answers for each configuration. From a single seed problem, VeRA automatically creates unlimited verified variants with reliable labels at near-zero marginal cost without human involvement. VeRA operates in two complementary modes. VeRA-E (equivalent) rewrites problems while keeping the underlying logic intact, useful for detecting memorization versus genuine reasoning. VeRA-H (hardened) systematically increases complexity while remaining verifiable, enabling reliable creation and labelling of fresh difficult tasks at the boundary of intelligence. Evaluating 16 frontier models with VeRA, we find: (i) VeRA-E improves evaluation quality and reveals contamination patterns. (ii) VeRA-H enables human-free generation of hard tasks with reliable labels. (iii) VeRA establishes verified benchmarks as a general paradigm. VeRA reconceptualizes benchmarks from static objects used until exhausted, to executable specifications generating fresh, verified instances on demand, enhancing robustness and cost-effectiveness for evaluation. With VeRA, we envision that evaluation in any verifiable domain can scale indefinitely without sacrificing label integrity. To stimulate future research, we have open-sourced all code and datasets.

In LLM inference, the same prompt may yield different outputs across different runs. At the system level, this non-determinism arises from floating-point non-associativity combined with dynamic batching and GPU kernels whose reduction orders vary with batch size. A straightforward way to eliminate non-determinism is to disable dynamic batching during inference, but doing so severely degrades throughput. Another approach is to make kernels batch-invariant; however, this tightly couples determinism to kernel design, requiring new implementations. This coupling also imposes fixed runtime overheads, regardless of how much of the workload actually requires determinism. Inspired by ideas from speculative decoding, we present LLM-42, a scheduling-based approach to enable determinism in LLM inference. Our key observation is that if a sequence is in a consistent state, the next emitted token is likely to be consistent even with dynamic batching. Moreover, most GPU kernels use shape-consistent reductions. Leveraging these insights, LLM-42 decodes tokens using a non-deterministic fast path and enforces determinism via a lightweight verify-rollback loop. The verifier replays candidate tokens under a fixed-shape reduction schedule, commits those that are guaranteed to be consistent across runs, and rolls back those violating determinism. LLM-42 mostly re-uses existing kernels unchanged and incurs overhead only in proportion to the traffic that requires determinism.

The standard paradigm for solving coding tasks via large language models (LLMs) is to generate-then-rank programs, where the latter step uses a verifier in the ranking process. The growing consensus is that a comprehensive verifier (e.g., a full test suite) should be prioritized over an outcome reward model (ORM) whenever possible, with little consideration given to the trade-offs involved. We aim to challenge this assumption by systematically exploring the tradeoff between speed and accuracy. We find that ORMs play a crucial role in scaling verification through trading accuracy for speed, even when a comprehensive verifier is available. Their value becomes especially apparent when used in a generate-prune-then-rank approach, where a faster but less accurate verifier removes incorrect solutions prior to ranking -- leading to a system that is 11.65x faster while only being 8.33% less accurate than the full test suite. We analyze the generate-prune-then-rank approach and show that it works by filtering out incorrect but highly ranked solutions. These findings enable the design of scalable and accurate program ranking systems.

Large language models demonstrate remarkable reasoning capabilities but often produce unreliable or incorrect responses. Existing verification methods are typically model-specific or domain-restricted, requiring significant computational resources and lacking scalability across diverse reasoning tasks. To address these limitations, we propose VerifiAgent, a unified verification agent that integrates two levels of verification: meta-verification, which assesses completeness and consistency in model responses, and tool-based adaptive verification, where VerifiAgent autonomously selects appropriate verification tools based on the reasoning type, including mathematical, logical, or commonsense reasoning. This adaptive approach ensures both efficiency and robustness across different verification scenarios. Experimental results show that VerifiAgent outperforms baseline verification methods (e.g., deductive verifier, backward verifier) among all reasoning tasks. Additionally, it can further enhance reasoning accuracy by leveraging feedback from verification results. VerifiAgent can also be effectively applied to inference scaling, achieving better results with fewer generated samples and costs compared to existing process reward models in the mathematical reasoning domain. Code is available at https://github.com/Jiuzhouh/VerifiAgent

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate strong capabilities for solving scientific and mathematical problems, yet they struggle to produce valid, challenging, and novel problems - an essential component for advancing LLM training and enabling autonomous scientific research. Existing problem generation approaches either depend on expensive human expert involvement or adopt naive self-play paradigms, which frequently yield invalid problems due to reward hacking. This work introduces VHG, a verifier-enhanced hard problem generation framework built upon three-party self-play. By integrating an independent verifier into the conventional setter-solver duality, our design constrains the setter's reward to be jointly determined by problem validity (evaluated by the verifier) and difficulty (assessed by the solver). We instantiate two verifier variants: a Hard symbolic verifier and a Soft LLM-based verifier, with evaluations conducted on indefinite integral tasks and general mathematical reasoning tasks. Experimental results show that VHG substantially outperforms all baseline methods by a clear margin.

Test-time scaling (TTS) has emerged as a new frontier for scaling the performance of Large Language Models. In test-time scaling, by using more computational resources during inference, LLMs can improve their reasoning process and task performance. Several approaches have emerged for TTS such as distilling reasoning traces from another model or exploring the vast decoding search space by employing a verifier. The verifiers serve as reward models that help score the candidate outputs from the decoding process to diligently explore the vast solution space and select the best outcome. This paradigm commonly termed has emerged as a superior approach owing to parameter free scaling at inference time and high performance gains. The verifiers could be prompt-based, fine-tuned as a discriminative or generative model to verify process paths, outcomes or both. Despite their widespread adoption, there is no detailed collection, clear categorization and discussion of diverse verification approaches and their training mechanisms. In this survey, we cover the diverse approaches in the literature and present a unified view of verifier training, types and their utility in test-time scaling. Our repository can be found at https://github.com/elixir-research-group/Verifierstesttimescaling.github.io.

We introduce the Formally Verified Automated Programming Progress Standards, or FVAPPS, a benchmark of 4715 samples for writing programs and proving their correctness, the largest formal verification benchmark, including 1083 curated and quality controlled samples. Previously, APPS provided a benchmark and dataset for programming puzzles to be completed in Python and checked against unit tests, of the kind seen in technical assessments in the software engineering industry. Building upon recent approaches for benchmarks in interactive theorem proving, we generalize the unit tests to Lean 4 theorems given without proof (i.e., using Lean's "sorry" keyword). On the 406 theorems of 100 randomly selected samples, Sonnet correctly proves 30% and Gemini correctly proves 18%. We challenge the machine learning and program synthesis communities to solve both each general purpose programming problem and its associated correctness specifications. The benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/quinn-dougherty/fvapps.

The widespread lack of broad source code verification on blockchain explorers such as Etherscan, where despite 78,047,845 smart contracts deployed on Ethereum (as of May 26, 2025), a mere 767,520 (< 1%) are open source, presents a severe impediment to blockchain security. This opacity necessitates the automated semantic analysis of on-chain smart contract bytecode, a fundamental research challenge with direct implications for identifying vulnerabilities and understanding malicious behavior. Prevailing decompilers struggle to reverse bytecode in a readable manner, often yielding convoluted code that critically hampers vulnerability analysis and thwarts efforts to dissect contract functionalities for security auditing. This paper addresses this challenge by introducing a pioneering decompilation pipeline that, for the first time, successfully leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to transform Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode into human-readable and semantically faithful Solidity code. Our novel methodology first employs rigorous static program analysis to convert bytecode into a structured three-address code (TAC) representation. This intermediate representation then guides a Llama-3.2-3B model, specifically fine-tuned on a comprehensive dataset of 238,446 TAC-to-Solidity function pairs, to generate high-quality Solidity. This approach uniquely recovers meaningful variable names, intricate control flow, and precise function signatures. Our extensive empirical evaluation demonstrates a significant leap beyond traditional decompilers, achieving an average semantic similarity of 0.82 with original source and markedly superior readability. The practical viability and effectiveness of our research are demonstrated through its implementation in a publicly accessible system, available at https://evmdecompiler.com.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

Reinforcement learning (RL) has recently emerged as a compelling approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), where an LLM generator serves as a policy guided by a verifier (reward model). However, current RL post-training methods for LLMs typically use verifiers that are fixed (rule-based or frozen pretrained) or trained discriminatively via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Such designs are susceptible to reward hacking and generalize poorly beyond their training distributions. To overcome these limitations, we propose Tango, a novel framework that uses RL to concurrently train both an LLM generator and a verifier in an interleaved manner. A central innovation of Tango is its generative, process-level LLM verifier, which is trained via RL and co-evolves with the generator. Importantly, the verifier is trained solely based on outcome-level verification correctness rewards without requiring explicit process-level annotations. This generative RL-trained verifier exhibits improved robustness and superior generalization compared to deterministic or SFT-trained verifiers, fostering effective mutual reinforcement with the generator. Extensive experiments demonstrate that both components of Tango achieve state-of-the-art results among 7B/8B-scale models: the generator attains best-in-class performance across five competition-level math benchmarks and four challenging out-of-domain reasoning tasks, while the verifier leads on the ProcessBench dataset. Remarkably, both components exhibit particularly substantial improvements on the most difficult mathematical reasoning problems. Code is at: https://github.com/kaiwenzha/rl-tango.

We introduce MacroBench, a code-first benchmark that evaluates whether LLMs can synthesize reusable browser-automation programs (macros) from natural-language goals by reading HTML/DOM and emitting Selenium. MacroBench instantiates seven self-hosted sites covering 681 tasks across interaction complexity and targeting difficulty. Our end-to-end protocol validates generated code via static checks, sandboxed execution, and outcome verification (DOM assertions, database snapshots), and includes a safety suite for scraping, spam/abuse, and credential/privacy prompts. Across 2,636 model-task runs, we observe stratified success: GPT-4o-mini (96.8%), GPT-4o (95.3%), Gemini (89.0%), DeepSeek (83.4%). Models handle simple tasks reliably (91.7%) but fail on complex workflows (0.0%), and none meet production-quality coding practices despite functional completion. We release our complete benchmark pipeline, evaluation framework, and experimental results at https://github.com/hyunjun1121/MacroBench to enable reproducible assessment of macro synthesis for web automation.

Using large language models (LLMs) to generate source code from natural language prompts is a popular and promising idea with a wide range of applications. One of its limitations is that the generated code can be faulty at times, often in a subtle way, despite being presented to the user as correct. In this paper, we explore ways in which formal methods can assist with increasing the quality of code generated by an LLM. Instead of emitting code in a target language directly, we propose that the user guides the LLM to first generate an opaque intermediate representation, in the verification-aware language Dafny, that can be automatically validated for correctness against agreed on specifications. The correct Dafny program is then compiled to the target language and returned to the user. All user-system interactions throughout the procedure occur via natural language; Dafny code is never exposed. We describe our current prototype and report on its performance on the HumanEval Python code generation benchmarks.

Commercial LLM services often conceal internal reasoning traces while still charging users for every generated token, including those from hidden intermediate steps, raising concerns of token inflation and potential overbilling. This gap underscores the urgent need for reliable token auditing, yet achieving it is far from straightforward: cryptographic verification (e.g., hash-based signature) offers little assurance when providers control the entire execution pipeline, while user-side prediction struggles with the inherent variance of reasoning LLMs, where token usage fluctuates across domains and prompt styles. To bridge this gap, we present PALACE (Predictive Auditing of LLM APIs via Reasoning Token Count Estimation), a user-side framework that estimates hidden reasoning token counts from prompt-answer pairs without access to internal traces. PALACE introduces a GRPO-augmented adaptation module with a lightweight domain router, enabling dynamic calibration across diverse reasoning tasks and mitigating variance in token usage patterns. Experiments on math, coding, medical, and general reasoning benchmarks show that PALACE achieves low relative error and strong prediction accuracy, supporting both fine-grained cost auditing and inflation detection. Taken together, PALACE represents an important first step toward standardized predictive auditing, offering a practical path to greater transparency, accountability, and user trust.

Large language models (LLMs) struggle with multi-step reasoning, where inference-time scaling has emerged as a promising strategy for performance improvement. Verifier-guided search outperforms repeated sampling when sample size is limited by selecting and prioritizing valid reasoning paths. However, we identify a critical limitation: scaling flaws, prevalent across different models (Mistral 7B and DeepSeekMath 7B), benchmarks (GSM8K and MATH), and verifiers (outcome value models and process reward models). As sample size increases, verifier-guided search exhibits diminishing advantages and eventually underperforms repeated sampling. Our analysis attributes this to verifier failures, where imperfect verifiers misrank candidates and erroneously prune all valid paths. These issues are further exacerbated in challenging and out-of-distribution problems, restricting search effectiveness. To mitigate verifier failures, we explore reducing reliance on verifiers and conduct preliminary investigations using two simple methods. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in verifier-guided search and suggest future directions.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

Dataflow analysis is a fundamental code analysis technique that identifies dependencies between program values. Traditional approaches typically necessitate successful compilation and expert customization, hindering their applicability and usability for analyzing uncompilable programs with evolving analysis needs in real-world scenarios. This paper presents LLMDFA, an LLM-powered compilation-free and customizable dataflow analysis framework. To address hallucinations for reliable results, we decompose the problem into several subtasks and introduce a series of novel strategies. Specifically, we leverage LLMs to synthesize code that outsources delicate reasoning to external expert tools, such as using a parsing library to extract program values of interest and invoking an automated theorem prover to validate path feasibility. Additionally, we adopt a few-shot chain-of-thought prompting to summarize dataflow facts in individual functions, aligning the LLMs with the program semantics of small code snippets to mitigate hallucinations. We evaluate LLMDFA on synthetic programs to detect three representative types of bugs and on real-world Android applications for customized bug detection. On average, LLMDFA achieves 87.10% precision and 80.77% recall, surpassing existing techniques with F1 score improvements of up to 0.35. We have open-sourced LLMDFA at https://github.com/chengpeng-wang/LLMDFA.

The demonstrated code-understanding capability of LLMs raises the question of whether they can be used for automated program verification, a task that often demands high-level abstract reasoning about program properties, which is challenging for verification tools. We propose a general methodology to combine the power of LLMs and automated reasoners for automated program verification. We formally describe this methodology as a set of derivation rules and prove its soundness. We instantiate the calculus as a sound automated verification procedure, which led to practical improvements on a set of synthetic and competition benchmarks.

Software testing and verification are critical for ensuring the reliability and security of modern software systems. Traditionally, formal verification techniques, such as model checking and theorem proving, have provided rigorous frameworks for detecting bugs and vulnerabilities. However, these methods often face scalability challenges when applied to complex, real-world programs. Recently, the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has introduced a new paradigm for software analysis, leveraging their ability to understand insecure coding practices. Although LLMs demonstrate promising capabilities in tasks such as bug prediction and invariant generation, they lack the formal guarantees of classical methods. This paper presents a comprehensive study of state-of-the-art software testing and verification, focusing on three key approaches: classical formal methods, LLM-based analysis, and emerging hybrid techniques, which combine their strengths. We explore each approach's strengths, limitations, and practical applications, highlighting the potential of hybrid systems to address the weaknesses of standalone methods. We analyze whether integrating formal rigor with LLM-driven insights can enhance the effectiveness and scalability of software verification, exploring their viability as a pathway toward more robust and adaptive testing frameworks.

Identifying LLM-generated code through watermarking poses a challenge in preserving functional correctness. Previous methods rely on the assumption that watermarking high-entropy tokens effectively maintains output quality. Our analysis reveals a fundamental limitation of this assumption: syntax-critical tokens such as keywords often exhibit the highest entropy, making existing approaches vulnerable to logic corruption. We present STONE, a syntax-aware watermarking method that embeds watermarks only in non-syntactic tokens and preserves code integrity. For rigorous evaluation, we also introduce STEM, a comprehensive metric that balances three critical dimensions: correctness, detectability, and imperceptibility. Across Python, C++, and Java, STONE preserves correctness, sustains strong detectability, and achieves balanced performance with minimal computational overhead. Our implementation is available at https://github.com/inistory/STONE-watermarking.

Verifiers have been demonstrated to enhance LLM reasoning via test-time scaling (TTS). Yet, they face significant challenges in complex domains. Error propagation from incorrect intermediate reasoning can lead to false positives for seemingly plausible solutions, while lacking external grounding makes verifiers unreliable on computation or knowledge-intensive tasks. To address these challenges, we propose Agentic Verifier, a framework that transforms reward modeling into a multi-turn, tool-augmented deliberative process. We introduce complementary forward and backward agents: one traces solutions from premises to conclusions, while the other re-checks conclusions against their underlying premises. This bidirectional process enables a comprehensive, reliable, and interpretable assessment of solutions. To facilitate practical deployment, we propose AgentV-RL. Through proactive exploration and reinforcement learning, the verifier autonomously interleaves tool-use with internal reasoning. Extensive experiments show that Agentic Verifier yields consistent performance gains under both parallel and sequential TTS. Notably, our 4B variant surpasses state-of-the-art ORMs by 25.2%, positioning it as a promising paradigm for agentic reward modeling.

Verifiers play a crucial role in large language model (LLM) reasoning, needed by post-training techniques such as reinforcement learning. However, reliable verifiers are hard to get for difficult coding problems, because a well-disguised wrong solution may only be detected by carefully human-written edge cases that are difficult to synthesize. To address this issue, we propose HARDTESTGEN, a pipeline for high-quality test synthesis using LLMs. With this pipeline, we curate a comprehensive competitive programming dataset HARDTESTS with 47k problems and synthetic high-quality tests. Compared with existing tests, HARDTESTGEN tests demonstrate precision that is 11.3 percentage points higher and recall that is 17.5 percentage points higher when evaluating LLM-generated code. For harder problems, the improvement in precision can be as large as 40 points. HARDTESTS also proves to be more effective for model training, measured by downstream code generation performance. We will open-source our dataset and synthesis pipeline at https://leililab.github.io/HardTests/.

Software testing plays a critical role in ensuring that systems behave as intended. However, existing automated testing approaches struggle to match the capabilities of human engineers due to key limitations such as test locality, lack of general reliability, and business logic blindness. In this work, we propose a novel framework that leverages functional programming and type systems to translate Scala backend code into formal Lean representations. Our pipeline automatically generates theorems that specify the intended behavior of APIs and database operations, and uses LLM-based provers to verify them. When a theorem is proved, the corresponding logic is guaranteed to be correct and no further testing is needed. If the negation of a theorem is proved instead, it confirms a bug. In cases where neither can be proved, human intervention is required. We evaluate our method on realistic backend systems and find that it can formally verify over 50% of the test requirements, which suggests that half of a testing engineer's workload can be automated. Additionally, with an average cost of only $2.19 per API, LLM-based verification is significantly more cost-effective than manual testing and can be scaled easily through parallel execution. Our results indicate a promising direction for scalable, AI-powered software testing, with the potential to greatly improve engineering productivity as models continue to advance.

Recent advances have shown that scaling test-time computation enables large language models (LLMs) to solve increasingly complex problems across diverse domains. One effective paradigm for test-time scaling (TTS) involves LLM generators producing multiple solution candidates, with LLM verifiers assessing the correctness of these candidates without reference answers. In this paper, we study generative verifiers, which perform verification by generating chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning followed by a binary verdict. We systematically analyze verification dynamics across three dimensions - problem difficulty, generator capability, and verifier generation capability - with empirical studies on 12 benchmarks across mathematical reasoning, knowledge, and natural language reasoning tasks using 14 open-source models (2B to 72B parameter range) and GPT-4o. Our experiments reveal three key findings about verification effectiveness: (1) Easy problems allow verifiers to more reliably certify correct responses; (2) Weak generators produce errors that are easier to detect than strong generators; (3) Verification ability is generally correlated with the verifier's own problem-solving capability, but this relationship varies with problem difficulty. These findings reveal opportunities to optimize basic verification strategies in TTS applications. First, given the same verifier, some weak generators can nearly match stronger ones in post-verification TTS performance (e.g., the Gemma2-9B to Gemma2-27B performance gap shrinks by 75.5%). Second, we identify cases where strong verifiers offer limited advantage over weak ones, as both fail to provide meaningful verification gains, suggesting that verifier scaling alone cannot overcome fundamental verification challenges.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

Mathematical verfier achieves success in mathematical reasoning tasks by validating the correctness of solutions. However, existing verifiers are trained with binary classification labels, which are not informative enough for the model to accurately assess the solutions. To mitigate the aforementioned insufficiency of binary labels, we introduce step-wise natural language feedbacks as rationale labels (i.e., the correctness of the current step and the explanations). In this paper, we propose Math-Minos, a natural language feedback enhanced verifier by constructing automatically-generated training data and a two-stage training paradigm for effective training and efficient inference. Our experiments reveal that a small set (30k) of natural language feedbacks can significantly boost the performance of the verifier by the accuracy of 1.6\% (86.6\% rightarrow 88.2\%) on GSM8K and 0.8\% (37.8\% rightarrow 38.6\%) on MATH. We have released our code and data for further exploration.

We present DafnyPro, an inference-time framework that enhances LLMs for generating verification annotations in Dafny. DafnyPro comprises three key components: a diff-checker that prevents modifications to base program logic, a pruner that removes unnecessary invariants, and a hint-augmentation system that retrieves and applies predefined, problem-independent proof strategies. We evaluate DafnyPro using Claude Sonnet 3.5 and 3.7 on four benchmarks: Clover, MBPP-Dafny, HumanEval-Dafny, and DafnyBench, achieving consistent performance gains in all cases. Notably, on DafnyBench, the most challenging benchmark, Claude Sonnet 3.5 enhanced with DafnyPro achieves 86% correct proofs, a 16 pp improvement over the base model. We also fine-tune two Qwen models on training data derived from verification attempts by larger models enhanced with DafnyPro. Our 7B and 14B models achieve 68% and 70% correct proofs on DafnyBench, respectively, demonstrating that smaller models can maintain high verification accuracy.

AI agents that execute tasks via tool calls frequently hallucinate results - fabricating tool executions, misstating output counts, or presenting inferences as facts. Recent approaches to verifiable AI inference rely on zero-knowledge proofs, which provide cryptographic guarantees but impose minutes of proving time per query, making them impractical for interactive agents. We propose NabaOS, a lightweight verification framework inspired by Indian epistemology (Nyaya Shastra), which classifies every claim in an LLM response by its epistemic source (pramana): direct tool output (pratyaksha), inference (anumana), external testimony (shabda), absence (abhava), or ungrounded opinion. Our runtime generates HMAC-signed tool execution receipts that the LLM cannot forge, then cross-references claims against these receipts to detect hallucinations in real time. We evaluate on NyayaVerifyBench, a new benchmark of 1,800 agent response scenarios across four languages with injected hallucinations of six types. NabaOS detects 94.2% of fabricated tool references, 87.6% of count misstatements, and 91.3% of false absence claims, with <15ms verification overhead per response. For deep delegation (agents performing multi-step web tasks), our cross-checking protocol catches 78.4% of URL fabrications via independent re-fetching. We compare against five approaches: zkLLM (cryptographic proofs, 180s/query), TOPLOC (locality-sensitive hashing), SPEX (sampling-based proof of execution), tensor commitments, and self-consistency checking. NabaOS achieves the best cost-latency-coverage trade-off for interactive agents: 94.2% coverage at <15ms versus zkLLM's near-perfect coverage at 180,000ms. For interactive agents, practical receipt-based verification provides better cost-benefit than cryptographic proofs, and epistemic classification gives users actionable trust signals rather than binary judgments.

Test-time scaling is a powerful strategy for boosting the performance of large language models on complex reasoning tasks. While state-of-the-art approaches often employ generative verifiers to select the best solution from a pool of candidates, this method incurs prohibitive computational costs, limiting its practicality. In this work, we shift the focus to a more budget-aware paradigm: discriminative verification. We conduct a thorough empirical analysis and demonstrate that while discriminative verifiers may underperform in isolation, combining them with self-consistency in a hybrid approach creates a powerful and efficient test-time scaling mechanism. Notably, under a fixed compute budget, this hybrid approach surpasses state-of-the-art generative verification by a significant margin: achieving up to 15.3\% higher accuracy on AIME2025. Our findings establish that for practical, real-world applications, budget-aware scaling with discriminative verifiers is not only a "free" upgrade over self-consistency, but also a more effective and efficient alternative to costly generative techniques. Code is available at https://github.com/wang-research-lab/verification.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance their reasoning capabilities through feedback. A critical challenge is verifying the consistency of model-generated responses and reference answers, since these responses are often lengthy, diverse, and nuanced. Rule-based verifiers struggle with complexity, prompting the use of model-based verifiers. However, specialized verifiers lack flexibility, while general LLM judges can be inconsistent. Existing research primarily focuses on building better verifiers, yet a systematic evaluation of different types of verifiers' performance across domains remains lacking, severely constraining the reliable development of Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Reward (RLVR). To address this, we propose VerifyBench--a cross-domain comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating verifiers. We construct 4,000 expert-level questions covering mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology. Each question is equipped with reference answers and diverse responses. The reliability of the evaluation is ensured through a rigorous annotation process conducted by a multidisciplinary expert team. We design a four-dimensional experimental framework to comprehensively compare the performance boundaries of specialized verifiers and general LLMs under combined conditions of extracted answers vs. complete responses, and short vs. long outputs. Our evaluation uncovers fundamental trade-offs in verifiers: while specialized verifiers achieve leading accuracy, they exhibit deficiencies in recall; general models show stronger inclusivity but unstable precision. More importantly, we discover verifiers' high sensitivity to input structure and inherent limitations in cross-domain generalization, providing critical insights into the bottlenecks of current verifier technology.

AI coding agents are increasingly used to write real-world software, but ensuring that their outputs are correct remains a fundamental challenge. Formal verification offers a promising path: an agent generates code together with a machine-checked proof, guaranteeing that the code satisfies a formal specification. However, there is no guarantee that the formal spec itself matches the user's intent. In this work, we study specification autoformalization: whether LLM agents can translate informal programming problems into faithful formal specifications. We introduce Verus-SpecBench, a benchmark of 581 spec-writing tasks derived from Codeforces problems targeting Verus, a verifier for Rust, and Verus-SpecGym, an agentic environment in which models interact with Verus, bash, & the filesystem to develop these specs. The central challenge is evaluation: expert-written reference specs are expensive to write, & LLM judges can miss subtle mistakes. We address this by (a) extending Verus's exec_spec mechanism so that generated specs can be executed as Rust code, & (b) testing them against official Codeforces tests & adversarial cases extracted from Codeforces "hacks", which are edge cases written by competitors to break incorrect solutions. On Verus-SpecBench, the strongest model, Gemini 3.1 Pro, solves 77.8% of tasks, other frontier models solve 51.1--57.8% & OSS models reach only 21.5--25.5%. Our analysis of failure modes shows that model-generated specs can omit important input assumptions, accept incorrect outputs, & reject valid ones. We also find that LLM-as-a-judge evaluation misses 26% of the failures our evaluator catches. Overall, our results suggest that spec autoformalization is within reach for frontier agents but remains brittle even on problems where they can already generate correct code. The code, data, & logs can be found at https://github.com/formal-verif-is-cool/verus-spec-gym

Common self-improvement approaches for large language models (LLMs), such as STaR (Zelikman et al., 2022), iteratively fine-tune LLMs on self-generated solutions to improve their problem-solving ability. However, these approaches discard the large amounts of incorrect solutions generated during this process, potentially neglecting valuable information in such solutions. To address this shortcoming, we propose V-STaR that utilizes both the correct and incorrect solutions generated during the self-improvement process to train a verifier using DPO that judges correctness of model-generated solutions. This verifier is used at inference time to select one solution among many candidate solutions. Running V-STaR for multiple iterations results in progressively better reasoners and verifiers, delivering a 4% to 17% test accuracy improvement over existing self-improvement and verification approaches on common code generation and math reasoning benchmarks with LLaMA2 models.

Access to frontier large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-5 and Gemini-2.5, is often hindered by high pricing, payment barriers, and regional restrictions. These limitations drive the proliferation of shadow APIs, third-party services that claim to provide access to official model services without regional limitations via indirect access. Despite their widespread use, it remains unclear whether shadow APIs deliver outputs consistent with those of the official APIs, raising concerns about the reliability of downstream applications and the validity of research findings that depend on them. In this paper, we present the first systematic audit between official LLM APIs and corresponding shadow APIs. We first identify 17 shadow APIs that have been utilized in 187 academic papers, with the most popular one reaching 5,966 citations and 58,639 GitHub stars by December 6, 2025. Through multidimensional auditing of three representative shadow APIs across utility, safety, and model verification, we uncover both indirect and direct evidence of deception practices in shadow APIs. Specifically, we reveal performance divergence reaching up to 47.21%, significant unpredictability in safety behaviors, and identity verification failures in 45.83% of fingerprint tests. These deceptive practices critically undermine the reproducibility and validity of scientific research, harm the interests of shadow API users, and damage the reputation of official model providers.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is starting to transform the research process as we know it by automating the discovery of new solutions. Given a task, the typical AI-driven approach is (i) to generate a set of diverse solutions, and then (ii) to verify these solutions and select one that solves the problem. Crucially, this approach assumes the existence of a reliable verifier, i.e., one that can accurately determine whether a solution solves the given problem. We argue that systems research, long focused on designing and evaluating new performance-oriented algorithms, is particularly well-suited for AI-driven solution discovery. This is because system performance problems naturally admit reliable verifiers: solutions are typically implemented in real systems or simulators, and verification reduces to running these software artifacts against predefined workloads and measuring performance. We term this approach as AI-Driven Research for Systems (ADRS), which iteratively generates, evaluates, and refines solutions. Using penEvolve, an existing open-source ADRS instance, we present case studies across diverse domains, including load balancing for multi-region cloud scheduling, Mixture-of-Experts inference, LLM-based SQL queries, and transaction scheduling. In multiple instances, ADRS discovers algorithms that outperform state-of-the-art human designs (e.g., achieving up to 5.0x runtime improvements or 50% cost reductions). We distill best practices for guiding algorithm evolution, from prompt design to evaluator construction, for existing frameworks. We then discuss the broader implications for the systems community: as AI assumes a central role in algorithm design, we argue that human researchers will increasingly focus on problem formulation and strategic guidance. Our results highlight both the disruptive potential and the urgent need to adapt systems research practices in the age of AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exploded a new heatwave of AI, for their ability to engage end-users in human-level conversations with detailed and articulate answers across many knowledge domains. In response to their fast adoption in many industrial applications, this survey concerns their safety and trustworthiness. First, we review known vulnerabilities of the LLMs, categorising them into inherent issues, intended attacks, and unintended bugs. Then, we consider if and how the Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques, which have been widely developed for traditional software and deep learning models such as convolutional neural networks, can be integrated and further extended throughout the lifecycle of the LLMs to provide rigorous analysis to the safety and trustworthiness of LLMs and their applications. Specifically, we consider four complementary techniques: falsification and evaluation, verification, runtime monitoring, and ethical use. Considering the fast development of LLMs, this survey does not intend to be complete (although it includes 300 references), especially when it comes to the applications of LLMs in various domains, but rather a collection of organised literature reviews and discussions to support the quick understanding of the safety and trustworthiness issues from the perspective of V&V.

Large language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable proficiency in code generation tasks across various programming languages. However, their outputs often contain subtle but critical vulnerabilities, posing significant risks when deployed in security-sensitive or mission-critical systems. This paper introduces TypePilot, an agentic AI framework designed to enhance the security and robustness of LLM-generated code by leveraging strongly typed and verifiable languages, using Scala as a representative example. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach in two settings: formal verification with the Stainless framework and general-purpose secure code generation. Our experiments with leading open-source LLMs reveal that while direct code generation often fails to enforce safety constraints, just as naive prompting for more secure code, our type-focused agentic pipeline substantially mitigates input validation and injection vulnerabilities. The results demonstrate the potential of structured, type-guided LLM workflows to improve the SotA of the trustworthiness of automated code generation in high-assurance domains.

As demand for LLM inference grows, it is becoming increasingly important that providers and their customers can verify that inference processes are performed correctly, without errors or tampering. However, re-running the same inference process twice often leads to different results due to benign numerical noise, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate variation from actual problems. To address this problem, we introduce Token-DiFR (Token-Divergence-From-Reference), a method for verifying inference outputs by comparing generated tokens against predictions made by a trusted reference implementation conditioned on the same random seed. Sampling seed synchronization tightly constrains valid outputs, leaving providers minimal room to deviate from correct inference, which allows output tokens themselves to serve as auditable evidence of correctness at zero additional cost to the provider. Token-DiFR reliably identifies sampling errors, simulated bugs, and model quantization, detecting 4-bit quantization with AUC > 0.999 within 300 output tokens. For applications requiring sample-efficient forward-pass verification, we additionally introduce Activation-DiFR, a scheme that uses random orthogonal projections to compress activations into compact fingerprints for subsequent verification. Activation-DiFR detects 4-bit quantization with AUC > 0.999 using just 2 output tokens, while reducing communication overhead by 25-75% relative to existing methods. We release an open-source integration with vLLM to accelerate practical deployment of verifiable inference.

As autonomous AI agents are used in regulated and safety-critical settings, organizations need effective ways to turn policy into enforceable controls. We introduce a regulatory machine learning framework that converts unstructured design artifacts (like PRDs, TDDs, and code) into verifiable runtime guardrails. Our Policy as Prompt method reads these documents and risk controls to build a source-linked policy tree. This tree is then compiled into lightweight, prompt-based classifiers for real-time runtime monitoring. The system is built to enforce least privilege and data minimization. For conformity assessment, it provides complete provenance, traceability, and audit logging, all integrated with a human-in-the-loop review process. Evaluations show our system reduces prompt-injection risk, blocks out-of-scope requests, and limits toxic outputs. It also generates auditable rationales aligned with AI governance frameworks. By treating policies as executable prompts (a policy-as-code for agents), this approach enables secure-by-design deployment, continuous compliance, and scalable AI safety and AI security assurance for regulatable ML.

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

The popularity of the Rust language continues to explode; yet, many critical codebases remain authored in C, and cannot be realistically rewritten by hand. Automatically translating C to Rust is thus an appealing course of action. Several works have gone down this path, handling an ever-increasing subset of C through a variety of Rust features, such as unsafe. While the prospect of automation is appealing, producing code that relies on unsafe negates the memory safety guarantees offered by Rust, and therefore the main advantages of porting existing codebases to memory-safe languages. We instead explore a different path, and explore what it would take to translate C to safe Rust; that is, to produce code that is trivially memory safe, because it abides by Rust's type system without caveats. Our work sports several original contributions: a type-directed translation from (a subset of) C to safe Rust; a novel static analysis based on "split trees" that allows expressing C's pointer arithmetic using Rust's slices and splitting operations; an analysis that infers exactly which borrows need to be mutable; and a compilation strategy for C's struct types that is compatible with Rust's distinction between non-owned and owned allocations. We apply our methodology to existing formally verified C codebases: the HACL* cryptographic library, and binary parsers and serializers from EverParse, and show that the subset of C we support is sufficient to translate both applications to safe Rust. Our evaluation shows that for the few places that do violate Rust's aliasing discipline, automated, surgical rewrites suffice; and that the few strategic copies we insert have a negligible performance impact. Of particular note, the application of our approach to HACL* results in a 80,000 line verified cryptographic library, written in pure Rust, that implements all modern algorithms - the first of its kind.

Rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has achieved major advances in reasoning, planning, and function-calling capabilities. Multi-agentic collaborative frameworks using such LLMs place them at the center of solving software development-related tasks such as code generation. However, direct use of LLM generated code in production software development systems is problematic. The code could be unstable or erroneous and contain vulnerabilities such as data poisoning, malicious attacks, and hallucinations that could lead to widespread system malfunctions. This prohibits the adoption of LLM generated code in production AI systems where human code reviews and traditional secure testing tools are impractical or untrustworthy. In this paper, we discuss safety and reliability problems with the execution of LLM generated code and propose a Secure Transpiler and Executor of LLM-Generated Program (STELP), capable of executing LLM-generated code in a controlled and safe manner. STELP secures autonomous production AI systems involving code generation, filling the critical void left by the impracticality or limitations of traditional secure testing methodologies and human oversight. This includes applications such as headless code generation-execution and LLMs that produce executable code snippets as an action plan to be executed in real time. We contribute a human-validated dataset of insecure code snippets and benchmark our approach on publicly available datasets for correctness, safety, and latency. Our results demonstrate that our approach outperforms an existing method by a significant margin, particularly in its ability to safely execute risky code snippets. Warning: This paper contains malicious code snippets that should be run with caution.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly aided developers by generating or assisting in code writing, enhancing productivity across various tasks. While identifying incorrect code is often straightforward, detecting vulnerabilities in functionally correct code is more challenging, especially for developers with limited security knowledge, which poses considerable security risks of using LLM-generated code and underscores the need for robust evaluation benchmarks that assess both functional correctness and security. Current benchmarks like CyberSecEval and SecurityEval attempt to solve it but are hindered by unclear and impractical specifications, failing to assess both functionality and security accurately. To tackle these deficiencies, we introduce CWEval, a novel outcome-driven evaluation framework designed to enhance the evaluation of secure code generation by LLMs. This framework not only assesses code functionality but also its security simultaneously with high-quality task specifications and outcome-driven test oracles which provides high accuracy. Coupled with CWEval-bench, a multilingual, security-critical coding benchmark, CWEval provides a rigorous empirical security evaluation on LLM-generated code, overcoming previous benchmarks' shortcomings. Through our evaluations, CWEval reveals a notable portion of functional but insecure code produced by LLMs, and shows a serious inaccuracy of previous evaluations, ultimately contributing significantly to the field of secure code generation. We open-source our artifact at: https://github.com/Co1lin/CWEval .

In this paper we present a novel solution that combines the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with Formal Verification strategies to verify and automatically repair software vulnerabilities. Initially, we employ Bounded Model Checking (BMC) to locate the software vulnerability and derive a counterexample. The counterexample provides evidence that the system behaves incorrectly or contains a vulnerability. The counterexample that has been detected, along with the source code, are provided to the LLM engine. Our approach involves establishing a specialized prompt language for conducting code debugging and generation to understand the vulnerability's root cause and repair the code. Finally, we use BMC to verify the corrected version of the code generated by the LLM. As a proof of concept, we create ESBMC-AI based on the Efficient SMT-based Context-Bounded Model Checker (ESBMC) and a pre-trained Transformer model, specifically gpt-3.5-turbo, to detect and fix errors in C programs. Our experimentation involved generating a dataset comprising 1000 C code samples, each consisting of 20 to 50 lines of code. Notably, our proposed method achieved an impressive success rate of up to 80% in repairing vulnerable code encompassing buffer overflow and pointer dereference failures. We assert that this automated approach can effectively incorporate into the software development lifecycle's continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) process.

The widespread adoption of deep neural networks (DNNs) requires efficient techniques for verifying their safety. DNN verifiers are complex tools, which might contain bugs that could compromise their soundness and undermine the reliability of the verification process. This concern can be mitigated using proofs: artifacts that are checkable by an external and reliable proof checker, and which attest to the correctness of the verification process. However, such proofs tend to be extremely large, limiting their use in many scenarios. In this work, we address this problem by minimizing proofs of unsatisfiability produced by DNN verifiers. We present algorithms that remove facts which were learned during the verification process, but which are unnecessary for the proof itself. Conceptually, our method analyzes the dependencies among facts used to deduce UNSAT, and removes facts that did not contribute. We then further minimize the proof by eliminating remaining unnecessary dependencies, using two alternative procedures. We implemented our algorithms on top of a proof producing DNN verifier, and evaluated them across several benchmarks. Our results show that our best-performing algorithm reduces proof size by 37%-82% and proof checking time by 30%-88%, while introducing a runtime overhead of 7%-20% to the verification process itself.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

Current paradigms for code verification rely heavily on external mechanisms-such as execution-based unit tests or auxiliary LLM judges-which are often labor-intensive or limited by the judging model's own capabilities. This raises a fundamental, yet unexplored question: Can an LLM's functional correctness be assessed purely from its internal computational structure? Our primary objective is to investigate whether the model's neural dynamics encode internally decodable signals that are predictive of logical validity during code generation. Inspired by mechanistic interpretability, we propose to treat code verification as a mechanistic diagnostic task, mapping the model's explicit algorithmic trajectory into line-level attribution graphs. By decomposing complex residual flows, we aim to identify the structural signatures that distinguish sound reasoning from logical failure within the model's internal circuits. Analysis across Python, C++, and Java confirms that intrinsic correctness signals are robust across diverse syntaxes. Topological features from these internal graphs predict correctness more reliably than surface heuristics and enable targeted causal interventions to fix erroneous logic. These findings establish internal introspection as a decodable property for verifying generated code. Our code is at https:// github.com/bruno686/CodeCircuit.

The increasing sophistication of large vision-language models (LVLMs) has been accompanied by advances in safety alignment mechanisms designed to prevent harmful content generation. However, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks. Existing jailbreak methods typically rely on direct and semantically explicit prompts, overlooking subtle vulnerabilities in how LVLMs compose information over multiple reasoning steps. In this paper, we propose a novel and effective jailbreak framework inspired by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) techniques from software security. Our approach decomposes a harmful instruction into a sequence of individually benign visual gadgets. A carefully engineered textual prompt directs the sequence of inputs, prompting the model to integrate the benign visual gadgets through its reasoning process to produce a coherent and harmful output. This makes the malicious intent emergent and difficult to detect from any single component. We validate our method through extensive experiments on established benchmarks including SafeBench and MM-SafetyBench, targeting popular LVLMs. Results show that our approach consistently and substantially outperforms existing baselines on state-of-the-art models, achieving near-perfect attack success rates (over 0.90 on SafeBench) and improving ASR by up to 0.39. Our findings reveal a critical and underexplored vulnerability that exploits the compositional reasoning abilities of LVLMs, highlighting the urgent need for defenses that secure the entire reasoning process.

Verifiers can improve language model capabilities by scoring and ranking responses from generated candidates. Currently, high-quality verifiers are either unscalable (e.g., humans) or limited in utility (e.g., tools like Lean). While LM judges and reward models have become broadly useful as general-purpose verifiers, a significant performance gap remains between them and oracle verifiers (verifiers with perfect accuracy). To help close this gap, we introduce Weaver, a framework for designing a strong verifier by combining multiple weak, imperfect verifiers. We find weighted ensembles of verifiers, which typically require learning from labeled data, significantly outperform unweighted combinations due to differences in verifier accuracies. To reduce dependency on labeled data, Weaver leverages weak supervision to estimate each verifier's accuracy and combines outputs into a unified score that better reflects true response quality. However, directly applying weak supervision algorithms poses challenges, including inconsistent verifier output formats and handling low-quality verifiers. Weaver addresses these using dataset statistics to normalize outputs and filter specific verifiers. We study Weaver's effectiveness in test-time repeated sampling, where a model generates multiple candidate responses and selects one. Our evaluations show Weaver significantly improves over Pass@1-performance when selecting the first candidate-across reasoning and math tasks, achieving o3-mini-level accuracy with Llama 3.3 70B Instruct as generator, and an ensemble of 70B or smaller judge and reward models as verifiers (87.7% average). This gain mirrors the jump between GPT-4o and o3-mini (69.0% vs. 86.7%), which required extensive finetuning and post-training. To reduce computational costs of verifier ensembles, we train a 400M cross-encoder using Weaver's combined output scores.

Federated Language Model (FedLM) allows a collaborative learning without sharing raw data, yet it introduces a critical vulnerability, as every untrustworthy client may leak the received functional model instance. Current watermarking schemes for FedLM often require white-box access and client-side cooperation, providing only group-level proof of ownership rather than individual traceability. We propose EmbTracker, a server-side, traceable black-box watermarking framework specifically designed for FedLMs. EmbTracker achieves black-box verifiability by embedding a backdoor-based watermark detectable through simple API queries. Client-level traceability is realized by injecting unique identity-specific watermarks into the model distributed to each client. In this way, a leaked model can be attributed to a specific culprit, ensuring robustness even against non-cooperative participants. Extensive experiments on various language and vision-language models demonstrate that EmbTracker achieves robust traceability with verification rates near 100\%, high resilience against removal attacks (fine-tuning, pruning, quantization), and negligible impact on primary task performance (typically within 1-2\%).

Large Language Models (LLMs) are one of the most promising developments in the field of artificial intelligence, and the software engineering community has readily noticed their potential role in the software development life-cycle. Developers routinely ask LLMs to generate code snippets, increasing productivity but also potentially introducing ownership, privacy, correctness, and security issues. Previous work highlighted how code generated by mainstream commercial LLMs is often not safe, containing vulnerabilities, bugs, and code smells. In this paper, we present a framework that leverages testing and static analysis to assess the quality, and guide the self-improvement, of code generated by general-purpose, open-source LLMs. First, we ask LLMs to generate C code to solve a number of programming tasks. Then we employ ground-truth tests to assess the (in)correctness of the generated code, and a static analysis tool to detect potential safety vulnerabilities. Next, we assess the models ability to evaluate the generated code, by asking them to detect errors and vulnerabilities. Finally, we test the models ability to fix the generated code, providing the reports produced during the static analysis and incorrectness evaluation phases as feedback. Our results show that models often produce incorrect code, and that the generated code can include safety issues. Moreover, they perform very poorly at detecting either issue. On the positive side, we observe a substantial ability to fix flawed code when provided with information about failed tests or potential vulnerabilities, indicating a promising avenue for improving the safety of LLM-based code generation tools.

Symbolic execution detects vulnerabilities with precision, but applying it to large codebases requires harnesses that set up symbolic state, model dependencies, and specify assertions. Writing these harnesses has traditionally been a manual process requiring expert knowledge, which significantly limits the scalability of the technique. We present Static Analysis Informed and LLM-Orchestrated Symbolic Execution (SAILOR), which automates symbolic execution harness construction by combining static analysis with LLM-based synthesis. SAILOR operates in three phases: (1) static analysis identifies candidate vulnerable locations and generates vulnerability specifications; (2) an LLM uses vulnerability specifications and orchestrates harness synthesis by iteratively refining drivers, stubs, and assertions against compiler and symbolic execution feedback; symbolic execution then detects vulnerabilities using the generated harness, and (3) concrete replay validates the symbolic execution results against the unmodified project source. This design combines the scalability of static analysis, the code reasoning of LLMs, the path precision of symbolic execution, and the ground truth produced by concrete execution. We evaluate SAILOR on 10 open-source C/C++ projects totaling 6.8 M lines of code. SAILOR discovers 379 distinct, previously unknown memory-safety vulnerabilities (421 confirmed crashes). The strongest of five baselines we compare SAILOR to (agentic vulnerability detection using Claude Code with full codebase access and unlimited interaction), finds only 12 vulnerabilities. Each phase of SAILOR is critical: Without static analysis targeting confirmed vulnerabilities drop 12.2X; without iterative LLM synthesis zero vulnerabilities are confirmed; and without symbolic execution no approach can detect more than 12 vulnerabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant progress in solving complex reasoning tasks by Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). This advancement is also inseparable from the oversight automated by reliable verifiers. However, current outcome-based verifiers (OVs) are unable to inspect the unreliable intermediate steps in the long reasoning chains of thought (CoTs). Meanwhile, current process-based verifiers (PVs) have difficulties in reliably detecting errors in the complex long CoTs, limited by the scarcity of high-quality annotations due to the prohibitive costs of human annotations. Therefore, we propose the Outcome-based Process Verifier (OPV), which verifies the rationale process of summarized outcomes from long CoTs to achieve both accurate and efficient verification and enable large-scale annotation. To empower the proposed verifier, we adopt an iterative active learning framework with expert annotations to progressively improve the verification capability of OPV with fewer annotation costs. Specifically, in each iteration, the most uncertain cases of the current best OPV are annotated and then subsequently used to train a new OPV through Rejection Fine-Tuning (RFT) and RLVR for the next round. Extensive experiments demonstrate OPV's superior performance and broad applicability. It achieves new state-of-the-art results on our held-out \thisbench, outperforming much larger open-source models such as Qwen3-Max-Preview with an F1 score of 83.1 compared to 76.3. Furthermore, OPV effectively detects false positives within synthetic dataset, closely align with expert assessment. When collaborating with policy models, OPV consistently yields performance gains, e.g., raising the accuracy of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B from 55.2\% to 73.3\% on AIME2025 as the compute budget scales.

The advent of large language models (LLMs) has greatly facilitated code generation, but ensuring the functional correctness of generated code remains a challenge. Traditional validation methods are often time-consuming, error-prone, and impractical for large volumes of code. We introduce CodeSift, a novel framework that leverages LLMs as the first-line filter of code validation without the need for execution, reference code, or human feedback, thereby reducing the validation effort. We assess the effectiveness of our method across three diverse datasets encompassing two programming languages. Our results indicate that CodeSift outperforms state-of-the-art code evaluation methods. Internal testing conducted with subject matter experts reveals that the output generated by CodeSift is in line with human preference, reinforcing its effectiveness as a dependable automated code validation tool.

Verifiers or reward models are often used to enhance the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs). A common approach is the Best-of-N method, where N candidate solutions generated by the LLM are ranked by a verifier, and the best one is selected. While LLM-based verifiers are typically trained as discriminative classifiers to score solutions, they do not utilize the text generation capabilities of pretrained LLMs. To overcome this limitation, we instead propose training verifiers using the ubiquitous next-token prediction objective, jointly on verification and solution generation. Compared to standard verifiers, such generative verifiers (GenRM) can benefit from several advantages of LLMs: they integrate seamlessly with instruction tuning, enable chain-of-thought reasoning, and can utilize additional inference-time compute via majority voting for better verification. We demonstrate that when using Gemma-based verifiers on algorithmic and grade-school math reasoning tasks, GenRM outperforms discriminative verifiers and LLM-as-a-Judge, showing a 16-64% improvement in the percentage of problems solved with Best-of-N. Furthermore, we show that GenRM scales favorably across dataset size, model capacity, and inference-time compute.

Code LLMs still struggle with code execution reasoning, especially in smaller models. Existing methods rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with teacher-generated explanations, primarily in two forms: (1) input-output (I/O) prediction chains and (2) natural-language descriptions of execution traces. However, intermediate execution steps cannot be explicitly verified during SFT, so the training objective can reduce to merely matching teacher explanations. Moreover, training data is typically collected without explicit control over task difficulty. We introduce ExecVerify, which goes beyond text imitation by incorporating verifiable white-box rewards derived from execution traces, including next-statement prediction and variable value/type prediction. Our work first builds a dataset with multiple difficulty levels via constraint-based program synthesis. Then, we apply reinforcement learning (RL) to reward correct answers about both intermediate execution steps and final outputs, aligning the training objective with semantic correctness at each execution step. Finally, we adopt a two-stage training pipeline that first enhances execution reasoning and then transfers to code generation. Experiments demonstrate that a 7B model trained with ExecVerify achieves performance comparable to 32B models on code reasoning benchmarks and improves pass@1 by up to 5.9\% on code generation tasks over strong post-training baselines.

Large language model (LLM)-based reasoning systems have recently achieved gold medal-level performance in the IMO 2025 competition, writing mathematical proofs where, to receive full credit, each step must be not only correct but also sufficiently supported. To train LLM-based reasoners in such challenging, open-ended settings, strong verifiers capable of catching step-level mistakes are necessary prerequisites. We introduce Hard2Verify, a human-annotated, step-level verification benchmark produced with over 500 hours of human labor. Hard2Verify is designed to rigorously assess step-level verifiers at the frontier: Verifiers must provide step-level annotations or identify the first error in responses generated by frontier LLMs for very recent, challenging, and open-ended math questions. We evaluate 29 generative critics and process reward models, demonstrating that, beyond a few standouts, open-source verifiers lag closed source models. We subsequently analyze what drives poor performance in step-level verification, the impacts of scaling verifier compute, as well as fundamental questions such as self-verification and verification-generation dynamics.

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved from simple chatbots into autonomous agents capable of performing complex tasks such as editing production code, orchestrating workflows, and taking higher-stakes actions based on untrusted inputs like webpages and emails. These capabilities introduce new security risks that existing security measures, such as model fine-tuning or chatbot-focused guardrails, do not fully address. Given the higher stakes and the absence of deterministic solutions to mitigate these risks, there is a critical need for a real-time guardrail monitor to serve as a final layer of defense, and support system level, use case specific safety policy definition and enforcement. We introduce LlamaFirewall, an open-source security focused guardrail framework designed to serve as a final layer of defense against security risks associated with AI Agents. Our framework mitigates risks such as prompt injection, agent misalignment, and insecure code risks through three powerful guardrails: PromptGuard 2, a universal jailbreak detector that demonstrates clear state of the art performance; Agent Alignment Checks, a chain-of-thought auditor that inspects agent reasoning for prompt injection and goal misalignment, which, while still experimental, shows stronger efficacy at preventing indirect injections in general scenarios than previously proposed approaches; and CodeShield, an online static analysis engine that is both fast and extensible, aimed at preventing the generation of insecure or dangerous code by coding agents. Additionally, we include easy-to-use customizable scanners that make it possible for any developer who can write a regular expression or an LLM prompt to quickly update an agent's security guardrails.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) suggest great promises in code and proof generations. However, scaling automated formal verification to real-world projects requires resolving cross-module dependencies and global contexts, which are crucial challenges overlooked by existing LLM-based methods with a special focus on targeting isolated, function-level verification tasks. To systematically explore and address the significant challenges of verifying entire software repositories, we introduce RVBench, the first verification benchmark explicitly designed for repository-level evaluation, constructed from four diverse and complex open-source Verus projects. We further introduce RagVerus, an extensible framework that synergizes retrieval-augmented generation with context-aware prompting to automate proof synthesis for multi-module repositories. RagVerus triples proof pass rates on existing benchmarks under constrained model inference budgets, and achieves a 27% relative improvement on the more challenging RVBench benchmark, demonstrating a scalable and sample-efficient verification solution.

Vericoding refers to the generation of formally verified code from rigorous specifications. Recent AI models show promise in vericoding, but a unified methodology for cross-paradigm evaluation is lacking. Existing benchmarks test only individual languages/tools (e.g., Dafny, Verus, and Lean) and each covers very different tasks, so the performance numbers are not directly comparable. We address this gap with AlgoVeri, a benchmark that evaluates vericoding of 77 classical algorithms in Dafny, Verus, and Lean. By enforcing identical functional contracts, AlgoVeri reveals critical capability gaps in verification systems. While frontier models achieve tractable success in Dafny (40.3% for Gemini-3 Flash), where high-level abstractions and SMT automation simplify the workflow, performance collapses under the systems-level memory constraints of Verus (24.7%) and the explicit proof construction required by Lean (7.8%). Beyond aggregate metrics, we uncover a sharp divergence in test-time compute dynamics: Gemini-3 effectively utilizes iterative repair to boost performance (e.g., tripling pass rates in Dafny), whereas GPT-OSS saturates early. Finally, our error analysis shows that language design affects the refinement trajectory: while Dafny allows models to focus on logical correctness, Verus and Lean trap models in persistent syntactic and semantic barriers. All data and evaluation code can be found at https://github.com/haoyuzhao123/algoveri.

Static analysis tools provide a powerful means to detect security vulnerabilities by specifying queries that encode vulnerable code patterns. However, writing such queries is challenging and requires diverse expertise in security and program analysis. To address this challenge, we present QLCoder - an agentic framework that automatically synthesizes queries in CodeQL, a powerful static analysis engine, directly from a given CVE metadata. QLCode embeds an LLM in a synthesis loop with execution feedback, while constraining its reasoning using a custom MCP interface that allows structured interaction with a Language Server Protocol (for syntax guidance) and a RAG database (for semantic retrieval of queries and documentation). This approach allows QLCoder to generate syntactically and semantically valid security queries. We evaluate QLCode on 176 existing CVEs across 111 Java projects. Building upon the Claude Code agent framework, QLCoder synthesizes correct queries that detect the CVE in the vulnerable but not in the patched versions for 53.4% of CVEs. In comparison, using only Claude Code synthesizes 10% correct queries.

Fact verification is essential for ensuring the reliability of LLM applications. In this study, we evaluate 12 pre-trained LLMs and one specialized fact-verifier, including frontier LLMs and open-weight reasoning LLMs, using a collection of examples from 14 fact-checking benchmarks. We share three findings intended to guide future development of more robust fact verifiers. First, we highlight the importance of addressing annotation errors and ambiguity in datasets, demonstrating that approximately 16\% of ambiguous or incorrectly labeled data substantially influences model rankings. Neglecting this issue may result in misleading conclusions during comparative evaluations, and we suggest using a systematic pipeline utilizing LLM-as-a-judge to help identify these issues at scale. Second, we discover that frontier LLMs with few-shot in-context examples, often overlooked in previous works, achieve top-tier performance. We therefore recommend future studies include comparisons with these simple yet highly effective baselines. Lastly, despite their effectiveness, frontier LLMs incur substantial costs, motivating the development of small, fine-tuned fact verifiers. We show that these small models still have room for improvement, particularly on instances that require complex reasoning. Encouragingly, we demonstrate that augmenting training with synthetic multi-hop reasoning data significantly enhances their capabilities in such instances. We release our code, model, and dataset at https://github.com/just1nseo/verifying-the-verifiers

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into software engineering has revolutionized code generation, enabling unprecedented productivity through promptware and autonomous AI agents. However, this transformation introduces significant risks, including insecure code generation, hallucinated outputs, irreversible actions, and a lack of transparency and accountability. Incidents like the Replit database deletion underscore the urgent need for robust safety and governance mechanisms. This paper comprehensively analyzes the inherent challenges of LLM-assisted code generation, such as vulnerability inheritance, overtrust, misinterpretation, and the absence of standardized validation and rollback protocols. To address these, we propose the SAFE-AI Framework, a holistic approach emphasizing Safety, Auditability, Feedback, and Explainability. The framework integrates guardrails, sandboxing, runtime verification, risk-aware logging, human-in-the-loop systems, and explainable AI techniques to mitigate risks while fostering trust and compliance. We introduce a novel taxonomy of AI behaviors categorizing suggestive, generative, autonomous, and destructive actions to guide risk assessment and oversight. Additionally, we identify open problems, including the lack of standardized benchmarks for code specific hallucinations and autonomy levels, and propose future research directions for hybrid verification, semantic guardrails, and proactive governance tools. Through detailed comparisons of autonomy control, prompt engineering, explainability, and governance frameworks, this paper provides a roadmap for responsible AI integration in software engineering, aligning with emerging regulations like the EU AI Act and Canada's AIDA to ensure safe, transparent, and accountable AI-driven development.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

Improving open-source models on real-world SWE tasks (solving GITHUB issues) faces two key challenges: 1) scalable curation of execution environments to train these models, and, 2) optimal scaling of test-time compute. We introduce AgentGym, the largest procedurally-curated executable gym environment for training real-world SWE-agents, consisting of more than 8.7K tasks. AgentGym is powered by two main contributions: 1) SYNGEN: a synthetic data curation recipe that enables scalable curation of executable environments using test-generation and back-translation directly from commits, thereby reducing reliance on human-written issues or unit tests. We show that this enables more scalable training leading to pass@1 performance of 34.4% on SWE-Bench Verified benchmark with our 32B model. 2) Hybrid Test-time Scaling: we provide an in-depth analysis of two test-time scaling axes; execution-based and execution-free verifiers, demonstrating that they exhibit complementary strengths and limitations. Test-based verifiers suffer from low distinguishability, while execution-free verifiers are biased and often rely on stylistic features. Surprisingly, we find that while each approach individually saturates around 42-43%, significantly higher gains can be obtained by leveraging their complementary strengths. Overall, our approach achieves 51% on the SWE-Bench Verified benchmark, reflecting a new state-of-the-art for open-weight SWE-agents and for the first time showing competitive performance with proprietary models such as o1, o1-preview and sonnet-3.5-v2 (with tools). We will open-source our environments, models, and agent trajectories.

The growing popularity of Machine Learning (ML) has led to its deployment in various sensitive domains, which has resulted in significant research focused on ML security and privacy. However, in some applications, such as Augmented/Virtual Reality, integrity verification of the outsourced ML tasks is more critical--a facet that has not received much attention. Existing solutions, such as multi-party computation and proof-based systems, impose significant computation overhead, which makes them unfit for real-time applications. We propose Fides, a novel framework for real-time integrity validation of ML-as-a-Service (MLaaS) inference. Fides features a novel and efficient distillation technique--Greedy Distillation Transfer Learning--that dynamically distills and fine-tunes a space and compute-efficient verification model for verifying the corresponding service model while running inside a trusted execution environment. Fides features a client-side attack detection model that uses statistical analysis and divergence measurements to identify, with a high likelihood, if the service model is under attack. Fides also offers a re-classification functionality that predicts the original class whenever an attack is identified. We devised a generative adversarial network framework for training the attack detection and re-classification models. The evaluation shows that Fides achieves an accuracy of up to 98% for attack detection and 94% for re-classification.

Statically analyzing dynamically-typed code is a challenging endeavor, as even seemingly trivial tasks such as determining the targets of procedure calls are non-trivial without knowing the types of objects at compile time. Addressing this challenge, gradual typing is increasingly added to dynamically-typed languages, a prominent example being TypeScript that introduces static typing to JavaScript. Gradual typing improves the developer's ability to verify program behavior, contributing to robust, secure and debuggable programs. In practice, however, users only sparsely annotate types directly. At the same time, conventional type inference faces performance-related challenges as program size grows. Statistical techniques based on machine learning offer faster inference, but although recent approaches demonstrate overall improved accuracy, they still perform significantly worse on user-defined types than on the most common built-in types. Limiting their real-world usefulness even more, they rarely integrate with user-facing applications. We propose CodeTIDAL5, a Transformer-based model trained to reliably predict type annotations. For effective result retrieval and re-integration, we extract usage slices from a program's code property graph. Comparing our approach against recent neural type inference systems, our model outperforms the current state-of-the-art by 7.85% on the ManyTypes4TypeScript benchmark, achieving 71.27% accuracy overall. Furthermore, we present JoernTI, an integration of our approach into Joern, an open source static analysis tool, and demonstrate that the analysis benefits from the additional type information. As our model allows for fast inference times even on commodity CPUs, making our system available through Joern leads to high accessibility and facilitates security research.

Large language models (LLMs) can generate plausible code but offer limited guarantees of correctness. Formally verifying that implementations satisfy specifications requires constructing machine-checkable proofs, a task that remains beyond current automation. We propose a hierarchical proof search framework for automated code verification in Lean~4 that decomposes complex verification goals into structurally simpler subgoals before attempting tactic-level proving. Central to our approach is a principled decomposition score that combines constructive justification with structural effectiveness. Crucially, this score serves as both the training reward and the inference-time ranking criterion, ensuring strict alignment between optimization and deployment. We train Goedel-Code-Prover-8B, a single unified policy for both decomposition and completion, via supervised initialization followed by hybrid reinforcement learning, where a continuous decomposition reward drives planning exploration while supervised replay stabilizes proof generation. On three Lean-based code verification benchmarks comprising 427 tasks, our 8B-parameter model achieves a 62.0\% prove success rate, a 2.6times improvement over the strongest baseline, surpassing neural provers up to 84times larger. We further observe consistent inference-time scaling: success rates improve monotonically with search iterations and sampling budget, with our trained model achieving greater efficiency than frontier off-the-shelf models of comparable scale.

The rapid advancement of pre-trained language models (PLMs) has demonstrated promising results for various code-related tasks. However, their effectiveness in detecting real-world vulnerabilities remains a critical challenge. % for the security community. While existing empirical studies evaluate PLMs for vulnerability detection (VD), their inadequate consideration in data preparation, evaluation setups, and experimental settings undermines the accuracy and comprehensiveness of evaluations. This paper introduces RevisitVD, an extensive evaluation of 17 PLMs spanning smaller code-specific PLMs and large-scale PLMs using newly constructed datasets. Specifically, we compare the performance of PLMs under both fine-tuning and prompt engineering, assess their effectiveness and generalizability across various training and testing settings, and analyze their robustness against code normalization, abstraction, and semantic-preserving transformations. Our findings reveal that, for VD tasks, PLMs incorporating pre-training tasks designed to capture the syntactic and semantic patterns of code outperform both general-purpose PLMs and those solely pre-trained or fine-tuned on large code corpora. However, these models face notable challenges in real-world scenarios, such as difficulties in detecting vulnerabilities with complex dependencies, handling perturbations introduced by code normalization and abstraction, and identifying semantic-preserving vulnerable code transformations. Also, the truncation caused by the limited context windows of PLMs can lead to a non-negligible amount of labeling errors. This study underscores the importance of thorough evaluations of model performance in practical scenarios and outlines future directions to help enhance the effectiveness of PLMs for realistic VD applications.

Modern code completion engines, powered by large language models (LLMs), assist millions of developers with their strong capabilities to generate functionally correct code. Due to this popularity, it is crucial to investigate the security implications of relying on LLM-based code completion. In this work, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art black-box LLM-based code completion engines can be stealthily biased by adversaries to significantly increase their rate of insecure code generation. We present the first attack, named INSEC, that achieves this goal. INSEC works by injecting an attack string as a short comment in the completion input. The attack string is crafted through a query-based optimization procedure starting from a set of carefully designed initialization schemes. We demonstrate INSEC's broad applicability and effectiveness by evaluating it on various state-of-the-art open-source models and black-box commercial services (e.g., OpenAI API and GitHub Copilot). On a diverse set of security-critical test cases, covering 16 CWEs across 5 programming languages, INSEC increases the rate of generated insecure code by more than 50%, while maintaining the functional correctness of generated code. We consider INSEC practical -- it requires low resources and costs less than 10 US dollars to develop on commodity hardware. Moreover, we showcase the attack's real-world deployability, by developing an IDE plug-in that stealthily injects INSEC into the GitHub Copilot extension.

Code production is now a commodity; the bottleneck is knowing what to build and proving it works. We present the Kitchen Loop, a framework for autonomous, self-evolving software built on a unified trust model: (1) a specification surface enumerating what the product claims to support; (2) 'As a User x 1000', where an LLM agent exercises that surface as a synthetic power user at 1,000x human cadence; (3) Unbeatable Tests, ground-truth verification the code author cannot fake; and (4) Drift Control, continuous quality measurement with automated pause gates. We validate across two production systems over 285+ iterations, producing 1,094+ merged pull requests with zero regressions detected by the regression oracle (methodology in Section 6.1). We observe emergent properties at scale: multi-iteration self-correction chains, autonomous infrastructure healing, and monotonically improving quality gates. The primitives are not new; our contribution is their composition into a production-tested system with the operational discipline that makes long-running autonomous evolution safe.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

By utilizing more computational resources at test-time, large language models (LLMs) can improve without additional training. One common strategy uses verifiers to evaluate candidate outputs. In this work, we propose a novel scaling dimension for test-time compute: scaling the number of verifiers. We introduce Multi-Agent Verification (MAV) as a test-time compute paradigm that combines multiple verifiers to improve performance. We propose using Aspect Verifiers (AVs), off-the-shelf LLMs prompted to verify different aspects of outputs, as one possible choice for the verifiers in a MAV system. AVs are a convenient building block for MAV since they can be easily combined without additional training. Moreover, we introduce BoN-MAV, a simple multi-agent verification algorithm that combines best-of-n sampling with multiple verifiers. BoN-MAV demonstrates stronger scaling patterns than self-consistency and reward model verification, and we demonstrate both weak-to-strong generalization, where combining weak verifiers improves even stronger LLMs, and self-improvement, where the same base model is used to both generate and verify outputs. Our results establish scaling the number of verifiers as a promising new dimension for improving language model performance at test-time.

Most existing pre-trained language models for source code focus on learning the static code text, typically augmented with static code structures (abstract syntax tree, dependency graphs, etc.). However, program semantics will not be fully exposed before the real execution. Without an understanding of the program execution, statically pre-trained models fail to comprehensively capture the dynamic code properties, such as the branch coverage and the runtime variable values, and they are consequently less effective at code understanding tasks, such as retrieving semantic clones and detecting software vulnerabilities. To close the gap between the static nature of language models and the dynamic characteristics of programs, we introduce TRACED, an execution-aware pre-training strategy for source code. Specifically, we pre-train code language models with a combination of source code, executable inputs, and corresponding execution traces. Our goal is to teach code models the complicated execution logic during the pre-training, enabling the model to statically estimate the dynamic code properties without repeatedly executing code during task-specific fine-tuning. To illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, we fine-tune and evaluate TRACED on three downstream tasks: static execution estimation, clone retrieval, and vulnerability detection. The empirical results show that TRACED relatively improves the statically pre-trained code models by 12.4% for complete execution path prediction and by 25.2% for runtime variable value predictions. TRACED also significantly outperforms statically pre-trained models in clone retrieval and vulnerability detection across four public benchmarks.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted for code vulnerability detection, their reliability and robustness across diverse vulnerability types have become a pressing concern. In traditional adversarial settings, code obfuscation has long been used as a general strategy to bypass auditing tools, preserving exploitability without tampering with the tools themselves. Numerous efforts have explored obfuscation methods and tools, yet their capabilities differ in terms of supported techniques, granularity, and programming languages, making it difficult to systematically assess their impact on LLM-based vulnerability detection. To address this gap, we provide a structured systematization of obfuscation techniques and evaluate them under a unified framework. Specifically, we categorize existing obfuscation methods into three major classes (layout, data flow, and control flow) covering 11 subcategories and 19 concrete techniques. We implement these techniques across four programming languages (Solidity, C, C++, and Python) using a consistent LLM-driven approach, and evaluate their effects on 15 LLMs spanning four model families (DeepSeek, OpenAI, Qwen, and LLaMA), as well as on two coding agents (GitHub Copilot and Codex). Our findings reveal both positive and negative impacts of code obfuscation on LLM-based vulnerability detection, highlighting conditions under which obfuscation leads to performance improvements or degradations. We further analyze these outcomes with respect to vulnerability characteristics, code properties, and model attributes. Finally, we outline several open problems and propose future directions to enhance the robustness of LLMs for real-world vulnerability detection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become critical to modern software development, but their reliance on uncurated web-scale datasets for training introduces a significant security risk: the absorption and reproduction of malicious content. To systematically evaluate this risk, we introduce Scam2Prompt, a scalable automated auditing framework that identifies the underlying intent of a scam site and then synthesizes innocuous, developer-style prompts that mirror this intent, allowing us to test whether an LLM will generate malicious code in response to these innocuous prompts. In a large-scale study of four production LLMs (GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Llama-4-Scout, and DeepSeek-V3), we found that Scam2Prompt's innocuous prompts triggered malicious URL generation in 4.24% of cases. To test the persistence of this security risk, we constructed Innoc2Scam-bench, a benchmark of 1,559 innocuous prompts that consistently elicited malicious code from all four initial LLMs. When applied to seven additional production LLMs released in 2025, we found the vulnerability is not only present but severe, with malicious code generation rates ranging from 12.7% to 43.8%. Furthermore, existing safety measures like state-of-the-art guardrails proved insufficient to prevent this behavior, with an overall detection rate of less than 0.3%.

LLM agents rely on prompts to implement task-specific capabilities based on foundation LLMs, making agent prompts valuable intellectual property. However, in untrusted deployments, adversaries can copy and reuse these prompts with other proprietary LLMs, causing economic losses. To protect these prompts, we identify four key challenges: proactivity, runtime protection, usability, and non-portability that existing approaches fail to address. We present PragLocker, a prompt protection scheme that satisfies these requirements. PragLocker constructs function-preserving obfuscated prompts by anchoring semantics with code symbols and then using target-model feedback to inject noise, yielding prompts that only work on the target LLM. Experiments across multiple agent systems, datasets, and foundation LLMs show that PragLocker substantially reduces cross-LLM portability, maintains target performance, and remains robust against adaptive attackers.

The automatic generation of programs has long been a fundamental challenge in computer science. Recent benchmarks have shown that large language models (LLMs) can effectively generate code at the function level, make code edits, and solve algorithmic coding tasks. However, to achieve full automation, LLMs should be able to generate production-quality, self-contained application modules. To evaluate the capabilities of LLMs in solving this challenge, we introduce BaxBench, a novel evaluation benchmark consisting of 392 tasks for the generation of backend applications. We focus on backends for three critical reasons: (i) they are practically relevant, building the core components of most modern web and cloud software, (ii) they are difficult to get right, requiring multiple functions and files to achieve the desired functionality, and (iii) they are security-critical, as they are exposed to untrusted third-parties, making secure solutions that prevent deployment-time attacks an imperative. BaxBench validates the functionality of the generated applications with comprehensive test cases, and assesses their security exposure by executing end-to-end exploits. Our experiments reveal key limitations of current LLMs in both functionality and security: (i) even the best model, OpenAI o1, achieves a mere 60% on code correctness; (ii) on average, we could successfully execute security exploits on more than half of the correct programs generated by each LLM; and (iii) in less popular backend frameworks, models further struggle to generate correct and secure applications. Progress on BaxBench signifies important steps towards autonomous and secure software development with LLMs.

The code generation capabilities of large language models(LLMs) have emerged as a critical dimension in evaluating their overall performance. However, prior research has largely overlooked the security risks inherent in the generated code. In this work, we introduce SafeGenBench, a benchmark specifically designed to assess the security of LLM-generated code. The dataset encompasses a wide range of common software development scenarios and vulnerability types. Building upon this benchmark, we develop an automatic evaluation framework that leverages both static application security testing(SAST) and LLM-based judging to assess the presence of security vulnerabilities in model-generated code. Through the empirical evaluation of state-of-the-art LLMs on SafeGenBench, we reveal notable deficiencies in their ability to produce vulnerability-free code. Our findings highlight pressing challenges and offer actionable insights for future advancements in the secure code generation performance of LLMs. The data and code will be released soon.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have improved their performance on coding benchmarks. However, improvement is plateauing due to the exhaustion of readily available high-quality data. Prior work has shown the potential of synthetic self-instruct data, but naively training on a model's own outputs can cause error accumulation, especially in coding tasks, where generalization may collapse due to overly simple or erroneous training data, highlighting the need for rigorous quality checks on synthetic data. In this work, we explore an effective approach whereby the model itself verifies the correctness of its own data. We thus propose Sol-Ver, a self-play solver-verifier framework that jointly improves a single model's code and test generation capacity. By iteratively refining code (LLM-as-a-solver) and tests (LLM-as-a-verifier) together, we boost both capabilities without relying on human annotations or larger teacher models. Experiments with the Llama 3.1 8B model demonstrate substantial performance enhancements, achieving average relative improvements of 19.63% in code generation and 17.49% in test generation on MBPP and LiveCodeBench.

The pre-training paradigm plays a key role in the success of Large Language Models (LLMs), which have been recognized as one of the most significant advancements of AI recently. Building on these breakthroughs, code LLMs with advanced coding capabilities bring huge impacts on software engineering, showing the tendency to become an essential part of developers' daily routines. However, the current code LLMs still face serious challenges related to trustworthiness, as they can generate incorrect, insecure, or unreliable code. Recent exploratory studies find that it can be promising to detect such risky outputs by analyzing LLMs' internal states, akin to how the human brain unconsciously recognizes its own mistakes. Yet, most of these approaches are limited to narrow sub-domains of LLM operations and fall short of achieving industry-level scalability and practicability. To address these challenges, in this paper, we propose PtTrust, a two-stage risk assessment framework for code LLM based on internal state pre-training, designed to integrate seamlessly with the existing infrastructure of software companies. The core idea is that the risk assessment framework could also undergo a pre-training process similar to LLMs. Specifically, PtTrust first performs unsupervised pre-training on large-scale unlabeled source code to learn general representations of LLM states. Then, it uses a small, labeled dataset to train a risk predictor. We demonstrate the effectiveness of PtTrust through fine-grained, code line-level risk assessment and demonstrate that it generalizes across tasks and different programming languages. Further experiments also reveal that PtTrust provides highly intuitive and interpretable features, fostering greater user trust. We believe PtTrust makes a promising step toward scalable and trustworthy assurance for code LLMs.

Speculative Decoding (SD) is a recently proposed technique for faster inference using Large Language Models (LLMs). SD operates by using a smaller draft LLM for autoregressively generating a sequence of tokens and a larger target LLM for parallel verification to ensure statistical consistency. However, periodic parallel calls to the target LLM for verification prevent SD from achieving even lower latencies. We propose SPRINTER, which utilizes a low-complexity verifier trained to predict if tokens generated from a draft LLM would be accepted by the target LLM. By performing sequential approximate verification, SPRINTER does not require verification by the target LLM and is only invoked when a token is deemed unacceptable. This reduces the number of calls to the larger LLM, achieving further speedups and lower computation cost. We present a theoretical analysis of SPRINTER, examining the statistical properties of the generated tokens, as well as the expected reduction in latency as a function of the verifier. We evaluate SPRINTER on several datasets and model pairs, demonstrating that approximate verification can still maintain high quality generation while further reducing latency.

In industrial control systems, the generation and verification of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) code are critical for ensuring operational efficiency and safety. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have made strides in automated code generation, they often fall short in providing correctness guarantees and specialized support for PLC programming. To address these challenges, this paper introduces Agents4PLC, a novel framework that not only automates PLC code generation but also includes code-level verification through an LLM-based multi-agent system. We first establish a comprehensive benchmark for verifiable PLC code generation area, transitioning from natural language requirements to human-written-verified formal specifications and reference PLC code. We further enhance our `agents' specifically for industrial control systems by incorporating Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), advanced prompt engineering techniques, and Chain-of-Thought strategies. Evaluation against the benchmark demonstrates that Agents4PLC significantly outperforms previous methods, achieving superior results across a series of increasingly rigorous metrics. This research not only addresses the critical challenges in PLC programming but also highlights the potential of our framework to generate verifiable code applicable to real-world industrial applications.

As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks. However, there is no standard approach to evaluate tamper resistance. Varied data sets, metrics, and tampering configurations make it difficult to compare safety, utility, and robustness across different models and defenses. To this end, we introduce TamperBench, the first unified framework to systematically evaluate the tamper resistance of LLMs. TamperBench (i) curates a repository of state-of-the-art weight-space fine-tuning attacks and latent-space representation attacks; (ii) enables realistic adversarial evaluation through systematic hyperparameter sweeps per attack-model pair; and (iii) provides both safety and utility evaluations. TamperBench requires minimal additional code to specify any fine-tuning configuration, alignment-stage defense method, and metric suite while ensuring end-to-end reproducibility. We use TamperBench to evaluate 21 open-weight LLMs, including defense-augmented variants, across nine tampering threats using standardized safety and capability metrics with hyperparameter sweeps per model-attack pair. This yields novel insights, including effects of post-training on tamper resistance, that jailbreak-tuning is typically the most severe attack, and that Triplet emerges as a leading alignment-stage defense. Code is available at: https://github.com/criticalml-uw/TamperBench

Security of Android devices is now paramount, given their wide adoption among consumers. As researchers develop tools for statically or dynamically detecting suspicious apps, malware writers regularly update their attack mechanisms to hide malicious behavior implementation. This poses two problems to current research techniques: static analysis approaches, given their over-approximations, can report an overwhelming number of false alarms, while dynamic approaches will miss those behaviors that are hidden through evasion techniques. We propose in this work a static approach specifically targeted at highlighting hidden sensitive operations, mainly sensitive data flows. The prototype version of HiSenDroid has been evaluated on a large-scale dataset of thousands of malware and goodware samples on which it successfully revealed anti-analysis code snippets aiming at evading detection by dynamic analysis. We further experimentally show that, with FlowDroid, some of the hidden sensitive behaviors would eventually lead to private data leaks. Those leaks would have been hard to spot either manually among the large number of false positives reported by the state of the art static analyzers, or by dynamic tools. Overall, by putting the light on hidden sensitive operations, HiSenDroid helps security analysts in validating potential sensitive data operations, which would be previously unnoticed.

In this paper, we present the first comprehensive empirical study of specialized LLM-based detectors and compare them with traditional static analyzers at the project scale. Specifically, our study evaluates five latest and representative LLM-based methods and two traditional tools using: 1) an in-house benchmark of 222 known real-world vulnerabilities (C/C++ and Java) to assess detection capability, and 2) 24 active open-source projects, where we manually inspected 385 warnings to assess their practical usability and underlying root causes of failures. Our evaluation yields three key findings: First, while LLM-based detectors exhibit low recall on the in-house benchmark, they still uncover more unique vulnerabilities than traditional tools. Second, in open-source projects, both LLM-based and traditional tools generate substantial warnings but suffer from very high false discovery rates, hindering practical use. Our manual analysis further reveals shallow interprocedural reasoning and misidentified source/sink pairs as primary failure causes, with LLM-based tools exhibiting additional unique failures. Finally, LLM-based methods incurs substantial computational costs-hundreds of thousands to hundreds of millions of tokens and multi-hour to multi-day runtimes. Overall, our findings underscore critical limitations in the robustness, reliability, and scalability of current LLM-based detectors. We ultimately summarize a set of implications for future research toward more effective and practical project-scale vulnerability detection.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable code generation capabilities, but the correctness of the generated code cannot be inherently trusted. This paper explores the feasibility of using formal software verification, specifically the SPARK framework for Ada, to ensure the reliability of LLM-generated code. We present Marmaragan, a tool that leverages an LLM in order to generate SPARK annotations for existing programs, enabling formal verification of the code. The tool is benchmarked on a curated set of SPARK programs, with annotations selectively removed to test specific capabilities. The performance of Marmaragan with GPT-4o on the benchmark is promising, with correct annotations having been generated for 50.7% of the benchmark cases. The results establish a foundation for future work on combining the power of LLMs with the reliability of formal software verification.