Daily Papers

Despite the ubiquity of large language models (LLMs) in AI research, the question of embodiment in LLMs remains underexplored, distinguishing them from embodied systems in robotics where sensory perception directly informs physical action. Our investigation navigates the intriguing terrain of whether LLMs, despite their non-embodied nature, effectively capture implicit human intuitions about fundamental, spatial building blocks of language. We employ insights from spatial cognitive foundations developed through early sensorimotor experiences, guiding our exploration through the reproduction of three psycholinguistic experiments. Surprisingly, correlations between model outputs and human responses emerge, revealing adaptability without a tangible connection to embodied experiences. Notable distinctions include polarized language model responses and reduced correlations in vision language models. This research contributes to a nuanced understanding of the interplay between language, spatial experiences, and the computations made by large language models. More at https://cisnlp.github.io/Spatial_Schemas/

We investigate the extent to which an LLM's hidden-state geometry can be recovered from its behavior in psycholinguistic experiments. Across eight instruction-tuned transformer models, we run two experimental paradigms -- similarity-based forced choice and free association -- over a shared 5,000-word vocabulary, collecting 17.5M+ trials to build behavior-based similarity matrices. Using representational similarity analysis, we compare behavioral geometries to layerwise hidden-state similarity and benchmark against FastText, BERT, and cross-model consensus. We find that forced-choice behavior aligns substantially more with hidden-state geometry than free association. In a held-out-words regression, behavioral similarity (especially forced choice) predicts unseen hidden-state similarities beyond lexical baselines and cross-model consensus, indicating that behavior-only measurements retain recoverable information about internal semantic geometry. Finally, we discuss implications for the ability of behavioral tasks to uncover hidden cognitive states.

The evaluation of LLMs has so far focused primarily on how well they can perform different tasks such as reasoning, question-answering, paraphrasing, or translating. For most of these tasks, performance can be measured with objective metrics, such as the number of correct answers. However, other language features are not easily quantified. For example, arousal, concreteness, or gender associated with a given word, as well as the extent to which we experience words with senses and relate them to a specific sense. Those features have been studied for many years by psycholinguistics, conducting large-scale experiments with humans to produce ratings for thousands of words. This opens an opportunity to evaluate how well LLMs align with human ratings on these word features, taking advantage of existing studies that cover many different language features in a large number of words. In this paper, we evaluate the alignment of a representative group of LLMs with human ratings on two psycholinguistic datasets: the Glasgow and Lancaster norms. These datasets cover thirteen features over thousands of words. The results show that alignment is black{generally} better in the Glasgow norms evaluated (arousal, valence, dominance, concreteness, imageability, familiarity, and gender) than on the Lancaster norms evaluated (introceptive, gustatory, olfactory, haptic, auditory, and visual). This suggests a potential limitation of current LLMs in aligning with human sensory associations for words, which may be due to their lack of embodied cognition present in humans and illustrates the usefulness of evaluating LLMs with psycholinguistic datasets.

Research at the intersection of personality psychology, computer science, and linguistics has recently focused increasingly on modeling and predicting personality from language use. We report two major improvements in predicting personality traits from text data: (1) to our knowledge, the most comprehensive set of theory-based psycholinguistic features and (2) hybrid models that integrate a pre-trained Transformer Language Model BERT and Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BLSTM) networks trained on within-text distributions ('text contours') of psycholinguistic features. We experiment with BLSTM models (with and without Attention) and with two techniques for applying pre-trained language representations from the transformer model - 'feature-based' and 'fine-tuning'. We evaluate the performance of the models we built on two benchmark datasets that target the two dominant theoretical models of personality: the Big Five Essay dataset and the MBTI Kaggle dataset. Our results are encouraging as our models outperform existing work on the same datasets. More specifically, our models achieve improvement in classification accuracy by 2.9% on the Essay dataset and 8.28% on the Kaggle MBTI dataset. In addition, we perform ablation experiments to quantify the impact of different categories of psycholinguistic features in the respective personality prediction models.

We introduce a new type of test, called a Turing Experiment (TE), for evaluating how well a language model, such as GPT-3, can simulate different aspects of human behavior. Unlike the Turing Test, which involves simulating a single arbitrary individual, a TE requires simulating a representative sample of participants in human subject research. We give TEs that attempt to replicate well-established findings in prior studies. We design a methodology for simulating TEs and illustrate its use to compare how well different language models are able to reproduce classic economic, psycholinguistic, and social psychology experiments: Ultimatum Game, Garden Path Sentences, Milgram Shock Experiment, and Wisdom of Crowds. In the first three TEs, the existing findings were replicated using recent models, while the last TE reveals a "hyper-accuracy distortion" present in some language models.

With their increasing size, large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly good at language understanding tasks. But even with high performance on specific downstream task, LLMs fail at simple linguistic tests for negation or quantifier understanding. Previous work on quantifier understanding in LLMs show inverse scaling in understanding few-type quantifiers. In this paper, we question the claims of of previous work and show that it is a result of inappropriate testing methodology. We also present alternate methods to measure quantifier comprehension in LLMs and show that LLMs are able to better understand the difference between the meaning of few-type and most-type quantifiers as their size increases, although they are not particularly good at it. We also observe inverse scaling for most-type quantifier understanding, which is contrary to human psycho-linguistic experiments and previous work, where the model's understanding of most-type quantifier gets worse as the model size increases. We do this evaluation on models ranging from 125M-175B parameters, which suggests that LLMs do not do as well as expected with quantifiers. We also discuss the possible reasons for this and the relevance of quantifier understanding in evaluating language understanding in LLMs.

Word-level psycholinguistic norms lend empirical support to theories of language processing. However, obtaining such human-based measures is not always feasible or straightforward. One promising approach is to augment human norming datasets by using Large Language Models (LLMs) to predict these characteristics directly, a practice that is rapidly gaining popularity in psycholinguistics and cognitive science. However, the novelty of this approach (and the relative inscrutability of LLMs) necessitates the adoption of rigorous methodologies that guide researchers through this process, present the range of possible approaches, and clarify limitations that are not immediately apparent, but may, in some cases, render the use of LLMs impractical. In this work, we present a comprehensive methodology for estimating word characteristics with LLMs, enriched with practical advice and lessons learned from our own experience. Our approach covers both the direct use of base LLMs and the fine-tuning of models, an alternative that can yield substantial performance gains in certain scenarios. A major emphasis in the guide is the validation of LLM-generated data with human "gold standard" norms. We also present a software framework that implements our methodology and supports both commercial and open-weight models. We illustrate the proposed approach with a case study on estimating word familiarity in English. Using base models, we achieved a Spearman correlation of 0.8 with human ratings, which increased to 0.9 when employing fine-tuned models. This methodology, framework, and set of best practices aim to serve as a reference for future research on leveraging LLMs for psycholinguistic and lexical studies.

Neural network language models (LMs) have been shown to successfully capture complex linguistic knowledge. However, their utility for understanding language acquisition is still debated. We contribute to this debate by presenting a case study where we use LMs as simulated learners to derive novel experimental hypotheses to be tested with humans. We apply this paradigm to study cross-dative generalization (CDG): productive generalization of novel verbs across dative constructions (she pilked me the ball/she pilked the ball to me) -- acquisition of which is known to involve a large space of contextual features -- using LMs trained on child-directed speech. We specifically ask: "what properties of the training exposure facilitate a novel verb's generalization to the (unmodeled) alternate construction?" To answer this, we systematically vary the exposure context in which a novel dative verb occurs in terms of the properties of the theme and recipient, and then analyze the LMs' usage of the novel verb in the unmodeled dative construction. We find LMs to replicate known patterns of children's CDG, as a precondition to exploring novel hypotheses. Subsequent simulations reveal a nuanced role of the features of the novel verbs' exposure context on the LMs' CDG. We find CDG to be facilitated when the first postverbal argument of the exposure context is pronominal, definite, short, and conforms to the prototypical animacy expectations of the exposure dative. These patterns are characteristic of harmonic alignment in datives, where the argument with features ranking higher on the discourse prominence scale tends to precede the other. This gives rise to a novel hypothesis that CDG is facilitated insofar as the features of the exposure context -- in particular, its first postverbal argument -- are harmonically aligned. We conclude by proposing future experiments that can test this hypothesis in children.

This paper explores the intersection of psychology and artificial intelligence through the development and evaluation of specialized Large Language Models (LLMs). We introduce PsychoLex, a suite of resources designed to enhance LLMs' proficiency in psychological tasks in both Persian and English. Key contributions include the PsychoLexQA dataset for instructional content and the PsychoLexEval dataset for rigorous evaluation of LLMs in complex psychological scenarios. Additionally, we present the PsychoLexLLaMA model, optimized specifically for psychological applications, demonstrating superior performance compared to general-purpose models. The findings underscore the potential of tailored LLMs for advancing psychological research and applications, while also highlighting areas for further refinement. This research offers a foundational step towards integrating LLMs into specialized psychological domains, with implications for future advancements in AI-driven psychological practice.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are central to a multitude of applications but struggle with significant risks, notably in generating harmful content and biases. Drawing an analogy to the human psyche's conflict between evolutionary survival instincts and societal norm adherence elucidated in Freud's psychoanalysis theory, we argue that LLMs suffer a similar fundamental conflict, arising between their inherent desire for syntactic and semantic continuity, established during the pre-training phase, and the post-training alignment with human values. This conflict renders LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein intensifying the models' desire for continuity can circumvent alignment efforts, resulting in the generation of harmful information. Through a series of experiments, we first validated the existence of the desire for continuity in LLMs, and further devised a straightforward yet powerful technique, such as incomplete sentences, negative priming, and cognitive dissonance scenarios, to demonstrate that even advanced LLMs struggle to prevent the generation of harmful information. In summary, our study uncovers the root of LLMs' vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, hereby questioning the efficacy of solely relying on sophisticated alignment methods, and further advocates for a new training idea that integrates modal concepts alongside traditional amodal concepts, aiming to endow LLMs with a more nuanced understanding of real-world contexts and ethical considerations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are claimed to be capable of Natural Language Inference (NLI), necessary for applied tasks like question answering and summarization. We present a series of behavioral studies on several LLM families (LLaMA, GPT-3.5, and PaLM) which probe their behavior using controlled experiments. We establish two biases originating from pretraining which predict much of their behavior, and show that these are major sources of hallucination in generative LLMs. First, memorization at the level of sentences: we show that, regardless of the premise, models falsely label NLI test samples as entailing when the hypothesis is attested in training data, and that entities are used as ``indices'' to access the memorized data. Second, statistical patterns of usage learned at the level of corpora: we further show a similar effect when the premise predicate is less frequent than that of the hypothesis in the training data, a bias following from previous studies. We demonstrate that LLMs perform significantly worse on NLI test samples which do not conform to these biases than those which do, and we offer these as valuable controls for future LLM evaluation.

If you had an AI Whale-to-English translator, how could you validate whether or not it is working? Does one need to interact with the animals or rely on grounded observations such as temperature? We provide theoretical and proof-of-concept experimental evidence suggesting that interaction and even observations may not be necessary for sufficiently complex languages. One may be able to evaluate translators solely by their English outputs, offering potential advantages in terms of safety, ethics, and cost. This is an instance of machine translation quality evaluation (MTQE) without any reference translations available. A key challenge is identifying ``hallucinations,'' false translations which may appear fluent and plausible. We propose using segment-by-segment translation together with the classic NLP shuffle test to evaluate translators. The idea is to translate animal communication, turn by turn, and evaluate how often the resulting translations make more sense in order than permuted. Proof-of-concept experiments on data-scarce human languages and constructed languages demonstrate the potential utility of this evaluation methodology. These human-language experiments serve solely to validate our reference-free metric under data scarcity. It is found to correlate highly with a standard evaluation based on reference translations, which are available in our experiments. We also perform a theoretical analysis suggesting that interaction may not be necessary nor efficient in the early stages of learning to translate.

Language models (LMs) have proven to be powerful tools for psycholinguistic research, but most prior work has focused on purely behavioural measures (e.g., surprisal comparisons). At the same time, research in model interpretability has begun to illuminate the abstract causal mechanisms shaping LM behavior. To help bring these strands of research closer together, we introduce CausalGym. We adapt and expand the SyntaxGym suite of tasks to benchmark the ability of interpretability methods to causally affect model behaviour. To illustrate how CausalGym can be used, we study the pythia models (14M--6.9B) and assess the causal efficacy of a wide range of interpretability methods, including linear probing and distributed alignment search (DAS). We find that DAS outperforms the other methods, and so we use it to study the learning trajectory of two difficult linguistic phenomena in pythia-1b: negative polarity item licensing and filler--gap dependencies. Our analysis shows that the mechanism implementing both of these tasks is learned in discrete stages, not gradually.

Evaluations are critical for understanding the capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Fundamentally, evaluations are experiments; but the literature on evaluations has largely ignored the literature from other sciences on experiment analysis and planning. This article shows researchers with some training in statistics how to think about and analyze data from language model evaluations. Conceptualizing evaluation questions as having been drawn from an unseen super-population, we present formulas for analyzing evaluation data, measuring differences between two models, and planning an evaluation experiment. We make a number of specific recommendations for running language model evaluations and reporting experiment results in a way that minimizes statistical noise and maximizes informativeness.

The recent proliferation of research into transformer based natural language processing has led to a number of studies which attempt to detect the presence of human-like cognitive behavior in the models. We contend that, as is true of human psychology, the investigation of cognitive behavior in language models must be conducted in an appropriate population of an appropriate size for the results to be meaningful. We leverage work in uncertainty estimation in a novel approach to efficiently construct experimental populations. The resultant tool, PopulationLM, has been made open source. We provide theoretical grounding in the uncertainty estimation literature and motivation from current cognitive work regarding language models. We discuss the methodological lessons from other scientific communities and attempt to demonstrate their application to two artificial population studies. Through population based experimentation we find that language models exhibit behavior consistent with typicality effects among categories highly represented in training. However, we find that language models don't tend to exhibit structural priming effects. Generally, our results show that single models tend to over estimate the presence of cognitive behaviors in neural models.

Natural Language Inference (NLI) and Semantic Textual Similarity (STS) are widely used benchmark tasks for compositional evaluation of pre-trained language models. Despite growing interest in linguistic universals, most NLI/STS studies have focused almost exclusively on English. In particular, there are no available multilingual NLI/STS datasets in Japanese, which is typologically different from English and can shed light on the currently controversial behavior of language models in matters such as sensitivity to word order and case particles. Against this background, we introduce JSICK, a Japanese NLI/STS dataset that was manually translated from the English dataset SICK. We also present a stress-test dataset for compositional inference, created by transforming syntactic structures of sentences in JSICK to investigate whether language models are sensitive to word order and case particles. We conduct baseline experiments on different pre-trained language models and compare the performance of multilingual models when applied to Japanese and other languages. The results of the stress-test experiments suggest that the current pre-trained language models are insensitive to word order and case marking.

Most large language models are trained on linguistic input alone, yet humans appear to ground their understanding of words in sensorimotor experience. A natural solution is to augment LM representations with human judgments of a word's sensorimotor associations (e.g., the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms), but this raises another challenge: most words are ambiguous, and judgments of words in isolation fail to account for this multiplicity of meaning (e.g., "wooden table" vs. "data table"). We attempted to address this problem by building a new lexical resource of contextualized sensorimotor judgments for 112 English words, each rated in four different contexts (448 sentences total). We show that these ratings encode overlapping but distinct information from the Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms, and that they also predict other measures of interest (e.g., relatedness), above and beyond measures derived from BERT. Beyond shedding light on theoretical questions, we suggest that these ratings could be of use as a "challenge set" for researchers building grounded language models.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

We study word learning in subword and character language models with the psycholinguistic lexical decision task. While subword LMs struggle to discern words and non-words with high accuracy, character LMs solve this task easily and consistently. Furthermore, when comparing word learning and syntactic learning, both processes are separable in character LM where word learning predates syntactic learning, whereas these processes are simultaneous in subword LM. This raises questions about the adequacy of subword LMs for modeling language acquisition and positions character LMs as a viable alternative.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

Language places subtle constraints on how we make inductive inferences. Developmental evidence by Gelman et al. (2002) has shown children (4 years and older) to differentiate among generic statements ("Bears are daxable"), universally quantified NPs ("all bears are daxable") and indefinite plural NPs ("some bears are daxable") in extending novel properties to a specific member (all > generics > some), suggesting that they represent these types of propositions differently. We test if these subtle differences arise in general purpose statistical learners like Vision Language Models, by replicating the original experiment. On tasking them through a series of precondition tests (robust identification of categories in images and sensitivities to all and some), followed by the original experiment, we find behavioral alignment between models and humans. Post-hoc analyses on their representations revealed that these differences are organized based on inductive constraints and not surface-form differences.

Today's probabilistic language generators fall short when it comes to producing coherent and fluent text despite the fact that the underlying models perform well under standard metrics, e.g., perplexity. This discrepancy has puzzled the language generation community for the last few years. In this work, we posit that the abstraction of natural language generation as a discrete stochastic process--which allows for an information-theoretic analysis--can provide new insights into the behavior of probabilistic language generators, e.g., why high-probability texts can be dull or repetitive. Humans use language as a means of communicating information, aiming to do so in a simultaneously efficient and error-minimizing manner; in fact, psycholinguistics research suggests humans choose each word in a string with this subconscious goal in mind. We formally define the set of strings that meet this criterion: those for which each word has an information content close to the expected information content, i.e., the conditional entropy of our model. We then propose a simple and efficient procedure for enforcing this criterion when generating from probabilistic models, which we call locally typical sampling. Automatic and human evaluations show that, in comparison to nucleus and top-k sampling, locally typical sampling offers competitive performance (in both abstractive summarization and story generation) in terms of quality while consistently reducing degenerate repetitions.

Developmental psychologists have spent decades devising experiments to test the intelligence and knowledge of infants and children, tracing the origin of crucial concepts and capacities. Moreover, experimental techniques in developmental psychology have been carefully designed to discriminate the cognitive capacities that underlie particular behaviors. We propose that using classical experiments from child development is a particularly effective way to probe the computational abilities of AI models, in general, and LLMs in particular. First, the methodological techniques of developmental psychology, such as the use of novel stimuli to control for past experience or control conditions to determine whether children are using simple associations, can be equally helpful for assessing the capacities of LLMs. In parallel, testing LLMs in this way can tell us whether the information that is encoded in text is sufficient to enable particular responses, or whether those responses depend on other kinds of information, such as information from exploration of the physical world. In this work we adapt classical developmental experiments to evaluate the capabilities of LaMDA, a large language model from Google. We propose a novel LLM Response Score (LRS) metric which can be used to evaluate other language models, such as GPT. We find that LaMDA generates appropriate responses that are similar to those of children in experiments involving social understanding, perhaps providing evidence that knowledge of these domains is discovered through language. On the other hand, LaMDA's responses in early object and action understanding, theory of mind, and especially causal reasoning tasks are very different from those of young children, perhaps showing that these domains require more real-world, self-initiated exploration and cannot simply be learned from patterns in language input.

Recent advancements in natural language processing, especially the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs), have opened exciting possibilities for constructing computational simulations designed to replicate human behavior accurately. However, LLMs are complex statistical learners without straightforward deductive rules, making them prone to unexpected behaviors. In this study, we highlight the limitations of LLMs in simulating human interactions, particularly focusing on LLMs' ability to simulate political debates. Our findings indicate a tendency for LLM agents to conform to the model's inherent social biases despite being directed to debate from certain political perspectives. This tendency results in behavioral patterns that seem to deviate from well-established social dynamics among humans. We reinforce these observations using an automatic self-fine-tuning method, which enables us to manipulate the biases within the LLM and demonstrate that agents subsequently align with the altered biases. These results underscore the need for further research to develop methods that help agents overcome these biases, a critical step toward creating more realistic simulations.

People can categorize the same entity at multiple taxonomic levels, such as basic (bear), superordinate (animal), and subordinate (grizzly bear). While prior research has focused on basic-level categories, this study is the first attempt to examine the organization of categories by analyzing exemplars produced at the subordinate level. We present a new Italian psycholinguistic dataset of human-generated exemplars for 187 concrete words. We then use these data to evaluate whether textual and vision LLMs produce meaningful exemplars that align with human category organization across three key tasks: exemplar generation, category induction, and typicality judgment. Our findings show a low alignment between humans and LLMs, consistent with previous studies. However, their performance varies notably across different semantic domains. Ultimately, this study highlights both the promises and the constraints of using AI-generated exemplars to support psychological and linguistic research.

Although the mapping between sound and meaning in human language is assumed to be largely arbitrary, research in cognitive science has shown that there are non-trivial correlations between particular sounds and meanings across languages and demographic groups, a phenomenon known as sound symbolism. Among the many dimensions of meaning, sound symbolism is particularly salient and well-demonstrated with regards to cross-modal associations between language and the visual domain. In this work, we address the question of whether sound symbolism is reflected in vision-and-language models such as CLIP and Stable Diffusion. Using zero-shot knowledge probing to investigate the inherent knowledge of these models, we find strong evidence that they do show this pattern, paralleling the well-known kiki-bouba effect in psycholinguistics. Our work provides a novel method for demonstrating sound symbolism and understanding its nature using computational tools. Our code will be made publicly available.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

What mechanisms underlie linguistic generalization in large language models (LLMs)? This question has attracted considerable attention, with most studies analyzing the extent to which the language skills of LLMs resemble rules. As of yet, it is not known whether linguistic generalization in LLMs could equally well be explained as the result of analogical processes, which can be formalized as similarity operations on stored exemplars. A key shortcoming of prior research is its focus on linguistic phenomena with a high degree of regularity, for which rule-based and analogical approaches make the same predictions. Here, we instead examine derivational morphology, specifically English adjective nominalization, which displays notable variability. We introduce a new method for investigating linguistic generalization in LLMs: focusing on GPT-J, we fit cognitive models that instantiate rule-based and analogical learning to the LLM training data and compare their predictions on a set of nonce adjectives with those of the LLM, allowing us to draw direct conclusions regarding underlying mechanisms. As expected, rule-based and analogical models explain the predictions of GPT-J equally well for adjectives with regular nominalization patterns. However, for adjectives with variable nominalization patterns, the analogical model provides a much better match. Furthermore, GPT-J's behavior is sensitive to the individual word frequencies, even for regular forms, a behavior that is consistent with an analogical account of regular forms but not a rule-based one. These findings refute the hypothesis that GPT-J's linguistic generalization on adjective nominalization involves rules, suggesting similarity operations on stored exemplars as the underlying mechanism. Overall, our study suggests that analogical processes play a bigger role in the linguistic generalization of LLMs than previously thought.

Human-like personality traits have recently been discovered in large language models, raising the hypothesis that their (known and as yet undiscovered) biases conform with human latent psychological constructs. While large conversational models may be tricked into answering psychometric questionnaires, the latent psychological constructs of thousands of simpler transformers, trained for other tasks, cannot be assessed because appropriate psychometric methods are currently lacking. Here, we show how standard psychological questionnaires can be reformulated into natural language inference prompts, and we provide a code library to support the psychometric assessment of arbitrary models. We demonstrate, using a sample of 88 publicly available models, the existence of human-like mental health-related constructs (including anxiety, depression, and Sense of Coherence) which conform with standard theories in human psychology and show similar correlations and mitigation strategies. The ability to interpret and rectify the performance of language models by using psychological tools can boost the development of more explainable, controllable, and trustworthy models.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

This study investigates the potential of large language models (LLMs) to provide accurate estimates of concreteness, valence and arousal for multi-word expressions. Unlike previous artificial intelligence (AI) methods, LLMs can capture the nuanced meanings of multi-word expressions. We systematically evaluated ChatGPT-4o's ability to predict concreteness, valence and arousal. In Study 1, ChatGPT-4o showed strong correlations with human concreteness ratings (r = .8) for multi-word expressions. In Study 2, these findings were repeated for valence and arousal ratings of individual words, matching or outperforming previous AI models. Study 3 extended the prevalence and arousal analysis to multi-word expressions and showed promising results despite the lack of large-scale human benchmarks. These findings highlight the potential of LLMs for generating valuable psycholinguistic data related to multiword expressions. To help researchers with stimulus selection, we provide datasets with AI norms of concreteness, valence and arousal for 126,397 English single words and 63,680 multi-word expressions

Chomsky and others have very directly claimed that large language models (LLMs) are equally capable of learning languages that are possible and impossible for humans to learn. However, there is very little published experimental evidence to support such a claim. Here, we develop a set of synthetic impossible languages of differing complexity, each designed by systematically altering English data with unnatural word orders and grammar rules. These languages lie on an impossibility continuum: at one end are languages that are inherently impossible, such as random and irreversible shuffles of English words, and on the other, languages that may not be intuitively impossible but are often considered so in linguistics, particularly those with rules based on counting word positions. We report on a wide range of evaluations to assess the capacity of GPT-2 small models to learn these uncontroversially impossible languages, and crucially, we perform these assessments at various stages throughout training to compare the learning process for each language. Our core finding is that GPT-2 struggles to learn impossible languages when compared to English as a control, challenging the core claim. More importantly, we hope our approach opens up a productive line of inquiry in which different LLM architectures are tested on a variety of impossible languages in an effort to learn more about how LLMs can be used as tools for these cognitive and typological investigations.

Recent work investigates whether LMs learn human-like linguistic generalizations and representations from developmentally plausible amounts of data. Yet, the basic linguistic units processed in these LMs are determined by subword-based tokenization, which limits their validity as models of learning at and below the word level. In this paper, we explore the potential of tokenization-free, phoneme- and grapheme-based language models. We demonstrate that small models based on the Llama architecture can achieve strong linguistic performance on standard syntactic and novel lexical/phonetic benchmarks when trained with character-level vocabularies. We further show that phoneme-based models almost match grapheme-based models in standard tasks and novel evaluations. Our findings suggest a promising direction for creating more linguistically plausible language models that are better suited for computational studies of language acquisition and processing.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

Recent psycholinguistic studies have drawn conflicting conclusions about the relationship between the quality of a language model and the ability of its surprisal estimates to predict human reading times, which has been speculated to be due to the large gap in both the amount of training data and model capacity across studies. The current work aims to consolidate these findings by evaluating surprisal estimates from Transformer-based language model variants that vary systematically in the amount of training data and model capacity on their ability to predict human reading times. The results show that surprisal estimates from most variants with contemporary model capacities provide the best fit after seeing about two billion training tokens, after which they begin to diverge from humanlike expectations. Additionally, newly-trained smaller model variants reveal a 'tipping point' at convergence, after which the decrease in language model perplexity begins to result in poorer fits to human reading times. These results suggest that the massive amount of training data is mainly responsible for the poorer fit achieved by surprisal from larger pre-trained language models, and that a certain degree of model capacity is necessary for Transformer-based language models to capture humanlike expectations.

Advances in large language models (LLMs) have empowered a variety of applications. However, there is still a significant gap in research when it comes to understanding and enhancing the capabilities of LLMs in the field of mental health. In this work, we present the first comprehensive evaluation of multiple LLMs, including Alpaca, Alpaca-LoRA, FLAN-T5, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4, on various mental health prediction tasks via online text data. We conduct a broad range of experiments, covering zero-shot prompting, few-shot prompting, and instruction fine-tuning. The results indicate a promising yet limited performance of LLMs with zero-shot and few-shot prompt designs for the mental health tasks. More importantly, our experiments show that instruction finetuning can significantly boost the performance of LLMs for all tasks simultaneously. Our best-finetuned models, Mental-Alpaca and Mental-FLAN-T5, outperform the best prompt design of GPT-3.5 (25 and 15 times bigger) by 10.9% on balanced accuracy and the best of GPT-4 (250 and 150 times bigger) by 4.8%. They further perform on par with the state-of-the-art task-specific language model. We also conduct an exploratory case study on LLMs' capability on the mental health reasoning tasks, illustrating the promising capability of certain models such as GPT-4. We summarize our findings into a set of action guidelines for potential methods to enhance LLMs' capability for mental health tasks. Meanwhile, we also emphasize the important limitations before achieving deployability in real-world mental health settings, such as known racial and gender bias. We highlight the important ethical risks accompanying this line of research.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

Can large language models (LLMs) implement computations of psychopathology? An effective approach to the question hinges on addressing two factors. First, for conceptual validity, we require a general and computational account of psychopathology that is applicable to computational entities without biological embodiment or subjective experience. Second, mechanisms underlying LLM behaviors need to be studied for better methodological validity. Thus, we establish a computational-theoretical framework to provide an account of psychopathology applicable to LLMs. To ground the theory for empirical analysis, we also propose a novel mechanistic interpretability method alongside a tailored empirical analytic framework. Based on the frameworks, we conduct experiments demonstrating three key claims: first, that distinct dysfunctional and problematic representational states are implemented in LLMs; second, that their activations can spread and self-sustain to trap LLMs; and third, that dynamic, cyclic structural causal models encoded in the LLMs underpin these patterns. In concert, the empirical results corroborate our hypothesis that network-theoretic computations of psychopathology have already emerged in LLMs. This suggests that certain LLM behaviors mirroring psychopathology may not be a superficial mimicry but a feature of their internal processing. Thus, our work alludes to the possibility of AI systems with psychopathological behaviors in the near future.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Language models are often used as the backbone of modern dialogue systems. These models are pre-trained on large amounts of written fluent language. Repetition is typically penalised when evaluating language model generations. However, it is a key component of dialogue. Humans use local and partner specific repetitions; these are preferred by human users and lead to more successful communication in dialogue. In this study, we evaluate (a) whether language models produce human-like levels of repetition in dialogue, and (b) what are the processing mechanisms related to lexical re-use they use during comprehension. We believe that such joint analysis of model production and comprehension behaviour can inform the development of cognitively inspired dialogue generation systems.

State of the art large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance on a variety of benchmark tasks and are increasingly used as components in larger applications, where LLM-based predictions serve as proxies for human judgements or decision. This raises questions about the human-likeness of LLM-derived information, alignment with human intuition, and whether LLMs could possibly be considered (parts of) explanatory models of (aspects of) human cognition or language use. To shed more light on these issues, we here investigate the human-likeness of LLMs' predictions for multiple-choice decision tasks from the perspective of Bayesian statistical modeling. Using human data from a forced-choice experiment on pragmatic language use, we find that LLMs do not capture the variance in the human data at the item-level. We suggest different ways of deriving full distributional predictions from LLMs for aggregate, condition-level data, and find that some, but not all ways of obtaining condition-level predictions yield adequate fits to human data. These results suggests that assessment of LLM performance depends strongly on seemingly subtle choices in methodology, and that LLMs are at best predictors of human behavior at the aggregate, condition-level, for which they are, however, not designed to, or usually used to, make predictions in the first place.

The recent developments in Large Language Models (LLM), mark a significant moment in the research and development of social interactions with artificial agents. These agents are widely deployed in a variety of settings, with potential impact on users. However, the study of social interactions with agents powered by LLM is still emerging, limited by access to the technology and to data, the absence of standardised interfaces, and challenges to establishing controlled experimental setups using the currently available business-oriented platforms. To answer these gaps, we developed LEXI, LLMs Experimentation Interface, an open-source tool enabling the deployment of artificial agents powered by LLM in social interaction behavioural experiments. Using a graphical interface, LEXI allows researchers to build agents, and deploy them in experimental setups along with forms and questionnaires while collecting interaction logs and self-reported data. The outcomes of usability testing indicate LEXI's broad utility, high usability and minimum mental workload requirement, with distinctive benefits observed across disciplines. A proof-of-concept study exploring the tool's efficacy in evaluating social HAIs was conducted, resulting in high-quality data. A comparison of empathetic versus neutral agents indicated that people perceive empathetic agents as more social, and write longer and more positive messages towards them.

Despite widespread use of LLMs as conversational agents, evaluations of performance fail to capture a crucial aspect of communication: interpreting language in context -- incorporating its pragmatics. Humans interpret language using beliefs and prior knowledge about the world. For example, we intuitively understand the response "I wore gloves" to the question "Did you leave fingerprints?" as meaning "No". To investigate whether LLMs have the ability to make this type of inference, known as an implicature, we design a simple task and evaluate four categories of widely used state-of-the-art models. We find that, despite only evaluating on utterances that require a binary inference (yes or no), models in three of these categories perform close to random. However, LLMs instruction-tuned at the example-level perform significantly better. These results suggest that certain fine-tuning strategies are far better at inducing pragmatic understanding in models. We present our findings as the starting point for further research into evaluating how LLMs interpret language in context and to drive the development of more pragmatic and useful models of human discourse.

Self-consciousness, the introspection of one's existence and thoughts, represents a high-level cognitive process. As language models advance at an unprecedented pace, a critical question arises: Are these models becoming self-conscious? Drawing upon insights from psychological and neural science, this work presents a practical definition of self-consciousness for language models and refines ten core concepts. Our work pioneers an investigation into self-consciousness in language models by, for the first time, leveraging causal structural games to establish the functional definitions of the ten core concepts. Based on our definitions, we conduct a comprehensive four-stage experiment: quantification (evaluation of ten leading models), representation (visualization of self-consciousness within the models), manipulation (modification of the models' representation), and acquisition (fine-tuning the models on core concepts). Our findings indicate that although models are in the early stages of developing self-consciousness, there is a discernible representation of certain concepts within their internal mechanisms. However, these representations of self-consciousness are hard to manipulate positively at the current stage, yet they can be acquired through targeted fine-tuning. Our datasets and code are at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/SelfConsciousness.

How do humans learn language, and can the first language be learned at all? These fundamental questions are still hotly debated. In contemporary linguistics, there are two major schools of thought that give completely opposite answers. According to Chomsky's theory of universal grammar, language cannot be learned because children are not exposed to sufficient data in their linguistic environment. In contrast, usage-based models of language assume a profound relationship between language structure and language use. In particular, contextual mental processing and mental representations are assumed to have the cognitive capacity to capture the complexity of actual language use at all levels. The prime example is syntax, i.e., the rules by which words are assembled into larger units such as sentences. Typically, syntactic rules are expressed as sequences of word classes. However, it remains unclear whether word classes are innate, as implied by universal grammar, or whether they emerge during language acquisition, as suggested by usage-based approaches. Here, we address this issue from a machine learning and natural language processing perspective. In particular, we trained an artificial deep neural network on predicting the next word, provided sequences of consecutive words as input. Subsequently, we analyzed the emerging activation patterns in the hidden layers of the neural network. Strikingly, we find that the internal representations of nine-word input sequences cluster according to the word class of the tenth word to be predicted as output, even though the neural network did not receive any explicit information about syntactic rules or word classes during training. This surprising result suggests, that also in the human brain, abstract representational categories such as word classes may naturally emerge as a consequence of predictive coding and processing during language acquisition.

In this work, we develop a pipeline for historical-psychological text analysis in classical Chinese. Humans have produced texts in various languages for thousands of years; however, most of the computational literature is focused on contemporary languages and corpora. The emerging field of historical psychology relies on computational techniques to extract aspects of psychology from historical corpora using new methods developed in natural language processing (NLP). The present pipeline, called Contextualized Construct Representations (CCR), combines expert knowledge in psychometrics (i.e., psychological surveys) with text representations generated via transformer-based language models to measure psychological constructs such as traditionalism, norm strength, and collectivism in classical Chinese corpora. Considering the scarcity of available data, we propose an indirect supervised contrastive learning approach and build the first Chinese historical psychology corpus (C-HI-PSY) to fine-tune pre-trained models. We evaluate the pipeline to demonstrate its superior performance compared with other approaches. The CCR method outperforms word-embedding-based approaches across all of our tasks and exceeds prompting with GPT-4 in most tasks. Finally, we benchmark the pipeline against objective, external data to further verify its validity.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on "counterfactual" task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to a degree, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

This study explores an LLM's ability to learn new languages using explanations found in a grammar book, a process we term "explicit learning." To rigorously assess this ability, we design controlled translation experiments between English and constructed languages generated, through specific cryptographic means, from Latin or French. Contrary to previous studies, our results demonstrate that LLMs do possess a measurable capacity for explicit learning. This ability, however, diminishes as the complexity of the linguistic phenomena to be learned increases. Supervised fine-tuning on ad hoc chains of thought significantly enhances LLM performance but struggles to generalize to typologically novel or more complex linguistic features. These findings point to the need for more diverse training sets and alternative fine-tuning strategies to further improve explicit learning by LLMs, benefiting low-resource languages typically described in grammar books but lacking extensive corpora.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

We describe our team's contribution to the STRICT-SMALL track of the BabyLM Challenge. The challenge requires training a language model from scratch using only a relatively small training dataset of ten million words. We experiment with three variants of cognitively-motivated curriculum learning and analyze their effect on the performance of the model on linguistic evaluation tasks. In the vocabulary curriculum, we analyze methods for constraining the vocabulary in the early stages of training to simulate cognitively more plausible learning curves. In the data curriculum experiments, we vary the order of the training instances based on i) infant-inspired expectations and ii) the learning behavior of the model. In the objective curriculum, we explore different variations of combining the conventional masked language modeling task with a more coarse-grained word class prediction task to reinforce linguistic generalization capabilities. Our results did not yield consistent improvements over our own non-curriculum learning baseline across a range of linguistic benchmarks; however, we do find marginal gains on select tasks. Our analysis highlights key takeaways for specific combinations of tasks and settings which benefit from our proposed curricula. We moreover determine that careful selection of model architecture, and training hyper-parameters yield substantial improvements over the default baselines provided by the BabyLM challenge.

Supervised machine learning provides the learner with a set of input-output examples of the target task. Humans, however, can also learn to perform new tasks from instructions in natural language. Can machines learn to understand instructions as well? We present the Turking Test, which examines a model's ability to follow natural language instructions of varying complexity. These range from simple tasks, like retrieving the nth word of a sentence, to ones that require creativity, such as generating examples for SNLI and SQuAD in place of human intelligence workers ("turkers"). Despite our lenient evaluation methodology, we observe that a large pretrained language model performs poorly across all tasks. Analyzing the model's error patterns reveals that the model tends to ignore explicit instructions and often generates outputs that cannot be construed as an attempt to solve the task. While it is not yet clear whether instruction understanding can be captured by traditional language models, the sheer expressivity of instruction understanding makes it an appealing alternative to the rising few-shot inference paradigm.

This paper presents null-shot prompting. Null-shot prompting exploits hallucination in large language models (LLMs) by instructing LLMs to utilize information from the "Examples" section that never exists within the provided context to perform a task. While reducing hallucination is crucial and non-negligible for daily and critical uses of LLMs, we propose that in the current landscape in which these LLMs still hallucinate, it is possible, in fact, to exploit hallucination to increase performance in performing tasks compared to standard zero-shot prompting. Experiments with six LLMs show improvements in performance across the majority of eight datasets, including reading comprehension, arithmetic reasoning, and closed-book question answering. The observed inconsistency in increased relative performance across LLMs also potentially indicates a different degree of inherent hallucination in each model. These differences show that it is possible to utilize null-shot prompting as a way to detect degrees of hallucination in LLMs using existing benchmarking datasets. We also perform ablation studies, including experimenting with a modified version of null-shot prompting that incorporates ideas from zero-shot chain-of-thought prompting, which shows different trends of results.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear. In this work, we investigated whether the well-known Knobe effect, a moral bias in intentionality judgements, emerges in finetuned LLMs and whether it can be traced back to specific components of the model. We conducted a Layer-Patching analysis across 3 open-weights LLMs and demonstrated that the bias is not only learned during finetuning but also localized in a specific set of layers. Surprisingly, we found that patching activations from the corresponding pretrained model into just a few critical layers is sufficient to eliminate the effect. Our findings offer new evidence that social biases in LLMs can be interpreted, localized, and mitigated through targeted interventions, without the need for model retraining.

Large language models (LLMs) can produce erroneous responses that sound fluent and convincing, raising the risk that users will rely on these responses as if they were correct. Mitigating such overreliance is a key challenge. Through a think-aloud study in which participants use an LLM-infused application to answer objective questions, we identify several features of LLM responses that shape users' reliance: explanations (supporting details for answers), inconsistencies in explanations, and sources. Through a large-scale, pre-registered, controlled experiment (N=308), we isolate and study the effects of these features on users' reliance, accuracy, and other measures. We find that the presence of explanations increases reliance on both correct and incorrect responses. However, we observe less reliance on incorrect responses when sources are provided or when explanations exhibit inconsistencies. We discuss the implications of these findings for fostering appropriate reliance on LLMs.

Structural priming is a cognitive phenomenon where exposure to a particular syntactic structure increases the likelihood of producing the same structure in subsequent utterances. While humans consistently demonstrate structural priming effects across various linguistic contexts, it remains unclear whether multimodal large language models (MLLMs) exhibit similar syntactic preservation behaviors. We introduce PRISMATIC, the first multimodal structural priming dataset, which advances computational linguistics by providing a standardized benchmark for investigating syntax-vision interactions. We propose the Syntactic Preservation Index (SPI), a novel reference-free evaluation metric designed specifically to assess structural priming effects in sentence level. Using this metric, we constructed and tested models with two different multimodal encoding architectures to investigate their structural preservation capabilities. Our experimental results demonstrate that models with both encoding methods show comparable syntactic priming effects. However, only fusion-encoded models exhibit robust positive correlations between priming effects and visual similarity, suggesting a cognitive process more aligned with human psycholinguistic patterns. This work provides new insights into evaluating and understanding how syntactic information is processed in multimodal language models.

Understanding and manipulating the causal generation mechanisms in language models is essential for controlling their behavior. Previous work has primarily relied on techniques such as representation surgery -- e.g., model ablations or manipulation of linear subspaces tied to specific concepts -- to intervene on these models. To understand the impact of interventions precisely, it is useful to examine counterfactuals -- e.g., how a given sentence would have appeared had it been generated by the model following a specific intervention. We highlight that counterfactual reasoning is conceptually distinct from interventions, as articulated in Pearl's causal hierarchy. Based on this observation, we propose a framework for generating true string counterfactuals by reformulating language models as Generalized Structural-equation. Models using the Gumbel-max trick. This allows us to model the joint distribution over original strings and their counterfactuals resulting from the same instantiation of the sampling noise. We develop an algorithm based on hindsight Gumbel sampling that allows us to infer the latent noise variables and generate counterfactuals of observed strings. Our experiments demonstrate that the approach produces meaningful counterfactuals while at the same time showing that commonly used intervention techniques have considerable undesired side effects.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

Representational spaces learned via language modeling are fundamental to Natural Language Processing (NLP), however there has been limited understanding regarding how and when during training various types of linguistic information emerge and interact. Leveraging a novel information theoretic probing suite, which enables direct comparisons of not just task performance, but their representational subspaces, we analyze nine tasks covering syntax, semantics and reasoning, across 2M pre-training steps and five seeds. We identify critical learning phases across tasks and time, during which subspaces emerge, share information, and later disentangle to specialize. Across these phases, syntactic knowledge is acquired rapidly after 0.5% of full training. Continued performance improvements primarily stem from the acquisition of open-domain knowledge, while semantics and reasoning tasks benefit from later boosts to long-range contextualization and higher specialization. Measuring cross-task similarity further reveals that linguistically related tasks share information throughout training, and do so more during the critical phase of learning than before or after. Our findings have implications for model interpretability, multi-task learning, and learning from limited data.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

Current Large Language Models (LLMs) are unparalleled in their ability to generate grammatically correct, fluent text. LLMs are appearing rapidly, and debates on LLM capacities have taken off, but reflection is lagging behind. Thus, in this position paper, we first zoom in on the debate and critically assess three points recurring in critiques of LLM capacities: i) that LLMs only parrot statistical patterns in the training data; ii) that LLMs master formal but not functional language competence; and iii) that language learning in LLMs cannot inform human language learning. Drawing on empirical and theoretical arguments, we show that these points need more nuance. Second, we outline a pragmatic perspective on the issue of `real' understanding and intentionality in LLMs. Understanding and intentionality pertain to unobservable mental states we attribute to other humans because they have pragmatic value: they allow us to abstract away from complex underlying mechanics and predict behaviour effectively. We reflect on the circumstances under which it would make sense for humans to similarly attribute mental states to LLMs, thereby outlining a pragmatic philosophical context for LLMs as an increasingly prominent technology in society.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Recent interpretability methods have proposed to translate LLM internal representations into natural language descriptions using a second verbalizer LLM. This is intended to illuminate how the target model represents and operates on inputs. But do such activation verbalization approaches actually provide privileged knowledge about the internal workings of the target model, or do they merely convey information about the inputs provided to it? We critically evaluate popular verbalization methods and datasets used in prior work and find that one can perform well on such benchmarks without access to target model internals, suggesting that these datasets are not ideal for evaluating verbalization methods. We then run controlled experiments which reveal that verbalizations often reflect the parametric knowledge of the verbalizer LLM that generated them, rather than the knowledge of the target LLM whose activations are decoded. Taken together, our results indicate a need for targeted benchmarks and experimental controls to rigorously assess whether verbalization methods provide meaningful insights into the operations of LLMs.

We propose leveraging cognitive science research on emotions and communication to improve language models for emotion analysis. First, we present the main emotion theories in psychology and cognitive science. Then, we introduce the main methods of emotion annotation in natural language processing and their connections to psychological theories. We also present the two main types of analyses of emotional communication in cognitive pragmatics. Finally, based on the cognitive science research presented, we propose directions for improving language models for emotion analysis. We suggest that these research efforts pave the way for constructing new annotation schemes, methods, and a possible benchmark for emotional understanding, considering different facets of human emotion and communication.

Models of language trained on very large corpora have been demonstrated useful for NLP. As fixed artifacts, they have become the object of intense study, with many researchers "probing" the extent to which linguistic abstractions, factual and commonsense knowledge, and reasoning abilities they acquire and readily demonstrate. Building on this line of work, we consider a new question: for types of knowledge a language model learns, when during (pre)training are they acquired? We plot probing performance across iterations, using RoBERTa as a case study. Among our findings: linguistic knowledge is acquired fast, stably, and robustly across domains. Facts and commonsense are slower and more domain-sensitive. Reasoning abilities are, in general, not stably acquired. As new datasets, pretraining protocols, and probes emerge, we believe that probing-across-time analyses can help researchers understand the complex, intermingled learning that these models undergo and guide us toward more efficient approaches that accomplish necessary learning faster.

Word-by-word language model surprisal is often used to model the incremental processing of human readers, which raises questions about how various choices in language modeling influence its predictive power. One factor that has been overlooked in cognitive modeling is the granularity of subword tokens, which explicitly encodes information about word length and frequency, and ultimately influences the quality of vector representations that are learned. This paper presents experiments that manipulate the token granularity and evaluate its impact on the ability of surprisal to account for processing difficulty of naturalistic text and garden-path constructions. Experiments with naturalistic reading times reveal a substantial influence of token granularity on surprisal, with tokens defined by a vocabulary size of 8,000 resulting in surprisal that is most predictive. In contrast, on garden-path constructions, language models trained on coarser-grained tokens generally assigned higher surprisal to critical regions, suggesting their increased sensitivity to syntax. Taken together, these results suggest a large role of token granularity on the quality of language model surprisal for cognitive modeling.

A growing body of work makes use of probing to investigate the working of neural models, often considered black boxes. Recently, an ongoing debate emerged surrounding the limitations of the probing paradigm. In this work, we point out the inability to infer behavioral conclusions from probing results and offer an alternative method that focuses on how the information is being used, rather than on what information is encoded. Our method, Amnesic Probing, follows the intuition that the utility of a property for a given task can be assessed by measuring the influence of a causal intervention that removes it from the representation. Equipped with this new analysis tool, we can ask questions that were not possible before, e.g. is part-of-speech information important for word prediction? We perform a series of analyses on BERT to answer these types of questions. Our findings demonstrate that conventional probing performance is not correlated to task importance, and we call for increased scrutiny of claims that draw behavioral or causal conclusions from probing results.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently showcased their remarkable capacities, not only in natural language processing tasks but also across diverse domains such as clinical medicine, legal consultation, and education. LLMs become more than mere applications, evolving into assistants capable of addressing diverse user requests. This narrows the distinction between human beings and artificial intelligence agents, raising intriguing questions regarding the potential manifestation of personalities, temperaments, and emotions within LLMs. In this paper, we propose a framework, PsychoBench, for evaluating diverse psychological aspects of LLMs. Comprising thirteen scales commonly used in clinical psychology, PsychoBench further classifies these scales into four distinct categories: personality traits, interpersonal relationships, motivational tests, and emotional abilities. Our study examines five popular models, namely text-davinci-003, ChatGPT, GPT-4, LLaMA-2-7b, and LLaMA-2-13b. Additionally, we employ a jailbreak approach to bypass the safety alignment protocols and test the intrinsic natures of LLMs. We have made PsychoBench openly accessible via https://github.com/CUHK-ARISE/PsychoBench.

Distributional word representation methods exploit word co-occurrences to build compact vector encodings of words. While these representations enjoy widespread use in modern natural language processing, it is unclear whether they accurately encode all necessary facets of conceptual meaning. In this paper, we evaluate how well these representations can predict perceptual and conceptual features of concrete concepts, drawing on two semantic norm datasets sourced from human participants. We find that several standard word representations fail to encode many salient perceptual features of concepts, and show that these deficits correlate with word-word similarity prediction errors. Our analyses provide motivation for grounded and embodied language learning approaches, which may help to remedy these deficits.

Applying large language models (LLMs) to assist in psycho-counseling is an emerging and meaningful approach, driven by the significant gap between patient needs and the availability of mental health support. However, current LLMs struggle to consistently provide effective responses to client speeches, largely due to the lack of supervision from high-quality real psycho-counseling data, whose content is typically inaccessible due to client privacy concerns. Furthermore, the quality of therapists' responses in available sessions can vary significantly based on their professional training and experience. Assessing the quality of therapists' responses remains an open challenge. In this work, we address these challenges by first proposing a set of professional and comprehensive principles to evaluate therapists' responses to client speeches. Using these principles, we create a preference dataset, PsychoCounsel-Preference, which contains 36k high-quality preference comparison pairs. This dataset aligns with the preferences of professional psychotherapists, providing a robust foundation for evaluating and improving LLMs in psycho-counseling. Experiments on reward modeling and preference learning demonstrate that PsychoCounsel-Preference is an excellent resource for LLMs to acquire essential skills for responding to clients in a counseling session. Our best-aligned model, PsychoCounsel-Llama3-8B, achieves an impressive win rate of 87% against GPT-4o. We release PsychoCounsel-Preference, PsychoCounsel-Llama3-8B and the reward model PsychoCounsel Llama3-8B-Reward to facilitate the research of psycho-counseling with LLMs at: https://hf.co/Psychotherapy-LLM.

Language models are increasingly being deployed as user simulators, but their memory is far more reliable than that of real users. To measure this gap, we run a series of classic memory experiments from psychology on both humans and language models. Across tasks, we find that out-of-the-box language models exhibit better memory than humans, even when prompted to imitate human behavior. We then show that better prompting strategies and the use of a compactor can cause language models to forget content in a more human-like way. Using these methods, we show preliminary evidence that language models with human-like memory constraints can function as more effective user simulators in a downstream education task. Finally, we release human reference data and benchmarks to support future work on simulating human memory with language models.

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to mimic human behavior triggered a plethora of computational social science research, assuming that empirical studies of humans can be conducted with AI agents instead. Since there have been conflicting research findings on whether and when this hypothesis holds, there is a need to better understand the differences in their experimental designs. We focus on replicating the behavior of social network users with the use of LLMs for the analysis of communication on social networks. First, we provide a formal framework for the simulation of social networks, before focusing on the sub-task of imitating user communication. We empirically test different approaches to imitate user behavior on X in English and German. Our findings suggest that social simulations should be validated by their empirical realism measured in the setting in which the simulation components were fitted. With this paper, we argue for more rigor when applying generative-agent-based modeling for social simulation.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

Natural language inference (NLI) is the task of determining if a natural language hypothesis can be inferred from a given premise in a justifiable manner. NLI was proposed as a benchmark task for natural language understanding. Existing models perform well at standard datasets for NLI, achieving impressive results across different genres of text. However, the extent to which these models understand the semantic content of sentences is unclear. In this work, we propose an evaluation methodology consisting of automatically constructed "stress tests" that allow us to examine whether systems have the ability to make real inferential decisions. Our evaluation of six sentence-encoder models on these stress tests reveals strengths and weaknesses of these models with respect to challenging linguistic phenomena, and suggests important directions for future work in this area.

Previous work has shown correlations between the hidden states of large language models and fMRI brain responses, on language tasks. These correlations have been taken as evidence of the representational similarity of these models and brain states. This study tests whether these previous results are robust to several possible concerns. Specifically this study shows: (i) that the previous results are still found after dimensionality reduction, and thus are not attributable to the curse of dimensionality; (ii) that previous results are confirmed when using new measures of similarity; (iii) that correlations between brain representations and those from models are specific to models trained on human language; and (iv) that the results are dependent on the presence of positional encoding in the models. These results confirm and strengthen the results of previous research and contribute to the debate on the biological plausibility and interpretability of state-of-the-art large language models.

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) create a feedback loop with human users: models learn human beliefs from data, reinforce these beliefs with generated content, reabsorb the reinforced beliefs, and feed them back to users again and again. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the lock-in of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test it empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. Analysis reveals sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop. Code and data available at https://thelockinhypothesis.com

This paper evaluates whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit cognitive fan effects, similar to those discovered by Anderson in humans, after being pre-trained on human textual data. We conduct two sets of in-context recall experiments designed to elicit fan effects. Consistent with human results, we find that LLM recall uncertainty, measured via token probability, is influenced by the fan effect. Our results show that removing uncertainty disrupts the observed effect. The experiments suggest the fan effect is consistent whether the fan value is induced in-context or in the pre-training data. Finally, these findings provide in-silico evidence that fan effects and typicality are expressions of the same phenomena.

Can large language models detect and report their own internal states? A number of studies have argued that the answer to this question is yes. We argue, based on lessons from human metacognition research, that this conclusion may be premature: to be convinced of this conclusion we need to distinguish genuine introspection from pattern matching based on surface-level cues. Furthermore, we argue that behavioral evidence alone is inherently insufficient to establish strong introspective claims. We re-examine two recently introduced evaluation paradigms in light of this consideration. In the first paradigm, models are expected to detect whether their internal states have been tampered with. We find that models cannot reliably distinguish such interventions on their internal states from manipulations of the input, suggesting that their success in the original studies reflects their ability to detect anomalies more generally, as opposed to interventions on their internal states in particular. In the second paradigm we examine, models are tasked with predicting labels derived from their own hidden states. Here, we find that classifiers that only have access to the input achieve equivalent performance to the model's own in-context predictions, indicating that the original results do not conclusively demonstrate that the model has privileged access to its internal representations. We further introduce a relabeled control setting, where models cannot rely on the semantics of the task to solve it, and instead must rely on the internal representation; models perform closer to chance on this better-controlled version of the task. Taken together, these results indicate that current evidence is insufficient to establish that LLMs display metacognitive monitoring.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in language generation, understanding, and few-shot learning in recent years. An extensive body of work has explored how their performance may be further improved through the tools of prompting, ranging from verification, self-consistency, or intermediate scratchpads. In this paper, we present a complementary approach to improve language responses where multiple language model instances propose and debate their individual responses and reasoning processes over multiple rounds to arrive at a common final answer. Our findings indicate that this approach significantly enhances mathematical and strategic reasoning across a number of tasks. We also demonstrate that our approach improves the factual validity of generated content, reducing fallacious answers and hallucinations that contemporary models are prone to. Our approach may be directly applied to existing black-box models and uses identical procedure and prompts for all tasks we investigate. Overall, our findings suggest that such "society of minds" approach has the potential to significantly advance the capabilities of LLMs and pave the way for further breakthroughs in language generation and understanding.

Large language models (LLMs) can perform reasoning computations both internally within their latent space and externally by generating explicit token sequences like chains of thought. Significant progress in enhancing reasoning abilities has been made by scaling test-time compute. However, understanding and quantifying model-internal reasoning abilities - the inferential "leaps" models make between individual token predictions - remains crucial. This study introduces a benchmark (n = 4,000 items) designed to quantify model-internal reasoning in different domains. We achieve this by having LLMs indicate the correct solution to reasoning problems not through descriptive text, but by selecting a specific language of their initial response token that is different from English, the benchmark language. This not only requires models to reason beyond their context window, but also to overrise their default tendency to respond in the same language as the prompt, thereby posing an additional cognitive strain. We evaluate a set of 18 LLMs, showing significant performance variations, with GPT-4.5 achieving the highest accuracy (74.7%), outperforming models like Grok-2 (67.2%), and Llama 3.1 405B (65.6%). Control experiments and difficulty scaling analyses suggest that while LLMs engage in internal reasoning, we cannot rule out heuristic exploitations under certain conditions, marking an area for future investigation. Our experiments demonstrate that LLMs can "think" via latent-space computations, revealing model-internal inference strategies that need further understanding, especially regarding safety-related concerns such as covert planning, goal-seeking, or deception emerging without explicit token traces.

Linear sequences of words are implicitly represented in our brains by hierarchical structures that organize the composition of words in sentences. Linguists formalize different frameworks to model this hierarchy; two of the most common syntactic frameworks are Constituency and Dependency. Constituency represents sentences as nested groups of phrases, while dependency represents a sentence by assigning relations between its words. Recently, the pursuit of intelligent machines has produced Language Models (LMs) capable of solving many language tasks with a human-level performance. Many studies now question whether LMs implicitly represent syntactic hierarchies. This thesis focuses on producing constituency and dependency structures from LMs in an unsupervised setting. I review the critical methods in this field and highlight a line of work that utilizes a numerical representation for binary constituency trees (Syntactic Distance). I present a detailed study on StructFormer (SF) (Shen et al., 2021), which retrofits a transformer encoder architecture with a parser network to produce constituency and dependency structures. I present six experiments to analyze and address this field's challenges; experiments include investigating the effect of repositioning the parser network within the SF architecture, evaluating subword-based induced trees, and benchmarking the models developed in the thesis experiments on linguistic tasks. Models benchmarking is performed by participating in the BabyLM challenge, published at CoNLL 2023 (Momen et al., 2023). The results of this thesis encourage further development in the direction of retrofitting transformer-based models to induce syntactic structures, supported by the acceptable performance of SF in different experimental settings and the observed limitations that require innovative solutions to advance the state of syntactic structure induction.

Abstract concepts - justice, theory, availability - have no single perceivable referent; in the human brain, their meaning emerges from a web of experiences, affect, and social context. Do large language models (LLMs) ground abstract concepts in a similar way? We study this by replicating property-generation experiments from cognitive science on 21 frontier and open-weight LLMs. Across models and experiments, we find a consistent pattern: when compared to humans, models rely too heavily on word associations, and underproduce properties tied to emotion and internal states. This yields a large and consistent grounding gap: no model exceeds a Pearson correlation r=0.37 with human responses, compared to a human-to-human ceiling above r=0.9. To better interpret this gap, we also replicate a rating experiment on grounding categories and find that here LLMs align more closely with human judgment, and alignment improves as models get larger. We then use sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to inspect whether this information is also reflected in the models' internal features, and we do identify features connected to grounding dimensions such as "sensorimotor" and "social". These findings suggest that current LLMs can recover grounding dimensions when explicitly queried, but do not recruit them in a human-like way when words are generated freely.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Implicit meanings are integral to human communication, making it essential for language models to be capable of identifying and interpreting them. Grice (1975) proposed a set of conversational maxims that guide cooperative dialogue, noting that speakers may deliberately violate these principles to express meanings beyond literal words, and that listeners, in turn, recognize such violations to draw pragmatic inferences. Building on Surian et al. (1996)'s study of children's sensitivity to violations of Gricean maxims, we introduce a novel benchmark to test whether language models pretrained on less than 10M and less than 100M tokens can distinguish maxim-adhering from maxim-violating utterances. We compare these BabyLMs across five maxims and situate their performance relative to children and a Large Language Model (LLM) pretrained on 3T tokens. We find that overall, models trained on less than 100M tokens outperform those trained on less than 10M, yet fall short of child-level and LLM competence. Our results suggest that modest data increases improve some aspects of pragmatic behavior, leading to finer-grained differentiation between pragmatic dimensions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have lately been on the spotlight of researchers, businesses, and consumers alike. While the linguistic capabilities of such models have been studied extensively, there is growing interest in investigating them as cognitive subjects. In the present work I examine GPT-3 and ChatGPT capabilities on an limited-data inductive reasoning task from the cognitive science literature. The results suggest that these models' cognitive judgements are not human-like.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

Vision-Language Models demonstrate remarkable capabilities but often struggle with compositional reasoning, exhibiting vulnerabilities regarding word order and attribute binding. This limitation arises from a scarcity of informative samples needed to differentiate subtle semantic variations during contrastive pretraining. Although hard negative mining offers a promising remedy, existing methods lack explicit mechanisms to dictate which linguistic elements undergo modification. Instead of engineering generative architectures, this study establishes lexical concreteness as a fundamental determinant of negative sample efficacy. Modifying highly concrete terms generates more pronounced structural and visual discrepancies, providing a substantially stronger learning signal. Leveraging this principle, ConcretePlant is proposed to systematically isolate and manipulate perceptually grounded concepts. Analyses of the InfoNCE further reveals a severe gradient imbalance, where easily distinguishable pairs disproportionately overwhelm the optimization process and restrict the bandwidth available for nuanced learning. To resolve this degradation, the Cement loss is formulated utilizing a margin-based approach. By correlating psycholinguistic scores with sample difficulty, this objective dynamically calibrates the penalization applied to individual training pairs. Comprehensive evaluations substantiate these theoretical claims. The integrated framework, designated as Slipform, achieves state-of-the-art accuracy across diverse compositional evaluation benchmarks, general cross-modal retrieval, single and multi label linear probing.

Human processing of idioms relies on understanding the contextual sentences in which idioms occur, as well as language-intrinsic features such as frequency and speaker-intrinsic factors like familiarity. While LLMs have shown high performance on idiomaticity detection tasks, this success may be attributed to reasoning shortcuts in existing datasets. To this end, we construct a novel, controlled contrastive dataset designed to test whether LLMs can effectively use context to disambiguate idiomatic meaning. Additionally, we explore how collocational frequency and sentence probability influence model performance. Our findings reveal that LLMs often fail to resolve idiomaticity when it is required to attend to the surrounding context, and that models perform better on sentences that have higher likelihood. The collocational frequency of expressions also impacts performance. We make our code and dataset publicly available.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

This paper explores the advancements in making large language models (LLMs) more human-like. We focus on techniques that enhance natural language understanding, conversational coherence, and emotional intelligence in AI systems. The study evaluates various approaches, including fine-tuning with diverse datasets, incorporating psychological principles, and designing models that better mimic human reasoning patterns. Our findings demonstrate that these enhancements not only improve user interactions but also open new possibilities for AI applications across different domains. Future work will address the ethical implications and potential biases introduced by these human-like attributes.

The success of neural language models (LMs) on many technological tasks has brought about their potential relevance as scientific theories of language despite some clear differences between LM training and child language acquisition. In this paper we argue that some of the most prominent benchmarks for evaluating the syntactic capacities of LMs may not be sufficiently rigorous. In particular, we show that the template-based benchmarks lack the structural diversity commonly found in the theoretical and psychological studies of language. When trained on small-scale data modeling child language acquisition, the LMs can be readily matched by simple baseline models. We advocate for the use of the readily available, carefully curated datasets that have been evaluated for gradient acceptability by large pools of native speakers and are designed to probe the structural basis of grammar specifically. On one such dataset, the LI-Adger dataset, LMs evaluate sentences in a way inconsistent with human language users. We conclude with suggestions for better connecting LMs with the empirical study of child language acquisition.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

As humans, we consistently engage in interactions with our peers and receive feedback in the form of natural language. This language feedback allows us to reflect on our actions, maintain appropriate behavior, and rectify our errors. The question arises naturally: can we use language feedback to align large language models (LLMs)? In contrast to previous research that aligns LLMs with reward or preference data, we present the first systematic exploration of alignment through the lens of language feedback (i.e., judgment). We commence with an in-depth investigation of potential methods that can be adapted for aligning LLMs with judgments, revealing that these methods are unable to fully capitalize on the judgments. To facilitate more effective utilization of judgments, we propose a novel framework, Contrastive Unlikelihood Training (CUT), that allows for fine-grained inappropriate content detection and correction based on judgments. Our offline alignment results show that, with merely 1317 off-the-shelf judgment data, CUT (LLaMA2-13b) can beat the 175B DaVinci003 and surpass the best baseline by 52.34 points on AlpacaEval. The online alignment results demonstrate that CUT can align LLMs (LLaMA2-chat-13b) in an iterative fashion using model-specific judgment data, with a steady performance improvement from 81.09 to 91.36 points on AlpacaEval. Our analysis further suggests that judgments exhibit greater potential than rewards for LLM alignment and warrant future research.

In this paper we argue that key, often sensational and misleading, claims regarding linguistic capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are based on at least two unfounded assumptions; the assumption of language completeness and the assumption of data completeness. Language completeness assumes that a distinct and complete thing such as `a natural language' exists, the essential characteristics of which can be effectively and comprehensively modelled by an LLM. The assumption of data completeness relies on the belief that a language can be quantified and wholly captured by data. Work within the enactive approach to cognitive science makes clear that, rather than a distinct and complete thing, language is a means or way of acting. Languaging is not the kind of thing that can admit of a complete or comprehensive modelling. From an enactive perspective we identify three key characteristics of enacted language; embodiment, participation, and precariousness, that are absent in LLMs, and likely incompatible in principle with current architectures. We argue that these absences imply that LLMs are not now and cannot in their present form be linguistic agents the way humans are. We illustrate the point in particular through the phenomenon of `algospeak', a recently described pattern of high stakes human language activity in heavily controlled online environments. On the basis of these points, we conclude that sensational and misleading claims about LLM agency and capabilities emerge from a deep misconception of both what human language is and what LLMs are.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit sycophancy, distorting responses to align with user beliefs, notably by readily agreeing with user counterarguments. Paradoxically, LLMs are increasingly adopted as successful evaluative agents for tasks such as grading and adjudicating claims. This research investigates that tension: why do LLMs show sycophancy when challenged in subsequent conversational turns, yet perform well when evaluating conflicting arguments presented simultaneously? We empirically tested these contrasting scenarios by varying key interaction patterns. We find that state-of-the-art models: (1) are more likely to endorse a user's counterargument when framed as a follow-up from a user, rather than when both responses are presented simultaneously for evaluation; (2) show increased susceptibility to persuasion when the user's rebuttal includes detailed reasoning, even when the conclusion of the reasoning is incorrect; and (3) are more readily swayed by casually phrased feedback than by formal critiques, even when the casual input lacks justification. Our results highlight the risk of relying on LLMs for judgment tasks without accounting for conversational framing.

The output of Large Language Models (LLMs) are a function of the internal model's parameters and the input provided into the context window. The hypothesis presented here is that under a greedy sampling strategy the variance in the LLM's output is a function of the conceptual certainty embedded in the model's parametric knowledge, as well as the lexical variance in the input. Finetuning the model results in reducing the sensitivity of the model output to the lexical input variations. This is then applied to a classification problem and a probabilistic method is proposed for estimating the certainties of the predicted classes.

We analyze the influence of utterance-level construction distributions in German child-directed speech on the resulting formal linguistic competence and the underlying learning trajectories for small language models trained on a novel collection of developmentally plausible language data for German. We find that trajectories are surprisingly robust for markedly different distributions of constructions in the training data, which have little effect on final accuracies and almost no effect on global learning trajectories. While syntax learning benefits from more complex utterances, lexical learning culminates in better scores with more fragmentary data. We argue that LMs trained on developmentally plausible data can contribute to debates on how rich or impoverished linguistic stimuli actually are.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful sources of evidence for linguists seeking to develop theories of syntax. In this paper, we argue that causal interpretability methods, applied to LLMs, can greatly enhance the value of such evidence by helping us characterize the abstract mechanisms that LLMs learn to use. Our empirical focus is a set of English filler-gap dependency constructions (e.g., questions, relative clauses). Linguistic theories largely agree that these constructions share many properties. Using experiments based in Distributed Interchange Interventions, we show that LLMs converge on similar abstract analyses of these constructions. These analyses also reveal previously overlooked factors -- relating to frequency, filler type, and surrounding context -- that could motivate changes to standard linguistic theory. Overall, these results suggest that mechanistic, internal analyses of LLMs can push linguistic theory forward.

"Kawaii" is the Japanese concept of cute, which carries sociocultural connotations related to social identities and emotional responses. Yet, virtually all work to date has focused on the visual side of kawaii, including in studies of computer agents and social robots. In pursuit of formalizing the new science of kawaii vocalics, we explored what elements of voice relate to kawaii and how they might be manipulated, manually and automatically. We conducted a four-phase study (grand N = 512) with two varieties of computer voices: text-to-speech (TTS) and game character voices. We found kawaii "sweet spots" through manipulation of fundamental and formant frequencies, but only for certain voices and to a certain extent. Findings also suggest a ceiling effect for the kawaii vocalics of certain voices. We offer empirical validation of the preliminary kawaii vocalics model and an elementary method for manipulating kawaii perceptions of computer voice.

Abstract grammatical knowledge - of parts of speech and grammatical patterns - is key to the capacity for linguistic generalization in humans. But how abstract is grammatical knowledge in large language models? In the human literature, compelling evidence for grammatical abstraction comes from structural priming. A sentence that shares the same grammatical structure as a preceding sentence is processed and produced more readily. Because confounds exist when using stimuli in a single language, evidence of abstraction is even more compelling from crosslingual structural priming, where use of a syntactic structure in one language primes an analogous structure in another language. We measure crosslingual structural priming in large language models, comparing model behavior to human experimental results from eight crosslingual experiments covering six languages, and four monolingual structural priming experiments in three non-English languages. We find evidence for abstract monolingual and crosslingual grammatical representations in the models that function similarly to those found in humans. These results demonstrate that grammatical representations in multilingual language models are not only similar across languages, but they can causally influence text produced in different languages.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Data visualizations are powerful tools for communicating patterns in quantitative data. Yet understanding any data visualization is no small feat -- succeeding requires jointly making sense of visual, numerical, and linguistic inputs arranged in a conventionalized format one has previously learned to parse. Recently developed vision-language models are, in principle, promising candidates for developing computational models of these cognitive operations. However, it is currently unclear to what degree these models emulate human behavior on tasks that involve reasoning about data visualizations. This gap reflects limitations in prior work that has evaluated data visualization understanding in artificial systems using measures that differ from those typically used to assess these abilities in humans. Here we evaluated eight vision-language models on six data visualization literacy assessments designed for humans and compared model responses to those of human participants. We found that these models performed worse than human participants on average, and this performance gap persisted even when using relatively lenient criteria to assess model performance. Moreover, while relative performance across items was somewhat correlated between models and humans, all models produced patterns of errors that were reliably distinct from those produced by human participants. Taken together, these findings suggest significant opportunities for further development of artificial systems that might serve as useful models of how humans reason about data visualizations. All code and data needed to reproduce these results are available at: https://osf.io/e25mu/?view_only=399daff5a14d4b16b09473cf19043f18.

Large language models (LLMs) have a tendency to generate plausible-sounding yet factually incorrect responses, especially when queried on unfamiliar concepts. In this work, we explore the underlying mechanisms that govern how finetuned LLMs hallucinate. Our investigation reveals an interesting pattern: as inputs become more unfamiliar, LLM outputs tend to default towards a ``hedged'' prediction, whose form is determined by how the unfamiliar examples in the finetuning data are supervised. Thus, by strategically modifying these examples' supervision, we can control LLM predictions for unfamiliar inputs (e.g., teach them to say ``I don't know''). Based on these principles, we develop an RL approach that more reliably mitigates hallucinations for long-form generation tasks, by tackling the challenges presented by reward model hallucinations. We validate our findings with a series of controlled experiments in multiple-choice QA on MMLU, as well as long-form biography and book/movie plot generation tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

Does vision-and-language (VL) training change the linguistic representations of language models in meaningful ways? Most results in the literature have shown inconsistent or marginal differences, both behaviorally and representationally. In this work, we start from the hypothesis that the domain in which VL training could have a significant effect is lexical-conceptual knowledge, in particular its taxonomic organization. Through comparing minimal pairs of text-only LMs and their VL-trained counterparts, we first show that the VL models often outperform their text-only counterparts on a text-only question-answering task that requires taxonomic understanding of concepts mentioned in the questions. Using an array of targeted behavioral and representational analyses, we show that the LMs and VLMs do not differ significantly in terms of their taxonomic knowledge itself, but they differ in how they represent questions that contain concepts in a taxonomic relation vs. a non-taxonomic relation. This implies that the taxonomic knowledge itself does not change substantially through additional VL training, but VL training does improve the deployment of this knowledge in the context of a specific task, even when the presentation of the task is purely linguistic.

Understanding which information is encoded in deep models of spoken and written language has been the focus of much research in recent years, as it is crucial for debugging and improving these architectures. Most previous work has focused on probing for speaker characteristics, acoustic and phonological information in models of spoken language, and for syntactic information in models of written language. Here we focus on the encoding of syntax in several self-supervised and visually grounded models of spoken language. We employ two complementary probing methods, combined with baselines and reference representations to quantify the degree to which syntactic structure is encoded in the activations of the target models. We show that syntax is captured most prominently in the middle layers of the networks, and more explicitly within models with more parameters.

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.

Language models provide a key framework for studying linguistic theories based on prediction, but phonological analysis using large language models (LLMs) is difficult; there are few phonological benchmarks beyond English and the standard input representation used in LLMs (subwords of graphemes) is not suitable for analyzing the representation of phonemes. In this work, we demonstrate how word segmentation can be used as a phonological probing task, allowing us to study the representations learned by phoneme-based language models trained on child-directed speech across 31 languages. Following computational models of word segmentation, we present unsupervised methods for extracting word boundaries from a trained model using the observation that prediction-error peaks at the start of words. We also use linear probes to identify that these models implicitly track word boundaries, even when they do not appear in training. This cross-lingual work corroborates statistical learning theories of acquisition and empirically motivates new methods for training subword tokenizers.