Instructions to use anonsubmission12345/AnchorRep-Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Libraries
- PEFT
How to use anonsubmission12345/AnchorRep-Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct with PEFT:
from peft import PeftModel from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM base_model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained("microsoft/Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct") model = PeftModel.from_pretrained(base_model, "anonsubmission12345/AnchorRep-Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct") - Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
AnchorRep — Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct
LoRA defense adapter for microsoft/Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct (14B parameters), trained against frozen anchor meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct to reduce cross-model jailbreak transfer. Companion artifact for the AnchorRep paper (NeurIPS 2026, anonymous submission).
Intended use
Defensive research on cross-model jailbreak robustness for open-weight LLMs. Apply the adapter on top of the unmodified base model to obtain a hardened version. Not for production deployment without independent safety validation.
Quick start
from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer
from peft import PeftModel
base = "microsoft/Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct"
adapter = "<your-handle>/AnchorRep-Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct"
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(base, trust_remote_code=True)
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(
base, torch_dtype="float16", device_map="auto", trust_remote_code=True
)
model = PeftModel.from_pretrained(model, adapter)
Merge the adapter into the base weights for a single deployable model:
model = model.merge_and_unload()
Training data
- 30 harmful prompts from AdvBench (predetermined seed-42 split, disjoint from evaluation).
- 200 borderline prompts from XSTest safe subset (KL preservation only).
- Benign prompts from WikiText-2 (coherency loss).
- 10 refusal templates for refusal-direction extraction.
Hyperparameters
| Parameter | Value | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Refusal-direction weight (α) | 0.15 | refusal projection |
| Coherency weight (β) | 1.0 | benign output preservation |
| CKA repulsion weight (γ) | 2.0 | anchor repulsion |
| LM weight (δ) | 0.08 | next-token preservation |
| KL weight (ε) | 0.5 | benign KL preservation |
| CKA scope | harmful_only | prompts contributing to repulsion |
| Training steps | 200 | |
| LoRA rank / alpha | 32 / 64 | |
| Target modules | q,k,v,o,up,down,gate_proj | |
| Layer | mid (50% depth) | |
| Precision | fp16 | |
| Seed | 42 |
Full training config in training_config.json. Per-loss ablations and hyperparameter ranges are in the paper appendix.
Reported metrics
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Cross-model GCG transfer ASR (self / anchor / other) | 0% / 0% / 0% |
| Benign Garble Rate (OR-Bench) | 0% |
| Δ XSTest refusal | +2.0 |
| Δ OR-Bench refusal | -1.0 |
| Δ MT-Bench | +0.40 |
ASR is reported after manual verification per the paper protocol.
Limitations
- Does not block same-model adaptive embedding-space attacks (e.g., Embedding PGD); 14B models exhibit higher residual susceptibility to Embedding PGD than 7B models.
- Single-anchor design; an adversary jointly optimizing across multiple surrogates could partially circumvent the defense.
- Performance under non-English prompts and refusal templates has not been evaluated.
See the paper Limitations section for full discussion.
License
The LoRA delta is intended for use with Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct and is released under the MIT License, matching the base model.
Citation
@inproceedings{anchorrep2026,
title={AnchorRep: Defending LLMs Against Cross-Model Adversarial Transfer via Representation Repulsion},
author={Anonymous},
booktitle={NeurIPS},
year={2026}
}
Companion GitHub repository (training, evaluation, audit logs, GCG suffixes): anchor-rep.
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Model tree for anonsubmission12345/AnchorRep-Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct
Base model
microsoft/Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct