rule_id stringlengths 36 36 | title stringlengths 10 97 | description stringlengths 28 1.02k | logsource_product stringclasses 28
values | logsource_category stringclasses 34
values | logsource_service stringclasses 69
values | sigma_rule stringlengths 467 251k | attack_techniques listlengths 0 14 | attack_tactics listlengths 0 8 | level stringclasses 5
values | status stringclasses 3
values | false_positives listlengths 0 5 | references listlengths 0 23 | splunk_spl stringlengths 7 246k ⌀ | elastic_lucene stringlengths 8 250k ⌀ | sentinel_kql stringlengths 40 37.3k ⌀ | source_path stringlengths 29 132 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
b59c98c6-95e8-4d65-93ee-f594dfb96b17 | F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API Command Execution - Proxy | Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands on the BIG-IP | proxy | title: F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API Command Execution - Proxy
id: b59c98c6-95e8-4d65-93ee-f594dfb96b17
related:
- id: 85254a62-22be-4239-b79c-2ec17e566c37
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands
on the BI... | [
"T1190"
] | [
"initial-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate usage of the BIG IP REST API to execute command for administration purposes"
] | [
"https://f5-sdk.readthedocs.io/en/latest/apidoc/f5.bigip.tm.util.html#module-f5.bigip.tm.util.bash",
"https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/icontrolrest-11-5-execute-bash-command/td-p/203029",
"https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/running-bash-commands-via-rest-api/td-p/272516"
] | "cs-method"="POST" "c-uri"="*/mgmt/tm/util/bash" | cs-method:POST AND c-uri:*\/mgmt\/tm\/util\/bash | null | web/proxy_generic/proxy_f5_tm_utility_bash_api_request.yml | ||
ba3874b9-0fae-465f-836c-eb5d071a1789 | NodeJS Execution of JavaScript File | Detects execution of JavaScript or JSC files using NodeJs binary node.exe, that could be potentially suspicious.
Node.js is a popular open-source JavaScript runtime that runs code outside browsers and is widely used for both frontend and backend development.
Adversaries have been observed abusing Node.js to disguise ma... | windows | process_creation | title: NodeJS Execution of JavaScript File
id: ba3874b9-0fae-465f-836c-eb5d071a1789
status: experimental
description: 'Detects execution of JavaScript or JSC files using NodeJs binary node.exe, that could be potentially suspicious.
Node.js is a popular open-source JavaScript runtime that runs code outside browsers a... | [
"T1059.007"
] | [
"execution"
] | low | experimental | [
"Legitimate use of node.exe to execute JavaScript or JSC files on your environment"
] | [
"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/04/15/threat-actors-misuse-node-js-to-deliver-malware-and-other-malicious-payloads/"
] | Image="*\\node.exe" OR OriginalFileName="node.exe" OR Product="Node.js" CommandLine="*.js*" | (Image:*\\node.exe OR OriginalFileName:node.exe OR Product:Node.js) AND CommandLine:*.js* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\node.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "node.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoProductName =~ "Node.js") and ProcessCommandLine contains ".js" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_security_susp_node_js_execution.yml | |
b140afd9-474b-4072-958e-2ebb435abd68 | Suspicious Get-ADDBAccount Usage | Detects suspicious invocation of the Get-ADDBAccount script that reads from a ntds.dit file and may be used to get access to credentials without using any credential dumpers | windows | ps_module | title: Suspicious Get-ADDBAccount Usage
id: b140afd9-474b-4072-958e-2ebb435abd68
status: test
description: Detects suspicious invocation of the Get-ADDBAccount script that reads from a ntds.dit file and may be used to
get access to credentials without using any credential dumpers
references:
- https://www.n00py.io/20... | [
"T1003.003"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.n00py.io/2022/03/manipulating-user-passwords-without-mimikatz/",
"https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals/blob/7ba59c12ee9a1cb430d7dc186a3366842dd612c8/Documentation/PowerShell/Get-ADDBAccount.md"
] | Payload="*Get-ADDBAccount*" Payload="*BootKey *" Payload="*DatabasePath *" | Payload:*Get\-ADDBAccount* AND Payload:*BootKey\ * AND Payload:*DatabasePath\ * | null | windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_get_addbaccount.yml | |
058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2 | HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution Patterns | Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework | windows | process_creation | title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution Patterns
id: 058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2
status: stable
description: Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework
references:
- https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-11-06
tags:
-... | [
"T1047",
"T1053",
"T1059.003",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"execution"
] | high | stable | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec"
] | CommandLine IN ("*cmd.exe /Q /c * 1> \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1*", "*cmd.exe /C * > \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1*", "*cmd.exe /C * > *\\Temp\\* 2>&1*", "*powershell.exe -exec bypass -noni -nop -w 1 -C \"*", "*powershell.exe -noni -nop -w 1 -enc *") | CommandLine:(*cmd.exe\ \/Q\ \/c\ *\ 1\>\ \\\\*\\*\\*\ 2\>\&1* OR *cmd.exe\ \/C\ *\ \>\ \\\\*\\*\\*\ 2\>\&1* OR *cmd.exe\ \/C\ *\ \>\ *\\Temp\\*\ 2\>\&1* OR *powershell.exe\ \-exec\ bypass\ \-noni\ \-nop\ \-w\ 1\ \-C\ \"* OR *powershell.exe\ \-noni\ \-nop\ \-w\ 1\ \-enc\ *) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "cmd.exe /Q /c " and ProcessCommandLine contains " 1> \\" and ProcessCommandLine contains "\\" and ProcessCommandLine contains "\\" and ProcessCommandLine contains " 2>&1") or (ProcessCommandLine contains "cmd.exe /C " and ProcessCommandLine contains " > \\" and ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_crackmapexec_execution_patterns.yml | |
639c9081-f482-47d3-a0bd-ddee3d4ecd76 | All Backups Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE | Detects the deletion of all backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe".
This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and actors.
This may only be successful on server platforms that have Windows Backup enabled. | windows | process_creation | title: All Backups Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE
id: 639c9081-f482-47d3-a0bd-ddee3d4ecd76
related:
- id: 89f75308-5b1b-4390-b2d8-d6b2340efaf8
type: derived
status: test
description: 'Detects the deletion of all backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe".
This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and ... | [
"T1490"
] | [
"impact"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell",
"https://github.com/albertzsigovits/malware-notes/blob/558898932c1579ff589290092a2c8febefc3a4c9/Ransomware/Lockbit.md... | Image="*\\wbadmin.exe" OR OriginalFileName="WBADMIN.EXE" CommandLine="*delete*" CommandLine="*backup*" CommandLine="*keepVersions:0*" | (Image:*\\wbadmin.exe OR OriginalFileName:WBADMIN.EXE) AND ((CommandLine:*delete* AND CommandLine:*backup*) AND CommandLine:*keepVersions\:0*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\wbadmin.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "WBADMIN.EXE") and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "delete" and ProcessCommandLine contains "backup") and ProcessCommandLine contains "keepVersions:0") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wbadmin_delete_all_backups.yml | |
89f75308-5b1b-4390-b2d8-d6b2340efaf8 | Windows Backup Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE | Detects the deletion of backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe".
This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and actors.
This may only be successful on server platforms that have Windows Backup enabled. | windows | process_creation | title: Windows Backup Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE
id: 89f75308-5b1b-4390-b2d8-d6b2340efaf8
related:
- id: 639c9081-f482-47d3-a0bd-ddee3d4ecd76
type: derived
status: test
description: 'Detects the deletion of backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe".
This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and a... | [
"T1490"
] | [
"impact"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate backup activity from administration scripts and software."
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell",
"https://github.com/albertzsigovits/malware-notes/blob/558898932c1579ff589290092a2c8febefc3a4c9/Ransomware/Lockbit.md... | Image="*\\wbadmin.exe" OR OriginalFileName="WBADMIN.EXE" CommandLine="*delete *" CommandLine="*backup*" NOT CommandLine="*keepVersions:0*" | ((Image:*\\wbadmin.exe OR OriginalFileName:WBADMIN.EXE) AND (CommandLine:*delete\ * AND CommandLine:*backup*)) AND (NOT CommandLine:*keepVersions\:0*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\wbadmin.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "WBADMIN.EXE") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "delete " and ProcessCommandLine contains "backup")) and (not(ProcessCommandLine contains "keepVersions:0")) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wbadmin_delete_backups.yml | |
b4926b47-a9d7-434c-b3a0-adc3fa0bd13e | Suspicious Double Extension Files | Detects dropped files with double extensions, which is often used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that Windows hide default extensions by default. | windows | file_event | title: Suspicious Double Extension Files
id: b4926b47-a9d7-434c-b3a0-adc3fa0bd13e
related:
- id: 1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8
type: derived
- id: 3215aa19-f060-4332-86d5-5602511f3ca8
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects dropped files with double extensions, which is often used by malware as a met... | [
"T1036.007"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/",
"https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations",
"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/a-bazar-of-tricks-following-team9s-developm... | (TargetFilename IN ("*.exe", "*.iso", "*.rar", "*.svg", "*.zip") TargetFilename IN ("*.doc.*", "*.docx.*", "*.gif.*", "*.jpeg.*", "*.jpg.*", "*.mp3.*", "*.mp4.*", "*.pdf.*", "*.png.*", "*.ppt.*", "*.pptx.*", "*.rtf.*", "*.svg.*", "*.txt.*", "*.xls.*", "*.xlsx.*")) OR TargetFilename IN ("*.rar.exe", "*.zip.exe") NOT Tar... | (((TargetFilename:(*.exe OR *.iso OR *.rar OR *.svg OR *.zip)) AND (TargetFilename:(*.doc.* OR *.docx.* OR *.gif.* OR *.jpeg.* OR *.jpg.* OR *.mp3.* OR *.mp4.* OR *.pdf.* OR *.png.* OR *.ppt.* OR *.pptx.* OR *.rtf.* OR *.svg.* OR *.txt.* OR *.xls.* OR *.xlsx.*))) OR (TargetFilename:(*.rar.exe OR *.zip.exe))) AND (NOT T... | DeviceFileEvents
| where (((FolderPath endswith ".exe" or FolderPath endswith ".iso" or FolderPath endswith ".rar" or FolderPath endswith ".svg" or FolderPath endswith ".zip") and (FolderPath contains ".doc." or FolderPath contains ".docx." or FolderPath contains ".gif." or FolderPath contains ".jpeg." or FolderPath co... | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_double_extension.yml | |
b02f9591-12c3-4965-986a-88028629b2e1 | Azure Kubernetes Pods Deleted | Identifies the deletion of Azure Kubernetes Pods. | azure | activitylogs | title: Azure Kubernetes Pods Deleted
id: b02f9591-12c3-4965-986a-88028629b2e1
status: test
description: Identifies the deletion of Azure Kubernetes Pods.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes
- https://github.com/elastic/detectio... | [] | [
"impact"
] | medium | test | [
"Pods may be deleted by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.",
"Pods deletions from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes",
"https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/065bf48a9987cd8bd826c098a30ce36e6868ee46/rules/integrations/azure/impact_kubernetes_pod_deleted.toml"
] | operationName="MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/PODS/DELETE" | operationName:MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES\/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS\/PODS\/DELETE | null | cloud/azure/activity_logs/azure_kubernetes_pods_deleted.yml | |
8a3038e8-9c9d-46f8-b184-66234a160f6f | Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling | Detects potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination. | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling
id: 8a3038e8-9c9d-46f8-b184-66234a160f6f
status: test
description: Detects potential use of an SSH utility to establish RDP over a reverse SSH Tunnel. This can be used by attackers
to enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination.... | [
"T1021"
] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-remote-desktop-tunneling-detected.html"
] | CommandLine="*:3389*" CommandLine IN ("* -L *", "* -P *", "* -R *", "* -pw *", "* -ssh *") | CommandLine:*\:3389* AND (CommandLine:(*\ \-L\ * OR *\ \-P\ * OR *\ \-R\ * OR *\ \-pw\ * OR *\ \-ssh\ *)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains ":3389" and (ProcessCommandLine contains " -L " or ProcessCommandLine contains " -P " or ProcessCommandLine contains " -R " or ProcessCommandLine contains " -pw " or ProcessCommandLine contains " -ssh ") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_remote_desktop_tunneling.yml | |
550d3350-bb8a-4ff3-9533-2ba533f4a1c0 | ProxyLogon MSExchange OabVirtualDirectory | Detects specific patterns found after a successful ProxyLogon exploitation in relation to a Commandlet invocation of Set-OabVirtualDirectory | windows | msexchange-management | title: ProxyLogon MSExchange OabVirtualDirectory
id: 550d3350-bb8a-4ff3-9533-2ba533f4a1c0
status: test
description: Detects specific patterns found after a successful ProxyLogon exploitation in relation to a Commandlet invocation
of Set-OabVirtualDirectory
references:
- https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-down-ms-exch... | [
"T1587.001"
] | [
"resource-development"
] | critical | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://bi-zone.medium.com/hunting-down-ms-exchange-attacks-part-1-proxylogon-cve-2021-26855-26858-27065-26857-6e885c5f197c"
] | "OabVirtualDirectory" " -ExternalUrl " "eval(request" OR "http://f/<script" OR "\"unsafe\"};" OR "function Page_Load()" | (*OabVirtualDirectory* AND *\ \-ExternalUrl\ *) AND (*eval\(request* OR *http\:\/\/f\/\<script* OR *\"unsafe\"\};* OR *function\ Page_Load\(\)*) | null | windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_proxylogon_oabvirtualdir.yml | |
c1dda054-d638-4c16-afc8-53e007f3fbc5 | Automated Collection Command PowerShell | Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. | windows | ps_script | title: Automated Collection Command PowerShell
id: c1dda054-d638-4c16-afc8-53e007f3fbc5
status: test
description: Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal
data.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfc... | [
"T1119"
] | [
"collection"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1119/T1119.md"
] | ScriptBlockText IN ("*.doc*", "*.docx*", "*.xls*", "*.xlsx*", "*.ppt*", "*.pptx*", "*.rtf*", "*.pdf*", "*.txt*") ScriptBlockText="*Get-ChildItem*" ScriptBlockText="* -Recurse *" ScriptBlockText="* -Include *" | (ScriptBlockText:(*.doc* OR *.docx* OR *.xls* OR *.xlsx* OR *.ppt* OR *.pptx* OR *.rtf* OR *.pdf* OR *.txt*)) AND (ScriptBlockText:*Get\-ChildItem* AND ScriptBlockText:*\ \-Recurse\ * AND ScriptBlockText:*\ \-Include\ *) | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_automated_collection.yml | |
9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a | Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - Security | Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts | windows | security | title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - Security
id: 9b8d9203-4e0f-4cd9-bb06-4cc4ea6d0e9a
related:
- id: 7e9c7999-0f9b-4d4a-a6ed-af6d553d4af4
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Nikita Nazar... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009"
] | EventID=4697 ServiceFileName="*mshta*" ServiceFileName="*vbscript:createobject*" ServiceFileName="*.run*" ServiceFileName="*window.close*" | EventID:4697 AND (ServiceFileName:*mshta* AND ServiceFileName:*vbscript\:createobject* AND ServiceFileName:*.run* AND ServiceFileName:*window.close*) | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_mshta_services_security.yml | |
8cbc9475-8d05-4e27-9c32-df960716c701 | Potentially Suspicious Desktop Background Change Using Reg.EXE | Detects the execution of "reg.exe" to alter registry keys that would replace the user's desktop background.
This is a common technique used by malware to change the desktop background to a ransom note or other image. | windows | process_creation | title: Potentially Suspicious Desktop Background Change Using Reg.EXE
id: 8cbc9475-8d05-4e27-9c32-df960716c701
related:
- id: 85b88e05-dadc-430b-8a9e-53ff1cd30aae
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects the execution of "reg.exe" to alter registry keys that would replace the user''s desktop background.
Th... | [
"T1112",
"T1491.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"impact",
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Administrative scripts that change the desktop background to a company logo or other image."
] | [
"https://www.attackiq.com/2023/09/20/emulating-rhysida/",
"https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/the-rhysida-ransomware-activity-analysis-and-ties-to-vice-society/",
"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/h/an-overview-of-the-new-rhysida-ransomware.html",
"https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a864282fea5... | Image="*\\reg.exe" OR OriginalFileName="reg.exe" CommandLine="*add*" CommandLine IN ("*Control Panel\\Desktop*", "*CurrentVersion\\Policies\\ActiveDesktop*", "*CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System*") (CommandLine="*/v NoChangingWallpaper*" CommandLine="*/d 1*") OR (CommandLine="*/v Wallpaper*" CommandLine="*/t REG_SZ*") OR... | ((Image:*\\reg.exe OR OriginalFileName:reg.exe) AND CommandLine:*add*) AND (CommandLine:(*Control\ Panel\\Desktop* OR *CurrentVersion\\Policies\\ActiveDesktop* OR *CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System*)) AND ((CommandLine:*\/v\ NoChangingWallpaper* AND CommandLine:*\/d\ 1*) OR (CommandLine:*\/v\ Wallpaper* AND CommandLine:... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\reg.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "reg.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "add") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "Control Panel\\Desktop" or ProcessCommandLine contains "CurrentVersion\\Policies\\ActiveDesktop" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Curr... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_desktop_background_change.yml | |
bc92ca75-cd42-4d61-9a37-9d5aa259c88b | Win Defender Restored Quarantine File | Detects the restoration of files from the defender quarantine | windows | windefend | title: Win Defender Restored Quarantine File
id: bc92ca75-cd42-4d61-9a37-9d5aa259c88b
status: test
description: Detects the restoration of files from the defender quarantine
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide
author: Nasreddine... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate administrator activity restoring a file"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide"
] | EventID=1009 | EventID:1009 | null | windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_restored_quarantine_file.yml | |
02ee49e2-e294-4d0f-9278-f5b3212fc588 | New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder | Detects suspicious new RUN key element pointing to an executable in a suspicious folder | windows | registry_set | title: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
id: 02ee49e2-e294-4d0f-9278-f5b3212fc588
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious new RUN key element pointing to an executable in a suspicious folder
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-gl... | [
"T1547.001"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | high | experimental | [
"Software using weird folders for updates"
] | [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/08/fin7-pursuing-an-enigmatic-and-evasive-global-criminal-operation.html",
"https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-bina... | TargetObject IN ("*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*", "*\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*", "*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run*") Details IN ("*:\\Perflogs*", "*:\\ProgramData'*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp*", "*:\\Temp*", "*\\AppData\\L... | (TargetObject:(*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run* OR *\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run* OR *\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run*)) AND ((Details:(*\:\\Perflogs* OR *\:\\ProgramData'* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp* OR *\:\\Temp* OR *\\AppData... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey contains "\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run" or RegistryKey contains "\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run" or RegistryKey contains "\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run") and ((RegistryValueData c... | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_run_key_img_folder.yml | |
fe3ac066-98bb-432a-b1e7-a5229cb39d4a | Malicious Named Pipe Created | Detects the creation of a named pipe seen used by known APTs or malware. | windows | pipe_created | title: Malicious Named Pipe Created
id: fe3ac066-98bb-432a-b1e7-a5229cb39d4a
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a named pipe seen used by known APTs or malware.
references:
- https://securelist.com/wild-neutron-economic-espionage-threat-actor-returns-with-new-tricks/71275/
- https://securelist.com/faq-th... | [
"T1055"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | critical | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://securelist.com/wild-neutron-economic-espionage-threat-actor-returns-with-new-tricks/71275/",
"https://securelist.com/faq-the-projectsauron-apt/75533/",
"https://web.archive.org/web/20180725233601/https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf",
"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/a... | PipeName IN ("\\46a676ab7f179e511e30dd2dc41bd388", "\\583da945-62af-10e8-4902-a8f205c72b2e", "\\6e7645c4-32c5-4fe3-aabf-e94c2f4370e7", "\\9f81f59bc58452127884ce513865ed20", "\\adschemerpc", "\\ahexec", "\\AnonymousPipe", "\\bc31a7", "\\bc367", "\\bizkaz", "\\csexecsvc", "\\dce_3d", "\\e710f28d59aa529d6792ca6ff0ca1b34",... | PipeName:(\\46a676ab7f179e511e30dd2dc41bd388 OR \\583da945\-62af\-10e8\-4902\-a8f205c72b2e OR \\6e7645c4\-32c5\-4fe3\-aabf\-e94c2f4370e7 OR \\9f81f59bc58452127884ce513865ed20 OR \\adschemerpc OR \\ahexec OR \\AnonymousPipe OR \\bc31a7 OR \\bc367 OR \\bizkaz OR \\csexecsvc OR \\dce_3d OR \\e710f28d59aa529d6792ca6ff0ca1b... | null | windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_susp_malicious_namedpipes.yml | |
c92c24e7-f595-493f-9c98-53d5142f5c18 | CodeIntegrity - Unsigned Image Loaded | Detects loaded unsigned image on the system | windows | codeintegrity-operational | title: CodeIntegrity - Unsigned Image Loaded
id: c92c24e7-f595-493f-9c98-53d5142f5c18
status: test
description: Detects loaded unsigned image on the system
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-e... | [] | [
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-ta... | EventID=3037 | EventID:3037 | null | windows/builtin/code_integrity/win_codeintegrity_unsigned_image_loaded.yml | |
234dc5df-40b5-49d1-bf53-0d44ce778eca | Payload Decoded and Decrypted via Built-in Utilities | Detects when a built-in utility is used to decode and decrypt a payload after a macOS disk image (DMG) is executed. Malware authors may attempt to evade detection and trick users into executing malicious code by encoding and encrypting their payload and placing it in a disk image file. This behavior is consistent with ... | macos | process_creation | title: Payload Decoded and Decrypted via Built-in Utilities
id: 234dc5df-40b5-49d1-bf53-0d44ce778eca
status: test
description: Detects when a built-in utility is used to decode and decrypt a payload after a macOS disk image (DMG) is executed.
Malware authors may attempt to evade detection and trick users into executi... | [
"T1059",
"T1204",
"T1140"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-5d42c3d772e04f1e8d0eb60f5233bc79def1ea73105a2d8822f44164f77ef823"
] | Image="*/openssl" CommandLine="*/Volumes/*" CommandLine="*enc*" CommandLine="*-base64*" CommandLine="* -d *" | Image:*\/openssl AND (CommandLine:*\/Volumes\/* AND CommandLine:*enc* AND CommandLine:*\-base64* AND CommandLine:*\ \-d\ *) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/openssl" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/Volumes/" and ProcessCommandLine contains "enc" and ProcessCommandLine contains "-base64" and ProcessCommandLine contains " -d ") | macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_payload_decoded_and_decrypted.yml | |
f7b5f842-a6af-4da5-9e95-e32478f3cd2f | MsiExec Web Install | Detects suspicious msiexec process starts with web addresses as parameter | windows | process_creation | title: MsiExec Web Install
id: f7b5f842-a6af-4da5-9e95-e32478f3cd2f
related:
- id: 8150732a-0c9d-4a99-82b9-9efb9b90c40c
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious msiexec process starts with web addresses as parameter
references:
- https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-usi... | [
"T1218.007",
"T1105"
] | [
"stealth",
"command-and-control"
] | medium | test | [
"False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment"
] | [
"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/attack-using-windows-installer-msiexec-exe-leads-lokibot/"
] | CommandLine="* msiexec*" CommandLine="*://*" | CommandLine:*\ msiexec* AND CommandLine:*\:\/\/* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains " msiexec" and ProcessCommandLine contains "://" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_web_install.yml | |
7610a4ea-c06d-495f-a2ac-0a696abcfd3b | Outbound Network Connection To Public IP Via Winlogon | Detects a "winlogon.exe" process that initiate network communications with public IP addresses | windows | network_connection | title: Outbound Network Connection To Public IP Via Winlogon
id: 7610a4ea-c06d-495f-a2ac-0a696abcfd3b
status: test
description: Detects a "winlogon.exe" process that initiate network communications with public IP addresses
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating... | [
"T1218.011"
] | [
"execution",
"command-and-control",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Communication to other corporate systems that use IP addresses from public address spaces"
] | [
"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/04/11/guidance-for-investigating-attacks-using-cve-2022-21894-the-blacklotus-campaign/"
] | Image="*\\winlogon.exe" Initiated="true" NOT (DestinationIp="127.0.0.0/8" OR DestinationIp="10.0.0.0/8" OR DestinationIp="172.16.0.0/12" OR DestinationIp="192.168.0.0/16" OR DestinationIp="169.254.0.0/16" OR DestinationIp="::1/128" OR DestinationIp="fe80::/10" OR DestinationIp="fc00::/7") | (Image:*\\winlogon.exe AND Initiated:true) AND (NOT (DestinationIp:127.0.0.0\/8 OR DestinationIp:10.0.0.0\/8 OR DestinationIp:172.16.0.0\/12 OR DestinationIp:192.168.0.0\/16 OR DestinationIp:169.254.0.0\/16 OR DestinationIp:\:\:1\/128 OR DestinationIp:fe80\:\:\/10 OR DestinationIp:fc00\:\:\/7)) | DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\winlogon.exe" and (not((ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "127.0.0.0/8") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "10.0.0.0/8") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "172.16.0.0/12") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "192.168.0.0/16") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "169.254.0.0/16")... | windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_winlogon_net_connections.yml | |
9a60e676-26ac-44c3-814b-0c2a8b977adf | User Access Blocked by Azure Conditional Access | Detect access has been blocked by Conditional Access policies.
The access policy does not allow token issuance which might be sights≈ of unauthorizeed login to valid accounts. | azure | signinlogs | title: User Access Blocked by Azure Conditional Access
id: 9a60e676-26ac-44c3-814b-0c2a8b977adf
status: test
description: 'Detect access has been blocked by Conditional Access policies.
The access policy does not allow token issuance which might be sights≈ of unauthorizeed login to valid accounts.
'
references:
-... | [
"T1110",
"T1078.004"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"credential-access",
"initial-access",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts"
] | ResultType=53003 | ResultType:53003 | null | cloud/azure/signin_logs/azure_user_login_blocked_by_conditional_access.yml | |
6ba5a05f-b095-4f0a-8654-b825f4f16334 | Potential MSTSC Shadowing Activity | Detects RDP session hijacking by using MSTSC shadowing | windows | process_creation | title: Potential MSTSC Shadowing Activity
id: 6ba5a05f-b095-4f0a-8654-b825f4f16334
status: test
description: Detects RDP session hijacking by using MSTSC shadowing
references:
- https://twitter.com/kmkz_security/status/1220694202301976576
- https://github.com/kmkz/Pentesting/blob/47592e5e160d3b86c2024f09ef04ceb87d20499... | [
"T1563.002"
] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/kmkz_security/status/1220694202301976576",
"https://github.com/kmkz/Pentesting/blob/47592e5e160d3b86c2024f09ef04ceb87d204995/Post-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet"
] | CommandLine="*noconsentprompt*" CommandLine="*shadow:*" | CommandLine:*noconsentprompt* AND CommandLine:*shadow\:* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "noconsentprompt" and ProcessCommandLine contains "shadow:" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mstsc_rdp_hijack_shadowing.yml | |
a6a39bdb-935c-4f0a-ab77-35f4bbf44d33 | Potentially Suspicious Powershell Script Execution From Temp Folder | Detects a potentially suspicious powershell script executions from temporary folder | windows | process_creation | title: Potentially Suspicious Powershell Script Execution From Temp Folder
id: a6a39bdb-935c-4f0a-ab77-35f4bbf44d33
status: test
description: Detects a potentially suspicious powershell script executions from temporary folder
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/13/microsoft-discovers-threat-ac... | [
"T1059.001"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Administrative scripts"
] | [
"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/07/13/microsoft-discovers-threat-actor-targeting-solarwinds-serv-u-software-with-0-day-exploit/"
] | Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") CommandLine IN ("*\\Windows\\Temp*", "*\\Temporary Internet*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Temp*", "*%TEMP%*", "*%TMP%*", "*%LocalAppData%\\Temp*") NOT (CommandLine="*-WindowStyle hidden -Verb runAs*" OR CommandLine="*\\Windows\\system32\\config\\syste... | ((Image:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe)) AND (CommandLine:(*\\Windows\\Temp* OR *\\Temporary\ Internet* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp* OR *\\AppData\\Roaming\\Temp* OR *%TEMP%* OR *%TMP%* OR *%LocalAppData%\\Temp*))) AND (NOT (CommandLine:*\-WindowStyle\ hidden\ \-Verb\ runAs* OR CommandLine:*\\Windows\\system32\\confi... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "\\Windows\\Temp" or ProcessCommandLine contains "\\Temporary Internet" or ProcessCommandLine contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp" or ProcessCommandLine contains "\\AppData\\Roaming\\T... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_script_exec_from_temp_folder.yml | |
a642964e-bead-4bed-8910-1bb4d63e3b4d | HackTool - Mimikatz Execution | Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments | windows | process_creation | title: HackTool - Mimikatz Execution
id: a642964e-bead-4bed-8910-1bb4d63e3b4d
status: test
description: Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments
references:
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
- https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules
auth... | [
"T1003.001",
"T1003.002",
"T1003.004",
"T1003.005",
"T1003.006"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment",
"https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules"
] | CommandLine IN ("*DumpCreds*", "*mimikatz*") OR CommandLine IN ("*::aadcookie*", "*::detours*", "*::memssp*", "*::mflt*", "*::ncroutemon*", "*::ngcsign*", "*::printnightmare*", "*::skeleton*", "*::preshutdown*", "*::mstsc*", "*::multirdp*") OR CommandLine IN ("*rpc::*", "*token::*", "*crypto::*", "*dpapi::*", "*sekurls... | (CommandLine:(*DumpCreds* OR *mimikatz*)) OR (CommandLine:(*\:\:aadcookie* OR *\:\:detours* OR *\:\:memssp* OR *\:\:mflt* OR *\:\:ncroutemon* OR *\:\:ngcsign* OR *\:\:printnightmare* OR *\:\:skeleton* OR *\:\:preshutdown* OR *\:\:mstsc* OR *\:\:multirdp*)) OR (CommandLine:(*rpc\:\:* OR *token\:\:* OR *crypto\:\:* OR *d... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "DumpCreds" or ProcessCommandLine contains "mimikatz") or (ProcessCommandLine contains "::aadcookie" or ProcessCommandLine contains "::detours" or ProcessCommandLine contains "::memssp" or ProcessCommandLine contains "::mflt" or ProcessCommandLine contains "::ncr... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_mimikatz_command_line.yml | |
002bdb95-0cf1-46a6-9e08-d38c128a6127 | WScript or CScript Dropper - File | Detects a file ending in jse, vbe, js, vba, vbs, wsf, wsh written by cscript.exe or wscript.exe | windows | file_event | title: WScript or CScript Dropper - File
id: 002bdb95-0cf1-46a6-9e08-d38c128a6127
related:
- id: cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a file ending in jse, vbe, js, vba, vbs, wsf, wsh written by cscript.exe or wscript.exe
references:
- WScript or CScript Dropper (cea728... | [
"T1059.005",
"T1059.007"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"WScript or CScript Dropper (cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846)"
] | Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") TargetFilename IN ("*:\\Perflogs\\*", "*:\\ProgramData\\*", "*:\\Temp\\*", "*:\\Tmp\\*", "*:\\Users\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Temp*", "*\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*", "*\\Temporary Internet*") TargetFilename IN ("*.... | (Image:(*\\wscript.exe OR *\\cscript.exe)) AND (TargetFilename:(*\:\\Perflogs\\* OR *\:\\ProgramData\\* OR *\:\\Temp\\* OR *\:\\Tmp\\* OR *\:\\Users\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp* OR *\\AppData\\Roaming\\Temp* OR *\\Start\ Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\* OR *\\Temporary\ Internet*)) AND (TargetFilen... | DeviceFileEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\wscript.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe") and (FolderPath contains ":\\Perflogs\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\ProgramData\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Temp\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Tmp\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Users... | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_cscript_wscript_dropper.yml | |
67f113fa-e23d-4271-befa-30113b3e08b1 | Suspicious JavaScript Execution Via Mshta.EXE | Detects execution of javascript code using "mshta.exe". | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious JavaScript Execution Via Mshta.EXE
id: 67f113fa-e23d-4271-befa-30113b3e08b1
status: test
description: Detects execution of javascript code using "mshta.exe".
references:
- https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/6bc283c4-21f2-4aed-a05c-a9a3ffa95dd4.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomi... | [
"T1218.005"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/6bc283c4-21f2-4aed-a05c-a9a3ffa95dd4.html",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.005/T1218.005.md"
] | Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR OriginalFileName="MSHTA.EXE" CommandLine="*javascript*" | (Image:*\\mshta.exe OR OriginalFileName:MSHTA.EXE) AND CommandLine:*javascript* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "MSHTA.EXE") and ProcessCommandLine contains "javascript" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mshta_javascript.yml | |
459f2f98-397b-4a4a-9f47-6a5ec2f1c69d | Arbitrary File Download Via MSOHTMED.EXE | Detects usage of "MSOHTMED" to download arbitrary files | windows | process_creation | title: Arbitrary File Download Via MSOHTMED.EXE
id: 459f2f98-397b-4a4a-9f47-6a5ec2f1c69d
status: test
description: Detects usage of "MSOHTMED" to download arbitrary files
references:
- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/238/files
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-19
modified: 20... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/238/files"
] | Image="*\\MSOHTMED.exe" OR OriginalFileName="MsoHtmEd.exe" CommandLine IN ("*ftp://*", "*http://*", "*https://*") | (Image:*\\MSOHTMED.exe OR OriginalFileName:MsoHtmEd.exe) AND (CommandLine:(*ftp\:\/\/* OR *http\:\/\/* OR *https\:\/\/*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\MSOHTMED.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "MsoHtmEd.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "ftp://" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http://" or ProcessCommandLine contains "https://") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msohtmed_download.yml | |
1c563233-030e-4a07-af8c-ee0490a66d3a | Suspicious New-PSDrive to Admin Share | Adversaries may use to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | windows | ps_script | title: Suspicious New-PSDrive to Admin Share
id: 1c563233-030e-4a07-af8c-ee0490a66d3a
status: test
description: Adversaries may use to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may
then perform actions as the logged-on user.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomi... | [
"T1021.002"
] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.002/T1021.002.md#atomic-test-2---map-admin-share-powershell",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/new-psdrive?view=powershell-7.2"
] | ScriptBlockText="*New-PSDrive*" ScriptBlockText="*-psprovider *" ScriptBlockText="*filesystem*" ScriptBlockText="*-root *" ScriptBlockText="*\\\\*" ScriptBlockText="*$*" | ScriptBlockText:*New\-PSDrive* AND ScriptBlockText:*\-psprovider\ * AND ScriptBlockText:*filesystem* AND ScriptBlockText:*\-root\ * AND ScriptBlockText:*\\\\* AND ScriptBlockText:*$* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_new_psdrive.yml | |
58af08eb-f9e1-43c8-9805-3ad9b0482bd8 | Invalid PIM License | Identifies when an organization doesn't have the proper license for PIM and is out of compliance. | azure | pim | title: Invalid PIM License
id: 58af08eb-f9e1-43c8-9805-3ad9b0482bd8
status: test
description: Identifies when an organization doesn't have the proper license for PIM and is out of compliance.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security... | [
"T1078"
] | [
"initial-access",
"stealth",
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Investigate if licenses have expired."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#the-organization-doesnt-have-microsoft-entra-premium-p2-or-microsoft-entra-id-governance"
] | riskEventType="invalidLicenseAlertIncident" | riskEventType:invalidLicenseAlertIncident | null | cloud/azure/privileged_identity_management/azure_pim_invalid_license.yml | |
df68f791-ad95-447f-a271-640a0dab9cf8 | DNS Query Request To OneLaunch Update Service | Detects DNS query requests to "update.onelaunch.com". This domain is associated with the OneLaunch adware application.
When the OneLaunch application is installed it will attempt to get updates from this domain. | windows | dns_query | title: DNS Query Request To OneLaunch Update Service
id: df68f791-ad95-447f-a271-640a0dab9cf8
status: test
description: 'Detects DNS query requests to "update.onelaunch.com". This domain is associated with the OneLaunch adware application.
When the OneLaunch application is installed it will attempt to get updates fr... | [
"T1056"
] | [
"credential-access",
"collection"
] | low | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/detections/pup-optional-onelaunch-silentcf",
"https://www.myantispyware.com/2020/12/14/how-to-uninstall-onelaunch-browser-removal-guide/",
"https://malware.guide/browser-hijacker/remove-onelaunch-virus/"
] | QueryName="update.onelaunch.com" Image="*\\OneLaunch.exe" | QueryName:update.onelaunch.com AND Image:*\\OneLaunch.exe | null | windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_onelaunch_update_service.yml | |
4bc90587-e6ca-4b41-be0b-ed4d04e4ed0c | Suspicious Velociraptor Child Process | Detects the suspicious use of the Velociraptor DFIR tool to execute other tools or download additional payloads, as seen in a campaign where it was abused for remote access and to stage further attacks. | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Velociraptor Child Process
id: 4bc90587-e6ca-4b41-be0b-ed4d04e4ed0c
status: experimental
description: Detects the suspicious use of the Velociraptor DFIR tool to execute other tools or download additional payloads,
as seen in a campaign where it was abused for remote access and to stage further atta... | [
"T1219"
] | [
"command-and-control",
"persistence"
] | high | experimental | [
"Legitimate administrators or incident responders might use Velociraptor to execute scripts or tools. However, the combination of Velociraptor spawning these specific processes with these command lines is suspicious. Tuning may be required to exclude known administrative actions or specific scripts."
] | [
"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2025/08/26/velociraptor-incident-response-tool-abused-for-remote-access/"
] | ParentImage="*\\Velociraptor.exe" (CommandLine="*code.exe*" CommandLine="*tunnel*" CommandLine="*--accept-server-license-terms*") OR (CommandLine="*msiexec*" CommandLine="*/i*" CommandLine="*http*") OR (Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\powershell_ise.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") CommandLine IN ("*Invoke-WebRequest *", "*IWR ... | ParentImage:*\\Velociraptor.exe AND ((CommandLine:*code.exe* AND CommandLine:*tunnel* AND CommandLine:*\-\-accept\-server\-license\-terms*) OR (CommandLine:*msiexec* AND CommandLine:*\/i* AND CommandLine:*http*) OR ((Image:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\powershell_ise.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe)) AND (CommandLine:(*Invoke\-WebReques... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\Velociraptor.exe" and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "code.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "tunnel" and ProcessCommandLine contains "--accept-server-license-terms") or (ProcessCommandLine contains "msiexec" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/i" and ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_velociraptor_child_process.yml | |
50e606bf-04ce-4ca7-9d54-3449494bbd4b | Cisco LDP Authentication Failures | Detects LDP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate MPLS labels | cisco | ldp | title: Cisco LDP Authentication Failures
id: 50e606bf-04ce-4ca7-9d54-3449494bbd4b
status: test
description: Detects LDP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate MPLS labels
references:
- https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-convery-franz-v3.pdf
author: Tim Brown
date: 2... | [
"T1078",
"T1110",
"T1557"
] | [
"initial-access",
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"credential-access",
"collection",
"stealth"
] | low | test | [
"Unlikely. Except due to misconfigurations"
] | [
"https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-convery-franz-v3.pdf"
] | "LDP" "SOCKET_TCP_PACKET_MD5_AUTHEN_FAIL" OR "TCPMD5AuthenFail" | *LDP* AND (*SOCKET_TCP_PACKET_MD5_AUTHEN_FAIL* OR *TCPMD5AuthenFail*) | null | network/cisco/ldp/cisco_ldp_md5_auth_failed.yml | |
a62b37e0-45d3-48d9-a517-90c1a1b0186b | Eventlog Cleared | One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution | windows | system | title: Eventlog Cleared
id: a62b37e0-45d3-48d9-a517-90c1a1b0186b
related:
- id: f2f01843-e7b8-4f95-a35a-d23584476423
type: obsolete
- id: d99b79d2-0a6f-4f46-ad8b-260b6e17f982
type: derived
- id: 100ef69e-3327-481c-8e5c-6d80d9507556
type: derived
status: test
description: One of the Windows Eventlogs has been clea... | [
"T1685.005"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Rollout of log collection agents (the setup routine often includes a reset of the local Eventlog)",
"System provisioning (system reset before the golden image creation)"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/deviouspolack/status/832535435960209408",
"https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100"
] | EventID=104 Provider_Name="Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog" NOT (Channel IN ("Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", "PowerShellCore/Operational", "Security", "System", "Windows PowerShell")) | (EventID:104 AND Provider_Name:Microsoft\-Windows\-Eventlog) AND (NOT (Channel:(Microsoft\-Windows\-PowerShell\/Operational OR Microsoft\-Windows\-Sysmon\/Operational OR PowerShellCore\/Operational OR Security OR System OR "Windows PowerShell"))) | null | windows/builtin/system/microsoft_windows_eventlog/win_system_eventlog_cleared.yml | |
1775e15e-b61b-4d14-a1a3-80981298085a | Rundll32 Execution Without CommandLine Parameters | Detects suspicious start of rundll32.exe without any parameters as found in CobaltStrike beacon activity | windows | process_creation | title: Rundll32 Execution Without CommandLine Parameters
id: 1775e15e-b61b-4d14-a1a3-80981298085a
status: test
description: Detects suspicious start of rundll32.exe without any parameters as found in CobaltStrike beacon activity
references:
- https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-opsec
- https://twitter.com/ber_m1ng/status... | [
"T1202"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Possible but rare"
] | [
"https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-opsec",
"https://twitter.com/ber_m1ng/status/1397948048135778309"
] | CommandLine IN ("*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe\"", "*\\rundll32") NOT (ParentImage IN ("*\\AppData\\Local\\*", "*\\Microsoft\\Edge\\*")) | (CommandLine:(*\\rundll32.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe\" OR *\\rundll32)) AND (NOT (ParentImage:(*\\AppData\\Local\\* OR *\\Microsoft\\Edge\\*))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine endswith "\\rundll32.exe" or ProcessCommandLine endswith "\\rundll32.exe\"" or ProcessCommandLine endswith "\\rundll32") and (not((InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "\\Microsoft\\Edge\\"))) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_no_params.yml | |
e66779cc-383e-4224-a3a4-267eeb585c40 | Bypass UAC via CMSTP | Detect commandline usage of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (cmstp.exe) to install specially formatted local .INF files | windows | process_creation | title: Bypass UAC via CMSTP
id: e66779cc-383e-4224-a3a4-267eeb585c40
status: test
description: Detect commandline usage of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (cmstp.exe) to install specially formatted
local .INF files
references:
- https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/e584f1a1-c303-4885-8a66-... | [
"T1548.002",
"T1218.003"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate use of cmstp.exe utility by legitimate user"
] | [
"https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/e584f1a1-c303-4885-8a66-21360c90995b.html",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.003/T1218.003.md",
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Cmstp/"
] | Image="*\\cmstp.exe" OR OriginalFileName="CMSTP.EXE" CommandLine IN ("*/s*", "*-s*", "*/au*", "*-au*", "*/ni*", "*-ni*") | (Image:*\\cmstp.exe OR OriginalFileName:CMSTP.EXE) AND (CommandLine:(*\/s* OR *\-s* OR *\/au* OR *\-au* OR *\/ni* OR *\-ni*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\cmstp.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "CMSTP.EXE") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/s" or ProcessCommandLine contains "-s" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/au" or ProcessCommandLine contains "-au" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/ni" or ProcessCommandL... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_uac_bypass_cmstp.yml | |
fe3a2d49-f255-4d10-935c-bda7391108eb | New BITS Job Created Via PowerShell | Detects the creation of a new bits job by PowerShell | windows | bits-client | title: New BITS Job Created Via PowerShell
id: fe3a2d49-f255-4d10-935c-bda7391108eb
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a new bits job by PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md
author: frack113
date: 2022... | [
"T1197"
] | [
"persistence",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | low | test | [
"Administrator PowerShell scripts"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md"
] | EventID=3 processPath IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") | EventID:3 AND (processPath:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe)) | null | windows/builtin/bits_client/win_bits_client_new_job_via_powershell.yml | |
48437c39-9e5f-47fb-af95-3d663c3f2919 | UAC Disabled | Detects when an attacker tries to disable User Account Control (UAC) by setting the registry value "EnableLUA" to 0. | windows | registry_set | title: UAC Disabled
id: 48437c39-9e5f-47fb-af95-3d663c3f2919
related:
- id: c5f6a85d-b647-40f7-bbad-c10b66bab038
type: similar
- id: 0d7ceeef-3539-4392-8953-3dc664912714
type: similar
status: stable
description: 'Detects when an attacker tries to disable User Account Control (UAC) by setting the registry value "Ena... | [
"T1548.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation"
] | medium | stable | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/7e11e9b79583545f208a6dc3fa062f2ed443d999/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md"
] | TargetObject="*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA*" Details="DWORD (0x00000000)" | TargetObject:*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA* AND Details:"DWORD \(0x00000000\)" | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA" and RegistryValueData =~ "DWORD (0x00000000)" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_uac_disable.yml | |
f4264e47-f522-4c38-a420-04525d5b880f | Renamed AutoIt Execution | Detects the execution of a renamed AutoIt2.exe or AutoIt3.exe.
AutoIt is a scripting language and automation tool for Windows systems. While primarily used for legitimate automation tasks, it can be misused in cyber attacks.
Attackers can leverage AutoIt to create and distribute malware, including keyloggers, spyware, ... | windows | process_creation | title: Renamed AutoIt Execution
id: f4264e47-f522-4c38-a420-04525d5b880f
status: test
description: 'Detects the execution of a renamed AutoIt2.exe or AutoIt3.exe.
AutoIt is a scripting language and automation tool for Windows systems. While primarily used for legitimate automation tasks,
it can be misused in cyber... | [
"T1027"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1665463817130725378?s=12&t=C0_T_re0wRP_NfKa27Xw9w",
"https://www.autoitscript.com/site/"
] | CommandLine IN ("* /AutoIt3ExecuteScript*", "* /ErrorStdOut*") OR Hashes IN ("*IMPHASH=FDC554B3A8683918D731685855683DDF*", "*IMPHASH=CD30A61B60B3D60CECDB034C8C83C290*", "*IMPHASH=F8A00C72F2D667D2EDBB234D0C0AE000*") OR OriginalFileName IN ("AutoIt3.exe", "AutoIt2.exe", "AutoIt.exe") NOT (Image IN ("*\\AutoIt.exe", "*\\A... | ((CommandLine:(*\ \/AutoIt3ExecuteScript* OR *\ \/ErrorStdOut*)) OR (Hashes:(*IMPHASH\=FDC554B3A8683918D731685855683DDF* OR *IMPHASH\=CD30A61B60B3D60CECDB034C8C83C290* OR *IMPHASH\=F8A00C72F2D667D2EDBB234D0C0AE000*)) OR (OriginalFileName:(AutoIt3.exe OR AutoIt2.exe OR AutoIt.exe))) AND (NOT (Image:(*\\AutoIt.exe OR *\\... | null | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_autoit.yml | |
e0b0c2ab-3d52-46d9-8cb7-049dc775fbd1 | Enumeration for Credentials in Registry | Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.
The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs.
Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs o... | windows | process_creation | title: Enumeration for Credentials in Registry
id: e0b0c2ab-3d52-46d9-8cb7-049dc775fbd1
status: test
description: 'Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.
The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs.
A... | [
"T1552.002"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.002/T1552.002.md"
] | Image="*\\reg.exe" CommandLine="* query *" CommandLine="*/t *" CommandLine="*REG_SZ*" CommandLine="*/s*" (CommandLine="*/f *" CommandLine="*HKLM*") OR (CommandLine="*/f *" CommandLine="*HKCU*") OR CommandLine="*HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\PuTTY\\Sessions*" | (Image:*\\reg.exe AND (CommandLine:*\ query\ * AND CommandLine:*\/t\ * AND CommandLine:*REG_SZ* AND CommandLine:*\/s*)) AND ((CommandLine:*\/f\ * AND CommandLine:*HKLM*) OR (CommandLine:*\/f\ * AND CommandLine:*HKCU*) OR CommandLine:*HKCU\\Software\\SimonTatham\\PuTTY\\Sessions*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\reg.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains " query " and ProcessCommandLine contains "/t " and ProcessCommandLine contains "REG_SZ" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/s")) and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "/f " and ProcessCommandLine contains "HKLM") or (ProcessCommand... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_enumeration_for_credentials_in_registry.yml | |
bb382fd5-b454-47ea-a264-1828e4c766d6 | Shell Invocation via Apt - Linux | Detects the use of the "apt" and "apt-get" commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.
Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments. | linux | process_creation | title: Shell Invocation via Apt - Linux
id: bb382fd5-b454-47ea-a264-1828e4c766d6
status: test
description: 'Detects the use of the "apt" and "apt-get" commands to execute a shell or proxy commands.
Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restric... | [
"T1083"
] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/apt/",
"https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/apt-get/"
] | Image IN ("*/apt", "*/apt-get") CommandLine="*APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::=*" | (Image:(*\/apt OR *\/apt\-get)) AND CommandLine:*APT\:\:Update\:\:Pre\-Invoke\:\:\=* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "/apt" or FolderPath endswith "/apt-get") and ProcessCommandLine contains "APT::Update::Pre-Invoke::=" | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_apt_shell_execution.yml | |
73e67340-0d25-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 | Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - PowerShell | Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell | windows | ps_script | title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - PowerShell
id: 73e67340-0d25-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2024-04-05
tags:... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009"
] | *
| regex ScriptBlockText="cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+clip(?:\\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\\(\\s\\\\\"\\{\\d\\}.+-f.+\"" | ScriptBlockText:/cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\"\{\d\}.+-f.+"/ | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_clip.yml | |
9d779ce8-5256-4b13-8b6f-b91c602b43f4 | Named Pipe Created Via Mkfifo | Detects the creation of a new named pipe using the "mkfifo" utility | linux | process_creation | title: Named Pipe Created Via Mkfifo
id: 9d779ce8-5256-4b13-8b6f-b91c602b43f4
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a new named pipe using the "mkfifo" utility
references:
- https://dev.to/0xbf/use-mkfifo-to-create-named-pipe-linux-tips-5bbk
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/barracuda-esg-exploited-... | [] | [
"execution"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://dev.to/0xbf/use-mkfifo-to-create-named-pipe-linux-tips-5bbk",
"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/barracuda-esg-exploited-globally"
] | Image="*/mkfifo" | Image:*\/mkfifo | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/mkfifo" | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_mkfifo_named_pipe_creation.yml | |
75f7a0e2-7154-4c4d-9eae-5cdb4e0a5c13 | Write Protect For Storage Disabled | Detects applications trying to modify the registry in order to disable any write-protect property for storage devices.
This could be a precursor to a ransomware attack and has been an observed technique used by cypherpunk group. | windows | process_creation | title: Write Protect For Storage Disabled
id: 75f7a0e2-7154-4c4d-9eae-5cdb4e0a5c13
status: test
description: 'Detects applications trying to modify the registry in order to disable any write-protect property for storage
devices.
This could be a precursor to a ransomware attack and has been an observed technique us... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/os-imaging-deployment/media-is-write-protected.html"
] | CommandLine="*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control*" CommandLine="*Write Protection*" CommandLine="*0*" CommandLine="*storage*" | CommandLine:*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control* AND CommandLine:*Write\ Protection* AND CommandLine:*0* AND CommandLine:*storage* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control" and ProcessCommandLine contains "Write Protection" and ProcessCommandLine contains "0" and ProcessCommandLine contains "storage" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_write_protect_for_storage_disabled.yml | |
975b2262-9a49-439d-92a6-0709cccdf0b2 | Unsigned AppX Installation Attempt Using Add-AppxPackage - PsScript | Detects usage of the "Add-AppxPackage" or it's alias "Add-AppPackage" to install unsigned AppX packages | windows | ps_script | title: Unsigned AppX Installation Attempt Using Add-AppxPackage - PsScript
id: 975b2262-9a49-439d-92a6-0709cccdf0b2
related:
- id: 37651c2a-42cd-4a69-ae0d-22a4349aa04a
type: similar
- id: 9a025188-6f2d-42f8-bb2f-d3a83d24a5af
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "Add-AppxPackage" or it's alia... | [] | [
"persistence",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Installation of unsigned packages for testing purposes"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/msix/package/unsigned-package",
"https://twitter.com/WindowsDocs/status/1620078135080325122"
] | ScriptBlockText IN ("*Add-AppPackage *", "*Add-AppxPackage *") ScriptBlockText="* -AllowUnsigned*" | (ScriptBlockText:(*Add\-AppPackage\ * OR *Add\-AppxPackage\ *)) AND ScriptBlockText:*\ \-AllowUnsigned* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_install_unsigned_appx_packages.yml | |
01d2e2a1-5f09-44f7-9fc1-24faa7479b6d | Uncommon Svchost Parent Process | Detects an uncommon svchost parent process | windows | process_creation | title: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
id: 01d2e2a1-5f09-44f7-9fc1-24faa7479b6d
status: test
description: Detects an uncommon svchost parent process
references:
- Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-08-15
modified: 2022-06-28
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036.005
logsource:
categor... | [
"T1036.005"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | Image="*\\svchost.exe" NOT (ParentImage IN ("*\\Mrt.exe", "*\\MsMpEng.exe", "*\\ngen.exe", "*\\rpcnet.exe", "*\\services.exe", "*\\TiWorker.exe") OR NOT ParentImage=* OR ParentImage IN ("-", "")) | Image:*\\svchost.exe AND (NOT ((ParentImage:(*\\Mrt.exe OR *\\MsMpEng.exe OR *\\ngen.exe OR *\\rpcnet.exe OR *\\services.exe OR *\\TiWorker.exe)) OR (NOT _exists_:ParentImage) OR (ParentImage:(\- OR "")))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\svchost.exe" and (not(((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\Mrt.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\MsMpEng.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\ngen.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\rpcnet.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath e... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_uncommon_parent_process.yml | |
6897cd82-6664-11ed-9022-0242ac120002 | PST Export Alert Using New-ComplianceSearchAction | Alert when a user has performed an export to a search using 'New-ComplianceSearchAction' with the '-Export' flag. This detection will detect PST export even if the 'eDiscovery search or exported' alert is disabled in the O365.This rule will apply to ExchangePowerShell usage and from the cloud. | m365 | threat_management | title: PST Export Alert Using New-ComplianceSearchAction
id: 6897cd82-6664-11ed-9022-0242ac120002
related:
- id: 18b88d08-d73e-4f21-bc25-4b9892a4fdd0
type: similar
status: test
description: Alert when a user has performed an export to a search using 'New-ComplianceSearchAction' with the '-Export' flag.
This detecti... | [
"T1114"
] | [
"collection"
] | medium | test | [
"Exporting a PST can be done for legitimate purposes by legitimate sources, but due to the sensitive nature of PST content, it must be monitored."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-compliancesearchaction?view=exchange-ps"
] | eventSource="SecurityComplianceCenter" Payload="*New-ComplianceSearchAction*" Payload="*Export*" Payload="*pst*" | eventSource:SecurityComplianceCenter AND (Payload:*New\-ComplianceSearchAction* AND Payload:*Export* AND Payload:*pst*) | null | cloud/m365/threat_management/microsoft365_pst_export_alert_using_new_compliancesearchaction.yml | |
f8341cb2-ee25-43fa-a975-d8a5a9714b39 | BPFtrace Unsafe Option Usage | Detects the usage of the unsafe bpftrace option | linux | process_creation | title: BPFtrace Unsafe Option Usage
id: f8341cb2-ee25-43fa-a975-d8a5a9714b39
status: test
description: Detects the usage of the unsafe bpftrace option
references:
- https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/offensive-bpf-bpftrace/
- https://bpftrace.org/
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
date: 2022-02-11
tags:
- at... | [
"T1059.004"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate usage of the unsafe option"
] | [
"https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/offensive-bpf-bpftrace/",
"https://bpftrace.org/"
] | Image="*bpftrace" CommandLine="*--unsafe*" | Image:*bpftrace AND CommandLine:*\-\-unsafe* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "bpftrace" and ProcessCommandLine contains "--unsafe" | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_bpftrace_unsafe_option_usage.yml | |
5af54681-df95-4c26-854f-2565e13cfab0 | Successful Account Login Via WMI | Detects successful logon attempts performed with WMI | windows | security | title: Successful Account Login Via WMI
id: 5af54681-df95-4c26-854f-2565e13cfab0
status: stable
description: Detects successful logon attempts performed with WMI
references:
- Internal Research
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2019-12-04
modified: 2024-01-17
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
logsource:
product: wind... | [
"T1047"
] | [
"execution"
] | low | stable | [
"Monitoring tools",
"Legitimate system administration"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | EventID=4624 ProcessName="*\\WmiPrvSE.exe" | EventID:4624 AND ProcessName:*\\WmiPrvSE.exe | DeviceLogonEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\WmiPrvSE.exe" | windows/builtin/security/account_management/win_security_susp_wmi_login.yml | |
1da8ce0b-855d-4004-8860-7d64d42063b1 | Apache Segmentation Fault | Detects a segmentation fault error message caused by a crashing apache worker process | apache | title: Apache Segmentation Fault
id: 1da8ce0b-855d-4004-8860-7d64d42063b1
status: test
description: Detects a segmentation fault error message caused by a crashing apache worker process
references:
- http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1633
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-02-28
modified: 2021-11-27
t... | [
"T1499.004"
] | [
"impact"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1633"
] | "exit signal Segmentation Fault" | *exit\ signal\ Segmentation\ Fault* | null | web/product/apache/web_apache_segfault.yml | ||
236d8e89-ed95-4789-a982-36f4643738ba | Suspicious Persistence Via VMwareToolBoxCmd.EXE VM State Change Script | Detects execution of the "VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe" with the "script" and "set" flag to setup a specific script that's located in a potentially suspicious location to run for a specific VM state | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Persistence Via VMwareToolBoxCmd.EXE VM State Change Script
id: 236d8e89-ed95-4789-a982-36f4643738ba
related:
- id: 7aa4e81a-a65c-4e10-9f81-b200eb229d7d
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects execution of the "VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe" with the "script" and "set" flag to setup a specific script... | [
"T1059"
] | [
"execution",
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://bohops.com/2021/10/08/analyzing-and-detecting-a-vmtools-persistence-technique/"
] | Image="*\\VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe" OR OriginalFileName="toolbox-cmd.exe" CommandLine="* script *" CommandLine="* set *" CommandLine IN ("*:\\PerfLogs\\*", "*:\\Temp\\*", "*:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp*") | (Image:*\\VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe OR OriginalFileName:toolbox\-cmd.exe) AND (CommandLine:*\ script\ * AND CommandLine:*\ set\ *) AND (CommandLine:(*\:\\PerfLogs\\* OR *\:\\Temp\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Tasks\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\VMwareToolBoxCmd.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "toolbox-cmd.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains " script " and ProcessCommandLine contains " set ") and (ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\PerfLogs\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\Temp\\" or Proces... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_vmware_toolbox_cmd_persistence_susp.yml | |
3371f518-5fe3-4cf6-a14b-2a0ae3fd8a4f | Sysinternals PsService Execution | Detects usage of Sysinternals PsService which can be abused for service reconnaissance and tampering | windows | process_creation | title: Sysinternals PsService Execution
id: 3371f518-5fe3-4cf6-a14b-2a0ae3fd8a4f
status: test
description: Detects usage of Sysinternals PsService which can be abused for service reconnaissance and tampering
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psservice
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali... | [
"T1543.003"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"discovery",
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate use of PsService by an administrator"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psservice"
] | OriginalFileName="psservice.exe" OR Image IN ("*\\PsService.exe", "*\\PsService64.exe", "*\\PsService64a.exe") | OriginalFileName:psservice.exe OR (Image:(*\\PsService.exe OR *\\PsService64.exe OR *\\PsService64a.exe)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "psservice.exe" or (FolderPath endswith "\\PsService.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\PsService64.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\PsService64a.exe") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_psservice.yml | |
6360757a-d460-456c-8b13-74cf0e60cceb | Potential DLL Sideloading Via comctl32.dll | Detects potential DLL sideloading using comctl32.dll to obtain system privileges | windows | image_load | title: Potential DLL Sideloading Via comctl32.dll
id: 6360757a-d460-456c-8b13-74cf0e60cceb
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading using comctl32.dll to obtain system privileges
references:
- https://github.com/binderlabs/DirCreate2System
- https://github.com/sailay1996/awesome_windows_logical_bugs/... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://github.com/binderlabs/DirCreate2System",
"https://github.com/sailay1996/awesome_windows_logical_bugs/blob/60cbb23a801f4c3195deac1cc46df27c225c3d07/dir_create2system.txt"
] | ImageLoaded IN ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\logonUI.exe.local\\*", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\werFault.exe.local\\*", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\consent.exe.local\\*", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\narrator.exe.local\\*", "C:\\windows\\system32\\wermgr.exe.local\\*") ImageLoaded="*\\comctl32.dll" | (ImageLoaded:(C\:\\Windows\\System32\\logonUI.exe.local\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\System32\\werFault.exe.local\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\System32\\consent.exe.local\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\System32\\narrator.exe.local\\* OR C\:\\windows\\system32\\wermgr.exe.local\\*)) AND ImageLoaded:*\\comctl32.dll | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where (FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\logonUI.exe.local\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\werFault.exe.local\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\consent.exe.local\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\narrator.exe.local\\" or FolderP... | windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_comctl32.yml | |
ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99 | Unusual File Download From File Sharing Websites - File Stream | Detects the download of suspicious file type from a well-known file and paste sharing domain | windows | create_stream_hash | title: Unusual File Download From File Sharing Websites - File Stream
id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99
related:
- id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
type: similar
- id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
type: similar
- id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
type: similar
- id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423... | [
"T1564.004"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=90015",
"https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a",
"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research... | Contents IN ("*.githubusercontent.com*", "*0x0.st*", "*anonfiles.com*", "*bashupload.com*", "*cdn.discordapp.com*", "*chunk.io*", "*ddns.net*", "*dl.dropboxusercontent.com*", "*ghostbin.co*", "*github.com*", "*glitch.me*", "*gofile.io*", "*hastebin.com*", "*mediafire.com*", "*mega.nz*", "*onrender.com*", "*pages.dev*",... | (Contents:(*.githubusercontent.com* OR *0x0.st* OR *anonfiles.com* OR *bashupload.com* OR *cdn.discordapp.com* OR *chunk.io* OR *ddns.net* OR *dl.dropboxusercontent.com* OR *ghostbin.co* OR *github.com* OR *glitch.me* OR *gofile.io* OR *hastebin.com* OR *mediafire.com* OR *mega.nz* OR *onrender.com* OR *pages.dev* OR *... | null | windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_file_sharing_domains_download_unusual_extension.yml | |
e6474a1b-5390-49cd-ab41-8d88655f7394 | Renamed Mavinject.EXE Execution | Detects the execution of a renamed version of the "Mavinject" process. Which can be abused to perform process injection using the "/INJECTRUNNING" flag | windows | process_creation | title: Renamed Mavinject.EXE Execution
id: e6474a1b-5390-49cd-ab41-8d88655f7394
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed version of the "Mavinject" process. Which can be abused to perform process
injection using the "/INJECTRUNNING" flag
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team... | [
"T1055.001",
"T1218.013"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.004/T1056.004.md",
"https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstru... | OriginalFileName IN ("mavinject32.exe", "mavinject64.exe") NOT (Image IN ("*\\mavinject32.exe", "*\\mavinject64.exe")) | (OriginalFileName:(mavinject32.exe OR mavinject64.exe)) AND (NOT (Image:(*\\mavinject32.exe OR *\\mavinject64.exe))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("mavinject32.exe", "mavinject64.exe")) and (not((FolderPath endswith "\\mavinject32.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\mavinject64.exe"))) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_mavinject.yml | |
6daac7fc-77d1-449a-a71a-e6b4d59a0e54 | User Couldn't Call a Privileged Service 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess' | The 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess' function verifies that the application making the function call is a logon process by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege set. Possible Rubeus tries to get a handle to LSA. | windows | security | title: User Couldn't Call a Privileged Service 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess'
id: 6daac7fc-77d1-449a-a71a-e6b4d59a0e54
status: test
description: The 'LsaRegisterLogonProcess' function verifies that the application making the function call is a logon process
by checking that it has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege set. Possibl... | [
"T1558.003"
] | [
"credential-access",
"lateral-movement",
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1"
] | EventID=4673 Service="LsaRegisterLogonProcess()" Keywords="0x8010000000000000" | EventID:4673 AND Service:LsaRegisterLogonProcess\(\) AND Keywords:0x8010000000000000 | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_user_couldnt_call_priv_service_lsaregisterlogonprocess.yml | |
976dd1f2-a484-45ec-aa1d-0e87e882262b | Potential Persistence Via CHM Helper DLL | Detects when an attacker modifies the registry key "HtmlHelp Author" to achieve persistence | windows | registry_set | title: Potential Persistence Via CHM Helper DLL
id: 976dd1f2-a484-45ec-aa1d-0e87e882262b
status: test
description: Detects when an attacker modifies the registry key "HtmlHelp Author" to achieve persistence
references:
- https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/htmlhelpauthor.html
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04... | [] | [
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/htmlhelpauthor.html",
"https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-76/"
] | TargetObject IN ("*\\Software\\Microsoft\\HtmlHelp Author\\Location*", "*\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\HtmlHelp Author\\Location*") | TargetObject:(*\\Software\\Microsoft\\HtmlHelp\ Author\\Location* OR *\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\HtmlHelp\ Author\\Location*) | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "\\Software\\Microsoft\\HtmlHelp Author\\Location" or RegistryKey contains "\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\HtmlHelp Author\\Location" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_chm.yml | |
b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e | Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process | Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process | windows | file_event | title: Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process
id: b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.00... | [
"T1566.001"
] | [
"initial-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference"
] | Image IN ("*\\cscript.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\wscript.exe") OR ParentImage IN ("*\\cscript.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\wscript.exe") TargetFilename IN ("*.docm", "*.dotm", "*.xlsm", "*.xltm", "*.potm", "*.pptm") | ((Image:(*\\cscript.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe OR *\\wscript.exe)) OR (ParentImage:(*\\cscript.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe OR *\\wscript.exe))) AND (TargetFilename:(*.docm OR *.dotm OR *.xlsm OR *.xltm OR *.potm OR *.pptm)) | DeviceFileEvents
| where ((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\regsvr32.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\rundll32.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\wscript.exe") or (InitiatingP... | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_office_macro_files_from_susp_process.yml | |
d7a63acb-1284-49bc-bfea-7771146c8b1c | Potential Vcruntime140 DLL Sideloading | Detects potential DLL sideloading of vcruntime140.dll, a common C++ runtime library.
Threat actors have been observed using DLL sideloading techniques to load malicious payloads under the guise of legitimate applications such as SqlWriter, SqlDumper etc.
Notably, APT29 has been documented leveraging WinELOADER to sidel... | windows | image_load | title: Potential Vcruntime140 DLL Sideloading
id: d7a63acb-1284-49bc-bfea-7771146c8b1c
status: experimental
description: 'Detects potential DLL sideloading of vcruntime140.dll, a common C++ runtime library.
Threat actors have been observed using DLL sideloading techniques to load malicious payloads under the guise o... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | high | experimental | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-wineloader-german-political-parties",
"https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/european-diplomats-targeted-spikedwine-wineloader",
"https://www.nextron-systems.com/2023/09/15/detecting-janelarat-with-yara-and-thor/"
] | ImageLoaded="*\\vcruntime140.dll" NOT (ImageLoaded IN ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", "C:\\Program Files\\*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*") OR (Signed=true SignatureStatus="Valid" Description="*C Runtime Library")) NOT (Image="C:\\Users\\*" Image="*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\OneDrive\\*") | ImageLoaded:*\\vcruntime140.dll AND (NOT ((ImageLoaded:(C\:\\Windows\\System32\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\\* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\*)) OR (Signed:true AND SignatureStatus:Valid AND Description:*C\ Runtime\ Library))) AND (NOT (Image:C\:\\Users\\* AND Image:*\\AppData\\Local\\Micro... | null | windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_vcruntime140.yml | |
1070db9a-3e5d-412e-8e7b-7183b616e1b3 | Persistence Via Sticky Key Backdoor | By replacing the sticky keys executable with the local admins CMD executable, an attacker is able to access a privileged windows console session without authenticating to the system.
When the sticky keys are "activated" the privilleged shell is launched. | windows | process_creation | title: Persistence Via Sticky Key Backdoor
id: 1070db9a-3e5d-412e-8e7b-7183b616e1b3
status: test
description: 'By replacing the sticky keys executable with the local admins CMD executable, an attacker is able to access
a privileged windows console session without authenticating to the system.
When the sticky keys ... | [
"T1546.008"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | critical | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/apt29_domain_frontin.html",
"https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ClearSky-Fox-Kitten-Campaign-v1.pdf",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/jonathantrull/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors"
] | CommandLine="*copy *" CommandLine="*/y *" CommandLine="*C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe C:\\windows\\system32\\sethc.exe*" | CommandLine:*copy\ * AND CommandLine:*\/y\ * AND CommandLine:*C\:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe\ C\:\\windows\\system32\\sethc.exe* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "copy " and ProcessCommandLine contains "/y " and ProcessCommandLine contains "C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe C:\\windows\\system32\\sethc.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_sticky_keys_replace.yml | |
0ef56343-059e-4cb6-adc1-4c3c967c5e46 | Suspicious Execution of Systeminfo | Detects usage of the "systeminfo" command to retrieve information | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Execution of Systeminfo
id: 0ef56343-059e-4cb6-adc1-4c3c967c5e46
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "systeminfo" command to retrieve information
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-1--... | [
"T1082"
] | [
"discovery"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-1---system-information-discovery",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/systeminfo"
] | Image="*\\systeminfo.exe" OR OriginalFileName="sysinfo.exe" | Image:*\\systeminfo.exe OR OriginalFileName:sysinfo.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\systeminfo.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "sysinfo.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_systeminfo_execution.yml | |
6e78b74f-c762-4800-82ad-f66787f10c8a | Potential Rcdll.DLL Sideloading | Detects potential DLL sideloading of rcdll.dll | windows | image_load | title: Potential Rcdll.DLL Sideloading
id: 6e78b74f-c762-4800-82ad-f66787f10c8a
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of rcdll.dll
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/c/iron-tiger-sysupdate-adds-linux-targeting.html
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-03-13
modifi... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/c/iron-tiger-sysupdate-adds-linux-targeting.html"
] | ImageLoaded="*\\rcdll.dll" NOT (ImageLoaded IN ("C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Windows Kits\\*")) | ImageLoaded:*\\rcdll.dll AND (NOT (ImageLoaded:(C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\Microsoft\ Visual\ Studio\\* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\Windows\ Kits\\*))) | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\rcdll.dll" and (not((FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Visual Studio\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Windows Kits\\"))) | windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_rcdll.yml | |
c98f2a0d-e1b8-4f76-90d3-359caf88d6b9 | Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 2 | Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity. | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 2
id: c98f2a0d-e1b8-4f76-90d3-359caf88d6b9
status: test
description: Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity.
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
references:
- Internal Resear... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | CommandLine IN ("*🤷🏼*", "*🤷🏼♂️*", "*🙎🏼♀️*", "*🙎🏼*", "*🙎🏼♂️*", "*🙍🏼♀️*", "*🙍🏼*", "*🙍🏼♂️*", "*💇🏼♀️*", "*💇🏼*", "*💇🏼♂️*", "*💆🏼♀️*", "*💆🏼*", "*💆🏼♂️*", "*🧖🏼♀️*", "*🧖🏼*", "*🧖🏼♂️*", "*💃🏼*", "*🕺🏼*", "*🕴🏼*", "*👩🏼🦽*", "*🧑🏼🦽*", "*👨🏼🦽*", "*👩🏼🦼*", "*🧑🏼🦼*", "*👨🏼... | CommandLine:(*🤷🏼* OR *🤷🏼♂️* OR *🙎🏼♀️* OR *🙎🏼* OR *🙎🏼♂️* OR *🙍🏼♀️* OR *🙍🏼* OR *🙍🏼♂️* OR *💇🏼♀️* OR *💇🏼* OR *💇🏼♂️* OR *💆🏼♀️* OR *💆🏼* OR *💆🏼♂️* OR *🧖🏼♀️* OR *🧖🏼* OR *🧖🏼♂️* OR *💃🏼* OR *🕺🏼* OR *🕴🏼* OR *👩🏼🦽* OR *🧑🏼🦽* OR *👨🏼🦽* OR *👩🏼🦼* OR *🧑🏼🦼* OR *👨🏼🦼*... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "🤷🏼" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🤷🏼♂️" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🙎🏼♀️" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🙎🏼" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🙎🏼♂️" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🙍🏼♀️" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🙍🏼" or ProcessCommand... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_emoji_usage_in_cli_2.yml | |
f26307d8-14cd-47e3-a26b-4b4769f24af6 | HackTool - CrackMapExec Process Patterns | Detects suspicious process patterns found in logs when CrackMapExec is used | windows | process_creation | title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Process Patterns
id: f26307d8-14cd-47e3-a26b-4b4769f24af6
status: test
description: Detects suspicious process patterns found in logs when CrackMapExec is used
references:
- https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/obtaining-credentials/dump-lsass
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Sy... | [
"T1003.001"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/obtaining-credentials/dump-lsass"
] | (CommandLine="*tasklist /fi *" CommandLine="*Imagename eq lsass.exe*" CommandLine IN ("*cmd.exe /c *", "*cmd.exe /r *", "*cmd.exe /k *", "*cmd /c *", "*cmd /r *", "*cmd /k *") User IN ("*AUTHORI*", "*AUTORI*")) OR (CommandLine="*do rundll32.exe C:\\windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump*" CommandLine="*\\Windows\\Tem... | ((CommandLine:*tasklist\ \/fi\ * AND CommandLine:*Imagename\ eq\ lsass.exe*) AND (CommandLine:(*cmd.exe\ \/c\ * OR *cmd.exe\ \/r\ * OR *cmd.exe\ \/k\ * OR *cmd\ \/c\ * OR *cmd\ \/r\ * OR *cmd\ \/k\ *)) AND (User:(*AUTHORI* OR *AUTORI*))) OR (CommandLine:*do\ rundll32.exe\ C\:\\windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll,\ MiniDump*... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((ProcessCommandLine contains "tasklist /fi " and ProcessCommandLine contains "Imagename eq lsass.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "cmd.exe /c " or ProcessCommandLine contains "cmd.exe /r " or ProcessCommandLine contains "cmd.exe /k " or ProcessCommandLine contains "cmd /c " or Process... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_crackmapexec_patterns.yml | |
62e0298b-e994-4189-bc87-bc699aa62d97 | Potential Suspicious Registry File Imported Via Reg.EXE | Detects the import of '.reg' files from suspicious paths using the 'reg.exe' utility | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Suspicious Registry File Imported Via Reg.EXE
id: 62e0298b-e994-4189-bc87-bc699aa62d97
related:
- id: 73bba97f-a82d-42ce-b315-9182e76c57b1
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the import of '.reg' files from suspicious paths using the 'reg.exe' utility
references:
- https://learn.microsoft... | [
"T1112"
] | [
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate import of keys"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/reg-import"
] | Image="*\\reg.exe" OR OriginalFileName="reg.exe" CommandLine="* import *" CommandLine IN ("*C:\\Users\\*", "*%temp%*", "*%tmp%*", "*%appdata%*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*C:\\ProgramData\\*") | (Image:*\\reg.exe OR OriginalFileName:reg.exe) AND CommandLine:*\ import\ * AND (CommandLine:(*C\:\\Users\\* OR *%temp%* OR *%tmp%* OR *%appdata%* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR *C\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *C\:\\ProgramData\\*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\reg.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "reg.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains " import " and (ProcessCommandLine contains "C:\\Users\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains "%temp%" or ProcessCommandLine contains "%tmp%" or ProcessCommandLine contains "%appda... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_import_from_suspicious_paths.yml | |
f1edd233-30b5-4823-9e6a-c4171b24d316 | Rundll32 Registered COM Objects | load malicious registered COM objects | windows | process_creation | title: Rundll32 Registered COM Objects
id: f1edd233-30b5-4823-9e6a-c4171b24d316
status: test
description: load malicious registered COM objects
references:
- https://nasbench.medium.com/a-deep-dive-into-rundll32-exe-642344b41e90
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee... | [
"T1546.015"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate use"
] | [
"https://nasbench.medium.com/a-deep-dive-into-rundll32-exe-642344b41e90",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md"
] | Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR OriginalFileName="RUNDLL32.EXE" CommandLine IN ("*-sta *", "*-localserver *") CommandLine="*{*" CommandLine="*}*" | (Image:*\\rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName:RUNDLL32.EXE) AND ((CommandLine:(*\-sta\ * OR *\-localserver\ *)) AND (CommandLine:*\{* AND CommandLine:*\}*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\rundll32.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "RUNDLL32.EXE") and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "-sta " or ProcessCommandLine contains "-localserver ") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "{" and ProcessCommandLine contains "}")) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_registered_com_objects.yml | |
19aa4f58-94ca-45ff-bc34-92e533c0994a | Suspicious User-Agents Related To Recon Tools | Detects known suspicious (default) user-agents related to scanning/recon tools | webserver | title: Suspicious User-Agents Related To Recon Tools
id: 19aa4f58-94ca-45ff-bc34-92e533c0994a
status: test
description: Detects known suspicious (default) user-agents related to scanning/recon tools
references:
- https://github.com/commixproject/commix/blob/c7f1447371524427bb30abe731235acc7386153b/src/utils/settings.py... | [
"T1190"
] | [
"initial-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/commixproject/commix/blob/c7f1447371524427bb30abe731235acc7386153b/src/utils/settings.py#L281",
"https://github.com/epi052/feroxbuster/blob/ffdf871abe0a358a1531ba4135e208d4dbe8fc31/src/config/utils.rs#L100",
"https://github.com/ffuf/ffuf/blob/ce3cf6bd733a24d3a9f024305234c1a6298198eb/pkg/runn... | "cs-user-agent" IN ("*commix/*", "*feroxbuster/*", "*Fuzz Faster U Fool*", "*GIS - AppSec Team - Project Vision*", "*gobuster/*", "*Nikto/*", "*Nmap Scripting Engine*", "*Recon-ng/v*", "*sqlmap/*", "*WhatWeb/*", "*Wfuzz/*", "*WPScan v*", "*zgrab/*") | cs-user-agent:(*commix\/* OR *feroxbuster\/* OR *Fuzz\ Faster\ U\ Fool* OR *GIS\ \-\ AppSec\ Team\ \-\ Project\ Vision* OR *gobuster\/* OR *Nikto\/* OR *Nmap\ Scripting\ Engine* OR *Recon\-ng\/v* OR *sqlmap\/* OR *WhatWeb\/* OR *Wfuzz\/* OR *WPScan\ v* OR *zgrab\/*) | null | web/webserver_generic/web_susp_useragents.yml | ||
738d9bcf-6999-4fdb-b4ac-3033037db8ab | Suspicious Reverse Shell Command Line | Detects suspicious shell commands or program code that may be executed or used in command line to establish a reverse shell | linux | title: Suspicious Reverse Shell Command Line
id: 738d9bcf-6999-4fdb-b4ac-3033037db8ab
status: test
description: Detects suspicious shell commands or program code that may be executed or used in command line to establish a
reverse shell
references:
- https://alamot.github.io/reverse_shells/
author: Florian Roth (Nextr... | [
"T1059.004"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://alamot.github.io/reverse_shells/"
] | "BEGIN {s = \"/inet/tcp/0/" OR "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/" OR "bash -i >& /dev/udp/" OR "sh -i >$ /dev/udp/" OR "sh -i >$ /dev/tcp/" OR "&& while read line 0<&5; do" OR "/bin/bash -c exec 5<>/dev/tcp/" OR "/bin/bash -c exec 5<>/dev/udp/" OR "nc -e /bin/sh " OR "/bin/sh | nc" OR "rm -f backpipe; mknod /tmp/backpipe p && nc "... | *BEGIN\ \{s\ \=\ \"\/inet\/tcp\/0\/* OR *bash\ \-i\ \>\&\ \/dev\/tcp\/* OR *bash\ \-i\ \>\&\ \/dev\/udp\/* OR *sh\ \-i\ \>$\ \/dev\/udp\/* OR *sh\ \-i\ \>$\ \/dev\/tcp\/* OR *\&\&\ while\ read\ line\ 0\<\&5;\ do* OR *\/bin\/bash\ \-c\ exec\ 5\<\>\/dev\/tcp\/* OR *\/bin\/bash\ \-c\ exec\ 5\<\>\/dev\/udp\/* OR *nc\ \-e\ ... | null | linux/builtin/lnx_shell_susp_rev_shells.yml | ||
225274c4-8dd1-40db-9e09-71dff4f6fb3c | Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 4 | Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity. | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Defense Evasion Activity Via Emoji Usage In CommandLine - 4
id: 225274c4-8dd1-40db-9e09-71dff4f6fb3c
status: test
description: Detects the usage of emojis in the command line, this could be a sign of potential defense evasion activity.
author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport'
references:
- Internal Resear... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | CommandLine IN ("*🔸*", "*🔹*", "*🔶*", "*🔷*", "*🔳*", "*🔲*", "*▪️*", "*▫️*", "*◾️*", "*◽️*", "*◼️*", "*◻️*", "*🟥*", "*🟧*", "*🟨*", "*🟩*", "*🟦*", "*🟪*", "*⬛️*", "*⬜️*", "*🟫*", "*🔈*", "*🔇*", "*🔉*", "*🔊*", "*🔔*", "*🔕*", "*📣*", "*📢*", "*👁🗨*", "*💬*", "*💭*", "*🗯*", "*♠️*", "*♣️*", "*♥️*", "*♦️*", "*🃏*... | CommandLine:(*🔸* OR *🔹* OR *🔶* OR *🔷* OR *🔳* OR *🔲* OR *▪️* OR *▫️* OR *◾️* OR *◽️* OR *◼️* OR *◻️* OR *🟥* OR *🟧* OR *🟨* OR *🟩* OR *🟦* OR *🟪* OR *⬛️* OR *⬜️* OR *🟫* OR *🔈* OR *🔇* OR *🔉* OR *🔊* OR *🔔* OR *🔕* OR *📣* OR *📢* OR *👁🗨* OR *💬* OR *💭* OR *🗯* OR *♠️* OR *♣️* OR *♥️* OR *♦️* OR *🃏* OR ... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "🔸" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🔹" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🔶" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🔷" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🔳" or ProcessCommandLine contains "🔲" or ProcessCommandLine contains "▪️" or ProcessCommandLine contains "▫️" or Proc... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_emoji_usage_in_cli_4.yml | |
7f7c49eb-2977-4ac8-8ab0-ab1bae14730e | Remote Schedule Task Recon via ITaskSchedulerService | Detects remote RPC calls to read information about scheduled tasks | rpc_firewall | application | title: Remote Schedule Task Recon via ITaskSchedulerService
id: 7f7c49eb-2977-4ac8-8ab0-ab1bae14730e
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to read information about scheduled tasks
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931
- htt... | [] | [
"discovery"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931",
"https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md",
"https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall",
"https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stop... | EventLog="RPCFW" EventID=3 InterfaceUuid="86d35949-83c9-4044-b424-db363231fd0c" NOT (OpNum IN (1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15)) | (EventLog:RPCFW AND EventID:3 AND InterfaceUuid:86d35949\-83c9\-4044\-b424\-db363231fd0c) AND (NOT (OpNum:(1 OR 3 OR 4 OR 10 OR 11 OR 12 OR 13 OR 14 OR 15))) | null | application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_itaskschedulerservice_recon.yml | |
a136cde0-61ad-4a61-9b82-8dc490e60dd2 | Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - PowerShell Module | Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell | windows | ps_module | title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher - PowerShell Module
id: a136cde0-61ad-4a61-9b82-8dc490e60dd2
related:
- id: 73e67340-0d25-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: ... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009"
] | *
| regex Payload="cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+clip(?:\\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\\(\\s\\\\\"\\{\\d\\}.+-f.+\"" | Payload:/cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r).+clip(?:\.exe)?.{0,4}&&.+clipboard]::\(\s\\"\{\d\}.+-f.+"/ | null | windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_clip.yml | |
6cc2b61b-d97e-42ef-a9dd-8aa8dc951657 | Okta Unauthorized Access to App | Detects when unauthorized access to app occurs. | okta | okta | title: Okta Unauthorized Access to App
id: 6cc2b61b-d97e-42ef-a9dd-8aa8dc951657
status: test
description: Detects when unauthorized access to app occurs.
references:
- https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
- https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/
author: Austin Songer @austinsong... | [] | [
"impact"
] | medium | test | [
"User might of believe that they had access."
] | [
"https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/",
"https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/"
] | displayMessage="User attempted unauthorized access to app" | displayMessage:"User attempted unauthorized access to app" | null | identity/okta/okta_unauthorized_access_to_app.yml | |
fe2f9663-41cb-47e2-b954-8a228f3b9dff | Linux Base64 Encoded Shebang In CLI | Detects the presence of a base64 version of the shebang in the commandline, which could indicate a malicious payload about to be decoded | linux | process_creation | title: Linux Base64 Encoded Shebang In CLI
id: fe2f9663-41cb-47e2-b954-8a228f3b9dff
status: test
description: Detects the presence of a base64 version of the shebang in the commandline, which could indicate a malicious
payload about to be decoded
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolut... | [
"T1140"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate administration activities"
] | [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html",
"https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/tree/master/linPEAS"
] | CommandLine IN ("*IyEvYmluL2Jhc2*", "*IyEvYmluL2Rhc2*", "*IyEvYmluL3pza*", "*IyEvYmluL2Zpc2*", "*IyEvYmluL3No*") | CommandLine:(*IyEvYmluL2Jhc2* OR *IyEvYmluL2Rhc2* OR *IyEvYmluL3pza* OR *IyEvYmluL2Zpc2* OR *IyEvYmluL3No*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "IyEvYmluL2Jhc2" or ProcessCommandLine contains "IyEvYmluL2Rhc2" or ProcessCommandLine contains "IyEvYmluL3pza" or ProcessCommandLine contains "IyEvYmluL2Zpc2" or ProcessCommandLine contains "IyEvYmluL3No" | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_base64_shebang_cli.yml | |
4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4 | Network Connection Initiated To Visual Studio Code Tunnels Domain | Detects network connections to Visual Studio Code tunnel domains initiated by a process on a system. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine. | windows | network_connection | title: Network Connection Initiated To Visual Studio Code Tunnels Domain
id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4
related:
- id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4
type: similar
- id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1
type: similar
- id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b
type: similar
status: test
descrip... | [
"T1567",
"T1572"
] | [
"exfiltration",
"command-and-control"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel will also trigger this."
] | [
"https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/",
"https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html",
"https://cydefops.com/vscode-data-exfiltration"
] | Initiated="true" DestinationHostname="*.tunnels.api.visualstudio.com" | Initiated:true AND DestinationHostname:*.tunnels.api.visualstudio.com | DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl endswith ".tunnels.api.visualstudio.com" | windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_domain_vscode_tunnel_connection.yml | |
18b042f0-2ecd-4b6e-9f8d-aa7a7e7de781 | Buffer Overflow Attempts | Detects buffer overflow attempts in Unix system log files | linux | title: Buffer Overflow Attempts
id: 18b042f0-2ecd-4b6e-9f8d-aa7a7e7de781
status: test
description: Detects buffer overflow attempts in Unix system log files
references:
- https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/etc/rules/attack_rules.xml
- https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19683-01/8... | [
"T1068"
] | [
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Base64 encoded data in log entries"
] | [
"https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/etc/rules/attack_rules.xml",
"https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19683-01/816-4883/6mb2joatd/index.html",
"https://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/266/review-ftp-protocol-cyber-defense-initiative/102802",
"https://blu.org/mhonarc/discuss/2001... | "attempt to execute code on stack by" OR "0bin0sh1" OR "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA" OR "stack smashing detected" | *attempt\ to\ execute\ code\ on\ stack\ by* OR *0bin0sh1* OR *AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA* OR *stack\ smashing\ detected* | null | linux/builtin/lnx_buffer_overflows.yml | ||
f64e5c19-879c-4bae-b471-6d84c8339677 | Webshell Tool Reconnaissance Activity | Detects processes spawned from web servers (PHP, Tomcat, IIS, etc.) that perform reconnaissance looking for the existence of popular scripting tools (perl, python, wget) on the system via the help commands | windows | process_creation | title: Webshell Tool Reconnaissance Activity
id: f64e5c19-879c-4bae-b471-6d84c8339677
status: test
description: 'Detects processes spawned from web servers (PHP, Tomcat, IIS, etc.) that perform reconnaissance looking for
the existence of popular scripting tools (perl, python, wget) on the system via the help commands... | [
"T1505.003"
] | [
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://ragged-lab.blogspot.com/2020/07/webshells-automating-reconnaissance.html"
] | ParentImage IN ("*\\caddy.exe", "*\\httpd.exe", "*\\nginx.exe", "*\\php-cgi.exe", "*\\w3wp.exe", "*\\ws_tomcatservice.exe") OR (ParentImage IN ("*\\java.exe", "*\\javaw.exe") ParentImage IN ("*-tomcat-*", "*\\tomcat*")) OR (ParentImage IN ("*\\java.exe", "*\\javaw.exe") CommandLine IN ("*CATALINA_HOME*", "*catalina.jar... | ((ParentImage:(*\\caddy.exe OR *\\httpd.exe OR *\\nginx.exe OR *\\php\-cgi.exe OR *\\w3wp.exe OR *\\ws_tomcatservice.exe)) OR ((ParentImage:(*\\java.exe OR *\\javaw.exe)) AND (ParentImage:(*\-tomcat\-* OR *\\tomcat*))) OR ((ParentImage:(*\\java.exe OR *\\javaw.exe)) AND (CommandLine:(*CATALINA_HOME* OR *catalina.jar*))... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\caddy.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\httpd.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\nginx.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\php-cgi.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\w3wp.exe" or InitiatingProcessFo... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_webshell_tool_recon.yml | |
439957a7-ad86-4a8f-9705-a28131c6821b | Old TLS1.0/TLS1.1 Protocol Version Enabled | Detects applications or users re-enabling old TLS versions by setting the "Enabled" value to "1" for the "Protocols" registry key. | windows | registry_set | title: Old TLS1.0/TLS1.1 Protocol Version Enabled
id: 439957a7-ad86-4a8f-9705-a28131c6821b
status: test
description: Detects applications or users re-enabling old TLS versions by setting the "Enabled" value to "1" for the "Protocols"
registry key.
references:
- https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-bl... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate enabling of the old tls versions due to incompatibility"
] | [
"https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/tls-1-0-and-tls-1-1-soon-to-be-disabled-in-windows/ba-p/3887947"
] | TargetObject IN ("*\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\SCHANNEL\\Protocols\\TLS 1.0\\*", "*\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\SCHANNEL\\Protocols\\TLS 1.1\\*") TargetObject="*\\Enabled" Details="DWORD (0x00000001)" | (TargetObject:(*\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\SCHANNEL\\Protocols\\TLS\ 1.0\\* OR *\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\SCHANNEL\\Protocols\\TLS\ 1.1\\*)) AND TargetObject:*\\Enabled AND Details:"DWORD \(0x00000001\)" | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey endswith "\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\SCHANNEL\\Protocols\\TLS 1.0*" or RegistryKey endswith "\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\SCHANNEL\\Protocols\\TLS 1.1*") and RegistryKey endswith "\\Enabled" and RegistryValueData =~ "DWORD (0x00000001)" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_tls_protocol_old_version_enabled.yml | |
55e29995-75e7-451a-bef0-6225e2f13597 | Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS SilentProcessExit Technique | Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to dump the memory of the lsass.exe process | windows | registry_event | title: Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS SilentProcessExit Technique
id: 55e29995-75e7-451a-bef0-6225e2f13597
related:
- id: 36803969-5421-41ec-b92f-8500f79c23b0
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects changes to the Registry in which a monitor program gets registered to dump the memory of the lsass.exe
... | [
"T1003.001"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | critical | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://www.deepinstinct.com/2021/02/16/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2/",
"https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/"
] | TargetObject="*Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\lsass.exe*" | TargetObject:*Microsoft\\Windows\ NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\lsass.exe* | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\lsass.exe" | windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_silentprocessexit_lsass.yml | |
50d66fb0-03f8-4da0-8add-84e77d12a020 | Suspicious RunAs-Like Flag Combination | Detects suspicious command line flags that let the user set a target user and command as e.g. seen in PsExec-like tools | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious RunAs-Like Flag Combination
id: 50d66fb0-03f8-4da0-8add-84e77d12a020
status: test
description: Detects suspicious command line flags that let the user set a target user and command as e.g. seen in PsExec-like
tools
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/k/hack-the-real-box-apt41-... | [] | [
"privilege-escalation"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/k/hack-the-real-box-apt41-new-subgroup-earth-longzhi.html"
] | CommandLine IN ("* -u system *", "* --user system *", "* -u NT*", "* -u \"NT*", "* -u 'NT*", "* --system *", "* -u administrator *") CommandLine IN ("* -c cmd*", "* -c \"cmd*", "* -c powershell*", "* -c \"powershell*", "* --command cmd*", "* --command powershell*", "* -c whoami*", "* -c wscript*", "* -c cscript*") | (CommandLine:(*\ \-u\ system\ * OR *\ \-\-user\ system\ * OR *\ \-u\ NT* OR *\ \-u\ \"NT* OR *\ \-u\ 'NT* OR *\ \-\-system\ * OR *\ \-u\ administrator\ *)) AND (CommandLine:(*\ \-c\ cmd* OR *\ \-c\ \"cmd* OR *\ \-c\ powershell* OR *\ \-c\ \"powershell* OR *\ \-\-command\ cmd* OR *\ \-\-command\ powershell* OR *\ \-c\ w... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains " -u system " or ProcessCommandLine contains " --user system " or ProcessCommandLine contains " -u NT" or ProcessCommandLine contains " -u \"NT" or ProcessCommandLine contains " -u 'NT" or ProcessCommandLine contains " --system " or ProcessCommandLine contains " ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_privilege_escalation_cli_patterns.yml | |
6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66 | OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication | Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication. | opencanary | application | title: OpenCanary - MSSQL Login Attempt Via Windows Authentication
id: 6e78f90f-0043-4a01-ac41-f97681613a66
status: test
description: 'Detects instances where an MSSQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt using Windows Authentication.
'
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/start... | [
"T1003",
"T1213"
] | [
"credential-access",
"collection"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration",
"https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52"
] | logtype=9002 | logtype:9002 | null | application/opencanary/opencanary_mssql_login_winauth.yml | |
fa84aaf5-8142-43cd-9ec2-78cfebf878ce | Temporary Access Pass Added To An Account | Detects when a temporary access pass (TAP) is added to an account. TAPs added to priv accounts should be investigated | azure | auditlogs | title: Temporary Access Pass Added To An Account
id: fa84aaf5-8142-43cd-9ec2-78cfebf878ce
status: test
description: Detects when a temporary access pass (TAP) is added to an account. TAPs added to priv accounts should be investigated
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations... | [
"T1078.004"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"initial-access",
"persistence",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Administrator adding a legitimate temporary access pass"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts"
] | properties.message="Admin registered security info" Status="Admin registered temporary access pass method for user" | properties.message:"Admin registered security info" AND Status:"Admin registered temporary access pass method for user" | null | cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_tap_added.yml | |
1d61f71d-59d2-479e-9562-4ff5f4ead16b | Suspicious Service Installation | Detects suspicious service installation commands | windows | system | title: Suspicious Service Installation
id: 1d61f71d-59d2-479e-9562-4ff5f4ead16b
related:
- id: ca83e9f3-657a-45d0-88d6-c1ac280caf53
type: obsolete
- id: 26481afe-db26-4228-b264-25a29fe6efc7
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious service installation commands
references:
- Internal Research
autho... | [
"T1543.003"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | Provider_Name="Service Control Manager" EventID=7045 ImagePath IN ("* -nop *", "* -sta *", "* -w hidden *", "*:\\Temp\\*", "*.downloadfile(*", "*.downloadstring(*", "*\\ADMIN$\\*", "*\\Perflogs\\*", "*&&*") | Provider_Name:"Service Control Manager" AND EventID:7045 AND (ImagePath:(*\ \-nop\ * OR *\ \-sta\ * OR *\ \-w\ hidden\ * OR *\:\\Temp\\* OR *.downloadfile\(* OR *.downloadstring\(* OR *\\ADMIN$\\* OR *\\Perflogs\\* OR *\&\&*)) | null | windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_service_install_susp.yml | |
044ba588-dff4-4918-9808-3f95e8160606 | Copy .DMP/.DUMP Files From Remote Share Via Cmd.EXE | Detects usage of the copy builtin cmd command to copy files with the ".dmp"/".dump" extension from a remote share | windows | process_creation | title: Copy .DMP/.DUMP Files From Remote Share Via Cmd.EXE
id: 044ba588-dff4-4918-9808-3f95e8160606
status: test
description: Detects usage of the copy builtin cmd command to copy files with the ".dmp"/".dump" extension from a remote share
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/
author: ... | [] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/"
] | Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR OriginalFileName="Cmd.Exe" CommandLine="*copy *" CommandLine="* \\\\*" CommandLine IN ("*.dmp*", "*.dump*", "*.hdmp*") | (Image:*\\cmd.exe OR OriginalFileName:Cmd.Exe) AND ((CommandLine:*copy\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \\\\*) AND (CommandLine:(*.dmp* OR *.dump* OR *.hdmp*))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "Cmd.Exe") and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "copy " and ProcessCommandLine contains " \\\\") and (ProcessCommandLine contains ".dmp" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".dump" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".hdmp")) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_copy_dmp_from_share.yml | |
4782eb5a-a513-4523-a0ac-f3082b26ac5c | Mshtml.DLL RunHTMLApplication Suspicious Usage | Detects execution of commands that leverage the "mshtml.dll" RunHTMLApplication export to run arbitrary code via different protocol handlers (vbscript, javascript, file, http...) | windows | process_creation | title: Mshtml.DLL RunHTMLApplication Suspicious Usage
id: 4782eb5a-a513-4523-a0ac-f3082b26ac5c
related:
- id: 9f06447a-a33a-4cbe-a94f-a3f43184a7a3
type: obsolete
- id: 73fcad2e-ff14-4c38-b11d-4172c8ac86c7
type: obsolete
status: test
description: 'Detects execution of commands that leverage the "mshtml.dll" RunHTMLA... | [] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/n1nj4sec/status/1421190238081277959",
"https://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/MICROSOFT_WINDOWS_DEFENDER_TROJAN.WIN32.POWESSERE.G_MITIGATION_BYPASS_PART2.txt",
"http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/MICROSOFT_WINDOWS_DEFENDER_DETECTION_BYPASS.txt"
] | CommandLine="*\\..\\*" CommandLine="*mshtml*" CommandLine IN ("*#135*", "*RunHTMLApplication*") | (CommandLine:*\\..\\* AND CommandLine:*mshtml*) AND (CommandLine:(*#135* OR *RunHTMLApplication*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "\\..\\" and ProcessCommandLine contains "mshtml") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "#135" or ProcessCommandLine contains "RunHTMLApplication") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_mshtml_runhtmlapplication.yml |
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