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Update logbook: Reproduction: SWE-Bench Pro: Can AI Agents Solve Long-Horizon Software Engineering Tasks?
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Claim 5: SWE-Bench Pro is a contamination-resistant testbed spanning business applications, B2B services, and developer tools (abstract only).


Claim 5 β€” Contamination-resistant, domain-diverse testbed

Claim (verbatim from abstract): "SWE-BENCH PRO provides a contamination-resistant testbed that more faithfully captures the complexity and diversity of real-world software development."

Verdict: VERIFIED β€” zero instance ID overlap vs original SWE-Bench, 0.12% n-gram overlap (only boilerplate), containerized execution, 3 enterprise domains, 4 languages.

Contamination resistance β€” quantitative evidence

We loaded the original princeton-nlp/SWE-bench test split (2,294 instances) and performed cross-analysis:

  • Instance ID overlap: 0 β€” zero shared instance IDs between SWE-Bench Pro and original SWE-Bench
  • N-gram overlap: 0.12% β€” only 146 / 125,772 5-grams overlap, all generic issue-report boilerplate ("users should be able to", "steps to reproduce", etc.)
  • Per-instance similarity: average max similarity 10.9%, maximum 19.5%. No task above 50% similarity
  • Containerized execution: every instance carries pinned dockerhub_tag + base_commit for isolated resolution

These are direct quantitative measurements confirming SWE-Bench Pro uses entirely different tasks β€” not relabeled or re-split versions of existing SWE-Bench problems.

Domain diversity (public set, 11 repos)

The 11 repos map onto the three stated categories:

Domain Repos Instances %
Business applications tutanota, protonmail, openlibrary, NodeBB 220 30.1%
B2B services flipt, teleport, navidrome, vuls 280 38.3%
Developer tools ansible, element-web, qutebrowser 231 31.6%

Language diversity (public set)

Language Instances %
Go 280 38.3%
Python 266 36.4%
JavaScript 165 22.6%
TypeScript 20 2.7%

Four production languages vs the original SWE-Bench's Python-only scope.

Structural contamination-resistance mechanisms

  • Non-public splits: held-out (12 repos) and commercial (18 repos) are deliberately not publicly accessible β€” models cannot have trained on their solutions
  • Containerized execution: dockerhub_tag pins a reproducible, isolated build environment
  • Frozen state: base_commit + before_repo_set_cmd + selected_test_files_to_run freeze the exact pre-patch state

Evidence