Datasets:
license: cc-by-4.0
task_categories:
- tabular-classification
- other
tags:
- host-intrusion-detection
- tetragon
- ebpf
- sequence-modeling
- att-and-ck
- anomaly-detection
size_categories:
- 10M<n<100M
language: []
pretty_name: v0.2 Tetragon-native HIDS corpus (22 technique IDs)
Dataset summary
- Source: Tetragon 1.6.1 eBPF telemetry on a single LXC container, 6-day collection window 2026-04-14 → 2026-04-20.
- Population: all process / file / network / credential / memory events attributable to the target container's PID-namespace inum across the collection window (parser filters host-namespace events at parse time).
- Splits: chronological — train (2026-04-14T01:41Z → 2026-04-19T22:09Z) / test (2026-04-19T21:46Z → 2026-04-20T02:01Z). All ART attack intervals fall in the test split; train is benign-only by construction.
- Format: Parquet shards under
data/, suitable for the Hugging Facedatasetslibrary streaming loader. Labels are a separatelabels.csv. - License: CC BY 4.0.
Supported tasks
- Host-telemetry anomaly detection. Per-event or per-window scoring
against the time-window labels in
labels.csv. - Sequence anomaly modeling. Autoregressive next-event prediction (NLL) or masked-event modeling (MEM, including field-aware MEM-FA) over the integer-coded feature columns.
- Event-stream classification baselines. N-gram, IsolationForest, XGBoost, etc. operate directly on the categorical / hash columns.
The corpus is not intended for: attack-payload synthesis, ground-truth event-level labels (only intervals are labeled), or production deployment without recalibration to the operator's own host distribution.
Dataset structure
Splits
| Split | Rows | Time span (UTC)† | Attack events | Attack rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| train | 16,951,950 | 2026-04-14 01:41:13 → 2026-04-19 22:09:18 | 0 | 0.0 % |
| test | 2,349,965 | 2026-04-19 21:46:27 → 2026-04-20 02:01:27 | 705,852 | 30.0 % |
† Pre-window event timestamps. ≈295 events (267 train + 28 test, 0.0015 %
of the corpus) carry event_time values that predate the stated collection
window. All have f_is_procfs_walk = 1: parser-synthesized process_exec
records for daemons (systemd, bash, dbus-daemon, polkitd, cron,
sshd, etc.) that were already running when Tetragon collection started,
using the daemon's original process_start_time as the event timestamp.
They preserve lineage roots for downstream events. Filter
WHERE f_is_procfs_walk = 0 to exclude them from time-window analysis.
Schema evolution (v0.2.1)
The release artifact is the encoded parquet (63 columns: 39 model-input
columns + 7 hash columns + identifier and side-string columns). Compared to
v0.2.0 the encoded schema gained four 3a′ promoted categoricals
(f_path_category, f_dst_ip_category, f_dst_port_category,
f_object_category) and lost two constant-zero booleans (f_in_init_tree,
f_args_truncated); two hash columns were right-sized
(f_proc_name_hash 1024 → 2048, f_proc_cwd_hash 256 → 4096 with depth
2 → 4 path components hashed). The full integer-code → label mapping is in
reproduction/feature_definitions.json (schema version 1.1).
The release pipeline is three-stage:
| Stage | Source field | Stage column | Transformation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Raw Tetragon JSON | process_exec / process_exit / process_kprobe envelope |
event_type |
passthrough → vocab f_event_type |
| → Parser (126-col raw, withheld) | process.binary |
proc_binary (full path) |
derive basename → proc_binary_basename (released, aliased) + hash f_proc_name_hash |
process.cwd |
proc_cwd (full path) |
normalize → proc_cwd_normalized (path-rewritten at release) + hash f_proc_cwd_hash |
|
process.uid |
proc_uid (uint32) |
bucket → f_proc_uid_bucket (uint8) — raw uid not released |
|
process.arguments |
proc_arguments |
length-bucket → f_args_length_bucket (uint8); raw args not released |
|
process_kprobe.args[].sock.daddr |
kp_sock_daddr |
category bucket → dst_ip_category (string) — raw IP not released |
|
| → Behavior builder (encoded, released) | (event_type, kprobe_function_name) | f_action_family (uint8, 15 codes) |
derived; see feature_definitions.json |
| (parent_basename, proc_basename) pair | f_parent_child_pair_hash (uint16, 1024 buckets) |
hash | |
| proc_exec_id walk | f_lineage_depth, f_root_ancestor_basename_hash, f_process_tree_id_hash |
derived |
The 126-column raw parser output is withheld from the public release. All raw paths, raw arguments, raw IPs, raw uids, hostnames, and PID-namespace inums are dropped at this stage; see "Personal and sensitive information" below for the per-column decisions.
Feature column inventory (encoded parquet)
Full integer-code → label mapping for every categorical column lives in
reproduction/feature_definitions.json. High-level summary:
- 22 integer-coded categorical columns — 18 from v0.2.0 plus the four
3a′ promoted categoricals (
f_path_category11-way,f_dst_ip_category6-way,f_dst_port_category7-way,f_object_category8-way). - 4 string-coded categorical columns (
path_category,object_category,dst_ip_category,dst_port_category) — provenance side columns, identical semantics to theirf_*integer counterparts. - 7 hash columns with declared bucket capacities (2048 / 1024 / 4096 / 256 / 1024 / 1024 / 4096 — see Hash-bucket utilization below).
- 6 boolean flag columns (e.g.
f_is_procfs_walk,f_uid_eq_parent,f_kp_commit_creds_uid_change). - 5 numeric columns (
delta_t_prev_ns,process_age_ns, mmap/mprotect prot bitmasks, fd integer). - 3 bucketed log-time columns (
f_delta_t_log_bucket,f_process_age_log_bucket,f_lineage_depth). - 3 identifier columns (
event_time,proc_exec_id,proc_pid). - 7 release-eligible side-string columns (basenames, normalized cwd, parent-child pair, token, process_tree_root_exec_id).
Class distributions (train split)
f_event_type (4-way; OOV not observed):
| Code | Label | Count | % |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | process_kprobe | 16,413,759 | 96.83 |
| 1 | process_exit | 288,716 | 1.70 |
| 0 | process_exec | 249,475 | 1.47 |
f_action_family (15-way; top 10 shown; full table in
feature_definitions.json):
| Code | Label | Count |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | FILE_OPEN | 14,852,286 |
| 12 | MEM_MAP | 1,168,402 |
| 1 | PROC_EXIT | 288,716 |
| 9 | PRIV_CHANGE | 257,709 |
| 0 | PROC_EXEC | 249,475 |
| 7 | FILE_DELETE | 44,818 |
| 5 | NET_SEND | 23,672 |
| 13 | MEM_PROTECT | 19,059 |
| 3 | NET_CLOSE | 18,451 |
| 2 | NET_CONNECT | 16,359 |
ATT&CK label coverage
61 labeled time intervals span 21 ATT&CK techniques + 1 supply-chain capstone chain across 8 tactics. All attack-positive intervals are in the test split. Per-technique event counts (test split, top 10 by event volume):
| ID | Technique | Test events |
|---|---|---|
| T1059.004 | Unix Shell | 175,797 |
| T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | 154,581 |
| T1552.001 | Credentials In Files | 97,493 |
| T1543.002 | Systemd Service | 47,901 |
| CHAIN.CAP01 | Capstone Chain v0.1 (Supply-Chain Narrative) | 34,130 |
| T1548.003 | Sudo and Sudo Caching | 24,229 |
| T1059.006 | Python | 22,675 |
| T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | 18,610 |
| T1195.002 | Compromise Software Supply Chain | 15,703 |
| T1548.001 | Setuid and Setgid | 12,461 |
Full per-technique table is reproducible from notebooks/v0-2_dataset_audit.ipynb
(cell 63).
Hash-bucket utilization (train split, post-3a′ caps)
| Column | Capacity | Buckets used | Saturation |
|---|---|---|---|
| f_proc_name_hash | 2048 | 269 | 13.1 % |
| f_parent_proc_hash | 1024 | 121 | 11.8 % |
| f_proc_cwd_hash | 4096 | 65 | 1.6 % |
| f_lineage_bag_hash | 256 | 98 | 38.3 % |
| f_parent_child_pair_hash | 1024 | 490 | 47.9 % |
| f_root_ancestor_basename_hash | 1024 | 5 | 0.5 % |
| f_process_tree_id_hash | 4096 | 7 | 0.2 % |
Low saturation reflects the single-host single-developer baseline (a small
real basename / cwd / lineage population). The 3a′ capacity bumps on
f_proc_name_hash and f_proc_cwd_hash were sized for plausible multi-host
saturation rather than this corpus's observed counts; the values are
documented here so re-trainers can resize the embedding tables.
Dataset creation
Curation rationale
This dataset was assembled to support the v0.2 milestone of an academic project investigating Mamba-based anomaly detection on host telemetry. The v0.1 predecessor produced an inverted AUROC (~0.35) on a similar but parser-buggy corpus; v0.2 was rebuilt with a Tetragon-native parser, sentinel-window exclusion at parse time, and a two-stage parser → behavior-builder design that preserves a raw normalized parquet internally for iteration. The v0.2.1 release further re-parsed the same collection on 2026-04-29 with five correctness fixes:
- Procfs-walk synthetic execs are now tagged, not dropped (1,346 events recovered corpus-wide; lineage gaps for daemons running before agent start closed).
delta_t_prev_nsis keyed per-process rather than globally, removing 44,947 train + 1,643 test negative residuals.- Test-split lineage walking now seeds from the train parquet first,
resolving 39 % of previously-missing parents (test
lineage_missing_parent: 5.25 % → 2.88 %). - Parser parallelized across files via
multiprocessing.Pool, with DuckDBORDER BY event_timefor chronological output. - Mamba NLL scorer's front-pad alignment fix:
nll_padded[i]is now event i's surprise (was i+1's in v0.2.0).
Source data
- Sensor: Tetragon 1.6.1 (Cilium eBPF) running on a Linux host.
- Workload: a single LXC container hosting a developer's daily workspace (Node, Python, VSCode, npm). Background services inside the container (systemd-resolved, dbus, polkitd, etc.) contribute system noise.
- Tracing policies: 7 YAML policies covering file, network, memory,
privilege, process-injection, and file-attribute kprobes (bundled in
reproduction/tetragon-configs/). - Attribution: the parser pins on PID-namespace inum, which uniquely identifies the target container across an inum rotation that occurred during the collection window. Host-namespace events are dropped at parse time.
Annotations
Time-window labels are provided in labels.csv (61 rows; 22 distinct
technique IDs incl. one capstone chain; 8 tactics). Labels were generated
by an Atomic Red Team campaign run inside the same container during the
test window, with start/end timestamps captured per-trial. The campaign
manifest is bundled at reproduction/agentic-art-campaign/.
Personal and sensitive information
component-first anonymization with deep aliasing across all PII-bearing string columns. Summary:
- 126-column raw parquet withheld. All raw paths, raw arguments, raw IPs, raw uids, hostnames, and PID-namespace inums are dropped at the parser stage. The released parquet is the 63-column encoded form.
- Basename aliasing. A single alias map covers
proc_binary_basename,parent_binary_basename, androot_ancestor_basename. Distro-standard binaries and dev-tooling that anchor the "standardized agentic-research workstation" baseline (bash,node,python3.12,claude,gh,npm,code,git, etc.) pass through verbatim. Custom binaries (ART trial scripts, build artifacts) becomecustom_tool_NNN(lex-sorted). VSCode commit-hash binaries (code-<40hex>) collapse to a singlevscode_server_binalias. The full original → alias map is shipped atreproduction/alias_map.json. - Composite re-composition.
parent_child_pairandtokenare regenerated from the aliased atomic columns via the canonicalformat_token, so the original (un-aliased) basename never re-enters these fields. - Path rewriting.
proc_cwd_normalizedis rewritten by ordered rules:/home/<user>→/home/_user_,/Users/<user>→/Users/_user_,/mnt/projects/<X>→/workspace/_project_,/projects/<X>→/workspace/_project_, residualrypow_→custom_. - Exec-id pseudonymization.
proc_exec_idandprocess_tree_root_exec_idare rewritten asexec_<32hex>via salted HMAC-SHA256 (16-byte digest, hex-encoded). Equality joins are preserved (lineage walks still work); the original base64-encodedhost:ts:pidpayload is erased. - Defensive global string sweep. A final substring pass over every
string column substitutes
rypow → research_user,prox1 → sandbox_host,dendroaspis → agent_platform_v02,ryan_admin → privileged_useras a safety net. - Post-write assertions. A regex sweep over the released shards
(notebook §22-24) confirms zero matches on raw or base64-decoded values
for any of:
prox1,rypow,ryan_admin,/home/rypow/,/projects/ml_final_project,/mnt/projects/,dendroaspis,/datasets/, MAC-address pattern.proc_exec_idandprocess_tree_root_exec_idare format-checked against^exec_[0-9a-f]{32}$. Every basename in the three basename columns is asserted to be in the alias-map closure.
Considerations for using the data
Sources of bias
- Single host, single developer. All baseline (benign) telemetry comes from one Linux container running one developer's daily workflow over six days. Tool habits (VSCode, npm, git, claude-code) appear at high frequency; absent activities (CI/CD pipelines, multi-tenant traffic, GPU jobs) are simply not represented.
- Container-internal UIDs. Tetragon 1.6.1 emits container-internal UIDs; the encoder buckets uids into 5 classes (ROOT / RESEARCH_USER / SYSTEM_LOW / DAEMON_HIGH / OTHER) rather than treating them as a continuous identifier. Researchers reusing these buckets on multi-host data should re-bucket.
- Time skew. Train spans 5 d 20 h, test spans only 4 h 15 m. The test window concentrates 30 % attack-event mass, which is unrealistically dense for production traffic; downstream metrics (AUROC, AP) on this corpus reflect the campaign's deliberate density.
- Hash-bucket sparsity. Hash columns are sized for plausible multi-host saturation; on this single-host corpus most are < 50 % utilized (see hash-bucket table above).
- Aliased basename narrative. The v0.2.1 anonymizer collapses a long
tail of one-off custom binaries into
custom_tool_NNNslots and folds per-build VSCode commit-hash binaries intovscode_server_bin. The resulting parquet looks like a "standardized agentic-research workstation" baseline more than the specific developer's machine; the true diversity of custom-script names was higher than what survives in the released string columns.
Social impact
This is a defensive-research dataset. It enables researchers to develop and benchmark host-anomaly-detection models without operating live attack infrastructure. The bundled ATT&CK technique inventory is not an attack tutorial — payload generation requires a separate Atomic Red Team installation and is out of scope.
Known limitations
- No ground-truth event-level labels. Labels are time-window only; some benign system activity (e.g. background daemons running during an ART technique window) is labeled-attack by association.
- Train has zero attack events. All ART intervals fall in test by construction. Unsupervised / self-supervised methods are the natural fit; fully supervised classifiers would need to engineer their own train-time positives.
- Single Tetragon version. Format quirks of Tetragon 1.6.1 (e.g.
KPROBE_ACTION enum coverage, ns-PID inum semantics) are baked in. Older
/ newer Tetragon emits slightly different envelopes; the parser pin in
reproduction/PARSER_VERSIONdocuments the exact reference build. - Linux only. Tetragon is Linux-only; this corpus has no Windows or macOS analogue.
Intended use + dual-use disclaimer
Intended use. This dataset supports:
- training and evaluating sequence / anomaly models on host telemetry,
- benchmarking baselines (n-gram, XGBoost, IsolationForest, LSTM, Mamba, Transformer) on a fixed split,
- studying ATT&CK-technique-specific detectability,
- research on attack representations, lineage features, and event encoders.
Not intended use. The attack telemetry is real ATT&CK technique execution but generated in an isolated lab LXC container; the corpus is not an attack template, not a payload library, and not a substitute for production EDR data. Operators who reuse the bundled tracing policies + parser to collect their own corpus are responsible for their own sandboxing.
Additional information
License
CC BY 4.0 — see LICENSE in this repo. Code under
reproduction/scripts/ (in the project repository) is MIT-licensed.
Citation
@dataset{dendroaspis_v0_2_2026,
title = {v0.2 Tetragon-native HIDS corpus with 21 ATT\&CK techniques},
author = {Powers, Ryan William},
year = {2026},
version = {0.2.1},
doi = {<TBD-on-publish>},
url = {<TBD-on-publish>}
}
Contact
GitHub: @ryypow. Issues / corrections preferred via the project repository.