qid stringlengths 13 15 | query_unmasked stringlengths 97 17.7k | query stringlengths 68 16.2k |
|---|---|---|
62018CJ0529-21 | 21 In paragraph 54 of the order under appeal, the General Court recalled, on the basis of the judgment of 6 September 2012, Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej v Commission (C‑422/11 P and C‑423/11 P, EU:C:2012:553, paragraph 24 and the case-law cited), that the concept of ‘independence’ of lawyers is defined not ... | 21 In of the order under appeal, the General Court recalled, on the basis of the judgment of Prezes and the case-law cited), that the concept of ‘independence’ of lawyers is defined not only positively, namely by reference to professional ethical obligations, but also negatively, that is to say, by the absence of an em... |
62018CJ0529-55 | 55 As a preliminary point, as regards EUIPO’s arguments alleging that the first and second grounds of appeal in Case C‑529/18 P are inadmissible, on the ground that they relate to questions of fact, it must be recalled that it follows from Article 256 TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Cou... | 55 As a preliminary point, as regards ’s arguments alleging that the first and second grounds of appeal in P are inadmissible, on the ground that they relate to questions of fact, it must be recalled that it follows from and the first paragraph of of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the Ge... |
62018CJ0529-58 | 58 As to the substance, it should be recalled, as regards the representation before the Courts of the European Union of a party not covered by the first two paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of that Statute, applicab... | 58 As to the substance, it should be recalled, as regards the representation before the Courts of the of a party not covered by the first two paragraphs of of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that the third and fourth paragraphs of of that Statute, applicable to proceedings before the General ... |
62018CJ0529-60 | 60 As regards the first condition, relating to the concept of ‘lawyer’, the Court has held that, in the absence of a reference in the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to the national law of the Member States, that concept must be given an autonomous and uniform ... | 60 As regards the first condition, relating to the concept of ‘lawyer’, the Court has held that, in the absence of a reference in the third paragraph of of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union to the national law of the Member States, that concept must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretat... |
62018CJ0529-61 | 61 In that regard, and as the General Court noted in paragraph 52 of the order under appeal, it is apparent from the wording of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in particular the use of the term ‘represented’, that a ‘party’, within the meaning of that prov... | 61 In that regard, and as the General Court noted in of the order under appeal, it is apparent from the wording of the third paragraph of of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the in particular the use of the term ‘represented’, that a ‘party’, within the meaning of that provision, whatever that party’s standing, i... |
62018CJ0529-62 | 62 That finding is confirmed by the context of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, from which it is clear that representation in legal proceedings of a party not covered by the first two paragraphs of that article can be provided only by a lawyer, whereas the ... | 62 That finding is confirmed by the context of the third paragraph of of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, from which it is clear that representation in legal proceedings of a party not covered by the first two paragraphs of that n be provided only by a lawyer, whereas the parties covered by th... |
62018CJ0529-63 | 63 That finding is borne out by the objective of parties not covered by the first two paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union being represented by a lawyer, which is, on the one hand, to prevent private parties from acting on their own behalf before the Courts without using... | 63 That finding is borne out by the objective of parties not covered by the first two paragraphs of of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the being represented by a lawyer, which is, on the one hand, to prevent private parties from acting on their own behalf before the Courts without using an intermediary and, on t... |
62018CJ0529-64 | 64 In that regard, the Court has emphasised that the objective of representation by a lawyer, as referred to in the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is to be carried out in the interests of the sound administration of justice, is above all to ... | 64 In that regard, the Court has emphasised that the objective of representation by a lawyer, as referred to in the third and fourth paragraphs of of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is to be carried out in the interests of the sound administration of justice, is above all to protect and... |
62018CJ0529-65 | 65 It is true that the concept of a lawyer’s ‘independence’ was initially developed in the context of document confidentiality in competition matters; the case-law, referred to in paragraphs 53 and 63 of the order under appeal, specified in that regard that a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to provide, in... | 65 It is true that the concept of a lawyer’s ‘independence’ was initially developed in the context of document confidentiality in competition matters; the case-law, referred to in of the order under appeal, specified in that regard that a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to provide, in the overriding inter... |
62018CJ0529-66 | 66 According to the case-law of the Court, the requirement of the independence of lawyers, in the specific context of Article 19 of the Statute, is determined not only negatively, that is to say, by the absence of an employment relationship, but also positively, that is by reference to professional ethical obligations ... | 66 According to the case-law of the Court, the requirement of the independence of lawyers, in the specific context of of the Statute, is determined not only negatively, that is to say, by the absence of an employment relationship, but also positively, that is by reference to professional ethical obligations (see, to th... |
62018CJ0529-68 | 68 In addition, as the General Court noted in paragraph 55 of the order under appeal, that reasoning applies with the same force in a situation in which lawyers are employed by an entity connected to the party they represent (judgment of 6 September 2012, Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej v Commission, C‑422/11 ... | 68 In addition, as the General Court noted in of the order under appeal, that reasoning applies with the same force in a situation in which lawyers are employed by an entity connected to the party they represent (judgment of Prezes ). |
62018CJ0529-69 | 69 As regards the positive definition of the concept of a lawyer’s ‘independence’, the Court has expressly stated that that independence must be understood not as the lack of any connection whatsoever between the lawyer and his or her client, but only of those which have a manifestly detrimental effect on his or her ca... | 69 As regards the positive definition of the concept of a lawyer’s ‘independence’, the Court has expressly stated that that independence must be understood not as the lack of any connection whatsoever between the lawyer and his or her client, but only of those which have a manifestly detrimental effect on his or her ca... |
62018CJ0529-72 | 72 However, as the Court has already noted, the mere existence of a civil law contractual relationship between a lawyer and his or her client is not sufficient for a finding that the lawyer is in a situation that clearly impairs his or her ability to defend his or her client’s interests in accordance with the criterion... | 72 However, as the Court has already noted, the mere existence of a civil law contractual relationship between a lawyer and his or her client is not sufficient for a finding that the lawyer is in a situation that clearly impairs his or her ability to defend his or her client’s interests in accordance with the criterion... |
62018CJ0529-75 | 75 It should, however, be recalled that, if the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but its operative part is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, the appeal must be dismissed (judgment of 22 September 2020, Austria v Commission, C‑594/18 P, EU:C:2020:742, paragraph... | 75 It should, however, be recalled that, if the grounds of a judgment of the General Court disclose an infringement of EU law but its operative part is shown to be well founded on other legal grounds, the appeal must be dismissed (judgment of Austria v Commission, P, and the case-law cited). |
62018CJ0529-86 | 86 It is important to recall that the principle of effective judicial protection of the rights which individuals derive from EU law, to which the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU also refers, is a general principle of EU law which derives from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States that is no... | 86 It is important to recall that the principle of effective judicial protection of the rights which individuals derive from EU law, to which the second subparagraph of also refers, is a general principle of EU law which derives from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States that is now affirmed in of t... |
62019CJ0106-105 | 105 The Commission points out that a distinction must be drawn between the political impact of a position taken by the Member States and its legally binding force, which is lacking in the present case. That distinction is, according to the Commission, confirmed by the case-law according to which, first, it is exclusive... | 105 The Commission points out that a distinction must be drawn between the political impact of a position taken by the Member States and its legally binding force, which is lacking in the present case. That distinction is, according to the Commission, confirmed by the case-law according to which, first, it is exclusive... |
62019CJ0106-106 | 106 The Commission adds that there is no reason to think that the co-legislator, which the Court has already recognised as being in a position to decide on the establishment of a body such as an agency of the Union (judgment of 2 May 2006, United Kingdom v Parliament and Council, C‑217/04, EU:C:2006:279, paragraphs 44 ... | 106 The Commission adds that there is no reason to think that the co-legislator, which the Court has already recognised as being in a position to decide on the establishment of a body such as an agency of the Union (judgment of ), cannot, as was the case here, decide with complete independence on the location of the se... |
62019CJ0106-111 | 111 According to settled case-law of the Court, the interpretation of a provision of EU law requires that account be taken not only of its wording and the objectives it pursues, but also of its context. The origins of a provision of EU law may also provide information relevant to its interpretation (see, to that effect... | 111 According to settled case-law of the Court, the interpretation of a provision of EU law requires that account be taken not only of its wording and the objectives it pursues, but also of its context. The origins of a provision of EU law may also provide information relevant to its interpretation (see, to that effect... |
62019CJ0106-118 | 118 Although the Court has held that the term ‘institutions’ within the meaning of that provision encompasses not only the institutions of the Union listed in Article 13(1) TEU but also all the bodies, offices and agencies of the Union that have been established by or under the Treaties and are intended to contribute t... | 118 Although the Court has held that the term ‘institutions’ within the meaning of that provision encompasses not only the institutions of the Union listed in but also all the bodies, offices and agencies of the Union that have been established by or under the Treaties and are intended to contribute to the achievement ... |
62019CJ0106-119 | 119 Thus, the broad interpretation given by the Court to the concept of ‘institutions’, for the purposes of applying the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, meets the need, justified by the general principles common to the laws of the Member States expressly referred to in that provision, to prevent the European Unio... | 119 Thus, the broad interpretation given by the Court to the concept of ‘institutions’, for the purposes of applying the second paragraph of meets the need, justified by the general principles common to the laws of the Member States expressly referred to in that provision, to prevent the from being able to avoid the ap... |
62019CJ0106-126 | 126 Nevertheless, first, the sole article of that protocol fixes, in terms comparable to those of Article 1 of the Edinburgh Decision, the seat only of institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union set up by the Member States. Secondly, although the Court recognised that that decision had binding legal force, ... | 126 Nevertheless, first, the sole article of that protocol fixes, in terms comparable to those of of the Edinburgh Decision, the seat only of institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union set up by the Member States. Secondly, although the Court recognised that that decision had binding legal force, in the jud... |
62019CJ0106-130 | 130 In any event, such a practice, which would run counter to the rules of the FEU Treaty and, in particular, Article 341 TFEU, by extending, notwithstanding its clear wording, the scope of that article to the location of the seat of the bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, could not create a precedent binding on... | 130 In any event, such a practice, which would run counter to the rules of the and, in particular, by extending, notwithstanding its clear wording, the scope of that article to the location of the seat of the bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, could not create a precedent binding on the institutions (see, to th... |
62019CJ0106-136 | 136 However, the political nature of the decision determining the location of the seat of such a body, office or agency of the Union is not in itself such as to justify that decision falling outside the competence of the EU legislature, which is indeed regularly called upon to make political choices in the exercise of ... | 136 However, the political nature of the decision determining the location of the seat of such a body, office or agency of the Union is not in itself such as to justify that decision falling outside the competence of the legislature, which is indeed regularly called upon to make political choices in the exercise of the... |
62019CJ0106-146 | 146 The Parliament and the Council’s legislative power, conferred in Article 14(1) TEU and Article 16(1) TEU, which reflects the principle of conferred powers, enshrined in Article 13(2) TEU and, more broadly, the principle of institutional balance, characteristic of the institutional structure of the European Union, m... | 146 The and the Council’s legislative power, conferred in and which reflects the principle of conferred powers, enshrined in and, more broadly, the principle of institutional balance, characteristic of the institutional structure of the means that it is for those institutions alone to decide the content of a measure (j... |
62019CJ0106-156 | 156 However, it cannot be inferred from that statement that the Parliament took the view that the decision of 20 November 2017 was legally binding. It is true that that decision and the selection process which preceded it may have had significant political importance, having regard in particular to the fact, relied on ... | 156 However, it cannot be inferred from that statement that the took the view that the decision of was legally binding. It is true that that decision and the selection process which preceded it may have had significant political importance, having regard in particular to the fact, relied on by the that it was imperativ... |
62019CJ0106-40 | 40 The granting of that request would not have enabled the Italian Republic to obtain suspension of the ongoing implementation of the contested regulation and, in particular, the process of transferring the seat of the EMA from London to Amsterdam. Moreover, the sensitive and complex nature of the legal problems raised... | 40 The granting of that request would not have enabled the to obtain suspension of the ongoing implementation of the contested regulation and, in particular, the process of transferring the seat of the from to . Moreover, the sensitive and complex nature of the legal problems raised by and the related cases to which th... |
62019CJ0106-54 | 54 Like any natural or legal person referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, such entities are subject to the specific conditions laid down by that provision. They must therefore establish, separately and cumulatively, both an interest in bringing proceedings and locus standi against the act the annulme... | 54 Like any natural or legal person referred to in the fourth paragraph of such entities are subject to the specific conditions laid down by that provision. They must therefore establish, separately and cumulatively, both an interest in bringing proceedings and locus standi against the act the annulment of which they s... |
62019CJ0106-55 | 55 According to the Court’s settled case-law, an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as that person has an interest in having the contested act annulled. Such an interest requires that the annulment of that act must be capable, in itself, of having legal consequences a... | 55 According to the Court’s settled case-law, an action for annulment brought by a natural or legal person is admissible only in so far as that person has an interest in having the contested act annulled. Such an interest requires that the annulment of that act must be capable, in itself, of having legal consequences a... |
62019CJ0106-59 | 59 In that regard, a regional or local entity may, in so far as, like the Comune di Milano, it has legal personality under national law, bring an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (judgment of 22 June 2021, Venezuela v Council (Whether a third state is affected), C‑872/19 P, EU:C:2021:... | 59 In that regard, a regional or local entity may, in so far as, like the it has legal personality under national law, bring an action for annulment under the fourth paragraph of (judgment of (Whether a third state is affected), P, and the case-law cited). |
62019CJ0106-61 | 61 In the first place, concerning whether the Commune di Milano is directly concerned by the contested regulation, it should be noted that the requirement laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, that a natural or legal person must be directly concerned by the measure forming the subject matter of the pro... | 61 In the first place, concerning whether the Commune di Milano is directly concerned by the contested regulation, it should be noted that the requirement laid down in the fourth paragraph of that a natural or legal person must be directly concerned by the measure forming the subject matter of the proceedings requires ... |
62019CJ0106-85 | 85 That resulted in an infringement of the institutional balance of the European Union and of the principles of representative democracy and sincere cooperation (judgment of 21 June 2018, Poland v Parliament and Council, C‑5/16, EU:C:2018:483, paragraph 90) and an infringement of an essential procedural requirement (ju... | 85 That resulted in an infringement of the institutional balance of the and of the principles of representative democracy and sincere cooperation (judgment of ) and an infringement of an essential procedural requirement (judgment of ). |
62019CJ0144-100 | 100 The principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law cannot therefore be interpreted as precluding the gradual, case-by-case clarification of the rules on criminal liability by judicial interpretation, provided that the result was reasonably foreseeable at the time the offence was committed, especially ... | 100 The principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law cannot therefore be interpreted as precluding the gradual, case-by-case clarification of the rules on criminal liability by judicial interpretation, provided that the result was reasonably foreseeable at the time the offence was committed, especially ... |
62019CJ0144-101 | 101 The scope of the notion of foreseeability depends to a considerable degree on the content of the text in issue, the field it covers and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. A law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to take appropriate legal advice ... | 101 The scope of the notion of foreseeability depends to a considerable degree on the content of the text in issue, the field it covers and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. A law may still satisfy the requirement of foreseeability even if the person concerned has to take appropriate legal advice ... |
62019CJ0144-102 | 102 It should also be pointed out that it is in no way necessary that the same type of agreement has already been penalised by the Commission in order for such agreements to be considered to be restrictive of competition by object, and that remains the case even if they occur in a specific context, such as that of inte... | 102 It should also be pointed out that it is in no way necessary that the same type of agreement has already been penalised by the Commission in order for such agreements to be considered to be restrictive of competition by object, and that remains the case even if they occur in a specific context, such as that of inte... |
62019CJ0144-105 | 105 Similarly, Lupin’s argument that the unforeseeable nature of the infringement attributed to it is confirmed by the fact that the General Court, in paragraph 282 of the judgment under appeal, referred to the judgment of 20 November 2008, Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers (C‑209/07, EU:C:2008:643, ... | 105 Similarly, ’s argument that the unforeseeable nature of the infringement attributed to it is confirmed by the fact that the General Court, in of the judgment under appeal, referred to the judgment of Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers (, ), whereas that judgment was delivered after the conclusion ... |
62019CJ0144-106 | 106 That assessment simply reflects the very essence of Article 101 TFEU. It follows that Lupin cannot claim that the Court of Justice’s interpretation of Article 101 TFEU in that judgment, which was delivered after the conclusion of the Lupin agreement, is such as to render unforeseeable the infringement attributed to... | 106 That assessment simply reflects the very essence of . It follows that cannot claim that the Court of Justice’s interpretation of in that judgment, which was delivered after the conclusion of the Lupin agreement, is such as to render unforeseeable the infringement attributed to it. In that regard, it should be recal... |
62019CJ0144-137 | 137 As regards the second part of the fourth ground of appeal, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. That principle requires that comparable... | 137 As regards the second part of the fourth ground of appeal, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the . That principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated d... |
62019CJ0144-154 | 154 In that regard, it should be recalled that it is not for the Court of Justice, when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the General Court exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed on undertak... | 154 In that regard, it should be recalled that it is not for the Court of Justice, when ruling on questions of law in the context of an appeal, to substitute, on grounds of fairness, its own assessment for that of the General Court exercising its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines imposed on undertak... |
62019CJ0144-164 | 164 As has been recalled in paragraph 137 of the present judgment, the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. According to settled case-law, that principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently an... | 164 As has been recalled in of the present judgment, the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EU law, enshrined in of the . According to settled case-law, that principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same wa... |
62019CJ0144-49 | 49 Accordingly, if the conduct of undertakings is to be subject to the prohibition in principle laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU, that conduct must reveal the existence of coordination between them, in other words, an agreement between undertakings, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice (... | 49 Accordingly, if the conduct of undertakings is to be subject to the prohibition in principle laid down in that conduct must reveal the existence of coordination between them, in other words, an agreement between undertakings, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice (see, to that effect, ... |
62019CJ0144-50 | 50 In addition, it is necessary to demonstrate, in accordance with the very wording of that provision, either that that conduct has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, or that that conduct has such an effect (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company , C‑333/21, EU:C... | 50 In addition, it is necessary to demonstrate, in accordance with the very wording of that provision, either that that conduct has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, or that that conduct has such an effect (judgment of European Superleague Company ). It follows that that provision,... |
62019CJ0144-51 | 51 Accordingly, as regards practices characterised as restrictions of competition by object, there is no need to investigate nor a fortiori to demonstrate their effects on competition, in so far as experience shows that such behaviour leads to falls in production and price increases, resulting in poor allocation of res... | 51 Accordingly, as regards practices characterised as restrictions of competition by object, there is no need to investigate nor a fortiori to demonstrate their effects on competition, in so far as experience shows that such behaviour leads to falls in production and price increases, resulting in poor allocation of res... |
62019CJ0144-52 | 52 On the other hand, where the anticompetitive object of an agreement, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice is not established, it is necessary to examine its effects in order to prove that competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent (see, ... | 52 On the other hand, where the anticompetitive object of an agreement, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice is not established, it is necessary to examine its effects in order to prove that competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent (see, ... |
62019CJ0144-53 | 53 That distinction arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition (judgments of 20 November 2008, Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers , C‑209/07, EU:C:2008:643, paragrap... | 53 That distinction arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition (judgments of and and of and Others ). |
62019CJ0144-54 | 54 It is true, as Lupin has submitted, that the concept of a restriction of competition by object must be interpreted strictly and can be applied only to certain agreements between undertakings which reveal, in themselves and having regard to the content of their provisions, their objectives, and the economic and legal... | 54 It is true, as has submitted, that the concept of a restriction of competition by object must be interpreted strictly and can be applied only to certain agreements between undertakings which reveal, in themselves and having regard to the content of their provisions, their objectives, and the economic and legal conte... |
62019CJ0144-57 | 57 Accordingly, the assessment of the degree of economic harm of an agreement to the proper functioning of competition in the market concerned must be based on objective considerations, where necessary as a result of a detailed analysis of the agreement at issue, its objectives and the economic and legal context of whi... | 57 Accordingly, the assessment of the degree of economic harm of an agreement to the proper functioning of competition in the market concerned must be based on objective considerations, where necessary as a result of a detailed analysis of the agreement at issue, its objectives and the economic and legal context of whi... |
62019CJ0144-58 | 58 In that context, it should also be borne in mind that a manufacturer of generic medicines, after assessing its chances of success in the court proceedings between it and the manufacturer of the originator medicine concerned, may decide to abandon entry to the market in question and to conclude with that manufacturer... | 58 In that context, it should also be borne in mind that a manufacturer of generic medicines, after assessing its chances of success in the court proceedings between it and the manufacturer of the originator medicine concerned, may decide to abandon entry to the market in question and to conclude with that manufacturer... |
62019CJ0144-59 | 59 Consequently, wherever an agreement to settle a dispute relating to the validity of a patent between a manufacturer of generic medicines and a manufacturer of originator medicines that holds that patent involves transfers of value by the manufacturer of originator medicines in favour of the manufacturer of generic m... | 59 Consequently, wherever an agreement to settle a dispute relating to the validity of a patent between a manufacturer of generic medicines and a manufacturer of originator medicines that holds that patent involves transfers of value by the manufacturer of originator medicines in favour of the manufacturer of generic m... |
62019CJ0144-61 | 61 Second, if that net gain from the transfers is not fully justified by such a need, it must be ascertained whether, in the absence of such justification, those transfers can have no explanation other than the commercial interest of those manufacturers of medicinal products not to engage in competition on the merits. ... | 61 Second, if that net gain from the transfers is not fully justified by such a need, it must be ascertained whether, in the absence of such justification, those transfers can have no explanation other than the commercial interest of those manufacturers of medicinal products not to engage in competition on the merits. ... |
62019CJ0144-63 | 63 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law referred to in paragraphs 54 to 57 of the present judgment, characterisation as a restriction of competition by object must be based not only on a detailed analysis of the agreement intended to implement a collusive practice, but also of its ... | 63 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law referred to in of the present judgment, characterisation as a restriction of competition by object must be based not only on a detailed analysis of the agreement intended to implement a collusive practice, but also of its objectives and the e... |
62019CJ0144-65 | 65 Thus, settlement agreements whereby a manufacturer of generic medicines that is seeking to enter a market recognises, at least temporarily, the validity of a patent held by a manufacturer of originator medicines and gives an undertaking, as a result, not to challenge that patent nor indeed to enter that market are l... | 65 Thus, settlement agreements whereby a manufacturer of generic medicines that is seeking to enter a market recognises, at least temporarily, the validity of a patent held by a manufacturer of originator medicines and gives an undertaking, as a result, not to challenge that patent nor indeed to enter that market are l... |
62019CJ0144-66 | 66 In addition, Lupin’s line of argument does not take account of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 59 to 61 of the present judgment, from which it follows that the test for determining whether a settlement agreement such as the Lupin agreement constitutes a restriction of competition by object consists in ascerta... | 66 In addition, ’s line of argument does not take account of the case-law referred to in of the present judgment, from which it follows that the test for determining whether a settlement agreement such as the Lupin agreement constitutes a restriction of competition by object consists in ascertaining whether the transfe... |
62019CJ0144-94 | 94 In the alternative, Lupin submits that, in accordance with what was held by the Court of Justice in the judgment of 3 July 1991, AKZO v Commission (C‑62/86, EU:C:1991:286, paragraph 163), and by the General Court in the judgment of 30 September 2003, Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission (T‑191/98 and T‑21... | 94 In the alternative, submits that, in accordance with what was held by the Court of Justice in the judgment of and by the General Court in the judgment of the General Court should have reduced the amount of the fine on account of the novelty of the infringement found by the decision at issue. It argues that, although... |
62019CJ0144-97 | 97 As regards Lupin’s principal line of argument, it should be recalled that it is apparent from Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 that the Commission may by decision impose fines on undertakings and associations of undertakings where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 101 or 102 TFEU. That... | 97 As regards ’s principal line of argument, it should be recalled that it is apparent from of Regulation No that the Commission may by decision impose fines on undertakings and associations of undertakings where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe . That condition is satisfied where the undertaking con... |
62019CJ0144-98 | 98 Thus, all that matters is whether that undertaking was in a position to determine that its conduct was objectively anticompetitive in nature (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 March 2021, Lundbeck v Commission , C‑591/16 P, EU:C:2021:243, paragraph 158). | 98 Thus, all that matters is whether that undertaking was in a position to determine that its conduct was objectively anticompetitive in nature (see, to that effect, judgment of ). |
62019CJ0151-105 | 105 As regards the admissibility of the third and fifth parts of the first ground of appeal, it should be borne in mind that, on appeal, complaints based on findings of fact and on the assessment of those facts in the contested decision are admissible on appeal where it is claimed that the General Court has made findin... | 105 As regards the admissibility of the third and fifth parts of the first ground of appeal, it should be borne in mind that, on appeal, complaints based on findings of fact and on the assessment of those facts in the contested decision are admissible on appeal where it is claimed that the General Court has made findin... |
62019CJ0151-106 | 106 That distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new appraisal of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 28 January 2021, Qualcomm and Qualcomm Europe v Commission , C‑466/19 P, EU:C:2021:76, paragraph 43). Although such a distortion may consist in... | 106 That distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new appraisal of the facts and the evidence (judgment of . Although such a distortion may consist in an interpretation of a document that is at odds with its content, that must be manifestly clear fro... |
62019CJ0151-110 | 110 In order to assess whether the General Court distorted the decision of the High Court of 3 October 2006 and the EPO decision of 27 July 2006, the review carried out by the Court of Justice is limited to verifying that the General Court did not manifestly exceed the limits of a reasonable assessment of that evidence... | 110 In order to assess whether the General Court distorted the decision of the High Court of and the EPO decision of the review carried out by the Court of Justice is limited to verifying that the General Court did not manifestly exceed the limits of a reasonable assessment of that evidence. The task of the Court of Ju... |
62019CJ0151-124 | 124 It is therefore clear, on reading that material, that the decision at issue, examined as a whole, was intended to demonstrate, on the basis of a body of consistent evidence, that Krka had not resigned itself to recognising the validity of the 947 patent following the EPO decision of 27 July 2006, despite the doubts... | 124 It is therefore clear, on reading that material, that the decision at issue, examined as a whole, was intended to demonstrate, on the basis of a body of consistent evidence, that had not resigned itself to recognising the validity of the 947 patent following the EPO decision of despite the doubts to which that deci... |
62019CJ0151-125 | 125 In so doing, the General Court distorted the meaning and scope of the decision at issue in so far as it relates to the effects of the EPO decision of 27 July 2006 on Krka’s recognition of the validity of the 947 patent (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 September 2003, Belgium v Commission , C‑197/99 P, EU:C:2003:444... | 125 In so doing, the General Court distorted the meaning and scope of the decision at issue in so far as it relates to the effects of the EPO decision of on ’s recognition of the validity of the 947 patent (see, by analogy, judgment of Belgium v Commission P, ). In addition, it infringed its obligation under of the Sta... |
62019CJ0151-134 | 134 By the second part of its second ground of appeal, the Commission complains that the General Court held, in paragraphs 199 and 201 to 208 of the judgment under appeal, that, where there is a genuine dispute relating to a patent, the linking of a settlement agreement with a licence agreement does not constitute a st... | 134 By the second part of its second ground of appeal, the Commission complains that the General Court held, in of the judgment under appeal, that, where there is a genuine dispute relating to a patent, the linking of a settlement agreement with a licence agreement does not constitute a strong indication of reverse pay... |
62019CJ0151-141 | 141 It is true that the fact that undertakings conclude a patent dispute settlement agreement linked to a licence agreement concerning that patent does not, in itself, constitute conduct restricting competition. Nevertheless, such agreements may, depending on both their content and their economic context, serve as an i... | 141 It is true that the fact that undertakings conclude a patent dispute settlement agreement linked to a licence agreement concerning that patent does not, in itself, constitute conduct restricting competition. Nevertheless, such agreements may, depending on both their content and their economic context, serve as an i... |
62019CJ0151-142 | 142 In order to be caught by the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU, a collusive practice must fulfil certain conditions depending not on the legal nature of that practice or on the legal instruments intended to implement it, but on its relationship with competition. Since the application of that provision is... | 142 In order to be caught by the prohibition laid down in a collusive practice must fulfil certain conditions depending not on the legal nature of that practice or on the legal instruments intended to implement it, but on its relationship with competition. Since the application of that provision is based on an assessme... |
62019CJ0151-143 | 143 Apart from the fact that, in the present case, the Krka settlement and licence agreements relate to separate markets and that the markets covered by the Krka licence agreement do not fall within the scope of the infringement of Article 101 TFEU, it must be pointed out that, while the conclusion by the holder of a p... | 143 Apart from the fact that, in the present case, the Krka settlement and licence agreements relate to separate markets and that the markets covered by the Krka licence agreement do not fall within the scope of the infringement of it must be pointed out that, while the conclusion by the holder of a patent of a settlem... |
62019CJ0151-145 | 145 Furthermore, as noted in paragraph 75 of the present judgment, the fact that undertakings the conduct of which could be regarded as a restriction of competition by object acted without having an intention to prevent, restrict or distort competition and the fact that they pursued certain legitimate objectives are no... | 145 Furthermore, as noted in of the present judgment, the fact that undertakings the conduct of which could be regarded as a restriction of competition by object acted without having an intention to prevent, restrict or distort competition and the fact that they pursued certain legitimate objectives are not decisive fo... |
62019CJ0151-146 | 146 That is why, in order to determine whether a collusive practice may be classified as a restriction of competition by object, it is necessary to examine its content, its origin and its legal and economic context, in particular the specific characteristics of the market in which its effects will actually occur. The f... | 146 That is why, in order to determine whether a collusive practice may be classified as a restriction of competition by object, it is necessary to examine its content, its origin and its legal and economic context, in particular the specific characteristics of the market in which its effects will actually occur. The f... |
62019CJ0151-175 | 175 By the first part of its third ground of appeal, the Commission criticises paragraphs 240 to 242 of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court held that a market-sharing agreement presupposes a ‘hermetic’ division of the markets between the parties. That assessment is contrary to Article 101(1)(c) TFEU, ... | 175 By the first part of its third ground of appeal, the Commission criticises of the judgment under appeal, in which the General Court held that a market-sharing agreement presupposes a ‘hermetic’ division of the markets between the parties. That assessment is contrary to which, as is apparent from the judgment of ( t... |
62019CJ0151-189 | 189 It is in fact true that a patent dispute settlement agreement and a licence agreement for that patent may be concluded, with a legitimate aim and entirely lawfully, on the basis of the parties’ recognition of the validity of that patent, in the absence of any other circumstance constituting an infringement of Artic... | 189 It is in fact true that a patent dispute settlement agreement and a licence agreement for that patent may be concluded, with a legitimate aim and entirely lawfully, on the basis of the parties’ recognition of the validity of that patent, in the absence of any other circumstance constituting an infringement of . How... |
62019CJ0151-200 | 200 In order to determine whether an agreement between undertakings reveals such a degree of harm, regard must be had to the content of its provisions, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part. When determining that context, it is also necessary to take into consideration the nature of... | 200 In order to determine whether an agreement between undertakings reveals such a degree of harm, regard must be had to the content of its provisions, its objectives and the economic and legal context of which it forms a part. When determining that context, it is also necessary to take into consideration the nature of... |
62019CJ0151-201 | 201 However, as has been pointed out in paragraphs 60 and 61 of the present judgment, and as the Commission rightly points out, as regards practices classified as restrictions of competition by object, there is no need to investigate or, a fortiori, to demonstrate their effects on competition. Experience shows that cer... | 201 However, as has been pointed out in of the present judgment, and as the Commission rightly points out, as regards practices classified as restrictions of competition by object, there is no need to investigate or, a fortiori, to demonstrate their effects on competition. Experience shows that certain behaviour is in ... |
62019CJ0151-225 | 225 Second, as regards the importance attached, in paragraph 252 of that judgment, to the content of the Krka settlement and licence agreements, the General Court, in essence, followed an erroneous line of reasoning, of an ‘ a contrario ’ nature, and misinterpreted the case-law arising from the judgment of 7 January 20... | 225 Second, as regards the importance attached, in of that judgment, to the content of the Krka settlement and licence agreements, the General Court, in essence, followed an erroneous line of reasoning, of an ‘ a contrario ’ nature, and misinterpreted the case-law arising from the judgment of ( P, P, P, P, P and P, ), ... |
62019CJ0151-239 | 239 In paragraph 252 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court correctly recalled, referring to the judgment of 25 January 2007, Sumitomo Metal Industries and Nippon Steel v Commission (C‑403/04 P and C‑405/04 P, EU:C:2007:52, paragraph 51), that, even if the Commission discovers evidence explicitly showing unlaw... | 239 In of the judgment under appeal, the General Court correctly recalled, referring to the judgment of that, even if the Commission discovers evidence explicitly showing unlawful contact between traders, it will normally be only fragmentary and sparse, so that it is often necessary to reconstitute certain details by d... |
62019CJ0151-240 | 240 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in EU law, the prevailing principle is that evidence may be freely adduced and that the only criterion for the purpose of assessing the evidence adduced is its credibility (judgments of 25 January 2007, Dalmine v Commission , C‑407/04 P, EU:C:2007:53, paragraphs 49 and... | 240 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that, in EU law, the prevailing principle is that evidence may be freely adduced and that the only criterion for the purpose of assessing the evidence adduced is its credibility (judgments of and of . |
62019CJ0151-241 | 241 In order to satisfy the burden of proof incumbent on it, the Commission must gather sufficiently serious, precise and consistent evidence to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement took place (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 March 1984, Compagnie royale asturienne des mines and Rheinzink v Co... | 241 In order to satisfy the burden of proof incumbent on it, the Commission must gather sufficiently serious, precise and consistent evidence to support the firm conviction that the alleged infringement took place (see, to that effect, judgments of and of ). |
62019CJ0151-242 | 242 However, it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 October... | 242 However, it is not necessary for every item of evidence produced by the Commission to satisfy those criteria in relation to every aspect of the infringement. It is sufficient if the body of evidence relied on by the institution, viewed as a whole, meets that requirement (see, to that effect, judgments of P, P, P, P... |
62019CJ0151-244 | 244 As has already been stated, in paragraph 146 of the present judgment, in response to the second part of the second ground of appeal, the fact that the terms of agreements intended to implement a collusive practice do not reveal an anticompetitive object is not, in itself, decisive. That is why it is necessary to ta... | 244 As has already been stated, in of the present judgment, in response to the second part of the second ground of appeal, the fact that the terms of agreements intended to implement a collusive practice do not reveal an anticompetitive object is not, in itself, decisive. That is why it is necessary to take into accoun... |
62019CJ0151-288 | 288 In the first place, after recalling, in paragraphs 317 to 342 of that judgment, the grounds which led the Commission to adopt that classification, the General Court held, in paragraphs 345 to 377 of that judgment, that the case-law relating to the taking into account of the potential effects of an agreement, in par... | 288 In the first place, after recalling, in of that judgment, the grounds which led the Commission to adopt that classification, the General Court held, in of that judgment, that the case-law relating to the taking into account of the potential effects of an agreement, in particular that resulting from the judgments of... |
62019CJ0151-304 | 304 According to Krka, agreements that have been implemented but have no actual effects cannot harm competition. Furthermore, although Article 101(1) TFEU permits both the actual and potential effects of an agreement on competition to be taken into account, that latter category of effects can only be taken into conside... | 304 According to agreements that have been implemented but have no actual effects cannot harm competition. Furthermore, although permits both the actual and potential effects of an agreement on competition to be taken into account, that latter category of effects can only be taken into consideration so long as the agre... |
62019CJ0151-306 | 306 According to Krka, the case-law requires the counterfactual scenario to be realistic and, where appropriate, to take account of the likely developments that would occur on the market in the absence of the agreements in question. According to the judgment of 11 September 2014, MasterCard and Others v Commission (C‑3... | 306 According to the case-law requires the counterfactual scenario to be realistic and, where appropriate, to take account of the likely developments that would occur on the market in the absence of the agreements in question. According to the judgment of such a scenario should be not only economically viable but also ... |
62019CJ0151-316 | 316 According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, recalled by the General Court in paragraph 315 of the judgment under appeal, in order to assess the existence of anticompetitive effects caused by an agreement between undertakings, it is necessary to compare the competitive situation resulting from that ag... | 316 According to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, recalled by the General Court in of the judgment under appeal, in order to assess the existence of anticompetitive effects caused by an agreement between undertakings, it is necessary to compare the competitive situation resulting from that agreement and th... |
62019CJ0151-318 | 318 The raison d’être of the counterfactual method is that any attempt to identify such a relationship of cause and effect runs up against the fact that it is impossible, in practice, to observe the state of the market at the same time with and without the agreement concerned, as those two states are, by definition, mu... | 318 The raison d’être of the counterfactual method is that any attempt to identify such a relationship of cause and effect runs up against the fact that it is impossible, in practice, to observe the state of the market at the same time with and without the agreement concerned, as those two states are, by definition, mu... |
62019CJ0151-329 | 329 Moreover, the distinction drawn by the General Court in paragraphs 345 to 377 of the judgment under appeal, for the purposes of classifying agreements concluded by undertakings as a restriction of competition by effect, depending on whether or not the agreement has been implemented, disregards the settled case-law ... | 329 Moreover, the distinction drawn by the General Court in of the judgment under appeal, for the purposes of classifying agreements concluded by undertakings as a restriction of competition by effect, depending on whether or not the agreement has been implemented, disregards the settled case-law of the Court of Justic... |
62019CJ0151-330 | 330 In the third place, as noted in paragraph 317 of the present judgment, the counterfactual method is not intended to foresee what a party’s conduct would have been if it had not concluded an agreement with its competitor or competitors, but to identify a causal relationship between that agreement and a deterioration... | 330 In the third place, as noted in of the present judgment, the counterfactual method is not intended to foresee what a party’s conduct would have been if it had not concluded an agreement with its competitor or competitors, but to identify a causal relationship between that agreement and a deterioration in the compet... |
62019CJ0151-354 | 354 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the existence of an infringement of the competition rules can only be correctly determined if the evidence upon which the contested decision is based is considered, not in isolation, but as a whole, account being taken of the specific features of the market of the ... | 354 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the existence of an infringement of the competition rules can only be correctly determined if the evidence upon which the contested decision is based is considered, not in isolation, but as a whole, account being taken of the specific features of the market of the ... |
62019CJ0151-358 | 358 In the present case, in order to determine whether Krka is justified in claiming that, on account of the EPO decision of 27 July 2006 and the decision of the High Court of 3 October 2006, it no longer had the ability or the firm intention to enter Servier’s core markets, and therefore no longer constituted a source... | 358 In the present case, in order to determine whether is justified in claiming that, on account of the EPO decision of and the decision of the it no longer had the ability or the firm intention to enter Servier’s core markets, and therefore no longer constituted a source of potential competition, it should be borne in... |
62019CJ0151-366 | 366 However, nor does that initiative show that Krka had decided not to compete with Servier on the latter’s core markets by means of its perindopril composed of the alpha crystalline form of erbumine protected by the 947 patent. As is apparent from the evidence relied on by the Commission in recitals 912 and 1688 of t... | 366 However, nor does that initiative show that had decided not to compete with on the latter’s core markets by means of its perindopril composed of the alpha crystalline form of erbumine protected by the 947 patent. As is apparent from the evidence relied on by the Commission in of the decision at issue, was aware tha... |
62019CJ0151-367 | 367 It should be recalled in that regard that the conclusion of an agreement between a number of undertakings, operating at the same level in the production chain, some of which have no presence in the market concerned, constitutes a strong indication that a competitive relationship exists between those undertakings (j... | 367 It should be recalled in that regard that the conclusion of an agreement between a number of undertakings, operating at the same level in the production chain, some of which have no presence in the market concerned, constitutes a strong indication that a competitive relationship exists between those undertakings (j... |
62019CJ0151-394 | 394 Furthermore, it is indeed true, as has been held in paragraph 189 of the present judgment, that patent dispute settlement agreements, like licence agreements associated with such agreements, may be concluded with a legitimate aim and entirely lawfully on the basis of the parties’ recognition of the validity of the ... | 394 Furthermore, it is indeed true, as has been held in of the present judgment, that patent dispute settlement agreements, like licence agreements associated with such agreements, may be concluded with a legitimate aim and entirely lawfully on the basis of the parties’ recognition of the validity of the patent in ques... |
62019CJ0151-410 | 410 It should be added, so far as this point is relevant, to the extent that Krka seeks, by some of its arguments, to downplay the degree of harmfulness of the Krka agreements, that there is no doubt that the restriction of competition found by the Commission was sufficiently harmful to be classified as a restriction o... | 410 It should be added, so far as this point is relevant, to the extent that seeks, by some of its arguments, to downplay the degree of harmfulness of the Krka agreements, that there is no doubt that the restriction of competition found by the Commission was sufficiently harmful to be classified as a restriction of com... |
62019CJ0151-424 | 424 As has already been held in paragraph 331 of the present judgment, it was for the Commission to prove that the counterfactual scenario used was realistic and credible. As is apparent, in essence, from paragraph 332 of the present judgment, in so far as, in the present case, the restriction of competition at issue r... | 424 As has already been held in of the present judgment, it was for the Commission to prove that the counterfactual scenario used was realistic and credible. As is apparent, in essence, from of the present judgment, in so far as, in the present case, the restriction of competition at issue related to the elimination of... |
62019CJ0151-434 | 434 The applicability of the exemption provided for in Article 101(3) TFEU is subject to satisfaction of four cumulative requirements laid down in that provision. Those requirements are, first, that the arrangement concerned must contribute to improving the production or distribution of the goods or services in questio... | 434 The applicability of the exemption provided for in is subject to satisfaction of four cumulative requirements laid down in that provision. Those requirements are, first, that the arrangement concerned must contribute to improving the production or distribution of the goods or services in question, or to promoting t... |
62019CJ0151-438 | 438 In the light of those factors, the restrictions of competition resulting from the Krka agreements cannot be regarded as being ‘indispensable’ within the meaning of the third requirement for enjoying an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU (see, by analogy, judgment of 23 January 2018, F. Hoffmann-La Roche and Others... | 438 In the light of those factors, the restrictions of competition resulting from the Krka agreements cannot be regarded as being ‘indispensable’ within the meaning of the third requirement for enjoying an exemption under (see, by analogy, judgment of ). |
62019CJ0151-58 | 58 Accordingly, if the conduct of undertakings is to be subject to the prohibition in principle laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU, that conduct must reveal the existence of coordination between them, in other words, an agreement between undertakings, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice (... | 58 Accordingly, if the conduct of undertakings is to be subject to the prohibition in principle laid down in that conduct must reveal the existence of coordination between them, in other words, an agreement between undertakings, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice (see, to that effect, ... |
62019CJ0151-59 | 59 The latter requirement means, with respect to horizontal cooperation agreements entered into by undertakings that operate at the same level of the production or distribution chain, that the coordination involves undertakings which are in competition with each other, if not in reality, then at least potentially (judg... | 59 The latter requirement means, with respect to horizontal cooperation agreements entered into by undertakings that operate at the same level of the production or distribution chain, that the coordination involves undertakings which are in competition with each other, if not in reality, then at least potentially (judg... |
62019CJ0151-60 | 60 In addition, it is necessary to demonstrate, in accordance with the very wording of that provision, either that that conduct has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, or that that conduct has such an effect (judgment of 21 December 2023, European Superleague Company , C‑333/21, EU:C... | 60 In addition, it is necessary to demonstrate, in accordance with the very wording of that provision, either that that conduct has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, or that that conduct has such an effect (judgment of European Superleague Company ). It follows that that provision,... |
62019CJ0151-61 | 61 Accordingly, as regards practices characterised as restrictions of competition by object, there is no need to investigate nor a fortiori to demonstrate their effects on competition, in so far as experience shows that such behaviour leads to falls in production and price increases, resulting in poor allocation of res... | 61 Accordingly, as regards practices characterised as restrictions of competition by object, there is no need to investigate nor a fortiori to demonstrate their effects on competition, in so far as experience shows that such behaviour leads to falls in production and price increases, resulting in poor allocation of res... |
62019CJ0151-62 | 62 On the other hand, where the anticompetitive object of an agreement, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice is not established, it is necessary to examine its effects in order to prove that competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent (see, ... | 62 On the other hand, where the anticompetitive object of an agreement, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice is not established, it is necessary to examine its effects in order to prove that competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent (see, ... |
62019CJ0151-63 | 63 That distinction arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition (judgments of 20 November 2008, Beef Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers , C‑209/07, EU:C:2008:643, paragrap... | 63 That distinction arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition (judgments of and and of and Others ). The concept of restriction of competition by object must be interpreted strictly ... |
62019CJ0151-64 | 64 The Court has already held that market-sharing agreements constitute particularly serious breaches of the competition rules (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 2013, Gosselin Group v Commission , C‑429/11 P, EU:C:2013:463, paragraph 50; of 5 December 2013, Solvay Solexis v Commission , C‑449/11 P, EU:C:2013:8... | 64 The Court has already held that market-sharing agreements constitute particularly serious breaches of the competition rules (see, to that effect, judgments of of and of . The Court has moreover held that agreements of that nature have, in themselves, an object restrictive of competition and fall within a category of... |
62019CJ0151-65 | 65 As regards such categories of agreements, it is thus only if Article 101(3) TFEU applies and all of the conditions provided for in that provision are observed that they may be granted the benefit of an exemption from the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 20 November 2008... | 65 As regards such categories of agreements, it is thus only if applies and all of the conditions provided for in that provision are observed that they may be granted the benefit of an exemption from the prohibition laid down in (see, to that effect, judgments of and and of ). |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.