rule_id stringlengths 36 36 | title stringlengths 10 97 | description stringlengths 28 1.02k | logsource_product stringclasses 28
values | logsource_category stringclasses 34
values | logsource_service stringclasses 69
values | sigma_rule stringlengths 467 251k | attack_techniques listlengths 0 14 | attack_tactics listlengths 0 8 | level stringclasses 5
values | status stringclasses 3
values | false_positives listlengths 0 5 | references listlengths 0 23 | splunk_spl stringlengths 7 246k ⌀ | elastic_lucene stringlengths 8 250k ⌀ | sentinel_kql stringlengths 40 37.3k ⌀ | source_path stringlengths 29 132 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba | Suspicious Mshta.EXE Execution Patterns | Detects suspicious mshta process execution patterns | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Mshta.EXE Execution Patterns
id: e32f92d1-523e-49c3-9374-bdb13b46a3ba
status: test
description: Detects suspicious mshta process execution patterns
references:
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application
- https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/mshta.exe
- https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072... | [
"T1106"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTML_Application",
"https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/mshta.exe",
"https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/"
] | (Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR OriginalFileName="MSHTA.EXE" ParentImage IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\wscript.exe") CommandLine IN ("*\\AppData\\Local\\*", "*C:\\ProgramData\\*", "*C:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*")) OR (Image="*... | ((Image:*\\mshta.exe OR OriginalFileName:MSHTA.EXE) AND ((ParentImage:(*\\cmd.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe OR *\\wscript.exe)) AND (CommandLine:(*\\AppData\\Local\\* OR *C\:\\ProgramData\\* OR *C\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *C\:\\Windows\\Temp\\*)))) OR ((Im... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "MSHTA.EXE") and ((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath e... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mshta_susp_pattern.yml | |
cc368ed0-2411-45dc-a222-510ace303cb2 | Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs From Uncommon Location | Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Regasm/Regsvcs utilities from a potentially suspicious location | windows | process_creation | title: Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs From Uncommon Location
id: cc368ed0-2411-45dc-a222-510ace303cb2
related:
- id: e9f8f8cc-07cc-4e81-b724-f387db9175e4
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Regasm/Regsvcs utilities from a potentially suspicious l... | [
"T1218.009"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.fortiguard.com/threat-signal-report/4718?s=09",
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/",
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/"
] | Image IN ("*\\Regsvcs.exe", "*\\Regasm.exe") OR OriginalFileName IN ("RegSvcs.exe", "RegAsm.exe") CommandLine IN ("*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*", "*\\PerfLogs\\*", "*\\Users\\Public\\*", "*\\Windows\\Temp\\*") | ((Image:(*\\Regsvcs.exe OR *\\Regasm.exe)) OR (OriginalFileName:(RegSvcs.exe OR RegAsm.exe))) AND (CommandLine:(*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR *\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start\ Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\* OR *\\PerfLogs\\* OR *\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\\Windows\\Temp\\*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\Regsvcs.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\Regasm.exe") or (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("RegSvcs.exe", "RegAsm.exe"))) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains "\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Star... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regasm_regsvcs_uncommon_location_execution.yml | |
2158f96f-43c2-43cb-952a-ab4580f32382 | Screen Capture Activity Via Psr.EXE | Detects execution of Windows Problem Steps Recorder (psr.exe), a utility used to record the user screen and clicks. | windows | process_creation | title: Screen Capture Activity Via Psr.EXE
id: 2158f96f-43c2-43cb-952a-ab4580f32382
status: test
description: Detects execution of Windows Problem Steps Recorder (psr.exe), a utility used to record the user screen and clicks.
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Psr/
- https://web.archive.org/... | [
"T1113"
] | [
"collection"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Psr/",
"https://web.archive.org/web/20200229201156/https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives/file/summit-archive-1493861893.pdf",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.... | Image="*\\Psr.exe" CommandLine IN ("*/start*", "*-start*") | Image:*\\Psr.exe AND (CommandLine:(*\/start* OR *\-start*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\Psr.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/start" or ProcessCommandLine contains "-start") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_psr_capture_screenshots.yml | |
882e858a-3233-4ba8-855e-2f3d3575803d | DNS Query Request By QuickAssist.EXE | Detects DNS queries initiated by "QuickAssist.exe" to Microsoft Quick Assist primary endpoint that is used to establish a session. | windows | dns_query | title: DNS Query Request By QuickAssist.EXE
id: 882e858a-3233-4ba8-855e-2f3d3575803d
status: experimental
description: 'Detects DNS queries initiated by "QuickAssist.exe" to Microsoft Quick Assist primary endpoint that is used to
establish a session.
'
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/20... | [
"T1071.001",
"T1210"
] | [
"command-and-control",
"initial-access",
"lateral-movement"
] | low | experimental | [
"Legitimate use of Quick Assist in the environment."
] | [
"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/05/15/threat-actors-misusing-quick-assist-in-social-engineering-attacks-leading-to-ransomware/",
"https://www.linkedin.com/posts/kevin-beaumont-security_ive-been-assisting-a-few-orgs-hit-with-successful-activity-7268055739116445701-xxjZ/",
"https://x.com/cyb3r... | Image="*\\QuickAssist.exe" QueryName="*remoteassistance.support.services.microsoft.com" | Image:*\\QuickAssist.exe AND QueryName:*remoteassistance.support.services.microsoft.com | null | windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_quickassist.yml | |
9e8f6035-88bf-4a63-96b6-b17c0508257e | Cisco Disabling Logging | Turn off logging locally or remote | cisco | aaa | title: Cisco Disabling Logging
id: 9e8f6035-88bf-4a63-96b6-b17c0508257e
status: test
description: Turn off logging locally or remote
references:
- https://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/security/command/reference/sec_a2.pdf
author: Austin Clark
date: 2019-08-11
modified: 2023-01-04
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- att... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/security/command/reference/sec_a2.pdf"
] | "no logging" OR "no aaa new-model" | *no\ logging* OR *no\ aaa\ new\-model* | null | network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_disable_logging.yml | |
d7662ff6-9e97-4596-a61d-9839e32dee8d | Add SafeBoot Keys Via Reg Utility | Detects execution of "reg.exe" commands with the "add" or "copy" flags on safe boot registry keys. Often used by attacker to allow the ransomware to work in safe mode as some security products do not | windows | process_creation | title: Add SafeBoot Keys Via Reg Utility
id: d7662ff6-9e97-4596-a61d-9839e32dee8d
related:
- id: fc0e89b5-adb0-43c1-b749-c12a10ec37de
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects execution of "reg.exe" commands with the "add" or "copy" flags on safe boot registry keys. Often used
by attacker to allow the ransomw... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://redacted.com/blog/bianlian-ransomware-gang-gives-it-a-go/"
] | Image="*\\reg.exe" OR OriginalFileName="reg.exe" CommandLine="*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot*" CommandLine IN ("* copy *", "* add *") | (Image:*\\reg.exe OR OriginalFileName:reg.exe) AND CommandLine:*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot* AND (CommandLine:(*\ copy\ * OR *\ add\ *)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\reg.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "reg.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot" and (ProcessCommandLine contains " copy " or ProcessCommandLine contains " add ") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_add_safeboot.yml | |
b494b165-6634-483d-8c47-2026a6c52372 | Telegram API Access | Detects suspicious requests to Telegram API without the usual Telegram User-Agent | proxy | title: Telegram API Access
id: b494b165-6634-483d-8c47-2026a6c52372
status: test
description: Detects suspicious requests to Telegram API without the usual Telegram User-Agent
references:
- https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-telerat-another-android-trojan-leveraging-telegrams-bot-api-to-target-i... | [
"T1071.001",
"T1102.002"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate use of Telegram bots in the company"
] | [
"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-telerat-another-android-trojan-leveraging-telegrams-bot-api-to-target-iranian-users/",
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/telecrypt-the-ransomware-abusing-telegram-api-defeated/",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-tele... | "cs-host"="api.telegram.org" NOT ("c-useragent" IN ("*Telegram*", "*Bot*")) | cs-host:api.telegram.org AND (NOT (c-useragent:(*Telegram* OR *Bot*))) | null | web/proxy_generic/proxy_telegram_api.yml | ||
843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6 | Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - System | Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation | windows | system | title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - System
id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
status: test
description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privile... | [
"T1134.001",
"T1134.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment",
"https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/"
] | Provider_Name="Service Control Manager" EventID=7045 (ImagePath="*/c*" ImagePath="*echo*" ImagePath="*\\pipe\\*" ImagePath IN ("*cmd*", "*%COMSPEC%*")) OR (ImagePath="*rundll32*" ImagePath="*.dll,a*" ImagePath="*/p:*") OR ImagePath="\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\*" | (Provider_Name:"Service Control Manager" AND EventID:7045) AND (((ImagePath:*\/c* AND ImagePath:*echo* AND ImagePath:*\\pipe\\*) AND (ImagePath:(*cmd* OR *%COMSPEC%*))) OR (ImagePath:*rundll32* AND ImagePath:*.dll,a* AND ImagePath:*\/p\:*) OR ImagePath:\\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\\*) | null | windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml | |
c67e0c98-4d39-46ee-8f6b-437ebf6b950e | Shellshock Expression | Detects shellshock expressions in log files | linux | title: Shellshock Expression
id: c67e0c98-4d39-46ee-8f6b-437ebf6b950e
status: test
description: Detects shellshock expressions in log files
references:
- https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/Shellshock_-_Tudor_Enache.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-03-14
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.persistenc... | [
"T1505.003"
] | [
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://owasp.org/www-pdf-archive/Shellshock_-_Tudor_Enache.pdf"
] | "(){:;};" OR "() {:;};" OR "() { :;};" OR "() { :; };" | *\(\)\{\:;\};* OR *\(\)\ \{\:;\};* OR *\(\)\ \{\ \:;\};* OR *\(\)\ \{\ \:;\ \};* | null | linux/builtin/lnx_shellshock.yml | ||
ab567429-1dfb-4674-b6d2-979fd2f9d125 | Internet Explorer DisableFirstRunCustomize Enabled | Detects changes to the Internet Explorer "DisableFirstRunCustomize" value, which prevents Internet Explorer from running the first run wizard the first time a user starts the browser after installing Internet Explorer or Windows. | windows | registry_set | title: Internet Explorer DisableFirstRunCustomize Enabled
id: ab567429-1dfb-4674-b6d2-979fd2f9d125
status: test
description: 'Detects changes to the Internet Explorer "DisableFirstRunCustomize" value, which prevents Internet Explorer
from running the first run wizard the first time a user starts the browser after ins... | [] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"As this is controlled by group policy as well as user settings. Some false positives may occur."
] | [
"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/devil-bait/NCSC-MAR-Devil-Bait.pdf",
"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/operation-ke3chang-resurfaces-with-new-tidepool-malware/",
"https://admx.help/?Category=InternetExplorer&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.InternetExplorer::NoFirstRunCusto... | TargetObject="*\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\DisableFirstRunCustomize" Details IN ("DWORD (0x00000001)", "DWORD (0x00000002)") NOT (Image IN ("C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ie4uinit.exe")) NOT ((Image="*\\Temp\\*" Image="*\\.cr\\avira_*" Details="*DWORD (0x00000001)*") OR (Image IN ("C:\\P... | (TargetObject:*\\Microsoft\\Internet\ Explorer\\Main\\DisableFirstRunCustomize AND (Details:("DWORD \(0x00000001\)" OR "DWORD \(0x00000002\)"))) AND (NOT (Image:(C\:\\Windows\\explorer.exe OR C\:\\Windows\\System32\\ie4uinit.exe))) AND (NOT (((Image:*\\Temp\\* AND Image:*\\.cr\\avira_*) AND Details:*DWORD\ \(0x00000001... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey endswith "\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\DisableFirstRunCustomize" and (RegistryValueData in~ ("DWORD (0x00000001)", "DWORD (0x00000002)"))) and (not((InitiatingProcessFolderPath in~ ("C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\ie4uinit.exe")))) and (not((((Init... | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_internet_explorer_disable_first_run_customize.yml | |
6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984 | BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load | Detects BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) loading DLLs from suspicious locations that are publicly writable which could indicate an attempt to lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking.
This technique abuses COM Classes configured as INTERACTIVE USER to spawn processes in the context of th... | windows | image_load | title: BaaUpdate.exe Suspicious DLL Load
id: 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984
related:
- id: 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) loading DLLs from suspicious locations that are
publicly writable which... | [
"T1218",
"T1021.003"
] | [
"stealth",
"lateral-movement"
] | high | experimental | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/BitlockMove"
] | Image="*\\BaaUpdate.exe" ImageLoaded="*.dll" ImageLoaded IN ("*:\\Perflogs\\*", "*:\\Users\\Default\\*", "*:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*", "*\\Contacts\\*", "*\\Favorites\\*", "*\\Favourites\\*", "*\\Links\\*", "*\\Music\\*", "*\\Pictures\\*", "*\\Pr... | Image:*\\BaaUpdate.exe AND ImageLoaded:*.dll AND (ImageLoaded:(*\:\\Perflogs\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Default\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Roaming\\* OR *\\Contacts\\* OR *\\Favorites\\* OR *\\Favourites\\* OR *\\Links\\* OR *\\Music\\* OR *\\Pictures\\* OR ... | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\BaaUpdate.exe" and FolderPath endswith ".dll" and (FolderPath contains ":\\Perflogs\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Users\\Default\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Users\\Public\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Windows\\Temp\\" or FolderPath contains "\\AppD... | windows/image_load/image_load_susp_baaupdate_dll_load.yml | |
526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d | Process Creation Attempt via Wmic.EXE | Detects the attempt to create a process via "wmic" with the "process call create" flag, which might
indicate an attempt to execute a malicious process on the compromised host. Adversaries may use
wmic to execute a process on the compromised host as part of their attack. This event is triggered on
on attempt and process... | windows | process_creation | title: Process Creation Attempt via Wmic.EXE
id: 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d
related:
- id: 3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8
type: derived
status: test
description: 'Detects the attempt to create a process via "wmic" with the "process call create" flag, which might
indicate an attempt to execute a mal... | [
"T1047"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.sans.org/blog/wmic-for-incident-response/",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/84215139ee5127f8e3a117e063b604812bd71928/atomics/T1047/T1047.md#atomic-test-5---wmi-execute-local-process"
] | Image="*\\wmic.exe" OR OriginalFileName="wmic.exe" CommandLine="*process*" CommandLine="*call*" CommandLine="*create*" | (Image:*\\wmic.exe OR OriginalFileName:wmic.exe) AND (CommandLine:*process* AND CommandLine:*call* AND CommandLine:*create*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\wmic.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "wmic.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "process" and ProcessCommandLine contains "call" and ProcessCommandLine contains "create") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_process_creation.yml | |
93d94efc-d7ad-4161-ad7d-1638c4f908d8 | HackTool - Dumpert Process Dumper Default File | Detects the creation of the default dump file used by Outflank Dumpert tool. A process dumper, which dumps the lsass process memory | windows | file_event | title: HackTool - Dumpert Process Dumper Default File
id: 93d94efc-d7ad-4161-ad7d-1638c4f908d8
related:
- id: 2704ab9e-afe2-4854-a3b1-0c0706d03578
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the creation of the default dump file used by Outflank Dumpert tool. A process dumper, which dumps the
lsass process memo... | [
"T1003.001"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | critical | test | [
"Very unlikely"
] | [
"https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert",
"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/actors-still-exploiting-sharepoint-vulnerability/"
] | TargetFilename="*dumpert.dmp" | TargetFilename:*dumpert.dmp | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "dumpert.dmp" | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_dumpert.yml | |
f24bcaea-0cd1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 | Uncommon Assistive Technology Applications Execution Via AtBroker.EXE | Detects the start of a non built-in assistive technology applications via "Atbroker.EXE". | windows | process_creation | title: Uncommon Assistive Technology Applications Execution Via AtBroker.EXE
id: f24bcaea-0cd1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects the start of a non built-in assistive technology applications via "Atbroker.EXE".
references:
- http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2016/07/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-42/... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate, non-default assistive technology applications execution"
] | [
"http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2016/07/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-42/",
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Atbroker/"
] | Image="*\\AtBroker.exe" OR OriginalFileName="AtBroker.exe" CommandLine="*start*" NOT (CommandLine IN ("*animations*", "*audiodescription*", "*caretbrowsing*", "*caretwidth*", "*colorfiltering*", "*cursorindicator*", "*cursorscheme*", "*filterkeys*", "*focusborderheight*", "*focusborderwidth*", "*highcontrast*", "*keybo... | ((Image:*\\AtBroker.exe OR OriginalFileName:AtBroker.exe) AND CommandLine:*start*) AND (NOT (CommandLine:(*animations* OR *audiodescription* OR *caretbrowsing* OR *caretwidth* OR *colorfiltering* OR *cursorindicator* OR *cursorscheme* OR *filterkeys* OR *focusborderheight* OR *focusborderwidth* OR *highcontrast* OR *ke... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\AtBroker.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "AtBroker.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "start") and (not((ProcessCommandLine contains "animations" or ProcessCommandLine contains "audiodescription" or ProcessCommandLine contains "caretbrowsing" or Proc... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_atbroker_uncommon_ats_execution.yml | |
0b4b72e3-4c53-4d5b-b198-2c58cfef39a9 | Guest User Invited By Non Approved Inviters | Detects when a user that doesn't have permissions to invite a guest user attempts to invite one. | azure | auditlogs | title: Guest User Invited By Non Approved Inviters
id: 0b4b72e3-4c53-4d5b-b198-2c58cfef39a9
status: test
description: Detects when a user that doesn't have permissions to invite a guest user attempts to invite one.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-account... | [
"T1078.004"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"initial-access",
"persistence",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"A non malicious user is unaware of the proper process"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#things-to-monitor"
] | properties.message="Invite external user" Status="failure" | properties.message:"Invite external user" AND Status:failure | null | cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_guest_invite_failure.yml | |
5dfc1465-8f65-4fde-8eb5-6194380c6a62 | Windows Recall Feature Enabled - DisableAIDataAnalysis Value Deleted | Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by deleting the existing "DisableAIDataAnalysis" registry value.
Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation discovery and collection activities.
This rule assumes that Recall is already ex... | windows | registry_delete | title: Windows Recall Feature Enabled - DisableAIDataAnalysis Value Deleted
id: 5dfc1465-8f65-4fde-8eb5-6194380c6a62
related:
- id: 75180c5f-4ea1-461a-a4f6-6e4700c065d4
type: similar
- id: 817f252c-5143-4dae-b418-48c3e9f63728
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall featur... | [
"T1113"
] | [
"collection"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate use/activation of Windows Recall"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/manage-recall",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowsai#disableaidataanalysis"
] | EventType="DeleteValue" TargetObject="*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\\DisableAIDataAnalysis" | EventType:DeleteValue AND TargetObject:*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\\DisableAIDataAnalysis | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where ActionType =~ "DeleteValue" and RegistryKey endswith "\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsAI\\DisableAIDataAnalysis" | windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_enable_windows_recall.yml | |
ff301988-c231-4bd0-834c-ac9d73b86586 | PowerShell Console History Logs Deleted | Detects the deletion of the PowerShell console History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence | windows | file_delete | title: PowerShell Console History Logs Deleted
id: ff301988-c231-4bd0-834c-ac9d73b86586
status: test
description: Detects the deletion of the PowerShell console History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic
evidence
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
dat... | [
"T1070"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | TargetFilename="*\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt" | TargetFilename:*\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt" | windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_delete_powershell_command_history.yml | |
09570ae5-889e-43ea-aac0-0e1221fb3d95 | Remove Exported Mailbox from Exchange Webserver | Detects removal of an exported Exchange mailbox which could be to cover tracks from ProxyShell exploit | windows | msexchange-management | title: Remove Exported Mailbox from Exchange Webserver
id: 09570ae5-889e-43ea-aac0-0e1221fb3d95
status: test
description: Detects removal of an exported Exchange mailbox which could be to cover tracks from ProxyShell exploit
references:
- https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/1416b5776d963f21b7b5b45d19f3e... | [
"T1070"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/1416b5776d963f21b7b5b45d19f3e961201e0aed/modules/exploits/windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce.rb#L430"
] | "Remove-MailboxExportRequest" " -Identity " " -Confirm \"False\"" | *Remove\-MailboxExportRequest* AND *\ \-Identity\ * AND *\ \-Confirm\ \"False\"* | null | windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_proxyshell_remove_mailbox_export.yml | |
6597be7b-ac61-4ac8-bef4-d3ec88174853 | UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - Registry | Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe (UACMe 52) | windows | registry_set | title: UAC Bypass Abusing Winsat Path Parsing - Registry
id: 6597be7b-ac61-4ac8-bef4-d3ec88174853
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a path parsing issue in winsat.exe (UACMe 52)
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-08-30
m... | [
"T1548.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME"
] | TargetObject="*\\Root\\InventoryApplicationFile\\winsat.exe|*" TargetObject="*\\LowerCaseLongPath" Details="c:\\users\\*" Details="*\\appdata\\local\\temp\\system32\\winsat.exe" | TargetObject:*\\Root\\InventoryApplicationFile\\winsat.exe\|* AND TargetObject:*\\LowerCaseLongPath AND Details:c\:\\users\\* AND Details:*\\appdata\\local\\temp\\system32\\winsat.exe | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "\\Root\\InventoryApplicationFile\\winsat.exe|" and RegistryKey endswith "\\LowerCaseLongPath" and RegistryValueData startswith "c:\\users\\" and RegistryValueData endswith "\\appdata\\local\\temp\\system32\\winsat.exe" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_uac_bypass_winsat.yml | |
75c505b1-711d-4f68-a357-8c3fe37dbf2d | HackTool - SILENTTRINITY Stager DLL Load | Detects SILENTTRINITY stager dll loading activity | windows | image_load | title: HackTool - SILENTTRINITY Stager DLL Load
id: 75c505b1-711d-4f68-a357-8c3fe37dbf2d
related:
- id: 03552375-cc2c-4883-bbe4-7958d5a980be
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects SILENTTRINITY stager dll loading activity
references:
- https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY
author: Aleksey Potapov, osc... | [
"T1071"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/SILENTTRINITY"
] | Description="*st2stager*" | Description:*st2stager* | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription contains "st2stager" | windows/image_load/image_load_hktl_silenttrinity_stager.yml | |
758ff488-18d5-4cbe-8ec4-02b6285a434f | Remote Access Tool - NetSupport Execution | An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.
These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed b... | windows | process_creation | title: Remote Access Tool - NetSupport Execution
id: 758ff488-18d5-4cbe-8ec4-02b6285a434f
status: test
description: 'An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist,
LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target s... | [
"T1219.002"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate use"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md"
] | Description="NetSupport Client Configurator" OR Product="NetSupport Remote Control" OR Company="NetSupport Ltd" OR OriginalFileName="PCICFGUI.EXE" | Description:"NetSupport Client Configurator" OR Product:"NetSupport Remote Control" OR Company:"NetSupport Ltd" OR OriginalFileName:PCICFGUI.EXE | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription =~ "NetSupport Client Configurator" or ProcessVersionInfoProductName =~ "NetSupport Remote Control" or ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName =~ "NetSupport Ltd" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "PCICFGUI.EXE" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_access_tools_netsupport.yml | |
99b97608-3e21-4bfe-8217-2a127c396a0e | Remote Thread Creation Via PowerShell In Uncommon Target | Detects the creation of a remote thread from a Powershell process in an uncommon target process | windows | create_remote_thread | title: Remote Thread Creation Via PowerShell In Uncommon Target
id: 99b97608-3e21-4bfe-8217-2a127c396a0e
related:
- id: eeb2e3dc-c1f4-40dd-9bd5-149ee465ad50
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a remote thread from a Powershell process in an uncommon target process
references:
- https://www... | [
"T1218.011",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/06/bring-your-own-land-novel-red-teaming-technique.html"
] | SourceImage IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") TargetImage IN ("*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe") | (SourceImage:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe)) AND (TargetImage:(*\\rundll32.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe)) | null | windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_powershell_susp_targets.yml | |
1a2ea919-d11d-4d1e-8535-06cda13be20f | Triple Cross eBPF Rootkit Default Persistence | Detects the creation of "ebpfbackdoor" files in both "cron.d" and "sudoers.d" directories. Which both are related to the TripleCross persistence method | linux | file_event | title: Triple Cross eBPF Rootkit Default Persistence
id: 1a2ea919-d11d-4d1e-8535-06cda13be20f
status: test
description: Detects the creation of "ebpfbackdoor" files in both "cron.d" and "sudoers.d" directories. Which both are related
to the TripleCross persistence method
references:
- https://github.com/h3xduck/Tripl... | [
"T1053.003"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://github.com/h3xduck/TripleCross/blob/12629558b8b0a27a5488a0b98f1ea7042e76f8ab/apps/deployer.sh"
] | TargetFilename="*ebpfbackdoor" | TargetFilename:*ebpfbackdoor | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "ebpfbackdoor" | linux/file_event/file_event_lnx_triple_cross_rootkit_persistence.yml | |
66a4d409-451b-4151-94f4-a55d559c49b0 | PowerShell Deleted Mounted Share | Detects when when a mounted share is removed. Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation | windows | ps_script | title: PowerShell Deleted Mounted Share
id: 66a4d409-451b-4151-94f4-a55d559c49b0
status: test
description: Detects when when a mounted share is removed. Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful
in order to clean up traces of their operation
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic... | [
"T1070.005"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Administrators or Power users may remove their shares via cmd line"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.md"
] | ScriptBlockText IN ("*Remove-SmbShare*", "*Remove-FileShare*") NOT (ScriptBlockText="*FileShare.cdxml*" ScriptBlockText="*Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\\Export-ModuleMember*" ScriptBlockText="*ROOT/Microsoft/Windows/Storage/MSFT_FileShare*" ScriptBlockText="*ObjectModelWrapper*" ScriptBlockText="*Cmdletization.MethodParame... | (ScriptBlockText:(*Remove\-SmbShare* OR *Remove\-FileShare*)) AND (NOT (ScriptBlockText:*FileShare.cdxml* AND ScriptBlockText:*Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\\Export\-ModuleMember* AND ScriptBlockText:*ROOT\/Microsoft\/Windows\/Storage\/MSFT_FileShare* AND ScriptBlockText:*ObjectModelWrapper* AND ScriptBlockText:*Cmdletizat... | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_mounted_share_deletion.yml | |
ed447910-bc30-4575-a598-3a2e49516a7a | Linux Setuid Capability Set on a Binary via Setcap Utility | Detects the use of the 'setcap' utility to set the 'setuid' capability (cap_setuid) on a binary file.
This capability allows a non privileged process to make arbitrary manipulations of user IDs (UIDs), including setting its current UID to a value that would otherwise be restricted (i.e. UID 0, the root user).
This beha... | linux | process_creation | title: Linux Setuid Capability Set on a Binary via Setcap Utility
id: ed447910-bc30-4575-a598-3a2e49516a7a
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the use of the ''setcap'' utility to set the ''setuid'' capability (cap_setuid) on a binary file.
This capability allows a non privileged process to make arbitrary man... | [
"T1548",
"T1554"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | low | experimental | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/setcap.8.html",
"https://dfir.ch/posts/linux_capabilities/",
"https://juggernaut-sec.com/capabilities/#cap_setuid"
] | Image="*/setcap" CommandLine="*cap_setuid*" | Image:*\/setcap AND CommandLine:*cap_setuid* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/setcap" and ProcessCommandLine contains "cap_setuid" | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_cap_setuid.yml | |
cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3 | MSHTA Execution with Suspicious File Extensions | Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) content,
such as .png, .jpg, .zip, .pdf, and others, which are often polyglots. MSHTA is a legitimate Windows utility for executing HTML Applications
containing VBScript or JScript. Threat actors often ... | windows | process_creation | title: MSHTA Execution with Suspicious File Extensions
id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
status: test
description: 'Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application)
content,
such as .png, .jpg, .zip, .pdf, and others, which are often polyg... | [
"T1140",
"T1218.005",
"T1059.007"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment"
] | [
"http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files",
"https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/framework/data/xml/xslt/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script",
"https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesti... | Image="*\\mshta.exe" OR OriginalFileName="mshta.exe" CommandLine IN ("*.7z*", "*.avi*", "*.bat*", "*.bmp*", "*.conf*", "*.csv*", "*.dll*", "*.doc*", "*.gif*", "*.gz*", "*.ini*", "*.jpe*", "*.jpg*", "*.json*", "*.lnk*", "*.log*", "*.mkv*", "*.mp3*", "*.mp4*", "*.pdf*", "*.png*", "*.ppt*", "*.rar*", "*.rtf*", "*.svg*", "... | (Image:*\\mshta.exe OR OriginalFileName:mshta.exe) AND (CommandLine:(*.7z* OR *.avi* OR *.bat* OR *.bmp* OR *.conf* OR *.csv* OR *.dll* OR *.doc* OR *.gif* OR *.gz* OR *.ini* OR *.jpe* OR *.jpg* OR *.json* OR *.lnk* OR *.log* OR *.mkv* OR *.mp3* OR *.mp4* OR *.pdf* OR *.png* OR *.ppt* OR *.rar* OR *.rtf* OR *.svg* OR *... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "mshta.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains ".7z" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".avi" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".bat" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".bmp" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".conf" or ProcessC... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mshta_susp_execution.yml | |
00321fee-ca72-4cce-b011-5415af3b9960 | MSSQL Destructive Query | Detects the invocation of MS SQL transactions that are destructive towards table or database data, such as "DROP TABLE" or "DROP DATABASE". | windows | application | title: MSSQL Destructive Query
id: 00321fee-ca72-4cce-b011-5415af3b9960
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the invocation of MS SQL transactions that are destructive towards table or database data, such as "DROP
TABLE" or "DROP DATABASE".
'
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statemen... | [
"T1485"
] | [
"exfiltration",
"impact"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Legitimate transaction from a sysadmin."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/drop-table-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/drop-database-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/truncate-table-transact-sql?view=sql-server-v... | Provider_Name="MSSQLSERVER$AUDIT" EventID=33205 Data IN ("*statement:TRUNCATE TABLE*", "*statement:DROP TABLE*", "*statement:DROP DATABASE*") | Provider_Name:MSSQLSERVER$AUDIT AND EventID:33205 AND (Data:(*statement\:TRUNCATE\ TABLE* OR *statement\:DROP\ TABLE* OR *statement\:DROP\ DATABASE*)) | null | windows/builtin/application/mssqlserver/win_mssql_destructive_query.yml | |
2975af79-28c4-4d2f-a951-9095f229df29 | Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing | Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons | dns | title: Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing
id: 2975af79-28c4-4d2f-a951-9095f229df29
status: test
description: Detects suspicious DNS queries known from Cobalt Strike beacons
references:
- https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-tracking-actor-patterns
- https://www.sekoia.io/en/hunting-and-detecting-cobalt-strike/
author... | [
"T1071.004"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | critical | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.icebrg.io/blog/footprints-of-fin7-tracking-actor-patterns",
"https://www.sekoia.io/en/hunting-and-detecting-cobalt-strike/"
] | query IN ("aaa.stage.*", "post.1*") OR query="*.stage.123456.*" | (query:(aaa.stage.* OR post.1*)) OR query:*.stage.123456.* | null | network/dns/net_dns_mal_cobaltstrike.yml | ||
fa1a7e52-3d02-435b-81b8-00da14dd66c1 | Diskshadow Script Mode - Execution From Potential Suspicious Location | Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode using the "/s" flag where the script is located in a potentially suspicious location. | windows | process_creation | title: Diskshadow Script Mode - Execution From Potential Suspicious Location
id: fa1a7e52-3d02-435b-81b8-00da14dd66c1
related:
- id: 1dde5376-a648-492e-9e54-4241dd9b0c7f
type: similar
- id: 9f546b25-5f12-4c8d-8532-5893dcb1e4b8
type: similar
- id: 56b1dde8-b274-435f-a73a-fb75eb81262a
type: similar
- id: 0c2f8629-7... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"False positives may occur if you execute the script from one of the paths mentioned in the rule. Apply additional filters that fits your org needs."
] | [
"https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/",
"https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration",
"https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/lolbin-execution-via-diskshadow-f6ff681a27a4",
"h... | OriginalFileName="diskshadow.exe" OR Image="*\\diskshadow.exe" CommandLine="*-s *" OR CommandLine="*/s *" OR CommandLine="*–s *" OR CommandLine="*—s *" OR CommandLine="*―s *" CommandLine IN ("*:\\Temp\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*", "*\\ProgramData\\*", "*\\Users\\Public\\... | (OriginalFileName:diskshadow.exe OR Image:*\\diskshadow.exe) AND CommandLine:(*\-s\ * OR *\/s\ * OR *–s\ * OR *—s\ * OR *―s\ *) AND (CommandLine:(*\:\\Temp\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\* OR *\\AppData\\Roaming\\* OR *\\ProgramData\\* OR *\\Users\\Public\\*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "diskshadow.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\diskshadow.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "-s " or ProcessCommandLine contains "/s " or ProcessCommandLine contains "–s " or ProcessCommandLine contains "—s " or ProcessCommandLine contains "―s ") and (... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_diskshadow_script_mode_susp_location.yml | |
4fd6b1c7-19b8-4488-97f6-00f0924991a3 | PUA - NimScan Execution | Detects usage of NimScan, a portscanner utility.
In early 2025, adversaries were observed using this utility to scan for open ports on remote hosts in a compromised environment.
This rule identifies the execution of NimScan based on the process image name and specific hash values associated with different versions of t... | windows | process_creation | title: PUA - NimScan Execution
id: 4fd6b1c7-19b8-4488-97f6-00f0924991a3
status: test
description: 'Detects usage of NimScan, a portscanner utility.
In early 2025, adversaries were observed using this utility to scan for open ports on remote hosts in a compromised environment.
This rule identifies the execution of... | [
"T1046"
] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate administrator activity"
] | [
"https://x.com/cyberfeeddigest/status/1887041526397587859",
"https://github.com/elddy/NimScan"
] | Image="*\\NimScan.exe" OR Hashes IN ("*IMPHASH=41BB1C7571B3A724EB83A1D2B96DBB8C*", "*IMPHASH=B1B6ADACB172795480179EFD18A29549*", "*IMPHASH=0D1F896DC7642AD8384F9042F30279C2*") | Image:*\\NimScan.exe OR (Hashes:(*IMPHASH\=41BB1C7571B3A724EB83A1D2B96DBB8C* OR *IMPHASH\=B1B6ADACB172795480179EFD18A29549* OR *IMPHASH\=0D1F896DC7642AD8384F9042F30279C2*)) | null | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_nimscan.yml | |
be2e3a5c-9cc7-4d02-842a-68e9cb26ec49 | JAMF MDM Execution | Detects execution of the "jamf" binary to create user accounts and run commands. For example, the binary can be abused by attackers on the system in order to bypass security controls or remove application control polices. | macos | process_creation | title: JAMF MDM Execution
id: be2e3a5c-9cc7-4d02-842a-68e9cb26ec49
status: test
description: 'Detects execution of the "jamf" binary to create user accounts and run commands. For example, the binary can
be abused by attackers on the system in order to bypass security controls or remove application control polices.
... | [] | [
"execution"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate use of the JAMF CLI tool by IT support and administrators"
] | [
"https://github.com/MythicAgents/typhon/",
"https://www.zoocoup.org/casper/jamf_cheatsheet.pdf",
"https://docs.jamf.com/10.30.0/jamf-pro/administrator-guide/Components_Installed_on_Managed_Computers.html"
] | Image="*/jamf" CommandLine IN ("*createAccount*", "*manage*", "*removeFramework*", "*removeMdmProfile*", "*resetPassword*", "*setComputerName*") | Image:*\/jamf AND (CommandLine:(*createAccount* OR *manage* OR *removeFramework* OR *removeMdmProfile* OR *resetPassword* OR *setComputerName*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/jamf" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "createAccount" or ProcessCommandLine contains "manage" or ProcessCommandLine contains "removeFramework" or ProcessCommandLine contains "removeMdmProfile" or ProcessCommandLine contains "resetPassword" or ProcessCommandLine contain... | macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_jamf_usage.yml | |
3dfd06d2-eaf4-4532-9555-68aca59f57c4 | Process Execution From A Potentially Suspicious Folder | Detects a potentially suspicious execution from an uncommon folder. | windows | process_creation | title: Process Execution From A Potentially Suspicious Folder
id: 3dfd06d2-eaf4-4532-9555-68aca59f57c4
status: test
description: Detects a potentially suspicious execution from an uncommon folder.
references:
- https://github.com/mbevilacqua/appcompatprocessor/blob/6c847937c5a836e2ce2fe2b915f213c345a3c389/AppCompatSear... | [
"T1036"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/mbevilacqua/appcompatprocessor/blob/6c847937c5a836e2ce2fe2b915f213c345a3c389/AppCompatSearch.txt",
"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/2019-crowdstrike-global-threat-report/",
"https://github.com/T... | Image IN ("*:\\Perflogs\\*", "*:\\Users\\All Users\\*", "*:\\Users\\Default\\*", "*:\\Users\\NetworkService\\*", "*:\\Windows\\addins\\*", "*:\\Windows\\debug\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Fonts\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Help\\*", "*:\\Windows\\IME\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Media\\*", "*:\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*:\\Windows\\security\\*", "*:\\... | (Image:(*\:\\Perflogs\\* OR *\:\\Users\\All\ Users\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Default\\* OR *\:\\Users\\NetworkService\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\addins\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\debug\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Fonts\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Help\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\IME\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Media\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\repair\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\security\... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath contains ":\\Perflogs\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Users\\All Users\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Users\\Default\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Users\\NetworkService\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Windows\\addins\\" or FolderPath contains ":\\Windows\\debug\\" or FolderPath contai... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_execution_path.yml | |
2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968 | Remote Access Tool - Potential MeshAgent Execution - Windows | Detects potential execution of MeshAgent which is a tool used for remote access.
Historical data shows that threat actors rename MeshAgent binary to evade detection.
Matching command lines with the '--meshServiceName' argument can indicate that the MeshAgent is being used for remote access. | windows | process_creation | title: Remote Access Tool - Potential MeshAgent Execution - Windows
id: 2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968
related:
- id: 22c45af6-f590-4d44-bab3-b5b2d2a2b6d9
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects potential execution of MeshAgent which is a tool used for remote access.
Historical data shows th... | [
"T1219.002"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Environments that legitimately use MeshAgent"
] | [
"https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access",
"https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/",
"https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/",
"https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks"
] | CommandLine="*--meshServiceName*" | CommandLine:*\-\-meshServiceName* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "--meshServiceName" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_access_tools_meshagent_arguments.yml | |
0e6a9e62-627e-496c-aef5-bfa39da29b5e | MaxMpxCt Registry Value Changed | Detects changes to the "MaxMpxCt" registry value.
MaxMpxCt specifies the maximum outstanding network requests for the server per client, which is used when negotiating a Server Message Block (SMB) connection with a client. Note if the value is set beyond 125 older Windows 9x clients will fail to negotiate.
Ransomware t... | windows | registry_set | title: MaxMpxCt Registry Value Changed
id: 0e6a9e62-627e-496c-aef5-bfa39da29b5e
status: test
description: 'Detects changes to the "MaxMpxCt" registry value.
MaxMpxCt specifies the maximum outstanding network requests for the server per client, which is used when negotiating a
Server Message Block (SMB) connection ... | [
"T1070.005"
] | [
"stealth"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.huntress.com/blog/blackcat-ransomware-affiliate-ttps",
"https://securityscorecard.com/research/deep-dive-into-alphv-blackcat-ransomware",
"https://www.intrinsec.com/alphv-ransomware-gang-analysis/?cn-reloaded=1",
"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/blackcat-ransomware-highly-configurable-rust-drive... | TargetObject="*\\Services\\LanmanServer\\Parameters\\MaxMpxCt" | TargetObject:*\\Services\\LanmanServer\\Parameters\\MaxMpxCt | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\Services\\LanmanServer\\Parameters\\MaxMpxCt" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_optimize_file_sharing_network.yml | |
99980a85-3a61-43d3-ac0f-b68d6b4797b1 | Google Cloud VPN Tunnel Modified or Deleted | Identifies when a VPN Tunnel Modified or Deleted in Google Cloud. | gcp | gcp.audit | title: Google Cloud VPN Tunnel Modified or Deleted
id: 99980a85-3a61-43d3-ac0f-b68d6b4797b1
status: test
description: Identifies when a VPN Tunnel Modified or Deleted in Google Cloud.
references:
- https://any-api.com/googleapis_com/compute/docs/vpnTunnels
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08-16
modified: ... | [] | [
"impact"
] | medium | test | [
"VPN Tunnel being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.",
"Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.",
"VPN Tunnel modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false posi... | [
"https://any-api.com/googleapis_com/compute/docs/vpnTunnels"
] | gcp.audit.method_name IN ("compute.vpnTunnels.insert", "compute.vpnTunnels.delete") | gcp.audit.method_name:(compute.vpnTunnels.insert OR compute.vpnTunnels.delete) | null | cloud/gcp/audit/gcp_vpn_tunnel_modified_or_deleted.yml | |
20f754db-d025-4a8f-9d74-e0037e999a9a | SES Identity Has Been Deleted | Detects an instance of an SES identity being deleted via the "DeleteIdentity" event. This may be an indicator of an adversary removing the account that carried out suspicious or malicious activities | aws | cloudtrail | title: SES Identity Has Been Deleted
id: 20f754db-d025-4a8f-9d74-e0037e999a9a
status: test
description: Detects an instance of an SES identity being deleted via the "DeleteIdentity" event. This may be an indicator
of an adversary removing the account that carried out suspicious or malicious activities
references:
- h... | [
"T1070"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/"
] | eventSource="ses.amazonaws.com" eventName="DeleteIdentity" | eventSource:ses.amazonaws.com AND eventName:DeleteIdentity | null | cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_delete_identity.yml | |
0adfbc14-0ed1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 | Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - PowerShell | Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell | windows | ps_script | title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - PowerShell
id: 0adfbc14-0ed1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2024... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009"
] | *
| regex ScriptBlockText="cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r)(?:\\s|)\"set\\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\\{\\d\\}){1,}\\\\\"\\s+?-f(?:.*\\)){1,}.*\"" | ScriptBlockText:/cmd.{0,5}(?:\/c|\/r)(?:\s|)"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\"\s+?-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*"/ | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_var.yml | |
654fcc6d-840d-4844-9b07-2c3300e54a26 | Legitimate Application Dropped Archive | Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk | windows | file_event | title: Legitimate Application Dropped Archive
id: 654fcc6d-840d-4844-9b07-2c3300e54a26
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write an archive to disk
references:
- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xm... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326"
] | Image IN ("*\\winword.exe", "*\\excel.exe", "*\\powerpnt.exe", "*\\msaccess.exe", "*\\mspub.exe", "*\\eqnedt32.exe", "*\\visio.exe", "*\\wordpad.exe", "*\\wordview.exe", "*\\certutil.exe", "*\\certoc.exe", "*\\CertReq.exe", "*\\Desktopimgdownldr.exe", "*\\esentutl.exe", "*\\finger.exe", "*\\notepad.exe", "*\\AcroRd32.e... | (Image:(*\\winword.exe OR *\\excel.exe OR *\\powerpnt.exe OR *\\msaccess.exe OR *\\mspub.exe OR *\\eqnedt32.exe OR *\\visio.exe OR *\\wordpad.exe OR *\\wordview.exe OR *\\certutil.exe OR *\\certoc.exe OR *\\CertReq.exe OR *\\Desktopimgdownldr.exe OR *\\esentutl.exe OR *\\finger.exe OR *\\notepad.exe OR *\\AcroRd32.exe ... | DeviceFileEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\winword.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\excel.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\powerpnt.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\msaccess.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\mspub.exe" or InitiatingProces... | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_archive.yml | |
75edd216-1939-4c73-8d61-7f3a0d85b5cc | File Download Via InstallUtil.EXE | Detects use of .NET InstallUtil.exe in order to download arbitrary files. The files will be written to "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\" | windows | process_creation | title: File Download Via InstallUtil.EXE
id: 75edd216-1939-4c73-8d61-7f3a0d85b5cc
status: test
description: 'Detects use of .NET InstallUtil.exe in order to download arbitrary files. The files will be written to "%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\"
'
references:
- https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/239"
] | Image="*\\InstallUtil.exe" OR OriginalFileName="InstallUtil.exe" CommandLine IN ("*ftp://*", "*http://*", "*https://*") | (Image:*\\InstallUtil.exe OR OriginalFileName:InstallUtil.exe) AND (CommandLine:(*ftp\:\/\/* OR *http\:\/\/* OR *https\:\/\/*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\InstallUtil.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "InstallUtil.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "ftp://" or ProcessCommandLine contains "http://" or ProcessCommandLine contains "https://") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_installutil_download.yml | |
100ef69e-3327-481c-8e5c-6d80d9507556 | Important Windows Eventlog Cleared | Detects the clearing of one of the Windows Core Eventlogs. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution | windows | system | title: Important Windows Eventlog Cleared
id: 100ef69e-3327-481c-8e5c-6d80d9507556
related:
- id: a62b37e0-45d3-48d9-a517-90c1a1b0186b
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects the clearing of one of the Windows Core Eventlogs. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution
references:
- https://twitter.com/dev... | [
"T1685.005"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Rollout of log collection agents (the setup routine often includes a reset of the local Eventlog)",
"System provisioning (system reset before the golden image creation)"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/deviouspolack/status/832535435960209408",
"https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100"
] | EventID=104 Provider_Name="Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog" Channel IN ("Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational", "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational", "PowerShellCore/Operational", "Security", "System", "Windows PowerShell") | EventID:104 AND Provider_Name:Microsoft\-Windows\-Eventlog AND (Channel:(Microsoft\-Windows\-PowerShell\/Operational OR Microsoft\-Windows\-Sysmon\/Operational OR PowerShellCore\/Operational OR Security OR System OR "Windows PowerShell")) | null | windows/builtin/system/microsoft_windows_eventlog/win_system_susp_eventlog_cleared.yml | |
e01fa958-6893-41d4-ae03-182477c5e77d | Remote Access Tool - RURAT Execution From Unusual Location | Detects execution of Remote Utilities RAT (RURAT) from an unusual location (outside of 'C:\Program Files') | windows | process_creation | title: Remote Access Tool - RURAT Execution From Unusual Location
id: e01fa958-6893-41d4-ae03-182477c5e77d
status: test
description: Detects execution of Remote Utilities RAT (RURAT) from an unusual location (outside of 'C:\Program Files')
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/
author: Nasreddine Be... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/"
] | Image IN ("*\\rutserv.exe", "*\\rfusclient.exe") OR Product="Remote Utilities" NOT (Image IN ("C:\\Program Files\\Remote Utilities*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Remote Utilities*")) | ((Image:(*\\rutserv.exe OR *\\rfusclient.exe)) OR Product:"Remote Utilities") AND (NOT (Image:(C\:\\Program\ Files\\Remote\ Utilities* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\Remote\ Utilities*))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\rutserv.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\rfusclient.exe") or ProcessVersionInfoProductName =~ "Remote Utilities") and (not((FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\Remote Utilities" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Remote Utilities"))) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_access_tools_rurat_non_default_location.yml | |
87cc6698-3e07-4ba2-9b43-a85a73e151e2 | Bitbucket User Permissions Export Attempt | Detects user permission data export attempt. | bitbucket | audit | title: Bitbucket User Permissions Export Attempt
id: 87cc6698-3e07-4ba2-9b43-a85a73e151e2
status: test
description: Detects user permission data export attempt.
references:
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/users-and-gro... | [
"T1213",
"T1082",
"T1591.004"
] | [
"reconnaissance",
"collection",
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate user activity."
] | [
"https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html",
"https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/users-and-groups-776640439.html"
] | auditType.category="Users and groups" auditType.action IN ("User details export failed", "User details export started", "User details exported") | auditType.category:"Users and groups" AND (auditType.action:("User details export failed" OR "User details export started" OR "User details exported")) | null | application/bitbucket/audit/bitbucket_audit_user_permissions_export_attempt_detected.yml | |
6414b5cd-b19d-447e-bb5e-9f03940b5784 | Potential DLL Sideloading Of DBGHELP.DLL | Detects potential DLL sideloading of "dbghelp.dll" | windows | image_load | title: Potential DLL Sideloading Of DBGHELP.DLL
id: 6414b5cd-b19d-447e-bb5e-9f03940b5784
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "dbghelp.dll"
references:
- https://hijacklibs.net/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Wietze Beukema (project and research)
date: 2022-10-25
modified: ... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate applications loading their own versions of the DLL mentioned in this rule"
] | [
"https://hijacklibs.net/"
] | ImageLoaded="*\\dbghelp.dll" NOT (ImageLoaded IN ("C:\\Program Files (x86)\\*", "C:\\Program Files\\*", "C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\*", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\*", "C:\\Windows\\SystemTemp\\*", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\*", "C:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*")) NOT (ImageLoaded IN ("*\\Anaconda3\\Lib\\site-packages\\vtrace\... | ImageLoaded:*\\dbghelp.dll AND (NOT (ImageLoaded:(C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\System32\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\SystemTemp\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\* OR C\:\\Windows\\WinSxS\\*))) AND (NOT ((ImageLoaded:(*\\Anaconda3\\Lib\\site\-pac... | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\dbghelp.dll" and (not((FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Win... | windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_dbghelp.yml | |
99b7460d-c9f1-40d7-a316-1f36f61d52ee | Cscript/Wscript Uncommon Script Extension Execution | Detects Wscript/Cscript executing a file with an uncommon (i.e. non-script) extension | windows | process_creation | title: Cscript/Wscript Uncommon Script Extension Execution
id: 99b7460d-c9f1-40d7-a316-1f36f61d52ee
status: test
description: Detects Wscript/Cscript executing a file with an uncommon (i.e. non-script) extension
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-15
modified:... | [
"T1059.005",
"T1059.007"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | OriginalFileName IN ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") OR Image IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") CommandLine IN ("*.csv*", "*.dat*", "*.doc*", "*.gif*", "*.jpeg*", "*.jpg*", "*.png*", "*.ppt*", "*.txt*", "*.xls*", "*.xml*") | ((OriginalFileName:(wscript.exe OR cscript.exe)) OR (Image:(*\\wscript.exe OR *\\cscript.exe))) AND (CommandLine:(*.csv* OR *.dat* OR *.doc* OR *.gif* OR *.jpeg* OR *.jpg* OR *.png* OR *.ppt* OR *.txt* OR *.xls* OR *.xml*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")) or (FolderPath endswith "\\wscript.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains ".csv" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".dat" or ProcessCommandLine contains ".doc" or ProcessCommandLine ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wscript_cscript_uncommon_extension_exec.yml | |
e94b9ddc-eec5-4bb8-8a58-b9dc5f4e185f | UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - FileCreation | Detects creation of a file named "wpbbin" in the "%systemroot%\system32\" directory. Which could be indicative of UEFI based persistence method | windows | file_event | title: UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - FileCreation
id: e94b9ddc-eec5-4bb8-8a58-b9dc5f4e185f
status: test
description: Detects creation of a file named "wpbbin" in the "%systemroot%\system32\" directory. Which could be indicative
of UEFI based persistence method
references:
- https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uef... | [
"T1542.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate usage of the file by hardware manufacturer such as lenovo (Thanks @0gtweet for the tip)"
] | [
"https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c",
"https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/wpbbin.html"
] | TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\System32\\wpbbin.exe" | TargetFilename:C\:\\Windows\\System32\\wpbbin.exe | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath =~ "C:\\Windows\\System32\\wpbbin.exe" | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_wpbbin_persistence.yml | |
dfe8b941-4e54-4242-b674-6b613d521962 | Startup Item File Created - MacOS | Detects the creation of a startup item plist file, that automatically get executed at boot initialization to establish persistence.
Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence.
Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell... | macos | file_event | title: Startup Item File Created - MacOS
id: dfe8b941-4e54-4242-b674-6b613d521962
status: test
description: 'Detects the creation of a startup item plist file, that automatically get executed at boot initialization to
establish persistence.
Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initializ... | [
"T1037.005"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate administration activities"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1037.005/T1037.005.md",
"https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/StartupItems.html"
] | TargetFilename IN ("/Library/StartupItems/*", "/System/Library/StartupItems*") TargetFilename="*.plist" | (TargetFilename:(\/Library\/StartupItems\/* OR \/System\/Library\/StartupItems*)) AND TargetFilename:*.plist | DeviceFileEvents
| where (FolderPath startswith "/Library/StartupItems/" or FolderPath startswith "/System/Library/StartupItems") and FolderPath endswith ".plist" | macos/file_event/file_event_macos_susp_startup_item_created.yml | |
d645ef86-2396-48a1-a2b6-b629ca3f57ff | Windows Credential Guard Related Registry Value Deleted - Registry | Detects attempts to disable Windows Credential Guard by deleting registry values. Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them.
Adversaries may disable Credential Guard to gain access to sensitive credentials stored in the system, such as... | windows | registry_delete | title: Windows Credential Guard Related Registry Value Deleted - Registry
id: d645ef86-2396-48a1-a2b6-b629ca3f57ff
related:
- id: c17d47b7-dcd6-4109-87eb-d1817bd4cbc9
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects attempts to disable Windows Credential Guard by deleting registry values. Credential Guard use... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | experimental | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://github.com/DambergC/SaveFolder/blob/90e945eba80fae85f2d54b4616e05a44ec90c500/Cygate%20Installation%20tool%206.22/Script/OSD/OSDeployment-CredentialGuardDisable.ps1#L50",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/configure"
] | TargetObject IN ("*\\DeviceGuard\\EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity", "*\\DeviceGuard\\LsaCfgFlags", "*\\DeviceGuard\\RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures", "*\\Lsa\\LsaCfgFlags") | TargetObject:(*\\DeviceGuard\\EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity OR *\\DeviceGuard\\LsaCfgFlags OR *\\DeviceGuard\\RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures OR *\\Lsa\\LsaCfgFlags) | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\DeviceGuard\\EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity" or RegistryKey endswith "\\DeviceGuard\\LsaCfgFlags" or RegistryKey endswith "\\DeviceGuard\\RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures" or RegistryKey endswith "\\Lsa\\LsaCfgFlags" | windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_disable_credential_guard.yml | |
74babdd6-a758-4549-9632-26535279e654 | Suspicious Executable File Creation | Detect creation of suspicious executable file names.
Some strings look for suspicious file extensions, others look for filenames that exploit unquoted service paths. | windows | file_event | title: Suspicious Executable File Creation
id: 74babdd6-a758-4549-9632-26535279e654
status: test
description: 'Detect creation of suspicious executable file names.
Some strings look for suspicious file extensions, others look for filenames that exploit unquoted service paths.
'
references:
- https://medium.com/@S... | [
"T1564"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://medium.com/@SumitVerma101/windows-privilege-escalation-part-1-unquoted-service-path-c7a011a8d8ae",
"https://app.any.run/tasks/76c69e2d-01e8-49d9-9aea-fb7cc0c4d3ad/"
] | TargetFilename IN ("*:\\$Recycle.Bin.exe", "*:\\Documents and Settings.exe", "*:\\MSOCache.exe", "*:\\PerfLogs.exe", "*:\\Recovery.exe", "*.bat.exe", "*.sys.exe") | TargetFilename:(*\:\\$Recycle.Bin.exe OR *\:\\Documents\ and\ Settings.exe OR *\:\\MSOCache.exe OR *\:\\PerfLogs.exe OR *\:\\Recovery.exe OR *.bat.exe OR *.sys.exe) | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath endswith ":\\$Recycle.Bin.exe" or FolderPath endswith ":\\Documents and Settings.exe" or FolderPath endswith ":\\MSOCache.exe" or FolderPath endswith ":\\PerfLogs.exe" or FolderPath endswith ":\\Recovery.exe" or FolderPath endswith ".bat.exe" or FolderPath endswith ".sys.exe" | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_executable_creation.yml | |
910ab938-668b-401b-b08c-b596e80fdca5 | Transferring Files with Credential Data via Network Shares | Transferring files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using network shares | windows | security | title: Transferring Files with Credential Data via Network Shares
id: 910ab938-668b-401b-b08c-b596e80fdca5
related:
- id: 2e69f167-47b5-4ae7-a390-47764529eff5
type: similar
status: test
description: Transferring files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using network shares
references:
- ... | [
"T1003.002",
"T1003.001",
"T1003.003"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Transferring sensitive files for legitimate administration work by legitimate administrator"
] | [
"https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment"
] | EventID=5145 RelativeTargetName IN ("*\\mimidrv*", "*\\lsass*", "*\\windows\\minidump\\*", "*\\hiberfil*", "*\\sqldmpr*") OR RelativeTargetName IN ("Windows\\NTDS\\ntds.dit", "Windows\\System32\\config\\SAM", "Windows\\System32\\config\\SECURITY", "Windows\\System32\\config\\SYSTEM") | EventID:5145 AND ((RelativeTargetName:(*\\mimidrv* OR *\\lsass* OR *\\windows\\minidump\\* OR *\\hiberfil* OR *\\sqldmpr*)) OR (RelativeTargetName:(Windows\\NTDS\\ntds.dit OR Windows\\System32\\config\\SAM OR Windows\\System32\\config\\SECURITY OR Windows\\System32\\config\\SYSTEM))) | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_transf_files_with_cred_data_via_network_shares.yml | |
530a6faa-ff3d-4022-b315-50828e77eef5 | Anydesk Remote Access Software Service Installation | Detects the installation of the anydesk software service. Which could be an indication of anydesk abuse if you the software isn't already used. | windows | system | title: Anydesk Remote Access Software Service Installation
id: 530a6faa-ff3d-4022-b315-50828e77eef5
status: test
description: Detects the installation of the anydesk software service. Which could be an indication of anydesk abuse if you
the software isn't already used.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/... | [] | [
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate usage of the anydesk tool"
] | [
"https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/",
"https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/"
] | Provider_Name="Service Control Manager" EventID=7045 (ServiceName="*AnyDesk*" ServiceName="*Service*") OR ImagePath="*AnyDesk*" | (Provider_Name:"Service Control Manager" AND EventID:7045) AND ((ServiceName:*AnyDesk* AND ServiceName:*Service*) OR ImagePath:*AnyDesk*) | null | windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_service_install_anydesk.yml | |
02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc | Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation | Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks | windows | process_creation | title: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation
id: 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc
related:
- id: 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6
type: derived
- id: 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation fra... | [
"T1482",
"T1087",
"T1087.001",
"T1087.002",
"T1069.001",
"T1069.002",
"T1069",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"execution",
"discovery"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921",
"https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries",
"https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1",
"https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf... | CommandLine IN ("*Add-Exfiltration*", "*Add-Persistence*", "*Add-RegBackdoor*", "*Add-RemoteRegBackdoor*", "*Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor*", "*Check-VM*", "*ConvertTo-Rc4ByteStream*", "*Decrypt-Hash*", "*Disable-ADIDNSNode*", "*Disable-MachineAccount*", "*Do-Exfiltration*", "*Enable-ADIDNSNode*", "*Enable-MachineAccount*", "*E... | CommandLine:(*Add\-Exfiltration* OR *Add\-Persistence* OR *Add\-RegBackdoor* OR *Add\-RemoteRegBackdoor* OR *Add\-ScrnSaveBackdoor* OR *Check\-VM* OR *ConvertTo\-Rc4ByteStream* OR *Decrypt\-Hash* OR *Disable\-ADIDNSNode* OR *Disable\-MachineAccount* OR *Do\-Exfiltration* OR *Enable\-ADIDNSNode* OR *Enable\-MachineAccou... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "Add-Exfiltration" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Add-Persistence" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Add-RegBackdoor" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Add-RemoteRegBackdoor" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Check-... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_malicious_cmdlets.yml | |
b6676963-0353-4f88-90f5-36c20d443c6a | Cscript/Wscript Potentially Suspicious Child Process | Detects potentially suspicious child processes of Wscript/Cscript. These include processes such as rundll32 with uncommon exports or PowerShell spawning rundll32 or regsvr32.
Malware such as Pikabot and Qakbot were seen using similar techniques as well as many others. | windows | process_creation | title: Cscript/Wscript Potentially Suspicious Child Process
id: b6676963-0353-4f88-90f5-36c20d443c6a
status: test
description: 'Detects potentially suspicious child processes of Wscript/Cscript. These include processes such as rundll32
with uncommon exports or PowerShell spawning rundll32 or regsvr32.
Malware such... | [] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Some false positives might occur with admin or third party software scripts. Investigate and apply additional filters accordingly."
] | [
"Internal Research",
"https://github.com/pr0xylife/Pikabot/blob/fc58126127adf0f65e78f4eec59675523f48f086/Pikabot_30.10.2023.txt",
"https://github.com/pr0xylife/Pikabot/blob/fc58126127adf0f65e78f4eec59675523f48f086/Pikabot_22.12.2023.txt"
] | ParentImage IN ("*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR (Image IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") (CommandLine="*mshta*" CommandLine="*http*") OR CommandLine IN ("*rundll32*", "*regsvr32*", "*msiexec*")) NOT (Image="*\\rundll32.exe" CommandLine IN ("*UpdatePerUserSystemParamete... | (ParentImage:(*\\wscript.exe OR *\\cscript.exe)) AND (Image:*\\rundll32.exe OR ((Image:(*\\cmd.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe)) AND ((CommandLine:*mshta* AND CommandLine:*http*) OR (CommandLine:(*rundll32* OR *regsvr32* OR *msiexec*))))) AND (NOT (Image:*\\rundll32.exe AND (CommandLine:(*UpdatePerUserSystemPar... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\wscript.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe") and (FolderPath endswith "\\rundll32.exe" or ((FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe") and ((ProcessCommandLin... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wscript_cscript_susp_child_processes.yml | |
9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512 | Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution | Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) which is not a common parent process for other processes.
Suspicious child processes spawned by baaupdate.exe could indicate an attempt at lateral movement via BitLocker DCOM & COM Hijacking. | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility Execution
id: 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512
related:
- id: 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the execution of the BitLocker Access Agent Update Utility (baaupdate.exe) which is not a common paren... | [
"T1218",
"T1021.003"
] | [
"stealth",
"lateral-movement"
] | high | experimental | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/BitlockMove"
] | ParentImage="*\\baaupdate.exe" Image IN ("*\\bitsadmin.exe", "*\\cmd.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\powershell_ise.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\schtasks.exe", "*\\wmic.exe", "*\\wscript.exe") | ParentImage:*\\baaupdate.exe AND (Image:(*\\bitsadmin.exe OR *\\cmd.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\powershell_ise.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe OR *\\schtasks.exe OR *\\wmic.exe OR *\\wscript.exe)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\baaupdate.exe" and (FolderPath endswith "\\bitsadmin.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\powershell_ise.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_baaupdate_susp_child_process.yml | |
de41232e-12e8-49fa-86bc-c05c7e722df9 | Suspicious PowerShell Download - PoshModule | Detects suspicious PowerShell download command | windows | ps_module | title: Suspicious PowerShell Download - PoshModule
id: de41232e-12e8-49fa-86bc-c05c7e722df9
related:
- id: 65531a81-a694-4e31-ae04-f8ba5bc33759
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects suspicious PowerShell download command
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloa... | [
"T1059.001"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"PowerShell scripts that download content from the Internet"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadfile?view=net-8.0",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient.downloadstring?view=net-8.0"
] | ContextInfo="*System.Net.WebClient*" ContextInfo IN ("*.DownloadFile(*", "*.DownloadString(*") | ContextInfo:*System.Net.WebClient* AND (ContextInfo:(*.DownloadFile\(* OR *.DownloadString\(*)) | null | windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_susp_download.yml | |
9c226817-8dc9-46c2-a58d-66655aafd7dc | Modify User Shell Folders Startup Value | Detect modification of the User Shell Folders registry values for Startup or Common Startup which could indicate persistence attempts.
Attackers may modify User Shell Folders registry keys to point to malicious executables or scripts that will be executed during startup.
This technique is often used to maintain persist... | windows | registry_set | title: Modify User Shell Folders Startup Value
id: 9c226817-8dc9-46c2-a58d-66655aafd7dc
related:
- id: 8f3ab69a-aa22-4943-aa58-e0a52fdf6818
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detect modification of the User Shell Folders registry values for Startup or Common Startup which could indicate
persistence attempts.
... | [
"T1547.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md",
"https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/muddywater-snakes-riverbank/"
] | TargetObject IN ("*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders*", "*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders*") TargetObject IN ("*\\Common Startup", "*\\Startup") NOT (NOT Details=* OR Details IN ("*C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\S... | ((TargetObject:(*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User\ Shell\ Folders* OR *SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell\ Folders*)) AND (TargetObject:(*\\Common\ Startup OR *\\Startup))) AND (NOT ((NOT _exists_:Details) OR (Details:(*C\:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start\ ... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where ((RegistryKey contains "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders" or RegistryKey contains "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders") and (RegistryKey endswith "\\Common Startup" or RegistryKey endswith "\\Startup")) and (not((i... | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_user_shell_folders.yml | |
37651c2a-42cd-4a69-ae0d-22a4349aa04a | Unsigned AppX Installation Attempt Using Add-AppxPackage | Detects usage of the "Add-AppxPackage" or it's alias "Add-AppPackage" to install unsigned AppX packages | windows | process_creation | title: Unsigned AppX Installation Attempt Using Add-AppxPackage
id: 37651c2a-42cd-4a69-ae0d-22a4349aa04a
related:
- id: 975b2262-9a49-439d-92a6-0709cccdf0b2
type: similar
- id: 9a025188-6f2d-42f8-bb2f-d3a83d24a5af
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects usage of the "Add-AppxPackage" or it's alias "Add-AppP... | [] | [
"persistence",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Installation of unsigned packages for testing purposes"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/msix/package/unsigned-package",
"https://twitter.com/WindowsDocs/status/1620078135080325122"
] | Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") OR OriginalFileName IN ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll") CommandLine IN ("*Add-AppPackage *", "*Add-AppxPackage *") CommandLine="* -AllowUnsigned*" | ((Image:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe)) OR (OriginalFileName:(PowerShell.EXE OR pwsh.dll))) AND (CommandLine:(*Add\-AppPackage\ * OR *Add\-AppxPackage\ *)) AND CommandLine:*\ \-AllowUnsigned* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe") or (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("PowerShell.EXE", "pwsh.dll"))) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "Add-AppPackage " or ProcessCommandLine contains "Add-AppxPackage ") and ProcessCommandLine contains " -A... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_install_unsigned_appx_packages.yml | |
cb9cc1d1-e84e-4bdc-b7ad-c31b1b7908ec | Insecure Transfer Via Curl.EXE | Detects execution of "curl.exe" with the "--insecure" flag. | windows | process_creation | title: Insecure Transfer Via Curl.EXE
id: cb9cc1d1-e84e-4bdc-b7ad-c31b1b7908ec
status: test
description: Detects execution of "curl.exe" with the "--insecure" flag.
references:
- https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html
author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-30
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: windows... | [] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Access to badly maintained internal or development systems"
] | [
"https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html"
] | Image="*\\curl.exe"
| rex field=CommandLine "(?<CommandLineMatch>\\s-k\\s)"
| eval CommandLineCondition=if(isnotnull(CommandLineMatch), "true", "false")
| search OR OriginalFileName="curl.exe" CommandLineCondition="true" OR CommandLine="*--insecure*" | (Image:*\\curl.exe OR OriginalFileName:curl.exe) AND (CommandLine:/\s-k\s/ OR CommandLine:*\-\-insecure*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\curl.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "curl.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine matches regex "\\s-k\\s" or ProcessCommandLine contains "--insecure") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_insecure_connection.yml | |
aff229ab-f8cd-447b-b215-084d11e79eb0 | Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via SASec | Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task via SASec | rpc_firewall | application | title: Remote Schedule Task Lateral Movement via SASec
id: aff229ab-f8cd-447b-b215-084d11e79eb0
status: test
description: Detects remote RPC calls to create or execute a scheduled task via SASec
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931
- ht... | [
"T1053",
"T1053.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"lateral-movement",
"execution",
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-tsch/d1058a28-7e02-4948-8b8d-4a347fa64931",
"https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-TSCH.md",
"https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall",
"https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stop... | EventLog="RPCFW" EventID=3 InterfaceUuid="378e52b0-c0a9-11cf-822d-00aa0051e40f" OpNum IN (0, 1) | EventLog:RPCFW AND EventID:3 AND InterfaceUuid:378e52b0\-c0a9\-11cf\-822d\-00aa0051e40f AND (OpNum:(0 OR 1)) | null | application/rpc_firewall/rpc_firewall_sasec_lateral_movement.yml | |
fe10751f-1995-40a5-aaa2-c97ccb4123fe | Linux Capabilities Discovery | Detects attempts to discover the files with setuid/setgid capability on them. That would allow adversary to escalate their privileges. | linux | auditd | title: Linux Capabilities Discovery
id: fe10751f-1995-40a5-aaa2-c97ccb4123fe
status: test
description: Detects attempts to discover the files with setuid/setgid capability on them. That would allow adversary to escalate
their privileges.
references:
- https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/getcap.8.html
- https://www.... | [
"T1083",
"T1548"
] | [
"discovery",
"privilege-escalation"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/getcap.8.html",
"https://www.hackingarticles.in/linux-privilege-escalation-using-capabilities/",
"https://mn3m.info/posts/suid-vs-capabilities/",
"https://int0x33.medium.com/day-44-linux-capabilities-privilege-escalation-via-openssl-with-selinux-enabled-and-enforced-74d2... | type="EXECVE" a0="getcap" a1="-r" a2="/" | type:EXECVE AND a0:getcap AND a1:\-r AND a2:\/ | null | linux/auditd/execve/lnx_auditd_capabilities_discovery.yml | |
a0e417e2-2fa1-40da-b6d2-e094cd5e1191 | Registry Enumeration via WMI Stdregprov | Detects the usage of wmic.exe to enumerate or read Windows registry via the WMI StdRegProv class read methods (EnumKey, EnumValues, GetStringValue, etc.).
While registry reads are common, attackers may use this technique to perform reconnaissance and discover sensitive configuration values, credentials, or installed so... | windows | process_creation | title: Registry Enumeration via WMI Stdregprov
id: a0e417e2-2fa1-40da-b6d2-e094cd5e1191
related:
- id: c453ab7a-1f5c-4716-a3b4-dea8135fb43a
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the usage of wmic.exe to enumerate or read Windows registry via the WMI StdRegProv class read methods
(EnumKey, EnumVal... | [
"T1047",
"T1012"
] | [
"execution",
"discovery"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Legitimate administrative activity"
] | [
"https://trustedsec.com/blog/command-line-underdog-wmic-in-action",
"https://trustedsec.com/blog/wmi-for-script-kiddies",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/regprov/stdregprov"
] | Image="*\\wmic.exe" OR OriginalFileName="wmic.exe" CommandLine="*stdregprov*" CommandLine="*call*" CommandLine IN ("*CheckAccess*", "*EnumKey*", "*EnumValues*", "*GetBinaryValue*", "*GetDWORDValue*", "*GetExpandedStringValue*", "*GetMultiStringValue*", "*GetQWORDValue*", "*GetSecurityDescriptor*", "*GetStringValue*") | (Image:*\\wmic.exe OR OriginalFileName:wmic.exe) AND ((CommandLine:*stdregprov* AND CommandLine:*call*) AND (CommandLine:(*CheckAccess* OR *EnumKey* OR *EnumValues* OR *GetBinaryValue* OR *GetDWORDValue* OR *GetExpandedStringValue* OR *GetMultiStringValue* OR *GetQWORDValue* OR *GetSecurityDescriptor* OR *GetStringValu... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\wmic.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "wmic.exe") and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "stdregprov" and ProcessCommandLine contains "call") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "CheckAccess" or ProcessCommandLine contains "EnumKey" or ProcessCommandLine contains... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_stdregprov_reg_enumeration.yml | |
0a99eb3e-1617-41bd-b095-13dc767f3def | HackTool - Jlaive In-Memory Assembly Execution | Detects the use of Jlaive to execute assemblies in a copied PowerShell | windows | process_creation | title: HackTool - Jlaive In-Memory Assembly Execution
id: 0a99eb3e-1617-41bd-b095-13dc767f3def
status: test
description: Detects the use of Jlaive to execute assemblies in a copied PowerShell
references:
- https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/Jlaive-Antivirus-Evasion-Tool
- https://web.archive.org/web/2022051407370... | [
"T1059.003"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/Jlaive-Antivirus-Evasion-Tool",
"https://web.archive.org/web/20220514073704/https://github.com/ch2sh/Jlaive"
] | ParentImage="*\\cmd.exe" ParentCommandLine="*.bat" (Image="*\\xcopy.exe" CommandLine="*powershell.exe*" CommandLine="*.bat.exe*") OR (Image="*\\xcopy.exe" CommandLine="*pwsh.exe*" CommandLine="*.bat.exe*") OR (Image="*\\attrib.exe" CommandLine="*+s*" CommandLine="*+h*" CommandLine="*.bat.exe*") | (ParentImage:*\\cmd.exe AND ParentCommandLine:*.bat) AND ((Image:*\\xcopy.exe AND (CommandLine:*powershell.exe* AND CommandLine:*.bat.exe*)) OR (Image:*\\xcopy.exe AND (CommandLine:*pwsh.exe* AND CommandLine:*.bat.exe*)) OR (Image:*\\attrib.exe AND (CommandLine:*\+s* AND CommandLine:*\+h* AND CommandLine:*.bat.exe*))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine endswith ".bat") and ((FolderPath endswith "\\xcopy.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains ".bat.exe")) or (FolderPath endswith "\\xcopy.exe" and (ProcessCommand... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_jlaive_batch_execution.yml | |
17e53739-a1fc-4a62-b1b9-87711c2d5e44 | Python Function Execution Security Warning Disabled In Excel - Registry | Detects changes to the registry value "PythonFunctionWarnings" that would prevent any warnings or alerts from showing when Python functions are about to be executed.
Threat actors could run malicious code through the new Microsoft Excel feature that allows Python to run within the spreadsheet. | windows | registry_set | title: Python Function Execution Security Warning Disabled In Excel - Registry
id: 17e53739-a1fc-4a62-b1b9-87711c2d5e44
related:
- id: 023c654f-8f16-44d9-bb2b-00ff36a62af9
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects changes to the registry value "PythonFunctionWarnings" that would prevent any warnings or alerts ... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/data-security-and-python-in-excel-33cc88a4-4a87-485e-9ff9-f35958278327"
] | TargetObject="*\\Microsoft\\Office\\*" TargetObject="*\\Excel\\Security\\PythonFunctionWarnings" Details="DWORD (0x00000001)" | TargetObject:*\\Microsoft\\Office\\* AND TargetObject:*\\Excel\\Security\\PythonFunctionWarnings AND Details:"DWORD \(0x00000001\)" | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\Microsoft\\Office*" and RegistryKey endswith "\\Excel\\Security\\PythonFunctionWarnings" and RegistryValueData =~ "DWORD (0x00000001)" | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_office_disable_python_security_warnings.yml | |
a753a6af-3126-426d-8bd0-26ebbcb92254 | Osacompile Execution By Potentially Suspicious Applet/Osascript | Detects potential suspicious applet or osascript executing "osacompile". | macos | process_creation | title: Osacompile Execution By Potentially Suspicious Applet/Osascript
id: a753a6af-3126-426d-8bd0-26ebbcb92254
status: test
description: Detects potential suspicious applet or osascript executing "osacompile".
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/mac-application-bundles/
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r), Red Canary (I... | [
"T1059.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://redcanary.com/blog/mac-application-bundles/"
] | ParentImage IN ("*/applet", "*/osascript") CommandLine="*osacompile*" | (ParentImage:(*\/applet OR *\/osascript)) AND CommandLine:*osacompile* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "/applet" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "/osascript") and ProcessCommandLine contains "osacompile" | macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_suspicious_applet_behaviour.yml | |
ee39a9f7-5a79-4b0a-9815-d36b3cf28d3e | Okta FastPass Phishing Detection | Detects when Okta FastPass prevents a known phishing site. | okta | okta | title: Okta FastPass Phishing Detection
id: ee39a9f7-5a79-4b0a-9815-d36b3cf28d3e
status: test
description: Detects when Okta FastPass prevents a known phishing site.
references:
- https://sec.okta.com/fastpassphishingdetection
- https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
- https://developer.okta.com/docs... | [
"T1566"
] | [
"initial-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://sec.okta.com/fastpassphishingdetection",
"https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/",
"https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/"
] | outcome.reason="FastPass declined phishing attempt" outcome.result="FAILURE" eventType="user.authentication.auth_via_mfa" | outcome.reason:"FastPass declined phishing attempt" AND outcome.result:FAILURE AND eventType:user.authentication.auth_via_mfa | null | identity/okta/okta_fastpass_phishing_detection.yml | |
13e6fe51-d478-4c7e-b0f2-6da9b400a829 | Suspicious File Downloaded From Direct IP Via Certutil.EXE | Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from direct IPs. | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious File Downloaded From Direct IP Via Certutil.EXE
id: 13e6fe51-d478-4c7e-b0f2-6da9b400a829
related:
- id: 19b08b1c-861d-4e75-a1ef-ea0c1baf202b
type: similar
- id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that al... | [
"T1027",
"T1105"
] | [
"stealth",
"command-and-control"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil",
"https://forensicitguy.github.io/agenttesla-vba-certutil-download/",
"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/",
"https://twitter.com/... | Image="*\\certutil.exe" OR OriginalFileName="CertUtil.exe" CommandLine IN ("*urlcache *", "*verifyctl *", "*URL *") CommandLine IN ("*://1*", "*://2*", "*://3*", "*://4*", "*://5*", "*://6*", "*://7*", "*://8*", "*://9*") NOT CommandLine="*://7-*" | ((Image:*\\certutil.exe OR OriginalFileName:CertUtil.exe) AND (CommandLine:(*urlcache\ * OR *verifyctl\ * OR *URL\ *)) AND (CommandLine:(*\:\/\/1* OR *\:\/\/2* OR *\:\/\/3* OR *\:\/\/4* OR *\:\/\/5* OR *\:\/\/6* OR *\:\/\/7* OR *\:\/\/8* OR *\:\/\/9*))) AND (NOT CommandLine:*\:\/\/7\-*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\certutil.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "CertUtil.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "urlcache " or ProcessCommandLine contains "verifyctl " or ProcessCommandLine contains "URL ") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "://1" or ProcessCommandLine contai... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_download_direct_ip.yml | |
550bbb84-ce5d-4e61-84ad-e590f0024dcd | File Encryption Using Gpg4win | Detects usage of Gpg4win to encrypt files | windows | process_creation | title: File Encryption Using Gpg4win
id: 550bbb84-ce5d-4e61-84ad-e590f0024dcd
status: test
description: Detects usage of Gpg4win to encrypt files
references:
- https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/11/batloader-the-evasive-downloader-malware.html
- https://www.gpg4win.de/documentation.html
- https://news.sophos.com/en... | [] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/11/batloader-the-evasive-downloader-malware.html",
"https://www.gpg4win.de/documentation.html",
"https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/01/19/zloader-installs-remote-access-backdoors-and-delivers-cobalt-strike/"
] | Image IN ("*\\gpg.exe", "*\\gpg2.exe") OR Description="GnuPG’s OpenPGP tool" CommandLine="* -c *" CommandLine="*passphrase*" | ((Image:(*\\gpg.exe OR *\\gpg2.exe)) OR Description:"GnuPG’s OpenPGP tool") AND (CommandLine:*\ \-c\ * AND CommandLine:*passphrase*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\gpg.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\gpg2.exe") or ProcessVersionInfoFileDescription =~ "GnuPG’s OpenPGP tool") and (ProcessCommandLine contains " -c " and ProcessCommandLine contains "passphrase") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_gpg4win_encryption.yml | |
1b9dc62e-6e9e-42a3-8990-94d7a10007f7 | Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - PowerShell | Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block \u2014 | windows | ps_script | title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - PowerShell
id: 1b9dc62e-6e9e-42a3-8990-94d7a10007f7
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework
from the following code block \u2014
references:
- https://github.com/daniel... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888"
] |
| rex field=ScriptBlockText "(?<ScriptBlockTextMatch>\\$PSHome\\[\\s*\\d{1,3}\\s*\\]\\s*\\+\\s*\\$PSHome\\[)"
| eval ScriptBlockTextCondition=if(isnotnull(ScriptBlockTextMatch), "true", "false")
| rex field=ScriptBlockText "(?<ScriptBlockTextMatch2>\\$ShellId\\[\\s*\\d{1,3}\\s*\\]\\s*\\+\\s*\\$ShellId\\[)"
| eval Scri... | ScriptBlockText:/\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\[/ OR ScriptBlockText:/\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\[/ OR ScriptBlockText:/\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\[/ OR ScriptBlockText:/\$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}/ OR ScriptBlockText:/\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name/ OR ScriptBlockText:/... | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex.yml | |
78a34b67-3c39-4886-8fb4-61c46dc18ecd | Microsoft 365 - Unusual Volume of File Deletion | Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported a user has deleted a unusual a large volume of files. | m365 | threat_management | title: Microsoft 365 - Unusual Volume of File Deletion
id: 78a34b67-3c39-4886-8fb4-61c46dc18ecd
status: test
description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported a user has deleted a unusual a large volume of files.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-polic... | [
"T1485"
] | [
"impact"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference"
] | eventSource="SecurityComplianceCenter" eventName="Unusual volume of file deletion" status="success" | eventSource:SecurityComplianceCenter AND eventName:"Unusual volume of file deletion" AND status:success | null | cloud/m365/threat_management/microsoft365_unusual_volume_of_file_deletion.yml | |
52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad | First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe | This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes | windows | security | title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe
id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
status: test
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to
detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
references:
- https://twitter.com/menasec1... | [
"T1021.002"
] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | high | test | [
"Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904"
] | EventID=5145 ShareName="\\\\\*\\IPC$" NOT (RelativeTargetName IN ("atsvc", "samr", "lsarpc", "lsass", "winreg", "netlogon", "srvsvc", "protected_storage", "wkssvc", "browser", "netdfs", "svcctl", "spoolss", "ntsvcs", "LSM_API_service", "HydraLsPipe", "TermSrv_API_service", "MsFteWds", "sql\\query", "eventlog")) | (EventID:5145 AND ShareName:\\\\\*\\IPC$) AND (NOT (RelativeTargetName:(atsvc OR samr OR lsarpc OR lsass OR winreg OR netlogon OR srvsvc OR protected_storage OR wkssvc OR browser OR netdfs OR svcctl OR spoolss OR ntsvcs OR LSM_API_service OR HydraLsPipe OR TermSrv_API_service OR MsFteWds OR sql\\query OR eventlog))) | null | windows/builtin/security/win_security_lm_namedpipe.yml | |
c6714a24-d7d5-4283-a36b-3ffd091d5f7e | Potential PHP Reverse Shell | Detects usage of the PHP CLI with the "-r" flag which allows it to run inline PHP code. The rule looks for calls to the "fsockopen" function which allows the creation of sockets.
Attackers often leverage this in combination with functions such as "exec" or "fopen" to initiate a reverse shell connection. | linux | process_creation | title: Potential PHP Reverse Shell
id: c6714a24-d7d5-4283-a36b-3ffd091d5f7e
status: test
description: 'Detects usage of the PHP CLI with the "-r" flag which allows it to run inline PHP code. The rule looks for calls
to the "fsockopen" function which allows the creation of sockets.
Attackers often leverage this in ... | [] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet",
"https://www.revshells.com/"
] | Image="*/php*" CommandLine="* -r *" CommandLine="*fsockopen*" CommandLine IN ("*ash*", "*bash*", "*bsh*", "*csh*", "*ksh*", "*pdksh*", "*sh*", "*tcsh*", "*zsh*") | Image:*\/php* AND (CommandLine:*\ \-r\ * AND CommandLine:*fsockopen*) AND (CommandLine:(*ash* OR *bash* OR *bsh* OR *csh* OR *ksh* OR *pdksh* OR *sh* OR *tcsh* OR *zsh*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath contains "/php" and (ProcessCommandLine contains " -r " and ProcessCommandLine contains "fsockopen") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "ash" or ProcessCommandLine contains "bash" or ProcessCommandLine contains "bsh" or ProcessCommandLine contains "csh" or ProcessCommandLine contain... | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_php_reverse_shell.yml | |
970007b7-ce32-49d0-a4a4-fbef016950bd | Potential Configuration And Service Reconnaissance Via Reg.EXE | Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to query reconnaissance information from the registry. Adversaries may interact with the Windows registry to gather information about credentials, the system, configuration, and installed software. | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Configuration And Service Reconnaissance Via Reg.EXE
id: 970007b7-ce32-49d0-a4a4-fbef016950bd
status: test
description: Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to query reconnaissance information from the registry. Adversaries may
interact with the Windows registry to gather information about credent... | [
"T1012",
"T1007"
] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Discord"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1012/T1012.md"
] | Image="*\\reg.exe" OR OriginalFileName="reg.exe" CommandLine="*query*" CommandLine IN ("*currentVersion\\windows*", "*winlogon\\*", "*currentVersion\\shellServiceObjectDelayLoad*", "*currentVersion\\run*", "*currentVersion\\policies\\explorer\\run*", "*currentcontrolset\\services*") | (Image:*\\reg.exe OR OriginalFileName:reg.exe) AND CommandLine:*query* AND (CommandLine:(*currentVersion\\windows* OR *winlogon\\* OR *currentVersion\\shellServiceObjectDelayLoad* OR *currentVersion\\run* OR *currentVersion\\policies\\explorer\\run* OR *currentcontrolset\\services*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\reg.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "reg.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "query" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "currentVersion\\windows" or ProcessCommandLine contains "winlogon\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains "currentVersion\\shellServiceObje... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_query_registry.yml | |
ad691d92-15f2-4181-9aa4-723c74f9ddc3 | Potential Defense Evasion Via Right-to-Left Override | Detects the presence of the "u202+E" character, which causes a terminal, browser, or operating system to render text in a right-to-left sequence.
This character is used as an obfuscation and masquerading techniques by adversaries to trick users into opening malicious files. | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Right-to-Left Override
id: ad691d92-15f2-4181-9aa4-723c74f9ddc3
related:
- id: e0552b19-5a83-4222-b141-b36184bb8d79
type: derived
- id: 584bca0f-3608-4402-80fd-4075ff6072e3
type: derived
status: test
description: 'Detects the presence of the "u202+E" character, which causes a te... | [
"T1036.002"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Commandlines that contains scriptures such as arabic or hebrew might make use of this character"
] | [
"https://redcanary.com/blog/right-to-left-override/",
"https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2014/01/the-rtlo-method",
"https://unicode-explorer.com/c/202E",
"https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2",
"https://unprotect.it/technique/right-to-left-override-rlo-extension-spoofing/"
] | CommandLine IN ("*\\u202e*", "*[U+202E]*", "**") | CommandLine:(*\\u202e* OR *\[U\+202E\]* OR **) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "\\u202e" or ProcessCommandLine contains "[U+202E]" or ProcessCommandLine contains "" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_right_to_left_override.yml | |
21541900-27a9-4454-9c4c-3f0a4240344a | OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand | Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command using the /bin/sh shell.
SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Linux Agent, is now used in a host of products including
Microsoft Operations Manager, Microsoft Azure, and Microsoft Operations... | linux | process_creation | title: OMIGOD SCX RunAsProvider ExecuteShellCommand
id: 21541900-27a9-4454-9c4c-3f0a4240344a
status: test
description: 'Rule to detect the use of the SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand to execute any UNIX/Linux command
using the /bin/sh shell.
SCXcore, started as the Microsoft Operations Manager UNIX/Lin... | [
"T1068",
"T1190",
"T1203"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"initial-access",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate use of SCX RunAsProvider Invoke_ExecuteShellCommand."
] | [
"https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure",
"https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/pull/3059"
] | User="root" LogonId=0 CurrentDirectory="/var/opt/microsoft/scx/tmp" CommandLine="*/bin/sh*" | User:root AND LogonId:0 AND CurrentDirectory:\/var\/opt\/microsoft\/scx\/tmp AND CommandLine:*\/bin\/sh* | null | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_omigod_scx_runasprovider_executeshellcommand.yml | |
0b8baa3f-575c-46ee-8715-d6f28cc7d33c | NTDS.DIT Created | Detects creation of a file named "ntds.dit" (Active Directory Database) | windows | file_event | title: NTDS.DIT Created
id: 0b8baa3f-575c-46ee-8715-d6f28cc7d33c
status: test
description: Detects creation of a file named "ntds.dit" (Active Directory Database)
references:
- Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-05
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.003
logsou... | [
"T1003.003"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research"
] | TargetFilename="*ntds.dit" | TargetFilename:*ntds.dit | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "ntds.dit" | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_ntds_dit_creation.yml | |
12fbff88-16b5-4b42-9754-cd001a789fb3 | CodePage Modification Via MODE.COM To Russian Language | Detects a CodePage modification using the "mode.com" utility to Russian language.
This behavior has been used by threat actors behind Dharma ransomware. | windows | process_creation | title: CodePage Modification Via MODE.COM To Russian Language
id: 12fbff88-16b5-4b42-9754-cd001a789fb3
related:
- id: d48c5ffa-3b02-4c0f-9a9e-3c275650dd0e
type: derived
status: test
description: 'Detects a CodePage modification using the "mode.com" utility to Russian language.
This behavior has been used by threat... | [
"T1036"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Russian speaking people changing the CodePage"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/intl/code-page-identifiers",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mode",
"https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/mode.com-59D1ED51ACB8C3D50F1306FD75F20E99.html",
"https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5e75ef025... | Image="*\\mode.com" OR OriginalFileName="MODE.COM" CommandLine="* con *" CommandLine="* cp *" CommandLine="* select=*" CommandLine IN ("*=1251", "*=866") | (Image:*\\mode.com OR OriginalFileName:MODE.COM) AND ((CommandLine:*\ con\ * AND CommandLine:*\ cp\ * AND CommandLine:*\ select\=*) AND (CommandLine:(*\=1251 OR *\=866))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\mode.com" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "MODE.COM") and ((ProcessCommandLine contains " con " and ProcessCommandLine contains " cp " and ProcessCommandLine contains " select=") and (ProcessCommandLine endswith "=1251" or ProcessCommandLine endswith "=866")) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mode_codepage_russian.yml | |
b0ce780f-10bd-496d-9067-066d23dc3aa5 | HackTool - SharpWSUS/WSUSpendu Execution | Detects the execution of SharpWSUS or WSUSpendu, utilities that allow for lateral movement through WSUS.
Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) is a critical component of Windows systems and is frequently configured in a way that allows an attacker to circumvent internal networking limitations. | windows | process_creation | title: HackTool - SharpWSUS/WSUSpendu Execution
id: b0ce780f-10bd-496d-9067-066d23dc3aa5
status: test
description: 'Detects the execution of SharpWSUS or WSUSpendu, utilities that allow for lateral movement through WSUS.
Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) is a critical component of Windows systems and is frequent... | [
"T1210"
] | [
"execution",
"lateral-movement"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/introducing-sharpwsus/",
"https://github.com/nettitude/SharpWSUS",
"https://web.archive.org/web/20210512154016/https://github.com/AlsidOfficial/WSUSpendu/blob/master/WSUSpendu.ps1"
] | (CommandLine="* -Inject *" CommandLine IN ("* -PayloadArgs *", "* -PayloadFile *")) OR (CommandLine IN ("* approve *", "* create *", "* check *", "* delete *") CommandLine IN ("* /payload:*", "* /payload=*", "* /updateid:*", "* /updateid=*")) | (CommandLine:*\ \-Inject\ * AND (CommandLine:(*\ \-PayloadArgs\ * OR *\ \-PayloadFile\ *))) OR ((CommandLine:(*\ approve\ * OR *\ create\ * OR *\ check\ * OR *\ delete\ *)) AND (CommandLine:(*\ \/payload\:* OR *\ \/payload\=* OR *\ \/updateid\:* OR *\ \/updateid\=*))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains " -Inject " and (ProcessCommandLine contains " -PayloadArgs " or ProcessCommandLine contains " -PayloadFile ")) or ((ProcessCommandLine contains " approve " or ProcessCommandLine contains " create " or ProcessCommandLine contains " check " or ProcessCommandLine c... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_sharpwsus_wsuspendu_execution.yml | |
ff3b6b39-e765-42f9-bb2c-ea6761e0e0f6 | Mstsc.EXE Execution From Uncommon Parent | Detects potential RDP connection via Mstsc using a local ".rdp" file located in suspicious locations. | windows | process_creation | title: Mstsc.EXE Execution From Uncommon Parent
id: ff3b6b39-e765-42f9-bb2c-ea6761e0e0f6
status: test
description: Detects potential RDP connection via Mstsc using a local ".rdp" file located in suspicious locations.
references:
- https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/rogue-rdp-revisiting-initial-access-methods/
- https://... | [] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/rogue-rdp-revisiting-initial-access-methods/",
"https://web.archive.org/web/20230726144748/https://blog.thickmints.dev/mintsights/detecting-rogue-rdp/"
] | ParentImage IN ("*\\brave.exe", "*\\CCleanerBrowser.exe", "*\\chrome.exe", "*\\chromium.exe", "*\\firefox.exe", "*\\iexplore.exe", "*\\microsoftedge.exe", "*\\msedge.exe", "*\\opera.exe", "*\\vivaldi.exe", "*\\whale.exe", "*\\outlook.exe") Image="*\\mstsc.exe" OR OriginalFileName="mstsc.exe" | (ParentImage:(*\\brave.exe OR *\\CCleanerBrowser.exe OR *\\chrome.exe OR *\\chromium.exe OR *\\firefox.exe OR *\\iexplore.exe OR *\\microsoftedge.exe OR *\\msedge.exe OR *\\opera.exe OR *\\vivaldi.exe OR *\\whale.exe OR *\\outlook.exe)) AND (Image:*\\mstsc.exe OR OriginalFileName:mstsc.exe) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\brave.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\CCleanerBrowser.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\chrome.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\chromium.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\firefox.exe" or Initi... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mstsc_run_local_rpd_file_susp_parent.yml | |
1ae64f96-72b6-48b3-ad3d-e71dff6c6398 | Suspicious External WebDAV Execution | Detects executables launched from external WebDAV shares using the WebDAV Explorer integration, commonly seen in initial access campaigns. | proxy | title: Suspicious External WebDAV Execution
id: 1ae64f96-72b6-48b3-ad3d-e71dff6c6398
related:
- id: 4c55738d-72d8-490e-a2db-7969654e375f
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects executables launched from external WebDAV shares using the WebDAV Explorer integration, commonly seen
in initial access campaigns.... | [
"T1584",
"T1566"
] | [
"initial-access",
"resource-development"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://dear-territory-023.notion.site/WebDav-Share-Testing-e4950fa0c00149c3aa430d779b9b1d0f?pvs=4",
"https://micahbabinski.medium.com/search-ms-webdav-and-chill-99c5b23ac462",
"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_no/research/24/b/cve202421412-water-hydra-targets-traders-with-windows-defender-s.html",
"https://www... | "c-useragent"="Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/*" "cs-method"="GET" "c-uri" IN ("*.7z", "*.bat", "*.dat", "*.cmd", "*.exe", "*.js", "*.lnk", "*.ps1", "*.rar", "*.url", "*.vbe", "*.vbs", "*.zip") NOT (dst_ip="127.0.0.0/8" OR dst_ip="10.0.0.0/8" OR dst_ip="172.16.0.0/12" OR dst_ip="192.168.0.0/16" OR dst_ip="169.254.0.0/16" O... | ((c-useragent:Microsoft\-WebDAV\-MiniRedir\/* AND cs-method:GET) AND (c-uri:(*.7z OR *.bat OR *.dat OR *.cmd OR *.exe OR *.js OR *.lnk OR *.ps1 OR *.rar OR *.url OR *.vbe OR *.vbs OR *.zip))) AND (NOT (dst_ip:127.0.0.0\/8 OR dst_ip:10.0.0.0\/8 OR dst_ip:172.16.0.0\/12 OR dst_ip:192.168.0.0\/16 OR dst_ip:169.254.0.0\/16... | null | web/proxy_generic/proxy_webdav_external_execution.yml | ||
552b6b65-df37-4d3e-a258-f2fc4771ae54 | Potential Antivirus Software DLL Sideloading | Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of antivirus software suchas McAfee, Symantec...etc | windows | image_load | title: Potential Antivirus Software DLL Sideloading
id: 552b6b65-df37-4d3e-a258-f2fc4771ae54
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of antivirus software suchas McAfee, Symantec...etc
references:
- https://hijacklibs.net/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Wiet... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Applications that load the same dlls mentioned in the detection section. Investigate them and filter them out if a lot FPs are caused.",
"Dell SARemediation plugin folder (C:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SARemediation\\plugin\\log.dll) is known to contain the 'log.dll' file.",
"The Canon MyPrinter folder 'C:\\Program... | [
"https://hijacklibs.net/"
] | (ImageLoaded="*\\log.dll" NOT (ImageLoaded IN ("C:\\Program Files\\Bitdefender Antivirus Free\\*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Bitdefender Antivirus Free\\*") OR (Image="C:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SARemediation\\audit\\TelemetryUtility.exe" ImageLoaded IN ("C:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SARemediation\\plugin\\log.dll", "C:\\Pro... | (ImageLoaded:*\\log.dll AND (NOT ((ImageLoaded:(C\:\\Program\ Files\\Bitdefender\ Antivirus\ Free\\* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\Bitdefender\ Antivirus\ Free\\*)) OR (Image:"C\:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SARemediation\\audit\\TelemetryUtility.exe" AND (ImageLoaded:("C\:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SARemediation\\plugin\\log... | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\log.dll" and (not(((FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\Bitdefender Antivirus Free\\" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Bitdefender Antivirus Free\\") or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath =~ "C:\\Program Files\\Dell\\SARemediation\\audit\\Telemetry... | windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_antivirus.yml | |
a35f5a72-f347-4e36-8895-9869b0d5fc6d | Suspicious Program Location Whitelisted In Firewall Via Netsh.EXE | Detects Netsh command execution that whitelists a program located in a suspicious location in the Windows Firewall | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Program Location Whitelisted In Firewall Via Netsh.EXE
id: a35f5a72-f347-4e36-8895-9869b0d5fc6d
status: test
description: Detects Netsh command execution that whitelists a program located in a suspicious location in the Windows Firewall
references:
- https://www.virusradar.com/en/Win32_Kasidet.AD/desc... | [
"T1686.003"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.virusradar.com/en/Win32_Kasidet.AD/description",
"https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/07e789f4f2f3259e7559fdccb36e96814c2dbff872a21e1fa03de9ee377d581f?environmentId=100"
] | Image="*\\netsh.exe" OR OriginalFileName="netsh.exe" (CommandLine="*firewall*" CommandLine="*add*" CommandLine="*allowedprogram*") OR (CommandLine="*advfirewall*" CommandLine="*firewall*" CommandLine="*add*" CommandLine="*rule*" CommandLine="*action=allow*" CommandLine="*program=*") CommandLine IN ("*:\\$Recycle.bin\\*... | (Image:*\\netsh.exe OR OriginalFileName:netsh.exe) AND ((CommandLine:*firewall* AND CommandLine:*add* AND CommandLine:*allowedprogram*) OR (CommandLine:*advfirewall* AND CommandLine:*firewall* AND CommandLine:*add* AND CommandLine:*rule* AND CommandLine:*action\=allow* AND CommandLine:*program\=*)) AND (CommandLine:(*\... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\netsh.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "netsh.exe") and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "firewall" and ProcessCommandLine contains "add" and ProcessCommandLine contains "allowedprogram") or (ProcessCommandLine contains "advfirewall" and ProcessCommandLine c... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_netsh_fw_allow_program_in_susp_location.yml | |
02122374-b74e-495c-b285-9e4da973f3d6 | DMSA Service Account Created in Specific OUs - PowerShell | Detects the creation of a dMSA service account using the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet in certain OUs.
The fact that the cmdlet is used to create a dMSASvc account in a specific OU is highly suspicious.
It is a pattern trying to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025.
On top of... | windows | ps_script | title: DMSA Service Account Created in Specific OUs - PowerShell
id: 02122374-b74e-495c-b285-9e4da973f3d6
related:
- id: e15bc294-ae2a-45ad-b7d6-637b33868bde
type: similar
- id: 0ea8db81-2ff6-4525-9448-33bbe7effc13
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the creation of a dMSA service account using... | [
"T1078.002",
"T1098"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"initial-access",
"persistence",
"stealth"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-bad-successor-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory"
] | ScriptBlockText="*New-ADServiceAccount*" ScriptBlockText="*-CreateDelegatedServiceAccount*" ScriptBlockText="*-path*" | ScriptBlockText:*New\-ADServiceAccount* AND ScriptBlockText:*\-CreateDelegatedServiceAccount* AND ScriptBlockText:*\-path* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_create_new_dmsasvc_account.yml | |
c633622e-cab9-4eaa-bb13-66a1d68b3e47 | New Virtual Smart Card Created Via TpmVscMgr.EXE | Detects execution of "Tpmvscmgr.exe" to create a new virtual smart card. | windows | process_creation | title: New Virtual Smart Card Created Via TpmVscMgr.EXE
id: c633622e-cab9-4eaa-bb13-66a1d68b3e47
status: test
description: Detects execution of "Tpmvscmgr.exe" to create a new virtual smart card.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-... | [] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate usage by an administrator"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/virtual-smart-cards/virtual-smart-card-tpmvscmgr"
] | Image="*\\tpmvscmgr.exe" OriginalFileName="TpmVscMgr.exe" CommandLine="*create*" | (Image:*\\tpmvscmgr.exe AND OriginalFileName:TpmVscMgr.exe) AND CommandLine:*create* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\tpmvscmgr.exe" and ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "TpmVscMgr.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "create" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_tpmvscmgr_add_virtual_smartcard.yml | |
2ea44a60-cfda-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 | Webshell ReGeorg Detection Via Web Logs | Certain strings in the uri_query field when combined with null referer and null user agent can indicate activity associated with the webshell ReGeorg. | webserver | title: Webshell ReGeorg Detection Via Web Logs
id: 2ea44a60-cfda-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003
status: test
description: Certain strings in the uri_query field when combined with null referer and null user agent can indicate activity
associated with the webshell ReGeorg.
references:
- https://community.rsa.com/community/pro... | [
"T1505.003"
] | [
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Web applications that use the same URL parameters as ReGeorg"
] | [
"https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2019/02/19/web-shells-and-netwitness-part-3",
"https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg"
] | "cs-uri-query" IN ("*cmd=read*", "*connect&target*", "*cmd=connect*", "*cmd=disconnect*", "*cmd=forward*") NOT "cs-referer"=* NOT "cs-user-agent"=* "cs-method"="POST" | (cs-uri-query:(*cmd\=read* OR *connect\&target* OR *cmd\=connect* OR *cmd\=disconnect* OR *cmd\=forward*)) AND ((NOT _exists_:cs-referer) AND (NOT _exists_:cs-user-agent) AND cs-method:POST) | null | web/webserver_generic/web_webshell_regeorg.yml | ||
b66474aa-bd92-4333-a16c-298155b120df | Potential Persistence Via Powershell Search Order Hijacking - Task | Detects suspicious powershell execution via a schedule task where the command ends with an suspicious flags to hide the powershell instance instead of executeing scripts or commands. This could be a sign of persistence via PowerShell "Get-Variable" technique as seen being used in Colibri Loader | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Persistence Via Powershell Search Order Hijacking - Task
id: b66474aa-bd92-4333-a16c-298155b120df
related:
- id: 6e8811ee-90ba-441e-8486-5653e68b2299
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious powershell execution via a schedule task where the command ends with an suspicious flags to
... | [
"T1053.005",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/"
] | ParentImage="C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\svchost.exe" ParentCommandLine="*-k netsvcs*" ParentCommandLine="*-s Schedule*" CommandLine IN ("* -windowstyle hidden", "* -w hidden", "* -ep bypass", "* -noni") | ParentImage:C\:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\svchost.exe AND (ParentCommandLine:*\-k\ netsvcs* AND ParentCommandLine:*\-s\ Schedule*) AND (CommandLine:(*\ \-windowstyle\ hidden OR *\ \-w\ hidden OR *\ \-ep\ bypass OR *\ \-noni)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath =~ "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\svchost.exe" and (InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-k netsvcs" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "-s Schedule") and (ProcessCommandLine endswith " -windowstyle hidden" or ProcessCommandLine endswith " -w hidden" or ProcessC... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_powershell_persistence.yml | |
b69888d4-380c-45ce-9cf9-d9ce46e67821 | Hidden Executable In NTFS Alternate Data Stream | Detects the creation of an ADS (Alternate Data Stream) that contains an executable by looking at a non-empty Imphash | windows | create_stream_hash | title: Hidden Executable In NTFS Alternate Data Stream
id: b69888d4-380c-45ce-9cf9-d9ce46e67821
status: test
description: Detects the creation of an ADS (Alternate Data Stream) that contains an executable by looking at a non-empty
Imphash
references:
- https://twitter.com/0xrawsec/status/1002478725605273600?s=21
auth... | [
"T1564.004"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"This rule isn't looking for any particular binary characteristics. As legitimate installers and programs were seen embedding hidden binaries in their ADS. Some false positives are expected from browser processes and similar."
] | [
"https://twitter.com/0xrawsec/status/1002478725605273600?s=21"
] | Hash="*IMPHASH=*" NOT Hash="*IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000*" | Hash:*IMPHASH\=* AND (NOT Hash:*IMPHASH\=00000000000000000000000000000000*) | null | windows/create_stream_hash/create_stream_hash_ads_executable.yml | |
d2b7a134-9c3e-4f8a-b56d-e0c1f8a29b47 | Suspicious Cross-User Process Spawn | Detects suspicious spawning of a process under a different user context than the parent process.
Processes such as notepad.exe, calculator etc. are generally spawned under the same user context and
also they are often targeted as sacrificial process or decoy process to check successful privilege escalation. | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Cross-User Process Spawn
id: d2b7a134-9c3e-4f8a-b56d-e0c1f8a29b47
status: experimental
description: 'Detects suspicious spawning of a process under a different user context than the parent process.
Processes such as notepad.exe, calculator etc. are generally spawned under the same user context and
... | [
"T1055",
"T1134"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | medium | experimental | [
"RunAs usage spawning one of the listed binaries under a different account"
] | [
"https://github.com/MSNightmare/LegacyHive",
"https://git.projectnightcrawler.dev/NightmareEclipse/LegacyHive"
] | null | null | null | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cross_user_process_spawn.yml | |
4fee3d51-8069-4a4c-a0f7-924fcaff2c70 | FileFix - Command Evidence in TypedPaths | Detects commonly-used chained commands and strings in the most recent 'url' value of the 'TypedPaths' key, which could be indicative of a user being targeted by the FileFix technique. | windows | registry_set | title: FileFix - Command Evidence in TypedPaths
id: 4fee3d51-8069-4a4c-a0f7-924fcaff2c70
related:
- id: 4be03877-d5b6-4520-85c9-a5911c0a656c
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects commonly-used chained commands and strings in the most recent ''url'' value of the ''TypedPaths'' key,
which could be ... | [
"T1204.004"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | experimental | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://x.com/russianpanda9xx/status/1940831134759506029",
"https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/",
"https://www.scpx.com.au/2025/11/16/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/"
] | TargetObject="*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\TypedPaths\\url1" Details="*#*" Details="*http*" Details IN ("*account*", "*anti-bot*", "*botcheck*", "*captcha*", "*challenge*", "*confirmation*", "*fraud*", "*human*", "*identification*", "*identificator*", "*identity*", "*robot*", "*validation*... | (TargetObject:*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\TypedPaths\\url1 AND (Details:*#* AND Details:*http*)) AND ((Details:(*account* OR *anti\-bot* OR *botcheck* OR *captcha* OR *challenge* OR *confirmation* OR *fraud* OR *human* OR *identification* OR *identificator* OR *identity* OR *robot* OR *va... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey endswith "\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\TypedPaths\\url1" and (RegistryValueData contains "#" and RegistryValueData contains "http")) and ((RegistryValueData contains "account" or RegistryValueData contains "anti-bot" or RegistryValueData contains "b... | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_filefix_typedpath_commands.yml | |
9d7ca793-f6bd-471c-8d0f-11e68b2f0d2f | Computer System Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE | Detects execution of wmic utility with the "computersystem" flag in order to obtain information about the machine such as the domain, username, model, etc. | windows | process_creation | title: Computer System Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE
id: 9d7ca793-f6bd-471c-8d0f-11e68b2f0d2f
status: test
description: Detects execution of wmic utility with the "computersystem" flag in order to obtain information about the machine
such as the domain, username, model, etc.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/secu... | [
"T1047"
] | [
"discovery",
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/"
] | Image="*\\wmic.exe" OR OriginalFileName="wmic.exe" CommandLine="*computersystem*" | (Image:*\\wmic.exe OR OriginalFileName:wmic.exe) AND CommandLine:*computersystem* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\wmic.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "wmic.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "computersystem" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_recon_computersystem.yml | |
1f358e2e-cb63-43c3-b575-dfb072a6814f | System and Hardware Information Discovery | Detects system information discovery commands | linux | auditd | title: System and Hardware Information Discovery
id: 1f358e2e-cb63-43c3-b575-dfb072a6814f
related:
- id: 42df45e7-e6e9-43b5-8f26-bec5b39cc239
type: derived
status: stable
description: Detects system information discovery commands
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcd... | [
"T1082"
] | [
"discovery"
] | informational | stable | [
"Legitimate administration activities"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-4---linux-vm-check-via-hardware"
] | type="PATH" name IN ("/sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version", "/sys/class/dmi/id/product_name", "/sys/class/dmi/id/chassis_vendor", "/proc/scsi/scsi", "/proc/ide/hd0/model", "/proc/version", "/etc/*version", "/etc/*release", "/etc/issue") | type:PATH AND (name:(\/sys\/class\/dmi\/id\/bios_version OR \/sys\/class\/dmi\/id\/product_name OR \/sys\/class\/dmi\/id\/chassis_vendor OR \/proc\/scsi\/scsi OR \/proc\/ide\/hd0\/model OR \/proc\/version OR \/etc\/*version OR \/etc\/*release OR \/etc\/issue)) | null | linux/auditd/path/lnx_auditd_system_info_discovery2.yml | |
e6ce8457-68b1-485b-9bdd-3c2b5d679aa9 | VBA DLL Loaded Via Office Application | Detects VB DLL's loaded by an office application. Which could indicate the presence of VBA Macros. | windows | image_load | title: VBA DLL Loaded Via Office Application
id: e6ce8457-68b1-485b-9bdd-3c2b5d679aa9
status: test
description: Detects VB DLL's loaded by an office application. Which could indicate the presence of VBA Macros.
references:
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-an... | [
"T1204.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment"
] | [
"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16"
] | Image IN ("*\\excel.exe", "*\\mspub.exe", "*\\onenote.exe", "*\\onenoteim.exe", "*\\outlook.exe", "*\\powerpnt.exe", "*\\winword.exe") ImageLoaded IN ("*\\VBE7.DLL", "*\\VBEUI.DLL", "*\\VBE7INTL.DLL") | (Image:(*\\excel.exe OR *\\mspub.exe OR *\\onenote.exe OR *\\onenoteim.exe OR *\\outlook.exe OR *\\powerpnt.exe OR *\\winword.exe)) AND (ImageLoaded:(*\\VBE7.DLL OR *\\VBEUI.DLL OR *\\VBE7INTL.DLL)) | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\excel.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\mspub.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\onenote.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\onenoteim.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\outlook.exe" or InitiatingP... | windows/image_load/image_load_office_vbadll_load.yml | |
53ef0cef-fa24-4f25-a34a-6c72dfa2e6e2 | Query Usage To Exfil Data | Detects usage of "query.exe" a system binary to exfil information such as "sessions" and "processes" for later use | windows | process_creation | title: Query Usage To Exfil Data
id: 53ef0cef-fa24-4f25-a34a-6c72dfa2e6e2
status: test
description: Detects usage of "query.exe" a system binary to exfil information such as "sessions" and "processes" for later
use
references:
- https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688
author: Nasreddine Bencherc... | [] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688"
] | Image="*:\\Windows\\System32\\query.exe" CommandLine IN ("*session >*", "*process >*") | Image:*\:\\Windows\\System32\\query.exe AND (CommandLine:(*session\ \>* OR *process\ \>*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith ":\\Windows\\System32\\query.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "session >" or ProcessCommandLine contains "process >") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_query_session_exfil.yml | |
8366030e-7216-476b-9927-271d79f13cf3 | Azure Unusual Authentication Interruption | Detects when there is a interruption in the authentication process. | azure | signinlogs | title: Azure Unusual Authentication Interruption
id: 8366030e-7216-476b-9927-271d79f13cf3
status: test
description: Detects when there is a interruption in the authentication process.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts
author: Austin Songer @austin... | [
"T1078"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"initial-access",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts"
] | (ResultType=50097 ResultDescription="Device authentication is required") OR (ResultType=50155 ResultDescription="DeviceAuthenticationFailed") OR (ResultType=50158 ResultDescription="ExternalSecurityChallenge - External security challenge was not satisfied") | (ResultType:50097 AND ResultDescription:"Device authentication is required") OR (ResultType:50155 AND ResultDescription:DeviceAuthenticationFailed) OR (ResultType:50158 AND ResultDescription:"ExternalSecurityChallenge \- External security challenge was not satisfied") | null | cloud/azure/signin_logs/azure_unusual_authentication_interruption.yml | |
313fbb0a-a341-4682-848d-6d6f8c4fab7c | Suspicious PowerShell WindowStyle Option | Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users.
In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden | windows | ps_script | title: Suspicious PowerShell WindowStyle Option
id: 313fbb0a-a341-4682-848d-6d6f8c4fab7c
status: test
description: 'Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users.
In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can... | [
"T1564.003"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.003/T1564.003.md"
] | ScriptBlockText="*powershell*" ScriptBlockText="*WindowStyle*" ScriptBlockText="*Hidden*" NOT (ScriptBlockText="*:\\Program Files\\Amazon\\WorkSpacesConfig\\Scripts\\*" ScriptBlockText="*$PSScriptRoot\\Module\\WorkspaceScriptModule\\WorkspaceScriptModule*") | (ScriptBlockText:*powershell* AND ScriptBlockText:*WindowStyle* AND ScriptBlockText:*Hidden*) AND (NOT (ScriptBlockText:*\:\\Program\ Files\\Amazon\\WorkSpacesConfig\\Scripts\\* AND ScriptBlockText:*$PSScriptRoot\\Module\\WorkspaceScriptModule\\WorkspaceScriptModule*)) | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_windowstyle.yml | |
54127bd4-f541-4ac3-afdb-ea073f63f692 | Potential Persistence Via Notepad++ Plugins | Detects creation of new ".dll" files inside the plugins directory of a notepad++ installation by a process other than "gup.exe". Which could indicates possible persistence | windows | file_event | title: Potential Persistence Via Notepad++ Plugins
id: 54127bd4-f541-4ac3-afdb-ea073f63f692
status: test
description: Detects creation of new ".dll" files inside the plugins directory of a notepad++ installation by a process other
than "gup.exe". Which could indicates possible persistence
references:
- https://pentes... | [] | [
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"Possible FPs during first installation of Notepad++",
"Legitimate use of custom plugins by users in order to enhance notepad++ functionalities"
] | [
"https://pentestlab.blog/2022/02/14/persistence-notepad-plugins/"
] | TargetFilename="*\\Notepad++\\plugins\\*" TargetFilename="*.dll" NOT (Image="*\\Notepad++\\updater\\gup.exe" OR (Image="C:\\Users\\*" Image="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*" Image IN ("*\\target.exe", "*Installer.x64.exe")) OR (Image="*\\npp.*" Image="*.exe" TargetFilename IN ("C:\\Program Files\\Notepad++\\plugins\\NppExpo... | (TargetFilename:*\\Notepad\+\+\\plugins\\* AND TargetFilename:*.dll) AND (NOT (Image:*\\Notepad\+\+\\updater\\gup.exe OR (Image:C\:\\Users\\* AND Image:*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\* AND (Image:(*\\target.exe OR *Installer.x64.exe))) OR (Image:*\\npp.* AND Image:*.exe AND (TargetFilename:("C\:\\Program Files\\Notepad\+\+\\... | DeviceFileEvents
| where (FolderPath contains "\\Notepad++\\plugins\\" and FolderPath endswith ".dll") and (not((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\Notepad++\\updater\\gup.exe" or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "C:\\Users\\" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\" and (Initiati... | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_notepad_plus_plus_persistence.yml | |
736ffa74-5f6f-44ca-94ef-1c0df4f51d2a | HackTool - CrackMapExec File Indicators | Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by CrackMapExec. | windows | file_event | title: HackTool - CrackMapExec File Indicators
id: 736ffa74-5f6f-44ca-94ef-1c0df4f51d2a
related:
- id: 9433ff9c-5d3f-4269-99f8-95fc826ea489
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by CrackMapExec.
references:
- https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/
auth... | [
"T1003.001"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/"
] | TargetFilename="C:\\Windows\\Temp\\*"
| rex field=TargetFilename "(?<TargetFilenameMatch>\\\\[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}\\.txt$)"
| eval TargetFilenameCondition=if(isnotnull(TargetFilenameMatch), "true", "false")
| rex field=TargetFilename "(?<TargetFilenameMatch2>\\\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\\.tmp$... | TargetFilename:C\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* AND ((TargetFilename:(*\\temp.ps1 OR *\\msol.ps1)) OR (TargetFilename:/\\[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}\.txt$/ OR TargetFilename:/\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.tmp$/)) | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\" and ((FolderPath endswith "\\temp.ps1" or FolderPath endswith "\\msol.ps1") or (FolderPath matches regex "\\\\[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}\\.txt$" or FolderPath matches regex "\\\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\\.tmp$")) | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_crackmapexec_indicators.yml | |
21ff4ca9-f13a-41ad-b828-0077b2af2e40 | Deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell | Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil | windows | process_creation | title: Deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell
id: 21ff4ca9-f13a-41ad-b828-0077b2af2e40
related:
- id: e17121b4-ef2a-4418-8a59-12fb1631fa9e
type: derived
- id: c1337eb8-921a-4b59-855b-4ba188ddcc42
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShe... | [
"T1490"
] | [
"impact"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell",
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.html"
] | CommandLine IN ("*Get-WmiObject*", "*gwmi*", "*Get-CimInstance*", "*gcim*") CommandLine="*Win32_ShadowCopy*" CommandLine IN ("*.Delete()*", "*Remove-WmiObject*", "*rwmi*", "*Remove-CimInstance*", "*rcim*") | (CommandLine:(*Get\-WmiObject* OR *gwmi* OR *Get\-CimInstance* OR *gcim*)) AND CommandLine:*Win32_ShadowCopy* AND (CommandLine:(*.Delete\(\)* OR *Remove\-WmiObject* OR *rwmi* OR *Remove\-CimInstance* OR *rcim*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "Get-WmiObject" or ProcessCommandLine contains "gwmi" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Get-CimInstance" or ProcessCommandLine contains "gcim") and ProcessCommandLine contains "Win32_ShadowCopy" and (ProcessCommandLine contains ".Delete()" or ProcessCommandLine con... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_shadowcopy_deletion.yml | |
8d01b53f-456f-48ee-90f6-bc28e67d4e35 | Suspicious Obfuscated PowerShell Code | Detects suspicious UTF16 and base64 encoded and often obfuscated PowerShell code often used in command lines | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Obfuscated PowerShell Code
id: 8d01b53f-456f-48ee-90f6-bc28e67d4e35
status: test
description: Detects suspicious UTF16 and base64 encoded and often obfuscated PowerShell code often used in command lines
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/fcadca91-3580-4ede-aff4-4d2bf809bf99/
author: Florian Roth ... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://app.any.run/tasks/fcadca91-3580-4ede-aff4-4d2bf809bf99/"
] | CommandLine IN ("*IAAtAGIAeABvAHIAIAAwAHgA*", "*AALQBiAHgAbwByACAAMAB4A*", "*gAC0AYgB4AG8AcgAgADAAeA*", "*AC4ASQBuAHYAbwBrAGUAKAApACAAfAAg*", "*AuAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlACgAKQAgAHwAI*", "*ALgBJAG4AdgBvAGsAZQAoACkAIAB8AC*", "*AHsAMQB9AHsAMAB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI*", "*B7ADEAfQB7ADAAfQAiACAALQBmAC*", "*AewAxAH0AewAwAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg*", ... | CommandLine:(*IAAtAGIAeABvAHIAIAAwAHgA* OR *AALQBiAHgAbwByACAAMAB4A* OR *gAC0AYgB4AG8AcgAgADAAeA* OR *AC4ASQBuAHYAbwBrAGUAKAApACAAfAAg* OR *AuAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlACgAKQAgAHwAI* OR *ALgBJAG4AdgBvAGsAZQAoACkAIAB8AC* OR *AHsAMQB9AHsAMAB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI* OR *B7ADEAfQB7ADAAfQAiACAALQBmAC* OR *AewAxAH0AewAwAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg* OR *AH... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "IAAtAGIAeABvAHIAIAAwAHgA" or ProcessCommandLine contains "AALQBiAHgAbwByACAAMAB4A" or ProcessCommandLine contains "gAC0AYgB4AG8AcgAgADAAeA" or ProcessCommandLine contains "AC4ASQBuAHYAbwBrAGUAKAApACAAfAAg" or ProcessCommandLine contains "AuAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlACgAKQA... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_base64_encoded_obfusc.yml | |
c5ac6a1e-9407-45f5-a0ce-ca9a0806a287 | Replace Desktop Wallpaper by Powershell | An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users.
This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper | windows | ps_script | title: Replace Desktop Wallpaper by Powershell
id: c5ac6a1e-9407-45f5-a0ce-ca9a0806a287
status: test
description: 'An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users.
This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with t... | [
"T1491.001"
] | [
"impact"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1491.001/T1491.001.md"
] | (ScriptBlockText="*Get-ItemProperty*" ScriptBlockText="*Registry::*" ScriptBlockText="*HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\*" ScriptBlockText="*WallPaper*") OR ScriptBlockText="*SystemParametersInfo(20,0,*,3)*" | (ScriptBlockText:*Get\-ItemProperty* AND ScriptBlockText:*Registry\:\:* AND ScriptBlockText:*HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Control\ Panel\\Desktop\\* AND ScriptBlockText:*WallPaper*) OR ScriptBlockText:*SystemParametersInfo\(20,0,*,3\)* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_wallpaper.yml | |
72af37e2-ec32-47dc-992b-bc288a2708cb | Azure New CloudShell Created | Identifies when a new cloudshell is created inside of Azure portal. | azure | activitylogs | title: Azure New CloudShell Created
id: 72af37e2-ec32-47dc-992b-bc288a2708cb
status: test
description: Identifies when a new cloudshell is created inside of Azure portal.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer
date: 2021-09-21
m... | [
"T1059"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"A new cloudshell may be created by a system administrator."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations"
] | operationName="MICROSOFT.PORTAL/CONSOLES/WRITE" | operationName:MICROSOFT.PORTAL\/CONSOLES\/WRITE | null | cloud/azure/activity_logs/azure_new_cloudshell_created.yml | |
8028c2c3-e25a-46e3-827f-bbb5abf181d7 | WMImplant Hack Tool | Detects parameters used by WMImplant | windows | ps_script | title: WMImplant Hack Tool
id: 8028c2c3-e25a-46e3-827f-bbb5abf181d7
status: test
description: Detects parameters used by WMImplant
references:
- https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/WMImplant
author: NVISO
date: 2020-03-26
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
pro... | [
"T1047",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Administrative scripts that use the same keywords."
] | [
"https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/WMImplant"
] | ScriptBlockText IN ("*WMImplant*", "* change_user *", "* gen_cli *", "* command_exec *", "* disable_wdigest *", "* disable_winrm *", "* enable_wdigest *", "* enable_winrm *", "* registry_mod *", "* remote_posh *", "* sched_job *", "* service_mod *", "* process_kill *", "* active_users *", "* basic_info *", "* power_off... | ScriptBlockText:(*WMImplant* OR *\ change_user\ * OR *\ gen_cli\ * OR *\ command_exec\ * OR *\ disable_wdigest\ * OR *\ disable_winrm\ * OR *\ enable_wdigest\ * OR *\ enable_winrm\ * OR *\ registry_mod\ * OR *\ remote_posh\ * OR *\ sched_job\ * OR *\ service_mod\ * OR *\ process_kill\ * OR *\ active_users\ * OR *\ basi... | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_wmimplant.yml |
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