rule_id stringlengths 36 36 | title stringlengths 10 97 | description stringlengths 28 1.02k | logsource_product stringclasses 28
values | logsource_category stringclasses 34
values | logsource_service stringclasses 69
values | sigma_rule stringlengths 467 251k | attack_techniques listlengths 0 14 | attack_tactics listlengths 0 8 | level stringclasses 5
values | status stringclasses 3
values | false_positives listlengths 0 5 | references listlengths 0 23 | splunk_spl stringlengths 7 246k ⌀ | elastic_lucene stringlengths 8 250k ⌀ | sentinel_kql stringlengths 40 37.3k ⌀ | source_path stringlengths 29 132 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
a10a2c40-2c4d-49f8-b557-1a946bc55d9d | Uncommon File Created In Office Startup Folder | Detects the creation of a file with an uncommon extension in an Office application startup folder | windows | file_event | title: Uncommon File Created In Office Startup Folder
id: a10a2c40-2c4d-49f8-b557-1a946bc55d9d
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a file with an uncommon extension in an Office application startup folder
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/d6fe6624-6ef8-485d-aa75-3d1bdda2a08c/
- http://addbalance.com... | [
"T1587.001"
] | [
"resource-development"
] | high | test | [
"False positive might stem from rare extensions used by other Office utilities."
] | [
"https://app.any.run/tasks/d6fe6624-6ef8-485d-aa75-3d1bdda2a08c/",
"http://addbalance.com/word/startup.htm",
"https://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/msoffice/forum/all/document-in-word-startup-folder-doesnt-open-when/44ab0932-2917-4150-8cdc-2f2cf39e86f3",
"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Microsoft_Office_f... | (TargetFilename="*\\Microsoft\\Word\\STARTUP*" OR (TargetFilename="*\\Office*" TargetFilename="*\\Program Files*" TargetFilename="*\\STARTUP*") NOT (TargetFilename IN ("*.docb", "*.docm", "*.docx", "*.dotm", "*.mdb", "*.mdw", "*.pdf", "*.wll", "*.wwl"))) OR (TargetFilename="*\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART*" OR (TargetFile... | (((TargetFilename:*\\Microsoft\\Word\\STARTUP* OR (TargetFilename:*\\Office* AND TargetFilename:*\\Program\ Files* AND TargetFilename:*\\STARTUP*)) AND (NOT (TargetFilename:(*.docb OR *.docm OR *.docx OR *.dotm OR *.mdb OR *.mdw OR *.pdf OR *.wll OR *.wwl)))) OR ((TargetFilename:*\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART* OR (Target... | DeviceFileEvents
| where (((FolderPath contains "\\Microsoft\\Word\\STARTUP" or (FolderPath contains "\\Office" and FolderPath contains "\\Program Files" and FolderPath contains "\\STARTUP")) and (not((FolderPath endswith ".docb" or FolderPath endswith ".docm" or FolderPath endswith ".docx" or FolderPath endswith ".dot... | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_office_uncommon_file_startup.yml | |
c72aca44-8d52-45ad-8f81-f96c4d3c755e | Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - PowerShell Module | Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts | windows | ps_module | title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - PowerShell Module
id: c72aca44-8d52-45ad-8f81-f96c4d3c755e
related:
- id: 86b896ba-ffa1-4fea-83e3-ee28a4c915c7
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Nikita Naza... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009"
] | *
| regex Payload="(?i)(set).*&&\\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\\$?\\{?input).*&&.*\"" | Payload:/(?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\$?\{?input).*&&.*"/ | null | windows/powershell/powershell_module/posh_pm_invoke_obfuscation_via_stdin.yml | |
bae2865c-5565-470d-b505-9496c87d0c30 | SMB Spoolss Name Piped Usage | Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled. | zeek | smb_files | title: SMB Spoolss Name Piped Usage
id: bae2865c-5565-470d-b505-9496c87d0c30
status: test
description: Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of
any machine that has the spoolservice enabled.
references:
- https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-acti... | [
"T1021.002"
] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | medium | test | [
"Domain Controllers that are sometimes, commonly although should not be, acting as printer servers too"
] | [
"https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1",
"https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/",
"https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608"
] | path="*IPC$" name="spoolss" | path:*IPC$ AND name:spoolss | null | network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_smb_spoolss_named_pipe.yml | |
42c575ea-e41e-41f1-b248-8093c3e82a28 | PsExec Service Installation | Detects PsExec service installation and execution events | windows | system | title: PsExec Service Installation
id: 42c575ea-e41e-41f1-b248-8093c3e82a28
status: test
description: Detects PsExec service installation and execution events
references:
- https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-06-1... | [
"T1569.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html",
"https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet"
] | Provider_Name="Service Control Manager" EventID=7045 ServiceName="PSEXESVC" OR ImagePath="*\\PSEXESVC.exe" | (Provider_Name:"Service Control Manager" AND EventID:7045) AND (ServiceName:PSEXESVC OR ImagePath:*\\PSEXESVC.exe) | null | windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_service_install_sysinternals_psexec.yml | |
9bd012ee-0dff-44d7-84a0-aa698cfd87a3 | LSASS Memory Access by Tool With Dump Keyword In Name | Detects LSASS process access requests from a source process with the "dump" keyword in its image name. | windows | process_access | title: LSASS Memory Access by Tool With Dump Keyword In Name
id: 9bd012ee-0dff-44d7-84a0-aa698cfd87a3
status: test
description: Detects LSASS process access requests from a source process with the "dump" keyword in its image name.
references:
- https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176
- https://www.ired.tea... | [
"T1003.001"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Rare programs that contain the word dump in their name and access lsass"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176",
"https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dump-credentials-from-lsass-process-without-mimikatz"
] | TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe" SourceImage="*dump*" GrantedAccess IN ("*10", "*30", "*50", "*70", "*90", "*B0", "*D0", "*F0", "*18", "*38", "*58", "*78", "*98", "*B8", "*D8", "*F8", "*1A", "*3A", "*5A", "*7A", "*9A", "*BA", "*DA", "*FA", "*0x14C2", "*FF") | TargetImage:*\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage:*dump* AND (GrantedAccess:(*10 OR *30 OR *50 OR *70 OR *90 OR *B0 OR *D0 OR *F0 OR *18 OR *38 OR *58 OR *78 OR *98 OR *B8 OR *D8 OR *F8 OR *1A OR *3A OR *5A OR *7A OR *9A OR *BA OR *DA OR *FA OR *0x14C2 OR *FF)) | null | windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_dump_keyword_image.yml | |
ccd6a6c8-bb4e-4a91-9d2a-07e632819374 | AWS SAML Provider Deletion Activity | Detects the deletion of an AWS SAML provider, potentially indicating malicious intent to disrupt administrative or security team access.
An attacker can remove the SAML provider for the information security team or a team of system administrators, to make it difficult for them to work and investigate at the time of the... | aws | cloudtrail | title: AWS SAML Provider Deletion Activity
id: ccd6a6c8-bb4e-4a91-9d2a-07e632819374
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the deletion of an AWS SAML provider, potentially indicating malicious intent to disrupt administrative
or security team access.
An attacker can remove the SAML provider for the informatio... | [
"T1078.004",
"T1531"
] | [
"stealth",
"privilege-escalation",
"initial-access",
"persistence",
"impact"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Automated processes using tools like Terraform may trigger this alert.",
"Legitimate administrative actions by authorized system administrators could cause this alert. Verify the user identity, user agent, and hostname to ensure they are expected.",
"Deletions by unfamiliar users should be investigated. If the... | [
"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteSAMLProvider.html"
] | eventSource="iam.amazonaws.com" eventName="DeleteSAMLProvider" status="success" | eventSource:iam.amazonaws.com AND eventName:DeleteSAMLProvider AND status:success | null | cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_delete_saml_provider.yml | |
1a31b18a-f00c-4061-9900-f735b96c99fc | Remote Access Tool Services Have Been Installed - System | Detects service installation of different remote access tools software. These software are often abused by threat actors to perform | windows | system | title: Remote Access Tool Services Have Been Installed - System
id: 1a31b18a-f00c-4061-9900-f735b96c99fc
related:
- id: c8b00925-926c-47e3-beea-298fd563728e
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects service installation of different remote access tools software. These software are often abused by threat
actor... | [
"T1543.003",
"T1569.002"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/"
] | Provider_Name="Service Control Manager" EventID IN (7045, 7036) ServiceName IN ("*AmmyyAdmin*", "*Atera*", "*BASupportExpressSrvcUpdater*", "*BASupportExpressStandaloneService*", "*chromoting*", "*GoToAssist*", "*GoToMyPC*", "*jumpcloud*", "*LMIGuardianSvc*", "*LogMeIn*", "*monblanking*", "*Parsec*", "*RManService*", "... | Provider_Name:"Service Control Manager" AND (EventID:(7045 OR 7036)) AND (ServiceName:(*AmmyyAdmin* OR *Atera* OR *BASupportExpressSrvcUpdater* OR *BASupportExpressStandaloneService* OR *chromoting* OR *GoToAssist* OR *GoToMyPC* OR *jumpcloud* OR *LMIGuardianSvc* OR *LogMeIn* OR *monblanking* OR *Parsec* OR *RManServic... | null | windows/builtin/system/service_control_manager/win_system_service_install_remote_access_software.yml | |
092bc4b9-3d1d-43b4-a6b4-8c8acd83522f | PowerShell Core DLL Loaded By Non PowerShell Process | Detects loading of essential DLLs used by PowerShell by non-PowerShell process.
Detects behavior similar to meterpreter's "load powershell" extension. | windows | image_load | title: PowerShell Core DLL Loaded By Non PowerShell Process
id: 092bc4b9-3d1d-43b4-a6b4-8c8acd83522f
related:
- id: 867613fb-fa60-4497-a017-a82df74a172c
type: obsolete
- id: fe6e002f-f244-4278-9263-20e4b593827f
type: obsolete
status: test
description: 'Detects loading of essential DLLs used by PowerShell by non-Pow... | [
"T1059.001"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Used by some .NET binaries, minimal on user workstation.",
"Used by Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio"
] | [
"https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921",
"https://github.com/p3nt4/PowerShdll"
] | Description="System.Management.Automation" OR OriginalFileName="System.Management.Automation.dll" OR ImageLoaded IN ("*\\System.Management.Automation.dll", "*\\System.Management.Automation.ni.dll") NOT (Image IN ("C:\\Program Files\\PowerShell\\7-preview\\pwsh.exe", "C:\\Program Files\\PowerShell\\7\\pwsh.exe", "C:\\Wi... | (Description:System.Management.Automation OR OriginalFileName:System.Management.Automation.dll OR (ImageLoaded:(*\\System.Management.Automation.dll OR *\\System.Management.Automation.ni.dll))) AND (NOT ((Image:("C\:\\Program Files\\PowerShell\\7\-preview\\pwsh.exe" OR "C\:\\Program Files\\PowerShell\\7\\pwsh.exe" OR C\... | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessVersionInfoFileDescription =~ "System.Management.Automation" or InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "System.Management.Automation.dll" or (FolderPath endswith "\\System.Management.Automation.dll" or FolderPath endswith "\\System.Management.Automation.ni.dll"))... | windows/image_load/image_load_dll_system_management_automation_susp_load.yml | |
b7bc7038-638b-4ffd-880c-292c692209ef | Certificate Request Export to Exchange Webserver | Detects a write of an Exchange CSR to an untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a webshell | windows | msexchange-management | title: Certificate Request Export to Exchange Webserver
id: b7bc7038-638b-4ffd-880c-292c692209ef
status: test
description: Detects a write of an Exchange CSR to an untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place
a webshell
references:
- https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/142917590890512793... | [
"T1505.003"
] | [
"persistence"
] | critical | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1429175908905127938"
] | "New-ExchangeCertificate" " -GenerateRequest" " -BinaryEncoded" " -RequestFile" "\\\\localhost\\C$" OR "\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$" OR "C:\\inetpub" OR ".aspx" | (*New\-ExchangeCertificate* AND *\ \-GenerateRequest* AND *\ \-BinaryEncoded* AND *\ \-RequestFile*) AND (*\\\\localhost\\C$* OR *\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$* OR *C\:\\inetpub* OR *.aspx*) | null | windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_proxyshell_certificate_generation.yml | |
811f459f-9231-45d4-959a-0266c6311987 | Suspicious Child Process Of BgInfo.EXE | Detects suspicious child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Child Process Of BgInfo.EXE
id: 811f459f-9231-45d4-959a-0266c6311987
related:
- id: aaf46cdc-934e-4284-b329-34aa701e3771
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to
proxy execution via external... | [
"T1059.005",
"T1218",
"T1202"
] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Bginfo/",
"https://oddvar.moe/2017/05/18/bypassing-application-whitelisting-with-bginfo/"
] | ParentImage IN ("*\\bginfo.exe", "*\\bginfo64.exe") Image IN ("*\\calc.exe", "*\\cmd.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\notepad.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\wscript.exe") OR Image IN ("*\\AppData\\Local\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*", "*:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*:\\Temp\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp\\*... | (ParentImage:(*\\bginfo.exe OR *\\bginfo64.exe)) AND ((Image:(*\\calc.exe OR *\\cmd.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\notepad.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe OR *\\wscript.exe)) OR (Image:(*\\AppData\\Local\\* OR *\\AppData\\Roaming\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\:\\Temp\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* ... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\bginfo.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\bginfo64.exe") and ((FolderPath endswith "\\calc.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\notep... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bginfo_suspicious_child_process.yml | |
6ec86d9e-912e-4726-91a2-209359b999b9 | Amsi.DLL Loaded Via LOLBIN Process | Detects loading of "Amsi.dll" by a living of the land process. This could be an indication of a "PowerShell without PowerShell" attack | windows | image_load | title: Amsi.DLL Loaded Via LOLBIN Process
id: 6ec86d9e-912e-4726-91a2-209359b999b9
status: test
description: Detects loading of "Amsi.dll" by a living of the land process. This could be an indication of a "PowerShell without
PowerShell" attack
references:
- Internal Research
- https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/se... | [] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research",
"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/security-operations/stopping-powershell-without-powershell/"
] | ImageLoaded="*\\amsi.dll" Image IN ("*\\ExtExport.exe", "*\\odbcconf.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe") | ImageLoaded:*\\amsi.dll AND (Image:(*\\ExtExport.exe OR *\\odbcconf.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe)) | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\amsi.dll" and (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\ExtExport.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\odbcconf.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\rundll32.exe") | windows/image_load/image_load_dll_amsi_suspicious_process.yml | |
e9f55347-2928-4c06-88e5-1a7f8169942e | Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION | Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER | windows | process_creation | title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION
id: e9f55347-2928-4c06-88e5-1a7f8169942e
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-16
tags:
- att... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009"
] | CommandLine="*&&set*" CommandLine="*cmd*" CommandLine="*/c*" CommandLine="*-f*" CommandLine IN ("*{0}*", "*{1}*", "*{2}*", "*{3}*", "*{4}*", "*{5}*") | (CommandLine:*\&\&set* AND CommandLine:*cmd* AND CommandLine:*\/c* AND CommandLine:*\-f*) AND (CommandLine:(*\{0\}* OR *\{1\}* OR *\{2\}* OR *\{3\}* OR *\{4\}* OR *\{5\}*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "&&set" and ProcessCommandLine contains "cmd" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/c" and ProcessCommandLine contains "-f") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "{0}" or ProcessCommandLine contains "{1}" or ProcessCommandLine contains "{2}" or ProcessCommandLine contain... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_invoke_obfuscation_via_var.yml | |
a5a30a6e-75ca-4233-8b8c-42e0f2037d3b | Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - PowerShell | Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts | windows | ps_script | title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - PowerShell
id: a5a30a6e-75ca-4233-8b8c-42e0f2037d3b
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-08
modified: 2022-11-29
tag... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009"
] | ScriptBlockText="*&&*" ScriptBlockText="*rundll32*" ScriptBlockText="*shell32.dll*" ScriptBlockText="*shellexec_rundll*" ScriptBlockText IN ("*value*", "*invoke*", "*comspec*", "*iex*") | (ScriptBlockText:*\&\&* AND ScriptBlockText:*rundll32* AND ScriptBlockText:*shell32.dll* AND ScriptBlockText:*shellexec_rundll*) AND (ScriptBlockText:(*value* OR *invoke* OR *comspec* OR *iex*)) | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_use_rundll32.yml | |
3d0ed417-3d94-4963-a562-4a92c940656a | Creation of a Diagcab | Detects the creation of diagcab file, which could be caused by some legitimate installer or is a sign of exploitation (review the filename and its location) | windows | file_event | title: Creation of a Diagcab
id: 3d0ed417-3d94-4963-a562-4a92c940656a
status: test
description: Detects the creation of diagcab file, which could be caused by some legitimate installer or is a sign of exploitation
(review the filename and its location)
references:
- https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1533879688141086... | [] | [
"resource-development"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate microsoft diagcab"
] | [
"https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1533879688141086720.html"
] | TargetFilename="*.diagcab" | TargetFilename:*.diagcab | DeviceFileEvents
| where FolderPath endswith ".diagcab" | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_diagcab.yml | |
90fb5e62-ca1f-4e22-b42e-cc521874c938 | Suspicious Shells Spawn by Java Utility Keytool | Detects suspicious shell spawn from Java utility keytool process (e.g. adselfservice plus exploitation) | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Shells Spawn by Java Utility Keytool
id: 90fb5e62-ca1f-4e22-b42e-cc521874c938
status: test
description: Detects suspicious shell spawn from Java utility keytool process (e.g. adselfservice plus exploitation)
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021
- https://www.syn... | [] | [
"initial-access",
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021",
"https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/how-to-exploit-cve-2021-40539-on-manageengine-adselfservice-plus.html"
] | ParentImage="*\\keytool.exe" Image IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\sh.exe", "*\\bash.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\schtasks.exe", "*\\certutil.exe", "*\\whoami.exe", "*\\bitsadmin.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\scrcons.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\hh.exe", "*\\wmic.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\rundll3... | ParentImage:*\\keytool.exe AND (Image:(*\\cmd.exe OR *\\sh.exe OR *\\bash.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe OR *\\schtasks.exe OR *\\certutil.exe OR *\\whoami.exe OR *\\bitsadmin.exe OR *\\wscript.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\scrcons.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\hh.exe OR *\\wmic.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\rundll32... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\keytool.exe" and (FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\sh.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\bash.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\schtasks.exe" or FolderPath ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_java_keytool_susp_child_process.yml | |
e54f5149-6ba3-49cf-b153-070d24679126 | Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - PowerShell | Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER | windows | ps_script | title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - PowerShell
id: e54f5149-6ba3-49cf-b153-070d24679126
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2024-04-0... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009"
] | *
| regex ScriptBlockText="(?i)&&set.*(\\{\\d\\}){2,}\\\\\"\\s+?-f.*&&.*cmd.*/c" | ScriptBlockText:/(?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\"\s+?-f.*&&.*cmd.*\/c/ | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_invoke_obfuscation_via_var.yml | |
c8da0dfd-4ed0-4b68-962d-13c9c884384e | Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS Process Clone | Detects a suspicious LSASS process process clone that could be a sign of credential dumping activity | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS Process Clone
id: c8da0dfd-4ed0-4b68-962d-13c9c884384e
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious LSASS process process clone that could be a sign of credential dumping activity
references:
- https://www.matteomalvica.com/blog/2019/12/02/win-defender-atp-cred-bypass/
- ... | [
"T1003",
"T1003.001"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | critical | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.matteomalvica.com/blog/2019/12/02/win-defender-atp-cred-bypass/",
"https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1420053502554951689",
"https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1464566846594691073?s=20"
] | ParentImage="*\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" Image="*\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" | ParentImage:*\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe AND Image:*\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and FolderPath endswith "\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lsass_process_clone.yml | |
778ba9a8-45e4-4b80-8e3e-34a419f0b85e | TeamViewer Domain Query By Non-TeamViewer Application | Detects DNS queries to a TeamViewer domain only resolved by a TeamViewer client by an image that isn't named TeamViewer (sometimes used by threat actors for obfuscation) | windows | dns_query | title: TeamViewer Domain Query By Non-TeamViewer Application
id: 778ba9a8-45e4-4b80-8e3e-34a419f0b85e
status: test
description: Detects DNS queries to a TeamViewer domain only resolved by a TeamViewer client by an image that isn't named
TeamViewer (sometimes used by threat actors for obfuscation)
references:
- https:... | [
"T1219.002"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown binary names of TeamViewer",
"Depending on the environment the rule might require some initial tuning before usage to avoid FP with third party applications"
] | [
"https://www.teamviewer.com/en-us/"
] | QueryName IN ("taf.teamviewer.com", "udp.ping.teamviewer.com") NOT Image="*TeamViewer*" | (QueryName:(taf.teamviewer.com OR udp.ping.teamviewer.com)) AND (NOT Image:*TeamViewer*) | null | windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_teamviewer_domain_query_by_uncommon_app.yml | |
5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760 | OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt | Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page. | opencanary | application | title: OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt
id: 5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760
status: test
description: 'Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page.
'
references:
- https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services... | [
"T1090"
] | [
"initial-access",
"command-and-control"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration",
"https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52"
] | logtype=7001 | logtype:7001 | null | application/opencanary/opencanary_httpproxy_login_attempt.yml | |
69ca006d-b9a9-47f5-80ff-ecd4d25d481a | HackTool - TruffleSnout Execution | Detects the use of TruffleSnout.exe an iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators, situational awareness and targeted low noise enumeration. | windows | process_creation | title: HackTool - TruffleSnout Execution
id: 69ca006d-b9a9-47f5-80ff-ecd4d25d481a
status: test
description: Detects the use of TruffleSnout.exe an iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators, situational awareness
and targeted low noise enumeration.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-t... | [
"T1482"
] | [
"discovery"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1482/T1482.md",
"https://github.com/dsnezhkov/TruffleSnout",
"https://github.com/dsnezhkov/TruffleSnout/blob/7c2f22e246ef704bc96c396f66fa854e9ca742b9/TruffleSnout/Docs/USAGE.md"
] | OriginalFileName="TruffleSnout.exe" OR Image="*\\TruffleSnout.exe" | OriginalFileName:TruffleSnout.exe OR Image:*\\TruffleSnout.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "TruffleSnout.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\TruffleSnout.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_trufflesnout.yml | |
c74d7efc-8826-45d9-b8bb-f04fac9e4eff | Run Once Task Configuration in Registry | Rule to detect the configuration of Run Once registry key. Configured payload can be run by runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup | windows | registry_event | title: Run Once Task Configuration in Registry
id: c74d7efc-8826-45d9-b8bb-f04fac9e4eff
status: test
description: Rule to detect the configuration of Run Once registry key. Configured payload can be run by runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup
references:
- https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/990717080805789697
- https:/... | [
"T1112"
] | [
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate modification of the registry key by legitimate program"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/990717080805789697",
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runonce/"
] | TargetObject="*\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components*" TargetObject="*\\StubPath" NOT ((Details="*C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\*" Details="*\\Installer\\chrmstp.exe\" --configure-user-settings --verbose-logging --system-level*") OR (Details IN ("*C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Ap... | (TargetObject:*\\Microsoft\\Active\ Setup\\Installed\ Components* AND TargetObject:*\\StubPath) AND (NOT ((Details:*C\:\\Program\ Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\* AND Details:*\\Installer\\chrmstp.exe\"\ \-\-configure\-user\-settings\ \-\-verbose\-logging\ \-\-system\-level*) OR ((Details:(*C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (RegistryKey contains "\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components" and RegistryKey endswith "\\StubPath") and (not(((RegistryValueData contains "C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\" and RegistryValueData contains "\\Installer\\chrmstp.exe\" --configure-user-settings --verb... | windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_runonce_persistence.yml | |
1fb76ab8-fa60-4b01-bddd-71e89bf555da | Pubprn.vbs Proxy Execution | Detects the use of the 'Pubprn.vbs' Microsoft signed script to execute commands. | windows | process_creation | title: Pubprn.vbs Proxy Execution
id: 1fb76ab8-fa60-4b01-bddd-71e89bf555da
status: test
description: Detects the use of the 'Pubprn.vbs' Microsoft signed script to execute commands.
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Pubprn/
author: frack113
date: 2022-05-28
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1... | [
"T1216.001"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Pubprn/"
] | CommandLine="*\\pubprn.vbs*" CommandLine="*script:*" | CommandLine:*\\pubprn.vbs* AND CommandLine:*script\:* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "\\pubprn.vbs" and ProcessCommandLine contains "script:" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_pubprn.yml | |
c7d16cae-aaf3-42e5-9c1c-fb8553faa6fa | Failed MSExchange Transport Agent Installation | Detects a failed installation of a Exchange Transport Agent | windows | msexchange-management | title: Failed MSExchange Transport Agent Installation
id: c7d16cae-aaf3-42e5-9c1c-fb8553faa6fa
status: test
description: Detects a failed installation of a Exchange Transport Agent
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=8
author: Tobias M... | [
"T1505.002"
] | [
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this."
] | [
"https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=8"
] | EventID=6 Data="*Install-TransportAgent*" | EventID:6 AND Data:*Install\-TransportAgent* | null | windows/builtin/msexchange/win_exchange_transportagent_failed.yml | |
d13c43f0-f66b-4279-8b2c-5912077c1780 | CLR DLL Loaded Via Office Applications | Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product | windows | image_load | title: CLR DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
id: d13c43f0-f66b-4279-8b2c-5912077c1780
status: test
description: Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product
references:
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
author: Antonlovesdnb
date: 20... | [
"T1204.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16"
] | Image IN ("*\\excel.exe", "*\\mspub.exe", "*\\outlook.exe", "*\\onenote.exe", "*\\onenoteim.exe", "*\\powerpnt.exe", "*\\winword.exe") ImageLoaded="*\\clr.dll*" | (Image:(*\\excel.exe OR *\\mspub.exe OR *\\outlook.exe OR *\\onenote.exe OR *\\onenoteim.exe OR *\\powerpnt.exe OR *\\winword.exe)) AND ImageLoaded:*\\clr.dll* | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\excel.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\mspub.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\outlook.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\onenote.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\onenoteim.exe" or InitiatingP... | windows/image_load/image_load_office_dotnet_clr_dll_load.yml | |
9257c05b-4a4a-48e5-a670-b7b073cf401b | Binary Proxy Execution Via Dotnet-Trace.EXE | Detects commandline arguments for executing a child process via dotnet-trace.exe | windows | process_creation | title: Binary Proxy Execution Via Dotnet-Trace.EXE
id: 9257c05b-4a4a-48e5-a670-b7b073cf401b
status: test
description: Detects commandline arguments for executing a child process via dotnet-trace.exe
references:
- https://twitter.com/bohops/status/1740022869198037480
author: Jimmy Bayne (@bohops)
date: 2024-01-02
tags:
... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate usage of the utility in order to debug and trace a program."
] | [
"https://twitter.com/bohops/status/1740022869198037480"
] | Image="*\\dotnet-trace.exe" OR OriginalFileName="dotnet-trace.dll" CommandLine="*-- *" CommandLine="*collect*" | (Image:*\\dotnet\-trace.exe OR OriginalFileName:dotnet\-trace.dll) AND (CommandLine:*\-\-\ * AND CommandLine:*collect*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\dotnet-trace.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "dotnet-trace.dll") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "-- " and ProcessCommandLine contains "collect") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dotnet_trace_lolbin_execution.yml | |
413d4a81-6c98-4479-9863-014785fd579c | Okta Admin Role Assigned to an User or Group | Detects when an the Administrator role is assigned to an user or group. | okta | okta | title: Okta Admin Role Assigned to an User or Group
id: 413d4a81-6c98-4479-9863-014785fd579c
status: test
description: Detects when an the Administrator role is assigned to an user or group.
references:
- https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
- https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-typ... | [
"T1098.003"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence"
] | medium | test | [
"Administrator roles could be assigned to users or group by other admin users."
] | [
"https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/",
"https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/"
] | eventType IN ("group.privilege.grant", "user.account.privilege.grant") | eventType:(group.privilege.grant OR user.account.privilege.grant) | null | identity/okta/okta_admin_role_assigned_to_user_or_group.yml | |
4eec988f-7bf0-49f1-8675-1e6a510b3a2a | Potential PendingFileRenameOperations Tampering | Detect changes to the "PendingFileRenameOperations" registry key from uncommon or suspicious images locations to stage currently used files for rename or deletion after reboot. | windows | registry_set | title: Potential PendingFileRenameOperations Tampering
id: 4eec988f-7bf0-49f1-8675-1e6a510b3a2a
status: test
description: 'Detect changes to the "PendingFileRenameOperations" registry key from uncommon or suspicious images locations
to stage currently used files for rename or deletion after reboot.
'
references:
-... | [
"T1036.003"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Installers and updaters may set currently in use files for rename or deletion after a reboot."
] | [
"https://any.run/report/3ecd4763ffc944fdc67a9027e459cd4f448b1a8d1b36147977afaf86bbf2a261/64b0ba45-e7ce-423b-9a1d-5b4ea59521e6",
"https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/determine-pending-reboot-statuspowershell-style-part-1/",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-ser... | TargetObject="*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\PendingFileRenameOperations*" Image="*\\Users\\Public\\*" OR Image IN ("*\\reg.exe", "*\\regedit.exe") | TargetObject:*\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session\ Manager\\PendingFileRenameOperations* AND (Image:*\\Users\\Public\\* OR (Image:(*\\reg.exe OR *\\regedit.exe))) | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\PendingFileRenameOperations" and (InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "\\Users\\Public\\" or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\reg.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\regedit.exe")) | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_susp_pendingfilerenameoperations.yml | |
2f77047c-e6e9-4c11-b088-a3de399524cd | Potential Persistence Via Security Descriptors - ScriptBlock | Detects usage of certain functions and keywords that are used to manipulate security descriptors in order to potentially set a backdoor. As seen used in the DAMP project. | windows | ps_script | title: Potential Persistence Via Security Descriptors - ScriptBlock
id: 2f77047c-e6e9-4c11-b088-a3de399524cd
status: test
description: Detects usage of certain functions and keywords that are used to manipulate security descriptors in order to
potentially set a backdoor. As seen used in the DAMP project.
references:
... | [] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP"
] | ScriptBlockText="*win32_Trustee*" ScriptBlockText="*win32_Ace*" ScriptBlockText="*.AccessMask*" ScriptBlockText="*.AceType*" ScriptBlockText="*.SetSecurityDescriptor*" ScriptBlockText IN ("*\\Lsa\\JD*", "*\\Lsa\\Skew1*", "*\\Lsa\\Data*", "*\\Lsa\\GBG*") | (ScriptBlockText:*win32_Trustee* AND ScriptBlockText:*win32_Ace* AND ScriptBlockText:*.AccessMask* AND ScriptBlockText:*.AceType* AND ScriptBlockText:*.SetSecurityDescriptor*) AND (ScriptBlockText:(*\\Lsa\\JD* OR *\\Lsa\\Skew1* OR *\\Lsa\\Data* OR *\\Lsa\\GBG*)) | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_ace_tampering.yml | |
472159c5-31b9-4f56-b794-b766faa8b0a7 | Suspicious LSASS Access Via MalSecLogon | Detects suspicious access to LSASS handle via a call trace to "seclogon.dll" with a suspicious access right. | windows | process_access | title: Suspicious LSASS Access Via MalSecLogon
id: 472159c5-31b9-4f56-b794-b766faa8b0a7
status: test
description: Detects suspicious access to LSASS handle via a call trace to "seclogon.dll" with a suspicious access right.
references:
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1541920424635912196
- https://github.com/ela... | [
"T1003.001"
] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1541920424635912196",
"https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/2bc1795f3d7bcc3946452eb4f07ae799a756d94e/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml",
"https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html"
] | TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe" SourceImage="*\\svchost.exe" GrantedAccess="0x14c0" CallTrace="*seclogon.dll*" | TargetImage:*\\lsass.exe AND SourceImage:*\\svchost.exe AND GrantedAccess:0x14c0 AND CallTrace:*seclogon.dll* | null | windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_seclogon_access.yml | |
7692f583-bd30-4008-8615-75dab3f08a99 | Enable BPF Kprobes Tracing | Detects common command used to enable bpf kprobes tracing | linux | process_creation | title: Enable BPF Kprobes Tracing
id: 7692f583-bd30-4008-8615-75dab3f08a99
status: test
description: Detects common command used to enable bpf kprobes tracing
references:
- https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/offensive-bpf-bpftrace/
- https://bpftrace.org/
- https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.0/trace/kprobetrace.... | [] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2021/offensive-bpf-bpftrace/",
"https://bpftrace.org/",
"https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.0/trace/kprobetrace.html"
] | CommandLine="*echo 1 >*" CommandLine="*/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/*" CommandLine IN ("*/myprobe/enable*", "*/myretprobe/enable*") | (CommandLine:*echo\ 1\ \>* AND CommandLine:*\/sys\/kernel\/debug\/tracing\/events\/kprobes\/*) AND (CommandLine:(*\/myprobe\/enable* OR *\/myretprobe\/enable*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "echo 1 >" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/myprobe/enable" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/myretprobe/enable") | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_bpf_kprob_tracing_enabled.yml | |
9f2cc74d-78af-4eb2-bb64-9cd1d292b87b | Microsoft Sync Center Suspicious Network Connections | Detects suspicious connections from Microsoft Sync Center to non-private IPs. | windows | network_connection | title: Microsoft Sync Center Suspicious Network Connections
id: 9f2cc74d-78af-4eb2-bb64-9cd1d292b87b
status: test
description: Detects suspicious connections from Microsoft Sync Center to non-private IPs.
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/
author: elhoim
date: 2022-04-28
modif... | [
"T1055",
"T1218"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth",
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/"
] | Image="*\\mobsync.exe" NOT (DestinationIp="127.0.0.0/8" OR DestinationIp="10.0.0.0/8" OR DestinationIp="172.16.0.0/12" OR DestinationIp="192.168.0.0/16" OR DestinationIp="169.254.0.0/16" OR DestinationIp="::1/128" OR DestinationIp="fe80::/10" OR DestinationIp="fc00::/7") | Image:*\\mobsync.exe AND (NOT (DestinationIp:127.0.0.0\/8 OR DestinationIp:10.0.0.0\/8 OR DestinationIp:172.16.0.0\/12 OR DestinationIp:192.168.0.0\/16 OR DestinationIp:169.254.0.0\/16 OR DestinationIp:\:\:1\/128 OR DestinationIp:fe80\:\:\/10 OR DestinationIp:fc00\:\:\/7)) | DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\mobsync.exe" and (not((ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "127.0.0.0/8") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "10.0.0.0/8") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "172.16.0.0/12") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "192.168.0.0/16") or ipv4_is_in_range(RemoteIP, "169.254.0.0/16") ... | windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_outbound_mobsync_connection.yml | |
b222df08-0e07-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 | Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher | Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell | windows | process_creation | title: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
id: b222df08-0e07-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
status: test
description: Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-13
modified: 2022-11-17
tags:
- attack.ste... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009"
] | CommandLine="*cmd*" CommandLine="*&&*" CommandLine="*clipboard]::*" CommandLine="*-f*" CommandLine IN ("*/c*", "*/r*") | (CommandLine:*cmd* AND CommandLine:*\&\&* AND CommandLine:*clipboard\]\:\:* AND CommandLine:*\-f*) AND (CommandLine:(*\/c* OR *\/r*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "cmd" and ProcessCommandLine contains "&&" and ProcessCommandLine contains "clipboard]::" and ProcessCommandLine contains "-f") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/c" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/r") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_invoke_obfuscation_clip.yml | |
dd3ee8cc-f751-41c9-ba53-5a32ed47e563 | Registry Modification of MS-settings Protocol Handler | Detects registry modifications to the 'ms-settings' protocol handler, which is frequently targeted for UAC bypass or persistence.
Attackers can modify this registry to execute malicious code with elevated privileges by hijacking the command execution path. | windows | process_creation | title: Registry Modification of MS-settings Protocol Handler
id: dd3ee8cc-f751-41c9-ba53-5a32ed47e563
related:
- id: 152f3630-77c1-4284-bcc0-4cc68ab2f6e7
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects registry modifications to the ''ms-settings'' protocol handler, which is frequently targeted for UAC
bypass or pe... | [
"T1548.002",
"T1546.001",
"T1112"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/",
"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/f/water-curse.html"
] | (Image="*\\reg.exe" OR OriginalFileName="reg.exe" CommandLine="*add*") OR (Image IN ("*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe") OR OriginalFileName IN ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll") CommandLine IN ("*New-ItemProperty*", "*Set-ItemProperty*", "*ni *", "*sp *")) CommandLine="*\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command*" | (((Image:*\\reg.exe OR OriginalFileName:reg.exe) AND CommandLine:*add*) OR (((Image:(*\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe)) OR (OriginalFileName:(powershell.exe OR pwsh.dll))) AND (CommandLine:(*New\-ItemProperty* OR *Set\-ItemProperty* OR *ni\ * OR *sp\ *)))) AND CommandLine:*\\ms\-settings\\shell\\open\\command* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (((FolderPath endswith "\\reg.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "reg.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "add") or (((FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe") or (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.dll"))) and (Pro... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_registry_modification_of_ms_setting_protocol_handler.yml | |
d9047477-0359-48c9-b8c7-792cedcdc9c4 | PUA - NirCmd Execution As LOCAL SYSTEM | Detects the use of NirCmd tool for command execution as SYSTEM user | windows | process_creation | title: PUA - NirCmd Execution As LOCAL SYSTEM
id: d9047477-0359-48c9-b8c7-792cedcdc9c4
status: test
description: Detects the use of NirCmd tool for command execution as SYSTEM user
references:
- https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd.html
- https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-wind... | [
"T1569.002"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate use by administrators"
] | [
"https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd.html",
"https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/",
"https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/nircmd2.html#using"
] | CommandLine="* runassystem *" | CommandLine:*\ runassystem\ * | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains " runassystem " | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_nircmd_as_system.yml | |
90ae0469-0cee-4509-b67f-e5efcef040f7 | Aruba Network Service Potential DLL Sideloading | Detects potential DLL sideloading activity via the Aruba Networks Virtual Intranet Access "arubanetsvc.exe" process using DLL Search Order Hijacking | windows | image_load | title: Aruba Network Service Potential DLL Sideloading
id: 90ae0469-0cee-4509-b67f-e5efcef040f7
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading activity via the Aruba Networks Virtual Intranet Access "arubanetsvc.exe" process
using DLL Search Order Hijacking
references:
- https://twitter.com/wdormann/stat... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1616581559892545537?t=XLCBO9BziGzD7Bmbt8oMEQ&s=09"
] | Image="*\\arubanetsvc.exe" ImageLoaded IN ("*\\wtsapi32.dll", "*\\msvcr100.dll", "*\\msvcp100.dll", "*\\dbghelp.dll", "*\\dbgcore.dll", "*\\wininet.dll", "*\\iphlpapi.dll", "*\\version.dll", "*\\cryptsp.dll", "*\\cryptbase.dll", "*\\wldp.dll", "*\\profapi.dll", "*\\sspicli.dll", "*\\winsta.dll", "*\\dpapi.dll") NOT (Im... | (Image:*\\arubanetsvc.exe AND (ImageLoaded:(*\\wtsapi32.dll OR *\\msvcr100.dll OR *\\msvcp100.dll OR *\\dbghelp.dll OR *\\dbgcore.dll OR *\\wininet.dll OR *\\iphlpapi.dll OR *\\version.dll OR *\\cryptsp.dll OR *\\cryptbase.dll OR *\\wldp.dll OR *\\profapi.dll OR *\\sspicli.dll OR *\\winsta.dll OR *\\dpapi.dll))) AND (N... | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\arubanetsvc.exe" and (FolderPath endswith "\\wtsapi32.dll" or FolderPath endswith "\\msvcr100.dll" or FolderPath endswith "\\msvcp100.dll" or FolderPath endswith "\\dbghelp.dll" or FolderPath endswith "\\dbgcore.dll" or FolderPath endswith "\\winine... | windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_aruba_networks_virtual_intranet_access.yml | |
c74c0390-3e20-41fd-a69a-128f0275a5ea | Cab File Extraction Via Wusa.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Paths | Detects the execution of the "wusa.exe" (Windows Update Standalone Installer) utility to extract ".cab" files using the "/extract" argument from potentially suspicious paths. | windows | process_creation | title: Cab File Extraction Via Wusa.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Paths
id: c74c0390-3e20-41fd-a69a-128f0275a5ea
related:
- id: 59b39960-5f9d-4a49-9cef-1e4d2c1d0cb9
type: derived
status: test
description: 'Detects the execution of the "wusa.exe" (Windows Update Standalone Installer) utility to extract ".cab" files
... | [] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html",
"https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/wusa.exe/"
] | Image="*\\wusa.exe" CommandLine="*/extract:*" CommandLine IN ("*:\\PerfLogs\\*", "*:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\Appdata\\Local\\Temp\\*") | (Image:*\\wusa.exe AND CommandLine:*\/extract\:*) AND (CommandLine:(*\:\\PerfLogs\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\Appdata\\Local\\Temp\\*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\wusa.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "/extract:") and (ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\PerfLogs\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\Users\\Public\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains ":\\Windows\\Temp\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains "\\Appdata\\Local\\Temp\\") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wusa_cab_files_extraction_from_susp_paths.yml | |
e2326866-609f-4015-aea9-7ec634e8aa04 | Shell Execution via Rsync - Linux | Detects the use of the "rsync" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments. | linux | process_creation | title: Shell Execution via Rsync - Linux
id: e2326866-609f-4015-aea9-7ec634e8aa04
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the use of the "rsync" utility to execute a shell. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation,
unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments.
'
... | [
"T1059"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | experimental | [
"Legitimate cases in which \"rsync\" is used to execute a shell"
] | [
"https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rsync/#shell"
] | Image IN ("*/rsync", "*/rsyncd") CommandLine="* -e *" CommandLine IN ("*/ash *", "*/bash *", "*/dash *", "*/csh *", "*/sh *", "*/zsh *", "*/tcsh *", "*/ksh *", "*'ash *", "*'bash *", "*'dash *", "*'csh *", "*'sh *", "*'zsh *", "*'tcsh *", "*'ksh *") | ((Image:(*\/rsync OR *\/rsyncd)) AND CommandLine:*\ \-e\ *) AND (CommandLine:(*\/ash\ * OR *\/bash\ * OR *\/dash\ * OR *\/csh\ * OR *\/sh\ * OR *\/zsh\ * OR *\/tcsh\ * OR *\/ksh\ * OR *'ash\ * OR *'bash\ * OR *'dash\ * OR *'csh\ * OR *'sh\ * OR *'zsh\ * OR *'tcsh\ * OR *'ksh\ *)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "/rsync" or FolderPath endswith "/rsyncd") and ProcessCommandLine contains " -e ") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "/ash " or ProcessCommandLine contains "/bash " or ProcessCommandLine contains "/dash " or ProcessCommandLine contains "/csh " or ProcessCommandLine conta... | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_rsync_shell_execution.yml | |
3883d9a0-fd0f-440f-afbb-445a2a799bb8 | Github Secret Scanning Feature Disabled | Detects if the secret scanning feature is disabled for an enterprise or repository. | github | audit | title: Github Secret Scanning Feature Disabled
id: 3883d9a0-fd0f-440f-afbb-445a2a799bb8
status: test
description: Detects if the secret scanning feature is disabled for an enterprise or repository.
references:
- https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/code-security/secret-scanning/about-secret-scanning
autho... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Allowed administrative activities."
] | [
"https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/code-security/secret-scanning/about-secret-scanning"
] | action IN ("business_secret_scanning.disable", "business_secret_scanning.disabled_for_new_repos", "repository_secret_scanning.disable", "secret_scanning_new_repos.disable", "secret_scanning.disable") | action:(business_secret_scanning.disable OR business_secret_scanning.disabled_for_new_repos OR repository_secret_scanning.disable OR secret_scanning_new_repos.disable OR secret_scanning.disable) | null | application/github/audit/github_secret_scanning_feature_disabled.yml | |
f6d1dd2f-b8ce-40ca-bc23-062efb686b34 | Script Event Consumer Spawning Process | Detects a suspicious child process of Script Event Consumer (scrcons.exe). | windows | process_creation | title: Script Event Consumer Spawning Process
id: f6d1dd2f-b8ce-40ca-bc23-062efb686b34
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious child process of Script Event Consumer (scrcons.exe).
references:
- https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/
- https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cortex-xdr/cortex-xdr-analytics... | [
"T1047"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://redcanary.com/blog/child-processes/",
"https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/cortex/cortex-xdr/cortex-xdr-analytics-alert-reference/cortex-xdr-analytics-alert-reference/scrcons-exe-rare-child-process.html"
] | ParentImage="*\\scrcons.exe" Image IN ("*\\svchost.exe", "*\\dllhost.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\schtasks.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\msiexec.exe", "*\\msbuild.exe") | ParentImage:*\\scrcons.exe AND (Image:(*\\svchost.exe OR *\\dllhost.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe OR *\\wscript.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\schtasks.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe OR *\\msiexec.exe OR *\\msbuild.exe)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\scrcons.exe" and (FolderPath endswith "\\svchost.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\dllhost.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\pwsh.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\wscript.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or ... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_scrcons_susp_child_process.yml | |
0d34ed8b-1c12-4ff2-828c-16fc860b766d | Suspicious Processes Spawned by Java.EXE | Detects suspicious processes spawned from a Java host process which could indicate a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j) | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Processes Spawned by Java.EXE
id: 0d34ed8b-1c12-4ff2-828c-16fc860b766d
related:
- id: dff1e1cc-d3fd-47c8-bfc2-aeb878a754c0
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects suspicious processes spawned from a Java host process which could indicate a sign of exploitation (e.g.
log4j)
references:
- ht... | [] | [
"initial-access",
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate calls to system binaries",
"Company specific internal usage"
] | [
"https://web.archive.org/web/20231230220738/https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/"
] | ParentImage="*\\java.exe" Image IN ("*\\AppVLP.exe", "*\\bitsadmin.exe", "*\\certutil.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\curl.exe", "*\\forfiles.exe", "*\\hh.exe", "*\\mftrace.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\net.exe", "*\\net1.exe", "*\\query.exe", "*\\reg.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe", "*\\schtasks.exe", "*\\scrcons.e... | ParentImage:*\\java.exe AND (Image:(*\\AppVLP.exe OR *\\bitsadmin.exe OR *\\certutil.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\curl.exe OR *\\forfiles.exe OR *\\hh.exe OR *\\mftrace.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\net.exe OR *\\net1.exe OR *\\query.exe OR *\\reg.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe OR *\\schtasks.exe OR *\\scrcons.ex... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\java.exe" and (FolderPath endswith "\\AppVLP.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\bitsadmin.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\certutil.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\curl.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\forfiles.exe" or Fol... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_java_susp_child_process.yml | |
ea61bb82-a5e0-42e6-8537-91d29500f1b9 | Potential Abuse of Linux Magic System Request Key | Detects the potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges
to silently manipulate or destabilize a system. By writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger, they can crash the system, kill processes,
or disrupt forensic analysis—all while bypassing standard logging. Tho... | linux | auditd | title: Potential Abuse of Linux Magic System Request Key
id: ea61bb82-a5e0-42e6-8537-91d29500f1b9
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient
privileges
to silently manipulate or destabilize a system. By writing... | [
"T1059.004",
"T1529",
"T1489",
"T1499"
] | [
"execution",
"impact"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Legitimate administrative activity"
] | [
"https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.10/_sources/admin-guide/sysrq.txt",
"https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/4/html/reference_guide/s3-proc-sys-kernel",
"https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-awfulshred-script-wiper.html"
] | type="PATH" name IN ("*/sysrq", "*/sysctl.conf", "*/sysrq-trigger") | type:PATH AND (name:(*\/sysrq OR *\/sysctl.conf OR *\/sysrq\-trigger)) | null | linux/auditd/path/lnx_auditd_magic_system_request_key.yml | |
fcc6d700-68d9-4241-9a1a-06874d621b06 | Suspicious File Created Via OneNote Application | Detects suspicious files created via the OneNote application. This could indicate a potential malicious ".one"/".onepkg" file was executed as seen being used in malware activity in the wild | windows | file_event | title: Suspicious File Created Via OneNote Application
id: fcc6d700-68d9-4241-9a1a-06874d621b06
status: test
description: Detects suspicious files created via the OneNote application. This could indicate a potential malicious ".one"/".onepkg"
file was executed as seen being used in malware activity in the wild
refere... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"False positives should be very low with the extensions list cited. Especially if you don't heavily utilize OneNote.",
"Occasional FPs might occur if OneNote is used internally to share different embedded documents"
] | [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-use-microsoft-onenote-attachments-to-spread-malware/",
"https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/",
"https://twitter.com/MaD_c4t/status/1623414582382567424",
"https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/detecting-onenote... | Image IN ("*\\onenote.exe", "*\\onenotem.exe", "*\\onenoteim.exe") TargetFilename="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\OneNote\\*" TargetFilename IN ("*.bat", "*.chm", "*.cmd", "*.dll", "*.exe", "*.hta", "*.htm", "*.html", "*.js", "*.lnk", "*.ps1", "*.vbe", "*.vbs", "*.wsf") | (Image:(*\\onenote.exe OR *\\onenotem.exe OR *\\onenoteim.exe)) AND TargetFilename:*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\OneNote\\* AND (TargetFilename:(*.bat OR *.chm OR *.cmd OR *.dll OR *.exe OR *.hta OR *.htm OR *.html OR *.js OR *.lnk OR *.ps1 OR *.vbe OR *.vbs OR *.wsf)) | DeviceFileEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\onenote.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\onenotem.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\onenoteim.exe") and FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\OneNote\\" and (FolderPath endswith ".bat" or FolderPath endswith ".chm" or ... | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_office_onenote_susp_dropped_files.yml | |
894a8613-cf12-48b3-8e57-9085f54aa0c3 | Potential Base64 Encoded User-Agent | Detects User Agent strings that end with an equal sign, which can be a sign of base64 encoding. | proxy | title: Potential Base64 Encoded User-Agent
id: 894a8613-cf12-48b3-8e57-9085f54aa0c3
related:
- id: d443095b-a221-4957-a2c4-cd1756c9b747
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects User Agent strings that end with an equal sign, which can be a sign of base64 encoding.
references:
- https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/20... | [
"T1071.001"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2022/07/yamabot.html",
"https://deviceatlas.com/blog/list-of-user-agent-strings#desktop"
] | "c-useragent"="*=" | c-useragent:*\= | null | web/proxy_generic/proxy_ua_susp_base64.yml | ||
4281cb20-2994-4580-aa63-c8b86d019934 | Hiding Files with Attrib.exe | Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users. | windows | process_creation | title: Hiding Files with Attrib.exe
id: 4281cb20-2994-4580-aa63-c8b86d019934
status: test
description: Detects usage of attrib.exe to hide files from users.
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sure-ill-take-new-combojack-malware-alters-clipboards-steal-cryptocurrency/
- https://www.uptycs.com/blog/... | [
"T1564.001"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"IgfxCUIService.exe hiding *.cui files via .bat script (attrib.exe a child of cmd.exe and igfxCUIService.exe is the parent of the cmd.exe)",
"Msiexec.exe hiding desktop.ini"
] | [
"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sure-ill-take-new-combojack-malware-alters-clipboards-steal-cryptocurrency/",
"https://www.uptycs.com/blog/lolbins-are-no-laughing-matter"
] | Image="*\\attrib.exe" OR OriginalFileName="ATTRIB.EXE" CommandLine="* +h *" NOT CommandLine="*\\desktop.ini *" NOT (ParentImage="*\\cmd.exe" CommandLine="+R +H +S +A \\\*.cui" ParentCommandLine="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\\*.bat") | ((Image:*\\attrib.exe OR OriginalFileName:ATTRIB.EXE) AND CommandLine:*\ \+h\ *) AND (NOT CommandLine:*\\desktop.ini\ *) AND (NOT (ParentImage:*\\cmd.exe AND CommandLine:"\+R \+H \+S \+A \\\*.cui" AND ParentCommandLine:C\:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\\*.bat)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\attrib.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "ATTRIB.EXE") and ProcessCommandLine contains " +h ") and (not(ProcessCommandLine contains "\\desktop.ini ")) and (not((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" and ProcessCommandLine =~ "+R +H +S +A \\*.cu... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_attrib_hiding_files.yml | |
1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849 | Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated | Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or addition... | windows | network_connection | title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
related:
- id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" ... | [
"T1567",
"T1568.002",
"T1572",
"T1090",
"T1102"
] | [
"exfiltration",
"command-and-control"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate use of the ngrok service."
] | [
"https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1",
"https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent"
] | DestinationHostname IN ("*tunnel.us.ngrok.com*", "*tunnel.eu.ngrok.com*", "*tunnel.ap.ngrok.com*", "*tunnel.au.ngrok.com*", "*tunnel.sa.ngrok.com*", "*tunnel.jp.ngrok.com*", "*tunnel.in.ngrok.com*") | DestinationHostname:(*tunnel.us.ngrok.com* OR *tunnel.eu.ngrok.com* OR *tunnel.ap.ngrok.com* OR *tunnel.au.ngrok.com* OR *tunnel.sa.ngrok.com* OR *tunnel.jp.ngrok.com* OR *tunnel.in.ngrok.com*) | DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl contains "tunnel.us.ngrok.com" or RemoteUrl contains "tunnel.eu.ngrok.com" or RemoteUrl contains "tunnel.ap.ngrok.com" or RemoteUrl contains "tunnel.au.ngrok.com" or RemoteUrl contains "tunnel.sa.ngrok.com" or RemoteUrl contains "tunnel.jp.ngrok.com" or RemoteUrl contains "tunnel.i... | windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_domain_ngrok_tunnel.yml | |
b86d356d-6093-443d-971c-9b07db583c68 | Suspicious Curl Change User Agents - Linux | Detects a suspicious curl process start on linux with set useragent options | linux | process_creation | title: Suspicious Curl Change User Agents - Linux
id: b86d356d-6093-443d-971c-9b07db583c68
related:
- id: 3286d37a-00fd-41c2-a624-a672dcd34e60
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects a suspicious curl process start on linux with set useragent options
references:
- https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html
author: Nas... | [
"T1071.001"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | medium | test | [
"Scripts created by developers and admins",
"Administrative activity"
] | [
"https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html"
] | Image="*/curl" CommandLine IN ("* -A *", "* --user-agent *") | Image:*\/curl AND (CommandLine:(*\ \-A\ * OR *\ \-\-user\-agent\ *)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/curl" and (ProcessCommandLine contains " -A " or ProcessCommandLine contains " --user-agent ") | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_susp_curl_useragent.yml | |
786cdae8-fefb-4eb2-9227-04e34060db01 | Suspicious Wordpad Outbound Connections | Detects a network connection initiated by "wordpad.exe" over uncommon destination ports.
This might indicate potential process injection activity from a beacon or similar mechanisms. | windows | network_connection | title: Suspicious Wordpad Outbound Connections
id: 786cdae8-fefb-4eb2-9227-04e34060db01
status: test
description: 'Detects a network connection initiated by "wordpad.exe" over uncommon destination ports.
This might indicate potential process injection activity from a beacon or similar mechanisms.
'
references:
- ... | [] | [
"command-and-control",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Other ports can be used, apply additional filters accordingly"
] | [
"https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2023/07/romcom-targets-ukraine-nato-membership-talks-at-nato-summit"
] | Initiated="true" Image="*\\wordpad.exe" NOT (DestinationPort IN (80, 139, 443, 445, 465, 587, 993, 995)) | (Initiated:true AND Image:*\\wordpad.exe) AND (NOT (DestinationPort:(80 OR 139 OR 443 OR 445 OR 465 OR 587 OR 993 OR 995))) | DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\wordpad.exe" and (not((RemotePort in~ ("80", "139", "443", "445", "465", "587", "993", "995")))) | windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_wordpad_uncommon_ports.yml | |
8eef149c-bd26-49f2-9e5a-9b00e3af499b | Pass the Hash Activity 2 | Detects the attack technique pass the hash which is used to move laterally inside the network | windows | security | title: Pass the Hash Activity 2
id: 8eef149c-bd26-49f2-9e5a-9b00e3af499b
status: stable
description: Detects the attack technique pass the hash which is used to move laterally inside the network
references:
- https://github.com/iadgov/Event-Forwarding-Guidance/tree/master/Events
- https://web.archive.org/web/2017090909... | [
"T1550.002"
] | [
"lateral-movement"
] | medium | stable | [
"Administrator activity"
] | [
"https://github.com/iadgov/Event-Forwarding-Guidance/tree/master/Events",
"https://web.archive.org/web/20170909091934/https://blog.binarydefense.com/reliably-detecting-pass-the-hash-through-event-log-analysis",
"https://blog.stealthbits.com/how-to-detect-pass-the-hash-attacks/"
] | (EventID=4624 SubjectUserSid="S-1-0-0" LogonType=3 LogonProcessName="NtLmSsp" KeyLength=0) OR (EventID=4624 LogonType=9 LogonProcessName="seclogo") NOT TargetUserName="ANONYMOUS LOGON" | ((EventID:4624 AND SubjectUserSid:S\-1\-0\-0 AND LogonType:3 AND LogonProcessName:NtLmSsp AND KeyLength:0) OR (EventID:4624 AND LogonType:9 AND LogonProcessName:seclogo)) AND (NOT TargetUserName:"ANONYMOUS LOGON") | null | windows/builtin/security/account_management/win_security_pass_the_hash_2.yml | |
c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0 | Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI | Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe, which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware. | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI
id: c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0
status: experimental
description: 'Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe,
which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware.
'
refe... | [
"T1547.001",
"T1047"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"persistence"
] | high | experimental | [
"Legitimate administrative activity or software installations"
] | [
"Internal Research",
"https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md"
] | Image="*\\wmic.exe" OR OriginalFileName="wmic.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\wmiprvse.exe" CommandLine="*reg*" CommandLine="* add *" CommandLine IN ("*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*", "*\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*", "*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\P... | ((Image:*\\wmic.exe OR OriginalFileName:wmic.exe OR ParentImage:*\\wmiprvse.exe) AND ((CommandLine:*reg* AND CommandLine:*\ add\ *) AND (CommandLine:(*\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run* OR *\\Software\\WOW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run* OR *\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVer... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((FolderPath endswith "\\wmic.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "wmic.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\wmiprvse.exe") and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "reg" and ProcessCommandLine contains " add ") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_autorun_registry_modified_via_wmic.yml | |
b2572bf9-e20a-4594-b528-40bde666525a | Impossible Travel | Identifies user activities originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than the time it takes to travel from the first location to the second. | azure | riskdetection | title: Impossible Travel
id: b2572bf9-e20a-4594-b528-40bde666525a
status: test
description: Identifies user activities originating from geographically distant locations within a time period shorter than
the time it takes to travel from the first location to the second.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/... | [
"T1078"
] | [
"stealth",
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"initial-access"
] | high | test | [
"Connecting to a VPN, performing activity and then dropping and performing additional activity."
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#impossible-travel",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins"
] | riskEventType="impossibleTravel" | riskEventType:impossibleTravel | null | cloud/azure/identity_protection/azure_identity_protection_impossible_travel.yml | |
43fa5350-db63-4b8f-9a01-789a427074e1 | Potential Obfuscated Ordinal Call Via Rundll32 | Detects execution of "rundll32" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Obfuscated Ordinal Call Via Rundll32
id: 43fa5350-db63-4b8f-9a01-789a427074e1
status: test
description: Detects execution of "rundll32" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls
references:
- Internal Research
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron ... | [
"T1027.010"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"Internal Research",
"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=52tAmVLg1KM&t=2070s"
] | Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR OriginalFileName="RUNDLL32.EXE" OR CommandLine="*rundll32*" CommandLine IN ("*#+*", "*#-*", "*#0*", "*#655*", "*#656*") | (Image:*\\rundll32.exe OR OriginalFileName:RUNDLL32.EXE OR CommandLine:*rundll32*) AND (CommandLine:(*#\+* OR *#\-* OR *#0* OR *#655* OR *#656*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\rundll32.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "RUNDLL32.EXE" or ProcessCommandLine contains "rundll32") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "#+" or ProcessCommandLine contains "#-" or ProcessCommandLine contains "#0" or ProcessCommandLine contains "#655" or Proc... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_rundll32_obfuscated_ordinal_call.yml | |
90d50722-0483-4065-8e35-57efaadd354d | Arbitrary MSI Download Via Devinit.EXE | Detects a certain command line flag combination used by "devinit.exe", which can be abused as a LOLBIN to download arbitrary MSI packages on a Windows system | windows | process_creation | title: Arbitrary MSI Download Via Devinit.EXE
id: 90d50722-0483-4065-8e35-57efaadd354d
status: test
description: Detects a certain command line flag combination used by "devinit.exe", which can be abused as a LOLBIN to download
arbitrary MSI packages on a Windows system
references:
- https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460815932402679809",
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Devinit/"
] | CommandLine="* -t msi-install *" CommandLine="* -i http*" | CommandLine:*\ \-t\ msi\-install\ * AND CommandLine:*\ \-i\ http* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains " -t msi-install " and ProcessCommandLine contains " -i http" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_devinit_lolbin_usage.yml | |
448fd1ea-2116-4c62-9cde-a92d120e0f08 | Azure Service Principal Removed | Identifies when a service principal was removed in Azure. | azure | auditlogs | title: Azure Service Principal Removed
id: 448fd1ea-2116-4c62-9cde-a92d120e0f08
status: test
description: Identifies when a service principal was removed in Azure.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#core-directory
- https://techcommunity.microsoft... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Service principal being removed may be performed by a system administrator.",
"Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.",
"Service principal removed from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it ... | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#core-directory",
"https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoft-entra-blog/keeping-track-of-object-deletions-in-microsoft-entra-id/4053415"
] | operationName="Remove service principal" | operationName:"Remove service principal" | null | cloud/azure/audit_logs/azure_service_principal_removed.yml | |
693a44e9-7f26-4cb6-b787-214867672d3a | Sysmon File Executable Creation Detected | Triggers on any Sysmon "FileExecutableDetected" event, which triggers every time a PE that is monitored by the config is created. | windows | sysmon | title: Sysmon File Executable Creation Detected
id: 693a44e9-7f26-4cb6-b787-214867672d3a
status: test
description: Triggers on any Sysmon "FileExecutableDetected" event, which triggers every time a PE that is monitored by the
config is created.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sy... | [] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon",
"https://medium.com/@olafhartong/sysmon-15-0-file-executable-detected-40fd64349f36"
] | EventID=29 | EventID:29 | null | windows/sysmon/sysmon_file_executable_detected.yml | |
83c17918-746e-4bd9-920b-8e098bf88c23 | Azure Network Firewall Policy Modified or Deleted | Identifies when a Firewall Policy is Modified or Deleted. | azure | activitylogs | title: Azure Network Firewall Policy Modified or Deleted
id: 83c17918-746e-4bd9-920b-8e098bf88c23
status: test
description: Identifies when a Firewall Policy is Modified or Deleted.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer @austin... | [
"T1686.001"
] | [
"impact",
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Firewall Policy being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.",
"Firewall Policy modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false... | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations"
] | operationName IN ("MICROSOFT.NETWORK/FIREWALLPOLICIES/WRITE", "MICROSOFT.NETWORK/FIREWALLPOLICIES/JOIN/ACTION", "MICROSOFT.NETWORK/FIREWALLPOLICIES/CERTIFICATES/ACTION", "MICROSOFT.NETWORK/FIREWALLPOLICIES/DELETE") | operationName:(MICROSOFT.NETWORK\/FIREWALLPOLICIES\/WRITE OR MICROSOFT.NETWORK\/FIREWALLPOLICIES\/JOIN\/ACTION OR MICROSOFT.NETWORK\/FIREWALLPOLICIES\/CERTIFICATES\/ACTION OR MICROSOFT.NETWORK\/FIREWALLPOLICIES\/DELETE) | null | cloud/azure/activity_logs/azure_network_firewall_policy_modified_or_deleted.yml | |
1a4bd6e3-4c6e-405d-a9a3-53a116e341d4 | USB Device Plugged | Detects plugged/unplugged USB devices | windows | driver-framework | title: USB Device Plugged
id: 1a4bd6e3-4c6e-405d-a9a3-53a116e341d4
status: test
description: Detects plugged/unplugged USB devices
references:
- https://df-stream.com/2014/01/the-windows-7-event-log-and-usb-device/
- https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-track-down-usb-flash-drive-usage-in-windows-10s-event-viewe... | [
"T1200"
] | [
"initial-access"
] | low | test | [
"Legitimate administrative activity"
] | [
"https://df-stream.com/2014/01/the-windows-7-event-log-and-usb-device/",
"https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-track-down-usb-flash-drive-usage-in-windows-10s-event-viewer/"
] | EventID IN (2003, 2100, 2102) | EventID:(2003 OR 2100 OR 2102) | null | windows/builtin/driverframeworks/win_usb_device_plugged.yml | |
28ac00d6-22d9-4a3c-927f-bbd770104573 | RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - ProcCreation | Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin mode.
RestrictedAdmin mode prevents the transmission of reusable credentials to the remote system to which you connect using Remote Desktop.
This prevents your credentials from being harvested during the initial... | windows | process_creation | title: RestrictedAdminMode Registry Value Tampering - ProcCreation
id: 28ac00d6-22d9-4a3c-927f-bbd770104573
related:
- id: d6ce7ebd-260b-4323-9768-a9631c8d4db2
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects changes to the "DisableRestrictedAdmin" registry value in order to disable or enable RestrictedAdmin
mode.
... | [
"T1112"
] | [
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/a8e3cf63e97b973a25903d3df9fd55da6252e564/atomics/T1112/T1112.md",
"https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/32905.remote-desktop-services-enable-restricted-admin-mode.aspx",
"https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-s... | CommandLine="*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa*" CommandLine="*DisableRestrictedAdmin*" | CommandLine:*\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa* AND CommandLine:*DisableRestrictedAdmin* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa" and ProcessCommandLine contains "DisableRestrictedAdmin" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_lsa_disable_restricted_admin.yml | |
459a2970-bb84-4e6a-a32e-ff0fbd99448d | Azure Key Vault Modified or Deleted | Identifies when a key vault is modified or deleted. | azure | activitylogs | title: Azure Key Vault Modified or Deleted
id: 459a2970-bb84-4e6a-a32e-ff0fbd99448d
status: test
description: Identifies when a key vault is modified or deleted.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger
date: 2021-08... | [
"T1552",
"T1552.001"
] | [
"impact",
"credential-access"
] | medium | test | [
"Key Vault being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator.",
"Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.",
"Key Vault modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positi... | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations"
] | operationName IN ("MICROSOFT.KEYVAULT/VAULTS/WRITE", "MICROSOFT.KEYVAULT/VAULTS/DELETE", "MICROSOFT.KEYVAULT/VAULTS/DEPLOY/ACTION", "MICROSOFT.KEYVAULT/VAULTS/ACCESSPOLICIES/WRITE") | operationName:(MICROSOFT.KEYVAULT\/VAULTS\/WRITE OR MICROSOFT.KEYVAULT\/VAULTS\/DELETE OR MICROSOFT.KEYVAULT\/VAULTS\/DEPLOY\/ACTION OR MICROSOFT.KEYVAULT\/VAULTS\/ACCESSPOLICIES\/WRITE) | null | cloud/azure/activity_logs/azure_keyvault_modified_or_deleted.yml | |
2db93a3f-3249-4f73-9e68-0e77a0f8ae7e | Remote Access Tool - TacticalRMM Agent Registration to Potentially Attacker-Controlled Server | Detects TacticalRMM agent installations where the --api, --auth, and related flags are used on the command line.
These parameters configure the agent to connect to a specific RMM server with authentication, client ID, and site ID.
This technique could indicate a threat actor attempting to register the agent with an att... | windows | process_creation | title: Remote Access Tool - TacticalRMM Agent Registration to Potentially Attacker-Controlled Server
id: 2db93a3f-3249-4f73-9e68-0e77a0f8ae7e
status: experimental
description: 'Detects TacticalRMM agent installations where the --api, --auth, and related flags are used on the command line.
These parameters configure ... | [
"T1219",
"T1105"
] | [
"command-and-control"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Legitimate system administrator deploying TacticalRMM"
] | [
"https://github.com/amidaware/tacticalrmm",
"https://apophis133.medium.com/powershell-script-tactical-rmm-installation-45afb639eff3"
] | Image="*\\TacticalAgent\\tacticalrmm.exe*" CommandLine="*--api*" CommandLine="*--auth*" CommandLine="*--client-id*" CommandLine="*--site-id*" CommandLine="*--agent-type*" | Image:*\\TacticalAgent\\tacticalrmm.exe* AND (CommandLine:*\-\-api* AND CommandLine:*\-\-auth* AND CommandLine:*\-\-client\-id* AND CommandLine:*\-\-site\-id* AND CommandLine:*\-\-agent\-type*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath contains "\\TacticalAgent\\tacticalrmm.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "--api" and ProcessCommandLine contains "--auth" and ProcessCommandLine contains "--client-id" and ProcessCommandLine contains "--site-id" and ProcessCommandLine contains "--agent-type") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_remote_access_tools_tacticalrmm_agent_registration_via_cli.yml | |
ec8c4047-fad9-416a-8c81-0f479353d7f6 | Diagnostic Library Sdiageng.DLL Loaded By Msdt.EXE | Detects both of CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) and DogWalk vulnerabilities exploiting msdt.exe binary to load the "sdiageng.dll" library | windows | image_load | title: Diagnostic Library Sdiageng.DLL Loaded By Msdt.EXE
id: ec8c4047-fad9-416a-8c81-0f479353d7f6
status: test
description: Detects both of CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) and DogWalk vulnerabilities exploiting msdt.exe binary to load the "sdiageng.dll"
library
references:
- https://www.securonix.com/blog/detecting-microso... | [
"T1202"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.securonix.com/blog/detecting-microsoft-msdt-dogwalk/"
] | Image="*\\msdt.exe" ImageLoaded="*\\sdiageng.dll" | Image:*\\msdt.exe AND ImageLoaded:*\\sdiageng.dll | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\msdt.exe" and FolderPath endswith "\\sdiageng.dll" | windows/image_load/image_load_dll_sdiageng_load_by_msdt.yml | |
1d2ab8ac-1a01-423b-9c39-001510eae8e8 | Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access | This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Azure AD Health service agents (e.g AD FS).
Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation... | windows | security | title: Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access
id: 1d2ab8ac-1a01-423b-9c39-001510eae8e8
status: test
description: 'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values
and sub-keys of Azure AD Health service agents (e.g AD FS).
Information from AD ... | [
"T1012"
] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/",
"https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/c3dec5443414231714d850565d364ca73475ade5/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_service_agent.yml"
] | EventID IN (4656, 4663) ObjectType="Key" ObjectName="\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\ADHealthAgent" NOT (ProcessName IN ("*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe*", "*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe*", "*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe*", "*Microsoft.... | ((EventID:(4656 OR 4663)) AND ObjectType:Key AND ObjectName:\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\ADHealthAgent) AND (NOT (ProcessName:(*Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe* OR *Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe* OR *Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe* OR *Mi... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey =~ "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\ADHealthAgent" and (not((InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe" or InitiatingProcessFold... | windows/builtin/security/win_security_aadhealth_svc_agent_regkey_access.yml | |
b2309017-4235-44fe-b5af-b15363011957 | Uncommon Child Process Of Defaultpack.EXE | Detects uncommon child processes of "DefaultPack.EXE" binary as a proxy to launch other programs | windows | process_creation | title: Uncommon Child Process Of Defaultpack.EXE
id: b2309017-4235-44fe-b5af-b15363011957
status: test
description: Detects uncommon child processes of "DefaultPack.EXE" binary as a proxy to launch other programs
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/DefaultPack/
- https://www.echotrail.... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/DefaultPack/",
"https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/defaultpack.exe"
] | ParentImage="*\\DefaultPack.exe" | ParentImage:*\\DefaultPack.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\DefaultPack.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_defaultpack_uncommon_child_process.yml | |
e290b10b-1023-4452-a4a9-eb31a9013b3a | LOLBAS Data Exfiltration by DataSvcUtil.exe | Detects when a user performs data exfiltration by using DataSvcUtil.exe | windows | process_creation | title: LOLBAS Data Exfiltration by DataSvcUtil.exe
id: e290b10b-1023-4452-a4a9-eb31a9013b3a
status: test
description: Detects when a user performs data exfiltration by using DataSvcUtil.exe
references:
- https://gist.github.com/teixeira0xfffff/837e5bfed0d1b0a29a7cb1e5dbdd9ca6
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previou... | [
"T1567"
] | [
"exfiltration"
] | medium | test | [
"DataSvcUtil.exe being used may be performed by a system administrator.",
"Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.",
"DataSvcUtil.exe being executed from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it ... | [
"https://gist.github.com/teixeira0xfffff/837e5bfed0d1b0a29a7cb1e5dbdd9ca6",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/framework/data/wcf/wcf-data-service-client-utility-datasvcutil-exe",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/framework/data/wcf/generating-the-data-service-... | CommandLine IN ("*/in:*", "*/out:*", "*/uri:*") Image="*\\DataSvcUtil.exe" OR OriginalFileName="DataSvcUtil.exe" | (CommandLine:(*\/in\:* OR *\/out\:* OR *\/uri\:*)) AND (Image:*\\DataSvcUtil.exe OR OriginalFileName:DataSvcUtil.exe) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessCommandLine contains "/in:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/out:" or ProcessCommandLine contains "/uri:") and (FolderPath endswith "\\DataSvcUtil.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "DataSvcUtil.exe") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_data_exfiltration_by_using_datasvcutil.yml | |
b3d57a5c-c92e-4b48-9a79-5f124b7cf964 | MSSQL SPProcoption Set | Detects when the a stored procedure is set or cleared for automatic execution in MSSQL. A stored procedure that is set to automatic execution runs every time an instance of SQL Server is started | windows | application | title: MSSQL SPProcoption Set
id: b3d57a5c-c92e-4b48-9a79-5f124b7cf964
status: test
description: Detects when the a stored procedure is set or cleared for automatic execution in MSSQL. A stored procedure that
is set to automatic execution runs every time an instance of SQL Server is started
references:
- https://www.... | [] | [
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate use of the feature by administrators (rare)"
] | [
"https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/relational-databases/system-stored-procedures/sp-procoption-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16"
] | Provider_Name="*MSSQL*" EventID=33205 Data="*object_name:sp_procoption*" Data="*statement:EXEC*" | Provider_Name:*MSSQL* AND EventID:33205 AND (Data:*object_name\:sp_procoption* AND Data:*statement\:EXEC*) | null | windows/builtin/application/mssqlserver/win_mssql_sp_procoption_set.yml | |
04b60639-39c0-412a-9fbe-e82499c881a3 | Windows Defender Firewall Has Been Reset To Its Default Configuration | Detects activity when Windows Defender Firewall has been reset to its default configuration | windows | firewall-as | title: Windows Defender Firewall Has Been Reset To Its Default Configuration
id: 04b60639-39c0-412a-9fbe-e82499c881a3
status: test
description: Detects activity when Windows Defender Firewall has been reset to its default configuration
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/win... | [
"T1686.003"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | low | test | [] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)"
] | EventID IN (2032, 2060) | EventID:(2032 OR 2060) | null | windows/builtin/firewall_as/win_firewall_as_reset_config.yml | |
9827ae57-3802-418f-994b-d5ecf5cd974b | Potential Registry Persistence Attempt Via DbgManagedDebugger | Detects the addition of the "Debugger" value to the "DbgManagedDebugger" key in order to achieve persistence. Which will get invoked when an application crashes | windows | registry_set | title: Potential Registry Persistence Attempt Via DbgManagedDebugger
id: 9827ae57-3802-418f-994b-d5ecf5cd974b
status: test
description: Detects the addition of the "Debugger" value to the "DbgManagedDebugger" key in order to achieve persistence.
Which will get invoked when an application crashes
references:
- https:/... | [
"T1574"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate use of the key to setup a debugger. Which is often the case on developers machines"
] | [
"https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/",
"https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper"
] | TargetObject="*\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework\\DbgManagedDebugger" NOT Details="\"C:\\Windows\\system32\\vsjitdebugger.exe\" PID %d APPDOM %d EXTEXT \"%s\" EVTHDL %d" | TargetObject:*\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework\\DbgManagedDebugger AND (NOT Details:"\"C\:\\Windows\\system32\\vsjitdebugger.exe\" PID %d APPDOM %d EXTEXT \"%s\" EVTHDL %d") | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey endswith "\\Microsoft\\.NETFramework\\DbgManagedDebugger" and (not(RegistryValueData =~ "\"C:\\Windows\\system32\\vsjitdebugger.exe\" PID %d APPDOM %d EXTEXT \"%s\" EVTHDL %d")) | windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_dbgmanageddebugger_persistence.yml | |
c0aac16a-b1e7-4330-bab0-3c27bb4987c7 | Remote Thread Creation In Mstsc.Exe From Suspicious Location | Detects remote thread creation in the "mstsc.exe" process by a process located in a potentially suspicious location.
This technique is often used by attackers in order to hook some APIs used by DLLs loaded by "mstsc.exe" during RDP authentications in order to steal credentials. | windows | create_remote_thread | title: Remote Thread Creation In Mstsc.Exe From Suspicious Location
id: c0aac16a-b1e7-4330-bab0-3c27bb4987c7
status: test
description: 'Detects remote thread creation in the "mstsc.exe" process by a process located in a potentially suspicious location.
This technique is often used by attackers in order to hook some ... | [] | [
"credential-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/S12cybersecurity/RDPCredentialStealer/blob/1b8947cdd065a06c1b62e80967d3c7af895fcfed/APIHookInjectorBin/APIHookInjectorBin/Inject.h#L25"
] | TargetImage="*\\mstsc.exe" SourceImage IN ("*:\\Temp\\*", "*:\\Users\\Public\\*", "*:\\Windows\\PerfLogs\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*") | TargetImage:*\\mstsc.exe AND (SourceImage:(*\:\\Temp\\* OR *\:\\Users\\Public\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\PerfLogs\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Tasks\\* OR *\:\\Windows\\Temp\\* OR *\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*)) | null | windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_mstsc_susp_location.yml | |
34979410-e4b5-4e5d-8cfb-389fdff05c12 | Remove Immutable File Attribute | Detects usage of the 'chattr' utility to remove immutable file attribute. | linux | process_creation | title: Remove Immutable File Attribute
id: 34979410-e4b5-4e5d-8cfb-389fdff05c12
related:
- id: a5b977d6-8a81-4475-91b9-49dbfcd941f7
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects usage of the 'chattr' utility to remove immutable file attribute.
references:
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/how-malicio... | [
"T1222.002"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Administrator interacting with immutable files (e.g. for instance backups)."
] | [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/i/how-malicious-actors-abuse-native-linux-tools-in-their-attacks.html"
] | Image="*/chattr" CommandLine="* -i *" | Image:*\/chattr AND CommandLine:*\ \-i\ * | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/chattr" and ProcessCommandLine contains " -i " | linux/process_creation/proc_creation_lnx_chattr_immutable_removal.yml | |
686c0b4b-9dd3-4847-9077-d6c1bbe36fcb | Windows Defender Virus Scanning Feature Disabled | Detects disabling of the Windows Defender virus scanning feature | windows | windefend | title: Windows Defender Virus Scanning Feature Disabled
id: 686c0b4b-9dd3-4847-9077-d6c1bbe36fcb
related:
- id: fe34868f-6e0e-4882-81f6-c43aa8f15b62
type: obsolete
status: stable
description: Detects disabling of the Windows Defender virus scanning feature
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endp... | [
"T1685"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | stable | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide#event-id-5012",
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md",
"https://craigclouditpro.wordpress.com/2020/03/04/hunt... | EventID=5012 | EventID:5012 | null | windows/builtin/windefend/win_defender_virus_scan_disabled.yml | |
95f0643a-ed40-467c-806b-aac9542ec5ab | Suspicious Get Information for SMB Share | Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as
a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.
Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file dire... | windows | ps_script | title: Suspicious Get Information for SMB Share
id: 95f0643a-ed40-467c-806b-aac9542ec5ab
status: test
description: 'Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information
to gather as
a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of inte... | [
"T1069.001"
] | [
"discovery"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.md"
] | ScriptBlockText="*get-smbshare*" | ScriptBlockText:*get\-smbshare* | null | windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_smb_share_reco.yml | |
f17211f1-1f24-4d0c-829f-31e28dc93cdd | Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter | Detects instances of svchost.exe running with an unusual or uncommon command line parameter by excluding known legitimate or common patterns.
This could point at a file masquerading as svchost, a process injection, or hollowing of a legitimate svchost instance. | windows | process_creation | title: Uncommon Svchost Command Line Parameter
id: f17211f1-1f24-4d0c-829f-31e28dc93cdd
status: experimental
description: 'Detects instances of svchost.exe running with an unusual or uncommon command line parameter by excluding known
legitimate or common patterns.
This could point at a file masquerading as svchost... | [
"T1036.005",
"T1055",
"T1055.012"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | high | experimental | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://cardinalops.com/blog/the-art-of-anomaly-hunting-patterns-detection/",
"https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/blackbyte-exbyte-ransomware",
"https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits/",
"https://media.kasperskycont... | Image="*\\svchost.exe"
| rex field=CommandLine "(?<CommandLineMatch>-k\\s\\w{1,64}(?:\\s?(?:-p|-s))?)"
| eval CommandLineCondition=if(isnotnull(CommandLineMatch), "true", "false")
| search NOT (CommandLineCondition="true" OR CommandLine="" OR NOT CommandLine=*) NOT ((ParentImage="*\\MsMpEng.exe" CommandLine="*svchost.e... | Image:*\\svchost.exe AND (NOT (CommandLine:/-k\s\w{1,64}(?:\s?(?:-p|-s))?/ OR CommandLine:"" OR (NOT _exists_:CommandLine))) AND (NOT ((ParentImage:*\\MsMpEng.exe AND CommandLine:*svchost.exe*) OR (ParentImage:*\\MRT.exe AND CommandLine:svchost.exe))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\svchost.exe" and (not((ProcessCommandLine matches regex "-k\\s\\w{1,64}(?:\\s?(?:-p|-s))?" or ProcessCommandLine =~ "" or isnull(ProcessCommandLine)))) and (not(((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\MsMpEng.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "svchost.exe") or (In... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_uncommon_command_line_flags.yml | |
8622c92d-c00e-463c-b09d-fd06166f6794 | Github High Risk Configuration Disabled | Detects when a user disables a critical security feature for an organization. | github | audit | title: Github High Risk Configuration Disabled
id: 8622c92d-c00e-463c-b09d-fd06166f6794
status: test
description: Detects when a user disables a critical security feature for an organization.
references:
- https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/managing-oauth-access-to-your-organizations-data/disabling-oauth-app-acce... | [
"T1556"
] | [
"credential-access",
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [
"Approved administrator/owner activities."
] | [
"https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/managing-oauth-access-to-your-organizations-data/disabling-oauth-app-access-restrictions-for-your-organization",
"https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/reviewing-the-audit-log-for-your-or... | action IN ("business_advanced_security.disabled_for_new_repos", "business_advanced_security.disabled_for_new_user_namespace_repos", "business_advanced_security.disabled", "business_advanced_security.user_namespace_repos_disabled", "org.advanced_security_disabled_for_new_repos", "org.advanced_security_disabled_on_all_re... | action:(business_advanced_security.disabled_for_new_repos OR business_advanced_security.disabled_for_new_user_namespace_repos OR business_advanced_security.disabled OR business_advanced_security.user_namespace_repos_disabled OR org.advanced_security_disabled_for_new_repos OR org.advanced_security_disabled_on_all_repos ... | null | application/github/audit/github_disable_high_risk_configuration.yml | |
b5de0c9a-6f19-43e0-af4e-55ad01f550af | Unsigned DLL Loaded by Windows Utility | Detects windows utilities loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL.
Adversaries often abuse those programs to proxy execution of malicious code. | windows | image_load | title: Unsigned DLL Loaded by Windows Utility
id: b5de0c9a-6f19-43e0-af4e-55ad01f550af
status: test
description: 'Detects windows utilities loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL.
Adversaries often abuse those programs to proxy execution of malicious code.
'
references:
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/Huntin... | [
"T1218.011",
"T1218.010"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/Hunting-for-Suspicious-Windows-Libraries-for-Execution-and-Evasion",
"https://akhere.hashnode.dev/hunting-unsigned-dlls-using-kql",
"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unsigned-dlls/?web_view=true"
] | Image IN ("*\\InstallUtil.exe", "*\\RegAsm.exe", "*\\RegSvcs.exe", "*\\regsvr32.exe", "*\\rundll32.exe") NOT (Signed="true" OR SignatureStatus IN ("errorChaining", "errorCode_endpoint", "errorExpired", "trusted", "Valid") OR NOT Signed=* OR Signed IN ("", "-") OR NOT SignatureStatus=* OR SignatureStatus IN ("", "-") OR... | (Image:(*\\InstallUtil.exe OR *\\RegAsm.exe OR *\\RegSvcs.exe OR *\\regsvr32.exe OR *\\rundll32.exe)) AND (NOT (Signed:true OR (SignatureStatus:(errorChaining OR errorCode_endpoint OR errorExpired OR trusted OR Valid)) OR (NOT _exists_:Signed) OR (Signed:("" OR \-)) OR (NOT _exists_:SignatureStatus) OR (SignatureStatus... | null | windows/image_load/image_load_susp_unsigned_dll.yml | |
24c77512-782b-448a-8950-eddb0785fc71 | SQLite Chromium Profile Data DB Access | Detect usage of the "sqlite" binary to query databases in Chromium-based browsers for potential data stealing. | windows | process_creation | title: SQLite Chromium Profile Data DB Access
id: 24c77512-782b-448a-8950-eddb0785fc71
status: test
description: Detect usage of the "sqlite" binary to query databases in Chromium-based browsers for potential data stealing.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/84d9edaaaa2c5511144521b0e4af72... | [
"T1539",
"T1555.003",
"T1005"
] | [
"credential-access",
"collection"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/84d9edaaaa2c5511144521b0e4af726d1c7276ce/atomics/T1539/T1539.md#atomic-test-2---steal-chrome-cookies-windows",
"https://blog.cyble.com/2022/04/21/prynt-stealer-a-new-info-stealer-performing-clipper-and-keylogger-activities/"
] | Product="SQLite" OR Image IN ("*\\sqlite.exe", "*\\sqlite3.exe") CommandLine IN ("*\\User Data\\*", "*\\Opera Software\\*", "*\\ChromiumViewer\\*") CommandLine IN ("*Login Data*", "*Cookies*", "*Web Data*", "*History*", "*Bookmarks*") | (Product:SQLite OR (Image:(*\\sqlite.exe OR *\\sqlite3.exe))) AND (CommandLine:(*\\User\ Data\\* OR *\\Opera\ Software\\* OR *\\ChromiumViewer\\*)) AND (CommandLine:(*Login\ Data* OR *Cookies* OR *Web\ Data* OR *History* OR *Bookmarks*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessVersionInfoProductName =~ "SQLite" or (FolderPath endswith "\\sqlite.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\sqlite3.exe")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains "\\User Data\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains "\\Opera Software\\" or ProcessCommandLine contains "\\ChromiumViewer\\") and (ProcessCom... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sqlite_chromium_profile_data.yml | |
c3edc6a5-d9d4-48d8-930e-aab518390917 | Potential Persistence Via Outlook Form | Detects the creation of a new Outlook form which can contain malicious code | windows | file_event | title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Form
id: c3edc6a5-d9d4-48d8-930e-aab518390917
status: test
description: Detects the creation of a new Outlook form which can contain malicious code
references:
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=76
- https... | [
"T1137.003"
] | [
"persistence"
] | high | test | [
"Legitimate use of outlook forms"
] | [
"https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=76",
"https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=79",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/vba/outlook/concepts/outlook-forms/create-an... | Image="*\\outlook.exe" TargetFilename IN ("*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\FORMS\\IPM*", "*\\Local Settings\\Application Data\\Microsoft\\Forms*") | Image:*\\outlook.exe AND (TargetFilename:(*\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\FORMS\\IPM* OR *\\Local\ Settings\\Application\ Data\\Microsoft\\Forms*)) | DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\outlook.exe" and (FolderPath contains "\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\FORMS\\IPM" or FolderPath contains "\\Local Settings\\Application Data\\Microsoft\\Forms") | windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_office_outlook_newform.yml | |
aae1243f-d8af-40d8-ab20-33fc6d0c55bc | Suspicious Use of PsLogList | Detects usage of the PsLogList utility to dump event log in order to extract admin accounts and perform account discovery or delete events logs | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Use of PsLogList
id: aae1243f-d8af-40d8-ab20-33fc6d0c55bc
status: test
description: Detects usage of the PsLogList utility to dump event log in order to extract admin accounts and perform account
discovery or delete events logs
references:
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-ser... | [
"T1087",
"T1087.001",
"T1087.002"
] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Another tool that uses the command line switches of PsLogList",
"Legitimate use of PsLogList by an administrator"
] | [
"https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/01/12/abusing-cloud-services-to-fly-under-the-radar/",
"https://www.cybereason.com/blog/deadringer-exposing-chinese-threat-actors-targeting-major-telcos",
"https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Sysinternals/PsLogList",
"https://twitter.com/EricaZelic/st... | OriginalFileName="psloglist.exe" OR Image IN ("*\\psloglist.exe", "*\\psloglist64.exe", "*\\psloglist64a.exe") CommandLine IN ("* security*", "* application*", "* system*") CommandLine="* -d*" OR CommandLine="* /d*" OR CommandLine="* –d*" OR CommandLine="* —d*" OR CommandLine="* ―d*" OR CommandLine="* -x*" OR CommandLi... | (OriginalFileName:psloglist.exe OR (Image:(*\\psloglist.exe OR *\\psloglist64.exe OR *\\psloglist64a.exe))) AND (CommandLine:(*\ security* OR *\ application* OR *\ system*)) AND (CommandLine:(*\ \-d* OR *\ \/d* OR *\ –d* OR *\ —d* OR *\ ―d*) OR CommandLine:(*\ \-x* OR *\ \/x* OR *\ –x* OR *\ —x* OR *\ ―x*) OR CommandLi... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "psloglist.exe" or (FolderPath endswith "\\psloglist.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\psloglist64.exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\psloglist64a.exe")) and (ProcessCommandLine contains " security" or ProcessCommandLine contains " application" or ProcessComma... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_sysinternals_psloglist.yml | |
3735d5ac-d770-4da0-99ff-156b180bc600 | Potential CCleanerReactivator.DLL Sideloading | Detects potential DLL sideloading of "CCleanerReactivator.dll" | windows | image_load | title: Potential CCleanerReactivator.DLL Sideloading
id: 3735d5ac-d770-4da0-99ff-156b180bc600
status: test
description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "CCleanerReactivator.dll"
references:
- https://lab52.io/blog/2344-2/
author: X__Junior
date: 2023-07-13
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
-... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"False positives could occur from other custom installation paths. Apply additional filters accordingly."
] | [
"https://lab52.io/blog/2344-2/"
] | ImageLoaded="*\\CCleanerReactivator.dll" NOT (Image IN ("C:\\Program Files\\CCleaner\\*", "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\CCleaner\\*") Image="*\\CCleanerReactivator.exe") | ImageLoaded:*\\CCleanerReactivator.dll AND (NOT ((Image:(C\:\\Program\ Files\\CCleaner\\* OR C\:\\Program\ Files\ \(x86\)\\CCleaner\\*)) AND Image:*\\CCleanerReactivator.exe)) | DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\CCleanerReactivator.dll" and (not(((InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\CCleaner\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\CCleaner\\") and InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\CCleanerReactivator.exe"))) | windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_ccleaner_reactivator.yml | |
d7329412-13bd-44ba-a072-3387f804a106 | Guest Account Enabled Via Sysadminctl | Detects attempts to enable the guest account using the sysadminctl utility | macos | process_creation | title: Guest Account Enabled Via Sysadminctl
id: d7329412-13bd-44ba-a072-3387f804a106
status: test
description: Detects attempts to enable the guest account using the sysadminctl utility
references:
- https://ss64.com/osx/sysadminctl.html
author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r)
date: 2023-02-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation... | [
"T1078",
"T1078.001"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"initial-access",
"stealth"
] | low | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://ss64.com/osx/sysadminctl.html"
] | Image="*/sysadminctl" CommandLine="* -guestAccount*" CommandLine="* on*" | Image:*\/sysadminctl AND (CommandLine:*\ \-guestAccount* AND CommandLine:*\ on*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "/sysadminctl" and (ProcessCommandLine contains " -guestAccount" and ProcessCommandLine contains " on") | macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_sysadminctl_enable_guest_account.yml | |
84b1ecf9-6eff-4004-bafb-bae5c0e251b2 | Potentially Suspicious GoogleUpdate Child Process | Detects potentially suspicious child processes of "GoogleUpdate.exe" | windows | process_creation | title: Potentially Suspicious GoogleUpdate Child Process
id: 84b1ecf9-6eff-4004-bafb-bae5c0e251b2
related:
- id: bdbab15a-3826-48fa-a1b7-723cd8f32fcc
type: derived
status: test
description: Detects potentially suspicious child processes of "GoogleUpdate.exe"
references:
- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documen... | [] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/malware-analysis-reports/goofy-guineapig/NCSC-MAR-Goofy-Guineapig.pdf"
] | ParentImage="*\\GoogleUpdate.exe" NOT (Image="*\\Google*" OR Image IN ("*\\setup.exe", "*chrome_updater.exe", "*chrome_installer.exe") OR NOT Image=*) | ParentImage:*\\GoogleUpdate.exe AND (NOT ((Image:*\\Google* OR (Image:(*\\setup.exe OR *chrome_updater.exe OR *chrome_installer.exe))) OR (NOT _exists_:Image))) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\GoogleUpdate.exe" and (not(((FolderPath contains "\\Google" or (FolderPath endswith "\\setup.exe" or FolderPath endswith "chrome_updater.exe" or FolderPath endswith "chrome_installer.exe")) or isnull(FolderPath)))) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_googleupdate_susp_child_process.yml | |
ebea773c-a8f1-42ad-a856-00cb221966e8 | DLL Sideloading by VMware Xfer Utility | Detects execution of VMware Xfer utility (VMwareXferlogs.exe) from the non-default directory which may be an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLL | windows | process_creation | title: DLL Sideloading by VMware Xfer Utility
id: ebea773c-a8f1-42ad-a856-00cb221966e8
status: test
description: Detects execution of VMware Xfer utility (VMwareXferlogs.exe) from the non-default directory which may be an
attempt to sideload arbitrary DLL
references:
- https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/lockbit-ransomw... | [
"T1574.001"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"persistence",
"execution",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/lockbit-ransomware-side-loads-cobalt-strike-beacon-with-legitimate-vmware-utility/"
] | Image="*\\VMwareXferlogs.exe" NOT Image="C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\*" | Image:*\\VMwareXferlogs.exe AND (NOT Image:C\:\\Program\ Files\\VMware\\*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\VMwareXferlogs.exe" and (not(FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\")) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dll_sideload_vmware_xfer.yml | |
be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd | Suspicious Process Masquerading As SvcHost.EXE | Detects a suspicious process that is masquerading as the legitimate "svchost.exe" by naming its binary "svchost.exe" and executing from an uncommon location.
Adversaries often disguise their malicious binaries by naming them after legitimate system processes like "svchost.exe" to evade detection. | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious Process Masquerading As SvcHost.EXE
id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd
related:
- id: 01d2e2a1-5f09-44f7-9fc1-24faa7479b6d
type: similar
- id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915
type: similar
status: test
description: 'Detects a suspicious process that is masquerading as the legitimate "sv... | [
"T1036.005"
] | [
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://tria.ge/240731-jh4crsycnb/behavioral2",
"https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/process-masquerading/"
] | Image="*\\svchost.exe" NOT (Image IN ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe") OR OriginalFileName="svchost.exe") | Image:*\\svchost.exe AND (NOT ((Image:(C\:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe OR C\:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe)) OR OriginalFileName:svchost.exe)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\svchost.exe" and (not(((FolderPath in~ ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe", "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\svchost.exe")) or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "svchost.exe"))) | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_svchost_masqueraded_execution.yml | |
8cd538a4-62d5-4e83-810b-12d41e428d6e | Processes Accessing the Microphone and Webcam | Potential adversaries accessing the microphone and webcam in an endpoint. | windows | security | title: Processes Accessing the Microphone and Webcam
id: 8cd538a4-62d5-4e83-810b-12d41e428d6e
status: test
description: Potential adversaries accessing the microphone and webcam in an endpoint.
references:
- https://twitter.com/duzvik/status/1269671601852813320
- https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-acc... | [
"T1123"
] | [
"collection"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/duzvik/status/1269671601852813320",
"https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072"
] | EventID IN (4657, 4656, 4663) ObjectName IN ("*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\CapabilityAccessManager\\ConsentStore\\microphone\\NonPackaged*", "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\CapabilityAccessManager\\ConsentStore\\webcam\\NonPackaged*") | (EventID:(4657 OR 4656 OR 4663)) AND (ObjectName:(*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\CapabilityAccessManager\\ConsentStore\\microphone\\NonPackaged* OR *\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\CapabilityAccessManager\\ConsentStore\\webcam\\NonPackaged*)) | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where RegistryKey contains "\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\CapabilityAccessManager\\ConsentStore\\microphone\\NonPackaged" or RegistryKey contains "\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\CapabilityAccessManager\\ConsentStore\\webcam\\NonPackaged" | windows/builtin/security/win_security_camera_microphone_access.yml | |
3d48c9d3-1aa6-418d-98d3-8fd3c01a564e | Potential Mftrace.EXE Abuse | Detects child processes of the "Trace log generation tool for Media Foundation Tools" (Mftrace.exe) which can abused to execute arbitrary binaries. | windows | process_creation | title: Potential Mftrace.EXE Abuse
id: 3d48c9d3-1aa6-418d-98d3-8fd3c01a564e
status: test
description: Detects child processes of the "Trace log generation tool for Media Foundation Tools" (Mftrace.exe) which can
abused to execute arbitrary binaries.
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinarie... | [
"T1127"
] | [
"execution",
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate use for tracing purposes"
] | [
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Mftrace/"
] | ParentImage="*\\mftrace.exe" | ParentImage:*\\mftrace.exe | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\mftrace.exe" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_mftrace_child_process.yml | |
7f4c43f9-b1a5-4c7d-b24a-b41bf3a3ebf2 | Registry Tampering by Potentially Suspicious Processes | Detects suspicious registry modifications made by suspicious processes such as script engine processes such as WScript, or CScript etc.
These processes are rarely used for legitimate registry modifications, and their activity may indicate an attempt to modify the registry
without using standard tools like regedit.exe o... | windows | registry_event | title: Registry Tampering by Potentially Suspicious Processes
id: 7f4c43f9-b1a5-4c7d-b24a-b41bf3a3ebf2
related:
- id: 2a0a169d-cc66-43ce-9ae2-6e678e54e46a
type: similar
- id: 921aa10f-2e74-4cca-9498-98f9ca4d6fdf
type: similar
status: experimental
description: 'Detects suspicious registry modifications made by suspi... | [
"T1112",
"T1059.005"
] | [
"persistence",
"execution",
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Some legitimate admin or install scripts may use these processes for registry modifications."
] | [
"https://www.nextron-systems.com/2025/07/29/detecting-the-most-popular-mitre-persistence-method-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/",
"https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_livingofftheland-redteam-persistence-activity-7344801774182051843-TE00/"
] | Image IN ("*\\mshta.exe", "*\\wscript.exe", "*\\cscript.exe") NOT (Details="Binary Data" OR NOT Details=* OR (Image="*\\wscript.exe" TargetObject IN ("*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Notifications\\Data\\*", "*\\Services\\bam\\State\\UserSettings\\S-1-*", "*Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Script\\Setting... | (Image:(*\\mshta.exe OR *\\wscript.exe OR *\\cscript.exe)) AND (NOT (Details:"Binary Data" OR (NOT _exists_:Details) OR (Image:*\\wscript.exe AND (TargetObject:(*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\ NT\\CurrentVersion\\Notifications\\Data\\* OR *\\Services\\bam\\State\\UserSettings\\S\-1\-* OR *Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\ S... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\wscript.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe") and (not((RegistryValueData =~ "Binary Data" or isnull(RegistryValueData) or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\wscript.... | windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_susp_process_registry_modification.yml | |
85de1f22-d189-44e4-8239-dc276b45379b | Curl Web Request With Potential Custom User-Agent | Detects execution of "curl.exe" with a potential custom "User-Agent". Attackers can leverage this to download or exfiltrate data via "curl" to a domain that only accept specific "User-Agent" strings | windows | process_creation | title: Curl Web Request With Potential Custom User-Agent
id: 85de1f22-d189-44e4-8239-dc276b45379b
status: test
description: Detects execution of "curl.exe" with a potential custom "User-Agent". Attackers can leverage this to download
or exfiltrate data via "curl" to a domain that only accept specific "User-Agent" str... | [] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers",
"https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/344203de742bb7e68bd56618f66d34be95a9f9fc/FIN7VEEAM/iocs.csv"
] | Image="*\\curl.exe"
| rex field=CommandLine "(?<CommandLineMatch>\\s-H\\s)"
| eval CommandLineCondition=if(isnotnull(CommandLineMatch), "true", "false")
| search OR OriginalFileName="curl.exe" CommandLineCondition="true" OR CommandLine="*--header*" CommandLine="*User-Agent:*" | (Image:*\\curl.exe OR OriginalFileName:curl.exe) AND (CommandLine:/\s-H\s/ OR CommandLine:*\-\-header*) AND CommandLine:*User\-Agent\:* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\curl.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "curl.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine matches regex "\\s-H\\s" or ProcessCommandLine contains "--header") and ProcessCommandLine contains "User-Agent:" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_custom_user_agent.yml | |
79609c82-a488-426e-abcf-9f341a39365d | All Rules Have Been Deleted From The Windows Firewall Configuration | Detects when a all the rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration | windows | firewall-as | title: All Rules Have Been Deleted From The Windows Firewall Configuration
id: 79609c82-a488-426e-abcf-9f341a39365d
status: test
description: Detects when a all the rules have been deleted from the Windows Defender Firewall configuration
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/w... | [
"T1686.003"
] | [
"defense-impairment"
] | high | test | [] | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10)"
] | EventID IN (2033, 2059) NOT ModifyingApplication="*:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" NOT (ModifyingApplication="*:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\*" ModifyingApplication="*\\MsMpEng.exe*") | (EventID:(2033 OR 2059)) AND (NOT ModifyingApplication:*\:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe) AND (NOT (ModifyingApplication:*\:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\ Defender\\Platform\\* AND ModifyingApplication:*\\MsMpEng.exe*)) | null | windows/builtin/firewall_as/win_firewall_as_delete_all_rules.yml | |
16ab6143-510a-44e2-a615-bdb80b8317fc | Bitbucket Global SSH Settings Changed | Detects Bitbucket global SSH access configuration changes. | bitbucket | audit | title: Bitbucket Global SSH Settings Changed
id: 16ab6143-510a-44e2-a615-bdb80b8317fc
status: test
description: Detects Bitbucket global SSH access configuration changes.
references:
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/ena... | [
"T1685",
"T1021.004"
] | [
"lateral-movement",
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate user activity."
] | [
"https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html",
"https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/enable-ssh-access-to-git-repositories-776640358.html"
] | auditType.category="Global administration" auditType.action="SSH settings changed" | auditType.category:"Global administration" AND auditType.action:"SSH settings changed" | null | application/bitbucket/audit/bitbucket_audit_global_ssh_settings_change_detected.yml | |
0ed75b9c-c73b-424d-9e7d-496cd565fbe0 | Security Software Discovery - MacOs | Detects usage of system utilities (only grep for now) to discover security software discovery | macos | process_creation | title: Security Software Discovery - MacOs
id: 0ed75b9c-c73b-424d-9e7d-496cd565fbe0
status: test
description: Detects usage of system utilities (only grep for now) to discover security software discovery
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T... | [
"T1518.001"
] | [
"discovery"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate activities"
] | [
"https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1518.001/T1518.001.md"
] | Image="/usr/bin/grep" CommandLine IN ("*nessusd*", "*santad*", "*CbDefense*", "*falcond*", "*td-agent*", "*packetbeat*", "*filebeat*", "*auditbeat*", "*osqueryd*", "*BlockBlock*", "*LuLu*") OR (CommandLine="*Little*" CommandLine="*Snitch*") | Image:\/usr\/bin\/grep AND ((CommandLine:(*nessusd* OR *santad* OR *CbDefense* OR *falcond* OR *td\-agent* OR *packetbeat* OR *filebeat* OR *auditbeat* OR *osqueryd* OR *BlockBlock* OR *LuLu*)) OR (CommandLine:*Little* AND CommandLine:*Snitch*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath =~ "/usr/bin/grep" and ((ProcessCommandLine contains "nessusd" or ProcessCommandLine contains "santad" or ProcessCommandLine contains "CbDefense" or ProcessCommandLine contains "falcond" or ProcessCommandLine contains "td-agent" or ProcessCommandLine contains "packetbeat" or Proce... | macos/process_creation/proc_creation_macos_security_software_discovery.yml | |
4bf943c6-5146-4273-98dd-e958fd1e3abf | Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation | Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block | windows | process_creation | title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation
id: 4bf943c6-5146-4273-98dd-e958fd1e3abf
status: test
description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework
from the following code block
references:
- https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfu... | [
"T1027",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"stealth",
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888"
] |
| rex field=CommandLine "(?<CommandLineMatch>\\$PSHome\\[\\s*\\d{1,3}\\s*\\]\\s*\\+\\s*\\$PSHome\\[)"
| eval CommandLineCondition=if(isnotnull(CommandLineMatch), "true", "false")
| rex field=CommandLine "(?<CommandLineMatch2>\\$ShellId\\[\\s*\\d{1,3}\\s*\\]\\s*\\+\\s*\\$ShellId\\[)"
| eval CommandLineCondition2=if(isn... | CommandLine:/\$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\[/ OR CommandLine:/\$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\[/ OR CommandLine:/\$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\[/ OR CommandLine:/\$env:ComSpec\[(?:\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2}/ OR CommandLine:/\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name/ OR CommandLine:/\$VerbosePreference\.T... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex "\\$PSHome\\[\\s*\\d{1,3}\\s*\\]\\s*\\+\\s*\\$PSHome\\[" or ProcessCommandLine matches regex "\\$ShellId\\[\\s*\\d{1,3}\\s*\\]\\s*\\+\\s*\\$ShellId\\[" or ProcessCommandLine matches regex "\\$env:Public\\[\\s*\\d{1,3}\\s*\\]\\s*\\+\\s*\\$env:Public\\[" or Pro... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_invoke_obfuscation_obfuscated_iex_commandline.yml | |
4f154fb6-27d1-4813-a759-78b93e0b9c48 | Operator Bloopers Cobalt Strike Modules | Detects Cobalt Strike module/commands accidentally entered in CMD shell | windows | process_creation | title: Operator Bloopers Cobalt Strike Modules
id: 4f154fb6-27d1-4813-a759-78b93e0b9c48
related:
- id: 647c7b9e-d784-4fda-b9a0-45c565a7b729
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects Cobalt Strike module/commands accidentally entered in CMD shell
references:
- https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstr... | [
"T1059.003"
] | [
"execution"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://hstechdocs.helpsystems.com/manuals/cobaltstrike/current/userguide/content/cobalt-4-5-user-guide.pdf",
"https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/04/bazarloader-and-the-conti-leaks/",
"https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/16/sans-ransomware-summit-2022-can-you-detect-this/"
] | OriginalFileName="Cmd.Exe" OR Image="*\\cmd.exe" CommandLine IN ("*Invoke-UserHunter*", "*Invoke-ShareFinder*", "*Invoke-Kerberoast*", "*Invoke-SMBAutoBrute*", "*Invoke-Nightmare*", "*zerologon*", "*av_query*") | (OriginalFileName:Cmd.Exe OR Image:*\\cmd.exe) AND (CommandLine:(*Invoke\-UserHunter* OR *Invoke\-ShareFinder* OR *Invoke\-Kerberoast* OR *Invoke\-SMBAutoBrute* OR *Invoke\-Nightmare* OR *zerologon* OR *av_query*)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "Cmd.Exe" or FolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "Invoke-UserHunter" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Invoke-ShareFinder" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Invoke-Kerberoast" or ProcessCommandLine contains "Invoke-SMBAutoBrute... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_cobaltstrike_bloopers_modules.yml | |
9e716b33-63b2-46da-86a4-bd3c3b9b5dfb | Certificate Exported Via PowerShell | Detects calls to cmdlets that are used to export certificates from the local certificate store. Threat actors were seen abusing this to steal private keys from compromised machines. | windows | process_creation | title: Certificate Exported Via PowerShell
id: 9e716b33-63b2-46da-86a4-bd3c3b9b5dfb
related:
- id: aa7a3fce-bef5-4311-9cc1-5f04bb8c308c
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects calls to cmdlets that are used to export certificates from the local certificate store. Threat actors
were seen abusing this to stea... | [
"T1552.004",
"T1059.001"
] | [
"credential-access",
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate certificate exports by administrators. Additional filters might be required."
] | [
"https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-112a",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/pki/export-pfxcertificate?view=windowsserver2022-ps",
"https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/breaking-the-chain-defending-against-certificate-services-abuse.html"
] | CommandLine IN ("*Export-PfxCertificate *", "*Export-Certificate *") | CommandLine:(*Export\-PfxCertificate\ * OR *Export\-Certificate\ *) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "Export-PfxCertificate " or ProcessCommandLine contains "Export-Certificate " | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_export_certificate.yml | |
ab37a6ec-6068-432b-a64e-2c7bf95b1d22 | Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32 | Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance. | windows | process_creation | title: Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32
id: ab37a6ec-6068-432b-a64e-2c7bf95b1d22
related:
- id: 8e2b24c9-4add-46a0-b4bb-0057b4e6187d
type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning
a "regsvr32" ... | [
"T1218.010"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate \".bat\", \".hta\", \".ps1\" or \".vbs\" scripts leverage legitimately often. Apply additional filter and exclusions as necessary",
"Some legitimate Windows services"
] | [
"https://web.archive.org/web/20171001085340/https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html",
"https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/"
] | ParentImage IN ("*\\cmd.exe", "*\\cscript.exe", "*\\mshta.exe", "*\\powershell_ise.exe", "*\\powershell.exe", "*\\pwsh.exe", "*\\wscript.exe") Image="*\\regsvr32.exe" NOT (ParentImage="C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe" CommandLine="* /s C:\\Windows\\System32\\RpcProxy\\RpcProxy.dll") | ((ParentImage:(*\\cmd.exe OR *\\cscript.exe OR *\\mshta.exe OR *\\powershell_ise.exe OR *\\powershell.exe OR *\\pwsh.exe OR *\\wscript.exe)) AND Image:*\\regsvr32.exe) AND (NOT (ParentImage:C\:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe AND CommandLine:*\ \/s\ C\:\\Windows\\System32\\RpcProxy\\RpcProxy.dll)) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where ((InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cmd.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\cscript.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\powershell_ise.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or Initia... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_regsvr32_susp_parent.yml | |
9cfc00b6-bfb7-49ce-9781-ef78503154bb | Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process | Detects the execution of "Wlrmdr.exe" with the "-u" command line flag which allows anything passed to it to be an argument of the ShellExecute API, which would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary binaries.
This detection also focuses on any uncommon child processes spawned from "Wlrmdr.exe" as a supplement for those... | windows | process_creation | title: Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process
id: 9cfc00b6-bfb7-49ce-9781-ef78503154bb
status: experimental
description: 'Detects the execution of "Wlrmdr.exe" with the "-u" command line flag which allows anything passed to it to
be an argument of the ShellExecute API, which would allow an attacker to execute ... | [
"T1218"
] | [
"stealth"
] | medium | experimental | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1493963591745220608?s=20&t=xUg9DsZhJy1q9bPTUWgeIQ",
"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wlrmdr/"
] | ParentImage="*\\wlrmdr.exe" OR (Image="*\\wlrmdr.exe" OR OriginalFileName="WLRMNDR.EXE" CommandLine="*-s *" OR CommandLine="*/s *" OR CommandLine="*–s *" OR CommandLine="*—s *" OR CommandLine="*―s *" CommandLine="*-f *" OR CommandLine="*/f *" OR CommandLine="*–f *" OR CommandLine="*—f *" OR CommandLine="*―f *" CommandL... | ParentImage:*\\wlrmdr.exe OR (((Image:*\\wlrmdr.exe OR OriginalFileName:WLRMNDR.EXE) AND CommandLine:(*\-s\ * OR *\/s\ * OR *–s\ * OR *—s\ * OR *―s\ *) AND CommandLine:(*\-f\ * OR *\/f\ * OR *–f\ * OR *—f\ * OR *―f\ *) AND CommandLine:(*\-t\ * OR *\/t\ * OR *–t\ * OR *—t\ * OR *―t\ *) AND CommandLine:(*\-m\ * OR *\/m\ ... | DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\wlrmdr.exe" or (((FolderPath endswith "\\wlrmdr.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "WLRMNDR.EXE") and (ProcessCommandLine contains "-s " or ProcessCommandLine contains "/s " or ProcessCommandLine contains "–s " or ProcessCommandLine contains... | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wlrmdr_uncommon_child_process.yml | |
b7b19cb6-9b32-4fc4-a108-73f19acfe262 | Suspicious VBoxDrvInst.exe Parameters | Detect VBoxDrvInst.exe run with parameters allowing processing INF file.
This allows to create values in the registry and install drivers.
For example one could use this technique to obtain persistence via modifying one of Run or RunOnce registry keys | windows | process_creation | title: Suspicious VBoxDrvInst.exe Parameters
id: b7b19cb6-9b32-4fc4-a108-73f19acfe262
status: test
description: 'Detect VBoxDrvInst.exe run with parameters allowing processing INF file.
This allows to create values in the registry and install drivers.
For example one could use this technique to obtain persistence... | [
"T1112"
] | [
"persistence",
"defense-impairment"
] | medium | test | [
"Legitimate use of VBoxDrvInst.exe utility by VirtualBox Guest Additions installation process"
] | [
"https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/4db780e0f0b2e2bb8cb1fa13e09196da9b9f1834/yml/LOLUtilz/OtherBinaries/VBoxDrvInst.yml",
"https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/993497996179492864"
] | Image="*\\VBoxDrvInst.exe" CommandLine="*driver*" CommandLine="*executeinf*" | Image:*\\VBoxDrvInst.exe AND (CommandLine:*driver* AND CommandLine:*executeinf*) | DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\VBoxDrvInst.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "driver" and ProcessCommandLine contains "executeinf") | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_virtualbox_vboxdrvinst_execution.yml | |
bcfcc962-0e4a-4fd9-84bb-a833e672df3f | Azure Virtual Network Modified or Deleted | Identifies when a Virtual Network is modified or deleted in Azure. | azure | activitylogs | title: Azure Virtual Network Modified or Deleted
id: bcfcc962-0e4a-4fd9-84bb-a833e672df3f
status: test
description: Identifies when a Virtual Network is modified or deleted in Azure.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations
author: Austin Songer @austi... | [] | [
"impact"
] | medium | test | [
"Virtual Network being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.",
"Virtual Network modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false... | [
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations"
] | operationName IN ("MICROSOFT.NETWORK/VIRTUALNETWORKGATEWAYS/*", "MICROSOFT.NETWORK/VIRTUALNETWORKS/*") operationName IN ("*/WRITE", "*/DELETE") | (operationName:(MICROSOFT.NETWORK\/VIRTUALNETWORKGATEWAYS\/* OR MICROSOFT.NETWORK\/VIRTUALNETWORKS\/*)) AND (operationName:(*\/WRITE OR *\/DELETE)) | null | cloud/azure/activity_logs/azure_virtual_network_modified_or_deleted.yml | |
34d81081-03c9-4a7f-91c9-5e46af625cde | Bitbucket Unauthorized Full Data Export Triggered | Detects when full data export is attempted an unauthorized user. | bitbucket | audit | title: Bitbucket Unauthorized Full Data Export Triggered
id: 34d81081-03c9-4a7f-91c9-5e46af625cde
status: test
description: Detects when full data export is attempted an unauthorized user.
references:
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html
- https://confluence.atlassian.com/b... | [
"T1213.003",
"T1586"
] | [
"collection",
"resource-development"
] | critical | test | [
"Unlikely"
] | [
"https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html",
"https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/secret-scanning-1157471613.html"
] | auditType.category="Data pipeline" auditType.action="Unauthorized full data export triggered" | auditType.category:"Data pipeline" AND auditType.action:"Unauthorized full data export triggered" | null | application/bitbucket/audit/bitbucket_audit_unauthorized_full_data_export_triggered.yml | |
c8e35e96-19ce-4f16-aeb6-fd5588dc5365 | Suspicious Named Error | Detects suspicious DNS error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting attempts | linux | syslog | title: Suspicious Named Error
id: c8e35e96-19ce-4f16-aeb6-fd5588dc5365
status: test
description: Detects suspicious DNS error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting
attempts
references:
- https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/e... | [
"T1190"
] | [
"initial-access"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/1ecffb1b884607cb12e619f9ab3c04f530801083/etc/rules/named_rules.xml"
] | " dropping source port zero packet from " OR " denied AXFR from " OR " exiting (due to fatal error)" | *\ dropping\ source\ port\ zero\ packet\ from\ * OR *\ denied\ AXFR\ from\ * OR *\ exiting\ \(due\ to\ fatal\ error\)* | null | linux/builtin/syslog/lnx_syslog_susp_named.yml | |
aa6f6ea6-0676-40dd-b510-6e46f02d8867 | Local File Read Using Curl.EXE | Detects execution of "curl.exe" with the "file://" protocol handler in order to read local files. | windows | process_creation | title: Local File Read Using Curl.EXE
id: aa6f6ea6-0676-40dd-b510-6e46f02d8867
status: test
description: Detects execution of "curl.exe" with the "file://" protocol handler in order to read local files.
references:
- https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-07-27
ta... | [] | [
"execution"
] | medium | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html"
] | Image="*\\curl.exe" OR OriginalFileName="curl.exe" CommandLine="*file:///*" | (Image:*\\curl.exe OR OriginalFileName:curl.exe) AND CommandLine:*file\:\/\/\/* | DeviceProcessEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\curl.exe" or ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "curl.exe") and ProcessCommandLine contains "file:///" | windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_local_file_read.yml | |
6309645e-122d-4c5b-bb2b-22e4f9c2fa42 | HackTool - Potential CobaltStrike Process Injection | Detects a potential remote threat creation with certain characteristics which are typical for Cobalt Strike beacons | windows | create_remote_thread | title: HackTool - Potential CobaltStrike Process Injection
id: 6309645e-122d-4c5b-bb2b-22e4f9c2fa42
status: test
description: Detects a potential remote threat creation with certain characteristics which are typical for Cobalt Strike beacons
references:
- https://medium.com/@olafhartong/cobalt-strike-remote-threads-det... | [
"T1055.001"
] | [
"privilege-escalation",
"stealth"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://medium.com/@olafhartong/cobalt-strike-remote-threads-detection-206372d11d0f",
"https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2018/04/09/cobalt-strike-3-11-the-snake-that-eats-its-tail/"
] | StartAddress IN ("*0B80", "*0C7C", "*0C88") | StartAddress:(*0B80 OR *0C7C OR *0C88) | null | windows/create_remote_thread/create_remote_thread_win_hktl_cobaltstrike.yml | |
152f3630-77c1-4284-bcc0-4cc68ab2f6e7 | Shell Open Registry Keys Manipulation | Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC Bypass using fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, slui.exe via registry keys (e.g. UACMe 33 or 62) | windows | registry_event | title: Shell Open Registry Keys Manipulation
id: 152f3630-77c1-4284-bcc0-4cc68ab2f6e7
related:
- id: dd3ee8cc-f751-41c9-ba53-5a32ed47e563
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC
Bypass using fodhelper.exe, ... | [
"T1548.002",
"T1546.001"
] | [
"persistence",
"privilege-escalation"
] | high | test | [
"Unknown"
] | [
"https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME",
"https://winscripting.blog/2017/05/12/first-entry-welcome-and-uac-bypass/",
"https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/Aggressor-Scripts/tree/master/UACBypass",
"https://tria.ge/211119-gs7rtshcfr/behavioral2 [Lokibot sample from Nov 2021]"
] | (EventType="SetValue" TargetObject="*Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\SymbolicLinkValue" Details="*\\Software\\Classes\\{*") OR TargetObject="*Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute" OR (EventType="SetValue" TargetObject IN ("*Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\(Default)", "*Cla... | (EventType:SetValue AND TargetObject:*Classes\\ms\-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\SymbolicLinkValue AND Details:*\\Software\\Classes\\\{*) OR TargetObject:*Classes\\ms\-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute OR ((EventType:SetValue AND (TargetObject:(*Classes\\ms\-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\\(Default\) O... | DeviceRegistryEvents
| where (ActionType =~ "RegistryValueSet" and RegistryKey endswith "Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\SymbolicLinkValue" and RegistryValueData contains "\\Software\\Classes\\{") or RegistryKey endswith "Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command\\DelegateExecute" or ((ActionType =~ "Regis... | windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_shell_open_keys_manipulation.yml |
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